THE STRUCTURE OF

INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT
C. R. Mitchell
Professor of International Relations
The City University, London

palgrave
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 Structure
. . . Conflict is a situation in which two or more human beings desire
goals which they perceive as being obtainable by one or the other but
not both. This compact definition can be opened out and clarified by
saying that there must be at least two parties; each party is mobilising
energy to obtain a goal, a desired object or situation; and each party
perceives the other as a barrier or threat to that goal . . .
Ross Stagner (1967a)

Considerable ambiguity surrounds the term 'conflict'. In everyday use,

it is often taken to mean some dispute in which two or more parties are
using violence as a means of winning, or more usually (as they perceive
it) 'in self-defence'. Violence is normally used in the sense of physical
damage, although it is becoming increasingly acknowledged that it is
possible to speak of using psychological violence and causing
psychological damage to an adversary. (It is not true that 'Sticks and
stones may break my bones, but names will never hurt me!') However,
a moment's reflection should be enough to recognise that a relation-
ship of quite genuine conflict may exist, even though none of the
parties behave in a manifestly violent manner. Two individuals in a
legal case are undoubtedly 'in conflict', but both are using essentially
non-violent methods in order to achieve their goals.
If the essential element of this common language meaning of conflict
is the activity of the parties, this leads to an assumption that the term
'conflict' refers to actual behaviour (which often involves coercion and
usually violence). Thelishaytomis_aimed-at least at preventing the
opposing party preventing. o e f _ io • ,0411 Its
absence iiiiicen to be a sign that the parties are in a co-operative
relationship, in a condition of peaceful co-existence, or 'at peace'.
Concentration upon the behavioural manifestations of a conflictful
relationship is extremely limiting, however, and leads to neglect of
other aspects of that relationship. Is a conflict merely a particular
(violent) kind of inter-action between parties, Or 1253X1212001.
(
state of mind among their members? If a group of people hate and fear
15
 16 THE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT

another group of people, are they not in conflict with them? And is a
dispute over specific issues, which may involve no feelings of fear or
r
hostility, or sense of personal threat, not conflict? There is little doubt
that feelings of antagonism and other personal and emotional dif-
ferences arising between humans, singly and in groups, are important
aspects of human conflict, and form part of the meaning often attached
to that concept.'
At the very beginning, then, we need to emphasise that such expres-
sions as 'social conflict' or 'international conflict' are vague, even multi-
meaning terms, presenting a challenge to devise clear definitions for
what are normally ambiguous concepts. Partly because of the variety of
phenomena commonly associated with such expressions, there seems
little point in attempting a definition of conflict which is unitary as well
as unambiguous. Instead, a multiple definition will be used throughout
this study, in order to include a number of everyday connotations of the
term, yet also to be able to discriminate between these aspects or com-
ponents. When speaking of any conflict or dispute, fundamental dis-
tinctions will be drawn between the three inter-related components of:

(i) a conflict situation;

(ii) conflict behaviour;
(iii) conflict attitudes and perceptions.

B ehaviour Attitudes

FIGURE 1.1 Triadic conflict structure

 STRUCTURE 17

The three-dimensional format can be illustrated by a simple figure,

adapted from Galtung (1969), emphasising that our three structural
components may be analytically considered separately but that, in any
real world conflict, all three are intimately connected with each other in
complex ways (see Fig. 1.1).

A. CONFLICT SITUATIONS

Initially, a situation of conflict will be defined as:

Any situation in which two or more social entities or 'parties' \'

(however defined or structured) perceive that they possess mutually -
incompatible goals.

By 'goals' we mean consciously desired future outcomes, conditions or

enclaigio, which often have intrinsic (but differeiiiTartreior mem ers
of particular parties, but which also bring with them other increased
benefits or decreased costs for party members. Thus, the Palestinian
goal of replacing Israel by a cantonal, secular Palestinian state is in
conflict with the Israeli goal of the continuing existence of an in-
dependent Israel. The former in itself represents a valuable future
achievement for many Palestinians, but also a wide variety of dif-
ferentially distributed benefits for particular Palestinian groups. Com-
pare the leadership of the PLO with existing Arab leaders in the West
Bank area, or with the bulk of refugees in the Palestinian camps.
A simpler, more basic situation would be two small boys simul-
taneously wanting exclusive possession of a single rubber ball, a
situation that might lead on to grabbing, name-calling, inter-party
violence, an escalation in both inter-party hostility and intra-party
anger plus appeals to superior third parties for assistance or arbitra-
tion. (The situation might also involve other factors, such as sibling
rivalry and the need to demonstrate strength and intransigence to third
parties.) Similar situations arise at other social levels. Divorced parents
quarrel over custody of the child, and even go to such lengths as court
cases and kidnapping in order to achieve their goal of possession (or
denying possession to the other). The Japanese Government and the
two Chinese Governments (Peking and Taiwan) all claim the Senkaku
Islands in the East China Sea, which passed back into Japanese control
in 1972 according to the terms of the US/Japanese Okinawa Agree-
ment. All these cases involve circumstances in which parties possess
 18 THE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT

goals which (apparently) cannot be simultaneously achieved, and hence

a conflict situation characterised by incompatibility exists.

1. SOURCES OF GOAL INCOMPATIBILITY

Defining conflict situations as those in which parties come to possess

mutually incompatible goals (whether the parties are individuals, social
groups or organisations), immediately prompts a further question.
What sorts of conditions regularly give rise to mutually incompatible
goals? Attempting to answer this question would require a book in
itself, but briefly, we operate on the assumption that the major source
ofinsajp n atible_goati:lies in a rim-ma c •etween social values and
social structure. Many conflict situations involve--- cot is of scarc 7
—iiia—VaTtreT,--Which place a premium on the possession of the same
resources or positions. Others result from value incompatibilities
regarding use or distribution of resources, about social and political
structures, or about beliefs and behaviour of others. Chalmers Johnson
(1968) refers to such condilionis:asestli , emphasising that
they arise most frequently in societies where rapid change is occurring
(either in social structure or values). The conception of diverse sources
may be included in Fig. 1.2 merely by adding a fourth element.
Inter-action between social structure and values producing conflict
is well illustrated in a type of peasant social system known as a 'limited
goods' society. In such a society, members hold acquisitive values, but
also believe that every desirable social 'good' is in limited and fixed
supply. Hence, there is a scarcity of such valued phenomena as
security, health, safety, influence, manliness, honour or friendship,
as well as such more familiar scarcities as wealth or land.2 The values
and perceptions in 'limited goods' societies are such that there is
an inevitable process whereby individuals, families and factions
develop goal incompatibilities, which arise when any other person
or group increases its share of a valued commodity thus, by definition,
decreasing the share available to others (Foster, 1967). In such cases,
inter-personal and inter-familial conflicts arise (and also call forth
social mechanisms for avoiding overt violence and coercion) through
the inter-action of:

(i) existing value systems;

(ii) perceptions of scarcity;
(iii) physical limitations of the amount of material goods at any one
point in time.
 STRUCTURE l9

Sources:
Social structure
vs Social values:
scarcity, competition,
change

Behaviour Attitudes

FIGURE 1.2 Sources and conflict structure

in more complex social settings, both intranational and inter-

national, conflicts also arise from a (possible temporary) scarcity of
oods, which existing value systems define as worthwhile or desirable,
arid—over which competition occurs. Fred Hirsch has pointed out that
circumstances of scE.cinaLallsEboti.....2asimsEerisiljoasis (oil wells,
motor cars), and positional goods (roles as managers, permanent
members of thrr itrSZCZTan111), the latter being scarce in some
absolute and final sense (Hirsch, 1977). However, beyond a certain
minimum point necessary for physical survival, both types of goods are
scarce at a given moment because value syser tn-s—Of variouss-Tars
persuade people that they are valuable and to be sought after; or
because they bring about certain effects (admiration, social status, a
sense of security) that people have learned to regard as desirable. (The
fact that other value systems lead to contempt for, and rejection of,
 20 THE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT

for example social status or material goods, underlines the argument

that scarcity is brought about by an inter-action of social structure and
social values. There is, as yet, no competition over the role of farm
labourer because material rewards remain low, and no value system
ascribes high status to that type of work.) If either type of goods is
scarce, then it is almost inevitable that goal incompatibilities over dis-
tribution will arise.
Izlirsch"s distinction between the scarcity_of material goods and
_polifiorkal goods is important, for it draws attention to the fact—thAt
many conflicts are oven issues such as the occupation of particular
scarce positions (as when conflict occurs over the occupancy of par-
ticular decision-making roles for society); the creation of alterna-
tive sets of positions (as when a group wishes to secede from one
national society and establish another, complete with independent
decision-making roles); or the exclusion of particular others from
scarce positions (as when one group works to prevent another
occupying positions of political influence within a society). Further-
more, his work underlines that success in conflicts over position often
provides, in addition, continued and unequal access to material goods,
leading to the development of a social structure based upon a whole set
of have and have-not (or have-less) groups. These differences can
stratify into permanent divisions where the have/have-not lines
reinforce each other in some stratified social system based upon caste,
race, language or class criteria. In such circumstances, goal in-
compatibilities tend to follow a similar pattern, and social entities
possess whole inter-linked sets of goal incompatibilities leading to
situations of almost wholly conflicting interests, with no shared goals
to offset that conflict. ocial structures are thus likely to be created
which, given the values of t se involved and the inability of that
society to produce more of either the material or positional goods in
dispute, lead to frequent, repetitive and often intense conflicts across
apparently permanent cleavages within the social structure, as parties
pursue goal incompatibilities that (in a very basic sense) arise from that
structure and set of values. Cleavages in Ulster or in pre-secession
Pakistan illustrate such structures. Alternatively, a social structure can
emerge where the divisions into haves and have-nots cut across one
another, the haves in one sense — social status — being the have-nots
in another — material wealth or political influence. It is often argued
that such a criss-crossing socza structure why e not necessarily
diminishing the number of conflict situations that arise, has the effect
of modifying the ferocity with which particular collectivities and
 STRUCTURE 21

grows ursug their interests -- that is, of modifying conflict behaviour

(Coser, 1956; McClelland, 1968).
This line of argument may offer insights into why much of the most
violent human conflict occurs at the international level, where social
structure is characterised by substantial 'vertical' cleavages between
territorial state-based social entities; by inevitable development of
mutually incompatible goals between these socially isolated and (often)
highly cohesive units (only in a Utopia of limitless resources will
conflicts not arise); by decentralisation of.decision-making power; and
by only the most rudimentary means for riloWg
resort to organised coercion or violence. Hence, the proportion of
highly lethal conflicts at this social level, and the frequent replication
of violent disputes when such conditions replicate themselves else-
where, as within Nigeria, Vietnam, Cyprus or the Lebanon.
Given the approach to the sources of conflict outlined above, it will be
obvious that this study is largely concerned with conflicts that are both
realistic and — in some limited sense — rational (or at least 'instru-
mental'). Conflict situations arise from the pursuit of goals, and from
goal incompatibilities, and in this minimal sense may be viewed as real.
However, even at the level of basic goal incompatibilities subjective and -
psychological factors can be important. In certain cases parties may
perceiy,e,,thaticheiF goals are incompatible at a given point-~n time when,
in_ fact, their perceptiotis41071-ttparrect:Tiiro -pijisible examples of this
are where parties act on the assumption that goals are logically mutually
exclusive, when this is not the case; or where one or both parties
misperceive the real nature of the other's goals, and perceive a conflict
situation when, with perfect knowledge all round, none would exist. In
the complex and emotional real world of human relations, neither
situation is as rare as might appear, particularly given the propensity of
goals to change over time, or the causes of a given situation to remain
ambiguous or unknown. It can be argued that such 'unreal' conflicts
should admit to an easy solution through correcting misperceptions, yet
the practical difficulties of doing so may remain substantial.

2. TYPES OF GOAL

To a large degree, the nature of the parties' goals offers insight into the
underlying sources of a conflict. The kind of goals held by individuals,
groups and organisations are clues both to the underlying sources of
particular types of conflict and the way the issues in conflict are
presented. Goals can be classified as two major types:
 22 THE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT

(a) Positive goals, already referred to as consciously desired future

states: increased wealth, favourable balance of payments, access to
the sea, custody of the child, becoming head of state, seceding and
establishing an independent country, achieving secure and defensible
borders.
(b) Negative goals, which involve the avoidance of unwanted future
states or happenings: avoiding bankruptcy, democrats coming to
power, or the CPR being admitted to the UN.

To some degree, negative goals are automatically implied by a party's

possession of positive goals. If Party A wants Goal X, then, logically, A
does not want any Not-X. However, there is a practical difference
between wanting a specific, positive goal as first choice and being
unwilling to accept any alternative future state as second best; and
wanting to avoid a specific future state yet perhaps being willing to
accept almost any alternative if only that undesired can be avoided. The
latter case can be illustrated by a conflict occurring annually on the
US/Canadian border between North Dakota and Manitoba, when the
spring floods fill the Pembina River (also the international boundary)
and spill over onto the land of whichever side (Canadian or American)
fails to build the higher dykes. The goals of both parties (local
Canadian and American farming communities) are to avoid having the
flood waters spill onto their side of the river and ruin the crops. To this
end, dykes on both sides of the river are built higher each year (but
apparently never high enough to contain the flood water completely).
In recent years, farmers from both communities have taken to
dynamiting the flood defences on the opposite side of the river in order
to avoid the unwanted future state of flood and ruin on their side of the
Pembina. It should be emphasised, of course, that the goal of both
communities is not primarily to have the spring floods flow onto the
land of the other community, but to prevent it flooding onto their own
land. Hence, a whole range of other alternative outcomes become
theoretically possible, most of them involving no loss or damage to the
other party in this 'international' conflict.' The example suggests that
conflicts involving negative goals for the parties may often be simpler to
solve, mainly because they also involve the possibility of a number of
alternative future states (some of which must be realistic as well as just
theoretically possible), which would satisfy the parties by avoiding
undesired outcomes.
The simple division of goals into positive or negative can be extended
by the observation that parties in the real world seldom pursue single
 STRUCTURE 23

goals in isolation, thus becoming involved in situations where

individual goals are mutually incompatible. A far more realistic view is
one in which the parties possess a set, or schedule, of desired goals
(both positive and negative), some of which are salient and highly
valued, others desired but peripheral, and all held in (at least) some
rough-and-ready order of importance. Circumstances will thus arise
where parties possess a number of goals that clash, but the number and
the salience of the clashing goals will vary from case to case. Similarly,
other parties may find that while some goals they pursue are mutually
incompatible, others are, in fact, compatible or congruent, their
achievement even depending upon the co-operative behaviour of the
other party. A mixed situation of conflict and co-operation often
exists. One further line of thought arising from the conception of
parties pursuing goal 'sets' is the nature of non-conflictful relation-
ships between social entities, and how these differ basically from
relationships involving conflict.

3. NON-CONFLICTFUL RELATIONSHIPS

That particular parties may possess and pursue congruent as well as

contradictory goals underlines the simple fact that social entities, from
individuals to countries, can be in co-operative as well as conflictful
relationships, and frequently are in mixed situations of conflict and co-
operation. Relationships of 'pure' conflict seldom exist, although it is
logical to allow for circumstances in which all the goals of two parties
are incompatible. Historically, situations of total conflict have
occasionally existed between parties, from families (Montagues and
Capulets before Romeo and Juliet reached puberty) to countries
(Germany and the Soviet Union from May 1941 to 1945).4
While the world mainly proffers examples of mixed relationships
between entities, it is interesting to consider the theoretical nature of
pure conflict or co-operation, and to exhaust the range of social
relationships that can exist, before concentrating upon those
dominated by conflicting goals. Once again, in considering the nature
of co-operation, common language approaches emphasise the be-
havioural aspects of the relationship (. . . 'cooperation, the process by
which social entities function in the service of one another
Wright, 1951, p. 197), although psychological aspects are also
commonly noted, such as mutual liking or role inter-dependence.'
However, our discussion of goal compatibility and incompatibility
leads to the conclusion that there are other components to the
24 THE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT

relationship of co-operation such as the nature of the parties goals,

which need to be included in any analysis of pure co-operation,
Furthermore, it can hardly be argued that relationships of conflict or
co-operation exhaust the possible range of circumstances. Countries,
collectivities, groups and individuals . may have non-interfering,
private, disjoint goals . (LAIschen, 1970, p. 24); may not inter-act at
the behavioural level; and (in extreme cases) may possess no per-
ceptions of, or attitudes towards, one another. In other words, parties
may have no relationship at all, one with another, and hence be in
circumstances of complete isolation. (Perhaps Japan under the
Tokugawas comes nearest to the pure situation at the international level
— that is, until Japanese isolation was broken through the action of
Commodore Perry's fleet.) Hence, while bearing in mind the mixed
nature of most real world relationships, we suggest the three relation-
ships in Table 1.1 as 'ideal' types.
TABLE 1.1 Social relationships: Basic types

Characteristic
`Pure' Characteristic inter-party Characteristic
situation Goals behaviour attitudes relationship

Incompatible:
Conflict (1) in different Solely at own Hostile Enmity
order of behest;
importance blocking,
(ii) Contra- resistant, inter-
dictory; fering; cost
mutually imposing
exclusive
Congruent:
Co-operation Identical, inter- Via consulta- Friendly Alignment
dependent or tion; concerted,
complementary or accommoda-
tive; benefit-
con ferring
Independent:
Isolation No inter-active None directed Ignorant or None
effects; goals towards the non-existent
can be held other party
simultaneously
as none affects
the other

Table I .I emphasises the central role of a party's goals in defining

what sort of relationship exists between it and another party or, more
 STRUCTURE 25

realistically, what degree of conflict and co-operation characterises the

inter-party relationship. As we have argued already, 'pure' situations
of conflict or co-operation seldom exist in real world relationships at
any social level, even the international. The degree to which, in mixed
relationships, conflicting relationships are off-set by co-operative ones
(and vice versa) will have a considerable effect both on the attitudes of
the parties towards one another, and to the behaviour they use to
pursue their goals. These other components of conflict, attitudes and
behaviour, must now be briefly introduced.

B. CONFLICT ATTITUDES

As we devote Part II of this study to considering the other two

structural components of our overall concept of 'conflict', we can be
brief in this present introductory section. The second of our major
components of 'conflict' consists of those psychological states or
conditions that accompany (and frequently exacerbate) both conflict
situations and resultant conflict behaviour. We should emphasise
initially that the main assumption of this study is that the 'psychology
of conflict' is best regarded as an exacerbating factor, rather than a
prime cause of social and international disputes. In other words, an
instrumental approach is adopted to the main question of the sources
of conflict, and the assumption made that conflicts are most usefully
regarded as arising from a realistic pursuit of goals, no matter how
oddly these goals appear to be selected. This approach is very much
opposed to another main line of thought in research into human
conflict, which may be characterised as the expressive view of the
sources of human conflict. This is mainly espoused by those psycholo-
gists, psychiatrists and ethologists, who insist that human conflict is
fundamentally an 'internally' generated phenomenon, its root causes
lying in the emotional states of fear, hostility, anger or aggression
shared by large and small groups of individuals. 'Wars begin in the
minds of men . . is a crucial sentiment of the opening sentences of
the UNESCO Charter. However, the exact interpretation of 'begin
in . is important. If it means that hostility, fear and aggression
arising spontaneously within men are the prime underlying cause of
conflict situations developing, or conflict behaviour taking place, then
the whole drive of research into conflict must take one particular
direction, as must practical efforts to solve conflicts and disputes.6 If it
means that fears, prejudices and assumptions inculcated into people in
26 THE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT

the past, or a current perception of threat and danger, can bring about
or accompany violence or other coercive behaviour as a reaction, then
quite different inferences for research and policy should be drawn.
It is worthwhile considering the expressive approach to the sources
of social and international conflict, in connection with our simple
`model' of the major components of conflict. Basically, an expressive
approach to conflict implies that the sources of a dispute lie in the
psychological processes determining a party's emotions, attitudes and
perceptions, and that these could, in turn, affect the selection of an
adversary, and of issues over which to differ, as well as the kind of
behaviour deemed appropriate. In short, the diagram would need to be
altered from that appropriate for an instrumental approach to conflict,
where the sources of conflict were those conditions in a party's
environment leading initially to situations of goal incompatibility, and
ensuing attitudes and behaviour, see Fig. 1.3.

Situation Situation

Sources:
Aggressive drives,
intra-personal
Behaviour Attitudes tensions, aggregate
frustrations

FIGURE 1.3 Instrumental and expressive theories of sources of conflict

This may seem rather an obscure distinction, although the second

diagram in Fig. 1.3 represents the position taken by some psyChiatrists,
psychoanalysts and ethologists, who argue that the basic sources of
war and other human ills brought about by unrestrained or lethal
disputes, lie in human, genetically determined aggressiveness,' the
death instinct (or some other manifestation of mental illness), or the
 STRUCTURE 27

normal (but regrettable) workings of the unconscious. It also throws

light upon the arguments of conflict researchers who hold that some
conflicts are, in a sense, unreal and thus require actions to end conflict
quite different from those indicated by their ostensible causes. One
example of unreal conflict is that caused by the process of scape-
goating, the name given to the process by which the frustrations, fears
and hostility generated within a particular group of people, either by
continual stress and deprivation, or by specific events or actions by
others, are redirected onto some easily available third party, which
then becomes the target of accusations, competition, and (often)
violence. Frequent cases of pogroms or disorganised violence carried
out against ethnic or religious minorities during times of economic
decline, high tension (war or an external threat) or severe frustration
(by an untouchable ruling elite), are often quoted as examples of this
process of redirecting hostility and energy away from the real source of
fear and goal-frustration. If and when such a process occurs, it does,
indeed, raise serious problems for anyone attempting to analyse the
dispute. The basic causes of the overt behaviour may not be those
consciously put forward by the belligerent party to explain that
behaviour. (Individuals may be rationalising their own activity.) In this
sense, then, the conflict may be 'unreal' and attempts to solve it by
operating on the ostensible causes doomed to failure. It is argued by
proponents of theories of unreal conflict that only when the original
(and often hidden) sources of frustration, tension or fear are removed,
will the redirected conflict behaviour come to an end. The problem for
the analyst (and policy-maker) is to discover the actual source of these
emotions, which usually involve salient goals not being achieved.
Even though a motive-oriented approach to conflict undoubtedly
offers a number of promising insights into otherwise puzzling aspects
of certain types of conflict (mainly individual and small group), none-
theless this study adopts a basically instrumental approach to disputes.
Conflict attitudes are regarded as those psychological states (both
common attitudes, emotions and evaluations, as well as patterns of
perception and misperception) that frequently accompany and arise
from involvement in a situation of conflict. Conflict attitudes and
perceptions are assumed to be factors arising through the stresses of
being in a conflict, rather than factors fundamentally causing con-
flicts, although extreme conflict attitudes involving hostility, mis-
perceptions and dehumanisation of the opposing party will obviously
exacerbate any dispute. Furthermore, it is undoubtedly the case that
previous experience of a conflict will leave residual elements of
28 THE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT

prejudice and hostility to affect future behaviour, and these may

become contributory sources of future disputes. The long drawn out
`feuds' of Orangeman and Catholic in Northern Ireland, or Greek and
Turk in Cyprus, are examples of this factor in operation.
Our choice should not be interpreted as downgrading the importance
of psychological aspects of any conflict, however, nor an intention to
neglect fear, hostility, suspicion, distrust and a sense of being under
threat as important contributory factors in the continuance of a
dispute. Conflict attitudes often become key factors in later states of
disputes, and in the continuation (and even extension) of the conflict
when the original situation has altered so that it no longer seems
sufficient reason for continuing. High levels of hatred and anger may
become of paramount importance, so that the conscious goals of the
parties change to include those of defeating, punishing or humiliating
the adversary. Recognition of the often crucial role of such
psychological aspects of a conflict is of greatest importance in
analysing any dispute, or in taking any action to bring about a solution
(or merely an end to violence). If, for example, efforts are being made
to remove the reasons for a conflict continuing, does one concentrate
upon the situation of goal incompatibility, or upon the psychological
condition and perceptions of the parties involved? The answer appears
to be that, in most cases, both are important and inter-connected. Past
experience of conflict (especially with the same adversary) will give
people a set of expectations regarding the future; assumptions about
their own nature and the nature of their opponents; and prejudices
about other parties and peoples, all of which affect the likelihood of
future conflict situations developing in the direction of coercion. Such
behaviour will undoubtedly reinforce previously held beliefs and
attitudes, and make participants ready to develop more extreme levels
of intolerance, hatred and suspicion. A self-reinforcing process
develops.
Implicit is the idea that, as conflict attitudes are regarded in this
study, two distinguishable aspects are involved; an emotional, judge-
mental or affective element, and a cognitive or perceptual element.
Both influence a party's view of its external environment, of itself and
its adversaries, whether the party is an individual or made up of
individuals. Both will affect the probability and intensity of subse-
quent violence. For the moment, therefore, we define conflict attitudes
(employed as shorthand for 'conflict attitudes and perceptions') as:
Common patterns of expectation, emotional orientation, and per-
ception which accompany involvement in a conflict situation. At this
 STR UCTURE 29

point, it is sufficient merely to indicate that conflict attitudes include:

(i) Emotional orientations, such as feelings of anger, distrust,

resentment, scorn, fear, envy or suspicion of the intentions of
others.
(ii) Cognitive processes, such as stereotyping, or a refusal to accept
non-conforming information in an endeavour to maintain a
consistent structure of beliefs about the outside world (and
especially about an adversary).

A number of specific 'images' are the result of these latter processes

operating in a situation of conflict, but detailed consideration of these
will be left until later.

D. CONFLICT BEHAVIOUR

Our third major component of 'conflict' consists of the actual

behaviour of the opposing parties resulting from their possession of
mutually incompatible goals and from their attempts to achieve those
goals. Conflict behaviour may initially be defined as:

Actions undertaken by one party in any situation of conflict aimed

at the opposing party with the intention of making that opponent
abandon or modify its goals.

Several comments need to be made to clarify this working definition.

The first is that it presents an immediate (and familiar) problem of
interpreting the motivations of a behaving party; in this case, of
`getting behind' the action and determining whether an action was
`truly' intended to affect an adversary in such a manner as to bring
about a change in goals and objectives. Use of the term 'truly'
emphasises that someone has to make a judgement about the intention
of the acting party and three possible answers exist to the question of
who interprets the aims and intentions of the actor:

(1) The actor himself.

(ii) Some observing third party.
(iii) The target of the act.

It is quite possible that an action may be perceived by an adversely

 30 THE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT

affected party as having the objective of forcing it to abandon a

particular disputed objective, but that, in spite of such a perception
this was not the underlying intention of the actor. A general warning
issued by a minister of one country may be taken by another govern-
ment to have been specifically directed against them, when the warning
was, in reality, directed against a third government. Nonetheless, it
seems from a common-sense point of view that conflict behaviour
should consist of actions aimed at affecting the other party, either
directly or indirectly, but certainly by intention. The particular
individual, group, organisation or country should be trying to raise the
costs to its adversary of the latter's continuing to pursue its own goals,
and should be conscious that this is its fundamental strategy. The
parties' intentions and objectives underlying particular actions are,
however, crucial elements in the definition. Conflict researchers have
indeed, made a distinction between conflict, implying behaviour aimed
at affecting an opponent, and competition, where behaviour is aimed
directly at achieving particular goals. (For instance, a fist-fight
contrasted with a foot-race.)
The second point about our definition is that actions do not
necessarily have to be violent to be counted as conflict behaviour,'
although they may be so. Violent behaviour does not automatically
arise from any conflict situation, nor, indeed, does conflict behaviour
necessarily have to involve any coercive element, or strategies that raise
the opponent's costs of continuing to pursue his own goals to such a
level that the pursuit will be abandoned. This may seem perverse, as
conflict behaviour is normally taken to mean some form of action
containing a coercive element, threatening or imposing costs on an
opposing party. Furthermore, any definition of conflict behaviour
which does not limit the category to that involving coercion places us in
the paradoxical position of arguing that all behaviour in a conflict
situation, provided it is aimed at the opposing party, is conflict
behaviour, even if this involves retreat, compromise or behaviour
which confers benefits on an adversary. According to our present
definition conflict behaviour can involve threats of negative sanctions,
offers of alternative benefits, discussion, persuasion, appeals to
common values, or common sense, and a whole range of non-violent
behaviour, even though the ultimate threat of future violence may be
constantly in the background to act as implicit coercion should any of
the non-coercive acts fail to achieve their desired objective.
Apart from the crucial element of deliberate intention, and the
unimportance of violence as a criterion of conflict behaviour, a third
 STRUCTURE 31

major implication of our working definition is that conflict behaviour

can take on a wide variety of forms in addition to the classical ones of
physical damage to other people and property on a large or small scale.
Often, these forms can be extremely bizarre. For example, one small
section of the pacifist sect known as Doukhobors, now resident in
western Canada, practices a wide variety of conflict behaviour in order
to force the remainder of the sect (and ultimately, the other inhabitants
of British Columbia) to abandon material possessions which threaten
'the spiritual life'. The 'Freedomites', as the radical section of the
Doukhobors is called, have blown up schools, public buildings and
other churches, as well as burning down their own villages and starting
major forest fires. However, one of their most frequent forms of social
protest is to appear in the nude, in order to emphasise their contempt
for material possessions and their desire to convert others to sharing
their values.9 Undoubtedly, such action falls within our present
working definition of conflict behaviour; a situation of goal in-
compatibility exists between orthodox and radical Doukhobors, and
the radical Freedomites are using this particular form of behaviour,
among others, to influence their adversaries to abandon their goals.
Paradoxically, other forms of conflict behaviour can be intended to
have a primary effect upon the opposing party, but result in an even
more drastic secondary effect upon the party taking the action. One
example is self-destruction (or the threat thereof) through: (i) suicide,
as in the case of a number of Buddhist monks in South Vietnam in their
struggle against the Catholic-dominated regime of Ngo Den Diem; or
(ii) hunger striking, as in the case of many suffragettes in England
during the struggle to obtain the franchise before World War I, or
various Catholic prisoners during the current troubles in Northern
Ireland. Both types of action may be seen as behaviour aimed at
changing the goals, decisions and behaviour of an adversary (usually a
much stronger one). The 'coercion' in such cases is not easy to identify
— at least in any everyday sense of that word — although some may be
exerted through loss of reputation, or through the anticipated negative
reactions of influential third parties. Physical damage occurs mainly to
the behaving party. However, self-destruction by some members of a
party in conflict can prove a very potent strategy in achieving 'victory'
for those of the party who remain.
When confronted with such strange examples of conflict behaviour,
a sense of intellectual simplicity arises when considering more
'orthodox' forms by parties in a conflict situation. However, even the
more straightforward types of conflict behaviour, involving coercion,
 32 THE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT

cost-imposition and (ultimately) violence, are all, to some degree,

culture bound. Hugh Foot, for example, describes how, during his
early years as a colonial administrator, a traditional form of conflict
behaviour between hamoulets (family farms or holdings) in Samarian
villages was tree cutting, whereby injury was inflicted upon an enemy
by cutting down or burning fig or olive trees belonging to the rival
hamoulet (Foot, 1964, p. 45). Sanctions against villagers who gave
evidence about such behaviour to colonial authorities consisted of
further bouts of tree cutting as a warning. Tens of thousands of pounds
worth of damage was inflicted annually by this activity.

E. SUMMARY

This opening chapter has introduced some of the conceptual com-

plexities that attend any study of the basic structure of social and
international conflicts, and in doing so has advanced the conception of
three inter-related components in what everyday language means by
`conflict':

(i) A situation of incompatible goals.

(ii) A range of psychological conditions experienced by the parties
involved.
(iii) A set of related behaviours used to achieve the disputed goals.

Working definitions were suggested for these basic components, a

short discussion undertaken of possible sources of social conflicts, and
some consideration given to questions of non-conflict relationships.
All of this may seem academic in the worst sense of that word, and to
have little connection with the realities of either conducting a conflict
in a cause deemed ,just, or of managing conflicts which threaten to be
damaging for the society in which they occur. However, discussions of
fundamental terms and concepts, and attempts to achieve initial cleat
thinking should be sympathetically considered. Clear analysis should
always precede action, and this is the case whether one is trying to
understand a conflict, win it, or find a solution before it becomes too
destructive. Consider the prime problem of how a society, intra or
international, can cope with intense conflicts. To a large degree, the
manner in which any social system attempts to deal with conflict
depends upon the dominant theories in that society about the nature of
the phenomenon, about its structures, and about the way in which it
 STRUCTURE 33

develops (perhaps in 'undesirable' directions). To take a crude example

of this principle, if certain conflicts within society are regarded as
stemming from ineradicable human qualities such as greed and envy
then they are defined as sins, crimes or social deviance, and are
`managed' by coercion or punishment and the imposition of law-and-
order policies through deterrent police forces. If, by contrast, conflicts
are deemed to be caused by inadequate socialisation then a solution is
sought by efforts to improve the inculcation of approved norms,
beliefs, and patterns of behaviour within new members of society. If
another society holds the theory that conflict becomes unavoidable
because of inherent aggressive drives in men, then the best way of
managing conflict in that society becomes the provision of 'safe'
opportunities whereby such aggressive drives can be released in ways
that cause minimum destruction to the social fabric, and to others in
society. If, finally, the view is prevalent that conflicts are basically
instrumental, and occur because of a rational pursuit of goals in
conditions of scarce resources, then conflict management becomes a
matte of resource redistribution, or the inculcation of different sets of
values, such as frugality and asceticism.
Adopting an initial approach that suggests that what are normally
called 'conflicts' are complex and multi-dimensional phenomena,
consisting of at least three basic components, we imply that efforts to
analyse disputes must take account of the existence of these three
components, and their inter-relationships. Similarly, attempts to
prosecute disputes, or to manage them so that they become productive
(or at least less harmful) must also take account of the three com-
ponents discussed in this chapter.
Unfortunately, a number of other complexities regarding the basic
nature of conflicts between human individuals and groups remain to be
discussed before proceeding to more detailed analysis of the realities of
international and intra-national disputes. For one thing, it is
manifestly the case that conflicts are not static phenomena, and hence
the dynamic aspects of conflict which alter both structure and inter-
party relationships over time, are essential aspects of any satisfactory
analysis. The necessity for considering the nature of basic conflict
processes, both inter-party and intra-party, is unarguable. Again, we
have tended to discuss the basic structure of conflicts in isolation from
any consideration of who takes part in such inter-actions, and of what
sorts of social entities engage in conflict, with what differences in
behaviour and results. The remainder of Part I therefore considers
such fundamental topics as the nature of conflict situations and
34 THE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT

conflict processes, the nature of parties in conflict, and the dynamics

of conflict. We begin with a more detailed discussion of the issues in
conflict.