1

UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF LEGAL STUDIES ,PANJAB UNIVERSITY ,

CHANDIGARH

IN THE HON’BLE SESSION’S COURT AT SONIPAT, HARYANA

CRIMINAL PETITION . ____/2023

UNDER SECTION 209 OF THE Cr.PC R/W SECTION 177 Cr.P.C

STATE OF HARYANA …………………………………...PROSECUTION

v.

SATISH KUMAR AND ORS. …………………………………….. DEFENCE

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE JUDGES OF HON’BLE SESSION’S COURT

COMPENDIUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

KIRAT BIR KAUR

Class Roll no 376/19
University Roll No- 17467 ,
Section -B
 2

This extract is taken from Syed Yousuf Hussain v. State of A.P., (2013) 4 SCC 517 :
(2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 497 : (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 337 : 2013 SCC OnLine SC 302 at page
522
12. In Mahbub Shah v. King Emperor [(1944-45) 72 IA 148 : (1945) 58 LW 368 : AIR
1945 PC 118] , it has been held thus : (IA p. 153)
“… Section 34 lays down a principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The
section does not say ‘the common intentions of all’, nor does it say ‘an intention common
to all’. Under the section, the essence of that liability is to be found in the existence of a
common intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in
furtherance of such intention. To invoke the aid of Section 34 successfully, it must be shown
that the criminal act complained against was done by one of the accused persons in the
furtherance of the common intention of all; if this is shown, then liability for the crime may
be imposed on any one of the persons in the same manner as if the act were done by him
alone.”

Marinal Das v. State of Tripura1

Para 46 Section 34 IPC, it is not necessary that individual act of the accused persons has to be
proved by the prosecution by direct evidence. Again, as mentioned above, common intention
has to be inferred from proved facts and circumstances and once there exist common intention,
mere presence of the accused persons among the assailants would be sufficient proof of their
participation in the offence.

1
(2011) 9 SCC 479
 3

This extract is taken from K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, 1962 Supp (1) SCR
567 : AIR 1962 SC 605 : (1962) 1 Cri LJ 521
85. The Indian law, relevant to the present enquiry, may be stated thus : (1) The test of
“grave and sudden” provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of
society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so
provoked as to lose his self-control. (2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain
circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within
the First Exception to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. (3) The mental background created
by the previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the
subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence. (4) The fatal
blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not
after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for
premeditation and calculation

This extract is taken from Ayyanar v. State of Tamil Nadu2, it was held that courts in the
decisions of BabuLal v. State3and Suyambukkani v. State of Tamil Nadu4 have added one
more exception, known as ‘sustained provocation’. Therefore, while considering whether
there are materials to indicate that there is a grave & sudden provocation as contemplated under
Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC, sustained provocation, on account of a series of acts more or
less grave spread over a certain period of time, would undoubtedly stand added to Exception 1
to Section 300 IPC. It is evident from the bare and apparent facts on record that the conduct of
the Appellants was not predetermined and there was no time to cool down therefore the offence
of murder is not made out as it was truly grave and sudden

3
AIR 1960 All 223
4
[1989 LW (Crl.) 86]
 4

This extract is taken from Chinnan v. State, 1995 SCC OnLine Mad 314 : (1995) 2
MWN (Cri) 178 : 1997 Cri LJ 441 : (1995) 2 LW (Cri) 589 at page 184
11. The next judgment is Sankarlal alias Sankarayee v. State (D.B.), (1988 L.W. (Crl.)
468) rendered on 20.6.1989. It is the judgment in Suyambukkani v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1989
L.W. (Crl.) 86), the Division Bench has expressed a word of caution. It is as follows :—
While coming to his conclusion we are aware of the position that nobody is entitled to
take away the life of another person and that a provocation to come under Exception 1 must
be grave and sudden in the real sense of the term. It is only in such cases, the question of
sustained provocation can be applied and we do not propose to lay down any hard and fast
rule in this regard. IT depends upon the facts and circumstances of each given case. The
Courts have held that the provocation must be sudden and that mere should not be any
interval between the provocation and the act. It is the fundamental principle that whenever
there was time to cool down, an accused person cannot take advantage of this exception, as
the law protects only the cases where an accused person acted out of sudden and grave
provocation and not in cases where he had time to cool down. Whenever there was time for
cooling, the Courts have held that an accused is not entitled to the benefit of exception 1 to
S. 300 I.P.C

63. In Hem Raj v. State (Delhi Admn.), 1990 Supp SCC 291, the accused inflicted single
stab injury landing on the chest of the deceased. The occurrence admittedly had taken place on
the spur of the moment and in heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. According to the doctor
the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This Court observed
as under : (SCC p. 295, para 14)”-

“14. The question is whether the appellant could be said to have caused that particular
injury with the intention of causing death of the deceased. As the totality of the established
facts and circumstances do show that the occurrence had happened most unexpectedly in
a sudden quarrel and without premeditation during the course of which the appellant
caused a solitary injury, he could not be imputed with the intention to cause death of the
deceased or with the intention to cause that particular fatal injury; but he could be imputed
with the knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death.
Because in the absence of any positive proof that the appellant caused the death of the
deceased with the intention of causing death or intentionally inflicted that particular injury
which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death, neither clause I nor
clause III of Section 300 IPC will be attracted
 5

This extract is taken from Comment : The Pernicious Impact of the Defence of Grave and
Sudden Provocation, 4.1 NLUO SLJ (2019) 77 at page 78

Excusatory defences are taken in circumstances where the accused had no mens rea for
committing the crime. For instance, if a crime is committed by an insane person, the person
being incapable of forming the required mens rea for committing the crime, will not be held
guilty for the same and will be excused. Justifiable defences are taken in those situations where
the act of the accused is justified by law. For instance, the right of private self defence is a
justifiable defence as the person is allowed to do an act to a certain extent in order to protect
himself/herself. These two defences generally lead to acquittal. Although both these defences
may share some common traits, however, these two defences are also different in an important
respect. Justifiable defences are granted in those situations, where the act fulfils all the criteria
of an offence but the act of the accused is justified, on the other hand, excusatory defences are
granted in those situations, where the accused's act is wrong but still he/she should not be
blamed for some reasons and hence is excused. No punishment is imposed on the accused if
these defences are proved. The third category is that of partial defences. This defence even if
proved, does not lead to acquittal but rather decrease in punishment. For example, if the defence
of grave and sudden provocation is proved, then the accused is not charged of murder under
section 302 of IPC 1860, rather the accused is charged of culpable homicide not amounting to
murder under section 209 of IPC 1860.
 6

This extract is taken from Purna Ch. Sarania v. State of Assam, 2018 SCC OnLine Gau
2293 : (2019) 5 Gau LR 349 at page 357

23. In order to invoke the Exception 1, it needs to be established, that the act constituting the
offence was done by the accused, while deprived of self-control, due to grave and sudden
provocation. In B.D. Khunte v. Union of India, (2015) 1 SCC 286, the Apex Court observed
that the expression ‘grave’ indicates that the provocation be of such a nature, so as to give cause
for alarm to the accused. ‘Sudden’ means an action, which must be quick and unexpected, so
as to provoke the accused. Therefore, the word ‘sudden’ necessarily indicates, that the
provocation must be in close proximity to the act constituting offence, so as to create a cause
and effect relation, between the provocation and the ‘act’ done. If there is long time gap
between the provocation and act done, which is sufficient to cool down or neutralise the effect
of provocation, the doctrine of “grave and sudden” provocation cannot be invoked. It is no
doubt true, that the provocation may be a single provocative act or accumulated effect of series
of act culminating in the last or ultimate provocative act and in such case, it may not be
necessary, that the entire set of provocative act must immediately preceeds the offence. A
Division Bench of this court in Manju Lakra v. State of Assam, 2013 (4) GLT 333, discussed
this aspect in detail in paras 79 to 88, 90 and 91 and let me quote the relevant portion as below:

79. In a quest for an answer to the query, so posed, it would be necessary to visit some of the
decided cases on this issue.

80. In R. v. Duffy, (1949) 1 All ER 932, the appellant attacked and killed her husband with a
hammer and a hatchet, whilst he was sleeping on bed. Her husband had subjected her to
violence throughout their marital life. Devlin, J, while delivering the judgment, gave the
definition of provocation as follows:

“Provocation is some act, or series of acts, done (or words spoken)… which would cause in any
reasonable person and actually causes, in the accused, a sudden and temporary loss of self-
control, rendering the accused so subject to passion as to make him or her, for the moment, not
master of his or her mind.”

81. In the light of what stand bserved in Duffy's case (supra), provocation may be an act or series
of acts, which, by their very nature, would induce sudden and temporary loss of self-control’
in a reasonable man so that it can be said that he is no longer master of his own mind. The span
 7

of series of acts may differ from case to case; but the law does recognise the series of acts as
cumulative circumstances sufficient to constitute provocation.

82. In Boya Munigadu v. The Queen, ILR (1881) 3 Mad. 33, the court upheld the plea of ‘grave
and sudden’ provocation in the following circumstances: The accused saw the deceased, when
she had cohabitation with his bitter enemy; that night he had no meals; next morning, he went
to the rayots to get his wages from them and, at that time, he saw his wife eating food along
with her paramour; he killed the paramour with a bill-hook.

84. The relevant observations, appearing in Boya Munigadu (supra), read:

“…………………………If having witnessed the act of adultery, he connected this subsequent

conduct as he could not fail to connect it, with that act, it would be conduct of a character highly
exasperating to him, implying as it must, that all concealment of their criminal relations and all
regard for his feelings were abandoned and that they purposely continued their course of
misconduct in his house. This, we think, amounted to provocation, grave enough and sudden
enough to deprive him of his self-control and reduce the offence from murder to culpable
homicide not amounting to murder.”

86. The decisions, in Duffy (supra) and Boya Munigadu (supra), were considered in K.M. Nanavati
v. State of Maharashtra, (AIR 1962 SC 605), and, on an analysis of the ratio, the Supreme
Court evolved the following illustrative parameters:

(1) The test of ‘“grave and sudden”’ provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the
same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed,
would be so provoked as to lose his self-control.

(2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause ‘grave and sudden’
provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the First Exception to section 30 of the
Penal Code, 1860.

(3) The mental background, created by the previous act of the victim, may be taken into
consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused ‘grave and sudden’
provocation for committing the offence.
 8

(4) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation
and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise, giving room and
scope for premeditation and calculation,

88. The principle No. 3, as reproduced above, enables the court to take into account all those acts,
which started building potential rage in the mind of an accused, culminating into the last
provocative act immediately preceding the causing of death, though the provocative act,
immediately preceding the causing of death, may not, by itself, be ‘grave and sudden’ within
the meaning of the expression ‘grave and sudden’ occurring in First Exception to section 300,
IPC. In such cases, the sentence, ‘whilst deprived of the power of self-control by ‘grave and
sudden’ provocation’ may have to be read as ‘whilst deprived of the power of self-control by
series of acts constituting ‘grave and sudden ‘provocation’.

90. The discussion on principle No. 3, laid down in Nanavati's case (supra), would be incomplete
without discussing the principle No. 4, which lays down that the fatal blow should be clearly
traceable to the influence of passion arising out of the previous provocation and not after the
passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise, giving room and scope for
premeditation and calculation. This principle was the answer to the question, which the
Supreme Court posed unto itself regarding the time lag and as to what is the effect of the time
lag between the act of provocation and the commission of offence.

91. Thus, what the principle No. 4 lays down is an extension of the principle No. 3. In other words,
it would be necessary for the courts to ascertain the proximity between the first act, in the entire
series of acts, along with the immediate act, which preceded the act of causing of death. If the
court is able to connect even an innocuous provocative act preceding the causing of death with
a series of acts, which, when taken together, constitute, in its entirety, ‘grave and sudden’
provocation’, the court would be justified in extending the benefit of First Exception to section
300, IPC. The series of acts, which together constitute ‘grave and sudden’ provocation, must
be such acts of provocation, which never really allowed the accused to calm down and the act,
immediately preceding the killing, was the culmination of the previous provocative acts as
mentioned hereinbefore
 9

Surinder Kumar vs Union Territory 5

Author: Ahmadi
Bench: Ahmadi, A.M. (J)
PETITIONER:
SURINDER KUMAR

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
UNION TERRITORY, CHANDIGARH

DATE OF JUDGMENT08/03/1989

BENCH:
AHMADI, A.M. (J)
BENCH:
AHMADI, A.M. (J)
NATRAJAN, S. (J)

Para 3 To invoke Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. four requirements must be satisfied,
namely (i) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a
heat of passion, and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel
manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor is it relevant who offered the provocation
or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive
factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and
unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Where, on a sudden quarrel,
a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one
of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this Exception provided he has
not acted cruelly

5
1989 AIR 1094, 1989 SCR (1) 941
 10

Sukhbir Singh vs State Of Haryana

Author: Sethi
Bench: R.P. Sethi, K.G. Balakrishnan
CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 650 of 1992

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/02/2002

BENCH:
R.P. Sethi & K.G. Balakrishnan

Para 5 To avail the benefit of Exception 4, the defence is required to probabilise that the offence
was committed without pre-meditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden
quarrel and the offender had not taken any undue advantage and the offender had not acted in
a cruel or unusual manner. The exception is based upon the principle that in the absence of pre-
meditation and on account of total deprivation of self-control but on account of heat of passion,
the offence was committed which, normally a man of sober urges would not resort to. Sudden
fight, though not defined under the Act, implies mutual provocation.
 11

This extract is taken from Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana, (1981) 3 SCC 616 : 1981
SCC (Cri) 768 at page 619
5. In assailing the conviction, learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the appellant
having struck a solitary blow on the head of the deceased with the blunt side of the gandhala,
can be attributed with the knowledge that it would cause an injury which was likely to cause
death and not with any intention to cause the death of the deceased. The offence committed by
the appellant, therefore, amounted to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable
under Section 304, Part II of the Code. He further contends, in the alternative, that there could
be no doubt that the appellant acted in the heat of the moment when he hit the deceased and is,
therefore, entitled to the benefit of Exception 4 of Section 300 of the Code. On the other hand,
learned Counsel for the State contends that the matter squarely falls within clause Thirdly of
Section 300 of the Code. He submits that merely because the appellant rendered a solitary blow
with the blunt side of the gandhala on the head would not necessarily imply that the offence
amounted to culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304, Part
II of the Code.
 12

Sachin Laxman Dandekar vs State of Maharashtra, 6

(BEFORE A.S. GADKARI AND MILIND N. JADHAV, JJ.)

Criminal Appeal No. 1032 of 2015.

Criminal Appeal No. 1032 of 2015 and Criminal Appeal No. 1033 of 2015

Decided on September 29, 2022, [Reserved On : 05th September, 2022]

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MILIND N. JADHAV, J.:— Criminal Appeal No. 1032 of 2015 is filed by Original Accused
No. 2 and Criminal Appeal No. 1033 of 2015 is filed by Original Accused No. 1. Accused No.
1 is the father of Accused No. 2.

25. Keeping in mind the aforementioned statutory provisions, on minute perusal of the
evidence and record of the present case, it is discernible that Appellant No. 1's daughter
(Jyostna) had a love affair with Sakharam which was not accepted by his family. It has come
on record that both Jyostna (19 years) and Sakharam (21 years) were of tender age and
belonged to different castes and hence their alliance was not accepted by Appellants' family.
From the deposition of PW-1, it is seen that Appellant No. 1 had visited Sakharam's house and
informed his family that he will not give Joystna's hand to Sakharam and they should find some
other bride for him. It is also important to note that few months prior tot he incident, Appellant
No. 2 had also confronted Sakharam at Umargaon and threatened to kill him if he continued
his lover affair with Jyostna.

26. . Since bystanders including PW-2 gathered at the spot, Appellants ran away on their
motorcycle. It is pertinent to note that Appellant No. 1 was a carpenter by profession and it is
therefore not unusual on his part to carry a hammer and other equipment related to carpentry
in the boot of his motorcycle. Therefore, in view of the provisions of Exception 4 to Section
300, in our opinion, the act of inflicting a singular blow with the hammer on Sakharam's
forehead by Appellant No. 1 can be said to have been inflicted in a heat of passion and on the
spur of the moment due to the motive, but certainly cannot be a premeditated and planned act
to murder him. We say so for the following reasons.

6
2022 SCC OnLine Bom 3120 : (2022) 3 AIR Bom R (Cri) 834
 13

27. After inflicting the singular blow, Appellants did not take any undue advantage or act
in a cruel or unusual manner but were frightened since bystanders gathered at the spot. Hence
they left the spot on their motorcycle. Further at the behest and instance of Appellant No. 1,
the weapon (hammer) and the motorcycle was recovered and seized by the IO. Hence it is
discernible that it could not have been the intention of Appellants to kill and murder Sakharam
but certainly both Appellants wanted to teach him a lesson and reprimand him for continuing
with the said alliance. The injury caused to Sakharam by blow of hammer was however fatal
leading to his death.

28. The discussion and findings alluded to hereinabove, in our considered opinion
pertaining to act of the Appellants does not travel beyond the offence of culpable homicide not
amounting to murder in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Act of Appellants due
to the motive proved by the prosecution was an act committed in the heat of passion and on the
sudden spur of moment whereby the singular blow of hammer was inflicted by Appellant No.
1 on Sakharam's forehead.

This extract is taken from Bavisetti Kameswara Rao v. State of A.P., (2008) 15 SCC 725 :
(2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1175 : 2008 SCC OnLine SC 553 at page 727
Para 8. Insofar as the first appellant-accused Bavisetti Kameswara Rao is concerned, the
learned counsel urged before us that this was a case of single injury, that too, the weapon used
was a screwdriver which was in the regular use of the accused as a tool, the appellant-accused
being a motor mechanic. It was but natural that he would use the said screwdriver in the regular
course of his occupation and since he had not used any other weapon, it could not be said that
his intention was to cause death of the deceased or also to cause such bodily injury as would
be sufficient to cause death of the deceased. The learned counsel for the accused submitted that
it was only a single injury and, therefore, even if in the knowledge of the accused that such
injury was likely to cause the death of the deceased, the offence at the most would be under
Section 304 Part II IPC. As an alternative argument, the learned counsel contended that at the
most this was a sudden quarrel and the altercation took place without a preplan. As such, the
offence at the most could have been under Section 304 Part I and, therefore, the High Court
and the trial court were not justified in convicting the accused for an offence under Section 302
and sentencing him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life.