What evidentiary value do confessions before a police officer hold?

Confession before the police could be proved against accused but it could be used by accused in his
favour. (DB) PLD 1974 Kar. 91 Ghulam Hussain. Principle of Section 32 of Evidence Act is that when a
person makes a statement rendering him liable to criminal prosecution, the statement is likely to be true.

What is the procedure for recording confession?

P.C provides that the confessions shall be recorded in immediate presence of a Judicial Magistrate of First
Class or Second Class especially empowered by the Government. There are certain checks and balances
that the confession is made voluntary and without any undue influence, coercion, promise, threat etc.

Which form of confession are done by forcing the accused to confess?

Forced confession

A forced or coerced confession is a confession obtained from a suspect or a prisoner by means of

pressure, torture (including enhanced interrogation techniques) or other forms of duress, whether
physical or psychological.

Confession is not clearly defines in QSO but the gist of related Articles of QSO from 37- 45 is that:
“Confession is a statement made by a guilty person voluntarily and without any undue influence in front
of a person who have authority to take it.

2. The fact must have been discovered in consequence of some information received from the
accused.3. The fact discovered must be relevant.4. The person from whom information is received
must not only be an accused but must also be in the custody of the police.5. The information sought
to be used in evidence must distinctly relate to the fact discovered.If upon the information of the
accused, crime weapon is discovered while he is in police custody,his confession is supposed to be
true.Where police already knows the happening of the crime, then the information provided by the
accused are not called confession.S. 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure applies on this type of
confession. It must be recorded before Magistrate. Magistrate shall explain to person that he is not
bound to confess and his confession may go against him. His confession must be voluntary. Magistrate
certifies the confession as provided in this section and puts his signature.Confession before Imam is
admissible because he is public person and not a policeman thus relevant to prove the guilt of accused.
Confession before a policeman who acts as Imam is not confession at all because law categorically
prohibits it.Principles relating to recording of confession:There are some formalities to be followed by
authoritative person to record it (generally Magistrate)

a) It should be recorded at earlier stage.b) The first act when accused agree to record confessional
statement handcuff should be removed at first.c) The police officials present inside the Court room
are to be sent out from the Court roomd) The Magistrate has to explain to the accused that he is
appearing before a Magistrate.e) It is known by the accused that statement may be used against himf)
It has to be asked to accuse whether he is induced by police or not for such statementg) The accused
to give sufficient time to ponder over the matterh) The accused may be asked it again that whether he
really willing to give such statementi) The accused should be remanded to judicial custodyj)
Statement should not be recorded on oath.Confession recorded on oath irrelevant and inadmissible [PLD
1966 S.C.420]k) After recording of confessional statement of the accused it is required to record some
prosecution evidence in corroboration of the confession.When the accused had refused to plead guilty at
the time of framing the charge and he wants to make a confessional statement but some corroborative
prosecution evidence must be recorded [1995 P.Cr. L. J. 159]

Confession to police officer and relevant confession in QSO 1984

Introduction
As earlier stated that in civil cases admissions were made in pleadings or during proceedings but in
criminal it can be made earlier but it is called confession rather than admission. A confession is
statements which either admits in terms the offence or at any rate substantially all the facts which
constitute the offence.

Confession in Qanoon-e-shahadat1984:
Confession is not clearly defines in QSO but the gist of related Articles of QSO from 37- 45 is that:
“Confession is a statement made by a guilty person voluntarily and without any undue influence in front
of a person who have authority to take it. It should not be includes any type of compromise, threats, any
promises, or any type of benefit given in exchange.”

Relevant Provision
Article 38 and 40 QSO 1984 Confession when admissible? Admissibility and relevancy of a confession
though basically question of law depends upon the facts of each case. Confession would be inadmissible
if its making appears to the Court have been caused by nay inducement threat or promise or is made
before the police officer or at the time when the accused was in the custody of the police. Police officer
as provided by Art. 37, 38, 39 of the QSO, 1984**. [2001MLD 1939]**
Determination of the question of admissibility or otherwise of the confession is left solely with the Court.
[2003 P. Cr. L 1212] Value of Confession in police custody Confession made while in police custody is not
admissible [2001 P.Cr.L 86] High Court Rules and Orders stated in its Volume II Chapter 13 stated that:
Statements or confession made in course of an investigation can be recorded only by a Magistrate of the
1st class or 2nd class who has been specially empowered by Provincial Government Death of confessor:
In case of death of confessor about himself that he is accomplice in a crime is not a substantive evidence
it will only be corroborative evidence.

Confession to police not to be proved Article 38

Police Officer is not authorized to take the statement of confession. If any accused confesses before
police officer, his confession shall not be used against accused. It is not material whether accused was
aware the person before he has made confession is police officer. This confession cannot be used against
accused. Also under Article 39, confession made by accused before Police Officer while custody cannot
be proved against him unless it is made in the immediate presence of Magistrate. The presence of

The fact must have been discovered in consequence of some information received from the accused.

The fact discovered must be relevant.

The person from whom information is received must not only be an accused but must also be in the
custody of the police.

The information sought to be used in evidence must distinctly relate to the fact discovered. If upon the
information of the accused, crime weapon is discovered while he is in police custody, his confession is
supposed to be true. Where police already knows the happening of the crime, then the information
provided by the accused are not called confession. S. 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure applies on this
type of confession. It must be recorded before Magistrate. Magistrate shall explain to person that he is
not bound to confess and his confession may go against him. His confession must be voluntary.
Magistrate certifies the confession as provided in this section and puts his signature. Confession before
Imam is admissible because he is public person and not a policeman thus relevant to prove the guilt of
accused. Confession before a policeman who acts as Imam is not confession at all because law
categorically prohibits it.

Principles relating to recording of confession:

There are some formalities to be followed by authoritative person to record it (generally Magistrate)

a) It should be recorded at earlier stage. b) The first act when accused agree to record confessional
statement handcuff should be removed at first. c) The police officials present inside the Court room are
to be sent out from the Court room d) The Magistrate has to explain to the accused that he is appearing
before a Magistrate. e) It is known by the accused that statement may be used against him f) It has to be
asked to accuse whether he is induced by police or not for such statement g) The accused to give
sufficient time to ponder over the matter h) The accused may be asked it again that whether he really
willing to give such statement i) The accused should be remanded to judicial custody j) Statement should
not be recorded on oath. Confession recorded on oath irrelevant and inadmissible [PLD 1966 S.C] k) After
recording of confessional statement of the accused it is required to record some prosecution evidence in
corroboration of the confession. When the accused had refused to plead guilty at the time of framing
the charge and he wants to make a confessional statement but some corroborative prosecution evidence
must be recorded [1995 P. L. J. 159]

Confession

The provisions of sections 164, 342 and 364 of the Criminal Procedure Code and articles 37 to 43 of
Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 deals with confession. Section 164 deals with the recording of confession
at any stage before the commencing of an enquiry or trial. Section 342 deals with the examination of
accused persons during the course of the enquiry or trial. Section 364 prescribes the manner in which
the examination of an accused person is to be recorded.

Confession is not defined in Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984 or even in Indian Evidence Act 1872. In a landmark
case Aghnoo Nagesia versus State of Bihar , the honorable judge observed that for a long time, the
Courts in India adopted the definition of confession given in Art. 22 of Stephen's

The articles of Qanun e Shahdat protects the voluntariness of confession. According to article 37 of
Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 confession caused by inducement, threat or promise is inadmissible
because that by making it the accused would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature
in reference to the proceedings against him. Therefore, threat or promise will affect the voluntariness
and unfairness so inadmissible in evidence. Similarly, article 38 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 says
that confession made to a police officer has no value as it also effects on voluntariness and unfairness of
confession. Thus, article 39 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 says that confession made by any person
whilst he is in the custody of a police officer is also inadmissible as it also effects the voluntariness and
unfairness of confession. Therefore article, 41 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 says that confession can
only be admissible if impression caused by inducement, threat or promise completely removed.

Professor Wigmore in his book stated that in history, Lord Mansfield in Rudd's Case in 1775 expressed
first judicial understanding that limited the admissibility of confession. He gave his views on confession
under assurance of pardon. He stated that the confessions made under threats or promises use against
persons who made them on their trial. However, in 1783, in

Appellant A was on the driver seat while appellant M was sitting adjacent to him on the front seat
whereas Magistrate discharged rest of three co-accused who were students. The car was searched and
from beneath of the seats of the car, 17 bags of charas were recovered. The weight of the charas was
18,500/- grams. Further, the samples of charas were sent for laboratory test.

The appellant M made his confession to the judicial magistrate. The confession of M is exculpatory in
nature. In his confession, he admitted that the car in question was belonging to him, which appellant A
was driving. M further said that A suddenly change the route and he was told that this route was a short
cut and when they were stopped by the police, A appellant made an attempt to flee away but was
caught. He has further stated that the charas was recovered from beneath the driver seat.

The honorable judge observed that the last portion of the confession made by M was exculpatory in
nature. In addition, Court cannot rely upon confession of M because huge quantity of charas weighing
18500 grams was recovered. Moreover, three important witnesses had given evidence against the
appellants. Thus, the appeal was

Confession u/s 164 CRPC: Procedure and evidentiary value

Adv. Dilip Joshi has been working in the Criminal Side of Practice at Gujarat High Court and Sessions
Court at Bhuj, Anjar, Gandhidham and Bachau for more than 34 years. In this Article, he has focused on
the Confessional side of Section 164 CRPC.

Introduction
Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a provision by which confession and statement of the
witnesses are recorded. Sub Section (1) of the Section 164 CPC empowers any Metropolitan Magistrate
or Judicial Magistrate to record any confession or statement made to him during the course of an
investigation under this irrespective of the fact whether or not he has jurisdiction in the case at any time
afterwards before the commencement of the inquiry or trial. This provision also puts and embargo that
no confession shall be recorded by a police officer on whom any power of a Magistrate has been
conferred under any law for the time being in force.

Thus section 164 CRPC provides for two very important terms in criminal jurisprudence and the framing
of language for both these terms is very interesting and also important. This has also been interpreted by
the Supreme Court and various High Courts and the water under these provisions is almost settled.
These two terms are “Confession” and “Statement”.

Dealing with the first phase used under section 164 CRPC, we can say that Confession is the admission of
guilt, stating or suggesting an inference as to guilt by an accused made in custody. According to Justice
Stephen, a “confession”, is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime stating or
suggesting the inference that he committed that crime.

A declaration made by the accused confessing his guilt is known as a confession. As a result, the
statement won't constitute a confession if the maker does not implicate himself. Additionally, a mixed
statement that, while containing certain confessional statements, will nonetheless be accepted and
result in acquittal is not a confession. Therefore, a statement that contains false self-exculpatory
information that would render the offense unconscionable cannot be considered a confession. This is the
case because a confession must be accepted as a whole or rejected as a whole, and the court lacks the
authority to accept merely the exculpatory element (statement of self-defense) and reject the
incriminating portion.

Subsection (2) of section 164 CRPC says that the Magistrate shall, before recording any such confession,
explain to the person making it that he is not bound to make a confession and it may be used as
evidence against him; and the Magistrate shall not record any such confession unless, upon questioning
the person making it, he has reason to believe that it is being made voluntarily.

Sub Section (3) of section 164 CRPC provides that If at any time before the confession is recorded, the
person appearing before the Magistrate states that he is not willing to make the confession, the
Magistrate shall not authorise the detention of such person in police custody.

In the case of State of NCT of Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu, (Appeal (crl.) 373-375 of 2004) the Supreme Court
observed that Confessions are considered highly reliable because no rational person would make an
admission against his interest unless prompted by his conscience to tell the truth. "Deliberate and
voluntary confessions of guilt, if clearly proved are among the most effectual proofs in law”

Before acting on a confession, the court must be certain that it was given voluntarily and voluntarily. A
confession obtained through coercion, the promise of advantage, compensation, or immunity, or
through force, fear instilled by violence or threats of violence, cannot be used as evidence against the
confession maker. The confession needs to have been made fully aware of its nature and its effects. The
court should exclude the confession from consideration if it has any reason to believe that these
requirements have not been met. At the pre-trial stage, the authority recording the confession, such as a
magistrate or another statutory functionary, must also consider whether the accused came forward to
make the confession under no coercion, fear, or expectation of reward from those in positions of
authority. The Indian Evidence Act has prohibited the admission of a confession given to the police
officer, taking into account the stark fact that the accused was engulfed in a condition of fear and panic,
anxiety, and despair while in police custody.

A helpful provision in the Cr.P.C. is Section 164, which specifies precautions the Magistrate must take
when recording a confession to ensure its voluntariness and the accused's placement away from the
danger or influence of the police. A legal overview of the evidential value of retracted confessions, which
is a common occurrence in our nation and elsewhere, is necessary before we turn our attention to the
more specific characteristics of confessions under POTA.

In the case of Bharat Vs. State of UP reported in 1971 (3) SCC 950 Hidayatullah, C.J., speaking for a three-
Judge Bench observed that:

"Confessions can be acted upon if the court is satisfied that they are voluntary and that they are true.
The voluntary nature of the confession depends upon whether there was any threat, inducement or
promise and its truth is judged in the context of the entire prosecution case. The confession must fit into
the proved facts and not run counter to them. When the voluntary character of the confession and its
truth are accepted, it is safe to rely on it. Indeed a confession, if it is voluntary and true and not made
under any inducement or threat or promise, is the most patent piece of evidence against the maker.
Retracted confession, however, stands on a slightly different footing. As the Privy Council once stated, in
India it is the rule to find a confession and to find it retracted later. A court may take into account the
retracted confession, but it must look for the reasons for the making of the confession as well as for its
retraction, and must weigh the two to determine whether the retraction affects the voluntary nature of
the confession or not. If the court is satisfied that it was retracted because of an after-thought or advice,
the retraction may not weigh with the court if the general facts proved in the case and the tenor of the
confession as made and the circumstances of its making and withdrawal warrant its user. All the same,
the courts do not act upon the retracted confession without finding assurance from some other sources
as to the guilt of the accused. Therefore, it can be stated that a true confession made voluntarily may be
acted upon with slight evidence to corroborate it, but a retracted confession requires the general
assurance that the retraction was an after-thought and that the earlier statement was true.

In the case of Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana (Appeal (crl.) 471 of 1998) court observed that, Where
the Magistrate fails to explain to accused that he was not bound to make the confession and that if he
did so, such confession might be used as evidence against him, that confession so recorded, cannot be
taken into consideration.

The Magistrate must be certain that the accused person who confesses was not subjected to coercion or
force. Any indication of the accused's identity can undermine the confession's voluntariness. When was
determined to be inadmissible under the section as well as other provisions of the Indian Evidence Act
like sections 21 & 29.

Bar against police pressure

As was mentioned above, Subsection 3 of Section 164 CRPC prevents authorities from applying coercion
to a person who refuses to confess. When the accused was held in judicial custody for more than two
days prior to confessing, it was determined that the time was adequate to remove any fear or influence
from the police, if any, and that the confession could thus be given voluntarily by the defendant. It is not
required that 24 hours pass between the initial interrogation and the recording of the confession. The
Magistrate's failure to reassure the accused that he wouldn't be returned to police custody in the event
of his refusal to make the confession did not lead a confession to be deemed invalid.

Manner of recording Confession, signatures etc.

In accordance with subsection (4) of section 164, the confession should be documented in accordance
with the procedures outlined in section 281, and it must be signed by the individual confessing. The
Magistrate will next write a memo in response to this confession. The Magistrate cannot simply sign a
written directive that has been given to him. This will be against the letter of the law. It can be stated
that the voluntary confession that was accurately recorded in a foreign language was irregular. The entire
confession needs to be recorded. Before the confession can be used, it must be demonstrated that it was
made voluntarily.

The accused must sign the confession in order for it to be valid. If it isn't, it won't be allowed as evidence,
the commission wouldn't need the confession, and the irregularity can be fixed in accordance with
section 463. When a confession is made in court to the officer handling the case at the time of trial, the
accused does not need to provide an attestation.

The confession that is made without a note stating that it is voluntary is illegal and cannot be used as
evidence. The statement of an accused is inadmissible as evidence even though it was recorded in the
magistrate's presence but not in compliance with section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

The decision to record or not record a confession is up to the magistrate. He is not required to record
this at all times. If he chooses to record it, he must abide by the following four rules: It must be
documented and signed in accordance with section 281, then forwarded to the relevant Magistrate.

He must first ensure that the confession is being made voluntarily, then he must warn the accused that
they are not required to make one and put a memorandum to the bottom of the confession.

Transfer of confession to Magistrate of jurisdiction

Section 164's final requirement is stated in subsection (6), which specifies that the Magistrate who
records a confession or statement under this section must send it to the Magistrate who will conduct the
investigation or trial.

Evidentiary value of confession

Despite not requiring everything, Section 164 makes it clear that before recording the confessional
statement, a preliminary, thorough inquiry must be made of the accused about the custody from which
he was produced and the treatment he had received in that custody in order to ensure that there is no
room for doubt regarding any type of extraneous influence originating from a third party.

The Magistrate has the duty to question the accused who is confessing as to why he wishes to make a
statement that will undoubtedly harm his interests during the trial. The maker of the confession must be
given adequate time to consider.

He should also be guaranteed protection from any suspected torture or police coercion if he refuses to
make a confessional statement.

Even a judicial confession that was not given voluntarily is untrustworthy; moreover, if such a confession
is retracted, the conviction cannot be founded on such a retracted judicial confession. Failure to comply
with Section 164 Cr.P.C. renders the confession untrustworthy.

The accused should be kept totally free of police interference during this period of thought. The judicial
official charged with recording confessions must use his judicial mind to determine and satisfy his
conscience that the accused's statement is not the result of any outside influence on him. No police
officer shall be present in the court during the recording of the accused's statement.

Confession is a weak type of evidence, and confession of a co-accused is one of the weakest. Before
convicting an accused individual based on a confessional statement, the Court always seeks
corroboration from the confessional statement.

_____________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________

Bharat Vs. State of UP reported in 1971 (3) SCC 950

Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana (Appeal (crl.) 471 of 1998)

State of NCT of Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu, (Appeal (crl.) 373-375 of 2004)

Code of Criminal Procedure

INTRODUCTION

The Judicial confessions are those confessions which are made before the Magistrate or in the Court, in
due course of legal proceeding. It is essential that they be made of free will of the party and with full
knowledge of the nature and consequences of the confessions. Extra judicial confessions are those which
are made by the party else where than before a Magistrate on in the Court. The confessions of such type
may be express or implied. It includes the confession made to private individuals and to the officers of
justice in private capacity such as constables, police officer. They are receivable in evidence after being
proved like other facts.

An extra judicial confession if satisfactory proved to have been voluntarily made, may be the basis for a
conviction even in the absence of corroboration.[2] There is no controversy that such confessions are
receivable in evidence if they are voluntary. The Supreme Court held[3] that, “An extra judicial confession
if voluntary can be relied upon by the court along with other evidence in convicting the accused. It will
have to be proved like any other fact.

The value of evidence as to the confession just like any other evidence depends upon the veracity of
witness of witness to whom it is made.”[4]Extra Judicial confession means admission of guilt to a private
person or to a judicial official in a private capacity.

If it always a question of fact to be determined in each case if:[5]When he was drunk or because it was
made in answer to which he need no have answered whatever may have been the form of those
questions or because he was not warned that he was not bound to make such confessions and that
evidence of it might be given against him.[6]Section 29 of Evidence Act covers the field of confession
other than those dealt within its proceeding section. In others words it covers extra judicial confession.

Any other view as to the meaning of this section would lead to repugnancy between the proceeding
sections and may in certain conditions of things lead to absurdity.[7]U/Sec. 164(3) of Cr. P.C. The
directions are given to warn the accused that he is not bound to make a statement are not mandatory,
but directory. The failure of the Magistrate to give the warning would not be sufficient to render the
confession inadmissible. So section 29 of Evidence Act Section 164(3) of Cr. P.C. can be read together. In
Rangappa vs. State[8] – It has been held that in context, this opening dense refers to a confession which
has been dealt with in proceeding sections. It postulates that they are admissible under said section,
such confessions deals section 29.

The Probative force of judicial and extra-judicial:- Logic may have its appropriate effect in case of the
judicial admission when used as probation rather than as levamen probationis. When used as proof, the
more deliberate and, as it is said, solemn nature of the circumstances under which the judicial admission
is made may confer upon it a probative force not characteristic of the average extra-judicial admission.

The former having been made in solemn for, in a Court of justice constituting the foundation, or a part of
the procedure, in causes pending, in which the rights of the parties are states, and by which the Courts
are called upon to pass judgment, and upon which they must solemnly decree the rights, of the parties,
are for those reasons entitled to greater consideration and weight than when casually or incautiously
made, at a time and place, and under circumstances not calculated or intended to affect the rights or
interests of others, and, perhaps, unmindful of all the facts and circumstances of the case –
Chamberlayne’s Evidence, p. 1236. But the absence of denial in written statement of an allegation in the
plaint may amount to an admission only for the purpose of that suit, and cannot have the effect of an
admission capable of being proved under this section. Diali v. Lachman, 225 Ind. Cas. 329 : 48 P.L.R. 21 :
A.I.R. 1946 Lah. 256.

The Evidentiary value extra-judicial admissions – If we analyze the verbal admissions it may be observed
that they ought to be received with great caution, Manu v. Lang, 3A, & E, 702; Curtis v. Hunt, 1 C. & P.
180. The evidence, consisting as it does in the mere reception of oral statements, is subject to much
imperfection and mistake; the party himself either being misinformed, or not having clearly expressed
his own meaning, or the witness having misunderstood him. It frequently happens, also, that the
witness, by unintentionally altering a few of the expressions really used, gives an effect to the statement
completely at variance with what the party actually did say. Greenleaf Evidence p, 200. “In a same way
extended experience of jury trials, we have been compelled to the conclusion that the most unreliable of
all evidence is that of the oral admissions of the party, and especially where they purport to have been
made during the pendency of the action or after the parties were in a state of controversy. It is not
uncommon for different witnesses of the same conversation to give precisely opposite account of it; and
in some instances it will appear that the witnesses depose to the statements of one party as coming
from the other, and it is not very uncommon to find witnesses of the best intentions repeating the
declarations of the party in his own favour as the fullest admissions of the utter falsity of his claim. When
we reflect upon the inaccuracy of many witnesses, in their original comprehension of a conversation,
their extreme liability to mingle subsequent facts and occurrences with the original transactions, and the
impossibility of recollecting the precise terms used by the party, or of translating them by exact
equivalents, we must conclude there is no substantial reliance upon this class of testimony.
The fact too, that in the final trial of open question of fact, both sides are largely supported by evidence
of this character, in the majority of instances, must lead all cautious tries of fact greatly to distrust its
reliability.” Vide Judge Redfield’s addendum to Section 200 of Greenleaf s Evidence, 12th Edn. Oral
admission should have little weight, if it appears that the witness testifying to the admission is careless in
his mode of testifying; that he does not accurately remember the statements; that he is willing to
misconstrue them, or that the declarant was misinformed, or did not clearly express his own meaning. A
fortiori, where the admission is that of one deceased, the caution should deepen into suspicion for
reasons that are obvious and without corroboration is of little value.

Burr Jones Evidence, p. 295. In Kenney v. Murray, 170 Mo, 674 (Am.), the Court said: “Evidence of such
declarations, it is true, is admissible, but it never amounts to direct proof of the facts claimed to have
been admitted by those declarations; and it is sometimes doubted whether it ought to be received at all
when introduced for the purpose of diverting a title created by deed.” “The intrinsic weakness of this
class of evidence is further enhanced in any given case by the length of time that has intervened since
the declarations were made and the case with which it can be manufactured, and the temptation to do
so, when all those by whom it could be contradicted are in their graves,’ Fanning v, Doon, 139 Mo, 392
(Am.). Hence, it is obvious that the degree of weight to be given to admissions depends upon the
circumstances under which they were made as shown by the testimony, as well upon the degree of
accuracy and truthfulness with which they are related. Burr Jones, p. 295. But where the admission is
deliberately made precisely identified, the evidence it affords is often; of the most satisfactory nature.
Rigg v. Curgenven, 2 Wills 395. In such a case it is neither weak evidence, nor does it require
corroboration. Commonwealth v. Galligan, 113 Mass, 202. On the other hand, when admissions are so
proved, they may have great inherent force as evidence. Dreher v, Fitchburg, 22 Wis. 675. So, what a
party to a litigation has admitted to be true may be presumed to be true and, until he rebuts it, the Court
will take it as established. Gulam v. Mahomed, 65 Ind. Cas. 398 : A.I.R. 1922 Oudh 98. A statement in a
document should, prima facie, be accepted as true as against the explanation unless it can be shown by
independent evidence to be false. Irshad v. Mt. Kariman, 22 C.W.N. 530 : 28 C.L.J. 173 : 20 Bom. L.R. 790
(P.C.). An admission is the best evidence against the party making the same, and unless it is shown that it
is untrue and is made under circumstances which does not make it binding on the party, must be
presumed -to be true.

The weight of the admission increases with the knowledge and deliberation of the speaker of the
solemnity of the occasion on which it is made Nanilal Das v, Nutbehari, 38 C.W.N. 861. Unless admissions
are contractual or unless they constitute an estoppel they are not conclusive, but are open to rebuttal or
explanation, or they may be controlled by higher evidence. Bur Jones, p. 296 in delivering the judgment
of the Court, observed: “There is no doubt but that the express admission of a party to a suit, or
admissions implied from his conduct, are evidence, and strong evidence against him, but, we think, he is
at liberty to prove that such admissions were mistaken or were untrue, and is not estopped or concluded
by them unless another person has been induced by them to alter his condition. In such a case, the party
is estopped from disputing their truth as against that person (and those claiming under him) and that
transaction, but as to third parties he is not bound,’ cited with approval by Lord Atkinson in Chandra v.
Chowdhury. In Newton v. Liddiard, 12 B. 926, Lord Denman approved and adopted this statement of the
law, and Ex parte Morgan. The rebuttal will be in accordance with the circumstances of each particular
case, but must be clearly established, and must show fully the reasons why such admissions should not
be binding. The party confesses its untruth; he may show mistake or that the response which formed the
admissions was made not in a serious but in a jocular manner; or that the admission was made in
ignorance of the true state of the facts. Sidu v. Netai, 9 Ind, Cas. 806. So, an admission obtained by
misrepresentation of fact is of no value, especially where the person making such admission is a female.
Talok v. Jogannath, 117 P.W.R. 1911. Gratuitous admission can be withdrawn unless there is some
obligation not to withdraw it.

The mere fact that certain admissions made in previous suits constituted a good defence to the suits in
which they were made, cannot lead to the conclusion that they were untrue. Where in cross-
examination a witness admits that a statement previously made by him relative to a certain fact is a false
statement, he ought to be asked in re-examination by the prosecution or at any rate by the Court, why
he made a statement which was false. The mere fact that the witness acknowledges the previous
statement to be false is no justification for rejecting such previous statement, if on other grounds the
Court is able to reach the conclusion that the statement is in substance true. An admission operates
merely to shift the onus and raises only a rebuttable presumption. Admissions are of no evidential value
once they are found untrue. A general statement by a witness that a number of persons admitted having
committed a crime is valueless without some indication as to which of the persons made the admission
in question and without some particulars of what was actually said. The admission of a wife in a divorce
proceeding unsupported by corroborative proof should be received with utmost circumspection and
caution. If a person admits a right, it is necessary implication that he also admits the legal consequences
of that right. Where a guardian is appointed to minor for purposes of litigation in order to look after his
interest, any admission made by minor against his own interest is waste paper. A statement made by a
person in his own favour is inadmissible in evidence on his behalf. Title by law cannot pass by admission
when the statute requires a deed.

A purchaser cannot be prejudiced by admission subsequently made to the debtor whose property has
been sold. An admission by an attorney unless satisfactorily explained away, furnishes cogent evidence
against the client. But an erroneous admission of the pleader of a party does not bind the parties.A
previous admission cannot be taken in a later case unless it is legally proved on record. Admissions are
always evidence against the party who makes them, but their evidential value varies very much in
accordance with the circumstances, and a Court is quite at liberty to reject them if it is satisfied from
other circumstances that they were untrue. The effect of acknowledgement of paternity validly made as
establishing marriage between the parents of the acknowledged paternity may be a matter of
substantive Mohammedan law; but the effect of an admission of marriage, as proof of such marriage, is
a question merely of adjective law governed by the Indian Evidence Act. Its probative value must depend
on the surrounding circumstances. Though the mere production of an account-book is not sufficient to
charge a person with liability, still with regard to admission, i.e. entries, against the producer’s own
pecuniary interest the law dispenses with all proof save that the book has been kept by or under the
authority of the producer. Though the filling of a suit for arrears of rent after a decree for ejectment may
amount to an admission recurrent as a piece of evidence under Section 17, it is no conclusive proof and
where there is no institution to re-admit and the rent is not paid in the belief there has been a re-
admission to the tenancy there is neither a re-admission to tenancy nor any estoppel. An admission is
not an inconclusive unless it amounts to estoppel. It may be proved to be wrong but unless it is so
proved it is a very strong piece of evidence against the maker thereof and is decisive of the matter
though not conclusive. Ghasiram v. Omkar, 34 Cut. L.T. 328; A.I.R. 1968 Orissa 99.

The Judicial confession in Sec. 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code:- The Judicial confession indicate
confessions which are made on a magisterial investigation. Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code
contains the provisions for recording confessions by Magistrates. The evidence of witness who are sent
up by the police for the purpose of having their statements recorded under Section 164, Criminal
Procedure Code, and who have been presumably in police custody until their production before the
Magistrate, should not be recorded by such Magistrate, unless he has some assurance that their
attendance and statements were voluntary. The provision of this section is imperative. The proper course
for a Magistrate to presume when an accused person is brought under the above section of the Code
before him is to ask him, if he wishes to make any statement or confession. If he says he does not, the
Magistrate should write down the statement or confession (as the case may be) and ask the accused
such questions as may be necessary to show clearly or ascertain clearly what his meaning is. The
examination of the accused must not be made with a view to eliciting by constant questions, the truth of
his mouth as though he were a witness. Before recording a confession the Magistrate should enquire
how long the accused has been in custody.

The failure to do this, however, is no irregularity and does not invalidates or cast any doubt upon the
genuineness and voluntary nature of the confession. A Magistrate should ask the prisoner, before
recording as to the circumstances under which it was made. A Magistrate must not put any question to
accused which tends to incriminate him, In re Rayappan, 2 Weir, 136. Section 164, Criminal Procedure
Code, should be read together with Section 24, 25 and 29 of the Evidence Act. If so read we get the
following rules : (1) that a confession shall not be made to a police-officer; (2) that if a person in police
custody desires to make a confession, he must do so in the presence of a Magistrate; (3) that the
Magistrate shall not record it unless he is upon enquiry form the person making it, satisfied that it is
voluntary; (4) then when the Magistrates records it, he shall record it, he shall record it in the manner
provided in Section 164, Criminal Procedure Code; (5) that only when so recorded the confession will
become relevant and admissible in evidence. It is neither expressed nor implied in Section 164 that the
statement of an accused person cannot be recorded unless it is a confession. The distinction made in the
section is between statements that are the confession and statements that are not, and not between the
persons by whom statements of either character are made, the object being to prescribe different
modes of recording. It is discretional with a Magistrate to act under Section 164 and prepare a record.
Great care and circumspection are necessary in recording confession under Section 164 of the Criminal
Procedure Code. It is necessary to record the questions put to the accused to ascertain whether the
confession was voluntary, to tell him that after his confession he will not have to go back to police
custody, to warm him of the consequence which will ensue if he falsely implicate himself in the hope of
release and to ask him whether the police or any other person has subjected him to any ill-treatment.

No hard and fast rule can or should be laid down as to the procedure which should be adopted when an
accused person is placed before a Magistrate for the recording of a confession under Section 164,
Criminal Procedure Code, but it is not sufficient to put one comprehensive question as to the nature of
the confession or to make a note at the commencement of the record of the confession that the accused
has been warned not to confess through any fear or inducement and that the police of the thana have
been removed from the Court. A Magistrate ought, by putting questions which occur to him, to make
himself conscientiously satisfied that, the man is a free agent and the confession is voluntary and had
not been procured by threats or inducements. Where a Magistrate asked a person who was charged
with an offence. “What offence are you going to confess 1” Instead of ascertaining whether the accused
wished to say anything at all, held that the Magistrate had not acted properly.

A Magistrate should ascertain whether a confessional statement was made voluntarily, at the beginning
of the statement, and not at the end. Where after the prisoner had made a long confessional statement,
‘he was told by the Magistrate that if he stated all that he knew, he would then be examined as an
approver and as a witness, held that the conduct of the Magistrate was highly improper. There is no
provision for the admission in evidence of a confession made to a Magistrate unless it is recorded in the
manner prescribed by law; and even if such confession may, under special circumstances be proved
otherwise, where the confession of the accused is shown to have been made under the inducement,
such fact deprives the evidence of its value. Where a Magistrate inadvertently omits to certify the
voluntariness of a confession recorded by him under Section 164, Criminal Procedure Code, the defect
may be cured by the evidence of the Magistrate, Ram Sanchi v. Emperor, 9 Ind. Case. 148: 12 Cr. LJ. 15. It
is for the prosecution to establish the admissibility of a confession. It is duty of the Court to find out
whether the confession is true or not. If it is not true the accused cannot be convicted upon it. Brahma v.
Emperor, A.I.R, 1947 Oudh, 95 : 228 Ind. Cas. 21 : 48 Cr. LJ. 27.

The confessions carrying inculpatory and exculpatory statements:-

The definition attempted by the Privy Council has found favour with the Supreme Court. In its decision in
Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab the Supreme Court approved the Privy Council decision in Pakala
Narayan Swami v. Emperor, over two scores. Firstly, that the definition of confession is that it must either
admit the guilt in terms or admit substantially all the facts which constitute the offence, and secondly,
that a mixed up statement which, even though contains some confessional statement, will still lead to
acquittal, is no confession. Palvinder was trial for the murder of her husband along with another whom
all the time remained absconding. The husband’s body was recovered from a well after it had already
suffered about two month’s decomposition.

The post mortem could not even reveal whether death was due to poisoning or what. In her statement
to the court the accused said that her husband , a hobbyist photographer, used to keep handy photo
developing material which is quick poison; that on the occasion he was ill and she brought him some
medicine; that the phial of medicine happened to be kept nearby the liquid developer and the husband
while going for the medicine by mistake swallowed the developer and died; that she got afraid and with
the help of the absconding accused packed the body in a trunk and disposed it off into the well. The
statement thus consisted of partly guilty and partly innocent remarks. It was partly inculpatory in the
sense that it confessed to something wrong and partly exculpatory in the sense that if accepted it would
totally absolve her of any guilt. The lower courts sorted out the exculpatory part and acting on the
inculpatory part announced her to be guilty of the murder of her husband by poisoning him. But the
Supreme Court did not countenance this approach. The court thus accepted the inculpatory part of the
statement and rejected the exculpatory part. In doing so it contravened the well-accepted rule regarding
the use of confession and admission that they must either be accepted as a whole or rejected as a whole
and that the court is not competent to accept only inculpatory part, while rejecting exculpatory part as
inherently incredible. Reference in this connection may be made to the observation of het Full Bench of
the Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. Balmukand with which we fully concur. The confession there
comprised of two elements: (a) an account of how the accused killed the woman and (b) an account of
his reasons for doing so. The former elements being inculpator and the latter exculpatory, the question
referred to the Full Bench was: Can the court if is of opinion that the inculpatory part commends itself,
and the exculpatory part is inherently incredible, act upon the former and refuse to act upon the latter ?

The answer to the reference was that where there is no other evidence to show affirmatively that any
portion of the exculpatory element in the confession is false, the court must accept or reject the
confession as a whole and cannot accept only the inculpatory element while rejecting the exculpatory
element as inherently incredible. Similarly, in a case before the Rajasthan High Court, the accused said
that he was in the room when his wife killed their children and then committed suicide, it was held that
the court could not accept the part of the statement by which he confessed to be there and reject the
rest. Under English law confession not rejected only because of exculpatory statements.
The principle of English law is that:

The whole statement must be left to the jury who may attach different weight to different parts of it. The
same rule applies in the case of confessions. This principle was established overruling earlier authorities
in R. v. McGregor, and again in R. v. Storey, In the Me Gregor case, LORD PARKER, C.J. supported the
better opinion when he said:

‘The better opinion seems to be that as in the case of all other evidence, the whole should be left to the
jury to say whether the facts asserted by the prisoner in his favour are true.”

In R. v. Storey, a girl was prosecuted along with another for possessing a dangerous drug, which was
recovered from her apartment. The other man was also in the apartment and her defence was that the
whole contraband belonged to him. This was in fact no confession, but an explanation that she was not
guilty. Even so the Court of Appeal held that the statement should go to the jury. “The fact that the
cannabis was on the applicant’s bed in her flat was in itself some evidence of possession to go to the
jury. Her unsworn explanation, although, if true, it would have been a complete answer to the charge,
did not cancel out or nullify the evidence which was provided by the presence of cannabis.

It was ultimately for the jury to decide whether that explanation was or might be true. Thus, the
principle has crystallized that a confessional statement should not be rejected merely because it also
carries with it exculpatory statements. It should be for the jury to say what weight shall be given to
several parts of the statement, for they may well believe that part which charges the prisoner, and reject
that which tends to exculpate him.

The Supreme Court approach to English Law:

The Supreme Court of India also appears to have been influenced by this development. Its decision in
Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar, marks the turning point. The accused was charged with murdering his
friend while traveling with him in a train. He was seen washing his clothes in a river flowing near the
station where the murder was detected. The news spread to a nearby village and villagers arrested the
accused. Blood-stained clothes, papers and a knife were recovered from him, and the blood on them
agreed with the blood of the deceased.
He admitted washing bloodstained clothes, but explained the presence of blood by two contradictory
statements. In one of them he tried to explain away the blood by saying that there was a struggle
between two persons in the compartment one of whom killed the other and some blood spilled over
him in the act of rescue. In the other version, he said that a herd boy had robbed and injured him. The
High Court did not accept these explanations and confirmed the conviction for murder. The Supreme
Court upheld the conviction and pointed out that there was nothing wrong in relying on a part of the
statement and rejecting the rest, and for this purpose the court drew support from English authorities.
The court did not mean to overrule Palvinder, Hanumant or Balmukund but distinguished the present
case from them. Here there was enough evidence to reject the exculpatory part of the statement of the
appellant.

The High Court had acted rightly in accepting the inculpatory part and piecing the same with the other
evidence to come to the conclusion that the appellant was the person responsible for the crime. In the
prosecution of Palvinder there was no other evidence of the circumstances surrounding her husband’s
death except her own statement and, therefore, the court had no choice but to hold that the statement
should be accepted or rejected as a whole, In Hanumant, also, where an officer was prosecuted for
forgery in tampering with a tender document and a letter, there was no choice, the confessional
statement being the only evidence on record. The letter in question was typed on a machine which was
purchased by the office much later than the date of the letter, which shoed that the letter was
deliberately antedated. The explanation of the officer was that the machine was with them for trial
before ultimate purchase. There being no other evidence to contradict this explanation, the court held
that the statement should be accepted or rejected as a whole. So was true of the Balmukund case. The
explanation offered by the accused as to why he killed his wife was the only evidence on record of his
guilt. But in Nishi Kant Jha’s case, the explanations were inconsistent in them and also with the other
evidence on record, and were, therefore, so obviously false that there was no chance of justice being
miscarried in discarding them. This approach has again been adopted by the Supreme Court in Keshoram
v. State. The accused admitted that he had struck the deceased with a sharp weapon but that he had
done so to defend himself and his farm labour whom the deceased was going to attach while they were
working in his (accused’s) field.

The self-defence part of the admission turned out to be false as there was evidence to the effect that the
deceased was attacked while he was working in his farm field. The court accordingly rejected that part of
the confession by which the plea of self-defence was set up and acting upon the rest of it convicted the
accused. Statement in the first information report which was furnished by an accused person was not
allowed to be used against another accused person. The court said that such statements could not be
used even against the maker unless he offers himself as a witness in which case a limited use could be
made for contradicting or corroborating his testimony. Statements recorded during an inquiry under
Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 or during confiscation proceedings are not confessions made by an
accused person within the meaning of Section 24. Such a confessional statement although subsequently
retracted, can be the sole basis of conviction if it is otherwise truthful and voluntary.

The outline of Confession:

A confession may occur in any form. It may be made to the court itself, when it will be known as judicial
confession or to anybody outside the court, in which case it is called an extra-judicial confession. It may
even consist of conversation to oneself, which may be produced in evidence if overheard by another. For
example, in Sahoo v. State of U.P. The accused that was charged with the murder of his daughter-in-law
with whom he was always quarreling was seen on the day of the murder going out of the home, saying
words to the effect: “I have finished her and with her the daily quarrels.”The statement was held to be a
confession relevant in evidence, for it is not necessary for the relevancy of a confession that it should be
communicated to some other person.

The voluntary nature of Extra-judicial confession:

“It has always been the fundamental principle of the courts that a prisoner’s confession outside the
court is only admissible if it is voluntary. In deciding whether an admission is voluntary the court had
been at pain to hold that even the most gentle threats or slight inducements will taint a
confession.”Recognizing the value of an extra-judicial confession, the Supreme Court remarked: The
learned Sessions judge regarded the extra-judicial confession to be very weak type of evidence and
therefore refused to rely on the same. Here the learned Sessions judge committed a clear error of law.
Law does not require that the evidence of an extra-judicial confession should in all cases be
corroborated. In the instant case, the extra-judicial confession was proved by an independent witness
(Sarpanch) who was a responsible officer and who bore no animus against the appellants.

There was hardly any justification, for the session’s judge to disbelieve the evidence of the Sarpnach
particularly when the confession was corroborated by the recovery of an empty cartridge from the place
of occurrence. In still another case the Supreme Court remarked that an extra-judicial confession to
afford a piece of reliable evidence must stand the test of reproduction of exact words, the reason and
motive for confession and the person selected in whom confidence is reposed. There was no evidence of
previous association between the witness and the two accused as may justify the inference that the
accused could repose confidence in him. Acting upon this principle the Supreme Court rejected the
evidence of confession by accused to another under-trial. Similarly, where the confession sought to be
proved was supposed to have been made to a witness for the purpose of seeking his help to save the
accused from harassment, but it was not shown how the witness was in a position to help him; the
confession was described to be unreliable.

An accused of murder and robbery confessed before the village Administrative Officer. His statement in
recording it and then submitting it to police was found to be reliable. The statement of the accused in
the trial court than the was innocent did not have the effect of retracting the confession or destroying its
evidentiary value. The confession was corroborated by several other circumstances such as recovery of
jewellery and other valuable stolen in connection with the killing. The accused was also absconding
immediately after the incident. An extra-judicial confession is, in the very nature of things a weak piece
of evidence. There should be no difficulty in rejecting it if it lacks in probability. A confession which was
cited in evidence was made by the accused persons to the Sarpanch of some other village. It was held
that in the absence of any reasons to show why and how the accused had reposed such a confidence in
that Sarpanch as to confess their guilt before him, the confession was held to be improbable. A
confession made by a large number of persons before the village Panchayat was held to be more in the
nature of a vague and general declaration.

It could not come within the definition of confession which requires specific admission of guilt. No
reliance could be placed upon such a confession. A confession made by a person at an arrack shop after
consuming some liquor to another person who, being otherwise stranger, dropped there by chance at
that very time was held to be not reliable. Where the prosecution witness to whom a confession as
supposed to have been made was produced before the magistrate after a gap of one month for
recording the confession made to him, the Supreme Court ruled that the confession had lost its reliability
because of .the gap. Where no reason was shown why the accused persons went to the witness and one
of them told him of their crime, ‘the confession was held to be not believable. Neither the witness was
much known to the accused for confiding in him, nor was he an influential person to be of any help. In
recognition of this principle, the Evidence Act indicates in sections 24 to 27 to circumstances in which a
confession is not voluntary and, therefore, not relevant.

The confessions to police in England:

English law does not discredit confessions to police as a rule. If the judge feels confident that there was
no oppression and the statement was free, fair and voluntary, he may admit it. A 24 years old State nurse
of previous good character was jointly charged with three others for possessions of cannabis resin and
knowingly permitting it to be smoked at their residence. She was arrested in the noon and detained in a
cell, which was exceptionally cold and was kept there till late evening. She was all alone in the cell, was
not told what the time was, nor served any refreshment till 7.15 p.m. when a policeman gave her a cup
of tea. During this period she was subjected to two spells of strenuous interview by the police and excise
staff. The court held that despite the lack of impropriety on the part of the police, all the above
circumstances combined to sap the defendant’s free will in such a way that her admissions were
obtained oppressively and also in breach of judge’s rules as to provision of refreshments.

The confession in custody of police:

No confession is made to anybody while the person making it is in police custody is provable. The section
will come into play when the person in police custody is in conversation with any person other than a
police officer and confesses to his guilt. The section is based upon the same fear, namely, that the police
would torture the accused and force him to confess, if not to the police officer himself, at least to some
one else. The confessions made to a police officer or to anyone else while the accused is in police
custody, are not different in kind and quality. Both are likely to suffer from the blemish of not being free
and voluntary. “The policy objectives underlying the limitation are clear. It is manifest to every one’s
experience that from the moment a person feels himself in custody on a criminal charge, his mental
condition undergoes a very remarkable change and he naturally becomes much more accessible to every
influence that addresses itself to either his hopes or fears.

The meaning of police custody

The Police custody means police control even if it be exercised in a home, in an open place or in the
course of a journey and not necessarily in the walls of a prison. All circumstances in which the accused
remains in the custody of the police while inquiries are made by them have been considered to fall
within the purview of the statutory bar. The courts have declined to recognize in this context any
distinction between lawful and unlawful police custody. Moreover, the concept of police custody does
not necessarily connote the immediate presence of police officers, so long as the accused persons are
aware that the place where they are detained is really accessible to the police.”

Thus, where a woman arrested for the murder of a young boy was left in the custody of villagers while
the chowkidar (watchman) who arrested her left for the police-station she confessed in his absence,
while the accused being carried on a tonga was left along by the policeman in the custody of the tonga-
drive and he told of his criminality to the tonga-driver and where the accused was taken to a doctor for
treatment, the policeman standing outside at the door, the accused confessed to the doctor, a
confession to the village Pradhan accompanying the police officer after the accused is in effective police
control, he is in police custody and temporary absence of the policeman makes no difference. The
legality of the custody is also immaterial. If there is “custody” in fact the confession will be vitiated even
if the accused was illegally detained. An accused made his confession to two persons of the locality.
Subsequently, the confession was reduced to writing inside the police station on the accused being
brought there. The Supreme Court said that such extra-judicial confession was not hit by section 26.
Explaining the concept of custody, the court said:

“Such custody need not necessarily be post-arrest custody. The word “custody” used in Section 26 is to
be understood in a pragmatic sense. If any accused is within the less of surveillance of the police during
which his movements are restricted, then it can be regarded as custodial surveillance for the purposes of
the section. If he makes any confession during that period to any person be he not a police officer, such
confession would be held within the banned contours outlines in section 26.”

The implication of this aspect to the fact of case the court said that the confession was not made while
the accused was anywhere nears the precincts of a police station or during the surveillance of the police.
The mere fact that the confession spoken to those witnesses was later put in black and white is no
reason to cover it with the wrapper of inadmissibility. Self incriminating statement made by party when
his mind is not in natural state ought to be received as evidence. His state of mind should be taken into
consideration by the jury as an informative circumstance. Thus a confession made by a prison then drunk
has been received by a party in state of total intoxication are void.

It is otherwise where intoxication is partial and not sufficient to prevent his being of aware of what he is
doing. A person has been hand to say while talking in his sleep seems not be legal evidence against him.
But these subjects have some exception:

Deception: The confession obtained by deception if otherwise admissible does not make it irrelevant.
Where a prisoner in jails on charge of felony asked the turnkey of the jail, to put the letter into the post
for him. After promising to do so, the prisoner gave him a letter and the turnkey instead of putting the
letter into the post, gave it to be prosecutor. It was held that the contents of the letter were admissible in
evidence against the prisoner.[9]Where a confession has been obtained by artifice deception but without
any use of promise or threats is admissible where the confession is obtained from an person by false
representation made to deception practiced upon him, it will not be inadmissible evidence.[10]A
confession is not excluded because of any illegality in the method of obtaining it or in the speaker’s
situation at the time of making it. The general principle is the illegality of the source of evidence is no bar
to its receptor.

It is not for any such reason that confessions are rejected. So the exclusion of confession is not due to
principle of public faith on private pledge of secrecy. It follows that the use of trick or fraud does not
itself exclude confessions induced by means of it. In a case it was held that the rules of evidence
contained in section 24 to 29 are based on certain rules of procedure adopted in English jurisprudence.

According to the rule Sec. 29 does not cover confessions recording by Magistrate U/S 164 Cr. P.C.
[11]Section 29 says that if a confession is otherwise relevant, it does not become irrelevant because the
accused was not warmed that he was not bound to make such a confession.

If any of the reasons mentioned in Section 24 to 28, the confession is inadmissible than there is no
question of applying the provision of section 29 at all section 29 proceeds to invalidate or negate
possible objections other than mentioned in section 24 to 28 to that may raise against it admissibility.
The principles of testimonials not trustworthy are being the foundation of exclusions. The confessions
should taken into account unless their case was such that the accused was induced to untruly confess.
Briefly was that inducement of such nature that there was risk of false confession.

The Promise of Secrecy: The confession will not become inadmissible obtained from the accused by a
promise of secrecy. The accused made their confession to a commissioned officer of the regiment who
stated to the accused that he had already obtained information from another person. He promised of
secrecy if they told him truth. It was held that the alleged deceptions inducement were covered by the
provision of section 29.[12] It does not make a confession inadmissible though a confession is thus
created in mind of prisoner and he is thrown of his guard.

Drunkenness : Confession made in state of intoxication are governed by general principle of testimonial
capacity that is capacity of observation, capacity of recollection, capacity of intelligence and truthful
narration etc, Therefore are usually admissible. It is only where intoxication is produced by a person
desirous of obtaining a confession that its trust worthless becomes really doubtful. So to of the
confessions during sleep or hypnotic influence.

A confession must be judged with reference to the time of its utterance. The mere fact of intoxication at
the time does not itself exclude the confession.

Want of caution: A voluntary confession is inadmissible though it does not appear that he was no so
warned. In some cases section 164 is not complied with the confession admissible. In other words, a
confession otherwise admissible does not become inadmissible merely because the accused was not
bound to make confession.

It the irregularity appears to the court that whether confession was voluntary or not the court would not
hesitate to reject the confession as being inadmissible on the ground that it is not voluntary.[13]Section
164(2) was not a mandatory but directory only.[14] The Rajasthan High Court held that although in view
of specific provision of section 29.[15] The more absence of warning U/S 164(2)[16] would not make the
confession recorded inadmissible.[17] The court has to satisfied that the accused knew that he was not
bound to make the confession.[18]

Cross-examination: The mere fact that a statement had been elicited by a question of fact did not make
irrelevant whether such statement is material otherwise. The confession is elicited by questions put by a
person in authority, is admissible in evidence. It being impossible to discover. The facts of crime without
putting question. If the questions we properly put after due warning the prisoners: answer were held to
be admissible in evidence.[19] There was no settled practice with respect to the admissibility of
confessions made by persons in response to questions put to them while in custody.[20]In a case before
Calcutta High Court, it was held that mere fact that a statement had been elicited by a question did not
become it irrelevant as a confession though; the fact that it was so elicited might be material to the
question, whether such statement was voluntary.[21] In India, the law expressly provides for the
examination of the accused persons by courts.[22]

Conclusion: It is a well settled law that if once police custody has commenced, the mere fact that for a
temporary period the police discretely withdraw from the scene and left the accused in charge of some
other person will not render the confession of the accused before that person admissible. Once an
accused is arrested by a police officer and is in his custody, the mere fact that for some purpose or other
the police officer happens to be temporarily absent and during this temporary absence leaves the
accused in charge of a private individual does not terminate his custody, the accused shall be deemed to
be still in police custody. The test, therefore, is whether at the time when the person makes an extra
judicial confession, he is a free man or his movements are 141 R. v. Vahala (7 Bombay H.C. 56). Sec. 161
controlled by the police either by themselves or through some other agency employed by them for the
purpose of security of such a confession. With the above study it seems that the relevance of the
statement of the accused is an important fact in conviction of the accused. But there are various factors
involved in the relevance of the statement of the accused.