Table of Contents

Welcome Letter 3

Student Officer Introductions 4

Introduction to the Committee 5

Introduction to the Topic 7

Background of the Topic 9

Key Terms and Definitions 11

Scope of Debate 13

Key Stakeholders 18

Potential Solutions 22

Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMA) 23

Conclusion 25

Bibliography 26

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Welcome Letter
Dear Delegates,
Welcome to the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC)! The Dais is
exhilarated to have you on board our spaceship.

DISEC is the First Committee of six main committees of the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA), and delegates in this council are tasked with the daunting task of
working together to strengthen international peace and security by generating solutions to
disarmament as well as tackling key security issues. Noting that DISEC has been criticised
multiple times before because of its ineffectiveness in passing binding resolutions, limited
implementation, and most saliently, gridlock and inaction amongst Member States,
delegates in DISEC must ensure that circular debate and ineffective diplomacy do not
undermine the main goal that DISEC has set out to achieve. This is even more pertinent
with the topic the Dais has prepared for you, on the demilitarisation of space. Contentious
blocs will inevitably arise as delegates find themselves having polarising stances with other
nations. Intense debate will be birthed as delegates fervently push for their own stances and
ideas, and the Dais look forward to all this happening in our council. The Dais also hopes for
concrete and feasible solutions to be implemented to address the topic and the
aforementioned shortcomings of DISEC throughout the four days of debate.

On a personal note, the Dais hopes that as a beginner council, we provide one of the most
fun yet rigorous councils conceivable to introduce you to the circuit. Regardless of how
much you know about MUN, regardless of how much you adore the humanities, regardless
of how persuasive a speaker you are, the Dais ardently hopes every delegate steps up and
pushes for their stance, learns to negotiate, and steps out of their comfort zones.

So delegates, strap yourselves tight, and prepare to go on a trip in your favourite rocket ship
as we zoom through the stars and figure out how to best protect them. #WhyDISEC!

Kailasom Aditya Suresh, Nay Wun Thant, and Janice Wong Chi Ching
Dais of the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC)

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Student Officer Introductions

Head Student Officer: Kailasom Aditya Suresh

Aditya is a JC1 student at Victoria Junior College, taking HELM and thoroughly enjoying not
having to study any form of Science whatsoever. As an avid fan of the humanities and all it
has to offer, MUN has become the classical way for him to put to use his argumentative
skills while looking good in WBA. In his free time, he enjoys experimenting in cooking and
vibing to The Weeknd which is always a soul-elevating experience. With that, Aditya is
excited to welcome all delegates to PREPMUN 2023 and hopes it will be a memorable
experience for all delegates!

Deputy Student Officer: Nay Wun Thant

Nay Wun is a Y2 Rafflesian who loves yet hates his never-ending deadlines, and adores the
humanities. Starting off note-passing in PREPMUN 2022, he has developed a love for MUN,
and is honoured to kickstart his chairing career with his maiden MUN. He loves football but
constantly cries over his favourite team, Manchester United. Further, he types with
full-stops and capital letters on WhatsApp because that’s ‘good English’. As resident public
transport enthusiast, he enjoys giving route advice using his 5,000+ bus guides. Nay Wun
hopes his friendliness will make his delegates love MUN, like what PREPMUN 2022 did for
him.

Deputy Student Officer: Janice Wong

Janice, a Y3 PCHL student from RGS, is commonly known for her impulsive bad haircuts and
fear of olives. She can often be found rapping Hamilton lyrics in blissful ignorance of her
endless slew of deadlines, and desperately defending Haruki Murakami. Janice is also a
devoted fan of the film Dead Poets Society, and occasionally peruses the works of Mao
Zedong. She is guaranteed to add much Sugar and Spice to the DISEC council, and wishes all
delegates a fruitful experience at PREPMUN!

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Introduction to the Committee
The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC), or the First Committee is
one of six main committees of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), formed as a
subsidiary organ under Article 22 of the UN Charter. DISEC deals with disarmament and
global security issues threatening the international community and formulates solutions for
such security challenges (United Nations, n.d.-a).

The role of DISEC can be outlined as per Article 11 of the United Nations Charter, which
states “the General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the
maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing
disarmament and the regulation of armaments and may make recommendations with
regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both”. Hence,
through the process of international cooperation, Member States of the DISEC work
together to strengthen international peace and security by considering solutions to
disarmaments and regulations as well as tackling key security issues (United Nations, n.d.-a).

The First Committee has two main bodies that report to it: the Disarmament Commision
and the Conference on Disarmament. It also hears reports from any expert groups it
establishes. These bodies often discuss matters that are intertwined with DISEC’s mandate
and role, namely the cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, addressing
the construction of new weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and more prominently to
our topic, the prevention of an arms race in outer space (United Nations, n.d.-a).

However, as a subsidiary organ of the UNGA, DISEC resolutions are legally non-binding and
structured in the form of recommendations. This has been a note for criticism by analysts in
the past, and hence, delegates must manoeuvre this obstacle to pass effective resolutions.
All in all, it can be said that DISEC is heavily responsible for the safety and disarmament of
space (United Nations, n.d.-b).

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Introduction to the Topic
Space, over time, has developed into a domain of peaceful cooperation and exploration.
However, now, with the advent of technology and heated geopolitical rivalry between
powerful nations, space is now at risk of becoming an arena for military competition and
conflict as nations strive to rapidly develop their space technology and prevent the other
from wielding significant influence. This can be traced back to the Space Race, which was a
period of competition between the Soviet Union and the United States of America over
who could achieve space exploration first (Royal Museums Greenwich, n.d.).

Since then, other economically and militarily developed countries have jumped on the
bandwagon, giving rise to a potentially catastrophic fallout as opposing blocs accuse one
another of trying to destabilise the planet and militarise space for their own selfish reasons.
This can be attributed to nations pursuing the potential militarisation of space, like the
United States of America, which has developed multiple space-based military capabilities
like reconnaissance satellites. Further, the USA has also established the US Space Force in
2019, further accentuating its intention to expand its influence in space (“Space Capabilities”,
n.d.). In a similar spirit, Russia has also been experimenting with the development of
anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons (Arms Control Association, n.d.), emphasising the importance
of protecting its national security interests beyond Earth, and has called for international
discussions on arms control in space. Overall, this may have a domino effect, leading to a
possible disastrous arms race.

Additionally, developing countries may be pressured by the amount of stress developed

powers like the US and China are placing on space, potentially straining ties between them,
especially when inflation is high and global supply chains are disrupted. They may also
advocate for inclusivity in space operations and capacity building in space technology.

The issue of demilitarisation of space has hence become a pressing topic that warrants the
attention of the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC). The
demilitarisation of space refers to preventing the deployment and use of weapons in outer
space. It involves establishing regulations, treaties, and frameworks that discourage the
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development and deployment of space-based military capabilities (UN, n.d.). Ultimately, the
end goal is to prevent an arms race in space and ensure that space is only used for peaceful
research and exploration purposes.

The demilitarisation of space is of great pertinence because it protects a peaceful

exploration of space. Hence, with the encouraging trend of expanding space technologies
for research and exploration, it is paramount that progress is not jeopardised by a
competitive arms race between nations. It is also important that these advancements are
not abused for military goals.

Presently, the exploration of space has always hinged upon international cooperation. For
instance, the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) has played a vital
role in promoting the peaceful use of space and facilitating international collaboration
(UNOOSA, n.d.). DISEC, as the primary committee focused on disarmament and
international security, is well-positioned to address the issue of demilitarisation of space
and formulate resolutions that promote global security, arms control, and the peaceful
coexistence of nations.

By engaging in this critical discussion, DISEC delegates have the opportunity to shape the
future of space governance, contribute to international security, and ensure that outer space
remains a domain of peaceful exploration and cooperation for generations to come.

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Background of the Topic
On 4 October 1957, the first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1, was launched, marking the
beginning of a long era in space (NSSDCA, n.d.). This was followed by several other major
milestones of space exploration such as a satellite carrying a living creature (Sputnik 2, 1957).
Both were launched amid political hostility between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) and the United States of America (USA) during the Cold War. Importantly, these
developments raised concerns in the West about the rate at which the USSR's technologies
were developing (US Department of State, n.d.). Shortly after, the USA followed suit, and on
31 January 1958, it launched Explorer 1, the first US satellite to reach orbit (Loff., 2023).

As more and more countries began to develop advanced anti-satellite missiles and other
space-based weapons, concerns arose regarding the potential for an arms race in space. This
situation was exacerbated by the successful tests of anti-satellite missiles (Gohd, 2021) and
the destruction of satellites in orbit by China and Russia (Drake, 2021).

In 1962, the United States conducted a nuclear test in space, code-named "Starfish Prime."
(Gutierrez, 2023). The detonation of a 1.4-megaton nuclear bomb at an altitude of 400
kilometres created an artificial radiation belt that damaged several satellites in orbit. The
test demonstrated the potential for nuclear weapons to be used in space, further raising
concerns about the militarisation of space.

To prevent the weaponisation of space, the United States, the Soviet Union, and other
countries signed the Outer Space Treaty in 1967 (Wichramatunga, n.d.). The treaty aims to
promote the peaceful use of outer space by prohibiting the placement of nuclear weapons
or any other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies, fostering an
environment of international cooperation and mutual respect. It also prohibits the use of
military personnel or weapons testing in space. The treaty has been successful in preventing
the weaponisation of space for over 50 years.

Despite the Outer Space Treaty, recent developments in space technology have raised
concerns about the potential for an arms race to develop in space. In 2007, China conducted

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a successful test of an anti-satellite missile, destroying one of its own weather satellites in
orbit (Broad & Sanger, 2007). The test created thousands of pieces of debris in orbit, posing
a risk to other satellites and the International Space Station. In 2018, Russia announced the
development of a new anti-satellite missile system, the Nudol, which is capable of
destroying satellites in low Earth orbit (Macias, 2018).

The development of space-based weapons has significant implications for global security
and stability. The use of space-based weapons could have catastrophic consequences,
including the destruction of critical infrastructure, disruption of global communication and
navigation systems, and the creation of long-lasting debris fields that could pose a threat to
future space missions. When a satellite is destroyed in space, it creates space debris, which
could easily damage valuable spacecraft such as the International Space Station (ISS), and
threaten the long-term sustainability of space exploration and research. One example of
this was Russia’s destructive anti-satellite weapon test in November 2021, wherein Russia
fired at one of its own satellites and created over 1,500 pieces of space debris. The debris
threatened the lives of seven astronauts aboard the ISS, who were forced to float into
lifeboat pods following the release of the debris (Ali and Gorman, 2021).

To address these concerns, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution in
2018 calling for the prevention of an arms race in space (United Nations, 2022). The
resolution called on all countries to refrain from the development, testing, and deployment
of weapons in space and to work together to prevent the weaponisation of space. It also
called for increased transparency and confidence-building measures among nations to
promote greater trust and cooperation in space activities.

The prevention of an arms race in space is a complex issue that requires international
cooperation and dialogue. The development of space-based weapons has significant
implications for global security and stability, and the potential consequences of their use are
severe. The international community must remain vigilant and work together to ensure the
peaceful and sustainable use of space for future generations.

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Key Terms and Definitions
Term Definition

Dual-use Space Dual-use space technologies are any form of technology, such as
technologies satellites and rockets, which have both commercial and potential
military applications.

Anti-satellite An anti-satellite (ASAT) attack is the capability or operation designed

attack to destroy and disable satellites that are within the Earth’s orbit
through non-kinetic, such as cyberattacks, or kinetic means.

International A set of non-binding, voluntary guidelines formulated by the European

Code of Conduct Union to establish protocols and practices for responsible behaviour
for Outer Space by countries in space.
Activities

Fractional The fractional orbital bombardment system is an intercontinental

Orbital ballistic missile that follows a trajectory such that the missile or
Bombardment warhead is placed into Low-Earth Orbit, with the ability to stay in orbit
System (FOBS) and remain in space before returning into the atmosphere to deliver its
payload.

Rendezvous and Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO) satellites are a type of
Proximity satellite that is designed to perform precise manoeuvres to position
Operations themselves in close proximity to other space infrastructure to interact
(RPO) satellite with the target and possibly, service it.

Situational Situational awareness in space refers to having a comprehensive

Awareness understanding of the events and activities occurring in space and
involves monitoring the environment in space in order to ensure the
safety and security of key space assets.

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United Nations A dedicated and specialised office within the United Nations
Office for Outer Secretariat that is tasked with promoting and coordinating
Space Affairs international cooperation amongst states when exploring and using
(UNOOSA) space.

Outer Space Formally known as the “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
Treaty of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,"it is a legally-binding, international
treaty that dictates and sets out key principles related to activities in
space (Schwarz, 2020).

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Scope of Debate
Dual-use Space Technologies
As elaborated above, dual-use space technologies can be employed for both military and
commercial purposes, such as in the case of anti-satellite attacks (ASAT). The proliferation
of dual-use technology, therefore, raises concerns of countries misusing technologies for
offensive purposes rather than for commercial purposes. In its essence, dual-use
technologies are not weapons. However, when countries build space technologies for
commercial purposes with potential military applications, there is the possibility that such
technologies can be exploited in an offensive manner against infrastructure in space
(Pražák, 2021).

For instance, small, co-orbital satellites have a wide range of uses, from communications to
in-space maintenance. Such small satellites are highly manoeuvrable, utilising a variety of
advanced onboard sensors and awareness technologies, to make precise orbital movements
that allow it to reach specific targets in space (Borowitz, 2022). However, such satellites can
be employed in the capacity of co-orbital ASATs by launching them into orbit and
manoeuvring them for kinetic or non-kinetic attacks against other satellites. For example, in
January 2020, two Russian satellites carried out high-speed, coordinated, orbital
manoeuvres near an American military reconnaissance satellite (Sankaran, 2022). This
illustrates the potential that small satellites possess in being able to act as an ASAT and
destroy vital infrastructure in space, which threatens its security and stability.

The problem of dual-use technologies is exacerbated by the fact that regulation around
them is hazy, without clear and explicit definitions of their use and production. Under Article
IV of the Outer Space Treaty, countries are prohibited from placing “in orbit around the earth
any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction,
install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station[ing] such weapons in outer space in any
other manner.” (Outer Space Treaty, 1966). While this may set out a legal framework that
prevents the placement of weapons or offensive technologies in space, dual-use

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technologies, as highlighted earlier, are not explicitly weapons, as they can have primarily
peaceful purposes.

Furthermore, the rise in the deployment of dual-use technologies in space heightens the
potential for grey-zone conflict. Grey-zone conflict or operations refers to actions between
competing states that tread the fine line between traditional warfare and peacetime
operations. Such operations tend to avoid outright and overt conflict between nations and
instead, employ covert means to target countries and achieve objectives while making the
intent and perpetrator of such actions ambiguous (Till, 2022). In this regard, developments
in dual-use technologies can result in space becoming another domain for the
intensification of grey-zone conflicts. This is due to the ambiguous commercial purpose and
yet offensive capabilities that space technologies can possess which can mask the true
intent of countries when they deploy such technologies in orbit. For example, countries can
integrate cyber-warfare capabilities into commercial satellites that disrupt the operations of
other satellites or provide an avenue for countries to gather intelligence through the
infiltration of satellite systems (Davis, 2019).

Therefore, delegates may consider the steps that can be taken by the DISEC to mitigate the
potential security and safety risks that arise from dual-use technologies in space.
Furthermore, delegates must consider the current state of international law concerning
dual-use technologies, with ambiguities regarding their definitions and scope, and examine
how such frameworks can be strengthened and better defined in the international context.

Gaps in the Current Governance of Space

Governance of space encompasses the enforcement of standards and regulations,
provisions for situational awareness in space, the tracking of objects in orbit, as well as the
coordination of the activities of countries in orbit. It is hence clear that the effective
governance of space is key to ensuring safety and security in this global common.

Global space governance refers to the framework of international space laws as well as
institutions and mechanisms, such as the United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs
(UNOOSA) and the Outer Space Treaty, that regulate and ensure the usage of space in a
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safe and peaceful manner. International space law is composed of two categories - binding
instruments such as treaties and regulations as well as non-binding agreements such as
standard practices and self-governance (Oltrogge & Christensen, 2020).

A pertinent issue that delegates must keep in mind is that the need for global space
governance first manifested in the 1970s due to the Space Race where the USA and USSR
were conducting space launches and tests. However, with the rapid developments in space,
such as the entry of commercial players and advancement of space technologies, space
governance must also evolve accordingly. Changing space governance must address salient
developments in space such as the prevalence of dual-use technologies in space, as well as
the active development and deployment of anti-satellite weapons in space by countries.

The Outer Space Treaty, for example, was formulated to primarily address the placement of
weapons in space. However, in the modern context, it has a lack of scope to address
developments such as ground-based launches of ASAT weapons to space, due to the
ambiguity over their purposes as well as their definition. To this regard, there is a lack of a
clear definition of what constitutes a space-based weapon. Additionally, the Outer Space
Treaty prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction in space, but it does not
define what qualifies as a weapon. This ambiguity leaves room for interpretation and raises
concerns about the potential for countries to develop and test space-based weapons under
the guise of peaceful space. Furthermore, treaties overlook the development of commercial
entities in space as there are no provisions that regulate their usage and presence in space.

Without a clear regulatory framework as well, the effectiveness of institutions such as

UNOOSA is eroded, as countries will now take unilateral actions and formulate their own
space policies in response to developments not adequately addressed by the Outer Space
Treaty. The new United States National Space Policy and Space Policy Directives, which
address debris management, space traffic management, commercial regulations and nuclear
power in space, is an example of countries increasingly favouring the formation of new
domestic policies over international agreements or treaties (Silverstein, 2021).

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Additionally, UNOOSA’s scope of work and duties are also limited to administration of
international treaties and convening space-related forums. With 9,943 satellites in orbit and
30,000 pieces of space debris in orbit (European Space Agency, 2022), situational awareness
in space and coordination of satellites has become a pertinent issue with the UNOOSA
lacking the capacity and scope to regulate traffic in space. For example, SpaceX’s Starlink
satellites are responsible for about 1,600 close passes between two spacecraft every week
(Pultarova, 2021), highlighting not only the lack of coordination of traffic in space but the
lack of regulation over commercial actors in space. Without appropriate mechanisms to
regulate and coordinate how countries and corporations operate in space, safety and
security issues will become prevalent.

Hence, it is pertinent for delegates to consider if the governance of space should potentially
be redefined, and the relevant parameters and considerations that need to be discussed.

Safety of Key Space Infrastructure

With countries following an individualist approach in space, moving away from multilateral
decisions on unaddressed problems, there is now a lack of accountability and appropriate
systems of management to address safety issues that threaten key infrastructure in space.

In this instance, key infrastructure can be defined simply as tools and structures used to help
countries in providing basic and essential goods and services. Examples of their uses include
communications, crisis management and monitoring, environmental control and the Global
Positioning System (GPS) to name a few. Considering the critical functions of such
infrastructure, safety threats would undermine the ability of countries to govern and lead.

One key safety threat to infrastructure in space is space debris. With more than 9,000
satellites orbiting the Earth, coupled with nearly 30,000 pieces of space debris, the risks of
collisions are significant. Collisions are concerning as they may cause the ‘Kressler Effect’
where a single collision would lead to a domino effect of multiple, successive collisions due
to significant crowding in low-Earth orbit (Atkins et al., 2022).

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Presently, there are established guidelines on space debris mitigation, and debate on the
issue has already begun. One such example is the set of guidelines on space debris
mitigation established by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC),
which were subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly in 2007. These guidelines
highlight seven principles that are recommended to be considered when planning launch
missions and space activities. However, critics note that the actions highlighted have been
insufficient in scope and depth. For example, while the seven principles set out the need to
“limit debris release during normal operation”, there are insufficient steps on how a nation
can seek to do that. As the European Space Agency has aptly put it, “space debris mitigation
guidelines provide a framework for what needs to be done, but not for how it is to be
achieved” (Atkins et al., 2022). Thus, it is evident that current mitigation guidelines lack
concrete instructions on how to manage space debris.

Furthermore, such guidelines have not proposed a clear direction for the international
community to follow, and instead merely provide standards that countries are
recommended to follow. It is pertinent for delegates to consider how guidelines can be
further developed from merely providing a base of guidelines and regulations to follow to
ensure safety into a framework that actively sets out the steps necessary for that safety to
be achieved.

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Key Stakeholders
Countries Dominant in Space
China
Since the start of its rapid economic growth and emergence as a global superpower, China
has followed in the footsteps of the United States of America and Russia in developing
revolutionary space technologies. Firstly, China has conducted several successful
anti-satellite (ASAT) experiments, and has been experimenting with cutting-edge
space-based surveillance monitoring systems, and developing anti-satellite jamming
technology that can disable or disrupt the function of adversary satellites (Broad & Sanger,
2007). Vis-a-vis dual-use technologies, China has leveraged upon its technological growth
to achieve both military and space exploration purposes. For instance, the Rendezvous and
Proximity Operations (RPO) are techniques that are not only used for docking and
refuelling, but also used to gather intelligence on other space assets (Sridharan, 2022).
Additionally, the Yaogan satellites, developed by China, are a large number of assorted
satellites which not only conduct land surveys of outer space, but can also be used to detect
and collect intelligence and data from other enemy space assets (Smid, 2022). Overall, China
has demonstrated a fervent position for the militarisation of space, as seen from its plethora
of forays into military space technology research and construction. Hence, China currently
has a formidable presence and influence over space.

Russia
Russia, with its extensive space heritage, has long been at the forefront of space
militarisation. It possesses a robust arsenal of ASAT weapons and has conducted successful
tests, including direct ascent ASAT systems (Defence Intelligence Agency, n.d.). Russia has
also invested in manoeuvrable satellites, known as "inspector satellites," which can approach
and potentially interfere with other spacecraft (Chatham House, n.d.). Furthermore, Russia
has developed and deployed advanced space-based reconnaissance and communication
systems to enhance its military capabilities. To further assist Russia’s space militarisation
venture, the defence industry of Russia has invested in new capabilities and systems in

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military robotics, successfully integrating unmanned vehicles such as aerial drones into its
military operations (Chatham House, n.d.), streamlining the process. However, according to
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, all current space militarisation programmes
were launched in pre-1991 days, when the Soviet Union still existed (Podvig & Zhang, n.d.).

United States of America

The United States of America boasts an extensive network of military satellites that provide
critical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. The United States has
conducted multiple successful ASAT tests, including the 2008 destruction of its own
malfunctioning satellite (Sheetz, 2022). Apart from the myriad of ASAT tests, the United
States has also launched various programmes to aid it in its space militarisation agenda.
Starting from the late 1950s through mid-1960s, the Nike-Zeus programme (Pike, n.d.) has
been responsible for the detection and subsequent destruction of ICBMs by means of
satellites and lasers respectively. The USA National Defence Authorisation Act was signed
into law in 2019, formalising the establishment of a new branch, the U.S. Space Force, in the
armed forces (U.S. Department of Defence, n.d.).

Countries with Peaceful Space Exploration Efforts

Canada
Canada has been an active voice for the demilitarisation of space, and has stressed multiple
times the importance of only pursuing space for exploration and educational purposes.
Canada supports international agreements and frameworks to prevent the weaponisation
of space (UNODA, n.d.), such as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (Arms Control Association,
n.d.). Canada has called for the development of comprehensive space security measures
that enhance transparency, confidence-building, and the prevention of the arms race in
outer space. The country has also been a proponent of initiatives like the International Code
of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, which seeks to establish norms for responsible space
behaviour (EEAS, n.d.). As of the Canadian government’s 2017 defence policy (Berthiaume,
2019), Canada has ensured that the militarisation of space does not infringe upon national
and global security, protecting its own satellites and non-military interests in space.

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Japan
Like Canada, Japan has prioritised peaceful space exploration and has taken significant steps
to promote the demilitarisation of space. The country actively participates in international
forums and initiatives to advocate for the non-militarisation of outer space (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Japan, n.d.). Her space strategy involves advancing two main agendas.
Firstly, the establishment of a rules-based international order and promote the stable and
sustainable usage of space. Secondly, the development of infrastructure to ensure security
on the ground is not weak or uncoordinated (Kazuto, 2023). This highlights Japan’s national
interests of protecting her own region and people, and accentuates its persistence in a
non-militarised and peaceful space. Aligning with the previously-mentioned, Japan has been
involved in efforts to establish norms for responsible space behaviour, such as the
development of guidelines on the prevention of debris creation and mitigation of space
debris. Furthermore, Japan has focused on expanding international collaboration in space
exploration and scientific research (“Japan Space Industry”, n.d.), emphasising the peaceful
utilisation of space assets. Overall, Japan is very dedicated to only utilising space for
educational and research purposes, and is concerned that the imminent arms race between
major powers will disrupt the peaceful and safe space that is status quo.

Developing Countries
In the grand scheme of things, developing countries often opt for a science and
technology-only approach to space. However, the current global arms race often inflicts
several unwanted and detrimental consequences on them. Developing space weapons
requires many resources, which are often unavailable to countries. As such, developing
countries would likely advocate for inclusivity in capacity building in space technology as
well. Space militarisation also causes unprecedented harm to developing countries through
other means. For example, the space-based equipment that developing countries rely on for
services like weather, navigation, and communication could be disrupted with the advent of
satellite jamming technologies. In summary, developing countries often advocate for
research and exploration-only space development because of fears over instability and
economic strains, and would likely fervently push for demilitarisation.

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African Union (AU)
The African Union as a whole, comprising 55 Member States in Africa, has been actively
promoting demilitarisation, and emphasised big powers collaborating with African nations
for collective development and accessibility of space technologies, within the African
continent. Through initiatives like the African Space Policy and Strategy, the AU aims to
develop African space capabilities while emphasising the peaceful and civilian use of space. It
believes that space should be restricted to the peaceful and educational realms, not for
militarisation and tension amongst large powers like the USA and Russia. To this end, the
AU encourages regional cooperation, knowledge-sharing, and capacity building in space
science and technology for each African nation to develop skill sets and establish facilities in
the field of space. Conclusively, it also advocates for the prevention of an arms race in outer
space and the equitable distribution of space-related benefits among African nations
(African Union, n.d.).

Brazil
Brazil has prioritised the peaceful use of space and has taken steps to promote
demilitarisation. The country's space agency, the Brazilian Space Agency (AEB), has focused
on launching satellites for communication, environmental monitoring, and scientific
research (IAF, n.d.). Brazil actively participates in international space forums to advocate for
responsible space behaviour and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The country
also emphasises cooperation with other developing nations, sharing its expertise and
resources to facilitate capacity building in space-related endeavours. In 2004, Brazil also
hosted the First International Conference on Space Security to tackle the issue of space
militarisation and discuss issues pertaining to space security (Filho, 1970). Brazil is an avid
promoter of transparency and cooperation in space activities, and is a member of the Group
of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer
Space Activities (Johnson, 2014).

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Potential Solutions
Enhancing Existing International Frameworks and Organisations
Delegates of DISEC can consider enhancing the capabilities and authority of existing
international frameworks and organisations, such as the United Nations Office for Outer
Space Affairs (UNOOSA). By strengthening UNOOSA's monitoring and regulatory
mechanisms, nations can ensure responsible and peaceful uses of space technologies with
potential dual-use applications. To achieve this, delegates in DISEC could focus on allocating
additional resources, improving information-sharing mechanisms, and fostering cooperation
among member states. This would enable better tracking and verification of space activities
involving such technologies, promoting greater transparency and accountability among
space-faring nations. Additionally, delegates can consider working towards defining clear
rules, responsibilities, and mechanisms for verification and enforcement that limit or
prohibit the deployment of space weapons, including anti-satellite missiles and nuclear
weapons. This would create an international governance framework for space, fostering a
cooperative and secure environment for peaceful space exploration.

Encouraging Guidelines for Responsible Space Debris Mitigation

To address the issue of increasing space debris, delegates can encourage space-faring
nations to adopt guidelines and best practices for responsible space debris mitigation. This
could involve standardised procedures for deorbiting defunct satellites, minimising
mission-related debris, and adopting space traffic management measures to prevent
collisions to promote safe and sustainable use of outer space. By working together to
mitigate space debris, nations can reduce potential risks to critical space assets and ensure
long-term sustainability in space activities.

Currently, the lack of sufficient guidelines at hand can be attributed to the rapid evolution of
the space industry, with a growing number of satellites and space missions, which has made
it challenging for international bodies to keep up with regulations and guidelines.
Additionally, space-faring nations may have differing interests and priorities, which can lead

22
to disagreements when attempting to establish common guidelines. Delegates must
navigate the diverse interests of space-faring nations and find common ground that
benefits all parties, and agree on how to assign responsibility for space debris incidents and
determine liability.

Establishing a Code of Conduct for Space Security

Delegates can also facilitate the establishment of a Code of Conduct for space security,
outlining responsible and safe behaviours to promote peaceful uses of outer space. This
Code would serve as a guiding document for all space-faring nations, and can emphasise the
importance of cooperation, transparency, and conflict resolution mechanisms in space
activities. By adhering to the Code, nations can build mutual trust and confidence, reducing
the likelihood of misunderstandings or tensions that may lead to the militarisation of space.

Delegates are advised to take reference from existing international agreements and codes
of conduct in related fields, such as the Outer Space Treaty which already provides a
framework for peaceful and cooperative use of outer space, international agreements like
the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas (INCSEA) or Confidence-Building
Measures (CBMs) adopted in arms control contexts, which provide valuable insights into
promoting responsible behaviours in space and agreements like the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which offer models for international
cooperation and monitoring mechanisms that can be adapted to space security.

Delegates must aim to strike a balance between personal needs and global concerns, which
can be achieved by ensuring that the development of the Code of Conduct involves all
space-faring nations to address their concerns and interests collectively, creating a Code
that allows for adaptation and updates as technology and international circumstances
evolve and transparent discussions during the drafting process to enable nations to express
their specific needs and concerns.

23
Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMA)
1. How can DISEC go about regulating dual-use technologies?
2. Should DISEC work towards the international governance of space?
3. How should DISEC encourage countries to comply with space treaties and
regulations?
4. Should DISEC redefine terms and regulations in key treaties related to space? What
considerations need to be made?
5. How would DISEC ensure the protection of key infrastructure in space?
6. How should DISEC build trust between major space powers?
7. How could DISEC establish treaties and frameworks that are specific and fair?
8. To what extent should militarisation be restricted in space?
9. How could DISEC encourage dialogue between developing and developed countries
to boost space infrastructure and ensure required funding and assistance is still levied
upon them?

24
Conclusion
With swift breakthroughs in space technology and hence the imminent prospect of the
militarisation of space, the debate of demilitarisation of space has proven itself a significant
and pressing matter for delegates of the DISEC to tackle. Be it through international
cooperation, negotiating treaties, or establishing novel frameworks, delegates of the DISEC
have the weight of outer space all on their shoulders. The militarisation of space has
demonstrated its perils and concerns even as a concept, and these worries will turn into
nightmarish realities if delegates do not promptly employ their diplomacy skills with specific
solutions and cooperation. It is a global matter that will have adverse, profound implications
on global security and trailblazing research if militarisation is left untouched.

Delegates must also reflect that collaboration and the exchange of ideas will be
instrumental in establishing effective regulatory frameworks and arms control agreements
between nations and private corporations. It is also paramount to note that the interests of
multinational corporations must not be disrespected or disregarded, for only through
consensus-building and compliant adherence will resolutions passed in DISEC be useful.

25
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