Estrada v.

Desierto GR# 146710-15, 3/2/01 Facts: This is a petition to question the legitimacy of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos assumption of the presidency of the Philippines, filed by her immediate predecessor Joseph Estrada.

What actually happened: May 11, 1998: Estrada wins the presidency with an overwhelming lead. Arroyo is elected as Vice-President. October 4, 2000: Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson starts publicly accusing Estrada and his family of receiving jueteng payoffs. October 5, 2000: Echoes of Singsons accusations resound in both the Senate and House of Representatives, mainly through opposition members /members of the Minority. October 11-November, 2000: Several advisers resign, including Department of Social Welfare and Development Secretary Arroyo. Estradas allies in the Majority defect to the other camp. Past presidents and Archbishop Cardinal Sin call for Estradas resignation. November 13, 2000: House Speaker Manuel Villar transmits the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. November 20, 2000: the Impeachment Process formally starts, with 21Senators as judges, and Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. presiding.

December 7, 2000-January 11, 2001: the Impeachment trial proper. Presentation of evidence. On January 11, 11 senators vote against the opening of the second envelope, which allegedly contains evidence to prove that Estrada indeed kept a secret bank account worth 3.3 billion pesos under the name Jose Velarde.These 11 outnumbered the 10 senators who wanted to have the envelope opened. January 17, 2001: Public prosecutors resign, and the impeachment proceedings, postponed indefinitely. January 18, 2001: Hundreds of people march to EDSA in a mass movement calling for Estradas resignation (dubbed the EDSA II Movement). January 19, 2001: the Military withdraws support from Estrada, and more members of the Executive branch resign. Estrada agrees to holding a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. January 20, 2001: Estradas and Arroyos advisers start negotiations on a peaceful and orderly transfer of power, only to be cut short by Arroyos oathtaking as the 14th President of the Philippines. That same day, Estrada and his family leave Malacaang. Estrada releases a statement which said that he was leaving Malacaang for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation.He also sends a letter to both chambers of Congress saying that he [is] unable to exercise the powers and duties of [his] office. January 22, 2001: Congress issues a Resolution recognizing and expressing support for the Arroyo presidency. Other countries expressed the same. February 6, 2001: Sen. Teofisto Guingona is nominated by Arroyo to be her Vice-President

February 7, 2001: Senate passed Resolution No. 83 terminating the Impeachment Court.

from the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. 2.Respondents Argument: The cases pose a political question (the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration ) and are therefore out of the Courts jurisdiction, especially since Arroyo became president through people power, and has already been recognized as such by other governments. They compare the present case with Aquinosrevolutionary government (Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino).

What the parties to this case did: February 5, 2001: Estrada files a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ or preliminary injunction to enjoin Ombudsman Desierto from continuing the probe on the criminal cases filed against him (OMB Case No. 0-00-1629,1754-1758), supposedly until his term as President is over. February 6, 2001: Estrada files another petition, this time a quo warranto petition, against Arroyo. He wanted to be confirmed as the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines and Arroyo only as temporary / acting president until he is able to resume his duties. February 24, 2001: Respondents file their replies to Estradas consolidated petitions.

Issue: Whether or not Estrada is merely a President on leave, which makes Arroyo just an Acting President. (Whether Estrada resigned from his position)

1.Petitioners Arguments: He has not resigned as President yet, and so Arroyos presidency was void since the position was not vacant at the time she was sworn in. He is only temporarily unable to fulfill his duties as President, and that he is merely on leave. Given the above arguments, Estrada is still President, especially since he was never impeached, and he thus enjoys Presidential Immunity from all kinds of suit. The Ombudsman has to stop the investigation since he had already developed a bias against him (Estrada)

Held: Estrada resigned from his position. There are two elements that must be present to consider someone to have resigned: first, the intent to resign, and second, the act/s of relinquishment. Both elements were evident in Estradas actuations before he left Malacaang, and so he must be considered to have resigned. Using the Totality Test (i.e., the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing material relevance on the issue), the Court found that Estradas acts to be tantamount to his resignation.

For intent: the Court mainly used Angaras Diary, Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in order to intuit Estradas intent. The Diary, which was published in a major publication, described Estradas acts following the massive withdrawal of support by former Estrada allies. Here, Estrada is quoted to have proposed a snap election of which he would not be a part. He was also shown to have conceded to the idea that he had to resign.

For acts of relinquishment: the Court enumerated five. 1. Estrada acknowledged Arroyos oath-taking as President of the Republic. 2. He said he was leaving the seat of presidency for the sake of peace but did not say that he would return or that he was leaving only temporarily. He did not specify what kind of inability it was that prevented him from discharging his presidential duties at that time. 3. He thanked the people for the opportunity to serve them. The Court took this as a past opportunity. 4. He also said he was ready for any future challenge, and the Court took to mean a future challenge after occupying the [presidency]. 5. He called on his supporters to join efforts at reconciliation and solidarity. The Court said that these would not be possible if Estrada refuses to give up the presidency. 6. Estrada also argues that he could not have resigned as a matter of law, since Section 12 of

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) prohibits the resignation or retirement of any public officer pending a criminal or administrative investigation for any case filed against him under RA 3019 or the Revised Penal Codes provisions on bribery. The Court interpreted this provision according to the intent of the lawmakers, and that is that the provision was included supposedly to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under [RA 3019]Estrada therefore cannot invoke this provision to violate the very practice it was supposed to prevent.

Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Bureau of Labor Relations G.R. No. L-43760 (August 21, 1976) FACTS: Petitioner lost to National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) in the certification elections for the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc. Tallied votes are as follows: NAFLU 429 PAFLU 414 Spoiled Ballots 17 (not counted) Abstained

4 Total Ballots 864 (Note: NAFLU didnt obtain the majority vote, which is 432.) Petitioner contends that the spoiled should be considered as in the ruling in a previous case. Respondent answered that the ruling in the previous case was based on the Industrial Peace Act, which has been superseded by the present Labor Code and as such cannot apply to the case at bar. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion by not allowing the spoiled ballots to be considered as in the previous case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines vs. CIR. HELD: There was no grave abuse of discretion made by Respondent since the basis of the ruling in the Allied Workers case has been superseded by the present Labor Code. Also, the Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code has been already been made known to public and as such has the enforcing power in the case at bar.

holiday wage incompliance to the issuance of Sec. 2 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code and the Policy Instruction No. 9 issued by Respondent (then Secretary of DOLE). Petitioner filed for a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiters decision of paying the holiday wages and the motion was granted. IBAA then appealed to NLRC and NLRC dismissed the appeal. At this point, IBAA filed a motion for reconsideration to Respondent. Respondent granted IBAAs motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari charging Respondent of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. ISSUE: 1. W/N the decision of the Labor Arbiter can be set aside by Respondent considering that it has become final and had been partially executed.

2. W/N Sec. 2 of Implementing Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9 are valid. HELD: A judgment in a labor case that has become executory cannot be revoked after finality of judgment. In the case at bar, IBAA waived its right to appeal by paying the holiday wage and is therefore deemed to have accepted the judgment as correct. Sec. 2 and Policy Instruction No. 9 are both null and void since they amended the provisions of the Labor Code. It has been held that where the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. And also, if a contemporaneous construction is so erroneous, the same must be declared null and void.

Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong, G.R. No. L-52415 (October 23, 1984) FACTS: Petitioner first filed a complaint to the lower Court against Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) for not paying the holiday pay. The Petition was granted and IBAA paid for the holiday wage. Later, IBAA stopped paying the

THE CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs . HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as the Incumbent Secretary of Labor, and THE CHARTERED BANK. G.R. No. L-44717 August 28, 1985 Power to construe Facts: On May 20, 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association, in representation of its monthly paid employees/members, instituted a complaint with the Regional Office No. IV, Department of Labor, now Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) against Chartered Bank, for the payment of ten (10) unworked legal holidays, as well as for premium and overtime differentials for worked legal holidays from November 1, 1974. The Minister of Labor dismissed the Chartered Bank Employees Associations claim for lack of merit basing its decision on Section 2, Rule IV, Book Ill of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9,which respectively provide: Sec. 2. Status of employees paid by the month. Employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not. POLICY INSTRUCTION NO. 9 TO: All Regional Directors SUBJECT: PAID LEGAL HOLIDAYS

The rules implementing PD 850 have clarified the policy in the implementation of the ten (10) paid legal holidays. Before PD 850, the number of working days a year in a firm was considered important in determining entitlement to the benefit. Thus, where an employee was working for at least 313 days, he was considered definitely already paid. If he was working for less than 313, there was no certainty whether the ten (10) paid legal holidays were already paid to him or not. The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily employees. In the case of monthly, only those whose monthly salary did not yet include payment for the ten (10) paid legal holidays are entitled to the benefit. Under the rules implementing PD 850, this policy has been fully clarified to eliminate controversies on the entitlement of monthly paid employees. The new determining rule is this: 'If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than P240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January to December, he is presumed to be already paid the ten (10) paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still entitled to the ten (10) paid legal holidays. These new interpretations must be uniformly and consistently upheld. Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor erred and acted contrary to law in promulgating Sec. 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9.

Held: Yes. The Secretary (Minister) of Labor had exceeded his statutory authority granted by Article 5 of the Labor Code authorizing him to promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. While it is true that the Minister has the authority in the performance of his duty to promulgate rules and regulations to implement, construe and clarify the Labor Code, such power is limited by provisions of the statute sought to be implemented, construed or clarified. G.R. No. L-16704 March 17, 1962VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitioner-appellant, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee. Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner-appellant.Office of the Solicitor General and Ernesto T. Duran for respondent-appellee. BARRERA, J.: On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the following tenor: Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee's remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month.

Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No.7, dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions, and submitting, "In order to assist your System in arriving at a proper interpretation of the term 'compensation' for the purposes of" such computation, their observations on Republic Act 1161and its amendment and on the general interpretation of the words "compensation", "remuneration" and "wages". Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette. Overruling these objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed. Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to this Court on appeal. The single issue involved in this appeal is whether or not Circular No. 22is a rule or regulation, as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act1161 empowering the Social Security Commission "to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act."

There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" anew law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law (Parker, Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law, p.194). Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may been forced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. (Davis, op.cit., p. 194.) . A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit., 195-197). On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.

Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation" contained in Section 8 (f) of Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment, reads as follows: (f) Compensation -- All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that part of the remuneration in excess of P500received during the month; (2) bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and (3) dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally required to do so. Republic Act No. "compensation" to: 1792 changed the definition of

(f) Compensation -- All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month. It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given in addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded, or exempted from the definition of the term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the law as amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely

stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be construed. The case of People v. Jolliffe (G.R. No. L-9553, promulgated on May 30, 1959) cited by appellant, does not support its contention that the circular in question is a rule or regulation. What was there said was merely that a regulation may be incorporated in the form of a circular. Such statements imply meant that the substance and not the form of a regulation is decisive in determining its nature. It does not lay down a general proposition of law that any circular, regardless of its substance and even if it is only interpretative, constitutes a rule or regulation which must be published in the Official Gazette before it could take effect. The case of People v. Que Po Lay (50 O.G. 2850) also cited by appellant is not applicable to the present case, because the penalty that may be incurred by employers and employees if they refuse to pay the corresponding premiums on bonus, overtime pay, etc. which the employer pays to his employees, is not by reason of non-compliance with Circular No. 22, but for violation of the specific legal provisions contained in Section 27(c) and (f) of Republic Act No. 1161. We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based, and that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity.

It hardly need be said that the Commission's interpretation of the amendment embodied in its Circular No. 22, is correct. The express elimination among the exemptions excluded in the old law, of all bonuses, allowances and overtime pay in the determination of the "compensation" paid to employees makes it imperative that such bonuses and overtime pay must now be included in the employee's remuneration in pursuance of the amendatory law. It is true that in previous cases, this Court has held that bonus is not demandable because it is not part of the wage, salary, or compensation of the employee. But the question in the instant case is not whether bonus is demandable or not as part of compensation, but whether, after the employer does, in fact, give or pay bonus to his employees, such bonuses shall be considered compensation under the Social Security Act after they have been received by the employees. While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it cannot be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some other purpose. Such is the case that is now before us. Republic Act 1161 specifically defined what "compensation "should mean For the purposes of this Act ". Republic Act 1792 amended such definition by deleting same exemptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this express substantial change in the phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been given to the phrase in question should give way to the clear mandate of the new law.IN VIEW OF THE

FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered. Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.