THECAM U 6 UEA-SM-353,5. J.M. Hopwood, J. Hum Atomic Energy of Canada LTD, XA0053580 Mississauga, Ontario, Canada
THECAM U 6 UEA-SM-353,5. J.M. Hopwood, J. Hum Atomic Energy of Canada LTD, XA0053580 Mississauga, Ontario, Canada
The CANDU® 6 is a modern nuclear power plant designed and developed under the aegis of Atomic
Energy of Canada, Limited (AECL) for domestic use and for export to other countries. This design has
successfully met criteria for operation and redundant safety features required by Canada and by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and has an estimable record of performance in all applications to date. Key to
this success is a defined program of design enhancement in which changes are made while retaining fundamental
features proven by operating experience. Basic design features and progress toward improvements are presented
here.
1. INTRODUCTION
The enhanced CANDU® 6 is a proven, up-to-date nuclear power plant design. It offers the
attributes of a next-generation product, with a successful operating record implemented in recent build
projects. AECL applies continuous improvement to the product evolution; incremental design
improvements are incorporated in successive projects, while retaining fundamental features proven by
operating experience. Thus the design and licensing bases are also updated, maximizing the benefits
of real-world project and licensing experience.
Since 1996, AECL has conducted a systematic CANDU® 6 enhancement program. This has
culminated in a design incorporating an integrated group of changes, each of which is practical as a
stand-alone upgrade. This next-generation-enhanced design shares many common features with the
family of plants; the following describes the main features and a number of the key improvements.
The CANDU® 6 is a nuclear power plant of the pressure tube type, notable for its use of heavy
water as a coolant and moderator. Some of the design features and characteristics of the reactor are:
• a reactor core comprising 380 small diameter pressure tube fuel channels,
• heavy water (D2O) for moderator and coolant,
• separate low pressure moderator and high pressure fuel cooling systems,
• on-power refueling,
• reactivity devices in the cool low pressure moderator, not subject to high temperatures or
pressures,
• natural uranium fuel,
• reduced consequences from accidental reactivity fluctuations - excess reactivity available from
the fuel is small, and the relatively long lifetime of prompt neutrons in the reactor precludes
rapid changes in power levels, and
• special safety systems to shut down the reactor and isolate/retain radioactive fission products.
The design objectives are to meet current and evolving licensing requirements in Canada, to
meet current and evolving IAEA safety standards and guides, and to include a comprehensive design
definition adaptable to the host country's licensing requirements without fundamental changes.
This plant meets the requirements of the Canadian regulatory agency, the Atomic Energy
Control Board (AECB) and complies with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) design
guides. CANDU® 6 meets Canadian licensing regulations. There are two operating plants in Canada
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(Point Lepreau and Gentilly-2) and units have been successfully licensed for operation in Argentina,
Romania and South Korea including most recently, Wolsong-3.
CANDU® stations operate extensively in the automatic, reactor following turbine mode,
subjecting the plant to continuous small perturbations in reactor power with no adverse effects.
Operating experience indicates that they can also operate in the load follow mode from 60 to 100 per
cent of full power without adverse effects. The following summarizes operating characteristics:
The unit is capable of sustained operation at any electrical output up to 100 per cent of rated
full power output. The normal operating mode is with reactor following turbine. For reactor power
increases, the nuclear steam plant is capable of maneuvering at the following rates:
Power range Rate
0 - 25 % of full power 4% of actual power per second
25 - 80 % of full power 1% of full power per second
80 -100 % of full power 0,15% of full power per second
The first four generating units have over 50 years of cumulative operating experience and an
excellent record. The plant at Point Lepreau, operated by New Brunswick Power, frequently led the
world in lifetime capacity factor. The Wolsong-1, operated by the Korean Electric Power
Corporation, was the best performing plant in the world for three out of its fourteen years of
operation, including 1993, when it achieved a capacity factor of 100.8 per cent.
The average capacity factor in 1997 for all six plants operating in Canada, Korea and Argentina
was 85.7 per cent. In fact, Wolsong-1, Wolsong-2 and Cernavoda-1 achieved capacity factors of 102,
97.1 and 89.1 per cent to the end of 1997, respectively. The average lifetime capacity factor for all
operating CANDU® 6s was in excess of 85 per cent to the end of 1997.
Each fuel channel contains 12 fuel bundles in the reactor core. The fuel channel assembly
includes a zirconium 2.5 per cent niobium alloy pressure tube of internal diameter 103.38 mm, a
zirconium calandria tube, stainless steel end fittings at each end, and spacers which maintain
separation of the pressure tube and the calandria tube. The lattice pitch between fuel channels is
28.575 cm. The space between the calandria tube and the pressure tube is filled with C02 gas to
insulate the hot pressure tube from the cool moderator. Each end fitting incorporates a feeder connect-
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ion through which heavy water coolant enters and leaves the fuel channel. Pressurized heavy water
coolant flows around and through the fuel bundles in the fuel channel and removes the heat generated
in the fuel by nuclear fission.
During on-power refuelling, the fuelling machines gain access to the fuel channel by removing
the closure plug and shield plug from both end fittings of the channel to be refueled.
2.1.2 Fuel
The standard CANDU® fuel bundle consists of 37 identical base elements, arranged in circular
rings as shown in Figure 2. Each element consists of natural uranium in cylindrical pellets of sintered
uranium dioxide contained in a zircaloy-4 sheath closed at each end by an end cap. The 37 elements
are held together by end plates at each end to form the fuel bundle. Spacers brazed to the elements
maintain the required separation of the fuel elements. The outer fuel elements have bearing pads to
support the fuel bundle in the pressure tube.
Fuel performance has been excellent. While more than 900,000 bundles have been irradiated in
Canada to date less than 0.1 per cent have developed defects. Similar performance has been achieved
FUEL CHANNEL
CALANDRIATU8E GASANNULUS
1-
FUEL BUNDLES
PRESSURE TUBE
in offshore units. Future design optimization will take advantage of the new CANFLEX 43-element
fuel bundle. This fuel bundle uses graded pin sizing to achieve 20 per cent lower peak element rating,
and 6-8 per cent greater thermal margins. The demonstration irradiation of CANFLEX fuel bundles is
successfully under way at Point Lepreau station, New Brunswick, Canada.
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INTER ELEMENT SPACERS
PRESSURE TUBE
The fuel changing operation combines use of two remotely controlled fuelling machines, one
operating on each end of a fuel channel. New fuel bundles from one fuelling machine are inserted
into a fuel channel in the same direction as the coolant flow and the displaced irradiated fuel bundles
are received into the second fuelling machine at the other end. Either machine can load or receive
fuel. The direction of loading depends upon the direction of coolant flow in the fuel channel being
fuelled, which alternates from channel to channel. The fuelling machines receive new fuel while
connected to the new fuel port and discharge irradiated fuel while connected to the discharge port.
The entire operation is accomplished by a pre-programmed computerized system. The control system
provides a printed log of all operations and permits manual intervention by the operator. Either all or
part of the fuel bundles in a fuel channel can be changed at any visit.
The fuel handling system, illustrated in Figure 3, performs the following functions:
• refuels the reactor remotely while it is operating at any level of power, and
• transfers the irradiated fuel remotely from the reactor to the storage bay.
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FAILED
.in
UNWO
FAILED FUEL
New fuel is received in the new fuel storage room in the service building. This room
accommodates six months' fuel inventory and can temporarily store all the fuel required for the initial
fuel loading. The fuel bundles are identified and loaded into the magazines of the new fuel ports.
Transfer of the new fuel bundles into the fuelling machines is remotely controlled. Irradiated fuel
received in the discharge port from the fuelling machine is transferred into an elevator, which lowers
it into a water-filled discharge bay. The irradiated fuel is then conveyed under water through a
transfer canal into a reception bay, where it is loaded onto storage trays or baskets and passed into the
storage bay. The discharge and transfer operations are remotely controlled. Operations in the storage
bays are carried out under water using special tools, aided by cranes and hoists. Defective fuel is
inserted into cans under water to limit the spread of contamination. The storage volume of the bays
has sufficient capacity for 20 years' accumulation of irradiated fuel.
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TO MODERA TOR CO VER QAS SYSTEM
MODERATOR
HEAD TANK
CALANDRIA VAULT
FROM PURIFICATION.
LIQUID POISON AND
DjO COLLECTION
SYSTEMS •
TOANDFROMD 2 O
SUPPLY SYSTEM
SERVICE WATER
TO PURIFICATION SYSTEM
HEAT EXCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER
The moderator pump motors are connected to the medium voltage Class III power supply. In
addition, each pump has a pony motor, capable of driving the pump at 25 per cent speed, connected to
the Class II power supply. In the event of a loss of Class IV power, standby diesel generators are
available to supply Class III power.
The heavy water in the calandria functions as a heat sink in the unlikely event of a loss of
coolant accident in the heat transport system coincident with a failure of emergency core cooling.
• maintains the purity of D2O, thereby minimizing radiolysis which can cause excessive
production of deuterium in the cover gas,
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• under operator command, reduces the concentration of the soluble poisons, boron and
gadolinium, in response to reactivity demands, and
• removes the soluble poison, gadolinium, after shutdown system number 2 has operated.
10.0 MPa(a) and 310°C at design conditions. Total heat transport coolant flow rate is 7.7 Mg/s.
Flows in individual fuel channels are optimized by choice of feeder pipe design to maintain similar
coolant outlet conditions throughout the core. Heat transport system materials are chosen for
protection against corrosion effects to ensure long design life and also capability for life extension up
to 60 years.
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The pressure in the heat transport system is controlled by a pressurizer connected to the outlet
headers at one end of the reactor. Valves provide isolation between the two loops in the event of a
loss-of-coolant accident. The principal performance features for the heat transport system and
associated systems are as follows:
• reactor coolant circulates through the fuel channels at all times during reactor operation,
shutdown and maintenance,
• HTS pressure is controlled in normal modes of operation by the pressure and inventory control
system,
• the HTS is protected from overpressure by instrumented relief valves and by the reactor
regulating and safety system,
• HTS coolant inventory is controlled in normal modes of operation by pressure and inventory
control systems,
• the shutdown cooling system, capable of operation at full HTS temperature and pressure, is used
to remove reactor decay heat during shutdowns and maintenance outages; this system also permits
the draining of pumps and steam generators in the HTS for maintenance,
• purification by filtering, ion exchange and degassing, and chemical addition maintains the
chemistry and purity of the reactor coolant, and
• by using welded construction and bellows-sealed valves where practical, heavy water leaks are
minimized. Potential leak sources are connected to the heat transport D2O collection system.
0 I 0FEEDPlM>S(2]
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• control HTS inventory over the full range of HTS and reactor operating modes,
• accommodate HTS coolant thermal expansion and contraction associated with warm-up, cool-
down, start-up, shutdown, and power maneuvering, and
The shutdown cooling system consists of pumps and heat exchangers arranged in two separate
circuits. In each circuit, one at each end of the reactor, the pump takes coolant from the reactor outlet
header and returns it to the reactor inlet header via the heat exchangers. The pumps and heat
exchangers are below the reactor headers so a net positive suction head is available for the pumps
when the HTS drains to the headers.
The shutdown cooling system is normally cold, depressurized, and isolated from the HTS by
valves during reactor operation. The shutdown cooling pumps are provided with backup power from
the Class III power supply. During normal operation, the shutdown coolers are cooled by the
recirculated cooling water system.
The D2O collection system collects any heavy water leakage from mechanical components, and
receives heavy water drained from equipment prior to maintenance. Collected heavy water is returned
to the heat transport heavy water storage tank.
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• adjusters, and
2.7.1.3 Adjusters
Adjusters are cylindrical neutron absorbing rods. A CANDU® reactor typically has 21
vertically mounted adjuster rods, normally stainless steel, normally inserted between columns of fuel
channels for flux shaping purposes. Removal of adjusters from the core provides positive reactivity to
compensate for xenon buildup following large power reductions or in the event that the on-power
refueling system is unavailable. The adjusters are driven in and out of the reactor core at variable
speeds to provide reactivity control. The adjusters are normally driven in banks, the largest bank
containing five rods. Total adjuster reactivity worth is 15 mk. A design enhancement to optimize
adjuster positioning in the core for increased burn-up has been defined.
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2.7.2.1 Ion Chamber System
Three ion chambers are employed in the reactor regulating system, for measuring neutron flux
in the range from 10'7 to 15 per cent of full power. These ion chambers are in housings at one side of
the core. In addition to one ion chamber for the reactor regulating system, each housing also contains
an ion chamber and shutter for shutdown system number 1. Each of the three channels consists of an
ion chamber and amplifier unit. The solid state amplifiers upgrade the ion chamber outputs to
suitable input signal levels for processing in the control computers. Three similar ion chambers,
mounted on the other side of the core, provide inputs to shutdown system number 2.
The in-core flux detectors of the regulating system and of shutdown system number 1 are
mounted vertically in the core, while those of shutdown system number 2 are mounted horizontally.
These in-core flux detectors provide exceptional capability to detect not only bulk power deviation
but small-scale local power, changes. Incorporating operating experience into detector position
optimization is part of the CANDU® 6 enhancements program.
2.7.2.4 Reliability
The reliability of the reactor regulating system is of paramount importance and is achieved by:
• hardware interlocks limiting the amount and rate of change of positive reactivity devices.
Recently-demonstrated improvements to signal noise analysis provide further aid to operator
monitoring of nuclear instrumentation performance.
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adjusters and mechanical control absorbers. Poison removal from the moderator is also inhibited to
prevent increased reactivity. The interlocks remain active, preventing reactor startup, until shutoff
rods are fully withdrawn and available for reactor shutdown. There are further interlocks to prevent
more than a limited number of high worth adjusters from withdrawal at the same time. This limits the
rate of positive reactivity insertion.
The turbine governor valves that admit steam to the high-pressure stage of the turbine, control
steam pressure. If the turbine is unavailable, up to 70 per cent of full power steam flow can bypass
GROUP 2
FEEOWATER
NOZZLE
SHROUD CONE
PREHEATER SECTION^
536
the turbine and go directly to the condenser. During this operation, the turbine by-pass valves control
pressure. Auxiliary bypass valves are also provided to permit up to 10 per cent of full power steam
flow during low power operation. Improved steam generator design with a larger steam drum has
been introduced into CANDU 6 to improve response to transients and to increase time for operator
response.
Steam pressure can also be controlled by discharging steam directly to the atmosphere via four
atmospheric steam discharge valves (ASDV) which have a combined capacity of 10 per cent of full
power steam flow. These valves are used primarily during warm-up or cool-down of the heat
transport system. Four safety relief valves connected to the four main steam lines provide over-
pressure protection for the steam system.
The steam turbine is a tandem compound unit, directly coupled to an electrical generator by a
single shaft. It comprises one double flow; high-pressure cylinder followed by external moisture
separators, live steam re-heaters and either two or three double flow, low pressure cylinders. The
turbine system has main steam stop valves, governor valves; reheat intercept and emergency stop
valves. All of these valves close automatically in the event of a turbine protection system trip.
3.2 Generator
The electrical generator is a three-phase, four-pole, gas cooled machine running at synchronous
speed. The excitation unit consists of a solid-state, automatic voltage regulator controlling a thyristor
converter that supplies the generator field via a field circuit breaker, generator slip rings and brush
gear. The main power output from the generator to the main output step-up transformer is by means of
a forced air cooled, isolated phase bus duct, with tap-offs to the unit service transformer, excitation
transformer and potential transformer cubicle.
The condenser is the heat sink for the steam cycle. During normal operation it receives and
condenses the exhaust from the turbine generator. During abnormal operation it receives the bypass
steam from the condenser steam discharge valves (turbine bypass valves).
The turbine condenser is designed with three separate shells. Each shell is connected to one of
the three low-pressure turbine exhausts. Exhaust steam from the turbine entering the shell is
condensed by flowing over a tube bundle assembly of cooling water, typically water from a lake, river
or ocean. A vacuum system removes air and other non-condensable gases from the condenser shells.
The condenser is designed to accept turbine bypass steam to permit the reactor power to be reduced
from 100 per cent power to 70 per cent if the turbine is unavailable. The bypass can accept 100 per
cent steam flow for a few minutes, and 70 per cent of full power steam flow continuously.
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3.4 Feedwater Heating System
The regenerative feedwater heating system heats the condensate to the required temperature
before supplying it to the steam generators. The system comprises the feedwater heating equipment,
the extraction steam system, and the feedwater heater drains and vents systems.
The electric power system comprises a main output transformer, unit and system service
transformers, and a switchyard. The output transformer steps up the generator output voltage to
match the grid requirements for transmission to the load centers and also supplies the power to
operate all of the station services. The switchyard contains equipment to permit switching of outputs
between transmission lines, comprising circuit breakers, switches, lightning and grounding protection
equipment to shield against electrical surges and faults.
4.1.2 Switchyard
The switchyard is the interface between the station and the power grid transmission lines.
There are at least two incoming lines that are synchronized under normal conditions. However, the
switchyard electrical equipment allows transmission of full station power through any one of the
incoming lines.
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in the event one is unavailable. The transformer is fed from the output system of the turbine
generator.
• a parallel transfer of power under normal operating conditions for maintenance purposes,
• a fast open transfer of power initiated by the electrical protection system; this ensures that the
voltage vector between the incoming supply and the residual voltage on the motors is small, so
that the inrush current and the transient torque are kept to a small value,
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• a residual voltage transfer, comprising automatic closure of the alternate breaker after the residual
voltage has decayed by approximately 70 per cent; this is time delayed, may require load
shedding and could result in reactor power cut-back. It is provided as a backup to the above
transfers.
The primary unit instrumentation and control systems are designed to give the operators in the
main control room all information and control capabilities to operate the unit safely during normal
and abnormal operation. A separate, independent control and instrumentation system, in a secondary
control area, is designed for shutting down the unit and maintaining it in a shutdown condition in case
the main control room becomes uninhabitable.
The main control room features extensive use of computer-driven color-graphic CRT (Cathode
Ray Tube) displays, and offers selective presentation of information in diagrammatic formats. The use
of CRT displays, designed using modern human factors engineering, simplifies the clutter of typical
control room panels, and provides a uniform man-machine interface for all plant systems. Plant
surveillance is also centralized in the main control room. For example, instrumentation for closed-
circuit television, meteorological sensing, fire detection and alarm vibration monitoring and access
control are all indicated and controlled from the main control room. A number of communications
networks such as telephone, public address, maintenance, and plastic suit are also centralized here.
A major feature of all CANDU® generating stations is an integrated control philosophy using
direct digital control. The plant is highly automated to require a minimum number of operator actions
during all phases of operation. Control of main systems, such as the turbine, steam generator, reactor,
heat transport and moderator systems are all under the control of the plant computer systems. This
permits reliable and practical application of multivariable control algorithms for dynamic
compensation in systems where this is advantageous.
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The dynamic control of reactivity mechanisms by the plant computers is a prime feature of
CANDU® reactors. Through the manipulation of mechanical control absorbers, adjusters, and light
water zone controllers, active spatial control of neutron flux within the reactor is continuously applied
for optimum performance. Direct digital control of the reactor also incorporates two automatic power
reduction algorithms upon detection of abnormal conditions. These algorithms force automatic,
controlled, power reductions under certain conditions, to avoid tripping the unit by shutdown systems.
The latest CANDU® 6 design features the advanced control room, illustrated in Figure 9. It
features an array of panels at the perimeter with two large central display screens, and the operations
console. Information on the panels and at the operations console allow safe control and monitoring of
the station. The instrumentation and controls on the panels are grouped by system, with a separate
panel allocated to each major system. Color monitors (CRTs) and advanced annunciation systems
provide uncluttered control room panel layouts and excellent monitoring capabilities. The operator
can call up information displays on the panel CRTs, the operating control console CRTs, and central
display screens in a variety of alphanumeric and graphic formats via keyboards. All display
annunciation messages are color coded to facilitate system identification and the priority of the alarm.
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6. SAFETY SYSTEMS
Special Safety Systems are incorporated in the plant for safety actions; namely reactor
shutdown, decay heat removal and/or retention of released radioactivity. They are completely
separate from the normal plant process systems, and perform no active function during normal
operation. They consist of:
• Shutdown System No. 1 (SDS1),
• Shutdown System No. 2 (SDS2),
• Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), and
• Containment System (containment structures, containment heat removal and isolation
systems).
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Each special safety system is designed to achieve a demand unavailability of less than 1/1000,
demonstrated by on-line testing and the reactor may not be operated unless all are available. Systems
to provide reliable services, such as electrical power, cooling water, and air supplies to the special
safety systems are referred to as safety support systems. To guard against cross-linked and common
mode events, all plant systems including the safety system, are assigned to one of two Groups (Group
1 and Group 2), and are separated spatially or by barriers.
The CANDU® 6 reactor incorporates two diverse, passive, shutdown systems that are
independent of each other and from the reactor regulating system. Each shutdown system is capable of
tripping the reactor and has sufficient negative reactivity to maintain it in a shutdown state. Each
system is designed with an array of trip instrumentation so that, for any initiating event requiring
shutdown, there are two different signals that trigger shutdown, for each system in turn.
Shutdown system No. 1 (SDS1) consists of mechanical shutdown rods that drop into the core
upon a trip signal. The signal de-energizes the clutches holding the rods in place, releasing them into
the reactor core.
Shutdown system No. 2 (SDS2) injects a concentrated solution of gadolinium nitrate into the
low-pressure moderator to quickly render the core sub-critical. The injection is initiated by opening
fast acting valves to pressurize poison tanks, one for each injection nozzle, with helium.
Each shutdown system has a set of trip parameters designed to protect against postulated
system failures. The measurements for the trip parameters are triplicated, with a complete set of
measurements provided in each of three channels for each shutdown system. Any measured
parameter exceeding its set point will trip the corresponding channel, and any two tripped channels in
the same shutdown system will shut down the reactor.
Independent neutron and process measurements provide signals to trip each shutdown system.
Neutron measurements are obtained from self-powered in-core flux detectors and ion chambers.
Process measurements include heat transport pressure, heat transport flow, reactor building pressure,
steam generator low level, pressurizer low level, low steam generator feedline pressure, and
moderator level. The reactor can be tripped manually in the main control room and in the secondary
control area.
All information regarding trip parameters and the status and operation of the shutdown systems
is displayed on dedicated panels in the main control room. Information for post-accident monitoring
for operator action is also provided in the secondary control area.
The ECC system is composed of three stages: high-pressure injection stage, intermediate stage,
and recovery stage. The high-pressure injection stage uses pre-pressurized air to inject water into the
HTS from water tanks. The intermediate stage supplies water from the dousing tank through
duplicated redundant pumps. Once the water supply depletes, the recovery stage recovers water that
collects in the reactor building sump and pumps it back into the HTS via the emergency cooling
system heat exchangers using the same emergency cooling recovery pumps as in the intermediate
stage.
The injection stage consists of one air gas tank and two water tanks. During normal reactor
operation the gas tank operates at a pressure of 4.1 MPa, whereas the water tank pressure is slightly
above atmospheric. The recovery pumps are two 100 per cent pumps. Each pump is supplied by Class
III power and also by the emergency power supply system. The two 100 per cent heat exchangers in
the recovery pump discharge line are designed to maintain the emergency cooling flow at about 50°C
at entry to the heat transport system. Transfer between stages is fully automatic, requiring no
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operator action. Use of passive features is maximized to minimize the degree of complexity in valve
stations, etc.
The ECC system is triggered automatically on a loss of coolant signal when the heat transport
pressure drops to 5.5 MPa and one of the conditioning parameters (high reactor building pressure,
high moderator level, high fuelling machine vault temperature, high steam generator room
temperature) reaches its set point. The following actions take place:
• All gas isolation valves, high pressure injection valves, and D2O isolating valves are opened.
This will break rupture discs in the injection lines and permit flow of high pressure water from
injection tanks to all reactor headers of failed and unfailed loops.
• The main steam safety valves on the steam generators are opened to rapidly cool down the
boilers and ensure a long-term heat sink, for small loss of coolant accidents.
• Valves in all lines interconnecting the two heat transport loops are closed. This will confine
the consequences of a loss of coolant accident only to the loop containing the break.
The ECC dousing tank valves to the ECC recovery pumps suction will open automatically on a
loss of coolant signal and one of the ECC pumps will automatically start when these valves are
opened. If this pump fails to start (as indicated by a low pump discharge pressure), the standby ECC
pump starts automatically.
As the dousing tank water depletes, the valves in the recovery line from the reactor building
sump automatically open, the valves in the line from the dousing tank automatically close, and the
cooling water valves open to supply service water to the ECC heat exchangers. The mixture of heat
transport coolant and water from the high pressure and dousing tanks is pumped from the sump in the
reactor building back to the heat transport system via the heat exchangers.
6.4 Containment
The containment system for accident protection consists of a post-tensioned concrete reactor
building structure with an epoxy liner; atmosphere energy removal via an automatic dousing system
and accident qualified building air coolers; access airlocks and an automatic containment isolation
system.
The dousing tank is located in the dome of the reactor building and holds water for emergency
dousing and emergency core cooling. About 500 cubic meters of water are reserved for emergency
core cooling. The total capacity of the tank is about 2600 cubic meters. Dousing valves control the
flow of water to six independent dousing spray header units located radially below the tank. Each
spray unit has two butterfly valves in a downcomer between the tank and the spray header. The
design dousing flow rate is about 4500 kg/s and any four of the six downcomers can provide this
flowrate. With all six downcomers operating, the total spray flow is about 6800 kg/s.
A hydrogen mitigation system addresses the short and long-term release of hydrogen in the
containment building. The hydrogen mitigation system maintains hydrogen in the containment
building, at a level at or below ignition concentrations. Hydrogen is intentionally burnt as soon as the
hydrogen-air mixture becomes flammable and before the hydrogen concentration reaches a detonation
threshold.
Under normal operation conditions, the pressure within containment is slightly less than
atmospheric and the containment ventilation dampers are all open.
The containment is automatically isolated in the event of a high radioactivity signal that may
occur following a loss of coolant accident or any other event-releasing radioactivity into the reactor
building. In the event of very small HTS leaks, the building coolers in the containment condense any
steam discharged. The building pressure remains at atmospheric pressure and there may be some
543
additional outflow of dried air through the ventilation system. In the event of larger breaks, the
building pressure rises and at an overpressure of about 3.4 kPa, containment pressure sensors also
initiate total containment closure. The containment pressure continues to rise and the dousing system
begins to operate automatically at an overpressure of 13.8 kPa. Once the dousing system overtakes
the pressure transient, the pressure begins to fall, and the building depressurizes to about atmospheric
pressure by condensation on the building walls and cooling by the air coolers. Leakage of
radioactivity from the isolated reactor building is restricted to very small levels. Continued heat
removal from the atmosphere by environmentally qualified local air coolers ensures containment
temperatures and pressures are controlled.
10
CANDU® 6 is designed as a single-unit plant; multiple-unit stations use the single unit as a
building block. The units of a multiple-unit station are self-sufficient, with all the facilities required
for day-to-day operation. However, some support facilities, such as heavy water management and
administration, may be integrated for more efficient and convenient operation.
A typical layout of a single-unit CANDU® 6 is presented in Figure 10. The principal structures
include the reactor building, the service building and turbine building. Auxiliary structures include
the pumphouse, secondary control area, the ECC building, the EWS pumphouse and the
administration building.
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7.2 Buildings and structure
The containment structure is separated from the internal structural systems. This provides
flexibility in over-all building construction and no inter-dependence between the containment wall
IRRADIATED
FUEL BAY
COOUHOAND
PURIFICATION
DjO MANAGEMENT
and other structures. A large portion of the reactor building is accessible during operations,
facilitating on-power maintenance, inspection and testing.
The layout of rooms within the service building provides safety and efficiency for plant
operation in terms of traffic patterns, radiation zoning and the routing of services between the
buildings. The irradiated fuel storage facility is also in the service building. Figure 11 shows the
basement plan of the service building, where major systems are located.
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Overhead traveling cranes in the turbine hall provide for erection and maintenance of the
turbine generator and its auxiliaries. The turbine building is a reinforced concrete substructure, with a
steel-framed superstructure, and steel roof trusses and insulated metal walls and roof.
7.2.4 Pumphouse
The pumphouse is a reinforced concrete substructure containing the condenser cooling water
pumps, raw service water pumps, fire pumps, screens, and racks and screen wash pumps. A steel-
framed superstructure provides houses the pump motors. Roof hatches allow installation and
maintenance of the pumps.
Heavy water management consists of systems and facilities to clean-up, upgrade, store, collect
and supply make-up of heavy water for the moderator and heat transport systems. The station design
prevents the loss of D2O from the reactor systems. Special measures recover and upgrade D2O that
escapes. A D2O upgrader facility is integrated into the station design.
The heavy water cleanup system removes dissolved particulate and organic impurities from
heavy water recovered from process systems and has a product suitable for upgrading in the heavy
water management facility. The heavy water management facilities are in the service building.
Provisions ensuring optimum D2O management are:
• extensive use of welded joints, with the number of mechanical joints in heavy water systems
kept to a minimum,
• heavy water and light water systems are segregated as much as possible,
• a D2O liquid recovery system is provided,
• the building containing most heavy water systems is sealed and has a minimum through
ventilation flow,
• air entering and leaving the reactor building is dried to minimize D2O downgrading and loss,
and
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• dry air is maintained within the building by closed circulation and drying systems so increases
in humidity can be readily detected. Heavy water vapor removed by the dryers is recovered
and upgraded.
Part of the CANDU® 6 program is simplifying and improving routing of ventilation systems
and D2O vapor recovery flows, to cut heavy water losses, already exceptionally low, by more than 50
per cent.
Radioactive waste management systems permit on-site collection, processing and handling of
all radioactive wastes produced. Facilities provide for either interim site storage or disposal on-site or
off-site.
The liquid radioactive waste management system receives all active liquid wastes and provides
storage, sampling, treatment and dispersal. The system consists of concrete storage tanks (for low
activity and for normal activity wastes). Filters and an ion exchanger reduce radioactivity as required.
The liquid waste management systems are in the nuclear steam plant services portion of the station
services building.
The gaseous radioactive waste management system handles potentially active airborne
discharges from the reactor building, irradiated fuel storage bay area, decontamination center, heavy
water handling area, and active ventilation exhausts. All active or potentially active gases, vapors, or
airborne particles are monitored and filtered, if necessary, prior to release via the ventilation exhaust
duct or stack. Active gases vented from the heat transport system are released to the active ventilation
system only after removal of heavy water and a delay to permit decay of short-half-life isotopes. The
stack effluent is continuously sampled to detect the presence of tritium, particulates, iodine-131 and
noble gases.
Solid radioactive wastes include a variety of solid materials that may be contaminated. These
include filters, ion exchange resins, activated components and common materials such as paper,
plastic, wood etc. A very small volume of radioactive liquid waste that can not be handled in the
radioactive liquid waste management systems may be included in the solid wastes. These and some
organic solvents, such as scintillation solutions, are immobilized using an inert absorbent. The solid
radioactive waste area is normally established on the reactor site, some distance from the reactor
building. It typically comprises an elevated earth-fill platform with an approach ramp for vehicles,
enclosed by a security fence, with concrete waste storage structures embedded in the earth of the
platform.
The CANDU® 6 spent fuel bay capacity with the most up-to-date storage rack design can store
up to 20 years of spent fuel; additional storage space is required for 40-year operations. Expanding
spent fuel cooling pools in nuclear power plants generally is logistically difficult and expensive, dry
storage systems evolved out of this need. Dry storage for fuel bundles is relatively simple, and has
been proven in dry storage units in operation at several units.
The CANDU® MACSTOR dry spent fuel storage system is an air-cooled concrete module
housing a number of metal canisters containing spent fuel. This provides highly efficient heat
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rejection, excellent shielding and complete structural soundness. Figure 12 illustrates this system.
Spent fuel handling is simplified by transferring fuel from the spent fuel bay in the same baskets, into
dry storage modules. Dry spent fuel storage can be applied as soon as after 6 years pool storage, and is
licensed locally.
7.5 m
8m
These data are typical values for a CANDU® 6 nuclear power plant, Actual values for a
specific plant may vary depending on site conditions.
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Reactor Core
Active core length 5.94 m
Core radius, effective 3.38 m
Number of lattice Cells 380
Cell array square
Lattice pitch 285.75 mm
Fuel inventory 95 tu
Fuel material Sintered U2O
Fuel assembly(fuel bundle) total length 495 mm
Fuel design (rod array) Circular array
Number of fuel bundles 4560
Number of fuel rods ( pins) /assembly 37-element
Average discharge burnup of fuel 7000 MW
Cladding tube material zircaloy-4
Cladding tube wall thickness 0.42 mm
Outer diameter of fuel rods 13.08 mm
Overall weight of fuel bundle 23.5 kg
Number of shutdown/control units - vertical 59
Number of shutdown units - horizontal 6
Reactivity control material - out of core stainless steel
- in core zircaloy/stainless steel/cadmium
Reactor Vessel
Calandria shield tank assembly (CSTA)(diam.) 7.65 m
Wall thickness of cylindrical shell - calandria 28.6 mm
- shield tank 25.4 mm
CSTA overall length 7.82 m
Base material - calandria 304L Stainless Steel
Base material - shield tank carbon steel
Fuel Channels
Channel length 10.82 m
Pressure tube length 6.30 m
Pressure tube inside diameter 103.4 mm
Number of pressure tubes 380
Flow rate single channel, nominal 117 m3/hr
Est. pressure drop across 12 bundles 758 kPa
Max. channel power (nominal) 6.46 MW
Steam Generators
Steam generator type vertical U-tube with integral preheaters
No. of steam generators 4
Tube dimensions (outer diaVthickness) 16/1.12 mm
Shell and tube sheet material carbon steel
Tube material Incoloy 800
Reactor Coolant Pump
Number 4
Design pressure (gauge) 12.9 MPa
Design temperature 279.4 °C
Design flow rate(at operating conditions) 2.228 m3/s
Operating temperature 266 °C
Pump head 215 m
Power demand at coupling, hot 6.7 MWe
Pump casing material carbon steel
Pressurizer
Total volume 45.3
Design pressure (gauge) 11 Mpa
Design temperature 310 °C
Heating power of heater rods 5x200 kWe
Material carbon steel
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Primary Containment
Containment type reinforced prestressed concrete
Overall form (spherical/cyl.) cylindrical
Inside diameter 41.45 m
Wall thickness 1.07 m
Height (top of base slab to top of dome) 51.21 m
Free volume 4 8 477 m3
Design pressure (LOCA) (gauge) 124.1 kPa
Reactor Auxiliary Systems
Reactor water cleanup - (purification) 24 kg/s
Reactor water cleanup - filter type disposable cartridge
Purification heat exchanger capacity 50 MW(th)
Shutdown cooling heat capacity 13.3 MW(th)
Reactivity Control
Shut-off units (SDSO
Quantity 28
Type stainless steel clad cadium tube
Static reactivity worth (28 rods) -80 milli-k
Liquid Injection Svstem(SDS2)
Quantity
Type horizontal nozzle inject liquid poison
into moderator
Poison Gadolinium nitrate
Reactivity worth, long term -300 milli-k
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Generator
Type 4 pole H2 cooled
Rated power 856 MVA
Active power 720 MWe
Voltage output 20 kV
The CANDU® 6 plant design is a "living" design, which has undergone continuous evolution
from the time of the original units that entered service in 1983. Since then, the design has been
maintained project-ready, while individual improvements have been incorporated as applicable and as
mandated by each customer. The present enhancement program was started in 1996, and will include
successive improvements when fully proven and pre-engineered. In this way, the design is up-to-date
and project- ready. The program objective is to have short-term design enhancements completed by
the year 2000. Continued design improvements will be made to adapt to operational and other
experiential feedback. In the longer term, this program will lead to adaptations to the medium-sized
CANDU® 6 concept to lead to an Advanced CANDU® project.
REFERENCES
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