HISTORY OF PHILIPPINE FOREIGN POLICY

The discourse on the history of Philippine political system and social organization
was predominantly presented based on the context of Spanish colonization and American
colonization in the country. Very few have been dedicated in the Philippine History dedicated
about pre-colonial period which is explained by the lack of evidences and reliable accounts.
(Corpuz, 1989; Veneracion, 1988) Characteristics of the contemporary Philippine
government and political institutions are largely described using the culture and features of
the colonial period. For instance, occasions of corruption and graft were associated with the
system of governance in the Spanish colonization as exemplified by the grave abuse of
discretionary powers granted to the Spanish officials and friars in the Philippines (Endriga,
1979; Peñalosa, 2014). More importantly, historians argued that it is difficult job to account
for the influences of the pre-colonial period since prior to the colonization by Spain in 1521
“rests in historical twilight” contained and documented in obscure works’ (Corpuz, 1957;
Reyes, 1999) Even though much has not been said about the pre-colonial period, it is not
proper to discount the development that can be happening in this period. On the accounts of
Governor Morga, he noted that the civilization of the Pre-Spanish Filipinos in regard to the
duties of life for that age was well advanced specially in the aspect of warfare and commerce
(Craig, 1933). The notion of development in terms of social and political organization and
administration of the western colonizers may be different and not match with the context,
need, and nature of the native communities at that particular period. Forces in the pre-colonial
period may be crucial in analyzing the current Philippine government and public
administration such as the values and behaviors exhibited its officials and bureaucrats.
COLONIAL PERIOD
Peopling of the Philippines
As to the present Filipinos, Indonesians and Malays of Malaysia, F. Landa Jocano
maintains that they are the end results of both the long process of evolution and the later …
movements of people. They stand co-equal as ethnic groups, without any one being the
dominant group, racially or culturally. Culturally, it is likewise erroneous to state that Filipino
culture is Malay in orientation. Even our historical experiences and social organization differ
from those of the people identified as Malays. The difference, according to Jocano, are due to
the difference in their responses to their environment. On the other hand, the similarities
found among them are due to the adjustment to their environment. Summarizing his findings,
Jocano maintains that;
The peoples of prehistoric Island Southeast Asia belong to the same population. It
grew out of the combination of human evolution which occurred in the Island Southeast Asia
about 1.9 million years ago, as evidenced by the fossil materials recovered from different
parts of the region, and of the movement of other peoples from Asia mainland during historic
times.
This core population shared a common cultural orientation that included both flake
and core implements and their complex ceramic industries. Other shared cultural elements
consist of similar ornaments, pendants, house types, belief systems, ritual complex, and
funerary practices.
 The configuration of these shared elements into a common way of life is what we call
the base culture. It emerged from similar responses people made to similar geographical
conditions, climate, fauna, and flora.
None of these ancient men could be categorized under any of the historically
identified ethnic groups (i.e., Malays, Indonesians, Filipinos) today. The western colonizers
were the ones who fragmented the population into ethnic groups as they partitioned the
region into their respective colonies. The British popularized in scholarship, the term Malay
to characterize the group of people they encountered in the Malay Peninsula. The Portuguese,
the Germans, and the Dutch introduced the Indonesians to the Western World. The Spaniards
strongly worked for the conversion of the Filipinos (formerly Indio) to Christianity. Later on
the Americans came and further differentiated the Filipinos from their Southeast Asian
cousins.
… the explanation of the peopling of the Philippines through a series of waves of
migration, as documented by folk history like the Maragtas, has to as the orginal settlers of
the region and dominant cultural transmitters must be corrected. Emerging from a common
population with the same base culture, the Malays, the Filipinos, and Indonesians are co-
equal as ethnic groups in the region of Island Southeast Asia, without any one of them being
racially or culturally dominant.
Existing literature on the study of social and political organization in the pre-colonial
period in the Philippines agreed that the Philippines started as “separate territories with no
central government over them” (Cariño, 1998; Endriga, 1979). In this context, this literature
review will first describe and analyze these separate territories or these communities of the
first inhabitants of the Philippine Islands.
Early Settlements
The early Filipino communities (Ca. 7000/5000 BC – 1588) were composed of
settlements called barangays. The concept of barangay can be traced with the description of
Pigafetta as a boat or a vessel – called balanghai that is about 18 meters in length – that could
carry one small clan or a large family (Corpuz, 1989; Peñalosa, 2014; Salazar, 1997). The
size of the settlement ranges from thirty to one hundred families. Among the literature, they
all agreed on the characteristics of the barangay as kin-based. From here, the idea of kinship
indicated in the culture, tradition, values, and conducts of the members of the barangay.
These people settled by the coasts and along rivers and streams. This serves as a prerequisite
for the development of their culture and more importantly, the development of economy and
trade with other barangay and foreigners (Corpuz, 1989; Veneracion, 1988). Note that this
Austronesian concept of barangay refers to settlements that are not based on land but the
focus is on people called “sakops”. Aside from the concept of barangay, Salazar (1997)
looked at the early communities using a “Pantayong Pananaw” approach wherein he
presented three constructs of a the pre-colonial community; banua, ili, and bayan. Similar to
Corupuz (1989), Salazar (1997) highlighted the idea of bayan which refers not only to
permanent territories but the people within these territories (Salazar, 1997 in Aquino, 1999).
This focus stems from the idea that most members are bound by blood relations and will later
in be an important factor in characterizing the political structure and social organization of
these communities. Some of these small independent socio-cultural-economic units will
eventually progress to a more complex form such as kaharian (300 AD) and then karahaan
(900 AD), and sultanato (from 1450) (Aquino 1999; Peñalosa, 2014). These units are said to
be more structures in terms of administrative and economic functions implicated by these
influences of Islam and connections with other political units e.g. Sultanate of Borneo
(Corpuz, 1989; Endriga, 1979; Scott, 1994).
Functions of the barangay as political organization include:
1. Maintaining its existence as a community by resisting and repelling
invasion by outside enemies, and
2. Preserving peace and order within its authority (Fernandez, 1976; Endriga,
1979). It is worth noting that even though laws in barangays were mostly unwritten
and their population is relatively small, they were able to attain peace and order
through some distinct values. Veneracion (1988) and Peñalosa (2014) highlighted
these values as pakikisama and pakikipagpalagayang loob as the common bond that
nurtures the barangay community in order to survive.
Political functions
Anthropologist Laura Lee Junker's comparative analysis of historical accounts from
cultures throughout the archipelago, depicts datus functioning as primary political authorities,
war leaders, legal adjudicators, the de facto owners of agricultural products and sea resources
within a district, the primary supporters of attached craft specialists, the overseers of intra-
district and external trade, and the pivotal centers of regional resource mobilization systems.
Anthropologists like F. Landa Jocano and Junker, historians, and historiographers
like William Henry Scott distinguish between the nobility and aristocratic nature of
the datus against the exercise of sovereign political authority. Although
the datus and paramount datus of early Philippine polities were a "birthright aristocracy" and
were widely recognized "aristocratic" or "noble", which were comparable to the nobles and
royals of the Spanish colonizers, the nature of their relationship with the members of their
barangay was less asymmetrical than monarchic political systems in other parts of the
world. Their control over territory was a function of their leadership of the barangay and, in
some local pre-colonial societies (mostly in Luzon), the concept of ruling was not a "divine
right". Furthermore, their position was dependent on the common consent of the members of
the barangay's aristocratic Maginoo-class. Although the position of datu could be inherited,
the maginoo could choose someone else to follow within their own class if that person proved
to be a more capable war leader or political administrator. Even paramount datus such
as lakans or rajahs exercised only a limited degree of influence over the less-senior datus they
led, which did not include claims over the barangays and territories. Antonio de Morga, in his
work Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas, expounds on the degree to which early
Philippine datus could exercise their authority:
There were no kings or lords throughout these islands who ruled over them as in the
manner of our kingdoms and provinces; but in every island, and in each province of it, many
chiefs were recognized by the natives themselves. Some were more powerful than others, and
each one had his followers and subjects, by districts and families; and these obeyed and
respected the chief. Some chiefs had friendship and communication with others, and at times
wars and quarrels... When any of these chiefs was more courageous than others in war and
upon other occasions, such a one enjoyed more followers and men; and the others were under
his leadership, even if they were chiefs. These latter retained to themselves the lordship and
particular government of their own following, which is called barangay among them. They
had datos and other special leaders [mandadores] who attended to the interests of the
barangay.
 Paramount datus
The term paramount datu or paramount ruler is a term applied by historians to
describe the highest ranking political authorities in the largest lowland polities or inter-polity
alliance groups in early Philippine history,] such as those in Maynila, Tondo,
the Confederation of Madja-as in Panay, Pangasinan, Cebu, Bohol, Butuan, Cotabato, and
Sulu.
Different cultures on the Philippine archipelago referred to the most senior datu using
different titles:] n Muslim polities such as Sulu and Cotabato, the paramount ruler was called
a sultan; in Tagalog communities, the equivalent title was lakan in communities which
historically had strong political or trade connections with Indianized polities in Indonesia and
Malaysia, the paramount ruler was called a rajah; among the Subanon people of
the Zamboanga Peninsula, the most senior thimuay is referred to as the thimuay
labi, or sulotan in more Islamized Subanon communities. In some other portions of the
Visayas and Mindanao, there was no separate name for the most senior ruler, so the
paramount ruler was called a datu, although one datu was identifiable as the most senior.

Introduction of Islam
The spread of Islam to Old Malaysia was brought about by the activities of the Arab
traders, missionaries, and teachers who introduced their religious beliefs among the Malays.
The foundation of Islam was laid in Malaysia by the Arabian scholar Mudum, who arrived in
the Malay Peninsula about the middle of the 14th century. He succeeded in establishing in
Malacca a rather tenuous foothold for Islam. About 1380, he proceeded to Sulu and preached
the doctrines of Mohammed. In 1390, Raja Baginda, one of the petty rulers of Menangkabaw,
Sumatra, arrived in Sulu and promptly converted some of the natives to Islam. His religious
activities were followed by Abu Bakr who, about 1450, left Palembang for Sulu. He married
Raja Baginda’s daughter, Paramisuli. After Baginda’s death, Abu Bakr exercised his powers
as sultan and established a government patterned after the Sultanate of Arabia. Islam spread
rapidly to all parts of Sulu. In Mindanao, Serif Kabungsuan, who had meanwhile arrived
from Johore with his men, immediately began laying the foundations of Islam. He converted
many tribes to his religion and, having married into an influential family, made himself the
first sultan of Mindanao. From then on, Islam spread rapidly to the Visayas and Luzon. The
arrival of the Spaniards in the second half of the 16th century and the subsequent conquest of
Luzon led the Muslims to retreat to the south where they maintained their independence from
foreign powers to the end of the Spanish regime.
Relations with the Orang Dampuans: Between 900 and 1200 A.D., another group of
immigrants came to the Philippines from southern Annam. Known as Orang Dampuans or
Men from Champa, they established trading posts in Sulu, resulting in a flourishing trade
between Sulu and Southern Annam. The Orang Dampuans were not politically minded and
had no intention of dominating the people of Sulu, who were called Buranuns. Their interest
lay in trade. As usually happened, the Orang Dampuans, because of their increasing
prosperity, aroused the jealousy of the Buranuns who, in a fit of anger, massacred some
Orang Dampuans. The latter, who had superior weapons, took their bloody revenge on the
Buranuns and, having leveled the enemy’s villages to the ground, sailed to their homeland. It
was not until the 13th century that the Orang Dampuans returned to Sulu to trade peacefully
with the natives.
 Relations with Banjarmasin: The fame of Sulu reached as far as northern Borneo
and soon Banjarmasin and Brunei, two of the important sub-states of the Empire of Sri
Vijaya, sent traders to Sulu. The latter’s famous pearl beds drew the interest of the
Banjarmasin merchants and adventurers. Thus, regular trade relations were established
between the people of Sulu and the men of Banjar, as the men of Banjarmasin were called.
The Buranuns looked with suspicion at the men of Banjar, for they had not forgotten their
tragic experience with the Orang Dampuans. But the men of Banjar, more diplomatic than
their predecessors, knew how to assuage the wounded pride of the Buranuns. Realizing the
power of a beautiful woman to soften the heart of a hostile ruler, the men of Banjar brought
their beautiful princess to Sulu. She was offered to the Buranun ruler, who did not need a
second look to decide that the princess was fit to be his queen. Sulu thus came under the
influence of Banjarmasin, and in no time the Buranuns found themselves willing tribute
payers to Banjarmasin. With Sulu now under their thumb, the men of Banjar sent more
adventurers and traders to Sulu until, as time went on, the Buranuns were slowly pressured
into the hinterland, leaving the coasts to the wily men of Banjar. Under the latter, Sulu
developed into an emporium, and trading ships from Cambodia, China, Java, and Sumatra
cast anchor at Sulu ports to savor their wealth and splendor. From the union of the Buranun
chieftain and the Banjarmasin princess came the rulers of Sulu. For many years thereafter,
Sulu remained under the influence of Banjarmasin.
Relations with China: From scanty records that have come down to the present, it is
known that the Philippines had some commercial relations with the neighboring countries,
particularly with China. Trade relations with the latter started in the 9th century when some
Arab traders who were barred from the Central China coast found an alternative route starting
from Malacca and passing through Borneo, the Philippines, and Taiwan. Goods from
Southeast Asia and the western world were carried by the Arab traders to the Philippines
through the southern route. Philippine goods, on the other hand, were brought by Arab ships
to the Chinese mainland through the port of Canton. During the rule of the Sung Dynasty
(960-1127) in China, Chinese goods began to flow in a continuous stream into the
Philippines. Chinese colonies were founded in the coastal towns of the archipelago. During
the Ming period (1368-1644), other colonies were established in the hinterland. By the
middle of the 14th century, however, other countries of Asia had begun to take an active
interest in Philippine trade. Cambodia and Champa, in IndoChina, trade their porcelain
products for Philippine wares. A little later, Annam, Siam and Tonkin also began to trade
with the Philippines. So keen was the competition that from 20% to 40% of the total trade
with the Southern Philippines was non-Chinese. Keen commercial rivalry lasted up to the
Javanese or Madjapahit period (1377-1478). The Chinese regained control of the Philippine
trade when the Ming emperor, Yung Lo, (1402-1424), came to the throne of China. Yung Lo
sent a large fleet consisting of more than sixty vessels to the Philippines under the command
of Admiral Cheng Ho. The fleet visited Lingayen in Pangasinan, Manila Bay, Mindoro, and
Sulu. These visits took place in 1405-06, 1408-10, and 1417. For a short period, the Chinese
Emperor even tried to maintain a kind of sovereignty over Luzon and sent Ko-ch’a-lao to the
island as “governor”. With the death of Yung Lo, however, his pretensions to suzerainty over
Luzon came to an end. In the 15th century when Islam began to spread to the southern
Philippines, the Indo-China trade suffered a setback and the Chinese traders, pressed back by
the Muslims, sought new trading routes to those parts of the Philippines where Islam had not
yet gained a foothold. Later on, the Chinese were allowed to trade with areas under the sway
of Islam.
 The Ten Bornean Datus. The Malay settlement of Panay in the Visayas is told in the
Maragtas, which is legendary or at least semi-historical. In the 13th century, about the time
that Sulu was undergoing a transformation owing to the paramount influence of Banjarmasin,
Borneo was seething with discontent. It appeared that Sultan Makatunaw was mistreating his
subjects, so that ten of the chieftains (or datus) decided to leave for unknown parts in search
of freedom. With their families, Datus Puti, Bangkaya, Dumalugdog, Sumakwel, Lubay,
Paiburong, Dumangsil, Balensusa, Paduhinog, and Dumangsol secretly sailed in their
balangays without any definite destination. After days of sailing, the Bornean datus reached
Panay which at the time was inhabited by the Negritos called Atis, who were ruled by their
brave chieftain, Marikudo, and his wife, Maniwantiwan. Realizing that the Atis suspected
them of evil intention, Datu Puti, the leader of the Bornean datus, assured them of their
peaceful intentions. All they wanted, he explained, was to buy land where he and his men and
families could settle peacefully. Marikudo, after consulting with his elders, decided to sell his
land to the newcomers. The purchase price was ridiculously low — a gold salakot and, to
satisfy feminine vanity, a long gold necklace for Maniwantiwan. As was customary, a feast
was held, after which Marikudo and his people retired to the interior. With the datus and their
families firmly settled in Panay, Datus Puti, Balensusa, and Dumangsil sailed northward to
Luzon, disembarking in the region around Lake Bonbon (Taal). The fertility of the soil led
Dumangsil and Balensusa to found a settlement there, while Puti, satisfied that his men were
leading peaceful lives, returned to Borneo. In the course of time, Dumangsil and Balensusa’s
families spread out to the neighboring regions now known as Laguna and the Bicol
Peninsula. As for the seven datus in Panay, they, too, prospered. They divided the island into
three districts: Hantik (now Antique), under Datu Sumakwel; Irong-Irong (now Iloilo), under
Datu Paiburong; and Aklan (now Aklan or Capiz), under Datu Bangkaya. For purposes of
protection as well as for maintaining close family relations, the datus formed a sort of
political organization known as the Confederation of Madyaas, whose ranking chieftain was
Sumakwel.
COLONIAL PERIOD
Political Institutions.--The hierarchical political set-up of the Philippines during the
Spanish regime may be seen in the political institutions established by the colonial power.
From 1565 to 1821, the Philippines was a captaincy-general administered by the Spanish king
through the viceroyalty of Nueva Espana (Mexico). All Spanish possessions were governed
by the Real y Supremo Consejo de las Indias (Royal and Supreme Council of the Indies)
established in 1524 by Charles V. It was, next to the King, the paramount lawmaker and
administrator over¬ seeing the colonies of the Spanish empire, guided basically by a
compendium of laws first compiled in 1681 called the Recopilacion de leyes de los reynos de
las Indias. The Ministerio de Ultra¬ mar (Ministry of Colonies), by May 1863, had
supplanted the Consejo de las Indias. Bureaucracy m the colonial Philippines may be divided
into different levels of administration, from the central or national, provincial, city,
municipal, and barrio levels.
On the national level with its seat of power in Manila, (Intramuros), the King, through
the Consejo de las Indias, governed through his sole spokesman and representative in the
Philippines, the gobernador y capitan-general. As Captain-General of the colony, the
gobernador-general was commander-in-chief of the army and the navy. He was also president
of the Real Audiencia (Supreme Court), the island’s highest judicial body, and as vice-real
patron, he had the power over ecclesiastical appointments in the church and even the right to
supervise mission work.
 The governor-general was the source of civil power for the various levels of
administration. His salary amounted to P40,000 per annum, but some unscrupulous and
enterprising among them, augmented it by receiving bribes and 4‘gifts”. On the provincial
level, heading the alcaldia (previously the encomienda) y provincia or hukuman (used by
Bonifacio’s Katipunan, and later called lalawigan) was the alcalde mayor (provincial
governor) for the pacified provinces and districts. The corregimientos or unpacified military
zones (like Mariveles, Mindoro and Panay) were headed by the corregidores. Not only did the
alcalde mayor exercise executive and judicial powers, but he also had the special privilege of
engaging in trade through the indulto de comercio (a privilege of alcaldes enjoyed between
1751 to 1844, when it was finally abolished) except in the provinces of Tondo, Cavite, and
Zamboanga, to name only a few. Only a Spaniard could be an alcalde mayor or a corregidor.
He exercised multiple prerogatives as judge, inspector of encomiendas, chief of police,
tribute collector, and even vice-regal patron and captain-general of the province. Thus, not
only was he the executive and judicial authority but he was also the military authority in his
area of responsibility, answerable solely to the Governor General and the Real Audiencia in
Manila. The annual salary of an alcalde mayor before 1844 ranged from P300 to P2,000, and
after 1847, from PI,600 to PI,500, according to class. However, with the indulto de comercio,
he earned considerably more, for as comerciante, the Filipinos were forced to do business
with him (they bought from his store), and he engaged in usurious money-lending practices.
In 1840, it was reported that some of the alcaldes mayores' positions were valued at P50,000
per annum. All the complaints of the Filipinos against the abuses of the alcaldes mayores
were somewhat relaxed by the Reform Decree of 1886 when the civil governor became the
executive provincial official and the alcalde was reduced to a municipal judge, thus
transforming the provincial governor from a “merchant-governor” to a “judge-governor”. By
the end of the seventeenth century, there were only six cities or villas established in Luzon
and the Visayas: Manila, Villa Femandina (Vigan), Nueva Segovia (Lal-lo, Cagayan), Nueva
Caceres (Naga), Cebu, and Arevalo (also called Villa, Iloilo). Cities were governed by the
ayuntamiento or city government formed in 1889. In 1894, there were eight ayuntamientos:
Manila, Iloilo, Cebu, Jaro, Batangas, Albay, Nueva Caceres, and Vigan. The Manila cabildo
(city council), for example, consisted of one or two alcaldes ordinarios who were elected by
the Spanish residents of villas; a number of regidores (councilors); an alguacil mayor (chief
constable) who maintained peace and order, and the escribano (secretary) who kept the
records of the city government.

PRE AND POST WORLD WAR II PERIOD

THE MALOLOS REPUBLIC. Aguinaldo returned to the Philippines from Hong
Kong with a plan to form a Filipino government. To show the capacity of the Filipinos for
self-government, Aguinaldo established the Dictatorial Government in May and, a month
later, the Revolutionary Government. Different departments were created to take charge of
the multifarious duties of the new government. In September, the Congress was convoked at
Malolos, and a constitution prepared to guide the government in its progress toward
republicanism. Diplomatic agents were sent abroad to work for the recognition of Philippine
independence. But the United States, however, had decided to take over control of the
Philippines, and in December 1898, the Treaty of Paris between Spain and the United States
was concluded. The treaty gave the Philippines to the United States. Even so, the Filipino
leaders proclaimed the Philippine Republic in Malolos with Aguinaldo as President. The
Dictatorial Government: In the wake of his military victories, Aguinaldo decided that it was
time to establish a Filipino government. He had with him when he arrived from Hong Kong a
draft of a plan prepared by Mariano Ponce for the establishment of a revolutionary
government. Consul Wildman, however, had advised Aguinaldo earlier to establish a
dictatorial government, which later on could be the nucleus of a republican government
similar to that of the United States. Probably because the critical times demanded a
government with a strong executive, Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista, Aguinaldo's adviser, told
him to form a dictatorial government. Consequently, Aguinaldo made known his intention of
establishing such a form of government when he announced, in the morning of May 24, 1898,
that he was assuming "command of all the troops in the struggle for the attainment of our
lofty aspirations, inaugurating a dictatorial government to be administered by decrees
promulgated under my sole responsibility..." Later in the day, he issued a decree formally
establishing the Dictatorial Government. The decree nullified the orders issued under the
authority of the Biyak-na-Bato Republic and asserted that the Dictatorial Government was
temporary in nature, "so that, when peace shall have been reestablished and our legitimate
aspiration for unrestricted liberty attained, it may be modified by the nation, in which rests
the principle of authority.
Treatment of Enemy: In general, the Filipinos treated the Spanish prisoners with
justice. But there were times when, because of hatred of the former masters, the Filipinos
exceeded their enthusiasm and maltreated some Spaniards. Aguinaldo, wishing his people to
follow the paths of righteousness and justice, appealed to them to treat the Spanish prisoners
humanely. One of Aguinaldo's first acts as Dictator was to issue a circular, dated May 29,
1898, urging the people to stop the disgraceful treatment of the Spanish prisoners. He said: "It
happens very often that the people and our soldiers, carried off by the triumph, forget all my
previous advice in regard to the treatment which they ought to accord to the prisoners, and,
you will endeavor to stop this disgraceful conduct toward the surrendered enemy, and to
punish those who may disobey your orders. To maintain peace and order and to suppress
crimes, Aguinaldo issued another order on June 1 providing that all classes of crimes were to
be tried by competent military tribunals. Again and again, he impressed upon the people the
necessity of respecting the persons and property of the enemy. Declaration of Independence:
With a government in operation, Aguinaldo thought that it was necessary to declare the
independence of the Philippines. He believed that such a move would inspire the people to
fight more eagerly against the Spaniards and at the same time lead the foreign countries to
recognize the independence of the country. Mabini, who had by now been made Aguinaldo's
unofficial adviser, objected. He based his objection on the fact that it was more important to
reorganize the government in such a manner as to convince the foreign powers of the
competence and stability of the new government than to proclaim Philippine independence at
such an early period. Aguinaldo, however, stood his ground and won. On June 5, Aguinaldo
issued a decree setting aside June 12 as the day for the proclamation of Philippine
independence. At the same time, he commissioned Julian Felipe, a composer from Cavite, to
prepare a composition which would be played during the independence ceremonies. On June
11, Felipe showed Aguinaldo the draft of his musical composition, which was entitled
Marcha Filipina Magdalo. Aguinaldo and other revolutionary leaders, upon hearing the
composition played on the piano, adopted it as the official march of the Philippines.
Aguinaldo then requested Felipe to teach the music to the members of the band of San
Francisco de Malabon so it could be played the next day. Felipe changed the title of the
march to Marcha National Filipina (Philippine National March). On June 12, between four
and five in the afternoon, Aguinaldo, in the presence of a huge crowd, proclaimed the
independence of the Philippines at Cavite el Viejo (Kawit). For the first time, the Philippine
National Flag, made in Hong Kong by Mrs. Marcela Agoncillo, assisted by Lorenza
Agoncillo and Delfina Herboza, was officially hoisted and the Philippine National March
played in public. The Act of the Declaration of Independence was prepared by Ambrosio
Rianzares Bautista, who also read it. A passage in the Declaration reminds one of another
passage in the American Declaration of Independence. The Philippine Declaration was signed
by ninety-eight persons, among them an American army officer who witnessed the
proclamation.
The proclamation of Philippine independence was, however, promulgated on August
1 when many towns had already been organized under the rules laid down by the Dictatorial
Government. Apolinario Mabini: It was immediately before the proclamation of
independence that a young man was brought before Aguinaldo as his adviser. He was
Apolinario Mabini. Born of very poor parents, Inocencio Mabini and Dionisia Maranan, in
Talaga, Tanawan, Batangas, Mabini studied in a school in Tanawan, then conducted by a
certain Simplicio Avelino. Much later, he transferred to a school conducted by the famous
pedagogue, Father Valerio Malabanan. He continued his studies at San Juan de Letran and at
the University of Sto. Tomas, where he received his law degree in 1894. His dream to defend
the poor led him to forsake the priesthood, which his mother wanted him to take. Early in
1896, he contracted an illness, probably infantile paralysis, that led to the paralysis of his
lower limbs. When the revolution broke out the same year, the Spanish authorities, suspecting
that he was somehow involved in the disturbance, arrested him. The fact, however, that he
could not move his lower limbs showed the Spaniards that they had made a mistake. He was
released and sent to the San Juan de Dios Hospital. Mabini, it must be noted, was not entirely
free from nationalistic association, for he was a member of Rizal's La Liga Filipina and
worked secretly for the introduction of reforms in the administration of the government. In
1898, while vacationing in Los Baños, Aguinaldo sent for him. It took hundreds of men
taking turns at carrying the hammock he was in to bring Mabini to Kawit. Aguinaldo, upon
seeing Mabini's physical condition, thought that he must have made a mistake in calling for
him to help him in his work. What could a man in such a condition do to help him? But when
Mabini spoke, Aguinaldo's doubts vanished. There was firmness in the sick man's voice, and
Aguinaldo decided to make him his trusted adviser. From then on, it was Mabini who stood
behind Aguinaldo. Envious enemies called him the "Dark Chamber of the President," but his
admirers considered him the "Brains of the Revolution."
AMERICAN PERIOD
The Insular Government of the Philippine Islands (Spanish: Gobierno Insular de las
Islas Filipinas) was an unincorporated territory of the United States that was established in
and was reorganized in in preparation for later independence. The Insular Government was
preceded by the United States Military Government of the Philippine Islands and was
followed by the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
The Philippines were acquired from Spain by the United States in following the
Spanish–American War. Resistance led to the Philippine–American War, in which the United
States suppressed the nascent First Philippine Republic. In , the United States Congress
passed the Philippine Organic Act, which organized the government and served as its basic
law. This act provided for a governor-general appointed by the president of the United States,
as well as a bicameral Philippine Legislature with the appointed Philippine Commission as
the upper house and a fully elected, fully Filipino elected lower house, the Philippine
Assembly. The Internal Revenue Law of provided for general internal revenue taxes,
documentary taxes, and transfer of livestock. A wide variety of revenue stamps were issued
in denominations ranging from one centavo to pesos.
The term "insular" refers to the fact that the government operated under the authority
of the U.S. Bureau of Insular Affairs. Puerto Rico and Guam also had insular governments at
this time. From to , the U.S. Supreme Court wrestled with the constitutional status of these
governments in the Insular Cases. In Dorr v. United States, the court ruled that Filipinos did
not have a constitutional right to trial by jury. In the Philippines itself, the term "insular" had
limited usage. On banknotes, postage stamps, and the coat of arms, the government referred
to itself simply as the "Philippine Islands".
The Philippine Organic Act was replaced in by the Jones Law, which ended the
Philippine Commission and provided for both houses of the Philippine Legislature to be
elected. In the Insular Government was replaced by the Commonwealth. Commonwealth
status was intended to last ten years, during which the country would be prepared for
independence.
The Insular Government evolved from the Taft Commission, or Second Philippine
Commission, appointed on March, This group was headed by William Howard Taft, and was
granted legislative powers by President William McKinley in September. The commission
created a judicial system, an educational system, a civil service, and a legal code. The legality
of these actions was contested until the passage of the Spooner Amendment in , which
granted the U.S. president authority to govern the Philippines.
The Insular Government saw its mission as one of tutelage, preparing the Philippines
for eventual independence. On July, Taft was appointed "civil governor," who also named his
cabinet at his inaugural address. Military Governor Adna Chaffee retained authority in
disturbed areas. On July, the office of military governor was abolished, and Taft became the
first U.S. governor-general of the Philippine Islands.
The Philippine Organic Act disestablished the Catholic Church as the state religion. In
, Taft negotiated the purchase of acres of church property for $7.5 million. Despite this, the
Insular Government failed to investigate the land titles of the friars' and restore them to the
patrimony of the Filipinos. The Insular Government then established a land titling system for
these lands, but due to a small surveyor staff, a lot of parcels of land remained untitled.
Two years after the completion and publication of a census, a general election was
conducted for the choice of delegates to a popular assembly. An elected Philippine Assembly
was convened in as the lower house of a bicameral legislature, with the Philippine
Commission as the upper house. The U.S. Payne–Aldrich Tariff Act provided for free trade
with the Philippines. Every year from, the Philippine Assembly (and later the Philippine
Legislature) passed resolutions expressing the Filipino desire for independence.
Jones Law
Philippine nationalists led by Manuel L. Quezon and Sergio Osmeña enthusiastically
endorsed the draft Jones Bill of , which provided for Philippine independence after eight
years, but later changed their views, opting for a bill which focused less on time than on the
conditions of independence. The nationalists demanded complete and absolute independence
to be guaranteed by the United States, since they feared that too-rapid independence from
American rule without such guarantees might cause the Philippines to fall into Japanese
hands. The Jones Bill was rewritten and passed a Congress controlled by Democrats in with a
later date of independence. The Democratic Party in the United States had strongly opposed
acquisitions of the Philippines in the first place, and increasingly became committed to
independence. The election of Democrat Woodrow Wilson, who advocated a constitutional
government in the Philippines as a step towards independence, in opened up the opportunity.
He appointed Francis Burton Harrison as governor, and Harrison replaced mainlanders with
Filipinos in the bureaucracy. At his departure in, of the 13,757 government bureaucrats,
13,143 were Filipinos; they occupied 56 of the top 69 positions.
The Jones Law, or Philippine Autonomy Act, replaced the Organic Act. Its preamble
stated that the eventual independence of the Philippines would be American policy, subject to
the establishment of a stable government. The law maintained an appointed governor-general,
but established a bicameral Philippine Legislature to replace the elected Philippine Assembly
(lower house); it replaced the appointive Philippine Commission (upper house) with an
elected senate.
Filipino activists suspended the independence campaign during the First World War
and supported the United States and the Allies of World War I against the German Empire.
After the war, they resumed their independence drive with great vigor. On March, the
Philippine Legislature passed a "Declaration of Purposes," which stated the inflexible desire
of the Filipino people to be free and sovereign. A Commission of Independence was created
to study ways and means of attaining liberation ideal. This commission recommended the
sending of an independence mission to the United States. The "Declaration of Purposes"
referred to the Jones Law as a veritable pact, or covenant, between the American and Filipino
peoples whereby the United States promised to recognize the independence of the Philippines
as soon as a stable government should be established. American Governor-General Harrison
had concurred in the report of the Philippine Legislature as to a stable government.
The Philippine Legislature funded an independence mission to the United States in .
The mission departed Manila on February 28 and met in America with and presented their
case to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker. U.S. president Woodrow Wilson, in his farewell
message to Congress, certified that the Filipino people had performed the condition imposed
on them as a prerequisite to independence, declaring that, this having been done, the duty of
the U.S. is to grant Philippine independence. Neither Congress nor Warren G. Harding,
Wilson's successor as president, acted on Wilson's recommendation. In, President Harding
sent William Cameron Forbes and Leonard Wood as heads of the Wood-Forbes Commission
to investigate conditions in the Philippines. The Commission concluded that Filipinos were
not yet ready for independence from the United States, a finding that was widely criticized in
the Philippines.
The Jones Law was an Organic Act passed by the United States Congress. The law
replaced the Philippine Organic Act of and acted as a constitution of the Philippines from its
enactment until , when the Tydings–McDuffie Act was passed (which in turn led eventually
to the Commonwealth of the Philippines and to independence from the United States). The
Jones Law created the first fully elected Philippine legislature.
The law was enacted by the 64th United States Congress on August and contained the
first formal and official declaration of the United States federal government's commitment to
grant independence to the Philippines. It was a framework for a "more autonomous
government," with certain privileges reserved to the United States to protect its sovereign
rights and interests, in preparation for the grant of independence by the United States. The
law provides that the grant of independence would come only "as soon as a stable
government can be established," which was to be determined by the United States
Government itself.
The law also changed the Philippine Legislature into the Philippines' first fully elected
body and therefore made it more autonomous of the U.S. government. The Philippine
Organic Act provided for an elected lower house (the Philippine Assembly), while the upper
house (the Philippine Commission) was appointed. The Jones Law provided for both houses
to be elected and changed the name of the Philippine Assembly to the House of
Representatives. The executive branch continued to be headed by an appointed governor
general of the Philippines, always an American.
Elections were held on October 3, 1916, for the newly created Philippine Senate.
Elections to the Philippine Assembly had already been held on June 6, 1916, and those
elected in that election were made members of the House of Representatives by the law.
Road to Commonwealth status
After the first independence mission, public funding of such missions was ruled
illegal. Subsequent independence missions in 1922, 1923, 1930, 1931, 1932, and two
missions in 1933 were funded by voluntary contributions. Numerous independence bills were
submitted to the U.S. Congress, which passed the Hare–Hawes–Cutting Bill on December 30,
1932. U.S. president Herbert Hoover vetoed the bill on January 13, 1933. Congress overrode
the veto on January 17, and the Hare–Hawes–Cutting Act became U.S. law. The law
promised Philippine independence after 10 years, but reserved several military and naval
bases for the United States, as well as imposing tariffs and quotas on Philippine exports. The
law also required the Philippine Senate to ratify the law. Quezon urged the Philippine Senate
to reject the bill, which it did. Quezon himself led the twelfth independence mission to
Washington to secure a better independence act. The result was the Tydings–McDuffie Act of
1934 which was very similar to the Hare–Hawes–Cutting Act except in minor details. The
Tydings–McDuffie Act was ratified by the Philippine Senate. The law provided for the
granting of Philippine independence by 1946.
The Tydings–McDuffie Act provided for the drafting and guidelines of a constitution
for a ten-year "transitional period" as the Commonwealth of the Philippines before the
granting of Philippine independence. On May 5, 1934, the Philippines Legislature passed an
act setting the election of convention delegates. Governor-General Frank Murphy designated
July 10 as the election date, and the Convention held its inaugural session on July 30. The
completed draft Constitution was approved by the Convention on February 8, 1935, approved
by U.S. president Franklin Roosevelt on March 23, and ratified by popular vote on May 14.
The first election under the new 1935 constitution was held on September 17, and on
November 15, 1935, the Commonwealth was established.
The Tydings–McDuffie Act specified a procedural framework for the drafting of a
constitution for the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines within two years of
its enactment. The act specified a number of mandatory constitutional provisions and
required approval of the constitution by the U.S. President and by Filipinos. The act
mandated U.S. recognition of independence of the Philippine Islands as a separate and self-
governing nation after a ten-year transition period.
Prior to independence, the act allowed the U.S to maintain military forces in the
Philippines and to call all military forces of the Philippine government into U.S. military
service. The act empowered the U.S. President, within two years following independence, to
negotiate matters relating to U.S. naval reservations and fueling stations of in the Philippine
Islands.
Immigration
The act reclassified all Filipinos, including those who were living in the United States,
as aliens for the purposes of immigration to America. A quota of immigrants per year was
established. Before this act, Filipinos were classified as United States nationals, but not
United States citizens, and while they were allowed to migrate relatively freely, they were
denied naturalization rights within the US, unless they were citizens by birth in the mainland
US.
Governor-general
On July 4, 1901, executive authority over the islands was transferred to the president
of the Philippine Commission, who had the title of "civil governor"—a position appointed by
the president of the United States and approved by the United States Senate. For the first year
a military governor, Adna Chaffee, ruled parts of the country still resisting American rule,
concurrent with civil governor William Howard Taft. Disagreements between the two were
not uncommon. The following year, on July 4, 1902, the civil governor became the sole
executive authority of the islands. The title was changed to "Governor-General" in 1905 by
Act of Congress (Public 43 – February 6, 1905).
Francis Burton Harrison was Governor-General from 1913 to 1921 under President
Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat. He advocated for and oversaw the process of Filipinization,
or the transfer of authority to Filipinos in the United States territory's Insular Government to
better prepare for independence. He was governor-general during the passages of the
Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Act, which converted the partially
elected Philippine Legislature with the appointed Philippine Commission as the upper house
and the elected Philippine Assembly as the lower house, to a fully elected Philippine
Legislature with the Philippine Senate replacing the now-dissolved Philippine Commission
and the Philippine Assembly renamed the House of Representatives of the Philippines.
Despite the length of his tenure as governor-general he vetoed only five bills, the least
number by any American governor-general in the Philippines. His pro-Filipino stance made
him a popular figure in the Philippines but also the object of criticism of conservative
Americans who viewed his liberal governance as not supportive enough of U.S. interests.
Under his administration, the Governor-General's Spanish-era mansion called
Malacañan Palace was expanded with the construction of an executive building. When he left
the Philippines, Harrison lived in Scotland until being recalled to the Philippines in 1934
during a period of transition from an unincorporated territory of the United States to the
Commonwealth of the Philippines.
In 1921, Republican president Warren G. Harding sent William Cameron Forbes and
Leonard Wood as heads of the Wood-Forbes Commission to investigate conditions in the
Philippines. The Commission concluded that Filipinos were not yet ready for independence
from the United States, a finding that was widely criticized in the Philippines.
On November 15, 1935, the Commonwealth government was inaugurated. The office
of President of the Philippines was created to replace the Governor-General as Chief
Executive, taking over many of the former's duties. The American Governor-General then
became known as the High Commissioner to the Philippines.
 Resident commissioners
From the passage of the Organic Act until independence, the Philippine Islands were
represented in the United States House of Representatives by two, and then one, resident
commissioners of the Philippines. Similar to delegates and the Resident Commissioner of
Puerto Rico, they were nonvoting members of Congress.

The 1935 Constitution

The 1935 Constitution was written, approved and adopted in 1934 by the
Commonwealth of the Philippines (1935–1946) and later used by the Third Republic (1946–
1972). It was written to meet requirements set forth in the Tydings–McDuffie Act to prepare
the country for its independence.
The Commonwealth Constitution was ratified to prepare the country for its
independence. This constitution was dominantly influenced by the Americans, but possess
the traces of the Malolos sonstitution, the German, Spanish, and Mexican constitutions,
constitutions of several South American countries, and the unwritten English constitution.
It originally provided for a unicameral legislature composed of a president and vice
president elected for a six-year term without re-election. It was amended in 1940 to provide
for a bicameral legislature composed of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The
President is to be elected to a four-year term, together with the vice-president, with one re-
election; the right of suffrage for male citizens of the Philippines who are twenty-one years of
age or over and are able to read and write were protected; this protection, later on, extended
to the right of suffrage for women two years after the adoption of the constitution.
The draft of the constitution was approved by the convention on February 8, 1935,
and was ratified by President Roosevelt in Washington, D.C., on March 25, 1935. Elections
were held on September 16, 1935, and Manuel L. Quezon was elected as the first President of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
The Preamble reads:
"The Filipino people, imploring the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a
government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation,
promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty, and democracy, do ordain and promulgate
this Constitution."
The original 1935 Constitution provided for a unicameral National Assembly, and the
President was elected to a six-year term without the possibility of re-election. It
was amended in 1940 to have a bicameral Congress composed of a Senate and House of
Representatives, to create an independent electoral commission and to grant the President a
four-year term with a maximum of two consecutive terms in office.
A Constitutional Convention was held in 1971 to rewrite the 1935 Constitution. The
convention was stained with manifest bribery and corruption. Possibly the most controversial
issue was removing the presidential term limit so that Ferdinand E. Marcos could seek re-
election for a third term, which many felt was the true reason for which the convention was
called. In any case, the 1935 Constitution was suspended in 1972 with Marcos' proclamation
of martial law, the rampant corruption of the constitutional process providing him with one of
his major premises for doing so.
The 1943 Constitution
The 1943 Constitution was drafted by a committee appointed by the Philippine
Executive Commission, the body established by the Japanese to administer the Philippines in
lieu of the Commonwealth of the Philippines which had established a government-in-exile. In
mid-1942, Japanese Premier Hideki Tōjō promised the Filipinos "the honor of independence"
which meant that the commission would be supplanted by a formal republic.
The Preparatory Committee for Philippine Independence tasked with drafting a new
constitution was composed, in large part, of members of the prewar National Assembly and
of individuals with experience as delegates to the convention that had drafted the 1935
Constitution. Their draft for the republic to be established under the Japanese occupation,
however, would be limited in duration, provide for indirect, instead of direct, legislative
elections, and an even stronger executive branch.
Upon the approval of the draft by the committee, the new charter was ratified in 1943
by an assembly of appointed, provincial representatives of the KALIBAPI,
the fascist political party established by the Japanese to supplant all previous political parties.
Upon the ratification by the Kalibapi assembly, the Second Republic was formally
proclaimed (1943–1945). José P. Laurel was elected president by the National Assembly and
sworn into office on October 14, 1943. Laurel was highly regarded by the Japanese for
having openly criticized the U.S. for the way that they governed the Philippines and because
he had a degree from the Tokyo Imperial University.
The 1943 Constitution remained in force in Japanese-controlled areas of the
Philippines, but was never recognized as legitimate or binding by the governments of the
United States, the Commonwealth of the Philippines, or the guerrilla organizations loyal to
them. In late 1944, President Laurel declared war on the United States and the British
Empire and proclaimed martial law, essentially ruling by decree. His government, in turn,
went into exile in December 1944, first to Taiwan and then Japan. After the announcement of
Japan's surrender, Laurel formally dissolved the Second Republic.
The Preamble reads:
"The Filipino people, imploring the aid of Divine Providence and desiring to lead a
free national existence, do hereby proclaim their independence, and in order to establish a
government that shall promote the general welfare, conserve and develop the patrimony of
the Nation, and contribute to the creation of a world order based on peace, liberty, and moral
justice, do ordain this Constitution."
The 1943 Constitution provided for strong executive powers. The Legislature
consisted of a unicameral National Assembly and only those considered to be anti-US could
stand for election, although in practice most legislators were appointed rather than elected.
Until the 1960s, the Second Republic and its officers were not viewed as a legitimate
Philippine government or as having any standing with the exception of the Second Republic-
era Supreme Court, whose decisions, limited to reviews of criminal and commercial cases as
part of a policy of discretion by Chief Justice José Yulo, continued to be part of official
records. This was made easier by the Commonwealth government-in-exile never constituting
a Supreme Court, and the formal vacancy in the position of Chief Justice for the
Commonwealth with the execution of José Abad Santos by the Japanese. It was only during
the Macapagal administration that a partial political rehabilitation of the Japanese-era
republic took place, with the official recognition of Laurel as a former president and the
addition of his cabinet and other officials to the roster of past government officials. However,
the 1943 Constitution was not taught in schools, and the laws of the 1943–44 National
Assembly were never recognized as valid or relevant.
Cold War Period and Martial Law Period
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS An independent country, the Republic of the Philippines has
anchored her foreign policy on three paramount planks: close association with the United
States, sympathy for the aspirations of all dependent countries, particularly of Asia, and close
cooperation with the United Nations. These three planks have been, and continue to be,
implemented in various ways. The first plank has been criticized by the nationalists for its
subservience to the United States in the belief that the interests of the Republic do not always
coincide with the interests of the United States. The second plank, which includes closer ties
with the countries of Asia, has also been criticized for not having been implemented to the
letter. The nationalist viewpoint has been that the foreign policy of the Republic must be
rooted in its national interests since the essence of any foreign policy is to work for the
interests of the country. The Garcia Administration had, so far, led the way in anchoring its
foreign policy on the Filipino First principle.
Foreign Policy Planks - When the Philippines finally regained her independence on
July 4, 1946, she found herself, so to speak, balancing on a bamboo pole placed across a
river. Destitute and suffering from the effects of the recently concluded war, her political
leaders could only look to America for assistance and economic salvation, for it was with
America that the country had conducted the experiment in mass democracy and with whom
she had fought the grim war. These historic ties, popularly and misleadingly called "special
relations with the United States," determine the direction of Philippine foreign policy.
Accordingly, when President Roxas stood up to deliver his inaugural address that morning of
July 4, 1946, he laid down the first plank of Philippine policy: the closest cooperation with
the United States "in all matters concerning our common defense and security." One result of
the war was the partial liquidation of Western imperialism in the Orient leading to the
political emancipation of Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia and Malaya. With the
emergence of these Asian states, the Philippines, as a geographic entity of Southeast Asia,
became tangent to its development. An increasing awareness of the emerging political setup
led President Roxas to enunciate the second plank of Philippine foreign policy: sympathy for
the political aspirations of all subject peoples, especially those of Asia, and the extension of
full cooperation in any plan or effort to raise the standards of living in the neighboring
countries. Earlier, when war was rushing to its conclusion, the Philippines joined the United
Nations as a full-fledged member and shared, along with other nations on the side of the
democracies, the hope of universal peace and security. This sentiment was expressed by then
President Sergio Osmeña and affirmed by succeeding Presidents. The third plank, therefore,
of Philippine foreign policy is the full and active participation of the Philippines in the ideals
and work of the United Nations.
First Plank: Implementation - The first plank of Philippine foreign policy revolved
around Filipino-American relations. The change from colonial status to independence
necessitated readjustments in the relations between the Philippines and the United States.
Consequently, the two countries entered into treaties and agreements designed to continue the
close friendship that has existed between them approximately since 1902. The Philippines
accepted, having then no better alternative, the Bell Trade Act and the Tydings Rehabilitation
Act of 1946 in order to proceed with the rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged
agriculture, industries, buildings, roads, bridges, and schoolhouses. Recognizing that the
recent war had "confirmed the mutuality of interest" of the Philippines and the United States
"in matters relating to the defense of their respective territories," and that measures should be
taken to promote their security, the Philippines and the United States concluded, on March
14, 1947, a military agreement by which the former granted the latter the right to "retain the
use of bases in the Philippines" for a period of ninety-nine years, to permit the United States
to use such bases as the latter may determine according to military necessity, and to enter into
negotiations with the United States concerning the expansion of such bases. Ostensibly the
military bases are designed to strengthen the American armed forces in the Philippines in
order to enable her to protect the latter from external aggression. While this may be true, it is
nevertheless true that, in a world divided between democracy and communism, those forces
are designed also to protect American interests in Southeast Asia. The maintenance of
American bases in the Philippines was not enough to ensure the security of the country and of
American interests in Asia. On March 21, 1947, the Military Assistance Pact was concluded
between the two countries under which the United States would furnish arms, ammunition,
equipment, and supplies to the armed forces of the Philippines. At the same time, the
agreement also provided for the creation of a Military Advisory Group composed of Filipino
and American personnel whose function was to "provide such advice and assistance" to the
Philippines as "is necessary to accomplish the purposes" of the agreement. The pact was to
last for five years. On June 26, 1953, an exchange of notes, which had the effect of a formal
agreement, extended the effectivity of the military assistance pact from July 5, 1953 until
terminated by either party. To show their complete unity and determination to "defend
themselves against external armed attack," both countries concluded the Mutual Defense
Treaty on August 30, 1951. Among other things, the treaty provides for the settlement of
international disputes in which they may get involved by peaceful means and for consultation
with each other "regarding the implementation of the treaty." Significantly, the treaty
provides that Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the
Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet
the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes. This particular provision
of the treaty, while at first sight favorable to the Philippines, is actually an empty declaration,
since, as pointed out by Senator Claro M. Recto, the foremost Filipino expert on foreign
affairs and consistent critic of Philippine foreign policy, the agreement does not provide for
an automatic declaration of war on the part of the United States against any external
aggressor of the Philippines. He correctly pointed out that in case of an external aggression
against the Philippines, the treaty merely provides for action "to meet the common dangers in
accordance with its constitutional processes," meaning that the United States might not come
to the assistance of the Philippines if the American Congress, which has the authority to
declare war, does not see fit to make such declaration. After the death of Senator Recto on
October 2, 1960, in Rome, the American Presidents, from Eisenhower to Johnson, including
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, tried to dissipate the fear and skepticism of the knowledgeable
Filipinos, especially the nationalists among them, by the assurance that the United States
would come to the aid of the Philippines at once in case of an aggression by a third party. But
in September 1966, an American Embassy spokesman in Manila, in a speech before Filipino
businessmen, realistically admitted, in connection with President Franklin Roosevelt's
wartime promise to the Filipinos that the United States would pay for every carabao killed
during the war, that Roosevelt's promise was not binding on the American Congress — an
honest admission that the promise of one American President is written on water. In the face
of this "confession", the Filipino nationalists had reason to rebuke and ridicule the naive
among their countrymen for pleading and repeating the discredited and mythical "special
relations" with the United States. On the economic front, the Philippines and the United
States have concluded agreements designed to help the former economically. The agreement
of July 4, 1946, an offshoot of the Bell Trade Act and the Tydings Rehabilitation Act,
provided for the amendment of the Philippine Constitution in order to give parity rights to the
Americans. Another agreement, known as the Quirino-Foster Agreement of November 14,
1950, provided for assistance to the Philippines in the "solution of age-old social and
economic problems gravely aggravated by the last war." In exchange for President Quirino's
promise to recommend to Congress legislation to bring about the "era of progress and
plenty," as recommended by the Bell Survey Mission, the American Government agreed to
"furnish with the least possible delay technical assistance particularly in the field of taxation
and revenue collection, social legislation and economic development." By virtue of this
provision, the Philippines created the Philippine Council for U.S. Aid (PHILCUSA), which
would collaborate with the American agency, the Economic CooperaJMany agreements have
been concluded between the two countries which deal with economic matters. Some of them
are: the Abaca Fiber Agreement of August 8, 1946, the Agreement on the Establishment of
the American Philippine Financial Commission of September 13, 1946; Agreement on the
Cancellation of Copra and Coconut Oil of November 5, 1946; and Agreement Regarding a
Road, Street, and Bridge Program of February 14, 1947. Problems of Fil-American Relations
- In spite of the highly touted "identity" of Filipino-American interests and the close
friendship that has characterized their experiment in democratic partnership, several irritants
have cropped up to make the "honeymoon" seem sour. In the first place, the so-called identity
of Filipino American interests is more sentimental and rhetorical than real and substantial. No
two independent nations ever had or could have identical national interests, owing to
geographic, economic, and ideological factors. In the second place, there are actuations of the
American Government and personnel which do not conform to the Filipino idea of friendship.
Lastly, the Filipinos, or the more intelligent and vocal among them, have come to realize that
American intentions in the Philippines have not been exactly altruistic and benevolent. When
the Philippines achieved independence in 1946, President Roxas lost no time in enunciating
his policy of following in the wake of America in the mistaken belief that what is good for
America is or must necessarily be good for the Philippines. Consequently, every American
imposition was accepted blithely in the belief that what America does in the Philippines and
elsewhere is done for the good of the Filipinos. In practically all international questions, the
Philippines, through her delegate to the United Nations, has almost always voted with the
United States until, in 1959, Filipino Ambassador to London, Leon Ma. Guerrero, Jr., cried
bitterly that the U.S. delegation to the U.N. had been "twisting the arm" of the Filipino
delegation, that is, putting pressure on the latter in order to vote as one with the U.S.
delegation on matters favorable to the United States even if, in some matters, the reputation
of the Philippines is adversely affected. Guerrero's "declaration of independence" seems to be
the beginning of a "revolt" and the implementation of the Filipino First policy in the field of
foreign relations. Some actuations of the American military in the Philippines have
contributed to the tension in Filipino-American relations. The killings of Filipinos by Filipino
or American security guards in the employ of the American armed forces in Clark Field,
Pampanga, and the refusal of the American military to hand over the killers to the Philippine
courts for trial have become a major irritant. The Philippine position on the matter is based on
the Military Bases Agreement of 1947 in which offenses committed by Filipinos against
Filipinos within the American bases are to be tried by Philippine courts. The American
military contend that any investigation into the reported killings inside the bases requires
consultations with higher authorities of the American Department of Defense. This conflict of
jurisdiction has increased the tension. In 1953, President Quirino and President Eisenhower
communicated with each other on the importance of expanding and developing "certain U.S.
military bases in the Philippines, as well as outstanding property and related questions."
Nothing resulted from this exchange of letters. Owing to bloody incidents in which alleged
Filipino pilferers were shot down like dogs inside the American bases, the House of
Representatives, in February 1956, took steps to re-examine Philippine-American relations.
This move was inspired by the detention of Enrique Santa Maria, a Filipino mining operator,
by the Clark Field authorities for mining in Bueno Hill, Capas, Tarlac, which was within the
American reservation. To resolve the bases questions, particularly the question of
jurisdiction, both countries appointed their respective panels to meet in Manila. The
Philippine panel, chairmanned by Vice-President Carlos P. Garcia, met with the American
panel, headed by Karl Bendetsen, from August 11, 1956, to December 5, 1956. The
Philippine position regarding the bases question was provided by Senator Claro M. Recto
when, on February 1, 1954, he refuted Attorney General Herbert Brownell's contention that
the United States owned the land on which the American bases were located. Recto
contended that the United States merely acquired the right to use such land. Two years later,
in July 1956, the American Government declared that the United States "recognizes the
sovereignty of the Philippine Government over the base lands." This was repeated by Vice-
President Richard Nixon when he visited the Philippines the same year. Thus, Recto was
justified in his contention. The Garcia-Bendetsen conferences concerning the question of
jurisdiction in the American bases in the Philippines ended in December 1956 without having
arrived at a reasonable solution. Meanwhile, more Filipinos have been fired upon and killed
within the American base at Clark Field. In some instances, the guilty party, if an American,
was sent to the United States on the ground that he had finished his tour of duty in the
Philippines. Rightly or wrongly, the Filipinos believe that such a technique is only a
smokescreen to cover up the real intention of not allowing the Philippine courts to try the
accused American. "When, on top of this, an American lawmaker, Phil Waver, accused the
Filipino pilferers of harassing the Americans within the Clark Field base, the Filipinos,
individually and collectively, could not help thinking that the "ugly Americans" are the cause
of the Filipino-American tension. The irritant became exceedingly irritating to the Filipinos
when, in 1964, a Filipino boy in Clark Field was shot in the back by an American sentry. This
was followed shortly by the killing of a Filipino fisherman by American sentries at the
Olongapo Naval Base. University students and laborers held vocal but peaceful
demonstrations before the American Embassy in Manila and denounced what they believed
was the unnecessary and unjustified killing of unarmed Filipinos. The American Embassy, in
its attempt to explain away the murder of the Filipino boy, issued a statement saying that
certain Filipinos tried to bomb the American school at Clark Field. A bomb was shown to the
press, but subsequent investigations showed that the bomb was a harmless one and could not
have exploded. Thinking Filipinos felt that the bomb was planted to make it appear that
Filipinos who came near the airfield threw the bomb at the American school. The excuse was
palpably lame, and the Filipino students, laborers, and some intellectuals held a mammoth
demonstration before the American Embassy on January 25, 1965, and denounced American
actuations in the Philippines. The Americans, seconded by their Filipino stooges,
immediately branded the demonstration as communistic, but this smear tactic had the effect
of fanning anti-American feeling. The killing of unarmed Filipinos by armed American
soldiers inside or outside American military and naval bases in the Philippines continued. In
1968, a Filipino was shot to death by an American sentry in Cavite. The following year,
another trigger-happy American soldier, who was off duty and, in violation of U.S. military
rules, went hunting with his service pistol, in broad daylight shot to death a Filipino
employee of the military base. When confronted with the murder, the American soldier said
he mistook the Filipino for a "wild boar." The American military court hastily tried the
offender and acquitted him. A few days later, he was reported to have left for the United
States. The furor that this particular incident provoked among the Filipino students, workers,
and intellectuals led to demands for the renegotiation of the Bases Treaty of 1947. The results
of this renegotiation move will determine the contour of Filipino American relations in the
years to come. Attempts at Relaxation of Tension: With the advent of the Garcia
Administration, a modification in the Philippine foreign policy was initiated. The
modification, in the words of Secretary of Foreign Affairs Felixberto Serrano, lay in a policy
of “respectable independence.” The year 1959 was fateful, for it saw the beginnings of a
nationalistic orientation, along Recto’s line of thinking, not only in foreign policy, but also in
the national economy. The increasing demand of the more farsighted and nationalistic sector
of the population for a reexamination of Philippine-American relations, particularly with
reference to parity, the 1947 Military Bases Agreement, the Laurel-Langley Agreement, and
the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, led to a series of conferences between Secretary Felixberto
Serrano and Ambassador Charles K. Bohlen late in September 1959. As a result of these
Conferences, the United States agreed in principle to the Philippine demand that the ninety-
nine-year lease of the bases to the United States should be cut down to only twenty-five years
subject to renewal every five years. Ambassador Bohlen, however, hedged on another
Philippine demand for the standby veto power in the use of American bases in the country for
“critical situations short of war” but which might explode into war. The deadlock on this
particular question was broken when Ambassador Bohlen, on October 12, 1959, gave in to
the Philippine demands. The understanding reached with Bohlen included:
1. recognition by the United States of the right of the Philippines to be consulted on
the operational use of American bases in the Philippines in situations in which the
U.S. might be involved in Asia;
2. formal inclusion of the principle of automatic retaliation in the Mutual Defense
Treaty of 1951;
3. prior consent of the Philippines before establishing missile sites in the country;
4. reduction of the ninety-nine-year lease of the American bases to twenty-five years
subject to renewal of termination by mutual consent; and
5. long-range programming of the different aspects of American military assistance to
the Philippines. On August 10, 1965, Foreign Secretary Mauro Mendez and American
Ambassador William M. Blair, Jr. signed an agreement revising Article XIII of the
1947 Bases Treaty. Under the agreement which, however, does not have the effect of
law, the United States agreed to (1) renounce exclusive jurisdiction over on-base
offenses, (2) define clearly the term “on-duty”, (3) improve the provisions on waivers
of jurisdiction, and (4) create a criminal jurisdiction implementation committee
composed of officials of both governments. On August 10, 1965, Foreign Secretary
Mauro Mendez and American Ambassador William M. Blair, Jr. signed an agreement
revising Article XIII of the 1947 Bases Treaty. Under the agreement, which, however,
does not have the effect of law, the United States agreed to: 1. Renounce exclusive
jurisdiction over on-base offenses. 2. Define clearly the term "on-duty." 3. Improve
the provisions on waivers of jurisdiction. 4. Create a criminal jurisdiction
implementation committee composed of officials of both governments. Contributing
to the relaxation of tension was the accord reached on October 23, 1959, which, as
finally signed in Manila on October 28, in which the United States turned over
Olongapo to the Philippines. Olongapo, a part of Subic, Zambales, had been
administered by the American Naval authorities and had been, for all practical
purposes, an American territory where Filipinos were considered aliens. With its
turnover to the Philippine Government, it became, in theory and in fact, a part of the
Philippines, and thereby removed one source of irritant between the Filipinos and the
Americans in that part of the country. Re-assessment of RP-US Relations.—Owing
mainly to the American military's unseemly behavior in their dealings with Filipino
civilians, especially inside the military bases, many thinking Filipinos have in recent
years begun to doubt the reality of the so-called special relations with the United
States. The Filipinos as a people were, however, more to blame than the Americans
for they, the Filipinos, had not learned the lessons of their history and had not realized
that in international relations the first duty of a people is to protect their national
interests. The myth of "special relations" with the United States was rooted in Filipino
belief that the Americans had nothing but pure love for the Filipinos and that this
mystical love would act as a force to compel the Americans to put the welfare of the
Philippines on the level with that of the United States. This naivete, which is not even
charming, has been the focus of pointed criticisms of the nationalists who warned the
Filipinos against relying too much on the United States and hinted, in broad strokes,
that the salvation of the Filipino nation lay, and still lies, in self-reliance and self-help.
For this dignified, although then unpopular stand, the nationalists were called prophets
of doom and communist sympathizers by the "brown Americans." Senator Claro M.
Recto, in particular, was called nasty names by certain Filipinos who, either because
of their ignorance or slave complex, fanatically believed in American benevolence
and magnanimity and who, therefore, favored President Manuel A. Roxas' "followin-
the-wake-of-America policy." In recent years, however, an increasing number of
Filipinos have been reassessing Philippine-American relations and have, as a
consequence, come to the conclusion that the so-called special relations with the
United States was a myth. The nationalists, in particular, began to criticize American
policy toward the Philippines and demanded in unmistakable terms the abolition of
the parity right of the Americans in the Philippines, the dismantling of the American
bases, and the termination of the Laurel-Langley Agreement. Realizing the need for
unity in the ranks, the nationalists in all sectors—teachers, students, farmers, laborers,
businessmen, industrialists, and professionals—banded themselves, on February 8,
1967, into the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (M. A. N.). The
nationalists urged the people to stand on their own feet and to rely on themselves for
their salvation. This appeal echoed in essence, Andres Bonifacio's exhortation to the
masses in 1896. Significantly, the nationalists stood, and still stand, for an
independent foreign policy, the control and direction of the national economy by
Filipinos, and an end to the so-called special relations with the United States. This
last, the end of the so-called special relations, was forcefully and frankly brought to
the attention of the Filipinos by no less than President Richard M. Nixon. Visiting the
Philippines on July 27-28, 1969, President Nixon, in a farewell note delivered at the
Manila International Airport on July 28, said that "as I come to the Philippines, in this
brief stay, I hope I can initiate a new era of Philippine-American relations, not
returning to the old special relationship because the winds of change have swept away
those factors, but building a new relationship which will be based on mutual trust, on
mutual confidence, on mutual cooperation."
Second Plank: Implementation.—Though it is pure rhetoric to say that the
Philippines occupies a "central position... in the evolving political and economic
pattern of Asia," she is nevertheless, only tangent to such pattern and, therefore,
cannot afford to remain isolated from her Asian neighbors. In the implementation of
the second plank, the Philippines supported the cause of Indonesian independence,
and sponsored or actively participated in conferences concerning cultural, economic,
and social questions that were and continue to be of paramount importance to the
Orient, such as the New Delhi Conference of 1949, the Baguio Conference of 1950,
the conferences of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE),
and the Bandung Conference of 1955. It may be said that the decade from 1950 to
1959 was an era of Asian rediscovery and re-awakening. Heretofore, owing to the
incursions of Western imperialism in the Orient, the Asian peoples lived in isolation
and were not allowed by the imperialist powers to know and understand one another.
The Philippines under Spain and the United States; Malaya, India, and Burma under
Great Britain; Indonesia under Holland; and Indo-China under France were, so to
speak, islands drifting aimlessly and without any appreciable knowledge of one
another. With Philippine independence, followed closely by the independence of
India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Ceylon, Viet-Nam, and, lastly, Malaya, the ancient
relations among them have been resumed. Since then they have been working at
rediscovering, first, their separate national identities, and, second, their
interdependence in cultural, social, and economic matters. Cultural and diplomatic
exchanges have been, and continue to be, made among the Southeast Asian countries
leading to closer understanding and amity. The Philippines concluded treaties of
friendship with Pakistan on January 3, 1951; with Indonesia on June 21, 1951; with
India on July 11, 1952 and on April 29, 1954; with Viet-Nam on April 26, 1959; and a
cultural collaboration pact with Indonesia on April 28, 1959. To emphasize the
importance of good neighborliness, President Garcia visited Viet-Nam, April 21-25,
1959, and thus paved the way for the Philippines-Vietnam treaty of friendship. Such a
gesture, though superficial, is at least an indication of the Philippines' changing
attitude towards her Asian neighbors.
The Manila Pact.—Probably the most significant event in the relations among some
Southeast Asian nations was the conclusion of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO), popularly called the Manila Pact, in 1954. The signing of this treaty
proceeded from an awareness of the relentless march of communism in Asia. At the
conclusion of World War II, Western imperialism in Asia suffered a setback and a
wave of nationalism swept over that part of colonized Asia. In this post-war
confusion, communism stepped in and, identifying itself with the struggling colonials,
acquired large supplies of weapons. Most of the countries of the region were then ripe
for communist pickings, for poverty, filth, and hunger led to desperation which made
the people clutch at the communist straw. The pattern of communist movement first
showed itself in Indo-China in 1945-46 when the native communists gained control of
the guerrilla movement and instigated the revolt against French authorities.
Communist subversion spread to other parts of Southeast Asia, principally in India,
Indonesia, Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines. The movement gained momentum
when in 1949, Chinese communist armies of Mao Tse-Tung overran the Chinese
mainland and drove Chiang Kai-shek to a hide-out in Formosa. On June 24, 1950, the
Communist North Koreans invaded South Korea, forcing the United Nations to
contribute fighting forces and relief materials to South Korea. In July 1953, an
armistice was signed ending the Korean bloodbath. But a year later, the communist-
led Viet-Minh (Northern Indo-China) invaded and overran the northern province of
Tonkin and advanced into Laos. This Indo-Chinese little war was halted in 1954 by
the decisions of the Geneva Conference which provided for the temporary withdrawal
of communists and French forces to zones north and south, respectively, of the 17th
parallel. Viet-nam, Cambodia, and Laos were recognized as independent states. The
dangers posed by the communist movement to the Western Powers' position in Asia
and to the independent existence of some Southeast Asian countries led Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles to propose, on July 23, 1954, the formation of "collective
arrangements to promote the security of the free peoples of South-East Asia." Prince
Wan Waithayakom of Thailand, however, expressed his country's desire to make the
collective arrangements purely defensive in nature. Consequently, in September 1954,
eight independent nations— the Philippines, Australia, France, New Zealand,
Thailand, Pakistan, the United States, and the United Kingdom—met in Manila to
make "collective arrangements" a reality. On September 6, President Magsaysay,
speaking at the opening conference, stated its objective: "It is the task of this
conference to help build an adequate system of defense around an exposed and
threatened sector of the world. On the success of this conference may well depend the
peace of Asia in the next ten years and the future freedom in the world for the next
thousand years." On September 8, the representatives of the countries in attendance
approved and signed the Manila Pact, which was designed for the defense of
Southeast Asia against armed external aggression. At the same time, they also
approved the Pacific Charter. The Manila Pact provides for the peaceful settlement of
international disputes in which they might get involved, the pooling of their resources
in an effort to resist any armed attack and to "prevent and counter subversive activities
directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability,"
cooperation with one another in the promotion of their economic and social well-
being, and a concerted action in the event outside aggression is directed against any of
its members in accordance with the constitutional processes of each of the member
states. On February 19, 1955, the SEATO formally came into being with the
ratification of the treaty by all the member-states. Though well-conceived and well-
intentioned, the SEATO nevertheless suffered from one capital weakness, namely,
that it did not include the more important states of Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia,
India, Malaysia, and Burma. Of the eight member states, three— the United States,
the United Kingdom, and France—were outside the area, while two—Australia and
New Zealand—were so far off that it is doubtful whether in the event of communist
aggression, say, against Thailand, they would or could be effective in giving aid to the
aggrieved nation. With India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Burma refusing to join the
alliance, the SEATO was at best effective on paper.
Third Plank: Implementation. - The United Nations as an international body
dedicated to the preservation of universal peace and to the promotion of the idea of
One World was born of bleeding humanity groping for deliverance from pain, hunger,
and hatred. From the moment of the birth of the United Nations in San Francisco in
1945, the Philippines has played an active role in its deliberations and activities. Her
role in that great international body is practically mandatory, for her Constitution
declares that she “renounces war as an instrument of national policy.” No other
constitution of any independent country anywhere has such a unique statement of
idealism. The Philippines, as a participant in the drafting of the UN Charter, has
worked with the UN and its instrumentalities and agencies in the promotion not only
of universal peace, but also of the social and economic well-being of underdeveloped
countries. The Philippine role in the activities of the UN may not be as significant as
that of the great Powers like the United States, Russia, Great Britain, and France, but
she has kept faith with the ideals of that international body. She is a member of the
Trusteeship Council and the Special Committee on Non-Self-Governing Territories
which has labored and is laboring for the interest of the undeveloped and
underdeveloped countries of the world. As a member of the Commission on Human
Rights, she participated in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The Philippine likewise initiated the program of the UN guaranteeing the freedom of
information. Because of Philippine interest in the liquidation of the former Italian
colonies, she was elected to the Advisory Council for the Trust Territory of
Somaliland for a term of ten years. Finally, the Philippines contributed in 1951 a
combat battalion to the Korean War as a member of the United Nations forces. The
Philippines is also a member of many of the UN’s specialized agencies engaged in
non-political activities. These include the World Health Organization, whose Asian
headquarters is located in Manila, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, the International Civil
Aviation Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and others. Anti-
Communism as a Policy. —The first intimation of the official policy on communism
may be gleaned from President Manuel Roxas’ speech at Clark Field on April 15,
1948. It was the time of the “cold war” and the United States, now hostile to Soviet
Russia, was exerting efforts to win nations to her side. The United States could not
afford to lose the ideological war. Roxas was invited by the American military at
Clark Field, an American enclave in the Philippines, to speak before the American
soldiers to spell out officially the Philippine stand on the Russo-American “cold war.”
Roxas, who owed his election to the presidency to the Americans—mainly to
MacArthur and McNutt—eloquently committed the Filipino youth to the American
side. Roxas, of course, had been anti-communist as shown by his outlawing of the
communist-led Hukbalahap organization, which opposed him vigorously in the 1946
elections. Upon his death on the very day that he delivered his “follow-America-
wherever-she-goes” speech, his successor, Quirino, and the other presidents after him,
made anti-communism a credo. On September 24, 1956, the British scholar, Arnold
Toynbee, the celebrated author of the massive The Study of History, spoke at the
Philippine Columbian Club and was asked, after his lecture, whether he was in favor
of outlawing communism. His answer was shocking to the intelligence community
and the professional witch-hunters. He was, he said, against outlawing communism,
for this would only force the communists to go underground. The wisdom of his
remark was proved when Congress, during Carlos P. Garcia’s administration, passed
the Anti-Subversion Law, which outlawed communism in the Philippines. The
handful of Filipino communists promptly went underground, and the intelligence
agencies resorted to unfounded suspicions, unreasonable accusations, and plain
prejudice to harass and smear the reputation of men and women who refused to swear
by conformism and parochialism. The period from approximately 1950 to 1967 may
be described as the era of witch-hunting. Professors, labor leaders, and students with
liberal orientation were branded “pinks” or “Reds” or “fellow-travelers”, thus making
them suspect in the eyes of the public. It was a season of trial by publicity, when a
man’s reputation was smeared in the name of democracy. President Ferdinand
Marcos, however, refused to be stampeded into ordering the government’s
intelligence agencies to arrest the dissenters and nonconformists in Philippine society.
Instead, he partially relaxed the ban on travel to communist countries, a relaxation that
led to the acceptance by Filipinos, some of whom were legislators and newspapermen,
of invitations to visit Red China. By 1968, businessmen, legislators, and
newspapermen had gone not only to Red China, but also to such communist countries
as Soviet Russia, Romania, Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany
to know more about these countries and to lay the ground for future trade and cultural
relations with them. In the same year, Russian scholars, some of whom could speak
Tagalog better than many Filipinos, were allowed to enter the Philippines, and in 1969
some Russian ballet dancers were invited to perform at the Meralco Auditorium.
Another group of Russians, composed of a lady scholar of Philippine history, a
journalist, and a bureaucrat, came to Manila for a visit and were invited to many
parties given in their honor. Such reception would have been labeled communistic in
the 1950’s. Even so, there are still Filipinos who think in terms of the “cold war” of
the late 1940’s and the 1950’s and, consequently, would not hear of any relations with
communist countries. Recent developments, however, show them to be dwindling into
the minority. Even the rabid Catholics who trembled with holy indignation at the mere
mention of communism have revised their attitude and are now more or less resigned
to accepting trade and cultural relations with communist countries. The reason for this
turnabout lies not only in the recognition of the hard realities of international politics,
but also in the changes that have swept—and are still sweeping—the Vatican
precisely since the liberal-minded Pope John XXIII ascended the papal throne. The
ecumenism which he began is being continued by his successor, Pope Paul VI. This
ecumenism has resulted in the liberalization of the Church’s thinking and practices,
including the recognition of the necessity to co-exist with people of opposite or even
hostile ideological orientation. The conditioning of the Filipino officials’ minds to
absolute anticommunism, even to the extent of being ridiculous, has not made the
Philippine position in Asia enviable. On the contrary, most Asian countries,
particularly those with independent foreign policies, consider the Philippines still
under the colonial rule of the United States. Maphilindo. —Philippine foreign policy
has not changed since 1946. Its second plank, that of cultivating closer relations with
Asian countries, has been implemented more or less haphazardly. In 1962, however,
Macapagal took an active interest in bringing together the peoples of Malay stock. He
proposed a “summit” conference among the leaders of the Philippines, Indonesia, and
Malaya. Consequently, a conference on the ministerial level was held in Manila from
June 7 to 11, 1963, resulting in a 16-point agreement among the three countries of
Malay stock. This agreement, known as the Manila accord, was approved in Manila
on July 31, 1963, and signed by Macapagal, Sukarno of Indonesia, and Tunku Abdul
Rahman of the Federation of Malaya. On August 6, the chiefs of state of the three
countries issued the Manila Declaration in which they laid down the principles that
would guide their countries, known as Maphilindo (Malaya, the Philippines, and
Indonesia), namely: First, that they reaffirm their adherence to the principle of equal
rights and selfdetermination of peoples as enunciated in the United Nations Charter
and the Bandung Declaration; Second, that they are determined, in the common
interest of their countries, to maintain fraternal relations, to strengthen cooperation
among their peoples in the economic, social and cultural progress and social well-
being in the region, and to put an end to the exploitation of man by man and of one
nation by another; Third, that the three nations shall combine their efforts in the
common struggle against colonialism and imperialism in all their forms and
manifestations and for the eradication of the vestiges thereof in the region in particular
and the world in general; Fourth, that the three nations, as new emerging forces in the
region, shall cooperate in building a new and better world based on national freedom,
social justice, and lasting peace; and Fifth, that in the context of the joint endeavors of
the three nations to achieve the foregoing objectives, they have agreed to take initial
steps towards the establishment of Maphilindo by holding frequent and regular
consultations at all levels to be known as Mushawarah Maphilindo. The Breakup. —
The jubilation that followed the creation of Maphilindo, which Western and some
Asian observers criticized as racially inspired, was short-lived, however. In
preparation for the creation of the Federation of Malaysia, which would include,
besides Malaya and Singapore, Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak, it was agreed, in
the spirit of Maphilindo, that the peoples of the last two territories should determine in
a plebiscite whether they would join the contemplated Federation. On August 1, 1963,
the Malayan and British governments committed a diplomatic faux pas by issuing a
joint statement in London whereby they agreed on principle that the Federation of
Malaysia, which would include Sabah and Sarawak, would be proclaimed on August
31, 1963— even before the results of the plebiscite were known. Indonesia and the
Philippines agreed to the holding of a plebiscite in Sarawak and Sabah under the
auspices of the United Nations Secretariat. On September 13, 1963, the U.N.
Secretary-General submitted the findings of his teams to the governments of the
Philippines, Malaya, Indonesia, and Britain. The findings showed that the peoples of
Sarawak and Sabah were for joining the Federation of Malaysia. Indonesia and the
Philippines demurred, saying that the plebiscite did not reflect the true feelings of the
peoples of Sarawak and Sabah owing to the British pressure. Consequently, the
Philippines severed diplomatic ties with Malaysia on September 16, 1963. Indonesia,
under the leadership of Sukarno, not only refused to recognize Malaysia but began an
anti-Malaysia campaign. While relations between the Philippines and Malaysia were
characterized with indifference, those between Indonesia and Malaysia were openly
hostile. The Philippines’ basis for the non-recognition of Malaysia lay in the former’s
territorial claim to Sabah, a claim that Malaysia, backed up by Britain, naturally
disputed. Obviously, Macapagal’s refusal to recognize Malaysia was a tactical
maneuver to force the latter to recognize the Philippine claim to Sabah in exchange
for Philippine recognition of the British-inspired Malaysia. The impasse was resolved
when, after Marcos’ inauguration as president, he promised to reestablish diplomatic
relations with Malaysia. On the assurance of the Malaysian government that it was not
averse to elevating the question of the Philippine claim to Sabah to the World Court or
to submitting it to peaceful negotiations or arbitration, the Philippines reestablished
diplomatic relations with Malaysia on June 3, 1966. On June 25, the Philippines
recognized Singapore which, on August 9, 1965, seceded from the Federation of
Malaysia. The Dispute Over Sabah. —No sooner had the Philippines re-established
diplomatic relations with Malaysia than a bitter controversy arose between them. In
accordance with the understanding between the two countries (see preceding
paragraph), the Philippines renewed its claim over Sabah, the former North Borneo.
The Philippine claim was based on the following historical facts:
1. The "sultan of Sulu acquired sovereignty over North Borneo (Sabah) from the
Sultan of Brunei in the early 17th century," whom the former helped in suppressing a
rebellion.
2. In 1878, the Sultan of Sulu leased North Borneo (Sabah) to an Austrian national,
Gustavus von Overbeck, who organized the North Borneo Company with Alfred
Dent, an Englishman, as his business partner. The Company administered the disputed
territory from 1878 to 1946 and during this period it paid the Sultan of Sulu an annual
rental of 5,000 Malayan dollars, which was increased in 1903 to 5,300 dollars.
3. The fact that the disputed territory was leased by the Sultan of Sulu shows that he
exercised sovereignty over the territory.
4. In 1903, the North Borneo Company, a private company, asked the "Sultan of Sulu
to execute a confirmatory deed to confirm the contract of 1878 (the Lease
Agreement)" and "expressly recognized that the Sultan of Sulu was sovereign in
Sabah."
5. According to British sources, the North Borneo Company did not acquire the
territory of Sabah for the British crown, for when Spain and the Netherlands raised
objections over the activities of the North Borneo Company, Lord Granville and the
Marquis of Salisbury, who were during their time Foreign Ministers of Britain,
explained to Spain and the Netherlands that "the British Government assumed no
dominion or sovereign rights in Borneo which was occupied by the Company and that
it did not purport to grant to the Company any powers of government" over the
disputed territory.
6. The annexation of North Borneo by Britain in 1946, eleven days after Philippine
independence, was illegal in the sense that the North Borneo Company, from which
the British Government took Sabah, had no right of sovereignty over Sabah;
consequently.
7. Britain had no right to turn over Sabah to Malaysia in 1963 because she, Britain,
had no sovereign right over Sabah. On the other hand, the Malaysian government
anchored its claim over Sabah on the fact that:
1. Great Britain turned over Sabah to Malaysia in 1963, thereby making Malaysia the
heir of Britain to Sabah.
2. In a plebiscite conducted in 1963 under the auspices of the United Nations, the
Sabahans voted to be a part of the Federation of Malaysia; and
3. The Philippine Constitution does not include Sabah in the delineation of the
geographical limits of the Philippines. Attempts to resolve the ticklish issue proved
futile: both parties refused to give in: the Philippines still refuses to give up the claim
over Sabah because of historical, sentimental, and legal facts involved in the case; and
Malaysia refuses to give up Sabah not only because to do so would be to destroy the
artificially created Federation of Malaysia, but also because Sabah has rich natural
resources which Malaysia as the principal in the Federation is exploiting to the
advantage of the Federation as a whole. The Philippines, in an attempt to resolve the
issue peacefully in accordance with the rule of law, suggested that the question be
elevated to the World Court for decision, but the Malaysian leaders who claimed that
the Philippines had neither political nor legal leg to stand on, adamantly refused to
have the World Court decide the case. This attitude drew a sharp stricture from the
courageous Philippines Free Press when it said: "One who is caught with the goods
will, quite naturally, refuse to go to court." In the face of Malaysia's refusal to submit
the case to the World Court, the Philippines withdrew its embassy from Kuala
Lumpur; a little later, Malaysia ordered its embassy in Manila to close shop.
Association of Southeast Asia. With the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with
Malaysia, many Asian observers of Southeast Asian development and politics felt that
the late Maphilindo with its alleged racial overtones should be replaced with a
regional association that would include non-Malay peoples. Hence the establishment
of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), which was the brainchild of then
President Carlos P. Garcia and Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman. In
January 1959, during Tunku Abdul Rahman's visit to Manila, he and President Garcia
issued a joint communique which called for a study of the "ways and means to elevate
the standard of living and improve the material welfare of their peoples." It was
proposed, however, that other Southeast Asian countries be invited to "subscribe to
this idea." On July 31, 1961, the Association of Southeast Asia was formally
established in Bangkok by the representatives of the Philippines, Malaya, and
Thailand. The aims, as expressed in the so-called Bangkok Declaration, were:
1. To establish an effective machinery for friendly consultations, collaboration, and
mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, scientific, and administrative
fields;
2. To provide educational, professional, technical, and administrative training and
research facilities in their respective countries for nationals and officials of the
associated countries;
3. To exchange information on matters of common interest or concern in the
economic, cultural, educational, and scientific fields;
4. To cooperate in the promotion of Southeast Asian studies;
5. To provide a machinery for fruitful collaboration in the utilization of their
respective natural resources, the development of their agriculture and industry, the
expansion of their trade, the improvement of their transport and communication
facilities, and generally raising the living standards of their peoples;
6. To cooperate in the study of problems in international commodity trade; and
7. Generally, to consult and cooperate with one another so as to achieve the aims and
purposes of the Association, as well as to contribute more effectively to the work of
existing international organizations and agencies. The diplomatic crisis that arose out
of the estrangement of the Philippines and Malaysia made the ASA another paper
agreement. During all the years from 1963 to the time the Philippines reestablished
diplomatic ties with Malaysia, the ASA was in a state of suspended animation. The
inception of the Marcos administration, however, revived the ASA. The meetings of
the Philippine, Malaysian, and Thai delegates first in Bangkok in March 1966 and
then in Kuala Lumpur from April 27 to 30, led to the agreement on the
implementation of the pending and new projects, such as:
1. consideration of the liberalization of trade, including a free trade area;
2. action on the proposed treaty of trade and navigation;
3. the studies of exchange of lecturers and scholars among higher educational
institutions of the ASA member countries; and
4. consideration of an ASA shipping line. The ASEAN. The efforts of the Southeast
Asian nations to "rise up from the confines of their colonial past" and to meet the
challenge of the social, economic, and cultural conditions of the region led to the
founding of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which was
formally established in Bangkok, Thailand, on August 8, 1967, when the Joint
Declaration was signed by the foreign ministers of five countries - Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The Joint Declaration, known as
the ASEAN Declaration, outlined the objectives and purposes as:
1. To hasten the economic, social, and cultural progress of the region;
2. To promote regional peace and stability through the rule of law;
3. To promote assistance and collaboration among the member-states in the social,
economic, cultural, technical, scientific, and administrative fields;
4. To assist one another in the form of "training and research facilities in the
educational, professional, technical, and administrative spheres"; and
5. To encourage the study of Southeast Asian history and culture. The ASEAN,
probably learning from the experience of SEATO, which is now a dead association,
emphatically made it clear that it is a non-political association. For purposes of
cooperation in matters cultural, social, economic, and administrative the member-
states consult with one another. Although nonpolitical, the ASEAN, however, had
made political decisions, such as the joint recognition of the new government of
Kampuchea (Cambodia) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; cooperation in
having a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality in Southeast Asia (originally
proposed by the late Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak); the conclusion
of the treaty of amity and cooperation at Bali, on February 24, 1976, and the signing
of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, also at Bali, on the same day. The ASEAN
projects, on the other hand, include activities in such fields as commerce and industry,
mass media, tourism, agriculture, civil air transportation and communications, and
social and cultural activities. Relations with Other Countries. The Philippines has
maintained and seeks to maintain friendly relations with other countries of the world.
She has resumed her relations, now on the level of equality, with Spain, with whom
she concluded a treaty of friendship on September 27, 1947, and a cultural treaty on
March 4, 1949. As a result of these and other agreements with the former colonizer,
Philippine-Spanish relations have been cemented resulting in the continuous
pilgrimage of Filipino students and professionals to Spain. In an effort to recapture the
 faith and love of the Filipinos, the Spanish Government has offered various
scholarships to Filipino students to enable them to study in Spanish institutions of
higher learning. More significantly, the Philippine Congress, as if to reciprocate,
passed a law in 1957 making the Spanish language compulsory in all high schools,
colleges, and universities. There has been bitter criticism of the so-called Spanish
Law, not because the language is repugnant in itself, nor that there is an attempt to re-
live the unsavory features of the past, but that the twenty-four units of Spanish
required for graduation in any college exceed the units required of some students for
the study of the national language — a situation that is not found in any self-
respecting independent nation. Moreover, the Spanish Law forces the students to
sacrifice other more important subjects, particularly the sciences and the humanities,
in order to enable them to take twenty-four units of Spanish. On the practical side, the
twenty-four units of Spanish in colleges and universities have not made any
appreciable contribution to the student's reading and speaking knowledge of Spanish.
Students study Spanish simply to qualify for graduation and do not evince any desire
to learn the language. The Philippines has also concluded treaties of friendship with
European, Oriental, and Latin American countries; with Italy, on July 9, 1947; with
Egypt, on January 18, 1955; with Greece, on August 28, 1950; with Switzerland, on
August 30, 1956; with Turkey, on June 30, 1949; with Ecuador, on January 18, 1948;
with France, on June 26, 1947; with Nationalist China, on April 18, 1947; and with
the Dominican Republic, on November 2, 1952. With Japan, against whom the
Philippines fought during World War II, the latter concluded the peace treaty of San
Francisco on September 8, 1951. Technically, the war with Japan did not end with her
surrender at Tokyo Bay in 1945; it ended, in so far as the Philippines was concerned,
when the Philippine Senate ratified the San Francisco Treaty on July 16, 1956. Since
this latter treaty provided for separate negotiations with countries damaged by Japan's
policy of expansion in the last war, she agreed to pay reparations to those countries,
the Philippines included, and to conclude reparations agreement with them. The
Reparations Agreement with Japan was concluded on May 9, 1956, by the terms of
which Japan agreed to pay the Philippines the amount of $800 million. With the
conclusion of this agreement, Philippine-Japanese relations were normalized and the
way was paved for the "promotion of those relations on the basis of friendship, mutual
respect and common understanding." Filipino businessmen, students, and plain
pleasure-seekers began and continue to flock to Japan, first, to work for the right to
receive reparations allocations; second, to study Japanese culture; and last, to taste the
pleasures of the renowned Japanese hospitality and, not the least, to brandish their
ignorance of the elementary rules of decency.
POST-COLD WAR PERIOD
Postwar Reconstruction: Pure Neo-Colonialism – 1946-57
Given the magnitude of wartime destruction and the granting of independence to a
nation in ruins, the degree of economic and military dependence on the US was probably
inevitable. The urgency of economic recovery displaced concerns for autonomy.
After more than three years of Japanese military oppression American colonialism
looked very good by comparison. The Philippines was the only country in the colonial world
that referred to the return of the Western colonial power at the end of the Second World War
as ‘liberation’. The US imposition of a constitutional amendment to favor American business,
endorsed by President Manuel Roxas but faced with opposition in the Congress of the
Philippines, was still supported in a referendum. The retention of 23 American bases with
free rent for 99 years had been a prerequisite of the granting of independence. A Joint US
Military Advisory Group was set up in March 1947 to train the new Philippine armed forces.
Elpidio Quirino, the second president, was faced with a growing Communist-led
peasant rebellion in Luzon, and within a year witnessed the victory of Mao Zedong in China.
He was not well regarded by Washington, because of corruption and mismanagement, and his
call for an Asian NATO and more economic aid had been dismissed (Welch, 1984: 300-1).
So that in early 1950 he briefly explored the question of neutralism (Buss, 1979: 29)
apparently to attract the American attention that he had failed to get in a more suppliant
mode. But with the invasion of South Korea in June, the Chinese threat became real and thus
also the felt need for US protection. In 1951 he signed a rather weakly worded Mutual
Security Treaty with the US. Both security and economic welfare goals took precedence over
autonomy in Philippine policy priorities.
But the further growth of the Communist-led Huks nearby Manila was Quirino’s main
concern, as it was that of the US. American military aid increased and Ramon Magsaysay
was appointed secretary of defense to reorganize and revitalize the armed forces. But in order
to get substantial new economic assistance, Quirino had to sign an agreement that committed
the Philippine government to tax, labor and agrarian reform and gave American advisers
considerable opportunity to shape the policies in question. The Quirino-Foster Agreement
was, in effect, institutionalized neo-colonialism, giving a peculiar legitimacy to American
penetration of the Philippine political process, despite objections from some Filipino
Congressmen. American penetration continued at a covert level with CIA guidance and
support for Magsaysay’s successful presidential campaign in 1953.
Magsaysay’s pro-American sentiments were not hidden; during the campaign he said,
‘I was not so sure . . . after we were given our independence that American-Philippine unity
would last undiminished. These doubts are gone. We belong together and know it’ (Abueva,
1971: 214n). It is not surprising that Magsaysay hosted the conference that created the US-
dominated SEATO. He endorsed US policy in Vietnam after the Geneva Conference and
some of his friends and supporters worked with the CIA to establish a Filipino civilian
presence there.. In fact, it may be said that Magsaysay’s pro-Americanism stimulated the
growth of the Filipino nationalist movement.

The Nationalist Interlude: 1957-72

Vice-President Carlos Garcia, who succeeded to the presidency when Magsaysay died
in a plane crash in 1957, was much more sympathetic to the new nationalism than had been
his predecessor. For a time it appeared that autonomy goals might be given highest priority.
Senator Recto and his slogan ‘Asia for the Asians’ became so influential under Garcia that
many Americans were frightened. But Recto’s recommendation that the Philippines
recognize Communist China was not followed. In fact, despite the rising tide of nationalism
in the Congress and the press, Garcia felt the need to make the traditional pilgrimage to
Washington to ask for aid. The Philippines continued to be a mainstay of SEATO.
Nevertheless, Vice-President Macapagal, with a more pro-American image and reputedly
some American financial backing, defeated Garcia’s bid for re-election in 1961, primarily
because charges of widespread corruption seemed justified to the voters.
For all of his pro-American rhetoric, however, Macapagal’s foreign policy initiatives
gave the US some discomfort. He had a long-time personal interest in the claim of the
Sultanate of Sulu in the southern Philippines to North Borneo. In June 1962 Manila presented
such a claim to the British, complicating plans for the formation of Malaysia. In the
meantime Macapagal also became enthused about an old Philippine dream of a pan-Malayan
federation, to be a counter to Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. After preparatory talks
Macapagal and Sukarno, together with a somewhat reluctant Tunku Abdul Rahman of
Malaysia, held a summit meeting in Manila in July 1963 where there was agreement in
principle on the formation of a tripartite MAPHILINDO. But the dispute over
North Borneo caused the Philippines to withhold recognition of Malaysia later in the
year, so that attempts to implement the MAPHILINDO idea failed. At the same time
Sukarno’s increasingly aggressive stance caused Macapagal to back away from that entente
under pressure from his own intelligence advisers as well as the US. The US quietly scuttled
Philippine efforts to get serious negotiations on their territorial claims. Macapagal’s
frustrations led him to change Philippine independence day from the US-determined 4 July
and to end American diplomatic representation of Filipinos abroad in the absence of
Philippine missions (Sussman, 1983: 210-28).

Yet in economic terms Macapagal’s policies were quite congruent with US interests.
He devalued the peso and removed foreign exchange controls, as well as undertaking other
recommendations made by the IMF and favored by exporters. Before the end of his term he
had requested Congress to authorize the sending of Philippine forces to South Vietnam. But
the US regarded him as unreliable. The traditional Philippine ambivalence about the US had
produced too much policy variance. US war damage funds which could have been released
before Macapagal’s re-election bid in 1965 were not; for this and other reasons he lost to
Ferdinand Marcos. Marcos more skillfully wove the nationalist strain into a foreign policy
that gained wide support without upsetting the Americans. In fact, he became quite successful
at inducing expanded American aid and putting it to his own political benefit, as in the
construction of school houses before the 1969 elections. And it was Marcos who received
secret American funds to support Filipino troops in Vietnam.
Changes in the policy process were closely related to the declaration of martial law .
But coincidentally there was also a change in the international environment in the 1970s
which helped give a new cast to foreign policy. Strategic threats and challenges receded.
There was no Korean invasion, no descending Chinese horde, nor even a new Malaysia on
the border. The final Communist conquest of South Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975 had been
a foregone conclusion for some time. Even top military officers were not concerned about
foreign threats. Thus President Marcos had unchallenged control of the policy process and
was not diverted by strategic fears. He could devote his attention to domestic priorities, as he
did. He bolstered the regime by neutralizing its enemies and building support among key
groups within society. For the first time regime survival became the dominant theme of
Philippine foreign policy. It was designed to deny support to Muslim rebels and the New
People’s Army, and to win over intellectuals, the economic elite, and the middle class while
solidifying support among the military. Marcos’ policies were ‘developmentalist’ (in the
sense used by Weinstein, 1976) since he saw rapid economic growth as the most likely source
of legitimacy.
One nationalist critique had been of the ridiculous extremes to which anti-
Communism had been carried – exclusion of the Yugoslav basketball team from a Manila
tournament by President Macapagal is often cited as the zenith of this tendency. The
Philippines had diplomatic relations with no Communist-ruled state until President Marcos’
second elected term, when, prodded by nationalist industrialists, he exchanged ambassadors
with Yugoslavia and Rumania. The big break came when an embassy was opened in Beijing
in June 1975, following a visit by the First Couple. Nationalist intellectuals, including some
senior foreign service officers, were assuaged. The Americans, of course, had already shown
the way and the Civil Liberties Union of the Philippines claimed that ‘The truth is that the
“bold” and “innovative” moves taken by the Department of Foreign Affairs, which it passes
off for “independence”, are the latest variation of its traditional subservience to America’s
global interests’ (CLUP statement, 15 October 1975). This was probably an exaggeration, but
the American shift did permit the Philippine initiative to take place without disturbing the
Washington-Manila axis (Quisumbing, 1983: 26-8). Thus the Marcos moves did not warrant
being called a full restructuring.
Foreign Policy for Regime Survival: 1972-86
Even though the declaration of martial law in 1972 marked a severe restructuring in
domestic politics, the break with the Philippine tradition of foreign policy was much more
modest. It is true, however, that with the disbanding of the elected legislature the President
was more completely in charge than ever before. For instance, the Taiwan Lobby in Congress
which could have blocked relations with Beijing, was rendered nearly impotent. Furthermore,
a regime which relied heavily on a greatly expanded military was much more concerned
about its arming and supply. An authoritarian regime also had the capability to reduce the
penetration of the system by friend and foe alike. Access to government officials by
foreigners was, for the first time, restricted. Foreign support for labor unions and other NGOs
was regulated. Military intelligence became both more pervasive and more effective.
Establishing relations with China served another purpose. The President gained
Chinese assurances that they would provide no aid to the Philippine Communist movement –
the Chinese were also eager for diplomatic relations. Undoubtedly, this proved a persuasive
argument for Marcos’ reluctant military brass. Furthermore, the Chinese promised small but
steady shipments of oil to the Philippines at a time when Arabs were showing their
displeasure with Marcos’ military action against the Moros.
Diplomatic exchange with the Soviet Union was not accomplished until 1977. Since
the Soviet’s allies within the Philippines, the old Communist Party, had already been co-
opted by Marcos, Moscow had a lower priority – but Moscow itself also showed less interest
in the Philippines than did Beijing. In the same year the Philippines recognized the three
Indochina states, and Vietnam pledged to refrain from the use of force or subversion.
The increasing prominence that Philippine foreign policy gave to ASEAN was also a
response to the nationalist desire for a stronger Asian orientation. The membership of
Indonesia, both a Moslem country and a major oil exporter, gave ASEAN added importance.
Marcos was able to gain Jakarta’s understanding of and sympathy on the Moro problem, plus
expanded oil supplies. Good relations with Malaysia, made easier by Marcos’ announcement
in 1976 that he intended to drop the Philippines’ Sabah claim, was facilitated within
the ASEAN framework, helping to cut off the MNLF’s foreign supply line. Furthermore,
President Marcos described ASEAN in 1980 as an organization in which ‘there are
exchanges which indicate a common and mutual interest in security . . .’, apparently referring
to the anti-Communist intelligence network (Manila Journal, 18 February 1980).
Aside from ASEAN, Third-World affinity was shown by an (unsuccessful) effort to
gain observer status at the Non-Aligned Conference in Colombo in 1976, an ostentatious
appearance by the First Couple at the UNCfAD conference in Nairobi in the same year, and
the hosting of UNCfAD in Manila in 1979, when Marcos helped draft the statement issued by
the Group of 77 developing countries. Though designed to mollify Filipino nationalists, these
events also provided an ego-satisfying role for the First Couple. (One has to recognize the
existence of more than one level of motivation.)
Expanding ties with the Muslim world to help interdict support for the Moro forces
included Imelda’s visits to Cairo and Riyadh, and a Manila invitation to King Hussein, as
well as a stronger proArab stance on the Palestinian question. But the most dramatic and
successful move was the opening to Colonel Muamar Khaddafi, who both supplied and
influenced Nur Misuari, the MNLF leader, then living in Tripoli. The First Lady went to
Libya as the President’s emissary in December 1976 and, following personal talks in which
she apparently persuaded Khaddafi to cut military aid to the Moro forces, a Philippine
government team hammered out an agreement with Misuari for a cease-fire and Muslim
‘autonomy’ in parts of Mindanao and Sulu (Manila Journal, 9 January 1977). The Tripoli
Agreement was never fully implemented, however.
While the effort to project the Philippine image as a successful, developing, non-
aligned country may have been fun for the leadership, the effort to satisfy the military
required some long, hard bargaining with the US. For Marcos it was most important to
provide up-to-date arms and equipment for an armed force which was his strongest political
supporter. But by 1974 the ‘human rights bloc’ in both the US House and Senate had growing
influence, just as detailed reports of arbitrary arrests and torture of Philippine political
dissidents began to reach Washington. Given the mood of Congress, Marcos had to find a
new means to get the US to equip his forces. Familiar with US base rental arrangements in
Spain, Portugal, Turkey and Greece, he perceived ‘rentals’ as politically more certain than
‘aid’, and laid the ground carefully. After a meeting of his National Security Council in April
1975 the President complained, echoing Recto, that ‘The bases, like magnets, only invite
attack by any nation hostile to the US’ and suggested that the Philippines might take them
over, then negotiate new terms with the US for their use. Anti-American stories began to
appear more often in the controlled press. In Washington consternation prevailed; not all
officials understood the Marcos strategy, nor the limits to his bargaining power (Wideman in
Philippine Times, 16—31 May 1976).
In April 1976 formal talks began in Washington on revision of the bases agreement.
But Marcos, overplaying his hand, asked for too much, was rebuffed and decided to wait for
Carter (Romualdez,
1980: 52ff). In the Carter administration serious thought was given to moving the
bases to Guam, should they become too costly. But after the Iranian revolution and the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, Clark Field and Subic Bay suddenly became essential way stations
to a new cradle of conflict, and were revalued upward by the Pentagon.
 Philippine demands for broader jurisdiction over criminal acts by US servicemen, and
continued insistence on generous base rentals delayed agreement, however, until January
1979. The US did not give on the jurisdiction question, and the designation of a ‘Philippine
Base Commander’, with the Philippine flag flying alongside the American, was a cosmetic
change that did not satisfy the nationalists. The Philippines received $ 500 million in military
grants and credits over a five-year period, in addition to ‘economic aid’. This amounted to a
doubling of the level of US military assistance. And with Reagan in office the next five-
yearly review of the bases agreement was completed early, in June 1983, with military aid
raised to $ 900 million for the period, including a higher grant component and lower interest
rates. Congress tried to delay delivery as Marcos’ abuses became more obvious, but the Bases
Agreement did reduce his vulnerability.
Despite the extreme importance of the military dimension, probably the most urgent
task for foreign policy under Marcos was to mobilize international resources for economic
growth. The economic elite were the prime beneficiaries of the President’s efforts, but he
realized that without a general sense of economic progress he would lose legitimacy in the
eyes of the Filipino people as a whole. His policies sought to attract more foreign capital,
with numerous new concessions – from new areas for 100 per cent foreign investment to
maintenance of low wages – and to expand foreign borrowing, influenced by successful
export-oriented industrialization elsewhere.
New foreign investment entered at a sharply accelerated rate from 1973, but
expectations were not sustained; the 1973 inflow in constant dollars was never again
equalled.
With the increased emphasis on credit by 1978 commercial loans from private
international banks were greater than all government rsources, bilateral or multilateral. But
private banks acted on assurances of viability by the WB/IMF and its Philippine Consultative
Group. The World Bank, in order to back up its assurances, exercised increasing influence
over essential elements of Philippine government economic policy – as was admitted in a
leaked memorandum from the Bank itself (Bello and Rivera, 1977: 97, citing draft by Gould).
In 1976 the Marcos government formally agreed to three years of ‘close economic
supervision’ by the IMF, renewed in subsequent agreements. World Bank officers gained
some legitimacy within the Philippine policy process, at least as great as that of American
advisers in the 1950s.
The events of the early 1980s indicate, however, that World Bank! IMF supervision
was no more effective than the influence of the technocrats – who shared World BanklIMF
views – over the cronies in the Marcos regime. Marcos and his cronies were powerful enough
to divert foreign resources, which came in at higher and higher interest rates, to their own
purposes, rescuing failed enterprises and salting away dollars abroad. It was such escapades
that pushed the Philippine foreign debt up to $ 26 billion by 1983 while productivity
declined. World economic conditions were certainly not favorablea point which Marcos
frequently reiterated – but no other country in Southeast Asia combined rising debt and
falling GNP to the degree that the Philippines did. It was a curious combination of
circumstances: World BanklIMF control over the economy increased, but it was not
sufficient to head off disaster instigated by the even greater power of the bureaucratic
capitalists around Marcos over the distribution of credit from government institutions. Thus
Philippine economic decline – which started as a great push for development – had to be
blamed as much on autonomous patrimonialism as on dependency. Marcos’ foreign
economic policy, largely viewed as a success in the mid-1970s, by the end of his term had put
the country in an unprecedented tailspin.
Aquino Foreign Policy
Mrs. Aquino came to power in a manner unique in Philippine history. Not only were
military intervention and unprecedented mass demonstrations necessary to implement her
electoral victory, but she emerged without the prior blessings of the White House, loyal to
Marcos almost to the end – though this is not to say that the CIA or the State Department
were unsympathetic. Her unprecedented popularity gave her the potential of a new autonomy
in both national and international realms. That popularity was reconfirmed in the
constitutional plebiscite of February 1987 and the legislative elections of May. But she did
not utilize her charismatic power as she might have. Charisma was merely used to
reinvigorate neo-patrimonialism, substituting for the economic resources that were no longer
available.
Foreign policy at first had relatively low salience under Aquino, perhaps because of
her confidence of legitimacy achieved through charisma and electoral processes. She thus felt
no compulsion to use foreign policy for regime survival as had Marcos.
Furthermore, a much more open regime, over which the President has ineffective
control, is more penetrable by foreign interests. Thus Pentagon pressure exercised through the
Philippine military helped to scuttle a more prolonged cease-fire, and the CIA moved in
rapidly to promote armed anti-Communist vigilantes, working through cabinet-level contacts.
The apparent use of delayed aid delivery by the Pentagon to press for greater military reform
even goaded President Aquino herself into sharp criticism of Washington in May 1987 —
shades of Marcos.
The most important foreign policy issue of the decade, the fate of US military bases,
was deliberately downplayed by Mrs. Aquino. At the beginning of the election campaign in
late 1985 she had favored the removal of the bases, but by January 1986 had become
comfortable with a different formula: respect the present agreement until it expires in 1991,
and then ‘keep my options open’ (Agence France Presse, 2 January 1986). This position was
carefully crafted to hold together the disparate wings of her coalition, though her opponents
on the Left believed that she would decide to renew in 1991. She stuck with this position after
assuming office, for it avoided distracting attention from more urgent political and economic
issues. Though it worried Pentagon officials, the State Department recognized the constraints
on her and was hopeful about the President’s ultimate choice.
The new element in the situation was the constitution ratified in February 1987.
Though proposed clauses outlawing foreign military bases had been defeated in the
Constitutional Commission, two crucial provisions were adopted – small steps towards
dependency reversal. One provided that if the bases agreement were to be extended in 1991,
it would have to be elevated from an executive agreement to a treaty and would thus require
concurrence by a twothirds vote of the Senate. Furthermore, the constitution’s ‘declaration of
principles’ stated that ‘the Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and
pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory’.
Even though the US refuses to confirm officially the presence of nuclear devices at
Clark Field or Subic Bay, the belief that they are there is almost universal in well-informed
circles. Thus the utility of the bases for the US,. if this provision were fully implemented,
would be severely restricted. In August 1987, without consulting the President, ten members
of the President’s party out of the 24 newly elected senators sponsored a bill that would
outlaw ‘possession, storage, or transport’ of nuclear weapons on Philippine territory
(Washington Post, 21 August 1987). In June 1988 it passed the Senate overwhelmingly. Thus
it appeared that diplomatic nuances preferred in the executive branch might not determine
Philippine policy. But the bill was stalled in the House and the Secretary of Justice ruled that
regulation of nuclear weapons was the President’s prerogative. When a new base
compensation package was signed by the US and the Philippines on 17 October 1988,
providing a record $ 960 million over two years, there was an exemption of ‘transit,
overflights or visits by US aircraft or ships’ from any requirement of Philippine government
approval for ‘storage or installation of nuclear weapons’.
Finding 16 Senate votes to endorse renewal of the bases agreement in 1991 might be
difficult. But the outcome is still very uncertain. Some senators, despite nationalist rhetoric,
when face to face with the economic costs to the Philippines of US base withdrawal, might
acquiesce. Yet, if Mrs Aquino, having lost her current popularity, should endorse an
extension while the US presses its demands clumsily, nationalist rhetoric could carry the day.
In any case, if the Senate should fail to ratify a new bases agreement, the danger of a
successful military coup – if not already transpired – should not be discounted. For the
impending loss of a large portion of US military aid could be the most effective unifier of a
factionalized armed force. But by the end of 1988 there was increasing talk in both
Washington and Manila of phased withdrawal of the bases. A speech by Secretary Manglapus
in January 1989 suggested that the bases, for various reasons, might become ‘obsolete’. He
concluded, ‘Whatever the developments, we are preparing for eventual conversion of US
facilities to civilian use’ (Philippines Free Press, 28 January 1989).
Whatever the strains in US- Philippine relations, however, relations with the other
superpower were initially much worse. An endorsement of the Marcos ‘re-election’ in
February 1986 by the Soviet ambassador – almost unique in the Manila diplomatic
community, naturally soured the incoming Aquino administration towards the USSR. But by
1988 the Gorbachev aura had warmed relations, though some officials had a hard time
burying the Cold War. The first ever visit by a Soviet foreign minister on 22 December
produced an invitation for Mrs Aquino to go to Moscow, which was accepted. Shevardnadze
won favor by assuring Filipinos that the Soviet Union had never supported and had no
intention of supporting the Communist Party of the Philippines/NPA insurgency (FB/S, 22
December 1988, p. 45). His hint that the Soviets might dismantle their bases in Vietnam even
before Washington made any decision to withdraw from Clark Field or Subic Bay was also
well received.
A state visit to Japan, on the other hand, was earlier on President Aquino’s agenda
than for any of her predecessors, indicating Japan’s rising economic importance to the
Philippines. Cory was also attracted by the great outpouring of sympathy for Ninoy shown by
the Japanese public after his assassination, a sympathy transferred to her in 1986.Economic
constraints frustrated expressions of autonomy by some in Aquino’s government, for
example, the statement by Solita Monsod, head of the National Economic Development
Authority, in 1986 favoring ‘selective repudiation’ of the foreign debt, especially loans
purloined by Marcos and his cronies. IMF/World Bank pressures have since helped to
subordinate that view to the ‘full repayment’ stance of the Secretary of Finance and the
Central Bank. Some of the same IMF/World Bank conditions, pushing ‘liberalization’, as had
been imposed on Marcos have again been accepted. Debt to equity schemes will expand the
role of foreign capital. But now economic nationalists have the benefit of a free press and
representation in Congress. The debt rescheduling agreement initialed in 1987 -less favorable
than Argentina’s – was not approved by cabinet and had to be renegotiated. Bills have been
introduced in Congress to reduce the debt service payment to 25 per cent or less of exports,
compared to the 1987 rate of 42 per cent. A bill creating a powerful, congressionally
dominated foreign debt commission was passed, but was vetoed by the President. Thus the
desire for greater economic autonomy is pushing against the constraints, but the trend in
decision-making up to 1988 has favored the IMF/World Bank. In December the government
promised the IMF to reduce budget deficits and scale down growth targets.

Initial indications are that Congress will indeed have an impact on relations
with ASEAN. Some leading legal minds appear to be interested in reviving the Philippine
claim to Sabah, blinded by juridicial and nationalistic argument to the adverse political
consequences such a revival would have for regional consensus. In fact, the Aquino
administration eagerly sought ASEAN support in May 1987 on the question of Mindanao
autonomy. Negotiations with Nur Misuari of the MNLF broke down, despite a rather
generous offer by Ambassador Emmanuel Pelaez, and the Philippines needed the
understanding of Islamic nations to prevent Misuari from mobilizing them against Manila.
Thus initiatives by Congress on Sabah and by the Department of Foreign Affairs on Muslim
autonomy may collide, the consequence of constitutional separation of powers without strong
executive leadership.
In fact, many observers fear that the Philippine government in the next two or three
years will suffer severe immobilism, given the President’s unwillingness at times to exercise
the power she has available. Immobilism will jeopardize economic growth, inhibit foreign
policy initiatives, and broaden opportunities for foreign penetration. It could eventually
trigger a military takeover.

Aquino
Ramos
Estrada
Arroyo
Aquino
Duterte
Marcos