SUIGENERIS

FACULTY OF LAW

BACHELORS OF LAWS (LLB) 2020 ACADEMIC YEAR

Legal methods lecture notes prepared by ISAAC CHRISTOPHER LUBOGO

second SEMESTER 2020

COURSE UNIT: legal methods, LAW 1104

Date: JANUARY 2020

Time: 08:00AM

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 UNIT 1
1.0 STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:

1.1 Objectives of this unit:

 To explain the meaning of Statutory Interpretation;
 To know the different rules of Statutory Interpretation;
 To know the application of the different rules in interpreting statutes;
 To know the rationale behind Statutory Interpretation;
 To know when to apply the different rules of Statutory interpretation; and
 To explain the roles of precedent in Statutory Interpretation.

1.2 Learning Outcomes:

 Basic knowledge on interpreting Statutes;
 Application of the rules of statutory interpretation in our daily statutes;
 Identifying the gaps in interpreting statutes; and
 Distinguishing between the different aids or materials to Statutory
Interpretation.

1.3 INTRODUCTION:
The courts must uphold the will of parliament and not try to usurp its powers, but
sometimes it is necessary to try to understand what the words used by the
parliamentary draftsman mean.

Citizens with the assistance of their advisers are intended to be able to understand
parliamentary enactments, so that they can regulate their conduct accordingly.
They should be able to rely upon what they read in an Act of Parliament. This

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 gives rise to a tension between the fundamental elements of the rule of law, and
the need to give effect to the intention of Parliament, from whatever source that
(objectively assessed) intention can be gleaned (Per Lord Nicholas in Spath
Holme).

1.4 Definition of Statutory Interpretation:

Statutory interpretation is the process of interpreting and applying legislation.
Some amount of interpretation is always necessary when a case involves a statute.
Sometimes the words of a statute have a plan and straight forward meaning. But
in most cases, there is some ambiguity or vagueness in words of the statutes.

Sometimes the words of a statute have a plain and straightforward meaning. But
in most cases, there is some ambiguity or vagueness in the words of the statute that
must be resolved by the judge. To find the meanings of the statutes, judges use
various tools and methods of statutory interpretation, including canons of statutory
interpretation, legislative history and purpose.

In Common Law jurisdictions, the judiciary may apply rules of statutory

interpretation to legislation enacted by the legislature or to delegated legislation
such as administrative agency regulations.

1.5 Why do we need rules for the interpretation of Statutes?

The following reasons have been advanced;
 Words are imperfect means of communication;
 Words very often have more than one meaning i.e. they can be ambiguous;
 Abroad term may be used in a statute, which can give rise to confusion and
uncertainty;
 There may be errors or omissions when the statute is drafted; and

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  New developments in society can make words used in a statute out of date and
they may no longer cover the current legislation.

1.6 Rules /Canons of Statutory Interpretation

There is no difference between a canon and a rule, except the word canon is
preferred because the “rules” are not really rules because the judge can ignore
them, they are simply aids Canon comes from a Greek word meaning a reed that
grows straight enough to be used as a measuring rod.

The Traditional Rules:

The traditional Common Law approach to statutory interpretation was to “Look at
the words of the Act”. This approach was founded on the assumption that the
statute alone was a reliable guide to the intent of the Parliament. To assist the
courts in interpreting legislation, judges relied upon three general rules. These
were the;

i) Literal Rule:
The literal rule dictated that courts gave effect to the “Ordinary and natural
meaning” of legislation.

It prescribes that the natural and ordinary meaning given to words in statutes.

It further uses the plain, ordinary, literal, and grammatical meaning of the
words in the Statute. Lord Reid’s in Pinner Vs Everett (1969) HL; defined the
literal rule to mean “The natural and ordinary meaning of the word or phrase
in its context in the statute”.

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 In Whitely Vs Chappell (1868): where someone impersonated a dead person
in order to vote at an election. It was held that D could not impersonate a dead
person because a dead person is not entitled to vote.

In Fisher Vs Bell (1961): a flick knife displayed in a shop was not “Offered
for sale”. It was presumed that the draftsmen knew technical legal language
and so the Common Law expression was not altered. In this case, the legal
meaning of the words were used to interpret a statute.

In R Vs Judge of the city of London Court (1892):

Court noted the following:-
1. “If the words of an Act are clear,” then you must follow them even though
they lead to a manifest absurdity”, and
2. “…The court has nothing to do with whether the legislature has committed
an absurdity...”

In Tarr Vs Tarr (1971): A Statute gave power to regulate but not prohibit
occupation of matrimonial home Lord Pearson held;

“In the end one has to read the enactment on its context and come to a
conclusion as to what it means”.

Similarly in Sussex Peerage case (1844): Tindal C.J. held;

“…the only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is, that they should
be construed according to the intent of the parliament which passed the Act. If
the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no
more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and

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 ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, test declare the
intention of the law giver”.

In London North Easter Railway Vs Berriman (1946):

While interpreting the Fatal Accidents Act, Court noted that topping up oil
boxes was not ‘repairing or relaying lines so the widow did not recover when
her husband was killed’.
In Harris Vs R (1836): while interpreting the offence of ‘unlawfully and
malicious … to stab, cut or wound...’ Court noted that it did not include biting
off his nose, thus he could not rely on it.

ii) Golden Rule:

According to this rule, the courts were to interpret legislation in a manner
which avoided obvious absurdities or inconsistencies. Obvious printing
mistakes or simple slips were set aside and the courts read the statute or
legislation as if these errors were not there.

The background to this rule was the harshness of the Literal Rule. If the
Literal Rule would lead to an absurdity then the Golden Rule may be used.
This rule is further used when the Literal Rule leads to a repugnant result.

In Backe Vs Smith (1836): Parke B: noted that;

“It is a very useful rule, in the construction of a statute,
to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used…
unless that is at a variance with the intention of the legislature,
to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest
absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may
be varied or modified, so as to avoid such inconvenience,
but no further”

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 There are two applications of the Golden Rules;
a) The narrow application:
This is used where the words are capable of having more than one
meaning. In this case, the meaning which is least absurd should be
used.
In Grey Vs Pearson (1837) HL: Lord Wensleydale noted;
“The ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless
it would lead to absurdity when the ordinary sense may
be modified to avoid the absurdity but no further”.

In the River Water Commissioners Vs Anderson (1872):

Court noted the following:

“We are to take the whole of the statute together and construe
it altogether, giving the words their ordinary signification, unless
when so applied they produce an inconsistencies or an
absurdity or inconvenience, so great as to convince the court
that the intention could not have been to use them in their
ordinary signification, and to justify the court in putting
them some other signification, which though less proper,
is one which the court thinks the words will bear”.

Read also; RVs Allen (1872): Find out the meaning of the court’s decision,
“Bigamist cannot ‘marry’ again”.
b) The Wider Application:
This is used to avoid a repugnant result in Re Sigsworth (1935): D
murdered his mother, repugnant ‘issue’ should inherit estate court applied.

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The principle of Public Policy, which prevents a murder, reaping the fruits of his
crime, thus he never inherited the deceased’s estate.

In Registrar General (Exparte Smith) Vs R. (1991). CA:

The applicant in this case was refused or denied a copy of his birth certificate
because he was likely to murder his mother.

In Duport Steels Ltd. Vs Sirs (1980); HL:

In interpreting the Trades Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974 which gave
immunity to union members committing torts in contemplation of furtherance of a
trade dispute, Lord Diplock held;

“Where the meaning of the Statutory words is plain and unambiguous, it is not for
the judges to invent financed ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to
its plain meaning because they themselves consider that the consequences of doing
so would be inexpedient or even unjust or immoral”.
iii) Mischief Rule:
This rule required the courts to interpret legislation in a manner consistent
with its purpose; the “Mischief” it was intended to remedy.

This rule was first used in Heydon’s case (1584):

This discovers the Mischief the Act intended to put right. Not a product of
modern times.

To apply this rule, Lord Diplock applied three (3) circumstances in Jones Vs
Wrotham Park Settled Estates (1979) HL; these include;

a) If it is possible to determine from the Act the precise mischief that the Act was
to remedy;

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b) If it was an accident that the Mischief had not been reserved by the Act’s literal
meaning; and
c) If it is possible to say with certainty. What additional words would have been
inserted by the draftsmen and approved by Parliament.

At this stage, it is noted that courts look for the Mischief the statute was passed to
stop thus in Smith Vs Hughes (1960) QBD;

The ‘Mischief’ this Act was trying to control was that of prostitutes openly
soliciting customers in the street, the prostitute was sitting in a house and tapping
on a window to attract the attention of men walking by.

Held: the aim of the Act was to enable people walk along the street without being
solicited and even though the prostitute was not in the street herself, the Act
should be interpreted to include this activity.

In Gardener Vs Savenoaks RDC (1950);

‘Cave’ Act intended to keep workers and others safe from combustible film;
therefore Cave was considered a ‘premise’ within the meaning of the Act.

In DPP Vs Bull (1994) DC: Common prostitutes loitering in a street or public

place did not include men; the Wolfenden Report, which led to the Act, clearly
saw the relevant mischief as one created by women.

In R Vs Chief Constable of Kent (Exparte the Police Federation) 1999:

The issue before court was whether the review of a detained person at a police
station was in the presence of the detainee if done by video link.

Held: parliament had intended a face to face review.

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 The traditional Common Law assumption was that the above mischief and golden
rule were subordinate to the Literal Rule: For this reason, the traditional rules of
statutory interpretation are sometimes termed “Literalism”. In the United States,
the literal approach is often termed the “Textualist” or “plain” meaning principle.

1.7 The Literal versus the purposive approaches to statutory interpretation:

Should judges interpret statutes so as to give effect to the intention or purpose of
the statute, the purposive approach or should judges take the literal meaning of the
words in the literal approach?

i) Arguments in Favour of the Literal Rule:

Judges should interpret statutes as to give words their literal meaning, their
job is not to make the law but to apply or interpret it; and

The literal approach is preferred by conservative judges who would want to

stick to the contents or wording of a statute.

ii) Arguments in favour of a purposive approach:

a) Judges try to decide what the purpose of the statute was, what was
Parliament attempting to achieve.
b) The purposive approach is preferred by creative judges such as Lord
Denning.
c) The Europeans prefer the purposive approach.

1.8 The modern approach to Statutory Interpretation:

The courts have recently integrated the traditional approaches to the
interpretation of statutes. The courts respect the actual words used but

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 rather than stick rigidly to them, interpret them in the context in which they
appear, and the underlying purpose of the statute.

1.9 Rules of Language:

The traditional approach also relied heavily on a number of rules of
language. Many of these are expressed in the form of a short Latin phrase.
Three important rules of language were;

a) Ejusdem Generis Rule:

This is where specific words are followed by general words, then the
general words are limited to things of the same kind e.g. ‘cats and
dogs’ does not include void animals.
In Allen Vs Emerson (1944) QBD:
Court noted that there must be atleast two specific words in a list before the
general word or phrase for this rule to operate.

Held: The phrase ‘theatre or other place or public entertainment’ includes a

fun fair even though it was not of the same kind as theatres.

In Evans Vs Cross (1938): a white line was held not a sign.

“… Warning sign posts, directions on posts,
signs or other devices” were considered a sign.

Read also Powell Vs Kempton Park Race Course (1899)

b) Expressio univs est exclusion alterius:

This means that the expression of one thing excludes others not mentioned.
Where there is a list of words which is not followed by general words, then
the Act will only apply to the items in the list.

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 e.g. The ‘men’ sign on a toilet door impliedly excludes women and vice
versa.

Surrounding words: where specific words are not followed by general

words, the things not expressly mentioned are not covered by the Act.

In Inhabitants of Sedgley Vs R (1831)

Held: “Lands and coalmines” implicitly excluded other bypass of mines
from the scope of “Land”.

In Tempest Vs Kilner (1846):

Held: “goods, wares and merchandise” did not include stocks and shares.

c) Noscitur a Sociis
This is a Latin maxim which means, “mean is known by his
associates”. This therefore means that a word is known by the
company it keeps. Words must be read in context and a statute must
be read as a whole.

The meaning of the words can be understood from the words around
them. So, ambiguous words or phrases can be classified by referring
to the context in which they are used:-

In Inland Revenue Commissioners Vs Frere (1964) HL

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 Applying Noscitur rule, it was held that ‘interest’ meant annual
interest. If the words – other annual interest had been left out. The
interest could have meant any interest – weekly, monthly and so on.

1.10 Presumptions:
When interpreting a statute, the court may make certain presumptions.
Unless expressly excluded the following presumptions may be applied to
the words in a statute;

i) Mensrea is required for a Criminal Act to be committed (see Sweet

Vs Parsley 1970);
ii) Statutes do not apply introspectively;
iii) Where necessary an Act should be “read down” so as to be within
the constitutional power of the relevant legislature.
iv) Legislation was presumed not to interfere with the proprietary
interests of individuals; and
v) Penal Laws were to be interpreted in favour of the individual if there
were two or more reasonable interpretations.

1.11 Aids to Statutory Interpretation:

These are divided into two types: intrinsic materials and extrinsic materials.

i) Intrinsic (Internal) Aids to Statutory Interpretation:

These include, in addition to the authorized text of a statute, those
parts of a piece of legislation that do not form part of the text, short

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 title, preamble, (only in older acts), notes, section, headings and
schedules.

Other enacting words: This is an examination of the whole of a

statute, or at least other parts which deal with the subject matter of
the provision to be interpreted, should give some indication of the
overall purpose of the legislation. It may show that a particular
interpretation of the provision will lead to absurdity when taken with
another section.

Explanatory Notes as an aid to Interpretation:

The use of explanatory notes in statutory interpretation is new; the notes
were first used by Parliament alongside bills in 1999.

The first judicial reference to them by the House of Lords appears to be by

Lord Hope in R Vs A (2001) HL: A rape case, when he made the
following comment.

“But I think that it is legitimate to refer for the purposes of

Clarification to the notes to this section in the explanatory
notes to the Act prepared by the Head Office. I would use
it in the same way as I would use the explanatory
note attached to a statutory instrument...”

However, the authority for their use is the ruling on R (Westminster City
Council Vs National Asylum Support Service (2002) HL
Lord Steyn made it clear that he considered explanatory notes admissible,
even when the statute was unambiguous.

“...in so far as the explanatory notes cost light on

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 the objective setting or contextual scene of the statute,
and the mischief at which it is aimed, such materials
are therefore always admissible as aids to construction”.
“What is impermissible is to treat the wishes and desire of
government about the scope of the statutory language as
reflecting the will of Parliament. The aims of clauses as
revealed in explanatory notes cannot be attributed
to parliament. The object is to see what is the
intention expressed by the words enacted.”

Again Lord Steyn referred to explanatory notes in R Vs Chief Constable

of South Yorkshire Police Exparte LS and Marper [2004] HL.

“Explanatory notes are not endorsed by Parliament. On the other

hand, in so far as they cast light on the setting of a statute, and
the mischiefs at which it is aimed, they are admissible in aid of
construction of estate. After all, they may potentially contain
much more immediate and valuable material than other
aids regularly used by the courts, such as Law
Commission Reports, Government Committees
Reports, Green papers and so further ”.

Aids found in all Acts:

a) Long title:
It became established in the Nineteenth Century that the long title could
be considered as an aid to interpretation. The long title should be read
as part of the context, “as the planet of all the guides to the general
objectives of the statute” (per Lord Simon in the Black – Clawson Case
(1975)

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 b) Preamble:
When there is a preamble it is generally in its recitals that the mischief
to be removed remedied and the scope of the Act are described. It is
therefore clearly permissible to have recourse to it as an aid to
constraining the enacting provisions.

Preambles ceased to be used in the Nineteenth Century except in Private

Acts.

c) Short Title:
There is some question whether the short total should be used to resolve
doubt. It is however commonly used in all Acts today and constitutes
part of our statutes.

d) Headings and Side-Notes:

Headings, side notes may be considered as part of the context of the
statute.

e) Punctuation:
These are now major commonly used but they were so common in older
statutes. See the story of Sir Roger Casement, harged because of a
common, here

In DPP Vs Schildkamp (1971):

Court held that punctuation could be used as aids, in cases of ambiguity
as could the long title of the Act, headings and side note.

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 In Hanlow Vs Law Society (1981):
Lord Lowry held; to ignore punctuation disregards the reality that
literate people, such as parliamentary draftsmen, do punctuate what they
write.

f) Schedules:
These are always at the back of the statute in most cases explaining the
nature of a document to be used in court, procedure and sometimes
explaining the monetary value of a free or cost e.g. each currency is
equivalent to UGX. 20,000/=.

g) Extrinsic (External) aids to Statutory Interpretation:

Extrinsic materials these are anything outside the body of legislation.
They include; any additional material included in the authorized text of
an Act, for example;

 Reports of Royal Commissions, Law Reform Commissions,

Committees of inquiry or similar bodies placed before parliament
during consideration of the legislation;
 Reports of joint or select committees made during the passage of the
legislation;
 Treaties or other international agreement mentioned in the Act;
 Explanatory Memoranda (or the equivalent relating to legislation;
and
 The text of parliament debates.

Interpretation Act:

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 This is an explanatory Act of the meaning of particular words that are so important
in a statute. It can also explain the different meanings of a word in a statute for
example;

He includes she;
Singular includes plural
Person includes corporations.
Writing include or may mean any other way of producing visible form.

Text Books and eminent writers on Law:

These can be cited as authoritative statements of the law of their time, and
therefore if the present law if it is shown to have charged. The reputation of the
author and the date of the book are important.
The Halsburrys Laws of England are not statute but highly respected as authorities
in legislation.

In R Vs Shivpuri (1987): a case on criminal attempts, the courts acknowledged

academic arguments as an aid to interpretation.

Cases from any branch of law and from any jurisdiction are used by the courts to
assist interpretation. So, in criminal man-slaughter, the courts used the civil case
of Donoghue Vs Stevenson (1932): to assist in deciding the scope of negligence,
and in Re: A Children; the court used a Rabbinic Judgement from Newyork.

Dictionaries:

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 Notably legal dictionaries of the time will be used to find out the meaning of a
word in an Act. Preferably Law Dictionaries e.g. Black’s Law Dictionary,
Osborne’s concise Dictionary, etc.

Treaties:
Reports of Law Reform Bodies, such as the Law Commission, and advisory
committees which lead to the passing of the Act can be used to discover the
reform, which the statute intended to make. These have become acceptable since
the Black Clawson case (1975); supra

White Papers:
Occasionally, reference will be made to the discussion documents produced by the
government even before a Bill has been drafted.

Such reference is found, in W Vs MPC [2006] on whether the word ‘remove’

meant a Police Officer or CSO could use force to take an under 10 years old home
from a ‘disposal area’, they a said that it did.

In Paragraph 31, the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) referred to White Paper to
assist them decide the scope of the Act.

Historical Setting:
A judge may consider the historical settings of the provision that is being
interpreted. In Spath Holme (2000); spent considerable time doing precisely this.

Practice:

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 The practice followed in the past may be a guide to interpretation. For example,
the practice of eminent conveyancers where the technical meaning of a word or
phrase used in conveyancing as in issue.

In Davis Vs Johnson (1979) HL:

Lord Donning; held
“…(not to use Hansard) would be to grope around in the
dark for the meaning of an Act without switching the light on”.

In Pickstone Vs Freemans (1988) HL:

Hansard was used to establish why the Equal Pay Act had been passed.

In Pepper Vs Hart (1993) HL: this case concerned construction of words in a

Finance Act. The House of Lords relaxed the old rule that excluded reference to
Hansard for the purposes of statutory interpretation; so as to ensure that taxation
was not imposed in a way that the treasury had “assured” the House of Commons
was not intended.

Hansard may be considered but only where the words of the Act are ambiguous or
obscure or lead to an absurdity.
Even then, Hansard should only be used if there was a clear statement by the
Minister introducing the legislation, which would resolve the ambiguity or
absurdity.

Until Pepper Vs Hart: using Hansard on that way would have been regards as a
breach of Parliamentary Privilege. This case mainly provides a limited exception
to the general rule that resort to Hansard is admission.

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 In R Vs SOS for Environment Exparte Spath Holme (2000) HL: The Rent
Acts (Maximum Fair Rent) order, 1999 was made under Section of the Landlord
and Tenant Act 1985.

The question was whether Section 31 gave the Minister power to make the order
and in what circumstances. The Act may have been past to control inflation which
was not now such a pressing problem.

The order restricted the ability of landlords to increase their tenants’ print. Spath
Holme was a landlord and challenged the legality of the order, because the statute
was not clear.

Travaux Preparatoires:
Original international convention and preparatory material can be used, following
the case of Fothergill Vs Monarch Airlines (1980):
In the past, the interpretation of extrinsic and intrinsic materials was subject to a
number of complicated rules, the details of which were often in dispute. In
determining the ordinary sense of words, the courts were originally free to consult
any dictionary they wished, even the courts’ choice might appear strained or
illogical.

Only parts of a printed Act were regarded as the actual text. The rules for reading
Acts assigned limits to the use of different parts of the Act depending on whether
the purpose of the Court was constructions or contextual. In general, the courts
were not allowed to use Parliamentary materials, such as second Reading
Speeches, as aids to constructive interpretation of statutes.

2.11 Precedents:

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 Although precedent was fundamental to the Common Law, it do not apply in quite
the same way the statutory interpretation as it does in other areas. Court is not
bound to interpret legislation in accordance with the interpretations placed on
similar provisions by other courts. Each court has an obligation to seek the
meaning of a particular piece of legislation for itself.
Although the Common Law permitted the Courts to make law through the use of
precedent, this practice was rest permissible in the field of statutory interpretation.
The courts were forbidden to treat legislation as representing a;

“Stab at formulating a concept. Their task was to interpret

the Statute, not is extract from it general concepts
which could be extended to guide the courts
in a wider range of circumstances”

These distinctions did not mean that precedent was unimportant. Courts were
usually expected to adhere to previous rulings on the same statute. This was based
on the assumption that, if parliament had not charged, the wording of legislation
following a court ruling this was good reason to believe that the parliament was
satisfied with courts interpretation.

2.12 Summary:

This unit dealt with;

a) The meaning of Statutory Interpretation;

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 b) The traditional rules of Statutory Interpretation;
c) The distinction between the literal and purposive approaches to statutory
interpretation;
d) The aids to Statutory Interpretation; and
e) The role of precedent in Statutory Interpretation.

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