Ichong vs.

Hernandez

Facts:
Petitioner Lao H. Ichong brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that Republic Act 1180 is
unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him,
particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the
constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law; (2) the subject of the Act is not
expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of
the Republic of the Philippines. In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila
contend that the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is
authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival.

Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act 1180 violates the equal protection of laws.

Ruling:
No. According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided that
police power cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The enactment
clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State. The law does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and
citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and
reasonably protects their privilege. The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

People vs. Vera

Private respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng applied for the probation under provisions of Act No.
4221. Cu Unijieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was
convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The Court
of First Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the
Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. The Court of First Instance of Manila,
seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.
The Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the herein
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on April 5, 1937,
alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of
Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the
Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform
throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the
power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective
provinces.
Judge Vera denied the application for probation of Cu Unijieng. The respondent judge thereupon
set the hearing of the motion for execution on August 21, 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for
leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion
for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on
August 19, 1937. Petitioners came to SC on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged
was an interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila which fostered "the campaign of
the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable
Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial
machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu
Unjieng."
 Petitioners contended that even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to entertain the
application for probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless acted without
jurisdiction or in excess thereof in continuing to entertain the motion for reconsideration and by failing to
commit Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison after he had promulgated his resolution of June 28, 1937, denying
Mariano Cu Unjieng's application for probation.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 11 of Act. 4221 is unconstitutional because it denies the equal protection of the
laws.

Ruling:
Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others in prohibited. But classification
on a reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. The classification, however,
to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be
germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply
equally to each member of the class.

It is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and
inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of
the equal protection of the law before court should assume the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on
that score, but premises and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No.
4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad.

If the law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. Under
section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be
in force in other provinces, but one province may appropriate for the salary of the probation officer of a
given year — and have probation during that year — and thereafter decline to make further appropriation,
and have no probation is subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion
which delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is
intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of
the equality clause but "a rope of sand".

People vs. Cayat

Facts:
In 1937, there existed a law, Act No. 1639 otherwise known as AN ACT TO PROHIBIT THE SALE,
GIFT, OR OTHER DISPOSAL OF ANY INTOXICATING LIQUOR, OTHER THAN THE SO-
CALLED NATIVE WINES AND LIQUORS, TO ANY MEMBER OF A NON-CHRISTIAN TRIBE
WITHIN THE MEANING OF ACT NUMBERED THIRTEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-SEVEN,
AND TO PROHIBIT THE USE OF SUCH LIQUOR BY ANY MEMBER OF SUCH A TRIBE. Cayat, a
native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of said Act. He was then charged and
was eventually sentenced to pay fine with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted
his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated
his right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He argued that the law treats non-Christian
tribes with discrimination or “mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled”; that the law
was an invalid classification between native non-Christians and Christians.

Issue:
Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.

Ruling:
No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC
emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that distinguish
them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to
be complied with are;

(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely
imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon “accident of birth or parentage.” The law, then,
does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as “an inferior or less capable race.” On the contrary, all
measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of
their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian
brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education,
the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure
for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian
brothers on the basis of true equality.

The SC also ruled: Act No. 1639 is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as
to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization
and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify
the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines.

British American Tobacco vs Camacho

Facts:
June 2001, petitioner British American Tobacco introduced and sold Lucky Strike, Lucky Strike Lights
and Lucky Strike Menthol Lights cigarettes w/ SRP P 9.90/pack - Initial assessed excise tax: P 8.96/pack
(Sec. 145 [c])
February 17, 2003: RR 9-2003: Periodic review every 2 years or earlier of the current net retail price of
new brands and variants thereof for the purpose of the establishing and updating their tax classification
March 11, 2003: RMO 6-2003: Guidelines and procedures in establishing current net retail prices of new
brands of cigarettes and alcohol products
August 8, 2003: RR 22-2003: Implement the revised tax classification of certain new brands introduced in
the market after January 1, 1997 based on the survey of their current net retail prices. This increased the
excise tax to P13.44 since the average net retail price is above P 10/pack. This cause petitioner to file
before the RTC of Makati a petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction sought to enjoin the implementation of Sec. 145 of the NIRC,
RR No. 1-97, 9-2003, 22-2003 and 6-2003 on the ground that they discriminate against new brands of
cigarettes in violation of the equal protection and uniformity provisions of the Constitution
RTC: Dismissed
While petitioner's appeal was pending, RA 9334 amending Sec. 145 of the 1997 NIRC among other took
effect on January 1, 2005 which in effect increased petitioners excise tax to P25/pack
Petitioner filed a Motion to Admit attached supplement and a supplement to the petition for review
assailing the constitutionality of RA 9334 and praying a downward classification of Lucky Strike
products at the bracket taxable at P 8.96/pack since existing brands are still taxed based on their price as
of October 1996 eventhough they are equal or higher than petitioner's product price.
Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing Incorporated, Fortune Tobacco Corp., Mighty Corp. and JT
International Intervened.
Fortune Tobacco claimed that the CTA should have the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the decision
of the BIR in tax disputes

Issue:
W/N RA 9334 of the classification freeze provision is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
and uniformity provisions of the Constitution

Ruling:
No. In Sison Jr. v. Ancheta, the court held that "xxx It suffices then that the laws operate equally and
uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same
manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. If
the law be looked upon in tems of burden on charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. xxx" Thus,
classification if rational in character is allowable. In Lutz v. Araneta: "it is inherent in the power to tax
that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that 'inequalities
which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation" SC previously held: "Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable
articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the
authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation"

Under the the rational basis test, a legislative classification, to survive an equal protection challenge, must
be shown to rationally further a legitimate state interest. The classifications must be reasonable and rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation

A legislative classification that is reasonable does not offend the constitutional guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws. The classification is considered valid and reasonable provided that: (1) it rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it applies, all things being equal, to
both present and future conditions; and (4) it applies equally to all those belonging to the same class.

Moreover, petitioner failed to clearly demonstrate the exact extent of such impact as the price is not the
only factor that affects competition.

Facts:
Antonio Serrano, claims that the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 violates the
OFWs' constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal protection
and denies them due process.
Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 provides:Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of
termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract,
the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent
(12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Antonio Serrano (serrano for brevity) was a Filipino sea fairer employed as Chief Officer by Gallant
Maritime Services Inc and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc (respondents for brevity) under a 12- month
contract with Basic Monthly Salary of US$1400. However, when he departed on March 19. 1998, Serrno
was constrained to accept a downgraded employment of Second Officer with monthly salary of US$1,000
with the assurance that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. However, respondents
failed to keep their promise so Serrano refused to stay as Second Oficer and was repatriated to the
Philippines, having served only 2 months and 7 days fot eh 12 month contract.

Serrano filed a complaint before the Labor arbiter for constructive dismissal and payment of money
claims (total US$26442.73), moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

LABOR ARBITER: Serrano was declared illegally dismissed and was awarded monetary benefits,
representing Serrano’s salary for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of his employment contract
(total USD8,770) at the exchange rate of USD45 and attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of total amount
awarded. LA’s basis was Serrano’s basic pay (USD1,400), fixed overtime pay (USD700), vacation leave
pay (USD490).

Serrano appealed to the NLRC, arguing that he is entitled to his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
contract pursuant to Tripe Intefrated Services Inc vs. NLRC.

NLRC: NLRC modified the monetary awards and ordered respondents to pay only USD4669 which is
equivalent to 3 months salary (USD1400 x 3); Salary differential of USD45 and 10% attorney’s fees of
USD424.5, reasoning that R.A. No. 8042 "does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should
be proven to have been actually performed, and for vacation leave pay. Other findings were affirmed.

Serrano questioned the constitutionality of said provision.

Court of Appeals: The CA affirmed the NLRC’s ruling on the reduction but skirted the constitutional
issue.

Respondents argue that respondent cannot belatedly question the constitutionality of the said law on
appeal.

The Sol Gen (OSG) argues that since the law preceded Serrano’s contract, it (especially the monetary
claims) is deemed incorporated therat sans stipulation. The OSG further contends that there is a
reasonable and valid basis to differentiate OFW from local workers; and therefore the provision does not
violate the equal protection clause nor sec. 18 Art. II of the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 8402 is constitutional.

Ruling:
The subject clause VIOLATES the Equal Protection Clause and Right of an individual to due Process(Sec
1, Art III), recognizing their rights as a protected Sector (Sec 18, Art II; and Section 3 of Article XIII)

Prior to R.A. 8042, all OFWs who were illegally terminated were subjected to a uniform rule of monetary
benefits computation: basic salary times the entire unexpired portion of their employment. However,
upon the enactment of R.A. 8042, illegally dismissed employees with unexpired portion of 1 year or more
are singled out and subjected to the disadvantageous monetary award of 3 months of their unexpired
portion; as opposed to those illegally terminated OFWs with unexpired contracts of less than one year
who are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired period; and illegally dismissed local workers with
fixed-term employment who are not subjected to the 3-cap limitation.
Filipino workers are protected and afforded certain rights under the Constitution subject to the inherent
power of Congress to incorporate a system of classification into its legislation.

There is a valid classification if the classification is

1.) based on substantial distinction,
2.) germane to the purpose of law,
3) it is not limited to existing conditions; and
4) it applies equally to all members of the class.

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification
embodied in a law:

1.) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be shown to
be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest
2.) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that the challenged
classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to
serving that interest; and
3.)) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest

In American jurisprudence, strict scrutiny is triggered by suspect classifications based on race or gender
but not when the classification is drawn along income categories. However, foreign decisions, although
persuasive, are not per se controlling in the Philippines. Philippine laws are to be construed in light of our
lawmakers intent and construed to serve our own public interest.

Imbued with the same sense of "obligation to afford protection to labor," the Court in the present case also
employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect
classification prejudicial to OFWs.

In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state interest that the
subject clause may possibly serve.

The Court ruled that the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a
compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against OFWs under the
subject clause.

The Court declared the provision unconstitutional clause VIOLATES the Equal Protection Clause and
Right of an individual to due Process(Sec 1, Art III), recognizing their rights as a protected Sector (Sec
18, Art II; and Section 3 of Article XIII).

Note how the Court approaches the issue applying Section 1, Art III and not solely on the provisions re
the Constitution’s state policy on labor.

This is so because Setion 3 of Article XII is not a self-executing provision and it cannot on its own, be a
source of enforceable right. What it does is recognize labor as a protected sector; otherwise, it will lead to
a broad interpretation would suggest a blanket shield in favor of labor.
In declaring the subject clause unconstitutional, the Court reasoned that since the same deprived Serrano
of property and money benefits without an existing valid and definitive governmental purpose, it violated
not only Serrano’s right to equal protection but as well as his right to substantive due process under
(Section1, Art. III of the Constitution); thus, entitling Serrano to his salaries for the entire unexpired
period.

White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila

1-20-09

Facts:
Mayor Lim signed into law the city ordinance which prohibits the short time admission in hotels, motels,
lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. Herein petitioners filed
a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order and such ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional. The city argued that the
ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.

RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. Before the Court of Appeals, the
City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the
Local Government Code which confers on cities, among other local government units, the power: [To]
regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels,
inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and
transports. CA reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.

Issue:
Whether or not the equal protection rights of the Petitioners are also being interfered with the said city
ordinance.

Ruling:
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has
held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to
the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must
not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

Due process evades a precise definition. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary
governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty
serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are
protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.

In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for
determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of
fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation
of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to
equal protection.

Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten

Commandments-style enumeration of what may or what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of
freedom where the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence as they interact with each
other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by them as inherent, without doing harm
or injury to others.
 It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual
behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments "have gained notoriety as
venue of ‘prostitution, adultery and fornications’ in Manila since they ‘provide the necessary atmosphere
for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the ‘ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-
seekers.’" Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that
legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally
protected will be curtailed as well.

Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted by
the modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived decay is not to prevent
legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive themselves by offering
incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals that would bring a
new grandeur to Manila.

The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its
citizens. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical
intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains
the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without
sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a
day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission

Facts:
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President Aquino.
The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to investigate reports of
graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration and submit their findings and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial
body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between parties. Its job is
to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has subpoena powers
but it has no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable
cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.

It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize
E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely
new office was inexistent like the Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it the power
duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief
Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the
President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the
law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected
by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used
the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.

Central Bank Employees Association vs. BSP

Facts:
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank
of the Philippines, and created a new BSP. On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of
R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for
prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents
from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground
that it is unconstitutional.

Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides: That compensation and wage structure of
employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates
prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758.

Petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes
of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below),
or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this
classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner also claims that it
is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which
is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that
"No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Ruling:
Yes. The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but
on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they
were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It
does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is to operate.

Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class.
If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be
treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of
the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.

If a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though
affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.
The statutes became invalid as denying "equal protection of the law," in view of changed conditions since
their enactment.

The "policy determination" argument may support the inequality of treatment between the rank-
and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between BSP rank-
and-file and other GFIs' who are similarly situated. It fails to appreciate that what is at issue in the second
level of scrutiny is not the declared policy of each law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress'
inconsistent and unequal policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven other GFIs. At
bottom, the second challenge to the constitutionality of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653
is premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of
persons similarly situated. In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that "no person shall be …
denied the equal protection of the laws" includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow
invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of
the law, or permits such denial, it is unconstitutional.

The violation to the equal protection clause becomes even more pronounced when we are faced
with this undeniable truth: that if Congress had enacted a law for the sole purpose of exempting the eight
GFIs from the coverage of the SSL, the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file employees would have been
devoid of any substantial or material basis. It bears no moment, therefore, that the unlawful
discrimination was not a direct result arising from one law. "Nemo potest facere per alium quod non
potest facere per directum." No one is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly.

It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL is a "privilege" fully within the legislative
prerogative to give or deny. However, its subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs
and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees breached the latter's right to equal protection. In
other words, while the granting of a privilege per se is a matter of policy exclusively within the domain
and prerogative of Congress, the validity or legality of the exercise of this prerogative is subject to
judicial review. So when the distinction made is superficial, and not based on substantial distinctions that
make real differences between those included and excluded, it becomes a matter of arbitrariness that this
Court has the duty and the power to correct.

PASEI vs. Drilon

Facts:
The petitioner (PASEI), engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, for overseas
placement, challenged the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), in the character of “GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS,” It said that:

The D.O. is discriminatory against males or females;

That it “does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar
skills;”
That it is violative of the right to travel.
Further, it contended that It was an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, in a sense that the police
power being legislative, and not executive, in character. In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes
Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation “in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.”

Further, they argued that Department Order No. 1 was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is
claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter’s non-impairment clause, that it would cause “great and
irreparable injury” that PASEI members would face should the Order be further enforced.

Issue:
Whether the Department Order of the Respondent is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and
Discriminatory against Sexes

Ruling:
No, the petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There
is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to “female contract workers,” but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that “equality before the law”
under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women.

It admits of classifications, provided that:

such classifications rest on substantial distinctions;

they are germane to the purposes of the law;
they are not confined to existing conditions; and
they apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially
domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and
personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and
various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for
urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to
protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government’s efforts.

The State through the labor Secretary Exercise the police power which is a power coextensive with self-
protection, and it is not inaptly termed the “law of overwhelming necessity.” It may be said to be that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society.”

Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. vs Ormoc

n January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed 1 Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964,
imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in
Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of
America and other foreign countries." 2

Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20,
1964 for P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of P12,087.50.

On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with
service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint 3 against the City of Ormoc as well as its
Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for
being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity
of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution), aside from being an export tax forbidden under Section
2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a
license tax which Ormoc City under Section 15-kk of its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act
2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and that the tax amounts to a
customs duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 because the tax
is on both the sale and export of sugar.

Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to
enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional
limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on
August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the
taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms
of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.

Appeal therefrom was directly taken to Us by plaintiff Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Appellant
alleges the same statutory and constitutional violations in the aforesaid taxing ordinance mentioned
earlier.

Section 1 of the ordinance states: "There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated, in Ormoc City, a
municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and
other foreign countries." Though referred to as a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when
the sugar produced is exported.

Appellant questions the authority of the defendant Municipal Board to levy such an export tax, in
view of Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which denies from municipal councils the
power to impose an export tax. Section 2287 in part states: "It shall not be in the power of the municipal
council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality,
or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an
unreasonable charge for wharfage use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void."

Subsequently, however, Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 effective June 19, 1959, gave chartered
cities, municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for public purposes just and uniform taxes,
licenses or fees. Anent the inconsistency between Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code and
Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, this Court, in Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Municipality of Roxas 4 held the
former to have been repealed by the latter. And expressing Our awareness of the transcendental effects
that municipal export or import taxes or licenses will have on the national economy, due to Section 2 of
Republic Act 2264, We stated that there was no other alternative until Congress acts to provide remedial
measures to forestall any unfavorable results.

The point remains to be determined, however, whether constitutional limits on the power of
taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed.

The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, 5 We ruled that the equal protection clause
applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the
subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies
not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the
present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
 A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it
taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At
the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar
central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to
future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is
now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance
expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily
collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of collection, the ordinance
provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional until
declared otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared
unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50 plaintiff-
appellant paid under protest. No costs. So ordered.

Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho

Facts:
Pao Ho is a Chinese national employed in the City of Manila. On 27 March 1968, then Manila Mayor
Antonio Villegas signed Ordinance No. 6537 which prohibited foreign nationals from being employed
within the City of Manila without first securing a permit from the Mayor. The permit will cost them . Pao
Ho, on 04 May 1968 filed a petition for prohibition against the said Ordinance alleging that as a police
power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed
employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any
standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal
delegation of legislative powers. Judge Francisco Arca of the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled in
favor of Pao Ho and he declared the Ordinance as void.

Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 6537 violates the equal protection clause.

Ruling:
Yes. The decision of Judge Arca was affirmed. Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or
standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. Hence an undue delegation of power.

Further, the fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid
substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal
protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification,
should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation. The same amount of is being collected from every employed alien, whether he is
casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may
withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines
to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit
aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of
law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and
equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
UNIDO vs COMELEC

Facts:
In 1981, the Batasang Pambansa proposed amendments to the 1973 Constitution. The amendments were
to be voted upon in a plebiscite for the people’s approval/disapproval. The YES vote was being advanced
by Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan – President Marcos’ political party. On the other hand, the NO vote was
being advanced by the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO). To ensure parity and equality,
COMELEC issued Resolutions 1467-1469 which basically provided that there be equal opportunity, equal
time and equal space on media use for campaigns for both sides. On 12 March 1981, Marcos campaigned
for the YES vote via TV and radio from 9:30pm to 11:30pm. The same was broadcasted live by 26 TV
stations and 248 radio stations nationwide. UNIDO petitioned before the COMELEC that they be granted
the same opportunity as Marcos had pursuant to Resolutions 1467-1469. COMELEC denied the demand.
UNIDO assailed the denial as a denial of the equal protection clause.

Issue:
Whether or not UNIDO was denied equal protection by virtue of COMELEC’s denial of their request.

Ruling:
No. The SC ruled that UNIDO was not denied due process. They were also not denied equal protection. It
is the considered view of the SC that when Marcos conducted his ‘pulong-pulong’ or consultation with
the people on March 12, 1981, he did so in his capacity as President/Prime Minister of the Philippines and
not as the head of any political party. Under the Constitution, the ‘Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall be
responsible . . . for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy’. In
instances where the head of state is at the same time the president of the political party that is in power, it
does not necessarily follow that he speaks with two voices when he dialogues with the governed. The
president is accorded certain privileges that the opposition may not have. Further, the SC cannot compel
TV stations and radio stations to give UNIDO free air time as they are not party to this case. UNIDO must
sought contract with these TV stations and radio stations at their own expense.