27A

BEFORE THE GREATER AVENGERS COURT

OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

4TH NALSAR UNHCR PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2024

CASE CONCERNING
The Refugee Status of Karol Denvers, Natasha Romanoff,
and Peter Quill in the Federal Republic of Wakanda

K. DENVERS, N. ROMANOFF, AND P. QUILL

(APPLICANTS)

v.

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF WAKANDA

(RESPONDENTS)

FILED UNDER
Article 2 of the Avengers’ Convention on
International Justice and Human Rights 2010 (ACIJ)

MEMORIAL FOR APPLICANTS

M EMORI AL FOR A PPLI CANTS [T ABLE OF C ONTENTS ]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................. IV

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................ VI
STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................................... X
ISSUES .................................................................................................................................. XII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS....................................................................................... XIII
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED.................................................................................................. 1

ISSUE I: KAROL DENVER SHOULD NOT BE STRIPPED OF THE REFUGEE

STATUS ASSESSED BY WAKANDAN AUTHORITY AND SHE SHOULD NOT BE
LAWFULLY REMOVED FROM DEADPOOL ISLAND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.
.............................................................................................................................. 1

A. KAROL DENVER’S REFUGEE STATUS WAS CORRECTLY ASSESSED BY TALOKAN.1

1. MEMBERSHIP IN A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP ..................................................... 2

B. ARTICLE 1F(B) OF THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION DOES NOT APPLY TO

KAROL DENVER. ............................................................................................................... 3

C. KAROL DENVER CANNOT BE LAWFULLY REMOVED FROM DEADPOOL ISLAND IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW ........................................................................................................ 4

1. VIOLATION OF UN CHARTER................................................................................... 4

2. VIOLATION OF PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION ................................................. 5

3. WAKANDA HAS COMMITTED THE ACT OF AGGRESSION .......................................... 6

4. THE INHERENT RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION EXERCISED BY A PUPPET

GOVERNMENT IS INVALID. ............................................................................................... 7

5. THE ATTACK RESULTED INTO OCCUPATION OF DEADPOOL ISLAND. ........................ 7

ISSUE II: THE REFUGEE APPLICATION OF COMMANDER NATASHA

ROMANOFF SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED AND SHE SHOULD AT LEAST ENJOY
THE PROTECTION OF NON-REFOULEMENT. ............................................................. 8

A. THE REFUGEE APPLICATION OF COMMANDER NATASHA ROMANOFF SHOULD NOT

BE EXCLUDED.................................................................................................................... 8

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1. THE DEPRIVATION OF REFUGEE STATUS IS IN VIOLATION OF THE REFUGEE

CONVENTION, 1951 ........................................................................................................ 9

a. Well Founded Fear........................................................................................... 9

b. Persecution ..................................................................................................... 10

c. The Deprivation of Refugee Status is in Violation of the UDHR, 1948 ......... 11

2. THE EXCLUSION CLAUSE OF ARTICLE 1(F) DOES NOT APPLY .............................. 12

a. 1F(a) doesn’t apply ........................................................................................ 12

b. 1F(b) does not apply ...................................................................................... 13

B. THAT ROMANOFF SHOULD AT LEAST ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF NON

REFOULMENT. ................................................................................................................. 15

1. THE EXTRADITION OF ROMANOFF IS IN VIOLATION OF 1951 CONVENTION ......... 15

C. THE EXTRADITION OF ROMANOFF IS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN LAW ...................................................................................................... 16

ISSUE III: PETER QUILL’S DEPRIVATION OF REFUGEE STATUS IS

UNLAWFUL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HE SHOULD ENJOY THE
PROTECTION OF NON-REFOULMENT. ....................................................................... 19

A. CLIMATE CHANGE CAN BE GROUNDS FOR GRANT OF REFUGEE STATUS................ 19

1. BECAUSE OF WAKANDA’S OBLIGATION UNDER THE ICCPR ................................. 19

B. WAKANDA HAS THE OBLIGATION UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ..... 21

C. PETER QUILL SHOULD ENJOY PROTECTION OF NON-REFOULMENT ................... 22

1. THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULMENT IS RECOGNIZED AS A PRINCIPLE OF

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW. .............................................................................. 22

2. THE NON- REFOULMENT PRINCIPLE CONSTITUTES A JUS COGENS PRINCIPLE IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW. .................................................................................................. 23

3. NON-REFOULMENT APPLICABLE AT THE HIGH SEAS............................................. 24

PRAYER ................................................................................................................................. 26

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

SR. NO. ABBREVIATION EXPANSION

1. ¶ Paragraph

2. & and

3. % percent

4. Applicant Pemola

Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally

5. ARSIWA
Wrongful Acts

6. Art. Article

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,

7. CAT
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Convention on the Elimination of All

8. CEDAW
Forms of Discrimination against Women

9. CIL Customary International Law

10. CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989

11. Ed. Edition

12. HRC Human Rights Commission

13. ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

14. ICJ International Court of Justice

15. ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

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16. IHL International Humanitarian Law

17. ILC International Law Commission

18. MoU Memorandum of Understanding

19. p. Page number

20. para. Paragraph

21. Respondents Boliria and Makonda

22. UN Charter United Nations Charter

23. UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

24. UNGAR United Nations General Assembly Resolution

25. v. Versus

26. VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

SR. NO. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AND RULES PAGE NO.

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July

1. 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (Refugee 1, 9, 12, 15
Convention)

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July

2. 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (Refugee 2
Convention) art. 33(1)

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July

3. 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (Refugee 1
Convention) art1

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December

4. 11
1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR)

SR. NO. CASES PAGE NO.

1. Aalbersberg et al. v Netherlands []2005 (CCRP/C/87/D/1440/2005) 21

2. Asylum Case (Colom. v Peru) [1950] I.C.J. 266, 276-77 21, 22

3. cf Watin v Ministère Public Fédéral [1964] 72 ILR 614 3

4. Chan v. Canada [1995] 3 SCR 593 2

5. Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda (Merits) [2021] Rep 4 8

6. Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy [2012] [GC], No. 27765/09 24

Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Aguirre-Aguirre (1999)

7. 13
526 US 415

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8. Ioane Teitiota v New Zealand [2016] CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 20

9. M. Özel and others v Turkey [2004] 14350/05 20

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua

10. (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits) < https://www.icj- 5, 6
cij.org/case/70 > accessed 28 November 2023

11. Portillo Cáceres et al. v Paraguay [2016] CCPR/C/126/D/2751 20

R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Navaratnam

12. 9
[1987] EWCA Civ J1012-1

13. S. v. Chief Executive, Department of Labour [2007] NZCA 182l 11

14. Soering v United Kingdom [1989] Application No. 14038/8 23

T v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] UKHL 8,

15. 3, 13
[1996]

16. United States v. Geiser [2008] 527 F.3d 288, 294-95 1

17. V.M.R.B. v Canada [1087] CCPR/C/33/D/236/1987 20

18. X v. Canada [1981] F.C.J. No. 1013, 59 2

SR. NO. OTHER AUTHORITIES PAGE NO.

Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under

the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol (Advisory Opinion) < https://www.unhcr.org/fr-
1. 16
fr/en/media/advisory-opinion-extraterritorial-application-non-
refoulement-obligations-under-1951-0> accessed 21 November
2023

2. ICJ Reports (1986) pp. 14, 94; 76 ILR pp. 349, 428 5

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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16

8, 11, 19,
3. December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171
24
(ICCPR)

4. Persecution, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) 2

Re Pavan [1927–28] Annual Digest of Public International Law

5. 3
Cases 347, 349

Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99 (16 August 2000), New Zealand

6. 10
Refugee Status Appeals Authority.

UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING

7. 1
TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES’

8. UNHCR “Res. 428(V), Annex, U.N. Doc. A/1775, — 1 (1950) 23

UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion No. 25, ‘General

9. 23
Conclusion on International Protection’ (1984)

UNHCR, ‘Guidance Note on Extradition and International Refugee

10. 18
Protection’ ( April 2008)

UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on International Protection: Application of

11. the Exclusion Clauses (Art. 1 F of the 1951 Convention)(September 14
2003)

UNHCR, ‘HANDBOOK AND GUIDELINES ON PROCEDURES AND

CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951

12. 1, 2, 3
CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF

REFUGEES’

UNHCR, 'Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian

13. 8
Persons in Time of War' (1949)

UNHCR, 'Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining

14. Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 3, 10, 15
Protocol'(February 2019) UN Doc HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV

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UNHCR’ Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of

15. Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating 25
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol’

United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, 'Title of

16. 6
the Document or Webpage' ([1974])

17. UNSC 'Purposes and Principles of the UN - Chapter I, UN Charter' 4

Xing-Yin Ni, ‘A Nation Going Under: Legal Protection for Climate

Change Refugees ’ (2015)
18. 21
<https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/71460871.pdf> accessed 5
December 2023

SR. NO. BOOKS PAGE NO.

1. Bryan A Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) 2

2. Shaw, M. N., International Law (6th edn, [2008]) 4

SR. NO. UN RESOLUTIONS PAGE NO.

1. UNGA Res 3314 (14 December 1974 6

2. UNGA Res. 36/148, U.N.Doc. A/RES/36/148 (Dec. 16, 1981) 24

3. UNGA. Res. 2312 (XII), Declaration on Territorial Asylum 25

SR. NO. ARTICLES PAGE NO.

Bogdan Ivanel's 'Puppet States: A Growing Trend of Covert

1. Occupation' (2009) <Puppet States: A Growing Trend of Covert 7
Occupation (researchgate.net)> accessed 28 November 2023

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M EMORI AL FOR A PPLI CANTS [S TATEMENT OF F ACTS ]

STATEMENT OF FACTS

[BACKGROUND OF AVENGER ARCHIPELAGO]

1. The Avengers Archipelago, comprising the Federal Republic of Wakanda, the Socialist
State of Talokan, and the Principality of Sokovia, faces a complex geopolitical landscape
shaped by historical conflicts and colonial influences. Wakanda, the largest state, boasts a
powerful economy and military but faces criticism for its human rights policies. Talokan,
with its nuclear capabilities, is known for providing refuge to persecuted people. Sokovia,
ruled by the Kang dynasty, excels in technology and weapons trade but faces scrutiny for
its human rights record. The archipelago's history involves Chitauri and Kree colonization,
with ongoing tensions and alliances shaping its current state of affairs.

[PLIGHT OF KAROL DENVER]

2. Karol Denver’s, a Wakandan Kree activist, faced arrest and harassment in Wakanda for
protesting the de-Kreefication policy. After a lot of arrests and harassment, Karol was
released through presidential clemency. To seek asylum, she escaped to Deadpool Island
in 2019. Facing extradition demands from Wakanda, Talokan granted her asylum, sparking
tensions. Wakanda threatened invasion, leading to Karol's arrest in 2022. Legal challenges
ensued, with Deadpool Island and Wakandan courts rejecting her claims. Before the
Wakandan Supreme Court, Karol argued against the annexation of Deadpool Island,
demanded humane treatment as a refugee, and contested improper asylum evaluation. The
court rejected her appeal, intensifying the complex legal and geopolitical situation
surrounding Karol Denver. Therefore, Karol Denvers filed a complaint in GACJ (Greater
Avengers Court of Justice).

[PLIGHT OF COMMANDER ROMANOFF]

3. In the tumultuous aftermath of the Ravengers incident, tensions escalate between Wakanda
and Talokan, with Deadpool Island at the center of a brewing conflict. The Talokan
authority reinforces its military presence on Deadpool Island, seeking naval support from
Prince Kang XIV. A fierce battle unfolds as Talokan and Sokovian naval forces, led by
Commander Natasha Romanoff, liberate Ravengers Island. However, the destruction of a

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M EMORI AL FOR A PPLI CANTS [S TATEMENT OF F ACTS ]

Wakandan nuclear-powered ship by Commander Romanoff sparks international outrage,

leading to an arrest warrant for ecocide issued by Chitauria. Facing extradition threats from
both Chitauria and Sokovia, Commander Romanoff seeks asylum, only to be arrested by
Wakanda. The Wakandan Supreme Court rejects her asylum plea, setting the stage for a
complex legal and geopolitical entanglement.

4. As the situation unfolds, Commander Romanoff challenges the decision before the
Wakandan Supreme Court, raising issues of the recognition of ecocide, justifiability of SS
T'Challa's destruction, and the validity of Sokovian charges. Despite her pleas, the court
rejects her application, emphasizing the need for Wakanda to address the allegations of war
crimes first. This decision intensifies the complexity surrounding Commander Romanoff's
fate, as she faces the prospect of extradition to Chitauria and Sokovia while grappling with
the intricacies of international law.

[PLIGHT OF PETER QUILL]

5. The aftermath of the Ravengers Island incident unfolds as Peter Quill, a last inhabitant of
Ravagers Island, seeks asylum, highlighting the environmental devastation caused by the
destruction of SS T’Challa, which caused the Nuclear disaster and which even caused the
Nuclear Radiation which lead to the death of Peter Quill’s son. Despite facing rejection
from Wolverine Island authorities, Peter contends that climate change should be recognized
as a valid refugee admission ground.

6. The Wakandan Supreme Court, however, dismisses his claims, emphasizing the absence of
such recognition in Wakandan refugee laws and excluding eco-piracy as grounds for
asylum. Dissatisfied, Peter, along with two other defendants, turns to the Greater Avengers
Court of Justice and Human Rights, invoking the regional jurisdiction established by the
Avengers' Convention on International Justice and Human Rights. The case reflects the
intersection of environmental concerns, refugee status, and piracy accusations in the
evolving legal landscape of the Avengers Archipelago.

7. Dissatisfied with the Wakandan Supreme Court rulings, Karol Denvers, Natasha Romanoff
and Peter Quill, collectively filed complaints before the Greater Avengers Court of Justice
and Human Rights (GACJ). Established in 2015 through the Avengers' Convention on
International Justice and Human Rights, the GACJ holds jurisdiction over the grievances,
involving the ratified states of Wakanda, Sokovia, and Talokan.

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M EMORI AL FOR A PPLI CANTS [I SSUES ]

ISSUES

~I~
WHETHER KAROL DENVERS MAY BE STRIPPED OF THE REFUGEE STATUS ASSESSED BY
WAKANDAN AUTHORITY AND WHETHER SHE MAY BE LAWFULLY REMOVED FROM DEADPOOL
ISLAND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW?

~ II ~
WHETHER THE REFUGEE APPLICATION OF COMMANDER NATASHA ROMANOFF BE EXCLUDED
AND WHETHER SHE SHOULD AT LEAST ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF NON-REFOULEMENT?

~ III ~
WHETHER PETER QUILL’S DEPRIVATION OF REFUGEE STATUS IS LAWFUL IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND WHETHER HE SHOULD AT LEAST ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF NON-REFOULEMENT?

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M EMORI AL FOR A PPLI CANTS [S UMMARY OF A RGUMENTS ]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

~I~

KAROL DENVER SHOULD NOT BE STRIPPED OF THE REFUGEE STATUS ASSESSED BY

WAKANDAN AUTHORITY AND SHE SHOULD NOT BE LAWFULLY REMOVED FROM
DEADPOOL ISLAND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

This is to respectfully submit that Karol Denver cannot be stripped of the refugee status and
she cannot be removed from Deadpool Island. Her refugee status cannot be taken away
because Talokan correctly assessed the applicant's refugee status as in this case there was a
well-founded fear of persecution. There was a fear of persecution based on membership in a
particular social group. Article 1F(b) of the 1951 Refugee Convention does not apply to
Karol Denver's. Additionally, Karol Denver’s cannot be removed from Deadpool Island
because the annexation violates the UN charter, it violates the principle of non-intervention,
Wakanda has committed an act of aggression, the right exercised by the puppet government
is invalid and attack resulted in an occupation and not an annexation.

~ II ~

THE REFUGEE APPLICATION OF COMMANDER NATASHA ROMANOFF SHOULD NOT BE

EXCLUDED AND SHE SHOULD AT LEAST ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF NON-REFOULEMENT.

The exclusion of Romanoff from the Refugee status violates her international rights because it
violates the Refugee Convention, 1951 and it violates the UDHR, 1948. It is most humbly
submitted that the extradition of the applicant violates the principle of non-refoulment because
it violates the 1951 Refugee Convention and it violates the customary international law.

~ III ~

PETER QUILL’S DEPRIVATION OF REFUGEE STATUS IS NOT LAWFUL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

AND HE SHOULD ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF NON-REFOULMENT.

The Applicant submits that the State of Wakanda is obligated to provide refugee Protection to
Peter Quill because of Wakanda’s obligation under the ICCPR and Wakanda has an obligation

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under customary international law. Peter Quill should enjoy the protection of non-refoulment
under International Law because the principle of non-refoulment is a principle of customary
international law, The principle of non-refoulment is a principle of jus cogens under
international law and the principle of Non-Refoulment applicable at the High Seas.

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M EMORI AL FOR A PPLI CANTS [A RGUMENTS A DVANCED ]

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE I: KAROL DENVER SHOULD NOT BE STRIPPED OF THE REFUGEE

STATUS ASSESSED BY WAKANDAN AUTHORITY AND SHE SHOULD NOT BE
LAWFULLY REMOVED FROM DEADPOOL ISLAND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.

[¶1.] This is to respectfully submit that Karol Denver cannot be stripped of the refugee status
and she cannot be removed from Deadpool Island. Her refugee status cannot be taken away
because firstly, Talokan correctly assessed the applicant's refugee status [A] as in this case
there was a well-founded fear of persecution. There was a fear of persecution based on
membership in a particular social group(1) Secondly, Article 1F(b) of the 1951 Refugee
Convention does not apply to Karol Denver's [B]. Additionally, Karol Denver’s cannot be
removed from Deadpool Island(c) because Firstly, the annexation violates the UN charter (1).
Secondly, it violates the principle of non-intervention (2) Thirdly, Wakanda has committed an
act of aggression (3) fourthly, the right exercised by the puppet government is invalid (4) and
lastly attack resulted in an occupation and not an annexation. (5).

A. KAROL DENVER’S REFUGEE STATUS WAS CORRECTLY ASSESSED BY TALOKAN.

[¶2.] Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, defines a
“refugee as an individual who, due to a well-founded fear of persecution based on their race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, cannot or
will not seek protection in their home country”1. To be considered a refugee, a person must
show a well-founded fear of persecution for one of the reasons stated above. It is immaterial
whether the persecution arises from any single one of these reasons or a combination of two or
more of them Well-Founded Fear of Persecution2.

[¶3.] The 1951 Refugee Convention requires asylum seekers to show that there is a
reasonable possibility that they will suffer persecution if returned to their country of nationality
or habitual residence.3 In United States v. Geiser4, the Court noted that Black’s Law Dictionary
defines ‘persecution’ as “violent, cruel, oppressive treatment directed towards a person or a

1
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189
UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention)
2
UNHCR, ‘HANDBOOK AND GUIDELINES ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS
UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES’
3
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189
UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention) art1
4
United States v. Geiser [2008] 527 F.3d 288, 294-95

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group of persons because of their race, religion, sexual orientation, politics or other beliefs.”5
Persecution is established when a person faces a threat to his or her life or freedom,6

[¶4.] There was violent treatment being done towards the Kree community by the Wakandan
authority. The Kree in Wakanda were getting persecuted as a result of the de-kreefication
policy because of which there was an imminent threat to the life of Karol Denver. Hence,
Article 1(A)(2) of the refugee convention is applicable in the case of Karol Denvers because
of the well-founded fear of persecution.

1. MEMBERSHIP IN A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP

[¶5.] A "particular social group" typically comprises individuals with similar backgrounds,
habits or social status7.Persecution on account of membership in a particular social group refers
to “persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons,
all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic.”8 People can be perceived by society
as a social group by reason of their origin or social background.9

[¶6.] Membership of such a particular social group may result in persecution due to lack of
confidence in the group's loyalty to the government, or because the political outlook,
antecedents, or economic activity of its members, or even the existence of the social group
itself, is perceived as an obstacle to the government's policies. 10

[¶7.] Based on the facts of the case, it is evident that Karol Denvers belonged to the minority
Kree community. The Kree community of Wakanda are a social group that comprises only
0.5% of Wakanda's population. Following the military confrontation between a Wakandan
coast guard ship and a Talokan navy vessel, the Wakanda government introduced a de-
Kreefication policy, which led to the persecution of the Kree people. This fact clearly explains
how Karol Denvers had a well-founded fear of persecution as a member of the Kree
community.

[¶8.] It is further respectfully submitted that in the case of Karol Denvers, there was a threat
to life because of the persecution of the Kree community that was being done in Wakanda due

5
Bryan A Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)
6
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189
UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention) art. 33(1)
7
UNHCR, ‘HANDBOOK AND GUIDELINES ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS
UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES’
8
Chan v. Canada [1995] 3 SCR 593
9
X v. Canada [1981] F.C.J. No. 1013, 59
10
UNHCR, ‘HANDBOOK AND GUIDELINES ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS
UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES’

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to the de-Kreefication policy and there was a threat to the freedom of Karol Denvers because
of how even after being arrested and tortured she was being held under surveillance after the
pardon given. These well-established facts clearly show and explain that there was a threat of
persecution and freedom on the grounds of nationality as they belonged to a National minority
and on the grounds of membership to a social group.

B. ARTICLE 1F(B) OF THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION DOES NOT

APPLY TO KAROL DENVER.

[¶9.] Article 1F(b) of the 1951 Convention states that the provisions of the Convention do
not apply to any person who has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country
of refuge before being admitted as a refugee11. Article 1F(b) will only apply in cases where the
crime committed is very grave and holds such a gravity that it will hold importance above the
fear of persecution of the person asking for asylum. For an individual to be excluded under
Article 1 F (b), the crime committed must be classified as a capital crime or a very serious
punishable act.12

[¶10.] Moreover, UNHCR defines seriousness by reference to crimes that involve significant
violence against persons, such as homicide, rape, child molesting, wounding, arson, drug
trafficking, and armed robbery. These are crimes that ordinarily warrant severe punishment,
thus making clear the Convention's commitment to the withholding of protection only from
those who have committed truly abhorrent wrongs.13

[¶11.] The leading UK case on political offences relates to exclusion from refugee status. In
T v Secretary of State for the Home Department. The then House of Lords stated that
‘Homicide, assassination and murder14, is one of the most heinous crimes15. It can only be
justified where no other method exists for protecting the final rights of humanity16. Therefore,
if there are serious reasons to consider that an applicant for refugee status has engaged in
indiscriminate violence constituting a crime ‘before [her/his] admission to that country as a
refugee’, then she would fall within article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention and forfeit her/his
protection under the treaty.

11
UNHCR, 'Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol'(February 2019) UN Doc HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV
12
ibid
13
ibid
14
cf Watin v Ministère Public Fédéral [1964] 72 ILR 614
15
T v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] UKHL 8, [1996]
16
Re Pavan [1927–28] Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases 347, 349

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[¶12.] It seems like you're discussing a legal case involving Karol Denvers and the application
of Article 1F(b) of the UN Charter, which deals with exceptions to refugee protection for
individuals who have committed serious non-political crimes. Here's a more refined legal
language based on the context you provided:

[¶13.] In consideration of this case involving Karol Denver, it is evident that her actions did
not amount to a grave offence nor did they contravene the principles outlined in the UN Charter.
Specifically, Karol Denver’s was pardoned by the President for her wrong expressing dissent
towards the de-kreefication policy, which was her involvement solely in protests against
arbitrary laws enacted by the Wakanda authority.

[¶14.] The petitioner's actions were not in violation of the principles of the UN Charter, nor
did they constitute crimes against humanity or peace. Consequently, the protests carried out by
Karol Denver or any other wrong committed cannot be deemed to satisfy the criteria outlined
in Article 1F(b) that would warrant exclusion from refugee status."

[¶15.] It is to submit before the Hon’ble court that the status of refugee given to Karol Denver
was on correct grounds and hence cannot be stripped off by the Wakanda authority on the
grounds of article 1F(b).

C. KAROL DENVER CANNOT BE LAWFULLY REMOVED FROM DEADPOOL ISLAND IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW

[¶16.] Article 2(4) was elaborated as a principle of international law in the 1970 Declaration
on Principles of International Law and analyzed systematically. First, wars of aggression
constitute a crime against peace for which there is responsibility under international law.
Secondly, states must not threaten or use force to violate existing international frontiers
(including demarcation or armistice lines) or to solve international disputes. Thirdly, states are
under a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force17.

1. VIOLATION OF UN CHARTER

[¶17.] Article 2 (4) 18of the Charter prohibits the threat or use of force and calls on all Members
to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of other States. The
principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct its affairs
without outside interference.

17
Shaw, M. N., International Law (6th edn, [2008])
18
UNSC 'Purposes and Principles of the UN - Chapter I, UN Charter'

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[¶18.] Article 2 (4) of the UN charter states that All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations. The travaux préparatoires to the UN Charter clarifies that “the unilateral use of force
is not authorized or admitted. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force
inter alia against the territorial integrity of states,19 while the draft Declaration on the Rights
and Duties of States, 1949, emphasized that territorial acquisitions by states were not to be
recognized by other states where achieved by means of the threat or use of force or in any other
manner inconsistent with international law and order.20Security Council resolution 242 (1967)
on the solution to the Middle East conflict emphasised ‘the inadmissibility of the acquisition
of territory by war’.

[¶19.] The annexation of Deadpool island violates article 2(4) of the UN charter. Wakanda
used force against the territory integrity and political independence of Talokan and this
annexation is also against the travaux préparatoires to the UN Charter as there was use of force
unilateral and not authorized because of these reasons and reasons stated above the annexation
is unlawful.

2. VIOLATION OF PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION

[¶20.] Territorial integrity denotes the inviolability of a State's physical territory and the
proscription of forcible trespassing of any kind. The principle of respect for the territorial
integrity of states is well-founded as one of the linchpins of the international system, as is the
norm prohibiting interference in the internal affairs of other states.

[¶21.] In the Nicaragua Case,21 the ICJ had explicitly ruled that the use of force could not be
the appropriate method to monitor or ensure respect for human rights, that there is no general
right of intervention in international law and, therefore, intervention violated international
law22.

[¶22.] In Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (hereinafter Armed Activities in the
Congo) and Nicaragua v. United States (hereinafter Nicaragua), this Court specified the types

19
Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda [2005] ICJ Rep168, 223
20
ILC, 'Commentary on the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court' (2nd Session, 1949)
21
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits)
< https://www.icj-cij.org/case/70 > accessed 28 November 2023
22
ICJ Reports (1986) pp. 14, 94; 76 ILR pp. 349, 428

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of activities constituting illegitimate intervention, such as the use of force, occupation, military
activities, or assisting armed rebel groups. 23

[¶23.] It is humbly submitted to the respected court that Wakanda attacked Deadpool island
on a joint operation that included the Wakanda navy and air force. The fight lasted two months
and Wakanda annexed Deadpool Island. The principle of respect for the territorial integrity of
states is well-founded as one of the linchpins of the international system, as is the norm
prohibiting interference in the internal affairs of other states. This annexation violates the
principle of non-intervention which states that there is a prohibition to use of the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state and no state shall
interfere in matters of another state which was violates by Wakanda in the process of annexing
Talokan.

3. WAKANDA HAS COMMITTED THE ACT OF AGGRESSION

24
[¶24.] The General Assembly adopted Resolution 3314 on the definition of aggression. It
defines ‘aggression’ broadly as: the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of another state or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this definition.

[¶25.] United Nations General Assembly Resolution25. Establishes that the “first use of armed
forces by a state in contravention of the charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act
of aggression.” This includes “bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory
of another State.” When a state fails to adhere to the conduct required to assert a right to self-
defence, the state is prohibited from engaging in invasion, attack, or bombardment, against the
territory of another State.

[¶26.] From the facts of the case, it can be clearly seen that Wakanda threatened to occupy
and annex Deadpool island. Wakanda later proceeded to attack Deadpool island with its army
and navy forces after making a strategic plan of occupying Revengers Island to weaken the
Talokan forces. These facts clearly establish how there was first use of armed forces by
Wakanda on Talokan constituting prima Facie evidence of act of aggression.

[¶27.] This annexation violates the principle of non-intervention which states that there is
prohibition to use of the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political

23
Nicaragua (n23)
24
United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, 'Title of the Document or Webpage' ([1974])
25
UNGA Res 3314 (14 December 1974)

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independence of any state and no state shall interfere in matters of other state which was
violated by Wakanda in the process of annexing Talokan.

[¶28.] Secondly, as established by the facts of the case there was the use of force, navy and
airforce for two whole months. This use of force by Wakanda on the territory of Talokan and
a crime against peace is against the principle of un charter.

4. THE INHERENT RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION EXERCISED BY A PUPPET GOVERNMENT IS

INVALID.

[¶29.] Despite being under the control of an external power, a puppet state often maintains its
own governmental structures and institutions, complete with its own head of state, military,
and flag. However, these are typically subject to manipulation, control, or oversight by the
puppeteer state. The puppet state might appear as an independent entity on the international
stage, but its freedom to act independently is severely constrained. It’s important to note that
puppet states are usually established for the benefit of the puppeteer state. The controlling
power may exploit the puppet state’s resources, use its territory for strategic purposes, or
employ it as a buffer against potential threats26.

[¶30.] This is to humbly submit before the court that Self-determination is a right given to
people to free themselves from any domination but this exercise of self-determination by the
government dominated by the other country for their own benefit is against the principle of
self-determination. The exercise of self-determination is not valid as it was exercised by the
puppet government established by Wakanda. This clearly establishes the fact that the
government wasn’t free of manipulation, or didn’t take the decision of secession and joining
Wakanda voluntary but rather took this decision under the control of the Government of
Wakanda who established this government clearly to benefit itself. Hence, the exercise of the
right of self-determination is not valid.

5. THE ATTACK RESULTED INTO OCCUPATION OF DEADPOOL ISLAND.

[¶31.] The ICJ confirmed the legal definition of occupation: “Under customary international
law as reflected in Article 42 of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 18 October 1907, a territory is considered

26
Bogdan Ivanel's 'Puppet States: A Growing Trend of Covert Occupation' (2009) <Puppet States: A Growing
Trend of Covert Occupation (researchgate.net)> accessed 28 November 2023

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occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army, and the occupation
extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised”.27

[¶32.] It is to state that with the exception of special measures authorized by the present
Convention, in particular by Articles 27 and 41 thereof, the situation of protected persons shall
continue to be regulated, in principle, by the provisions concerning aliens in time of peaceṅ28.
This is to further submit before the court that Article 17 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights 29specifies that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his
honour and reputation.”

[¶33.] Protected individuals must be treated with respect and dignity at all times. They are
entitled to safety from violence, threats, insults, and public scrutiny. Hence, as Deadpool Island
is an occupied territory the protected person of the territory shall be regulated. Karol Denver is
a protected person and her status shall remain the same. Karol Denver should be treated as per
the Geneva convention.

[¶34.] Hence, Karol Denvers cannot be removed from Deadpool island as the Wakandan
army's annexation was unlawful and resulted in an occupation. So, when Deadpool island
stands as an occupied territory the treatment of the refugee of the country will be based on the
fourth Geneva Convention and Karol Denvers will remain as a refugee. Karol Denver should
be regulated in the manner prescribed under the Geneva convention and cannot be arrested
from the country of refugee.

ISSUE II: THE REFUGEE APPLICATION OF COMMANDER NATASHA

ROMANOFF SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED AND SHE SHOULD AT LEAST
ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF NON-REFOULEMENT.

A. THE REFUGEE APPLICATION OF COMMANDER NATASHA ROMANOFF SHOULD NOT BE

EXCLUDED.

[¶35.] It is most respectfully submitted that the exclusion of Romanoff from the Refugee status
is in violation of her international rights because firstly, it violates the Refugee Convention,
1951 (1) and secondly. (2)

27
Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda (Merits) [2021] Rep 4
28
UNHCR, 'Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War' (1949)
29
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR)

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1. THE DEPRIVATION OF REFUGEE STATUS IS IN VIOLATION OF

THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, 1951

[¶36.] It is most humbly submitted that the deprivation of refugee status to the applicant is in
violation of the 1951 refugee convention to which the states of Wakanda, Talokan and Sokovia
are parties.

[¶37.] It is pertinent to note that the applicant merely criticized the decision of Government of
Sokovia to join the war. As an aftermath of this, the whole family of the applicant was arrested
by the Sokovian police. The Talokan authority was requested to detain her and extradite her
back to Sokovia. It is also relevant to note that all the persons convicted of crimes against the
Sokovian King faced death penalty. Therefore, the applicant had a legitimate fear of
persecution due to her political opinion.

[¶38.] It is most respectfully submitted that the Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention read
with the additional protocol states that whoever “owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is out-side the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear,
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” is a refugee for the purposes of
this convention30.

a. Well Founded Fear

[¶39.] It is further submitted that an applicant for refugee status had to have a “well-founded”
fear of persecution if he was returned to his own country meant that there had to be
demonstrated a reasonable degree of likelihood that he would be so persecuted, and in deciding
whether the applicant had made out his claim that his fear of persecution was well-founded the
Secretary of State could take into account facts and circumstances known to him or established
to his satisfaction31.

[¶40.] It is most respectfully submitted that the applicant merely criticized the decision of
Sokovian government to take part in the war. Merely on this ground the whole family of the
applicant was arrested. A request was even made by the Sokovian authority to detain her and
extradite her back to Sokovia. Taking into consideration the treatment meted out to her family
members and the statistics as per which anyone who questioned the decision of the King of

30
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189
UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention)
31
R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Navaratnam [1987] EWCA Civ J1012-1

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Sokovia faced death penalty and her well-known personality led to a “well-founded fear” in
the mind of the applicant that she would be subject to persecution.

b. Persecution

[¶41.] It is further provided that Persecution may be found by cumulative, specific instances
of violence and harassment toward an individual and her family members not only by the
government. It was also held that that persecution may be defined as the sustained or systemic
denial of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection32

[¶42.] As per the UNHCR handbook, it may be inferred that a threat to life or freedom on
account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social
group is always persecution. Other serious violations of human rights for the same reasons
would also constitute persecution. The relative importance or tenacity of the applicant’s
opinions in so far as this can be established from all the circumstances of the case –will also be
relevant. persecution “for reasons of political opinion” implies that an applicant holds an
opinion that either has been expressed or has come to the attention of the authorities33.

[¶43.] An applicant claiming fear of persecution because of political opinion need not show
that the authorities of his country of origin knew of his opinions before he left the country.
However, the mere fact of refusing to avail himself of the protection of his government, or a
refusal to return, may disclose the applicant’s true state of mind and give rise to fear of
persecution. In such circumstances the test of well-founded fear would be based on an
assessment of the consequences that an applicant having certain political dispositions would
have to face if he returned34.

[¶44.] It is further submitted that there may be reason to believe that a political offender would
be exposed to excessive or arbitrary punishment for the alleged
offence. Such excessive or arbitrary punishment will amount to persecution.

[¶45.] It was further held in a case that “Moreover, to constitute "persecution" harm threatened
need not be that of loss of life or liberty. Other forms of harm short of interference with life or
liberty may constitute "persecution" for the purposes of the Convention… “restrictions on the

32
Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99 (16 August 2000), New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority.
33
UNHCR, 'Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol'(February 2019) UN Doc HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV
34
ibid

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freedoms traditionally guaranteed in a democratic society such as freedom of speech may

constitute persecution35

[¶46.] It is most humbly submitted that ICCPR under Article 6 provides that every human
being has the inherent right to life and no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life, Article 7
provides that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment, Article 12 provides that everyone shall be free to leave any country, including
his own, Article 19 provides that everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without
interference36.

[¶47.] It is submitted that the applicant faced the threat of death penalty, which is evident from
the statistics, for merely exercising his freedom of speech by merely criticising the policy
decision of the government to take part in the war. It is submitted that the punishment feared
by the applicant was excessive and arbitrary. The restriction on the freedom of speech, the
threat of violation of freedom from torture, degrading punishment, the threat of arbitrary
deprivation of life etc which are granted in a democratic society, raised a well-founded fear of
persecution in the mind of the applicant.

[¶48.] Therefore, the applicant is a refugee within the meaning of 1951 convention and its
additional protocol as firstly he had a fear of persecution and secondly that fear was well-
founded.

c. The Deprivation of Refugee Status is in Violation of the UDHR, 1948

[¶49.] It is most respectfully submitted that the introductory note to the 1951 convention
provides that the basis of the refugee convention is the Article 14 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, 1948 which provides that “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in
other countries asylum from persecution.”37

[¶50.] It is further submitted that under UDHR, Article 6 provides for the right to life and
survival, Article 7 provides for the freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, Article 9 provides for the right to liberty and security of the person and freedom
from arbitrary arrest or detention, Article 12 provides that the right to liberty of movement and
freedom to choose residence and Article 19 provides the freedom of opinion and expression.

35
S. v. Chief Executive, Department of Labour [2007] NZCA 182l
36
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR)
37
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR)

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[¶51.] It can be concluded that by the refusal of the applicant’s refugee application and
extraditing her, the rights enjoyed by her under the UDHR such as her right to freedom of
speech and expression, freedom from degrading punishment, freedom from arbitrary detention,
freedom to choose residence and most importantly the right to seek and enjoy asylum from
persecution are violated.

2. THE EXCLUSION CLAUSE OF ARTICLE 1(F) DOES NOT APPLY

[¶52.] It is most respectfully submitted that there were mere rumours about Wakanda in
relation to development of nuclear weapons. It is relevant to note that even Wakanda had
repeatedly denied these rumours and allegations. Further, it should be noted that the
deployment of Nuclear-powered ship SS T’Challa was “unbeknownst” to anyone. It is also
relevant to note that the objective of the applicant behind the destruction of the ship was to gain
“military advantage” and not to destroy the Ravagers Island. It is submitted that merely being
a former director of the Sokovian Naval Intelligence doesn’t lead to the presumption that the
applicant knew about the nuclear-powered engine of the ship. Finally, the nuclear mission of
Wakanda was just a myth.

a. 1F(a) doesn’t apply

[¶53.] It is most humbly submitted that Article 1F(a) of the 1951 convention provides that the
protection of this convention would not be provided to a person if “he has committed a crime
against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity”38.The Rome Statute of ICC under
Article 8 defines War crime as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
namely, any of the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of
the relevant Geneva Convention: Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or
health; Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.

[¶54.] It also includes other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in
international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely,
any of the following acts: intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such
or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities; intentionally directing attacks
against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives.

38
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189
UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention)

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[¶55.] It is also relevant to note that for a war crime to be committed, the act had to be wilful
or intentional. It is most respectfully submitted that the applicant was not even slightly aware
that the ship SS T’Challa was a nuclear-powered ship. Also, Wakanda itself had denied any
secret development of nuclear weapons multiple times in the past. It is further submitted that
merely being a former director of the Sokovian Naval Intelligence doesn’t lead to the
presumption that the applicant knew about the nuclear-powered engine of the ship and it can
be inferred that the nuclear mission of Wakanda was just a myth.

[¶56.] Therefore, it can be concluded that the exclusion under 1F(a) cannot be applied to deny
refugee status to the applicant.

b. 1F(b) does not apply

[¶57.] It is most humbly submitted that the Article 1F(b) of the 1951 convention provides that
the protection of this convention would not be provided to a person if “he has committed a
serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country
as a refugee.39”

[¶58.] It was held by UK House of Lords that “A crime was a political crime for the purposes
of Article 1F of the 1951 Convention if it was committed for a political purpose and there was
a sufficiently close and direct link between the crime and the alleged political purpose. In
determining whether such a link existed, the court would consider the means used to achieve
the political end and, in particular, whether the crime was aimed at a military or governmental
target, or a civilian target40”

[¶59.] It is further submitted that it was held by the US Supreme court that “In evaluating the
political nature of a crime, the general standard was whether an offence’s political aspect
outweighs its common-law character. This would not be the case if the crime is grossly out of
proportion to the political objective or if it involves acts of an atrocious nature.41”

[¶60.] It is further provided in the UNHCR handbook that “In the present context, however, a
“serious” crime must be a capital crime or a very grave punishable act. Minor offences
punishable by moderate sentences are not grounds for exclusion under Article 1 F (b) even if
technically referred to as “crimes” in the penal law of the country concerned. In applying this
exclusion clause, it is also necessary to strike a balance between the nature of the offence

39
ibid
40
T v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] 2 All ER 865
41
Immigration and Naturalization Service v Aguirre-Aguirre (1999) 526 US 415

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presumed to have been committed by the applicant and the degree of persecution feared. If a
person has well-founded fear of very severe persecution, e.g. persecution endangering his life
or freedom, a crime must be very grave in order to exclude him.

[¶61.] It is further submitted that the UNHCR guidelines provide that “Criminal responsibility
can normally only arise where the individual concerned committed the material elements of the
offence with knowledge and intent. Where the mental element is not satisfied, for example,
because of ignorance of a key fact, individual criminal responsibility is not established.42”

[¶62.] It is most humbly submitted that Ecocide is not an internationally recognised crime.
Therefore, in absence of a crime, the exclusion under Article 1F(b) is not permissible. It is
further submitted that even if a parallel is drawn between ecocide and the relevant provisions
of the Additional Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Convention which under Article 35(3)provides
that it is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended to cause
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment, the exclusion doesn’t
apply because the there was no intentional widespread or severe damage because it is
sufficiently clear from the facts that information that SS T’Challa had nuclear powered engine
was unknown to anyone. The only reason that the applicant ordered the destruction of ship was
to gain military advantage. The applicant had no knowledge or the intention that the destruction
of ship would cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment. On
similar lines, Article 8 of Rome Statute of ICC is not applicable to the instant case.

[¶63.] It is further submitted that the applicant had directed his attack on a military object
rather than a civilian object. The applicant had no intention or the knowledge that his act would
cause harm that is not proportionate to the intended political objective of gaining military
advantage. It is further stated that the applicant did not intend to commit any “serious” criminal
act. The resultant damage was totally unintended and unforeseeable.

[¶64.] It is most respectfully submitted that a balance should be drawn between nature of
offence committed by the applicant and the degree of persecution feared. The applicant had
only intended to gain legitimate military advantage and not any other serious non-political
crime. The degree of persecution she fears is of death penalty which is totally disproportionate
to the benefit to be gained by excluding her under Article 1F(b) of the 1951 convention.

42
UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the Exclusion Clauses (Art. 1 F of the 1951
Convention)(September 2003)

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[¶65.] Therefore, it can be concluded that the applicant shouldn’t be excluded under Article
1F(b) of the convention.

B. THAT ROMANOFF SHOULD AT LEAST ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF NON REFOULMENT.

[¶66.] It is most humbly submitted that the extradition of the applicant violates the principle
of non-refoulment because it violates the 1951 Refugee Convention(1) and it violates the
international humanitarian law.(C)

1. THE EXTRADITION OF ROMANOFF IS IN VIOLATION OF 1951 CONVENTION

[¶67.] It is most respectfully submitted that the Article 33(1) of the 1951 convention provides
that “No Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”43It is further
submitted that it has already been established above that the applicant faced threat to his life
and freedom on account of his political opinion. Therefore, Wakanda was under an obligation
and was bound not to return or extradite the applicant to either Sokovia or Chitauria.

[¶68.] It is also relevant to mention that Article 33(2) of the said convention provides for
deprivation of right of non-refoulement on the grounds such as “there are reasonable grounds
for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the
community of that country.44”

[¶69.] It is humbly submitted that as per the UNHCR handbook, for the “security of the
country”45 exception to apply, it must be established that the refugee poses a current or future
danger to the host country. The danger must be very serious, rather than of a lesser order, and
must constitute a threat to the national security of the host country.46 It is further submitted that
it has already been established that the applicant has not committed any war crime or any
serious non-political crime or any other act which lead to inference of reasonable grounds for
regarding the applicant as a danger to the national security of Wakanda. The danger, if any,

43
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189
UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention)
44
ibid
45
UNHCR, 'Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol'(February 2019) UN Doc HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV
46
ibid

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posed to Wakanda was past danger or danger which had already subsided and not a current or
future danger.

[¶70.] It is further submitted that for the danger to the community exception to apply, not only
must the refugee in question have been convicted of a crime of a very grave nature, but it must
also be established that, in light of the crime and conviction, the refugee constitutes a very
serious present or future danger to the community of the host country It is pertinent to note that
the applicant has not been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime. The
applicant has been denied her right of non-refoulement merely because there are strong
allegations of war crimes against her. Neither there has been any trial against her on the charges
of war crimes or ecocide nor she has been convicted by the final judgement of any court.

C. THE EXTRADITION OF ROMANOFF IS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN LAW

[¶71.] It is most humbly submitted that if the extradition of a refugee has been sought by his
or her country of origin, the requested State is precluded under Article 33(1) of the 1951
Convention or customary international law from extraditing the wanted person. In such cases,
the principle of non- refoulement in international refugee law establishes a mandatory bar to
extradition, unless it has been established by the authorities of the requested State that the
wanted person comes within one of the exceptions provided for in Article 33(2) of the 1951
Convention. Even if this is the case, however, the requested State would nevertheless need to
abide by its non- refoulement obligations under human rights law47.

[¶72.] It is further submitted that certain human rights may now be regarded as having entered
into the category of customary international law in the light of state practice. These would
certainly include the prohibition of torture, genocide and slavery and the principle of non-
discrimination.48 It is further submitted that Article 1 of the 1984 Convention Against Torture
defines the term "torture" as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for
any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or

47
Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (Advisory Opinion) < https://www.unhcr.org/fr-fr/en/media/advisory-opinion-
extraterritorial-application-non-refoulement-obligations-under-1951-0> accessed 21 November 2023
48
ibid

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at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity.”

[¶73.] It is further submitted that Article 3 of the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment expressly provides that “No State Party
shall expel, return or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” As an inherent part of the
prohibition of torture under customary international law, which has attained the rank of jus
cogens, the prohibition of refoulement to a danger of such treatment is binding on all States,
including those which have not yet become party to the relevant treaties.49

[¶74.] The prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of life and of torture and other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 6 and 7, respectively, of the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as interpreted by the Human Rights
Committee, also encompasses a prohibition of refoulement to a risk of such treatment. The
prohibition under international human rights law of refoulement to a real risk of “irreparable
harm” extends to all persons who may be within a State’s territory or subject to its jurisdiction.
This includes refugees and asylum-seekers. It also applies with regard to the country to which
removal is to be effected or any other country to which the person may subsequently be
removed. It is non-derogable and not subject to exceptions50.

[¶75.] The European Court of Human Rights has held in consistent jurisprudence that a non-
refoulement obligation is inherent in the obligation not to subject any person to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of the 1950 European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), and that
this obligation is engaged whenever there is a real risk of exposure to such treatment as a result
of forcible removal, including extradition51.

[¶76.] It is most humbly submitted that the applicant had a well-founded fear that intentional
pain would be inflicted on her in the form of probable death penalty for the purpose of
punishing her for the act she is suspected of having committed. Therefore, there is a high
probability and fear that she would be subject to torture by extradition to Chitauria and Sokovia
as a result of her forcible removal or extradition. Thus, Wakanda would be in violation of Jus
Cogens and customary international law if the applicant is denied the right to non-refoulement

49
ibid
50
ibid
51
ibid

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and is extradited to Chitauria or Sokovia. The right of the applicant of non-refoulement is not
subject to any exceptions.

[¶77.] It is further submitted that in case of a conflict between the violation of principle of
non-refoulement and the country’s duty to extradite, bars to the surrender of an individual under
international refugee and human rights law prevail over any obligation to extradite. The
primacy of such obligations over those contained in extradition treaties is due to their nature
and their place within the hierarchies in the international legal order. It derives from Article
103, in conjunction with Articles 55(c) and 56, of the Charter of the United Nations52.

[¶78.] It is humbly submitted that Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations establishes
the prevalence of Charter obligations over those stemming from other international agreements.
In addition, under Articles 55(c) and 56 of the Charter, Member States of the United Nations
are bound to work towards the achievement of the purposes of the United Nations, which
include universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. In this regard, the United Nations
Security Council and General Assembly have made express reference to States’ obligations
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, including the principle of non-
refoulement53.

[¶79.] It is most respectfully submitted that in the instant case, the applicant should not be
extradited taking into account the hierarchy of obligations which require giving primacy to the
human right obligations, protecting the person in question form torture and not extraditing him
to the country where there is a well-founded risk of capital punishment to him. It might be
argued that the applicant is subject to legitimate prosecution but still there are reasonable
grounds to infer that she has a well-founded fear of persecution which satisfies the inclusion
criteria under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 convention.

[¶80.] Thus, it can be concluded that the application should not be denied the right of non-
refoulement under international humanitarian law and customary international law which are
non-derogable and from which no exceptions are provided.

52
UNHCR, ‘Guidance Note on Extradition and International Refugee Protection’ ( April 2008)
53
ibid

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ISSUE III: PETER QUILL’S DEPRIVATION OF REFUGEE STATUS IS

UNLAWFUL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HE SHOULD ENJOY THE
PROTECTION OF NON-REFOULMENT.

[¶81.] In the aftermath of the destruction of the nuclear vessel SS T’ Challa, Peter Quill found
himself among the remaining few Inhabitants of Ravagers Island. Therefore, he applied for
asylum application in Wolverine Island which the Wakanda Supreme Court rejected. The
decision of the Wakanda Supreme Court is wrong because climate change can be grounds for
grant of refugee status {A.}. Further non-refoulement extends to high seas even registered ships
of a state {B.}.

A. CLIMATE CHANGE CAN BE GROUNDS FOR GRANT OF REFUGEE STATUS

[¶82.] The Applicant submits that the State of Wakanda is obligated to provide refugee
Protection to Peter Quill because firstly, Because of Wakanda’s obligation under the ICCPR.
Secondly, Wakanda has the obligation under customary international law

1. BECAUSE OF WAKANDA’S OBLIGATION UNDER THE ICCPR

[¶83.] Art. 6 of the ICCPR prohibits a Contracting Party from refouling a person to a country
where he or she faces a real risk of irreparable harm as contemplated under Arts. 6 or 754. It is
submitted that the Right to life must be interpreted according to Article 6 of the International
Convention on Civil and Political right (ICCPR), that is, arbitrary deprivation of life involves
interference that is: (a) not prescribed by law; (b) not proportional to the ends sought; and (c)
not necessary in the particular circumstances of the case. Art. 6 preserves the inherent right to
life of every individual; while Art. 7 protects an individual from torture or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment55.

[¶84.] Further in paragraph 12 of its general comment No. 31 (2004) outlining the general
legal obligations imposed on States parties to the Covenant, the states have a duty not to
extradite, deport, expel, or otherwise remove individuals from their territory if there are
substantial grounds to believe in a genuine risk of irreparable harm, as outlined in articles 6
and 7 of the Covenant. It must be emphasized that this risk must be specific to the individual
and cannot solely stem from general conditions in the receiving State, except in highly
exceptional cases. Furthermore, the Committee establishes a rigorous standard, requiring a high

54
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR)
55
ibid

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threshold of evidence to demonstrate the existence of substantial grounds for a real risk of
irreparable harm. It has been stated that the duty to refrain from extraditing, deporting, or
otherwise transferring individuals, as outlined in Article 6 of the Covenant, may extend beyond
the parameters of the non-refoulement principle in international refugee law. {M.M. v. Denmark
(CCPR/C/125/D/2345/2014)}

[¶85.] Moreover, the states are required to opt for positive measures to protect the right to
life56. It has been established by both d regional human rights tribunals have established that
environmental degradation can compromise the effective enjoyment of the right to life57 and
that severe environmental degradation can adversely affect an individual’s well-being and lead
to a violation of the right to life58. Further, it had been asserted that in the absence of substantial
national and international initiatives, the consequences of climate change in recipient nations
could subject individuals to violations of their rights under Articles 6 or 7 of the Covenant.
Consequently, this would activate the non-refoulement obligations of sending States.

[¶86.] Therefore, it is submitted that after analysis of the International Human Right Standard
the Tribunal in Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand59 stated that “There is no hard and fast rule or
presumption of non-applicability of the the convention in case of claimate change exsists. Care
must be taken to examine the particular feature of the case”60 . Moreover, there is clear evidence
to support his contention that he is unable to grow food or obtain potable water. There is
evidence that he had no access to potable water and that the environmental conditions that he
faced or would face on return are so perilous that his life would be jeopardized

[¶87.] It is further submitted that Wakanda by removing Peter Quill from Wakanda would be
violating his right to life under Article 6 (1) of the Covenant. Because Peter Quill does not have
access to safe drinking water and moreover has no means to carry out farming there. Further is
submitted that there is clear evidence that no authority is taking is taking any pragmatic steps
to provide for the basic necessities of life in Ravagers Island. And there is enough reasons to
believe that there exists sufficient health risk that would seriously impair his enjoyment to life
with dignity and even cause his premature death. Moreover, due to the Nuclear Disaster
Ravagers Island had become unhabitable.

56
V.M.R.B. v Canada [1087] CCPR/C/33/D/236/1987
57
Portillo Cáceres et al. v Paraguay [2016] CCPR/C/126/D/2751
58
M. Özel and others v Turkey [2004] 14350/05
59
Ioane Teitiota v New Zealand [2016] CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016
60
ibid

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[¶88.] It is submitted that the risk to life must likely to occur. And there is clear evidence of
such occurrence61 in the instant case. The level of risk faced by the author and their family
meets the necessary threshold to substantiate a strong belief that they are at risk of arbitrary
deprivation of life, as outlined in Article 6 of the Covenant. The death of Peter Quill’s son
proves that in the instant case, there is clear evidence suggesting that the deaths were occurring
due to this catastrophic event.

[¶89.] Further, it is submitted that there were no steps taken by any authority on Ravagers
Island to mitigate the effect of the Nuclear Disaster. Therefore, it indicates the arbitrary
deprivation of the Right to Life within the Scope of Article 6 of the Convention and the real
risk of irreparable harm. Moreover, there was a sufficient degree of risk to his life on Ravagers
Island. Accordingly, by not granting refugee status to Peter Quill Wakanda will violate its
obligation under Article 6 of the ICCPR.

B. WAKANDA HAS THE OBLIGATION UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

[¶90.] It is submitted that another possible source of protection of refugees lies in Custom.
Customary international law gains legal force through the established and repeated behaviour
of states over time, driven by a shared belief in legal obligation, known as opinio juris. The
determination of opinio juris hinges on various factors, including legislative acts, judicial
decisions, and official government statements. Unlike treaty law, customary law does not
necessitate a specific number of states participating in a practice for it to become binding.
Notably, custom can emerge at a regional level, applying exclusively to states within that
particular geographical area.62 Similar to how a sequence of harms can meet the criteria for
persecution in refugee law, a series of efforts by Pacific states aimed at safeguarding
individuals displaced due to environmental reasons could potentially reach the threshold of
establishing a regional customary practice.63

[¶91.] Moreover, in the instant case, it is argued that prior to destruction of SS’T Challa, both
Talokan Island and Deadpool Island had welcomed individuals from Ravagers Island. Even in
the aftermath of a nuclear disaster, a significant number of people relocated to Talokan Island.
Notably, family members of Peter Quill also made the move to Deadpool Island. In the absence
of any intervention by authorities in Ravagers Island, the situation for the states of Ravagers

61
Aalbersberg et al. v Netherlands []2005 (CCRP/C/87/D/1440/2005)
62
Asylum Case (Colom. v Peru) [1950] I.C.J. 266, 276-77
63
Xing-Yin Ni, ‘A Nation Going Under: Legal Protection for Climate Change Refugees ’ (2015) <
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/71460871.pdf> accessed 5 December 2023

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Island is poised to deteriorate progressively. Over time, the possibility emerges that there may
be no habitable territory to which refugee seekers could return, rendering Ravagers Island
inhospitable. Once this scenario unfolds, meeting the criteria for establishing opinio juris would
become a relatively low threshold, given the imminent threat to the survival of the people of
Ravagers Islands.

[¶92.] There is a plausible argument that Wakanda and Talokan, owing to their geographical
proximity and historical ties, bear a heightened responsibility compared to the broader
international community for those displaced from the Ravagers Islands.

[¶93.] It is most humbly submitted that the series of Actions by Talokan and Deadpool Island
to protect environmentally displaced individuals could rise to the level of regional custom.
Therefore, the State of Wakanda under Customary International Law should accept Peter Quill
as a refugee.

C. PETER QUILL SHOULD ENJOY PROTECTION OF NON-REFOULMENT

[¶94.] Peter Quill should enjoy the protection of non-refoulment under the International Law
because Firstly, the principle of non-refoulment is a principle of customary international
law.(1) Secondly, the principle of non-refoulement is a principle of jus cogens under
international law(3). Thirdly, Non-Refoulment applicable at the High Seas(3)

1. THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULMENT IS RECOGNIZED AS A PRINCIPLE OF CUSTOMARY

INTERNATIONAL LAW.

[¶95.] The principles of customary international law, established through state practice and
opinio juris, hold binding significance for all states, a recognition affirmed by the United
Nations General Assembly and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ, in notable
cases like Nicaragua v. United States of America, has emphasized the authoritative value of
customary sources in international law64. Among these principles, non-refoulement stands out,
meeting the criteria for consideration as customary international law.

[¶96.] A wealth of state practice supports the general acceptance of non-refoulement as

customary international law. This is evident in the acknowledgment by the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, responding to inquiries from the German Federal

64
Asylum Case (Colom. v Peru) [1950] I.C.J. 266, 276-77

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Constitutional Court. Moreover, the New Zealand Court of Appeals in 2004 solidified the status
of non-refoulement as an established component of customary international law65.

[¶97.] The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees in 198466, subsequently affirmed by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ Executive Committee in 2005, underscores the
integration of non-refoulement with other Human Rights Instruments like the ICCPR. This
extends the status of non-refoulement as a customary international law principle.

[¶98.] Crucially, non-derogation is a defining characteristic of customary principles. The

United Nations General Assembly's recognition and affirmation in the European Court of
Human Rights further solidify non-refoulement's status.

[¶99.] Even with a more limited interpretation of non-refoulement's erga omnes character, it
aligns with the definition of an erga omnes obligation under Art. 1(b) of the International Law
Commission Resolution on Obligations and Rights erga omnes in International Law.

2. THE NON- REFOULMENT PRINCIPLE CONSTITUTES A JUS COGENS PRINCIPLE IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW.

[¶100.] The concept of jus cogens or peremptory norms in international law is codified in
Articles 53 and 64 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Jus Cogens norms
represent fundamental principles that cannot be overridden or negotiated by states. The
inclusion of peremptory norms in the Vienna Convention recognizes that certain principles are
beyond the power of states to legislate away or mutually agree to abrogate67. It is argued that
the principle of non-refoulement has achieved the status of jus cogens or a peremptory norm,
meeting the criteria of being non-derogable as acknowledged by state-nations.

[¶101.] The determination of whether a norm qualifies as jus cogens depends on whether states
consider it non-derogable68. The principle of non-refoulement fulfills this requirement, with
the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in
Conclusion No. 25 of 1982, noting that the principle was progressively becoming a peremptory
rule of international law.

[¶102.] The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees also recognizes non-refoulement as a jus

cogens norm. The High Commissioner for Refugees emphasized the importance of this

65
UNHCR “Res. 428(V), Annex, U.N. Doc. A/1775, — 1 (1950)’
66
Soering v United Kingdom [1989] Application No. 14038/8
67
UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion No. 25, ‘General Conclusion on International Protection’ (1984)
68
ibid

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principle as a cornerstone of international refugee protection, stating that it should be

acknowledged and observed as a rule of jus cogens69.

[¶103.] Moreover, academic writings, considered sources of law under Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the ICJ, affirm the jus cogens status of the principle of non-refoulement. Prof.
Robledo's writings, in particular, highlight the acknowledged status of non-refoulement as jus
cogens.

[¶104.] In summary, the principle of non-refoulement is acknowledged as both customary law

and a peremptory norm. These legal sources impose erga omnes obligations on parties to be
answerable to the international community for violations. The legal nature of the non-
refoulement principle also grants standing to individuals, such as Premola, to raise questions
regarding its violation.

3. NON-REFOULMENT APPLICABLE AT THE HIGH SEAS

[¶105.] The responsibility of States party to the Convention extends beyond their territorial
borders and is determined by the conduct attributable to the State. In general terms, States are
accountable for actions concerning individuals "subject to or within their jurisdiction," a
common phrase in human rights treaties70. The key factor in establishing jurisdiction is not the
person's location within the State's territory but whether, regarding the alleged conduct, they
were under the effective control of or affected by those representing the State in question71.

[¶106.] As affirmed in the Hirsi case, state officials operating on the high seas are bound by the
principle of non-refoulement, as intercepting refugees at sea grants them physical control. The
application of this principle depends on the exercise of "full" or "effective" control. Jurisdiction
is triggered when actions are taken on the high seas involving another vessel, leading to
migrants being taken on board, and when authorities exert de facto or de jure control over the
intercepted migrants. Such control is also considered when individuals are returned, directed,
instructed, ordered to return, disembarked, forced to enter, conducted to, or handed over to the
authorities or territory of another state72.

69
UNGA Res. 36/148, U.N.Doc. A/RES/36/148 (Dec. 16, 1981)
70
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR)
71
ibid
72
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy [2012] [GC], No. 27765/09

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[¶107.] Further it is submitted that the prohibition of refoulement extends to state actions
outside their territory, including those conducted on the high seas.73 Moreover, the
interpretation of a treaty should align with its objectives, and any understanding that diminishes
its practical impact should be avoided. Consequently, if Article 33 is deemed inapplicable to
extra-territorial state actions, States parties could potentially evade their non-refoulement
obligations by returning refugees from the high seas or their borders.

[¶108.] Further this interpretation is supported by decisions from the Inter-American

Commission on Human Rights74 and the House of Lords75. Additionally, international entities
such as the UNHCR76, United Nations General Assembly, Committee Against Torture, and
Human Rights Committee have expressed the view that the obligation of non-refoulement
applies to extra-territorial state actions.

[¶109.] Therefore, Article 33 should be applied to extra-territorial state actions, specifically

when the individual in question was under the effective control of the Contracting State.

[¶110.] Therefore, the State of Wakanda's argument that non-refoulement does not apply on the
High Seas is incorrect. since Peter Quill was intercepted on the High Seas, and therefore he is
entitled to the protection of non-refoulement.

73
ibid
74
HirsI (n 72)
75
UNHCR’ Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol’
76
UNGA. Res. 2312 (XII), Declaration on Territorial Asylum

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PRAYER

For reasons stated above, the Applicants hereby request the Court to adjudge and declare that:

~I~

KAROL DENVERS SHOULD NOT BE STRIPPED OF THE REFUGEE STATUS ASSESSED BY WAKANDAN
AUTHORITY AND SHE SHOULD NOT BE REMOVED FROM DEADPOOL ISLAND IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW.

~ II ~

THE REFUGEE APPLICATION OF COMMANDER NATASHA ROMANOFF SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED

AND SHE SHOULD ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF NON-REFOULEMENT.

~ III ~

PETER QUILL’S DEPRIVATION OF REFUGEE STATUS IS UNLAWFUL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND

HE SHOULD ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF NON-REFOULEMENT

~ IV ~

ANY OTHER RELIEF WHICH THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY DEEM FIT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.

Respectfully submitted,

AGENTS FOR THE APPLICANTS

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