CRIMINAL LAW

- Is that branch or division of law which defines crimes, treats of their

nature, and provides for their punishment.
CRIME
- Is an act committed or omitted in violation of a public law forbidding
or commanding it.
SOURCES
- The Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815) and its amendments
- The Special Penal Laws passed by the Phil. Commission, Phil.
Assembly, Phil. Legislature, National Assembly, the Congress of the
Phil., and the Batasang Pambansa
- The Penal Presidential Decree issued during martial law
- Local Ordinances
No common law crimes in the Philippines, unless particularly stipulated in the
penal code or the special penal laws that defines and punishes an act, even if
it is morally or socially wrong, no criminal liability is incurred by its
commission. Nulla poena sine lege latin phrase for – no penalty without a law.

LIMITATIONS OF LAWMAKING BODY TO ENACT PENAL LEGISLATION:

1. No ex-post facto law shall be enacted
2. No bill of attainder shall be enacted
3. No person shall be held to answer a criminal offense without due
process of law

1. Ex-post facto law is one which:

- Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law, which
was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;
- Aggravates a crime and makes it greater than it was when
committed;
- Changes the punishments or inflicts greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when committed;
- Alters the rules of evidence and authorizes conviction for less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the crime;
- Assumes to regulate civil rights or remedies only, in effect imposes
penalty or deprivation of rights for something which when done was
lawful; and

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 - Deprives the person accused of the crime some lawful protection to
which he has become entitles, such as a protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or proclamation of amnesty.
2. Bill of attainder
- Is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial
3. Right of the accused of due process of law

CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIMINAL LAW

1. GENERAL – criminal law is binding to all persons who live or sojourn in
Philippine territory.

Persons exempt from the operation of our criminal laws by virtue

of the principles of public international law.

2. TERRITORIAL – criminal laws undertake to punish crimes committed

within Philippine Territory

3. PROSPECTIVE – a penal law cannot make an act punishable in a

manner in which it was not punishable when committed.
Exceptions to the prospective application of criminal laws:
Whenever a new statute dealing with crime establishes conditions more
lenient or favorable to the accused, it can be given a retroactive effect.
But this exception has no application:
1. Where the new law is expressly made inapplicable to pending actions
or existing causes of action. (Tavera vs. Valdez, 1 Phil. 463, 470-471)
2. Where the offender is a habitual criminal under Rule 5, Article 62,
Revised Penal Code. (Art. 22, RPC)

Different effects of repeal of penal law:

1. If the repeal makes the penalty lighter in the new law, the new law
shall be applied, except when the offender is a habitual delinquent or
when the new law is made not applicable to pending action or
existing causes of action.
2. If the new law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in force at the time
of the commission of the offense shall be applied.
3. If the new law totally repeals the existing law so that the act which
was penalized under the old law is no longer punishable, the crime is
obliterated (DESTROYED/REMOVED)

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CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL LAWS
1. Penal laws are strictly construed against the Government and
liberally in favor of the accused.

- If only the law is ambiguous or susceptible to two interpretations, one

favourable to the accused and the other against him, that
interpretation favourable to him shall prevail.

2. Doctrine of equipoise – when the evidence of the prosecution and of

the defense is equally balanced, the scale should be tilted in favour of
the accused in the obedience to the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
3. Void for vagueness doctrine – expresses the rule that for an act to
constitute a crime, the law must expressly and clearly declare such act
as a crime (Romualdez vs COMELEC and Garay)
4. Doctrine of Pro-Reo when a circumstance is susceptible to two
interpretations, one favourable to the accused and the other against
him, that interpretation favourable to him shall prevail.

THE REVISED PENAL CODE

ART 1. Time when Act takes effect. – This Code shall take effect on the
first day of January nineteen hundred and thirty-two.
History:
Before the Revised Penal Code was the Old Penal Law
Before the Old Penal Law was the Spanish Codigo Penal
There are two important theories in criminal law:
1. Classical/jurist – man is essentially a moral creature with absolute free
will to choose between good and evil, thereby placing stress upon the
effect or result of felonious act than upon the man, the criminal himself.

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 2. Positivist/realistic – that man is subdued occasionally by a strange and
morbid phenomenon which constrains him to do wrong, in spite of or
contrary to his volition.
3. Eclectic/mixed – philosophy is based on the combination of classical
and positivist theory.
ART 2. Application of its provisions. — Except as provided in the treaties
and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be
enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its
atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its
jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship;
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the
Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the
Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into
these Islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the
preceding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an
offense in the exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and
the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this
Code.
Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over offenses committed on foreign
warships in territorial waters.
Distinction should be made between a merchant ship and a warship. The
former is subjected to territorial laws.
The Philippine court has no jurisdiction on the crime of theft committed on high
seas on board a vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines. (US vs.
Fowler, 1 Phil. 614)
Crimes punishable in the Philippines under Article 2 are cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court in which the charge is filed. (Sec.44[g], Judiciary Act of
1948, R.A. No.296)
EXCEPTIONS OF APPLICATION (RPC)
• Treaties
• Laws of preferential application o
o RP-US Visiting Forces Accord
o Military Bases Agreement
o Diplomatic Immunity (R.A.75)
 Public International Law

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Continuing offense on board a foreign vessel:
Failing to provide stalls for animals in transit is within the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts once it reached the territorial waters (violation of Act No. 55)
even if when the ship sailed from foreign port. (U.S. vs. Bull, 15 Phil.7)

Rules as to the jurisdiction over crimes committed board foreign merchant

vessels:
 French Rule – such crimes are not triable in the courts of the country,
unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory or
the safety of the state is endangered.
 English Rule – such crimes are triable in that country, unless they
merely affect things within the vessel or they refer to the internal
management thereof. In the Philippines, we observe the English Rule

Crimes not involving breach of public order committed on board a foreign

merchant vessel in transit not triable by our courts.
Mere possession of opium in a foreign merchant vessel in transit not triable in
the Philippines
Possession of opium in a foreign merchant vessel not in transit (terminal port)
in the Philippines is an open violation of Philippine laws. (U.S. vs. Look Chaw,
18 Phil. 573, 577- 578)
Smoking of opium aboard English vessel while anchored 2 ½ miles in Manila
Bay constitutes a breach of public order. (People vs. Wong Cheng, 46 Phil.
729,733)

ART 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies

(delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by
means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the act is performed with
deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Felony – acts and omissions punishable by the Revised Penal Code.
Felony – violation of Revised Penal Code (dolo)
Offense – violation of Special Laws
Crime – violation of ordinary/public laws/laws other than the RPC

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 Infraction – violation of ordinance

Elements of felonies in general are:

1. That there must be an act or omission,
2. That the act or omission must be punishable by the Revised Penal
Code,
3. That the act performed or the omission incurred by means of dolo
or culpa.
Act – any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the external
world, it being unnecessary that the same be actually produced, as the
possibility of production is sufficient.
Omission – or inaction, refers to failure to perform a positive duty which one
is bound to do. There must be a law requiring the doing or performance of an
act.
nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege – no crime where there is no law
punishing it.
Because there is no law that punishes a person who does not report to
the authorities the commission of a crime which he witnessed, the
omission to do so is not a felony.
Classification of felonies:
1. Intentional felonies – committed by means of dolo or with malice.
There is deliberate intent and must be voluntary.

2. Culpable felonies – performed without malice or intent to cause evil.

Imprudence Negligence
 Deficiency of action -Deficiency of perception
 Lack of skill -Lack of foresight
 Lack of precaution -Failure to apply diligence

A person who caused an injury, without intention to cause an evil, may

be held liable for culpable felony.
A criminal act is presumed to be voluntary. Acts executed negligently
are voluntary.

3 Reasons why the act or omission of felonies must be voluntary:

1. Revised Penal Code is based on Classical Theory (basis of criminal
liability is human free will)

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 2. Act or omissions punished by law are always voluntary, since man is a
rational being.
3. Felonies by dolo must necessarily be voluntary; in felonies by culpa,
imprudence consists in voluntarily but without malice, resulting to
material injury.

Requisites of dolo or malice:

In order that an act or Omission may be considered as having been
performed or incurred with deliberate intent, the following requisites must
concur:
(1) He must have FREEDOM while doing an act or omitting to do an act;
(2) He must have INTELLIGENCE while doing the act or omitting to do the
act;
(3) He must have INTENT while doing the act or omitting to do the act.

Mistake of fact is a misapprehension of fact on the part of the person

who caused injury to another. He is not, however, criminally liable,
because he did not act with criminal intent.
An honest mistake of fact destroys the presumption of criminal intent which
arises upon the commission of a felonious act. (People 44 FELONIES Art. 3
vs. Coching, et al., C.A., 52 O.G. 293, citing People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257)
Requisites of mistake of fact as a defense: (LIF)
1. That the act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the
accused believed them to be.
2. That the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful.
3. That the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the
accused.
The mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the
accused.

In culpable felonies, the injury caused to another should be

unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed
without malice.
Lack of intent to kill the deceased, because his intention was to kill
another, does not relieve the accused from criminal responsibility
ART. 4 Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:

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1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means.
Rationale of rule in paragraph 1 of Article 4: (Criminal Liability of Felonies)
The rationale of the rule in Article 4 is found in the doctrine that "el que es
causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused). (People vs. Ural, No. L-30801, March
27, 1974, 56 SCRA 138, 144)
IMPORTANT WORDS AND PHRASES IN PARAGRAPH 1
1. "Committing a felony."
Paragraph 1 of Article 4 says that criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person "committing a felony," not merely performing an
act. A felony is an act or omission punishable by the Revised Penal
Code. If the act is not punishable by the Code, it is not a felony. But the
felony committed by the offender should be one committed by means of
dolo, that is, with malice, because paragraph 1 of Art. 4 speaks of
wrongful act done "different from that which he intended."

2. "Although the wrongful act done be different from that which he

intended."
The causes which may produce a result different from that which
the offender intended are: (1) mistake in the identity of the victim; (2)
mistake in the blow, that is, when the offender intending to do an injury
to one person actually inflicts it on another; and (3) the act exceeds the
intent, that is, the injurious result is greater than that intended.

Under paragraph 1, Art. 4, a person committing a felony is still criminally

liable even if —

a. There is a mistake in the identity of the victim — error in

personae. (See the case of People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257)

In a case, defendant went out of the house with the

intention of assaulting Dunca, but in the darkness of the evening,
defendant mistook Mapudul for Dunca and inflicted upon him a
mortal wound with a bolo. In this case, the defendant is criminally
liable for the death of Mapudul. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil. 605)

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1. People vs. Gona (54 Phil. 605)
Facts: On the evening of October 26, 1928, a number of Mamacas
celebrated a reunion in the house of the Mansaca Gabriel. There seems
to have been a liberal supply of alcoholic drinks and some of the men
present became intoxicated, with the result that a quarrel took place
between the Mamaca, Dunca and the defendant. Dunca and his son
Aguipo eventually left the house and were followed by Mapudul and one
Awad. The defendant left the house about the same time with intention
of assaulting Dunca, but in the darkness of the evening and in the
intoxicated condition of the defendant, he mistook Mapudul for Dunca
and inflicted on him a mortal wound with a bolo, that eventually cause
his death.
Issue: WON Gona can be held criminally liable for mistakenly killing Mr.
Mapudul instead of Mr. Dunca.
Held: Yes. The defendant is criminally liable for killing Mr. Mapudul
even with the fact that he made a mistake in killing the wrong man.
a. There is a mistake in the blow — aberratio ictus. (People vs.
Mabugat, 51 Phil. 967)

2. People vs. Mabugat (51 Phil. 967)

Facts: The accused and Juana Buralo were sweethearts. One day, the
accused invited Juana to take a walk with him, but the latter refused him
on account of the accused having frequently visited the house of
another woman. Later on, the accused went to the house of Cirilo
Bayan where Juana had gone to take part in some devotion. There the
accused, revolver in hand, waited until Juana and her niece, Perfecta,
came downstairs. When they went in the direction of their house, the
accused followed them. As the two girls were going upstairs, the
accused, while standing at the foot of the stairway, fired a shot from his
revolver at Juana but which wounded Perfecta, the slug passing
through a part of her neck, having entered the posterior region thereof
and coming out through the left eye. Perfecta did not die due to proper
medical attention.
Held: that the accused is guilty of frustrated murder, qualified by
treachery, committed on the person of Perfecta Buralo.
a. The injurious result is greater than that intended — praeter
intentionem. (People vs. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 524)

3. People vs. Cagoco (58 Phil 524)

Facts: On the night of July 24, 1932 Yu Lon and Yu Yee, father and
son, stopped to talk on the sidewalk at the corner of Mestizos and San
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 Fernando Streets in the District of San Nicolas. Yu Lon was standing
near the outer edge of the sidewalk, with his back to the street. While
they were talking, a man, which is the defendant, Francisco Cagoco,
passed back and forth behind Yu Lon once or twice, and when Yu Yee
was about to take leave of his father, the man that had been passing
back the forth behind Yu Lon approached him from behind and
suddenly and without warning struck him with his fist on the back part of
the head. Yu Lon tottered and fell backwards. His head struck the
asphalt pavement; the lower part of his body fell on the sidewalk which
caused his immediate death.

Issue: WON the defendant be convicted of murder when he did not

intend to kill the deceased?

Held: We have seen that under the circumstances of this case the
defendant is liable for the killing of Yu Lon, because his death was the
direct consequence of defendant's felonious act of striking him on the
head. If the defendant had not committed the assault in a treacherous
manner. he would nevertheless have been guilty of homicide, although
he did not intend to kill the deceased; and since the defendant did
commit the crime with treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the
presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Requisites of Paragraph 1 of Art. 4:
In order that a person may be held criminally liable for a felony different
from that which he intended to commit, the following requisites must be
present:
a. That an intentional felony has been committed; and
b. That the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural
and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender.

a. That a felony has been committed.

Thus, in the cases of U.S. vs. Villanueva and People vs. Bindoy,
supra, the accused were not held criminally liable, because they were
not committing a felony when they caused the injury to another.

No felony is committed (1) when the act or omission is not

punishable by the Revised Penal Code, or (2) when the act is
covered by any of the justifying circumstances enumerated in Art.
11.

4. People vs. Bindoy (56 Phil. 15)

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Facts: In a tuba wineshop in the barrio market, the accused offered
tuba to Pacas' wife; and as she refused to drink having already so, the
accused threatened to injure her if she would not accept. There ensued
an interchange of words between her and the accused, and Pacas
stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away from the accused
the bolo he carried. This occasioned a disturbance which attracted the
attention of Emigdio Omamdam who lived near the market. Emigdio left
his house to see what was happening, while the accused and Pacas
were struggling for the bolo. In the course of this struggle, the accused
succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from
the latter's hand towards the left behind the accused, with such violence
that the point of the bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's chest, who was
then behind the accused. The accused was not aware of Omamdam's
presence in the place.

Held: There is no evidence to show that the accused injured the

deceased deliberately and with the intention of committing a crime. He
was only defending his possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying
to wrench away from him, and his conduct was perfectly legal. The
accused should be acquitted.

Any person who creates in another's mind an immediate sense of

danger, which causes the latter to do something resulting in the
latter's injuries, is liable for the resulting injuries

5. People vs. Toling

FACTS: Antonio Toling and Jose Toling (both the accused) are
twins, both married, illiterate farmers and natives of Barrio Nenita Samar.
They decided to go to Manila to see their children. Leonora, Antonio’s
daughter, gave her father P50. Antonio's grandson gave him P30.
Antonio placed the eighty pesos in the right pocket of his pants. To go
back to home, they boarded the night Bicol express train at about five
o'clock in the afternoon. The train left at six o'clock that evening. The
twins were in coach No. 9. After a while, Antonio stood up and stabbed
the man sitting directly in front of him with scissors. Jose stabbed the
sleeping old woman sitting in front of him with a knife. The twins ran
amuck and started stabbing the people in the coach. They were finally
stopped when Constabulary soldiers aboard the train heard about the
incident. At that time, Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Rayel was not on
duty and was simply taking his wife child to Quezon. He was at the
dining car when the incident happened. Constabulary Sargeant Vicente
Aldea was in the dining car as well. The dead amounted to twelve. Eight
suffered from stab wounds while four others died after they jumped off
the train, apparently trying to escape the violence. Seven were injured,
though one of them was reported to have died as well.

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 ISSUE: Whether or not the twins are criminally liable for the four (4)
victims who jumped from the train.
HELD: No. They were only held liable as co-principals for eight (8)
separate murders and one attempted murder. No one testified that
those four victims jumped from the train. Had the necropsy reports been
reinforced by testimony showing that the proximate cause of their deaths
was the violent and murderous conduct of the twins, then the latter
would be criminally responsible for their deaths. The same observation
applies to the injuries suffered by the other victims. The charge of
multiple frustrated murder based on the injuries suffered by Cipriano
Pantoja, Dinna Nosal, Corazon Bernal and Brigida Sarmiento (Exh. D,
D-3 to D-5) was dismissed by the trial court for lack of evidence. Unlike
Mrs. Mapa, the offended parties involved did not testify on the injuries
inflicted on them.
b. Wrong done must be the direct, natural and logical consequence
of felonious act.
It is an established rule that a person is criminally responsible for acts
committed by him in violation of the law and for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting therefrom.
In the following cases, the wrong done is considered the direct, natural
and logical consequence of the felony committed, although
a. The victim who was threatened or chased by the accused with
a knife, jumped into the water and because of the strong
current or because he did not know how to swim he sank
down and died of drowning. (U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 497;
People vs. Buhay, 79 Phil. 372)

6. US vs. Valdez (41, Phil. 497)

FACTS: The deceased is a member of the crew of a vessel. Accused is

in charge of the crew members engaged in the loading of cargo in the
vessel. Because the offended party was slow in his work, the accused
shouted at him. The offended party replied that they would be better if
he would not insult them.

The accused resented this, and rising in rage, he moved towards the
victim, with a big knife in hand threatening to kill him. The victim
believing himself to be in immediate peril threw himself into the water.
The victim died of drowning. The accused was prosecuted for homicide.
His contention that his liability should be only for grave threats since he
did not even stab the victim, that the victim died of drowning, and this
can be considered as a supervening cause.

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HELD: The deceased, in throwing himself into the river, acted solely in
obedience to the instinct of self-preservation, and was in no sense
legally responsible for his own death. As to him, it was but the exercise
of a choice between two evils, and any reasonable person under the
same circumstance might have done the same.

This case illustrates that proximate cause does not require that the
offender needs to actually touch the body of the offended party.

It is enough that the offender generated in the mind of the offended

party an immediate sense of danger that made him place his life at risk.
In this case, the accused must, therefore, be considered the author of
the death of the victim.

"If a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of dander

which causes such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injuries
himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for
the injuries which result." (Reg. vs. Halliday, 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.], 701.)
b. The victim removed the drainage from the wound which
resulted in the development of peritonitis which in turn caused his
death, it appearing that the wound caused by the accused
produced extreme pain and restlessness which made the victim
remove it. (People vs. Quianson, 62 Phil. 162)

7. People vs. Quianson (62 Phil. 162)

Facts: The accused took hold of a fireband and applied it to the neck of
the person who was pestering him. The victim also received from the
hand of the accused a wound in his abdomen below the navel. While
undergoing medical treatment, the victim took out the drainage from his
wound and as a result of the peritonitis that developed, he died. The
accused claimed as a defense that had not the deceased taken out the
drainage, he would not have died.
Held: Death was the natural consequence of the mortal wound inflicted.
The victim, in removing the drainage from his wound, did not do so
voluntarily and with knowledge that it was prejudicial to his health. The
act of the victim (removing the drainage from his wound) was attributed
to his pathological condition and state of nervousness and restlessness
on account of physical pain caused by the wound, aggravated by the
contact of the drainage tube with the inflamed peritoneum.

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 a. Other causes cooperated in producing the fatal result, as long
as the wound inflicted is dangerous, that is, calculated to
destroy or endanger life. This is true even though the
immediate cause of the death was erroneous or unskillful
medical or surgical treatment. This rule surely seems to have
its foundation in a wise and practical policy. A different
doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take
away from human life a salutary and essential safeguard.
Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the
uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily ailments
and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of homicide to
raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and thereby
to open wide the door by which persons guilty of the highest
crime might escape conviction and punishment. (13 R.C.L.,
751, 752; 22 L.R.A., New Series, 841, cited in People vs.
Moldes, 61 Phil. 4)
The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting
injury.
Proximate cause is "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred." (Bataclan vs. Medina,
102 Phil. 181, 186, quoting 38 Am. Jur. 695)
The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury
when:
b. there is an active force that intervened between the felony
committed and the resulting injury, and the active force is a
distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of
the accused; or

c. the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.

8. Bataclan v. Medina
[G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957]

Facts: At about 2:00am of September 13, 1952, the bus, operated by its
owner defendant Mariano Medina and driven by its regular chauffeur,
Conrado Saylon, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite. While on its way to
Pasay City, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag
until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned
turtle.

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Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus but the three
passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the
Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could
not get out of the overturned bus. No evidence to show that the freed
passengers, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to
pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the
vehicle.
After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted
torch, approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire
started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four
passengers trapped inside it.
Issue: W/N the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the
overturning of the bus or the fire that burned the bus, including the 4
passengers left inside.
Held: The Court held that the proximate cause was the overturning of the
bus because when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on
its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or
unexpected.
The coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call
for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the
driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark
(about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them,
and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights
were not available.

The driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary
precautions to insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the
tires, specially those in front, with new ones, as he had been instructed
to do, probably, despite his speeding, the blow out would not have
occurred.
Ratio: Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
Comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
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 moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.
When death is presumed to be the natural consequence of physical
injuries inflicted
The death of the victim is presumed to be the natural consequence of
the physical injuries inflicted, when the following facts are established:
1. That the victim at the time the physical injuries were inflicted was in
normal health.
2. That death may be expected from the physical injuries inflicted.
3. That death ensued within a reasonable time. (People vs. Datu
Baginda, C.A., 44 O.G. 2287)
Not direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed.
If the consequences produced have resulted from a distinct act or fact
absolutely foreign from the criminal act, the offender is not responsible for
such consequences. (People vs. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038)
The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury
when —
1. There is an active force that intervened between the felony committed
and the resulting injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact
absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or
2. The resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.

Impossible crimes
The commission of an impossible crime is indicative of criminal
propensity or criminal tendency on the part of the actor. Such person is a
potential criminal. According to positivist thinking, the community must be
protected from anti-social activities, whether actual or potential, of the morbid
type of man called "socially dangerous person."
Requisites of impossible crime:
1. That the act performed would be an offense against persons or
property.
2. That the act was done with evil intent.
3. That its accomplishment is inherently impossible, or that the means
employed is either inadequate or ineffectual.
4. That the act performed should not constitute a violation of another
provision of the Revised Penal Code.
IMPORTANT WORDS AND PHRASES IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF ART. 4

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1. "Performing an act which would be an offense against persons or
property."

In committing an impossible crime, the offender intends to commit

a felony against persons or a felony against property, and the act
performed would have been an offense against persons or property. But
a felony against persons or property should not be actually committed,
for, otherwise, he would be liable for that felony. There would be no
impossible crime to speak of.
Felonies against persons are:
a. Parricide (Art. 246)
b. Murder (Art. 248)
c. Homicide (Art. 249)
d. Infanticide (Art. 255)
e. Abortion (Arts. 256, 257, 258 and 259)
f. Duel (Arts. 260 and 261)
g. Physical injuries (Arts. 262, 263, 264, 265 and 266)
h. Rape (Art. 266-A)

Felonies against property are:

a. Robbery (Arts. 294, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302 and 303)
b. Brigandage (Arts. 306 and 307)
c. Theft (Arts. 308, 310 and 311)
d. Usurpation (Arts. 312 and 313)
e. Culpable insolvency (Art. 314)
f. Swindling and other deceits (Arts. 315, 316, 317 and 318)
g. Chattel mortgage (Art. 319)
h. Arson and other crimes involving destruction (Arts. 320, 321,
322, 323, 324, 325 and 326)
i. Malicious mischief (Arts. 327, 328, 329, 330 and 331)

If the act performed would be an offense other than a

felony against persons or against property, there is no impossible
crime.
2. "Were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means."

In impossible crime, the act performed by the offender cannot

produce an offense against persons or property, because: (1) the
commission of the offense (against persons or against property) is
inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is
either (a) inadequate; or (b) ineffectual.

a. "Inherent impossibility of its accomplishment." This phrase

means that the act intended by the offender is by its nature

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 one of impossible accomplishment. (See Art. 59, Revised
Penal Code)
There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2)
physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act.

b. "Employment of inadequate" means.

Example: A, determined to poison B, uses a small quantity of

arsenic by mixing it with the food given to B, believing that the
quantity employed by him is sufficient. But since in fact it is not
sufficient, B is not killed. The means employed (small quantity
of poison) is inadequate to kill a person.

c. Employment of "ineffectual means."

A tried to kill B by putting in his soup a substance which he

thought was arsenic when in fact it was sugar. B could not
have been killed, because the means employed was
ineffectual. But A showed criminal tendency and, hence, he
should be punished for it in accordance with Art. 4, par. 2, in
relation to Art. 59.
Purpose of the law in punishing the impossible crime: to suppress
criminal propensity or criminal tendencies. Objectively, the offender has not
committed a felony, but subjectively, he is a criminal.
Art. 5 Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be
repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of
excessive penalties. — Whenever a court has knowledge of any act
which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by
law, it shall render the proper decision and shall report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce
the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal
legislation.
In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through
the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper,
without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the
degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.

"In connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered
by the law." The 1st paragraph of this article which contemplates a trial of a
criminal case requires the following:
1. The act committed by the accused appears not punishable by any law;

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 2. But the court deems it proper to repress such act;
3. In that case, the court must render the proper decision by dismissing
the case and acquitting the accused;
4. The judge must then make a report to the Chief Executive, through the
Secretary of Justice, stating the reasons which induce him to believe
that the said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
The provision contained in paragraph 1 of Art. 5 is based on the legal maxim
"nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege," that is, that there is no crime if there is
no law that punishes the act.
"In cases of excessive penalties." The 2nd paragraph of Art. 5 requires that —
1. The court after trial finds the accused guilty;
2. The penalty provided by law and which the court imposes for the crime
committed appears to be clearly excessive, because —
a. the accused acted with lesser degree of malice, and/ or;
b. there is no injury or the injury caused is of lesser gravity.
3. The court should not suspend the execution of the sentence.
4. The judge should submit a statement to the Chief Executive, through
the Secretary of Justice, recommending executive clemency.

Example of the accused acting with lesser degree of malice:

9. People vs. Monleon (74 SCRA 263)

FACTS: On June 1, 1970, Cosme Monleon in his inebriated state

asked whether the carabao was already fed. To check the veracity of
the statement, he went to see the carabao. He discovered that the
carabao had not been adequately fed. He was about to hit Marciano,
his 10 year old son, when Concordia, his wife, intervened. Monleon
choked her, bashed her head against the post, and kicked her
abdomen. Concordia died the following day due to trauma or
external violence.

ISSUE: WON the accused is criminally liable although he had no

intention to kill his wife.

HELD: Yes. Art 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal
liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the
wrongful act don be different than that which he intended to do. The
maltreatment inflicted by the accused on his wife was the proximate
cause of her death. He could have easily killed his wife had he really
intended to take her life. He did not kill her outright. The accused
was found guilty of parricide sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.

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 Executive clemency recommended for the wife who killed her cruel
husband.
10. People vs. Canja (74 SCRA 263)
FACTS: Mrs. Canja the defendant was a battered wife by her deceased
husband, who has a mistress, a gambler and a habitual drunkard. The
defendant confessed that, on the day that she killed her husband, her
husband comes home drunk, forthwith laid hands on her, striking her on
the stomach until she fainted, and when she recovered consciousness
and asked for the reason for the unprovoked attack, he threatened to
renew the beating. At the supper table instead of eating the meal set
before him, he threw the rice from his plate, thus adding insult to injury.
Then he left the house and when he returned he again boxed his wife,
the herein appellant. The violence with which appellant killed her
husband reveals the pent-up righteous anger and rebellion against
years of abuse, insult, and tyranny seldom heard of.
Considering all these circumstances and provocations including the fact
as already stated that her conviction was based on her own confession,
the appellant is deserving of executive clemency, not of full pardon but
of a substantial if not a radical reduction or commutation of her life
sentence, as stated on the concurring opinion of Montemayor, J.
"When a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code." The
second paragraph of Art. 5 of the Revised Penal Code has no
application to the offense defined and penalized by a special law.
(People vs. Salazar, 102 Phil. 1184)
The reason for this ruling is that second paragraph of Art. 5
specifically mentions "the provisions of this Code." Art. 5 of the Revised
Penal Code may not be invoked in cases involving acts mala prohibita,
because said article applies only to acts mala in se, or crimes
committed with malice or criminal intent. (People vs. Quebral, C.A., 58
O.G. 7399) The ruling is based on the phrase, "taking into consideration
the degree of malice."

Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. —

Consummated felonies, as well as those which are frustrated and
attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the
offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the

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felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
Development of crime:
From the moment the culprit conceives the idea of committing a crime up to
the realization of the same, his act passes through certain stages.
These stages are: (1) internal acts; and (2) external acts.
1. Internal acts, such as mere ideas in the mind of a person, are
not punishable even if, had they been carried out, they would
constitute a crime.

2. External acts cover (a) preparatory acts; and (b) acts of

execution.
a. Preparatory acts — ordinarily they are not punishable.
b. Acts of execution — they are punishable under the
Revised Penal Code.
Attempted felony:
There is an attempt when the offender begins the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts. He has not performed all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony.
Elements of attempted felony:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly
by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony;
3. The offender's act is not stopped by his own spontaneous
desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to
cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance.
IMPORTANT WORDS AND PHRASES IN ART. 6
1. "Commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts."

When is the commission of a felony deemed commenced directly by

overt acts? When the following two requisites are present:

1. That there be external acts;

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 2. Such external acts have direct connection with the crime
intended to be committed.
An “overt act” is some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning
or preparation, which if carried to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
Drawing or trying to draw a pistol is not an overt act of homicide.
1. People vs. Tabago, et al, (C.A. 48 O.G. 3419)
Facts: While Tabago was talking with the Chief of Police, he made a
motion to draw his pistol, but the latter embraced him and prevented
him from drawing his pistol. Tabago then told his two companions to fire
at the Chief of Police, but they could not do so, because the Chief of
Police was embracing Tabago. One of his companions, Avelino Valle,
fired a shot but the same was not aimed at anybody.
Issue: WON the accused can be convicted of the crime of attempted
homicide.
Held: The action of the accused in placing his hand on his revolver,
which was then on his waist, is indeed very equivocal and susceptible of
different interpretations. For example, it cannot be definitely concluded
that the attempt of the accused to draw out his revolver would have, if
allowed to develop or be carried to its complete termination following its
natural course, logically and necessarily ripened into a concrete
offense, because it is entirely possible that at any time during the
subjective stage of the felony, the accused could have voluntarily
desisted from performing all the acts of execution and which, had it
happened, would completely exempt him from criminal responsibility for
the offense he intended to commit.
To constitute attempted homicide the person using a firearm must fire
the same, with intent to kill, at the offended party, without however
inflicting a mortal wound on the latter.
The external acts must have a direct connection with the crime
intended to be committed by the offender.
2. People vs. Lamahang (61 Phil. 703)
FACTS: March 2, 1935 – policeman Jose Tomambing, who was
patrolling, caught Lamahang in the act of making an opening with an
iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods. At that time, Tan Yu
(store owner) was sleeping inside with another China man. The

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accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening
another from the wall when the policeman showed up, who instantly
arrested him and placed him under custody.
ISSUE: Did the Trial Court err in their decision, finding Lamahang guilty
of attempted robbery?
HELD: No, the Supreme Court held that Lamahang is guilty of
attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force.
For overt acts to constitute an attempted offense, it is necessary that
their objective be known and established, or that said acts be of such
nature that they themselves should disclose the criminal objective
necessarily intended. The said objective and finality should serve as
ground for the designation of the offense.
The Court held that the facts do not constitute an attempted robbery but
attempted trespass to dwelling. This is an offense committed when a
private person shall enter the dwelling of another against the latter’s will.
What is an indeterminate offense? It is one where the purpose of
the offender in performing an act is not certain. Its nature in
relation to its objective is ambiguous.
In the case of People vs. Lamahang, supra, the final objective of the
offender, once he succeeded in entering the store, may be to rob, to
cause physical injury to the inmates, or to commit any other offense. In
such a case, there is no justification in finding the offender guilty of
attempted robbery by the use of force upon things.
Acts susceptible of double interpretation, that is, in favor as well as
against the accused, and which show an innocent as well as a
punishable act, must not and cannot furnish grounds by themselves for
attempted crime.
3. Araneta, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 43527, July 3, 1990, 187 SCRA 123, 126, 133-134
Facts: At about a little past midnight of March 22, 1972, while the victim
Manuel Esteban, Jr. and his companions were having a drinking spree
at the mezzanine floor of the Sands Kitchenette, Rizal Avenue, Manila,
a napkin container was thrown to their table coming from a group of
three or four persons, which included the petitioners. The victim
approached the group of petitioner Araneta, Jr. after which a heated
argument ensued. Petitioner Bautista pushed the left shoulder of the
victim causing the latter to spin at which time, petitioner Araneta, Jr.
fired his gun with his left hand (his right hand is atrophied), hitting the
victim, who was then in a stooping position, at the back. Having been

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 shot, the victim drew his gun and fired indiscriminately hitting Manuel de
Guzman, a companion of petitioner Araneta, Jr. on his left thigh. The
bullet which wounded De Guzman hit the wall and ricocheted, hitting
one of the accused Eden Ng along his umbilical cord. Petitioner
Bautista then held the victim who was bent forward, on his right wrist
and poked a gun at him. At this point, petitioner Bautista suddenly fired
his gun hitting the chest of the victim. Roque and Saguil together with a
bouncer from a nearby Soda Fountain brought the victim to the Jose
Reyes Memorial Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Issue: Should an accused who admittedly shot the victim but is shown
to have inflicted only a slight wound be held accountable for the death
of the victim due to a fatal wound caused by his co-accused?
Held: The slight wound did not cause the death of the victim nor
materially contribute to it. His liability should therefore be limited to the
slight injury he caused. However, the fact that he inflicted a gunshot
wound on the victim shows the intent to kill. The use of a gun fired at
another certainly leads to no other conclusion than that there is intent to
kill. He is therefore liable for the crime of attempted homicide and not
merely for slight physical injury.
Definition of subjective phase of the offense:
It is that portion of the acts constituting the crime, starting from the point
where the offender begins the commission of the crime to that point
where he has still control over his acts, including their (acts') natural
course. If between these two points the offender is stopped by any
cause outside of his voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not
been passed and it is an attempt. If he is not so stopped but continues
until he performs the last act, it is frustrated, provided the crime is not
produced. The acts then of the offender reached the objective phase of
the crime.
Frustrated felony:
Elements:
1. The offender performs all the acts of execution;
2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a
consequence;
3. But the felony is not produced;
4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
IMPORTANT WORDS AND PHRASES
1. "Performs all the acts of execution."

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 In frustrated felony, the offender must perform all the acts of execution.
Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has
performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. This element
distinguishes frustrated felony from attempted felony. In attempted
felony, the offender does not perform all the acts of execution. He does
not perform the last act necessary to produce the crime. He merely
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts.

4. U.S. vs. Eduave (36 Phil. 209)

FACTS: Defendant Protasio Eduave is the querido of the victim’s
mother. Eduave attacked the victim from behind using a bolo creating a
gash 8 1/2 inches long and 2 inches deep because the latter accused
defendant of having commiting rape against said victim. Upon thinking
that he has already killed the victim, he threw the body into the bushes
and left.
ISSUE: What is the crime committed by Eduave?
HELD: Accused is guilty of frustrated murder. The fact that Eduave
attacked the victim from behind, in a vital portion of the body, shows
treachery qualifying it as murder. The crime was not consummated
because the elements of the crime’s execution and accomplishment
were not complete as the victim did not die. Neither was the crime an
attempted one because the accused’s actions has already passed the
subjective phase, that is, there was no external force preventing
defendant from performing all the acts of execution necessary to
commit the felony. Consequently, the victim did not die because an
external element has prevented such death after Eduave has performed
all the necessary acts of execution that would have caused the death of
the victim.
In the following case, the stage of execution was held to be frustrated,
because the wound inflicted was mortal:
5. People vs. Honrada (62 Phil. 112)
FACTS: Gregorio Estandarte was walking along the road in the
municipality of General Trias about four o'clock in the afternoon of July
1, 1934 he was suddenly and without warning stabbed twice in the
back, and when he looked around he saw the defendant with a long fan
knife in his hand. The defendant, Marcelo Honrada, then renewed the
attack, and Estandarte tried to defend himself with the riding whip he
was carrying, but the defendant succeeded in stabbing him in the
abdomen, The offended party fell on his back in a ditch beside the road,
The defendant continued the attack and stabbed the offended party in
the chest and under the breastbone.

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 The assault took place near the house of Candido Rosari; and Maxima
Ballecer, who was going to the house of Rosari and saw the defendant
attack the offended party, shouted for help. Pedro Ballecer took the
wounded man to the poblacíón, where he was given first aid. He was
then taken to the Philippine General Hospital he was promptly operated
upon, and was able to leave the hospital at the end of three weeks.
ISSUE: WON the defendant committed a frustrated murder
HELD: The defendant’s attack was treacherous when he attacked the
offended party from behind. The number and seriousness of the
wounds, especially the one in the abdomen that penetrated the liver,
show that it was the intention of the defendant to kill the offended party.
It was only the prompt and skilful medical treatment which the offended
party received that saved his life. The offense committed by the
defendant was therefore frustrated murder.
2. "Would produce the felony as a consequence."

All the acts of execution performed by the offender could have produced
the felony as a consequence.
In the following case, the stage of execution was held to be attempted,
because there was no wound inflicted or the wound inflicted was not
mortal.
6. People vs. Kalalo, et al. (59 Phil. 715)

FACTS: The appellant Marcelo Kalalo and the deceased’s sister,

Isabela Holgado, had litigation over a parcel of land in a barrio. The
appellant cultivated the land in question during the agricultural years
1931 and 1932 but when harvest time came, Isabela Holgado reaped all
that had been planted thereon. One day, the defendants went to the
said land where some workers are plowing at the instruction of Isabela.
Marcelo told the workers to stop their jobs but Marcelino Panaligan, the
deceased’s cousin, ordered the laborers to continue their work. At this
juncture, the defendants slashed Arcadio Holgado, Marcelino Panaligan
and shot Hilarion Holgado with Marcelino’s revolver (after getting the
said firearm once Marcelino was dead). The first two died instantly while
Hilarion managed to dodge the shots.

ISSUE: WON the defendant committed a frustrated murder having

failed to kill Hilarion.

HELD: Not having hit the offended party, either because of his poor aim
or because his intended victim succeeded in dodging the shots, the
accused failed to perform all the acts of execution by reason of a cause

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 other than his spontaneous desistance. The trial court charged the
appellant with two accounts of murder and one frustrated murder.

3. "Do not produce it."

In frustrated felony, the acts performed by the offender do not produce

the felony, because if the felony is produced it would be consummated.

4. "Independent of the will of the perpetrator."

Even if all the acts of execution have been performed, the crime may
not be consummated, because certain causes may prevent its
consummation. These certain causes may be the intervention of third
persons who prevented the consummation of the offense or may be due
to the perpetrator's own will.
Frustrated felony distinguished from attempted felony:
1. In both, the offender has not accomplished his criminal purpose.
2. While in frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence, in
attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of
execution.

In other words, in frustrated felony, the offender has reached the

objective phase; in attempted felony, the offender has not passed the
subjective phase.
Attempted or frustrated felony distinguished from impossible crime:
1. In attempted or frustrated felony and impossible crime, the evil intent of
the offender is not accomplished.
2. But while in impossible crime, the evil intent of the offender cannot be
accomplished, in attempted or frustrated felony the evil intent of the
offender is possible of accomplishment.
3. In impossible crime, the evil intent of the offender cannot be
accomplished because it is inherently impossible of accomplishment or
because the means employed by the offender is inadequate or
ineffectual; in attempted or frustrated felony, what prevented its
accomplishment is the intervention of certain cause or accident in which
the offender had no part.
Consummated felony
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution
and accomplishment are present.

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Every crime has its own elements which must all be present to constitute a
culpable violation of a precept of law.
Theft:
7. People vs. Espiritu, et al., (CA-G.R. No. 2107-R, May 31, 1949)
Facts: In the Supply Depot at Quezon City, the accused removed from
the pile nine pieces of hospital linen and took them to their truck where
they were found by a corporal of the MP guards when they tried to pass
through the check point.
Issue: WON the crime committed was consummated theft.
Held: the crime of theft was consummated because the thieves were
able to take or get hold of the hospital linen and that the only thing that
was frustrated, which does not constitute any element of theft, is the
use or benefit that the thieves expected to derive from the commission
of the offense.
Frustrated Theft:
8. People vs. Flores (62 O.G. 2644)
[The Court] cannot agree in the appellee's contention that the crime was
consummated. The "traditional ruling" cited by the appellee is qualified
by the phrase "is placed in a situation where he could dispose of its
contents at once." Obviously, while the truck and the van were still
within the compound, the appellant could not have disposed of the
goods "at once." This is entirely different from the case where a much
less bulky and more common thing as money was the object of the
crime, where freedom to dispose or make use of it is palpably less
restricted.
Consummated Theft:
9. Valenzuela vs. People, et al,
(G.R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007)
FACTS: Petitioner was seen outside the Super Sale Club within the SM
Complex by security guard, Lorenzo Lago. Petitioner was seen
unloading cased of Tide detergent with an accomplice. Valenzuela then
hailed a taxi, loaded the detergent inside and boarded the same. Lago
proceeded to stop the taxi and asked for the receipt of the merchandise.
Petitioner and accomplice was about to flee when Largo fired a warning
shot to alert his fellow security guards. Valenzuela and accomplice were
then apprehended at the scene. The trial convicted the two with
consummated theft. Only Valenzuela appealed to the CA asserting that
he should only be convicted of frustrated theft. CA affirmed decision of
the trial court hence the present petition.
Page 28 of 32
 HELD: Valenzuela invoked the Diño and Flores cases. In both cases,
the accused were convicted of frustrated theft, of which it was held “the
fact determinative of consummation is the ability of the thief to dispose
freely of the articles stolen, even if it were more or less momentary.
Under Article 308 of the RPC, “Theft is committed by any person who,
with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons
not force upon things, shall take personal property of another without
the latter’s consent. Reading the Diño and Flores cases, the ability of
the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive
element of the crime of theft defined under Article 308 of the RPC. In
the present case, for the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is
susceptible of commission in the frustrated stage, the question is, when
is the crime of theft produced? Theft is produced when there is the
deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to
gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the
felony that the offender, once having committed all acts of execution for
theft, is able to unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the
deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of
execution. Unlawful taking is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing even if he has no opportunity to
dispose of the same. Hence, theft cannot have a frustrated stage; it
can only be consummated or attempted.
Frustrated Robbery:
10. People vs. Del Rosario (C.A., 46 O.G. 4332)
Mere removal of personal property, not sufficient to consummate the
crime of robbery by the use of force upon things. The culprits, after
breaking the floor of the bodega through which they entered the same,
removed a sack of sugar from the pile; but were caught in the act of
taking it out through the opening on the floor.
In robbery by the use of force upon things (Arts. 299 and 302), since the
offender must enter the building to commit the crime, he must be able to carry
out of the building the thing taken to consummate the crime.
In robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons (Art. 294), the crime
is consummated the moment the offender gets hold of the thing taken and I or
is in a position to dispose of it freely.
Physical Injury instead of Attempted Murder:
11. Pentecostes vs. People, 617 SCRA 507

Facts: On September 2, 1998, Rudy Baclig was drinking with his

brother-in-law. After consuming ½ bottle of gin, he left and went to the
house of a certain Siababa to buy coffee and sugar. He was

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 accompanied by his four- year-old son. On their way there, a gray
automobile coming from the opposite direction passed by them. After a
while, he noticed that the vehicle was moving backward towards them.
When the car was about two arms’ length from where they were, it
stopped and he heard the driver of the vehicle call him by his
nickname Parrod. Rudy came closer, but after taking one step, the
driver, which he identified as the petitioner, opened the door and while
still in the car drew a gun and shot him once, hitting him just below the
left armpit. Rudy immediately ran at the back of the car, while petitioner
sped away. After petitioner left, Rudy and his son headed to the
seashore. Rudy later went back to the place where he was shot and
shouted for help. The people who assisted him initially brought him to
the Municipal Hall of Gonzaga, Cagayan, where he was interrogated by
a policeman who asked him to identify his assailant. He informed the
policeman that petitioner was the one who shot him. After he was
interrogated, he was later brought to the Don Alfonso Ponce Memorial
Hospital at Gonzaga, Cagayan. The following day, he was discharged
from the hospital.

Issue: WON the petitioner committed an attempted murder.

Held: Petitioner only shot the victim once and did not hit any vital part of
the latter’s body. If he intended to kill him, petitioner could have
shot the victim multiple times or even ran him over with the car.
Favorably to petitioner, the inference that intent to kill existed should not
be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact
beyond reasonable doubt. When such intent is lacking but wounds are
inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not attempted murder but physical
injuries only.

Consummated Rape:

12. People vs. Orita (184 SCRA 105)

Facts: Ceilito Orita was accused of frustrated rape by the RTC. He

appealed to the Court of Appeals for review. The accused poke a
“balisong” to college freshman Cristina Abayan as soon as she got into
her boarding house early morning after arriving from a party. She knew
him as a frequent visitor of another boarder. She was dragged inside
the house up the stairs while his left arm wrapped around her neck, and
his right hand poking the Batangas knife to her neck. Upon entering her
room, he pushed her in and got her head hit on the wall. He
immediately undressed while still holding the knife with one hand, and
ordered her to do the same. He ordered her to lie down on the floor and

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 then mounted her. He asked her to hold his penis and insert it in her
vagina, while still poking the knife to her. She followed, but the appellant
could not fully penetrate her in such a position. Next, he laid down on
his back and commanded her to mount him, but he cannot fully
penetrate her. When Orita’s hands were both flat on the floor,
complainant escaped naked. She ran from room to room as appellant
pursued her, and finally jumped out through a window. She went to the
municipal building nearby and knocked on the back door for there was
no answer. When the door opened, the policemen inside the building
saw her crying and naked. She was given a jacket for covering by the
first policeman who saw her. The policemen dashed to her boarding
house but failed to apprehend the accused. She was brought to a
hospital for physical examination. Her PE revealed that she is still a
virgin, with abrasions on the left breast, left and right knees, and
multiple pinpoint marks on her back, among others. The trial court
convicted the accused of frustrated rape.

Issue: Whether or not the frustrated stage applies to the crime of rape?
Ruling: No.
Ratio Decidendi: Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the
offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually attains his
purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the
offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the
offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce
the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated.

Attempted Rape:

13. Tibong vs. People

GR No. 191000 – September 15, 2010

FACTS: AAA, 18 year old and a student of Benguet State U, was at the
house of the petitioner where where was boarding. One of the rooms
was occupied by petitioner and his wife. Days before the incident,
petitioner’s wife left the house after a misunderstanding with him.
Sometime on April 2006 before midnight, AAA was awakened when she
felt that someone was undressing her. She then saw her cousin wearing
only briefs and crouching over her on top of bed and pulling down her
pajamas and panties. Since AAA struggled and resisted, petitioner went
towards the compact disc player to watch bold movies. Finding

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 opportunity to escape, she grabbed her cellphone and bag and ran out
of the house. The following day, AAA, accompanied by her uncle,
reported the incident to the authorities.

Petitioner contention:

“Act of lying on top, embracing and kissing, mashing her breast,

inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her sexual organ do
not constitute attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner
actually commenced to force his penis into the complainant’s sexual
organ. Rather, these acts constitute acts of lasciviousness.1

ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of attempted rape.

HELD: YES! While rape and acts of lasciviousness have the same
nature, they are fundamentally different. For in rape, there is the intent
to lie with a woman, whereas in acts of lasciviousness, this element if
absent. Attempted felony: When the offender commences the
commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

During the defense’s cross examination of AAA, the existence of

petitioner’s overt acts showed his intent to lie with AAA was put to light.

Petitioner’s acts, as narrated by AAA, far from being mere obscene or

lewd, indisputably show that he intended to have, and was bent on
consummating, carnal knowledge of AAA.

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