Interim Injunctions
Interim Injunctions
INTERIM INJUNCTIONS
S.S. Upadhyay
Former District & Sessions Judge/
Former Addl. Director (Training)
Institute of Judicial Training & Research, UP, Lucknow.
Member, Governing Body,
Chandigarh Judicial Academy, Chandigarh.
Former Legal Advisor to Governor
Raj Bhawan, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow
Mobile : 9453048988
E-mail : [email protected]
C O N T E N T S
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11 Effect of non-compliance with the 12 Recording of reasons for
proviso to Order 39, Rule 3 CPC grant of temporary injunction
13 (A) Interim injunction beyond the 14 Interim relief not to be
scope & parties to the suit granted if final relief in the
(B) Relief larger than claim not to same terms cannot be
be granted granted
(C) T.I. not to be granted beyond
the terms of the prayer for
permanent injunction
15 Interim injunction or stay against 16 Interim Mandatory
Govt. regarding--- Injunction
(A) Public Policy
(B) Economic Policy
(C) Public Schemes
(D) Public Projects etc.
f1 Interim order granting final relief-- 18 Interim injunction in favour
7 - not to be passed of defendant in a suit filed by
plaintiff
19 Consequences of non-disposal of 20 Interim injunction
injunction application on application and objections
merits within 30 days from the regarding-
date of grant of ex-parte ad-interim (A) Jurisdiction
injunction (B) Valuation
(C) Court Fee
(D) Maintainability of suit
(E) Limitation & T.I.
(F) Resjudicata & T.I.
(G) Non-impleadment of
party
& T.I.
21 (A) Sec. 38 & 41 of Specific Relief 22 (A) Revival of Temporary
Act, 1963 & ad-interim Injunction on
injunction Restoration of Suit
(B) Licence By Municipal Board & (B) Temporary injunction
Injunction not to be granted unless
the suit is restored
23 Declaratory Suit & Interim 24 Public Parks/Play Grounds &
Injunction Temporary Injunction
Against Conversion Thereof
25 Roadside Land & Injunction 26 Public Road & Injunction
Against Removal Of Against Removal Of
Encroachment Thereon Encroachment Thereon
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27 License of Tehbazari on 28 Injunction By Inferior Court
Roadsideland & Injunction against Restraining Judicial
Removal thereof Proceeding Before Superior
Court
29 Educational Institutions & 30 No Injunction If The
Temporary Injunctions--- Disputed Property Is Not
(A) Administration of Internal Identifiable
Affairs of University
(B) Declaration of Result of
Examination
(C) Revaluation of Answer Books
(D) Issue of Admit Card or
Appearance in Examination
(E) Admission in University
31 Co-owners & Temporary 32 Second Marriage &
Injunction--- Temporary Injunction
(A) Interference into Possession
of co-sharer by co-sharer
(B) Transfer/Eviction/Constructi
on/Demolition by co-owner
33 Child Marriage & Injunction by 34 Agreement for Sale &
Judicial Magistrate under the Temporary Injunction
Prohibition of Child Marriage Act,
2006
35 (A) Possession & injunction 36 Effect of Non-Impleadment
(B) Party in lawful possession of of Third Party Likely To
property Be Adversely Affected By
(C) Dispossession & Injunction Temporary Injunction
37 Trespasser When Claiming 38 Execution of Eviction
Temporary Injunction Against Decree & Injunction Suit By
True Owner of Property Third Party
39 Injunction against true owner of 40 (A) Contract of Personal
property Service & Temporary
Injunction
(B) Tender & T.I.
41 Damage to crops---T.I. not to be 42 Alteration/damage to
granted building by tenant &
injunction
43 Trademark & injunction 44 Public premises & injunction
against eviction therefrom
45 Sec. 229-B, 229-D, 331 of the 46 Cantonment Act, 1924 &
UPZA & LR Act, 1951 & The injunction
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Power of Civil Court to Grant
Injunction
47 Share Certificates & injunction 48 Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC &
Police Aid etc.
49 Exhibition of T.V. serial 50 Election & Temporary
Injunction
51 Grant of interim injunction during 52 Appeal against order
stay of proceedings of suit granting interim injunction
53 Revision u/s. 115 CPC against ex- 54 Religious matters &
parte injunction Injunction
55 Invoking Bank Guarantee & 56 Grant of temporary
Injunction injunction u/s. 151 CPC after
rejection of application for
interim injunction under
Order 39, Rule 1 & 2 CPC
57 Anti-Suit Injunction 58 Restraining public servant
from exercising his powers
59 Recovery Of Public Dues & Loans 60 (A) Disconnection of
From Financial Institutions Electricity & Injunction
(B) Bar of Sec. 145 of
Electricity Act, 2003
against grant of
Temporary Injunction
61 Extension of already discontinued 62 Discharge etc. of temporary
interim injunction/stay order injunction
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fault and that he himself was not responsible for bringing about the state of things
complained of and that he was not unfair or inequitable in his dealings with the
party against whom he is seeking relief. His conduct should be fair and honest.
These considerations will arise not only in respect of the person who seeks an
order of injunction u/o 39, r. 1 or 2 of the CPC, but also in respect of the party
approaching the Court for vacating the ad-interim or temporary injunction order
already granted in the pending suit or proceedings. See---
1. K.R. Jadeja vs. Maruti Corporation, 2009 (107) RD 265 (SC)
2. M. Gurudas vs. Rasaranjan, 2006 (65) ALR 331 (SC)
3. Transmission Corp. of A.P. Ltd. vs. Lanco Kondapalli Power (Pvt.) Ltd.,
(2006) 1 SCC 540
4. M/s. Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. vs. Coca Cola Company, AIR 1995 SC 2372
5. U.P. Avas Evam Vikash Parishad vs. N.V. Rajgopalan Acharya, AIR 1989 All
125 (D.B.)
(A) Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to
be established on evidence at the trial. Prima facie case is a substantial question
raised, bonafide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction
of court that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction.
The court has to further satisfy that non-interference by court would result in
“irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy
available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from
the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. “Irreparable injury”
however does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the
injury but means only that the injury must be material one, namely one that
cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition is
that the “balance of convenience” must be in favour of grant of interim
injunction. The court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should
exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief of
injury which is likely to be caused to the parties if the injunction is refused and
compare it with that it is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is
granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of
injury, the court considers that pending the suit, the subject matter should be
maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. See---
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1. Dalpat Kumar vs. Prahlad Singh, AIR 1993 SC 276
2. U.P. Avas Evam Vikash Parishad vs. N.V. Rajgopalan Acharya, AIR 1989
All 125 (D.B.)
3. Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes Vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira,
(2012) 5 SCC 370
Note: It was a suit for specific performance of agreement for sale which was
decreed by the trial court and sale deed was also executed by the executing court.
Thereafter a separate suit to set aside that decree was filed and during the pendency
of the suit, the High Court granted temporary injunction which was set aside by the
Supreme Court by holding that the High Court was not right in granting the
temporary injunction.
(B) The principle upon which injunction is granted is well settled. Party to the
litigation, who seeks an injunction, must satisfy the court that there is a serious
question to be tried at the hearing of the suit and every probability tilts in his
favour for the relief sought for i.e. prima facie is in his favour. However, at this
juncture it is made clear that prima facie case may not be confused in prima
facie success, but simply if there is serious question to be tried the test of
prima facie is satisfied and further court’s interference is necessary without
which a right accrued in favour of the party concerned, cannot be protected
from species of injury which is known as irreparable injury and comparative
mischief which is likely to cause in the absence of the injunction will be greater
and not compensiable, thus the balance of convenience also tilts in his favour,
Broadly these principles apply where injunction is sought by the party. See--- Smt.
Shefali Roy vs. Hero Jaswant Dass, AIR 1992 All 254 (D.B.)
(C) Mini trail of suit not permissible u/o 39, rule 1 & 2 CPC : Court should
not proceed for mini trial of the suit while granting or refusing an application u/o
39, rule 1 & 2 CPC. See : Amir Alam Khan Vs Lucknow Development
Authority, Lucknow, 2011 (29) LCD 1695 (All---DB)(LB)
3. Pre-conditions for grant of interim injunction u/s. 94 CPC r/w. Order
39, rule 1 & 2 CPC
(A) Before obtaining interim injunction u/s. 94 CPC r/w. Order 39, rule 1 and 2
CPC, the party must show following pre-conditions in his favour---
(i) Prima facie case
(ii) Irreparable injury
(iii) Balance of convenience
(iv) Bonafide conduct,
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See : Neon Laboratories Ltd. Vs. Medical Technologies Ltd.,
(2016) 2 SCC 672 (para 6).
(B) No interim injunction in the absence of prima facie case even if the
other requirements are fulfilled--- Interim injunction u/o. 39, rule 1 & 2 CPC
cannot be granted when the party is unable to prove prima facie case in his favour
even if such party makes out a case of balance of convenience and irreparable
injury. See--- Kashi Math Samsthan vs. Shrimad Sudhindra Thirtha Swamy,
AIR 2010 SC 296
(C) Merit not to be adjudicated at interim stage : At the interim stage of
proceedings, issues touching upon merits of the case cannot be adjudicated . See :
Prasar Bharti Vs. Board of Control for Cricket in India, (2015) 6 SCC 614.
(D) Party seeking interim injunction in property must show proprietary
interest in subject matter of dispute : Ordinarily, a party seeking interim
injunction under Order 39, rule 1 & 2 CPC must have proprietary interest in the
subject matter of dispute. See : Margaret Almeida Vs. Bombay Catholic Co-
operative Society Limited, (2013) 6 SCC 538
(A) Equitable conduct of the party must for temporary injunction--- U/o 39
of the CPC, jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with an order of interlocutory or
temporary injunction is purely equitable and, therefore, the Court, on being
approached, will, apart from other considerations, also look to the conduct of the
party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, and may refuse to interfere unless his
conduct was free from blame. Since the relief is wholly equitable in nature, the
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party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court has to show that he himself was not at
fault and that he himself was not responsible for bringing about the state of things
complained of and that he was not unfair or inequitable in his dealings with the
party against whom he was seeking relief. His conduct should be fair and honest.
These considerations will arise not only in respect of the person who seeks an
order of injunction u/o 39, r. 1 or 2 of the CPC, but also in respect of the party
approaching the Court for vacating the ad-interim or temporary injunction order
already granted in the pending suit or proceedings. See--- M/s. Gujarat Bottling
Co. Ltd. vs. Coca Cola Company, AIR 1995 SC 2372
(B) Falsehoods etc.---In the case of falsehood and fraud by a party to a litigation,
Court has inherent power to protect itself and further stop the perpetuation of
fraud. Nicety of law and the Court’s reception to it are for those who come clean.
Such parties may seek redressal of their actionable claims and the academics of
legal or statutory interpretations. Parties harbouring falsehoods and deceit are to be
shown the door out of Court. This is for the protection of the Court. Otherwise, the
people will be loosing faith in public justice system when in the case of fraud the
Courts will listen to judicial polemics. Thus, notwithstanding anything contained in
Order 39,Rule 2 of the CPC as applicable in U.P., let no person indulge in
falsehood and fraud and then say that a Court will not protect itself under its
inherent powers by passing such orders as may be deemed necessary. See---
Naresh Chandra vs. District Magistrate, Nainital, AIR 1990 All 188
(C) Conduct of Plaintiff & Temporary Injunction---Equitable relief of
Injunction cannot be granted to plaintiff guilty of inequitable conduct. Note– In
this case, the plaintiff had abused process of law by instituting different cases at
different fora to evade his eviction under orders from lower court to High Court
and had ultimately filed an injunction suit against his eviction just to frustrate the
eviction decree. See--- Kauchusthabam Satyanarayana vs. Namuduri
Atchutramayya, 2005 (2) AWC 1239 (SC).
(D) In case of fraud, concealment of material facts or misrepresentation etc.,
temporary injunction is to be refused even if all the three ingredients are
fulfilled--- No interim injunction can be granted in favour a party concealing from
court some material facts, playing fraud and misrepresentations etc. even if all the
three legally required conditions for grant of interim injunctions (prima facie case,
balance of convenience & irreparable loss) are fulfilled and if already granted, the
same should be vacated by the court. See---
1. The National Textile Corporation U.P. Ltd. vs. Swadeshi Cotton Mills
Ltd., 1987 ALJ 1266 (All—D.B.)
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2. Shivnath vs. District Judge, Nainital, 1991 AWC 30 (All)
3. Naresh Chandra vs. D.M., Nainital, AIR 1990 All 188
(E) Misleading the court--- Where the plaintiff in the suit for injunction against
defendants restraining them from interfering with the construction of wall in a
passage, obtained an ex-parte interim injunction wrongly by misleading the Court
in as much as the Sale deed on the basis of which the plaintiff claimed ownership
of the suit property was not placed before the Court and the defendants were not
heard before passing the order of interim injunction, and after obtaining the order
the plaintiff completed the construction of the wall and then applied for withdrawal
of the suit and prayed for dismissal of injunction application as not pressed, the
order passed by Court u/s. 151 CPC for demolition of wall would be justified even
if Sec. 144 CPC is not applicable, Sec. 151 CPC is there to undo the wrong done
by the Court on being satisfied that the order was passed on being misled by the
party. See--- Rakesh Singhal vs. Vth ADJ, Bulandshhar, AIR 1990 All 12
(F) Delayed request for interim injunction--- It will be inequitable conduct on
the part of the party who seeks the relief of interim injunction after much delay and
the grant of the interim injunction would not be proper. Grant of injunction is an
equitable relief. A person who had kept quiet for a long time and allowed an other
person to deal with the property exclusively, ordinarily would not be entitled to an
order of injunction. See—
1. K.R. Jadeja vs. Maruti Corporation, 2009 (107) RD 265 (SC)
2. Sheoraj vs M/s Accord Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., 2011 (2) ALJ
501(All)(DB)
(A) The object of the interlocutory injunction is, to protect the plaintiff against
injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated
in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour
at the trial. See--- Zenit Mataplast P. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra, 2009(6)
Supreme 584
(B) Distinction between power of court to grant injunction u/s. 94 CPC r/w.
O. 39, r. 1 & 2 CPC & u/s. 151 CPC---- CPC has been divided into sections and
rules under various orders. Sections create jurisdiction of the court while rules
indicate manner in which jurisdiction is to be exercised. Power to grant injunction
u/s. 94 CPC can be exercised only if the circumstances under Order 39, Rule 1 & 2
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CPC are existing. Even if in a given case, circumstances do not fall within the
ambit of Order 39 CPC, the courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary
injunction u/s. 151 CPC if the court is of the opinion that interest of justice requires
issue of such interim injunction. See--- Vareed Jacob vs. Sosamma Geevarghese,
(2004) 6 SCC 378
7(A). Power of court to grant injunction u/s. 151 CPC
Even if in a given case, circumstances do not fall within the ambit of Order
39 CPC, the courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunction u/s. 151
CPC if the court is of the opinion that interest of justice requires issue of such
interim injunction. See---
1. Vareed Jacob vs. Sosamma Geevarghese, (2004) 6 SCC 378
2. State of Maharashtra vs. Admane Anita Moti, AIR 1995 SC 350
3. Shiv Ram Singh vs. Smt. Mangara, 1988 ALJ 1516 (All)
4. Ram Chand & Sons Sugar Mills vs. Kanhyalal Bhargava, AIR 1966 SC 1899
5. Manohar Lal Chopra vs. Ram Bahadur Rao, AIR 1962 SC 527
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(iii) Sec. 151 CPC cannot be invoked when there is express provision
under which relief can be claimed by the aggrieved party.
(iv) Inherent powers of court u/s. 151 CPC are in addition to the powers
specifically conferred on the court.”
(B-2) Writ Petition under Article 226 not to be entertained when alternative
remedy by way of civil suit or proceeding under 145 CrPC is available: In the
case noted below, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was
filed before the High Court seeking relief of possession over the disputed flat. The
Supreme Court held that remedy to the petitioner was available before the civil
court in the form of a civil suit or before the criminal court u/s 145 CrPC and the
extraordinary jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
could not have been invoked by the petitioner. See: Roshina T. Vs. Abdul Azeez
K.T., AIR 2019 SC 659.
(C) A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court has held in the case of Satya
Prakash Tiwari vs. Civil Judge (J.D.), Etawah, 2006 (62) ALR 431 (All—D.B.)
that powers u/s. 151 CPC cannot be invoked to deal with an application for which
there is a statutory provision and temporary injunction in that event can be granted
u/o. 39, r. 1 & 2 CPC and not u/s. 151 CPC.
(D) Interim injunction in representative suit : Where interim relief in the form
of interim injunction under Order 39, rule 1 & 2 CPC is likely to affect large
number of persons but the suit was not filed in representative capacity, it has been
held by the Supreme Court that there was need for plaintiffs to at least constitute
simple majority of affected persons. See : Margaret Almeida Vs. Bombay
Catholic Co-operative Society Limited, (2013) 6 SCC 538
8. Affidavit Sufficient For Grant Of Temporary Injunction
For temporary injunctions u/o. 39, r. 1 & 2 CPC, plaintiff can prove the three
ingredients, i.e. (1) Prima facie case, (2) Balance of convenience, and (3)
irreparable injury on affidavits. The power given to courts to act on affidavits is not
subject to the provisions of Order 19, r. 1 & 2 CPC. See--- Satya Prakash vs. Ist
ADJ, Etawah, AIR 2002 All 198
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(1) whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensue to the plaintiff;
(2) whether the refusal of ex-parte injunction would involve greater
injustice than the grant of it would involve;
(3) the court will also consider the time at which the plaintiff first had
notice of the act complained of so that the making of improper order
against a party in his absence is prevented;
(4) the court will consider whether the plaintiff had acquiesced for some
time and in such circumstances it will not grant ex-parte injunction;
(5) the court would expect a party applying for ex-parte injunction to
show utmost good faith in making the application;
(6) even if granted, the ex-parte injunction would be for a limited period
of time;
(7) general principles like prima facie case, balance of convenience and
irreparable loss would also be considered by the court. See---
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Issuing direction to maintain status quo in relation to the disputed property is
a well-known method and the usual order made during the pendency of a dispute
for preserving the property and protecting the interest of the true owner till the
adjudication is made. A change in the existing situation is fraught with the danger
of prejudicing the rights of the true owner, yet to be determined as the maintenance
of status quo during the pendency of the suit is necessary so that the disputed
property can be handed over to its true owner found entitled to it after decision of
the suit. See--- M. Ismail Faruqui vs. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 605 (Five
Judge Constitution Bench)—Known as Ram Janma Bhumi & Babri Masjid
dispute at Ayoddhya.
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Recording of reasons is must for grant of ex-parte temporary injunction.
See---
1. Shiv Kumar Chaddha vs. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi,(1993) 3 SCC 161
2. Road Flying Carrier vs. The General Electric Company of India Ltd., AIR 1990
All 134 (D.B.)
(A) An interim or interlocutory order ought not to be made beyond the scope of
the suit nor against the parties who are not before the court. See---
1. Ritona Consultancy Pvt. Ltd. vs. Lohia Jute Press, (2001) 3 SCC 68
2. Sree Jain Swetambar Terapanthi vs. Phundan Singh, (1999) 2 SCC 377
(B) Relief larger than claimed not to be granted--- A relief larger than the one
claimed by plaintiff in the suit cannot be granted by court. See---
(i) Meena Chaudhary Vs. Commissioner of Delhi Police, (2015) 2 SCC 156.
(ii) Rajendra Tewary vs. Basudeo Prasad, 2002 (46) ALR 222 (SC)
(C) T.I. not to be granted beyond the terms of the prayer for permanent
injunction--- Temporary injunction u/o 39, r. 1 & 2 CPC can be granted on the
term of the prayer for permanent injunction in the suit and not on different terms. If
the plaintiff did not pray for permanent injunction in the plaint, he cannot seek
temporary injunction on the same terms by means of application. See---
(i) Meena Chaudhary Vs. Commissioner of Delhi Police, (2015) 2 SCC 156.
(ii) V.D. Tripathi vs. Vijai Shanker Dwivedi, AIR 1976 All 97
14. Interim relief not to be granted if final relief in the same terms cannot
be granted
(Sec. 38 & 41 of the S.R. Act, 1963 r/w. Or. 39, rule 2, sub-rule 2, U.P.
Amendment, proviso, clause (a) CPC)
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injunction can be granted by court if the final relief in the same terms cannot be
granted. See--- Dilip Kumar vs. Spl. Judge, Barabanki, 1992 (10) LCD 13
(All—L.B.)
15
Order 39, Rules 1 & 2 CPC. See: State of Jharkhand Vs. Surendra
Kumar Srivastava, AIR 2019 SC 231.
(Sec. 39, Specific Relief Act, 1963 r/w. Sec. 94 & Order 39, Rule 1 & 2 CPC)
An interim mandatory injunction which virtually grants final relief asked for
in the plaint cannot be granted at the interim stage. See---
1. State of U.P. vs. Ram Sukhi Debi, 2005 (25) AIC 328 (SC)
2. Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs. Bombay Environmental
Action Group, (2005) 5 SCC 61
3. Dattaraj vs. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 1 SCC 590
4. B. Singh vs. Union of India, (2004) 3 SCC 363
5. Deoraj vs. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 4 SCC 697
6. Union of India vs. Modilutf Ltd., (2003) 6 SCC 65
7. State of U.P. vs. Vishweshar, 1995 (suppl.) 3 SCC 590
8. Bharatbhushan vs. Abdul Khalik, 1995 (suppl.) 2 SCC 593
9. Shiv Shankar vs. Board of Directors, 1995 (suppl.) 2 SCC 726
10. Commissioner vs. Ashok Kumar Kohli, JT 1995 (8) SC 403
11. Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund vs. Kartickdas, (1994) 4 SCC 225
12. Assistant Collector vs. Dunlop India Ltd., 1985 (1) SCC 260
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Interim relief or interim order which virtually grants final relief in the case,
cannot be granted. See---
1. Indore Development Authority vs. Mangal Amusement Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2011 SC 199.
2. Union of India vs. Modilutf Ltd., (2003) 6 SCC 65.
18(C). Plaintiff alone, and not the defendant, can maintain application for T.I.
under clauses (b) & (c) of o. 39, r. 1 CPC
The relief under Order 39, Rule 1(b) and (c) is available only to the plaintiff
and the defendant cannot maintain an application for the said reliefs in a suit filed
by the plaintiff, irrespective of the fact that his right to such relief arises either
from the same cause of action or a cause of action that arises subsequent to filing
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of the suit. However, it is open to the defendant to maintain a separate suit against
the plaintiff and seek relief provided under Order 39, Rule 1(b) and (c) of the
Code. See--- Smt. Shakunthalamma & Others Vs. Smt. Kanthamma & Others,
AIR 2015 Karnataka 13 (Full Bench).
19. Consequences of non-disposal of injunction
application on merits within 30 days from the
date of grant of ex-parte ad-interim injunction
(Order 39, Rule 3-A CPC has been omitted in the State of U.P. vide
Allahabad High Court’s Notification No. 103/IV-h-360, dated 3.2.1981)
18
(E) Limitation & T.I.
(F) Resjudicata & T.I.
(G) Non impleadment of party
19
evidence is required to be led. Evidence of a formal nature even with regard to a
preliminary issue has to be led because these issues would either create a bar in
accordance with law inforce or they are jurisdictional issues. See---
1. Hari Das vs. Usha Rani Banik, (2006) 4 SCC 78
2. Pandurang Dhoni Chougule vs. Maruti Hari Jadhav, AIR 1966 SC 153 (Five
Judge Bench)= (1966) 1 SCR 102.
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(B) Restoration of Writ Petition and revival of interim order passed therein
: Relying upon the case of Vareed Jacob vs. Sosamma Geevarghese, (2004)
6 SCC 378, the Lucknow Bench of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court has
held as under .....
"This Court has taken note of the fact that the writ petition was
dismissed in default on 4.02.2004 and within four days i.e. on 08.02.2004,
an application for restoration was submitted by the learned Counsel for
the petitioner No. 1 which remained pending for about two years and
ultimately on 27.09.2006, the said restoration application was allowed and
the writ petition was restored to its original number. The writ petition was
restored in toto. Applying the principle of law laid down by Hon'ble the
Supreme Court of India (Three Judges Bench) in the case of Vareed
Jacob (supra), this Court is also of the view that after restoration of the
writ petition, the interim order granted by a Division Bench of this Court
on 30.09.1985 has become operative and the petitioner ought to have been
allowed to continue as Principal of the Institution immediately after
27.09.2006".(Para 27). Kindly see... Mrs. Saroj Chaudhary Vs. State of
UP, 2007 (25) LCD 765 (Lucknow Bench).
(C) Temporary injunction not to be granted unless the suit is restored---
Where the suit wherein temporary injunction was granted, was dismissed in
default and during the pendency of proceedings of the restoration
application, an application for grant of temporary injunction was made, it
has been held by the Allahabad High Court that no temporary injunction can
be granted unless the suit is restored as the temporary injunction can be
issued only in suit and not after the disposal of the suit. See---
1. Jagdhari vs. Vth ADJ, Azamgarh, 1992 AWC 1152 (All)
2. Mohammad Ibrahim Khan vs. Pateshari Prasad Singh, AIR 1960 All
252 (D.B.)
(D) Writ petition under Article 227 against refusal of interim injunction
maintainable: A writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
against an order passed by the Civil Court refusing to grant interim
injunction under Order 39, Rules 1 & 2 CPC is maintainable. See: State of
Jharkhand Vs. Surendra Kumar Srivastava, AIR 2019 SC 231.
(E) Writ Petition under Article 226 not to be entertained when alternative
remedy by way of civil suit or proceeding under 145 CrPC is available:
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In the case noted below, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India was filed before the High Court seeking relief of possession over the
disputed flat. The Supreme Court held that remedy to the petitioner was
available before the civil court in the form of a civil suit or before the
criminal court u/s 145 CrPC and the extraordinary jurisdiction of High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution could not have been invoked by
the petitioner. See: Roshina T. Vs. Abdul Azeez K.T., AIR 2019 SC 659.
22
23. Declaratory Suit & Interim Injunction
(A) In a suit for mere declaration, no ad-interim injunction can be granted. See---
- Mohammad Ibrahim Khan vs. Pateshwari Prasad Singh, AIR 1960
Allahabad 252 (D.B.)
(B) In the case noted below, the Supreme Court has held that in a suit for
declaration of title simpliciter, the court has power under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2
CPC or even in Section 151 CPC to grant ad-interim injunction pending suit. See--
-(i) Ramji Rai Vs. Jagdish Mallah, AIR 2007 SC 900
(ii) Smt. Rajnibai vs. Smt. Kamla Devi, 1996 All. CJ. 225 (SC)
(C) A suit for decree of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from
interfering with the possession of plaintiff without seeking relief of declaration of
title is maintainable and interim injunction can be granted in such suits. See---
Corporation of City of Bangalore vs. M. Papaiah, AIR 1989 SC 1809
(D) Declaration of title alongwith injunction when necessary?---In a suit for
injunction, claming the relief of declaration of title when or when not would be
necessary, has been clarified by the Supreme Court (in the case noted below) as
under---
a. Where a cloud is raised over plaintiff’s title and he does not have possession,
a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential
injunction, is the remedy. Where the plaintiff’s title is not in dispute or under
a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession with a
consequential injunction. Where there is merely an interference with
plaintiff’s lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue
for an injunction simpliciter.
b. As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only with possession
normally the issue of title will not be directly and substantially in issue. The
prayer for injunction will be decided with reference to the finding on
possession. But in cases where dejure possession has to be established on the
basis of title to the property, as in the case of vacant sites, the issue of title
may directly and substantially arise for consideration, as without a finding
thereon, it will not be possible to decide the issue of possession.
23
c. But a finding on title cannot be recorded in a suit for injunction, unless there
are necessary pleadings and appropriate issue regarding title [ either specific
or implied as noticed an Annaimuthu Thevar (Supra)]. Where the averments
regarding title are absent in a plaint and where there is no issue relating to
title, the court will not investigate or examine or render a finding on a
question of title in a suit for injunction. Even where there are necessary
pleadings and issue, if the matter involves complicated questions of fact and
law relating to title, the court will relegate the parties to the remedy by way
of comprehensive suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in
a suit for mere injunction.
d. Where there are necessary pleadings regarding title, and appropriate issue
relating to title on which parties lead evidence, if the matter involved is
simple and straight forward the court may decide upon the issue regarding
title, even in a suit for injunction. But such cases, are the exception to the
normal rule that question of title will not be decided in suits for injunction.
But persons having clear title and possession suing for injunction, should not
be driven to the costlier and more cumbersome remedy of a suit for
declaration, merely because some meddler vexatious or wrongfully makes a
claim or tries to encroach upon his property. The Court should use its
discretion carefully to identify cases where it will enquire into title and cases
where it will refer plaintiff to a more comprehensive declaratory suit,
depending upon the facts of the case. See--- Anathula Sudhakar Vs. P.
Buchi Reddy, 2008(2) AWC 1768 (SC)
Forests, tanks, ponds, hillocks and mountains etc., held, are nature's
bounty. They help maintain the delicate ecological balance and need to be
protected for that reason. The High Court proceeded to hold that considering
the report of the SDO the area of 10 biswas only could be allotted and the
remaining five biswas of land which have still the character of a pond, could
not be allotted. It is difficult to sustain the impugned order of the High
Court. There is a concurrent finding that a pond exists and the area covered
by it varies in the rainy season. In such a case no part of it could have been
allotted to anybody for the purpose of house building or any allied purposes.
The material resources of the community like forests, tanks, ponds, hillock,
mountain etc. are nature's bounty. They maintain delicate ecological balance.
24
They need to be protected for a proper and healthy environment which
enables people to enjoy a quality life which is the essence of the guaranteed
right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The government, including the
Revenue Authorities i.e. Respondents 11 to 13, having noticed that a pond is
falling in disuse, should have bestowed their attention on developing the
same which would, on one hand, have prevented ecological disaster and on
the other provided better environment for the benefit of the public at large.
Such vigil is the best protection against knavish attempts to seek allotment of
non-abadi sites. Natural resources, Conservation of--Water bodies/resources-
-Artificial tanks--Preservation of--Right to--Entitlement to--Held, though
natural water storage resources must be protected and restored if fallen in
disuse, this principle cannot be applied in relation to artificial tanks--Tank in
question not a natural one--Only rain water could be collected in it--It was in
a dilapidated condition for a long time and had been used as a dumping yard
and sewage collection pond--No shortage of water in village where said tank
existed--Held, it was not a case where resurrection of said tank should be
directed--However, direction made to State and Gram Panchayat to see that
other tanks in or around the village were properly maintained, there was no
water shortage and ecology was preserved. See :
1. Hinch Lal Tiwari Vs. Kamla Devi & Others, (2001) 6 SCC 496
2. Susetha Vs. State of T.N. & Others, (2006) 6 SCC 543
3. Intellectuals Forum Vs. State of A.P., (2006) 3 SCC 549
4. Animal and Environment Legal Defence Fund Vs. Union of India, AIR
1997 SC 1071=(1997) 3 SCC 549
5. M.C. Mehta (Badkhal and Surajkund Lakes Matter) Vs. Union of
India, (1997) 3 SCC 715.
6. People United for Better Living in Calcutta Vs. State of W.B., AIR
1993 Cal 215
7. T.N. Godavarman Thirwulpad (99) Vs. Union of India, (2006) 5 SCC 47
8. L. Krishnan Vs. State of T.N., AIR 2005 Mad 311
9. Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd (3) Vs. Bombay Environment Action
Group, (2006) 3 SCC 434
25
constructions upon public parks, play grounds, stadium etc. and any such illegal
constructions thereon can be ordered by the court to be dismantled. See---
1. D.D. Vyas vs. Ghaziabad Development Authority, 1993 All. LJ 86 (All)(D.B.)
2. Bangalore Medical Trust vs. B.S. Mudappa, AIR 1991 SC 1902
3. Arun Kumar vs. Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad, 1987 All. LJ 1038 (D.B.)
4. Ram Das Shenoy vs. Chief Officers, Town Municipal Council Udipi, AIR
1974 SC 2177
The Constitution does not put an absolute embargo on the deprivation of life
of personal liberty but such a deprivation must be according to the procedure in the
given circumstances fair and reasonable. To become fair, just and reasonable, it
would not be enough that the procedure prescribed in law is a formality. It must be
26
pragmatic and realistic one to meet the given fact-situation. No inflexible rule of
hearing and due application of mind can be insisted upon in every or all cases.
Each case depends upon its own backdrop. The removal of encroachment needs
urgent action. But in this behalf what requires to be done by the competent
authority is to ensure constant vigil on encroachment of the public places. Sooner
the encroachment is removed when sighted, better would be the facilities or
convenience for passing or re-passing of the pedestrians on the pavements or
footpaths facilitating free flow of regulated traffic on the road or use of public
places. On the contrary, the longer the delay, the greater will be the danger of
permitting the encroachers claiming semblance of right to obstruct removal of the
encroachment. If the encroachment is of a recent origin the need to follow the
procedure of principle of natural justice could be obviated in that no one has a right
to encroach upon the public property and claim the procedure of opportunity, of
hearing which would be a tardious and time-consuming process leading to putting
a premium for high-handed and unauthorised acts of encroachment and unlawful
squatting. On the other hand, if the Municipal Corporation allows settlement of
encroachers for a long time for reasons best known to them and reasons are not far
to seek then necessarily a modicum of reasonable notice for removal, say two
weeks or 10 days, and personal service on the encroachers or substituted service by
fixing notice on the property is necessary. If the encroachment is not removed
within the specified time, the competent authority would be at liberty to have it
removed. That would meet the fairness of procedure and principle of giving
opportunity to remove the encroachment voluntarily by the encroachers. On their
resistance, necessarily appropriate and reasonable force can be used to have the
encroachment removed. See : Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Vs. Nawab
Khan Gulab Khan, AIR 1997 SC 152 (Para 9)
27
Before Superior Court
Court has no jurisdiction either u/s 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 or
u/s 151 CPC to grant temporary injunction restraining a person from instituting
any proceeding which such person is otherwise entitled to institute in a court not
subordinate to that from which the temporary injunction is sought. If final relief
asked for cannot be granted, the temporary injunction can hardly be granted. See--
- Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. vs. United Industrial Bank Ltd., AIR 1983
SC 1272.
28
Council for ISCE, New Delhi vs. District Judge, Agra, 1999 (35) ALR 221
(All)
(E) Admission in University (Or. 39, rule 2, sub-rule 2, U.P. Amendment,
proviso, clause (h) CPC):- In view of the alternative remedy for agitating the
matter before the Chancellor u/s. 68 of the U.P. Universities Act, 1973, injunction
to grant admission can not be issued. See---Satyaprakash Singh vs. Vice-
Chancellor, Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Vishwavidhalaya, Agra, AIR 1998 All
66.
30. No Injunction If The Disputed
Property Is Not Identifiable
In view of the provisions under Order 7, Rule 3 CPC & Order 20 Rule 9
CPC, injunction cannot be granted if the disputed immovable property is not
identifiable. See--- Smt. Phoolmati Devi vs. ManikLal, 2005 (2) AWC 1823
(All—LB)
29
the appellant and his father as surviving joint tenants came to own the entire
property. Under as agreement the appellant and his father, agreed to hold the
same as tenants in common, each having as equal undivided share therein so
that each can disposal of his undivided share in the property. Subsequently the
appellant’s father transferred his undivided half share in the suit property
infavour of his another son. Thus the appellant and his brother came to hold and
equal undivided one half share each, as tenants in common in respect of the said
property. Appellants brother died intestate. His widow and his two minor sons
sold their undivided one-half share in he said property to the vendee. The
appellant filed a suit against vendors i.e. his brother wife and her sons u/s 33 of
TP Act. The suit was filed on the ground that the suit property was a dwelling
house belonging to an undivided family, that there has not been any division of
the said property at any time, that the appellant-plaintiff and his deceased
brother during his lifetime were for convenience occupying different portions,
the plaintiff occupying the first floor while the deceased brother was occupying
the ground floor. After the death of brother his wife and sons continue to be in
occupation of that portion which was in the occupation of brother. In the
circumstances the vendee a stranger to the family has no right to have joint
possession or common enjoyment of the property alongwith the plaintiff on the
basis of the purchase of the undivided share. On this ground the appellant-
plaintiff claimed the suit property he has also claimed the interim injunction
restraining the vendors from parting with possession of the said property or any
part thereof and/or inducting the vendee into the suit property or any part or
portion thereof and a similar injunction restraining the vendee from entering
into or taking possession and/or remaining in possession or enjoyment of the
suit property or part thereof.
Held, that some notions of coparcenary property of a Hindu joint family
which may not be quite accurate in considering Section 44 but what is relevant
for the purpose of these proceedings was whether the selling house belonged to
an undivided family. Even if the family is divided in status in the sense that
they were holding the property as tenants in common but undivided qua the
property that is the property had not been divided by metes and bounds it would
be within the provisions of Section 44 of the Act. In the absence of a document
evidencing partition of absence of a document evidencing partition of the suit
house by metes and bounds and on the documentary evidence showing that the
property was held by the appellant and his brother in equal undivided shares, it
could be said that the plaintiff-appellant has shown a primafacie case that the
30
dwelling house belonged to an undivided family consisting of himself and his
brother. Primafacie, therefore, the transfer by the vendee would come within the
mischief of second paragraph of Sec.44.
While Sec. 44 does not give a transferee of a dwelling hould belonging to an
undivided family a right to joint possession and confer a corresponding right on
the other members of the family to deny the right to joint possession to a
stranger transferee, Sec.4 of the Partition Act gives a right to a member of the
family who has not transferred his share to purchase the transferee’s share on a
value to be fixed in accordance with law when the transferee filed a suit for
partition. Both theses are valuable rights to the members of the undivided
family whatever may be the object or purpose for which they were conferred on
the right to joint possession is denied to a transferee in order to prevent a
transferee who is an outsider from forcing his way into a dwelling house in
which the other members of his transferee’s family have a right to live. In
considered to be illegal and the only right of the stranger purchaser is to sue for
partition. All these considerations would go only to show that denying an
injunction against a transferee in such cases would primafacie cause irreparable
injury to the other members of the family. See---Dorab Cawasji Warden Vs.
Coomi Sorab Warden, AIR 1990 SC 867.
(D)Undivided share of co-parcener can be transferred but possession
cannot be handedover to him---An undivided share of co-parcener can be
transferred but possession cannot be handed over to vendee unless the property
is partitioned by metes and bounds either by decree of court in partition suit or
by settlement among co-sharers. See---
1. Gajara Vishnu Gosavi Vs. Prakash Nanasahed Kamble, 2010 (2)
SCCD 1105 (SC)
2. Ramdas Vs. Sitabai, JT 2009(8) SC 224
3. M.V.S. Manikayala Rao Vs Narasimhaswami, AIR 1966 SC 470
4. Sidheshwar Mukherjee Vs, Bhubneshwar Prasad Narain Sing, AIR
1953 SC 487
(E) Interim injunction against transfer of immovable property can be
granted : Interim injunction against transfer of immovable property can be granted
by the court u/o 39, Rule 1 CPC. See : Paras Nath Singh Vs Smt. Sirtaji
Kunwari, 2012 (117) RD 143 (All-LB).
(F) Where parties were co-sharers and no suit for partition must filed by the
31
plaintiff brother and the plaintiff was not exercising ownership rights on suit
property, it has been held that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of
injunction restraining defendant from raising construction on property. See...
Sheoraj Vs. M/s Accord Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., 2011 (2) ALJ
501(All)(DB)
32(A). Suit for declaration of matrimonial status maintainable before
Family Court and not before Civil Court :
General law in CPC i.e. Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC can be resorted to, even
ex-parte, to restrain party from contracting or performing void Act, i.e., second
marriage as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, though being a special statute, does not
provide for grant of interim injunction. See--- Km. Kirti Sharma vs. Civil Judge
(Senior Division), Etah, 2005 (2) AWC 1741 (All).
The Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 has been repealed since 11.1.2007
and the new Act “The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006” has come into
force since 11.1.2007. Under the 2006 Act, “child” means a person who, if a male,
has not completed 21 years of age and if a female, has not completed 18 years of
age. U/s. 13 of The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, a Judicial Magistrate
or Metropolitan Magistrate, on an application of the Child Marriage Prohibition
Officer or on receipt of an information through a complaint or otherwise from any
person, is competent to issue injunction restraining the solemnization of child
marriage. In case of any urgency, the Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan
Magistrate can issue an interim injunction without giving any notice to the
opposite parties.
32
34(A). Agreement for Sale & Temporary Injunction
33
(D) Where the party was in possession of the immovable property on the basis of
sale certificate issued by court in execution of decree, it has been held that the
possession of the party cannot be said to be that of a trespasser and injunction
cannot be granted against such party in possession. See--- Anand Prasad
Agarwalla vs. Tarkeshwar Prasad, AIR 2001 SC 2367
(E) Possession when must for injunction ?--- As a suit for injunction simpliciter
is concerned only with possession normally the issue of title will not be directly
and substantially in issue. The prayer for injunction will be decided with reference
to the finding on possession. But in cases where dejure possession has to be
established on the basis of title to the property, as in the case of vacant sites, the
issue of title may directly and substantially arise for consideration, as without a
finding thereon, it will not be possible to decide the issue of possession. See---
Anathula Sudhakar Vs. P. Buchi Reddy, 2008(2) AWC 1768 (SC)
(F) No injunction to watchman/care taker/agent/servant being persons in
gratuitous possession/permissive possession against dispossession by owner of
the premises : Suit for injunction by watchman/care taker/agent/servant being
persons in gratuitous possession/permissive possession against dispossession by
owner of the premises is not maintainable. Such person holds property on behalf
of principal (owner) and acquires no right or interest therein irrespective of long
possession. Protection of courts can be granted or extended only to a person who
has valid subsisting rent agreement, lease agreement or license agreement in his
favour. See : A. Shanmugam Vs. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu
Madalya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam, (2012) 6 SCC 430.
34
If a third party whose interest is to be adversely affected by the grant of
injunction is not impleaded as party to suit or in the application for interim
injunction, the application for interim injunction would not be maintainable and no
injunction can be granted by court in the event of such non-impleadment. See---
Mashkoor Hasan Khan Vs. Zila Parishad, Muzaffar Nagar, 1977 AWC 640
(All –D.B.)
35
owner of the property has been held by the Supreme Court as improper. See---
Hanumanthappa vs. Muninarayanappa, 1997 (29) ALR 392 (SC)
39(B). Pendente lite transfers
Pendente lite transfers not to affect the rights of parties specially of
plaintiff : It was brought to our notice that during the pendency of this litigation,
some more transactions took place in relation to the suit house. Suffice it to say,
such transactions are directly hit by the principle of lis pendens, as contemplated
under Section 52 of the TP Act and, therefore, it is of no consequence so far as this
litigation is concerned. In In other words these transactions are not binding on the
parties to the lis much less on the plaintiff. Such parties would be, therefore, at a
liberty to now work out their inter se rights in accordance with law as a fall out of
this judgment. See : Nadiminti Suryanarayan Murthy (Dead) through Legal
Representatives Vs. Kothurthi Krishna Bhaskara Rao & Others, (2017) 9
SCC 622 (para 32)
(A) An Employee of a private company cannot seek injunction under Order 39,
Rule 1&2 CPC against his suspension as no civil suit is maintainable in relation to
a contract of personal service not enforceable u/s. 14(b) of the Specific Relief Act,
1963. See--- Mahesh Chand Tyagi vs. Auric Styles Private Ltd., 1997 (29)
ALR 258 (All)
(B) Tender & Temporary Injunction--- Where in a suit there were strong
circumstances to show that the plaintiff was not competitively sound to make
competitive offer, it has been held that it was a good ground for not awarding
contract to him as no prima facie case was made out in favour of the plaintiff and
court was justified in not granting injunction in favour of the plaintiff. See---
Vikura Industries vs. G.M. Ordinance Factory, Kanpur, 2000 (3) AWC 2/31
(NOC) (All)
36
& 2 or u/s. 151 CPC cannot be granted against running of the brick kiln. See—
Subhash Satya vs. Ram Narain, AIR 1994 All 120 (LB)
45(A). The Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 (UP Act No. 8 of 2012)
The UPZA & LR Act, 1950 and the UP Land Revenue Act, 1901 and 30
other Acts relating to the lands and land revenue etc. in UP have now been
37
repealed by "The Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006" (UP Act No. 8 of 2012) =
mRrj izns'k jktLo lafgrk] 2006-
As per Section 1(3) of "The Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006", the said
Code shall come into force on such date as the State Government may, by
notification, appoint and different dates may be appointed for different areas or
for different provisions of this Code. The Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006
has been assented to by the President of India on 29.11.2012 under Article 201
of the Constitution. "The Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006" has come into
force vide UP Government's Notification No. -1044/79-V-1-12-1(ka)33/06,
Lucknow : dated December 12, 2012.
45(B).Sec. 229-B, 229-D, 331 of the UPZA & LR Act, 1950 &
The Power of Civil Court to Grant Injunction
Note : The UPZA & LR Act, 1950 and the UP Land Revenue Act, 1901
and 30 other Acts relating to the lands and land revenue etc. in UP have now
been repealed by "The Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006" (UP Act No. 8 of
2012) = mRrj izns'k jktLo lafgrk] 2006-
As per Section 1(3) of "The Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006", the said
Code shall come into force on such date as the State Government may, by
notification, appoint and different dates may be appointed for different areas or
for different provisions of this Code. The Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006
has been assented to by the President of India on 29.11.2012 under Article 201
of the Constitution. "The Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006" has come into
force vide UP Government's Notification No. -1044/79-V-1-12-1(ka)33/06,
Lucknow : dated December 12, 2012.
If the name of the plaintiff is not recorded as tenure holder of the agricultural
land in the revenue records and question of declaration of title is involved, the
jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain injunction suit and grant interim
injunction would be barred u/s. 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land
Reforms Act, 1951 as the civil court cannot direct for the expunction or correction
of the entries in revenue records and the same can be done only by the revenue
courts. The remedy of the plaintiff in respect of the agricultural land under such
facts and circumstances would be a suit for declaration of title before the revenue
court u/s. 229-B of the UPZA & LR Act, 1951 and interim injunction can also be
granted by the revenue court u/s. 229-D of the that Act. But where the name of the
plaintiff is recorded in the revenue records as tenure holder of the agricultural land
and no question of declaration of title is involved, the plaintiff can institute a suit in
civil court for injunction against the defendant for restraining him from transferring
38
the land, interfering with the possession of the plaintiff or demolishing any
constructions etc. on such land or cutting trees etc. standing thereon. See---
1. Kamla Shankar vs. IIIrd ADJ, Mirzapur, 1998(89) R.D. 484 (All)
2. Magan Lal Chaturvedi vs. District Judge, Mathura, 1998 ALJ 2323 (All)
3. Deokinandan vs. Surajpal, 1996 ALJ 144 (SC)
4. Tej Bhan Singh vs. II ADJ, Jaunpur, 1995 ALJ 109 (All)
5. Surya Narain Pandey vs. Addl. Civil Judge, Gyanpur, 1995 R.D. (H) 50
(All)
6. Jyoti Ram vs. District Judge, Saharanpur, 1995 RD 99 (All)
7. Tej Bhan Singh vs. IX ADJ, Jaunpur, 1994 R.D. 476 (All)
8. Indra Pal vs. Jagannath, 1993 ALJ 235 (All)
9. Bhagwat Prasad vs. Jitendra Narain, 1991 ALJ 971 (All)
10. Chandra Deo Pathak vs. Swami Nath Pathak, 1987 R.D. 51 (All)
11. Vijai Singh vs. 2nd ADJ, Bulandshahr, 1982 ALJ 725 (All)
12. 1980 R.D. 32 (Summary of Cases-43) (All—L.B.)
13. Jai Singh vs. Hanumant Singh, 1979 ALJ 645 (All)
14. Kishori Lal vs. Shambhoo Nath, 1978 ALJ 1273 (All)
15. Parsottam vs. Narottam, 1970 ALJ 505 (All—D.B.)
39
members can be made against the company, if the transferor retains the money in
his own hands and fails to pay it to him. The right of a transferee is only to call
upon the company to register his name and no more. No rights arise till such
registration takes place the completion of the transaction by having the name
entered in the register of members relates it back to the time when the transfer was
first made. So far as the question of rectification is concerned, it is the company
court alone which would have jurisdiction. But issues regarding title or ownership
etc. of the disputed shares will be decided by civil court only. Power to refuse to
register transfer of shares, without assigning any reasons, or in the directors’
absolute and uncontrolled discretion, is often found in the Articles of Association
of a company. A person aggrieved by the refusal to register transfer of shares has,
since the enactment of the Companies Act, 1956, two remedies for seeking relief
under the Companies Act; (1) to apply to the court for rectification of the register
u/s. 155 of the Companies Act, 1956, and (2) to appeal against the resolution
refusing to register the transfers u/s. 111 of the Companies Act, 1956. Interpreting
the provisions of Sec. 155 & 446 of the Companies Act, 1956, it has been held by
the Supreme Court (in AIR 1998 SC 3153) that the jurisdiction of the company
court u/s. 155 of the Companies Act, 1956 is summary in nature and the civil
courts jurisdiction regarding rectification of register of members is impliedly
barred. See---
1. Surendra Prakash Goyal vs. M/s. Goyal Industries Pvt. Ltd., 1980 Tax L.R. 2007
(All)
2. M/s. A.S. Corporation (P) Ltd. vs. M/s. M.P. Containers Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1998 SC
3153
3. Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Escorts Ltd. & others, AIR 1986 SC 1370
4. Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala, AIR 1961 SC 1669
5. M/s. Howrah Trading Co. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central,
Calcutta, AIR 1959 SC 775
40
(i) That there was some injunction order passed by the Court.
(ii) That the injunction order was conveyed to or served on the
defendant/contemnor.
(iii) That the defendant/contemnor had time and means to obey the order.
(iv) That the disobedience or breach was deliberate and willful.
(B). Violation of injunction must be willfully to entail punishment: Violation
of order of injunction, interim or final, is serious matter. But unless there is
clear evidence showing that the party willfully violated the Court order, he
cannot be punished under Order 39, rule 2-A CPC or under Order 21, rule
32(5) CPC. See: Ramasamy Vs. Venkatachalapathi, (2019) 3 SCC 544
(C-1) Liability for breach of temporary injunction when passed without
jurisdiction---- A contemnor of breach of temporary injunction is liable to be
punished u/o 39, r. 2-A CPC even if the suit was not maintainable and the interim
injunction was passed without jurisdiction by the court or when ultimately the suit
was dismissed as not maintainable for want of jurisdiction. See--- Tayabbhai M.
Bagasarwalla vs. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd., (1997) 3 SCC 443
(C-2). Contemnor of interim injunction can be punished U/O 39, rule 2-A
CPC and not under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 Where an injunction
under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC is granted by a subordinate Court, High
Court cannot punish the contemnor. It is considered a civil contempt punishable
under O. 39, R. 2-A of the Code. It is outside the purview of Section 2(b) of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 since the scope of contempt of Court as
contemplated under Order 39, R. 2-A(1) of CPC is different and is narrower than
the scope of civil contempt within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the said Act,
1971. The provisions under Order. 39, R. 2-A of CPC provides an elaborate and
exhaustive provision for dealing with breach of injunction order which is a serious
matter since the Civil Court is empowered to order to take away even the liberty of
an individual by detention of the person in a civil prison who has violated the
order. So the power is penal in nature and the burden is heavy on the person who
alleges disobedience to prove the ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable
doubt since there has to be a clear proof that the order so ordered was clear,
distinct, unambiguous and with full knowledge of the contemnor. See:
(i). Tapan Pal Vs. Pronab Pal, AIR 2019 Calcutta 139
(ii). AIR 1982 Karnataka 182
(D) Liability of state for breach of temporary injunction---- Officers of the
state breaching or disobeying the temporary injunction issued by court are liable to
be punished u/o 39, r. 2-A CPC. See--- State of Bihar vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari,
AIR 1961 SC 221 (Five Judge Bench)
41
(E) Appeal against an order passed u/o 39, r. 2-A CPC--- An order passed by
trial court u/o 39, r. 2-A CPC is appeallable u/o 43, r. 1 (r) CPC. Such an appeal
must be decided by the appellate court on its merits. See--G. Kamala Rao vs. K.
Jawahar Reddy, (2000) 9 SCC 231
(F-1) Restoration of status quo ante--- Where the defendant had demolished the
construction despite interim injunction issued by the court, it has been held that the
court can order for restoration of status quo ante. See--- Satya Prakash vs. Ist
ADJ, Etawah, AIR 2002 All 198
(F-2) Interim orders must be enforced: Interim orders of courts are an integral
element of judicial review. Interim directions issued on the basis of the
prima facie findings in a case are temporary arrangements till the matter is
finally decided. Interim orders ensure that the cause which is being agitated
does not become infructuous before the final hearing. The power of judicial
review is not only about the writs issued by superior courts or the striking
down of governmental action. Entrustment of judicial review is
accompanied by a duty to ensure that the judicial orders are complied with.
Unless the orders are enforced, citizens will lose faith in the efficacy of
judicial review and in the legal system that the faith of the citizens in the
constitutional courts of the country be maintained. See: K.S. Puttaswamy Vs.
Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1 (Five - Judge Bench)(Para ZU)
(G) Police Aid for Implementing Temporary Injunction & Duty of Court---
Once the court is satisfied that interim order passed by it is disobeyed, there could
be no justification for the court not to initiate proceedings for enforcement of it’s
order. Court cannot be merely a silent spectator while the order passed by it is
being violated with impunity and the party is left on the mercy of the so called
administration. It is not only an obligation but a solemn duty of the court to enforce
it’s order by all means and to ensure that the interim order passed by it is complied
with. To achieve the same, court should issue necessary instructions to the police if
facts so warrant. See---
1. Board of Trustees of the Port of Mumbai Vs. Nikhil N. Gupta, (2015) 10
SCC 139.
2. Sree Ram vs. State Of U.P. 2011 (2) ALJ 187(All...DB)
3. Smt. Jagannathiya vs. State of U.P., 2006 (64) ALR 330 (All—D.B.)
Note-- In the case of Smt. Jagannathiya, notedabove, the Division Bench of the
Allahabad High Court directed the civil court, Kaushambi to issue necessary orders
to the Superintendent of Police, Kaushambi to take all measures to ensure
compliance of the interim order passed by it at the earliest. The following rulings
have been relied upon by the Division Bench in the case of Smt. Jagannathiya---
42
(2) Rameshwarlal vs. Municipal Council, Tonk, (1996) 6 SCC 100
(3) K.L. Viramani vs. III ADJ, 1992 (20) ALR 1065 (All)
(4) State of Bihar vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari, AIR 1961 SC 221
(5) Kochira Krishnan vs. Joseph Desouza, AIR 1986 Kerala 63
(6) Sita Ram vs. Ganesh Das, AIR 1973 All 449
(7) Samee Khan vs. Bindu Khan, AIR 1998 SC 2765
43
(H-3) O. 39, Rule 2-A CPC & Contempt of Courts Act, 1971--- Scope and
applicability--- In case of disobedience of interim injunction orders, it has been
held by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court that the provision of O.
39, Rule 2-A CPC prevails over the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
See---
1. Smt. Jagannathiya vs. State of U.P., 2006 (64) ALR 330 (All—D.B.)
2. Dr. Alka Jaiswal Vs Fr. I. Farnandes, 1986 ALJ 133(All)
3. Anis Ahmad Khan Vs. State of UP, 1985 ALJ 30 (All)
(H-4) Tribunals have power to punish for contempt : Tribunals have power to
punish for contempt of Court. See : Madras Bar Association Vs. Union of
India, (2015) 8 SCC 583 (Five-Judge Bench).
(H-5).
(H-6) Labour Court's decision not to be treated as Precedent : Labour Court
is not a Court of record hence creates no precedents. See… Rahimuddin &
Others Vs. Gossini Fashions Ltd., 2012 (2) SLJ 487 (Delhi High Court).
49. Exhibition of T.V. serial
Where interim injunction was granted by court against the exhibition of
certain episodes of a T.V. serial entitled “Honi Anhoni”, the Supreme Court
interpreting the provisions of Order 39, r. 1 & 2 CPC, Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution and the provisions of Cinematograph Act, 1952, has held that as no
prima facie evidence was produced to show that the exhibition of the serial was
prejudicial to certain community or likely to cause any grave prejudice to public
generally or endanger public morality and therefore the grant of interim injunction
against the exhibition of the serial was held improper. See--- Odyssey
Communications Pvt. Ltd. vs. Lokvidayan Sabnghatana, AIR 1988 SC 1642
44
50(B). Courts not to interfere in the election process
during the mid of the elections
Once an election process has been set in motion, though the High
Court may entertain or may have already entertained a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution, it would not be justified in interfering with
the election process giving direction to the election officer to stall the
proceedings or to conduct the election process afresh particularly when the
election has already been held in which the voters were allegedly prevented
to exercise their franchise as that dispute is covered by an election dispute
and remedy is thus available at law for redressal. In the circumstances, the
order passed by the High Court giving direction not to declare the result of
the election or to conduct fresh poll for 20 persons, though the writ petition
is maintainable, would be illegal. The High Court, pending writ petition,
would not be justified in issuing direction to stall the election process. See :
(i) Boddula Krishnaiah Vs. State Election Commissioner, A.P., AIR 1996
SC 1595 (Three-Judge Bench) (paras 11 & 12), (ii) Lakshmi Charan Sen Vs.
A. K. M. Hassan Uzzaman, AIR 1985 SC 1233 (Five-Judge Bench)(para 28)
and (iii) State of U. P. Vs. Pradhan Sangh Kshettra samiti, (1995) Supp (2)
SCC 305 (at page 331)
45
51(B). Grant of interim injunction u/s 151 CPC during stay of
proceedings of suit
U/s 151 CPC, civil court can in exercise of its inherent powers grant
interim injunction even during the period of stay of the proceedings by
the superior court. See : Breach Candy Swimming Bath Trust Vs.
Dipesh Mehta, AIR 2016 (NOC) 167 (Bombay).
46
6. Suryadeo Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675
7. Rajendra Singh vs. Sri Brij Mohan Agarwal, 2003(1) ARC 270 (All)
8. Shiv Shakti Co-operative Housing Society vs. Swaraj Developers, (2003) 6 SCC 659
9. Ravinder Kaur vs. Ashok Kumar, (2003) 8 SCC 289
10. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Rajendra Singh, AIR 2000 SC 1165
11. Rajbir Singh vs. VII ADJ, Muzaffarnagar, 1998 RD 483 (All)
12. S.P. Chengal Varaya Naidu vs. Jagannath, AIR 1994 SC 853
Note: In compliance with the order of Hon’ble Allahabad High Court passed in
writ petition no. 802 (M/s) of 2007, Lalit Mohan Srivastava vs. Distt. Judge,
Ambedkar Nagar & others, C.L. No. 18/2007, dated 11.5.2007 and the C.L. No.
15/Admin ‘G’ 2006, dated 3.5.2006 in compliance with the directions issued in
the case of Bhagwati Pd. Lohar vs. State of U.P., 2005 (99) RD 333 (All)
circulated amongst the judicial officers of the State of U.P. directs that revision u/s.
115 CPC against issue of notice u/o 39, r. 1, 2, 3 CPC being interlocutory is not
maintainable.
54. Religious matters & Injunction
(A) Where a group of Muslims was prevented by other Muslims from loudly
uttering “Aameen” in mosque, it has been held by the Allahabad High Court that a
Musalman is entitled to enter a mosque dedicated to God and in the prayers utter
the word “Aameen” loudly but not with a malafide intention to disturb the peace of
the congregation and grant of injunction in such religious matters has been held
proper. See--- Syed Farzand Ali vs. Nasir Beg, AIR 1980 All 342
(B) Where a suit was filed to restrain defendants from using land belonging to a
deity by plaintiff as representing the worshippers of the deity in the temple u/o. 1,
r. 8 after obtaining permission from court which was given after notice and contest,
the suit would be maintainable at the instance of the plaintiff when the defendants
failed to prove that the plaintiffs were Arya Samajists, i.e., non-believers in
worship of deity and the plaintiffs were descendants of persons who had
constructed the temple for the idol. Case law discussed. See--- Vidya Sagar
Sharma vs. Anand Swarup Dublish, AIR 1981 All 106
(C) Injunction can be granted to perform "pooja" in a temple : Where the
dispute in a civil suit was in relation to a temple and the plaintiff had sought
interim injunction against the defendant restraining him from interfering in the
plaintiff's right to perform pooja in the temple, it has been held that if the plaintiff
was the the true owner of the property as claimed by him, he can claim injunction
against the defendant even if he was not performing pooja at the relevant time.
See--- Bhairab Dutt Vs. Bala Dutt Bhatt, 2011(114) RD 199(Uttarakhand)
47
(D) Mahantship though a legal right but not heritable like ordinary
property : In the conception of Mahantship, as in shebaitship, both the elements
of office and property of duties and personal interest are blended together and
neither can be detached from the other. The personal or beneficial interest of the
Mahant in the endowments attached to an institution is manifested in his large
powers of disposal and administration and his right to create derivative tenures in
respect to endowed properties and these and other rights of a similar character
invest the office of the Mahant with the character of proprietary right which,
though anomalous to some extent, is still a genuine legal right. However, the
Mahantiship is not heritable like ordinary property. See : The Commissioner,
Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras Vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of
Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282 (Seven-Judge Bench)(para 11).
48
English Courts do permit invoking their jurisdiction. Thus, it is clear that the
parties to a contract may agree to have their disputes resolved by a Foreign Court
termed as a ‘neutral Court’ or ‘Court of choice’ creating exclusive or non-
exclusive jurisdiction in it. See--- Modi Entertainment Network vs. W.S.G.
Cricket Pte. Ltd., AIR 2003 SC 1177
49
disconnection without seeking declaration of non-liability of dues, it has been held
by the Allahabad High Court that the suit was not maintainable and injunction
against disconnection of supply of electricity could not be granted. See---
1. M/s. Geeta Pump (P) Ltd. vs. District Judge, Saharanpur, AIR 2000 All 58
2. M/s. Pilibhit Ispat (P) Ltd. vs. U.P. State Electricity Board, AIR 1996 All
329 (D.B.)
3. Sir Shadi Lal Enterprises Ltd. vs. State of U.P., 1995 ALJ 1517 (All)(D.B.)
4. Debi Dayal vs. U.P. State Electricity Board, 1988 Civil Law Journal 266
(All)
Note: Injunction against disconnection of supply of electricity cannot be granted in
view of the provisions u/s. 4 & 5 of the U.P. Government Electrical Under
Taking (Dues Recovery) Act, 1958.
(B) Bar of Sec. 145 of Electricity Act, 2003 against grant of Temporary
Injunction--- According to Sec. 145 of the Electricity Act, 2003, no civil court
have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which
an assessing officer referred to in Sec. 126 or an appellate authority referred to in
Sec. 127 or the adjudicating officer appointed under this Act is empowered by or
under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other
authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power
conferred by or under this Act.
61. Extension of already discontinued interim injunction/stay order
Interim injunction/stay order when discontinued- An interim
injunction/stay order when extended to a particular date but not extended further
beyond that particular date, would be presumed to have ceased from the date of
non-extension. See--- Ashok Kumar vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2007 SC 1411.
62. Discharge etc. of temporary injunction
In view of the second proviso added to Rule 4 of Order 39 CPC in the State
of U.P. since 1.2.1977, the court shall set aside the order of injunction if the party
in whose favour the interim order of injunction was granted, appears to be dilating
the proceedings or otherwise abuses the process of the court.
63. Consent, waiver or acquiescence & jurisdiction of Civil Courts
No amount of consent, waiver or acquiescence can confer jurisdiction on a
court which it inherently lacks or where none exists. See--- Vithalbhai (P) Ltd. vs.
Union Bank of India, (2005) 4 SCC 315.
64. Civil/Revenue Courts have no jurisdiction in respect of waqf property :
In view of the provisions of the Waqf Act, 1995 as amended by Act of 2013,
Civil and Revenue Courts have no jurisdiction to decide suits in respect of the
50
waqf property. See : Lal Shah Baba Dargah Trust Vs. Magnum Developers, AIR
2016 SC 381.
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