Chapter One

Mill's theory of Proper Names

While talking about proper names one naturally begins with the John
Stuart Mill. Mill's theory was the earliest and perhaps the best known
theory on the subject. Mill was the first philosopher who implemented the
seed of proper names. Although, Mill had not been recognized as a
linguistic philosopher in the true sense of the term but from his
grammatical classification of proper names later philosophers had gained
ample clues on the basis of which they developed the concept of proper
name.
According to Mill, every name denotes an object or every name either
denotationally or connotationally or in the form of de re or de dicta is
associated with an object In short, it can be said that to be a name is to be
a name of an object. According to Mill, 'a proper name is an unmeaning
mark which we connect in our mind with the idea of the object.' 2
According to Mill, a proper name like 'Paul' or 'ceaser' is a singular
name which is devoid of all connotations. But here a question arises:
what is a name? What is it to be a singular? What is it to be devoid of all
connotations? Though the word 'name' is used in somewhat extra-
ordinary sense in Mill as well as in much of traditional logic, it is not
difficult to see what he meant by it. Generally, he thinks that a name is a
word or a group of words. But this does not mean that not all words or
group of words can be regarded as names. For example- 'Paul', 'the first
emperor of Rome', 'Man', 'Redness' are all names. But 'of, 'to', 'heavy'
etc. are not names at all. According to Mill, the words of the second
group can not be regarded as names because 'these words do not express

2
Mill, J. S. A System of Logic, Chap-2, London, Longmans, 1843, pp. 34-38.

11
 things of which anything can be affirmed or denied.' 3 We can say
significantly that 'Paul died young' or that 'the first emperor of Rome
was a great warrior' but at the same time we can not say that 'of is a
relation or that 'heavy' is difficult to carry. So it is clear, according to
Mill, that 'a word or a group of words would be a name only if it could be
used in the position of the subject of some assertion. ' 4 It seems possible
to add also that a name, in Mill's view, is what many contemporary
philosophers have called 'a referring expression'.
What does Mill mean by a singular name? It is better to remember that
Mill distinguished between a singular name and a general name.
According to Mill, 'an individual or singular name is a name which is
only capable of being truly affirmed, in the same sense of one thing. ' 5 So
'Ram' and 'the king who succeeded William the Conqueror', as well as
'the king' under suitable circumstances, are individual or singular names.
But 'Man' on the other hand, is not an individual or singular name; rather
it is a general name because it can be truly affirmed of an indefinite
number of individuals.
Again Mill says that a singular name is a name of a single thing or
person. A name in Mill's opinion is that which can be used in the position
of the subject in a subject-predicate statement.
Now it is clear that what Mill means by a singular name. Let us see what
does Mill mean by a non-Connotative name? Mill says that 'a non-
Connotative term (name) is one which signifies a subject only or an
attribute only' 6 • On the other hand, 'a Connotative term is one which
denotes a subject and implies an attribute. ' 7 In this regard, Mill

3
Ibid, p.34.
4
Ibid, p. 34.
5
Ibid. p.34.
6
Ibid, p.35.
7
Ibid. p.35.

12
 distinguishes between subject and predicate of a statement. A Name
being a non-connotative term always occupies the subject position. On
the other hand, connotative term always occupies the predicate position
of a statement. That is why, connotative term not only denotes a subject
or attribute. Connotative term always denotes an object and its properties
or attributes. So Mill thinks that a name means a singular name and a
singular non-connotative name which is positioned in the subject of some
assertion.
According to Mill, 'a non-connotative term is such that it applies to a
thing or things we can not infer that the thing or things to which it applies
are possessed of some properties. ' 8 Mill again says that a singular non-
connotative term is a term which can be used to refer to some single
thing, but from the fact that it can be used to refer to certain thing we can
not infer that the thing is possessed of any properties. In this regard, Mill
again gives an argument to accept that 'Caesar' is a non-Connotative
term. According to Mill, a proper name like 'Caesar' applies to some
individual, it is also correct, but we can not infer that the individual is
possessed of any properties. From the fact that the term 'man' cannot be
non-connotative because by the term 'man' we infer that he is possessed
of the property of being an animal; where the term 'Caesar'(correctly)
applies to an individual. We can not infer that the individual is possessed
of some properties.
While discussing about proper name after Mill there we have two terms
'Connotative' and 'non-Connotative'. According to Mill, a proper name
is always non-Connotative, because for Mill a non- Connotative term
always signifies a subject only or an attribute only. On the other hand, a
Connotative term denotes a subject and implies an attribute. In this
regard, Mill's distinction between Connotative and non-Connotative
8
Ibid. p. 35.

13
 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------

terms needs further clarification. Mill says that "a non-Connotative term
is one which signifies a subject only. A Connotative term is one which
denotes a subject and implies an attribute" 9 Mill uses the terms 'signifies'
and 'denotes' inter-changeably, so the difference between the two types,
as it is here presented, is that 'the Connotative term does something in
addition to what the non-Connotative terms does.' 10 This presentation of
the Connotative term as doing something more turns out not to be
justified by Mill subsequent explanation.

First, what is it that the two types of terms have in common? In Mill's
varying terminology they both "signify", "denote", "stand for" or are
"names of' the things of which they can be truly predicated. To use
Mill's own examples, both 'Socratise' (a non-connotative term) and
'virtuous (a connotative term) denote Socratise.We can truly say of this
man that he is Socratise and that he is virtuous. What connotative and
nonconnotative terms have in common is that each of them has a range of
correct application and an extension.
But how do these two terms differ? They differ in the ways in which they
'y_ come to have their extensions. The connotative term 'virtuous' applies to
Socrates and others, 'in consequence of an attribute which they are
supposed to posses in common the attribute which has received the name
ofvirtuous" 11 •
By contrast, the non-connotative concrete term 'Socrates' and the
conno~ative abstract term 'virtuous' apply to the man and the attribute
respectively in consequence of these terms having been on these
individuals to be "simply marks used to enable those individuals to be

9
Ibid. p.36.
10
Ibid. p. 36.
11
Ibid. p.36 ..

14
 made subject of discourse" 12 .The attribute in consequence of which a
non-connotative term applies is not one that is independent of the term
rather it is just the attribute of bearing the term as a 'mark' (name).
Mill's explanation makes it clear that this difference in the conditions of
application is the crucial difference between the terms. A connotative
term is one that applies to an individual. A non-connotative term is one
that applies to an individual simply because the term has been bestowed
on it as a label. One consequence of this distinction is that a connotative
term may be either general or singular depending on whether the attribute
that "gives the name" is shareable, but a non-connotative term will
always be a singular term applying just to the individual that bears the
term as a proper name.
But what can be made of the claim with which Mill introduces his
distinction-that connotative terms do something's more than non-
connotative terms? The extra that they are said to do is to "imply an
attribute". This is, of course, not something that connotative terms do
independently of denoting .They denote just those individuals that have
the "implied" attributive. To predicate a Connotative term is to ascribe an
attribute. However, a non-connotative term also denotes only in virtue of
certain attributes. They denote just the individual that bears the terms as
names. Consequently, to predicate a non-connotative term is to ascribe
the attribute of bearing the term as a name.
Mill, though, insists that non-connotative terms lack something that
connotative terms have. He regards connotation as information or
signification. He then says, "The only names of objects which connote
nothing are proper names; and these have strictly speaking, on
signification." 13 However there is confusion somewhere, for he has to
12
Ibid. p. 37.
13
Ibid. p.37.

15
 admit that it is informative to be told of a town that it is York. He tries to
dismiss this by saying that there is no information except that 'York' is its
name. He contrasts it with the information that the town is built of
marble. Here, we have entirely new information, according to Mill. The
identification of the town as York may easily be a new information
because of the fact that it is built of marble.
The difference between predication of the non connotative term and the
predication of the connotative term is simply is the kind of information
imparted. The first gives information of a relation between the town and
the term itself- the town has the name 'York'; while the other gives term
independent of information about the material used in the construction of
the town. The different in the kind of information expressed is precisely
the difference between non- connotative terms and connotative terms.
The former applies to those that have the attribute of having been labeled
with the term. The latter applies to those things that possess some
attribute other than bearing the term itself as a proper name.
Classification of Proper names
Mill has divided name into various types which are as follows:
Singular and general names
Mill classifies name as general and individual (or singular) name and
then distinguishes between them. A general name is familiarly defined as
a name which is capable of being truly affirmed, in the same sense of an
indefinite number of things. 'An individual or singular name is a name
which is only capable of being truly affirmed, in the same sense of one
thing. ' 14
Thus, man is capable of being truly affirmed of John, George, Marry and
other persons without assignable limit; and it is affirmed of all of them in
the same sense; for the word man expresses certain qualities and when we
14
----
Ibid. p. 38.

16
 predicate it of those persons, we assert that they all possess those
qualities. But John is only capable of being truly affirmed of one single
person, at least in the same sense. For though there are many persons who
bear that name, it is not conferred upon them to indicate any qualities or
any thing which belongs to them in common; and can not be said to be
affirmed of them in any sense at all, consequently not in the same sense.
"The king who succeeded William the conqueror" is also an individual
name. For there cannot be more than one person of whom it can be truly
affirmed, is implied in the meaning of the words. Even 'the king' when
the occasion or the context defines the individual of whom it is to be
understood, may justly be regarded as an individual name.
It is not unusual, by way of explaining what is meant by a general name,
to say that it is the name a class. But this, though a convenient mode of
expression for the some purposes, is objectionable as a definition. It
would be more logical to reverse the proposition and then tum it into a
definition of the word class: "A class is the indefinite multitude of
individuals denoted by a general name."
It is necessary to distinguish general names from collective names. A
general name is one which can be predicated of each individual of a
multitude; a collective name can not be predicated of each separately, but
only of all taken together. "The 76th regiment of foot in the British
Army", which is a collective name, is not a general but an individual
name; for though it can be predicated of a multitude of individual soldier
taken jointly, it can not be predicated of them severally. We may say
'John is a soldier' and Thompson is a soldier and Smith is a soldier but
we can not say Johns is the 76th regiment and Thompson is the 76th
regiment and Smith is the 76th regiment. We can only say, John and
Thompson and Smith and Brown and so forth are the 76th regiment.

272035
06 JUM1m5
17
 "The 76th regiment" is a collective name, but not a general one. A
regiment' is both a collective and a general name. General with respect to
all individual regiments, of each of which separately it can be affirmed;
collective with respect to the individual soldiers of whom any regiment in
composed.
Concrete and Abstract names
Mill admits Concrete and Abstract name. According to Mill a concrete
name is a name which stands for a thing; an abstract name is a name
which stands for an attribute of a thing. Thus 'John', 'the sea', 'this table'
are names of things. 'White', also is a name of a thing. Whiteness is the
name of a quality or attribute of those things. 'Man' is the name of many
things; humanity is a name of an attribute of those things.' 15 Old is a
name of a thing; old age is a name of one of their attributes.
We have used the words concrete and abstract in the sense annexed to
them by the schoolmen, who, notwithstanding the imperfections of their
philosophy, were unrivalled in the construction of technical language, and
whose definitions, in logic at least, though they never went more than a
little way into the subject, have seldom, I think, been altered but to be
spoiled. A practice, however, has grown up in more modem times,
which, if not introduced by Locke has gained currency chiefly from his
example, of applying the expression "abstract name" to all names which
are the result of abstraction or generalization, and consequently to 'all
general names, instead of confining it to the names of attributes.' 16 A
more wanton alteration in the meaning of a word is rarely to be met with;
for the expression general name, the exact equivalent of which exists in
all languages I am acquainted with, was already available for the purpose
to which abstract has been misappropriated, while the misappropriation

15
Mill, J.S. A System ofLogic, London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1972.pp.90-ll2 ..
16
Ibid. p. 91.

18
leaves that important class of words, the names of attributes, without any
compact distinctive appellation. The old acceptation, however, has not
gone so completely out of use, as to deprive those who still adhere to it of
all chances of being understood. Thus, Mill goes on to say that by
'abstract, then, I shall always, in Logic, mean the opposite of concrete: by
an abstract name, the name of an attribute; by a concrete name, the name
of an object'.
Do abstract names belong to the class of general or to the class of
singular name?
Mill says that some abstract names are certainly generaL However, some
of those which are name, but not of one single and definite attribute but
of a class of attributes. The word 'color' which is a name common to
whiteness, redness and so forth. Even the word whiteness, in respect. of
the different shades of whiteness to which it is applied in common; the
word magnitude, in respect of the various degrees of magnitude and the
various dimensions of space; the word weight, in respect of the various
digress of weight, such also is the word attribute itself, the common name
of all particular attribute. But when only one attribute, neither variable in
degree nor in kind, is designated by the name; as variables, tangibleness,
equality, squamess, milk-whiteness, then the name can hardly be
considered general; for though it denotes an attribute of many different
object , 'the attribute itself is always conceived as one, not many.' 17 To
avoid needless logomachies, the best course would probably be to
consider these names as neither general nor individual, and to place in the
class apart.
It may be objected to our definition of an abstract name, that not only the
names which we have called abstract, but adjective, which we have
placed m the concrete class, are names of attributes; that white, for
17
Ibid. p. 92.

19
 example, is as much as the name of the colour as whiteness is. But a word
ought to be considered as the name of that which we intend to be
understood by it when we put it to its principal use, that is, when we
employ it in predication. When we say, snow is white, milk is white,
linen is white; we do not mean it to be understood that snow, or linen, or
milk, is a colour. We mean that they are things having the colour. The
reverse is the case with the word whiteness. Here what we affirm to be
whiteness is not snow, but the colour of snow. Whiteness, therefore, is the
name of the colour exclusively. But white is a name of all things
whatever having the colour; a name, not of the quality whiteness, but of
every white object. It is true. This name was given to all those various
objects on account of the quality. We may therefore say, without lack of
decon1m, that the quality forms part of its signification; but a name can
only be said to stand for, or to be a name of, the things of which it can be
predicated. We shall presently see that all names which can be said to
have any signification, all names by applying which to an individual we
give any information respecting that individual, may be said to imply an
attribute of some sort; but they are not names of the attribute; it has its
own proper abstract name.
Connotative and non-connotative names
Mill divides names into connotative and nonconnotative, the latter
sometimes, but improperly, called absolute. This is one of the most
important distinctions which we shall have occasion to point out, and of
those which go deepest into the nature of language.
A non- connotative term is one which signifies a subject only or an
attribute only. "A connotative term", Mill opines, "is one which denotes a
subject, and implies an attribute." 18 By the term subject here is meant
anything which possesses attributes. Thus John, or London, or England,
18
Mill, J. S. A System of Logic, London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1949. p93.

20
 are names which signify a subject only. Whiteness, length, virtue, signify
attribute only. None of these names, therefore, is connotative. But white,
long, virtuous are connotative. The word 'white, denotes all white things,
as snow, paper, the foam of the sea, and so forth, and implies, or as it was
termed by the schoolmen, connotes, the attribute whiteness.' 19 The word
white is not predicated of the attribute, but of the subject, snow, and so
forth; but when we predicate it of them, we imply, or connote, that the
attribute whiteness belongs to them. The same may be said of the other
words cited above. Virtuous, for example, is the name of a class, which
includes Socrates, Howard, the Man of Ross, and an indefinable number
of other individuals, past, present, and to come. These individuals,
collectively and severally, can alone be said with propriety to be denoted
by the word: of them alone can it properly be said to be a name. But it is a
name applied to all of them in consequence of an attribute which they are
supposed to possess in common, the attribute which has received the
name of virtue. It is applied to all beings that are considered to posses this
attribute; and to none which are not so considered.
All concrete general names are connotative. The word man, for example,
denotes Peter, Jane, John and an indefinite number of other individuals,
of whom, taken as a class, it is the name. But it is applied to them,
because 'they posses, and to signify that they possess, certain
attributes.' 20 These seem to be, corporeity, animal life, rationality, and a
certain external form, which for distinction we call the human. Every
existing thing, which possessed all these attributes, would be called a
man; and anything which possessed none of them, or only one, or two, or
even three of them without the fourth, would not be so called. Or, if such
newly-discovered beings possessed the form of man without any vestige

19
Ibid. p 94.
20
Ibid. p. 95.

21
 of reason, it is probable that some other name than that of man would be
found for them. How it happens that there can be any doubt about the
matter, will appear hereafter. The word man, therefore, signifies all these
attributes, and all subjects which posses these attributes. But it can be
predicated only of the subjects. What we call men are the subject, the
individual Stiles and Nokes; not the qualities by which their humanity is
constituted. The name, therefore, is said to signify the subject directly, the
attributes indirectly; it denotes the subject, and implies, or involves, or
indicates, or as we shall say henceforth connotes, the attributes. It is a
connotative name.
CoP..notative names have hence been also called denominative, because
the subject which they denote is denominated by, or receives a name
from, the attribute which they connote. Snow, and other objects, receives
the name white, because they possess the attribute which is called
whiteness. Peter, James, and other receive the name man, because they
possess the attributes which are considered to constitute humanity. The
attribute, or attributes, may therefore be said to denominate those objects,
or to give them a common name.
It has been said that all concrete general names are connotative. Even
abstract names, though the names only of attributes, may in some
instances be justly considered as connotative; for attributes themselves
may have attributes ascribed to them ; and 'a word which denotes
attributes may connote an attribute of those attributes. ' 21 This word is a
name common to many attributes, and connotes hurtfulness, an attribute
of those various attributes. When, for example, we say that slowness, in a
horse, is a fault, we do not mean that the slow movement, the actual
change of place of the slow horse, is a bad thing, but that the property or

21
Ibid. p. 96.

22
 peculiarity of the horse, from which it derives that name, the quality of
being a slow mover, is an undesirable peculiarity.
With regard to those concrete names which are not general but individual,
a distinction must be made. Proper names are not connotative: they
denote the individuals who are called by them; but they do not indicate or
imply any attributes as belonging to those individuals. According to Mill
when we designate, for example, a child by the name Paul or a dog by the
name Caesar, we actually make sense to say that these 'names are simply
marks used to enable those individuals to be made subjects of
discourse. ' 22 It may be said, indeed, that we must have had some reason
for giving them those names rather than any others; and this is true; but
the name, once given, is independent of the reason. A man may have been
named John, because that was the name of his father; a town may have
been named Dartmouth, because it is situated at the mouth of the Dart.
But it is no part ofthe signification of the word John, which the father of
the person so called bore the same name; nor even of the word
Dartmouth, to be situated at the mouth of the Dart. If sand should choke
up the mouth of the river, or an earthquake change its course, and remove
it to a distance from the town, the name of the town would not necessarily
be changed. That fact, therefore, can from no part of the signification of
the word; for otherwise, when the fact confessedly ceased to be true, no
one would any longer think of applying the name. 'Proper names are
attached to the objects themselves, and are not dependent on the
continuance of any attribute of the object. ' 23
But there is another kind of names, which, although they are individual
names, that is, 'predicable only of one object, are really connotative. ' 24
For, though we may give to an individual a name utterly unmeaning,
22
Ibid. p. 97.
23
Ibid. p 97.
24
Ibid. p.98.

23
 which we call a proper name- a word which answers the purpose of
showing that thing it is we are talking about, but not of telling anything
about it; yet a name peculiar to an individual is not necessarily of this
description. It may be significant of some attribute, or some union of
attributes, which, being possessed by no object but one, determines the
name exclusively to that individual. "The sun" is a name of this
description; "God" when used by a monotheist, is another. These,
however, are scarcely examples of what we are now attempting to
illustrate, being, in strictness of language, general, not individual names;
for, however they may be, in fact, predicable only of one object, there is
nothing in the meaning of the words themselves which implies this: and,
accordingly, when we are imagining and not affirming, we may speak of
many suns; and the majority of mankind have believed, and still believe,
that there are many gods. But it is easy to produce words which are real
instances of connotative individual names. It may be part of the meaning
of the connotative name itself, that there can exist but one individual
possessing the attribute which it connotes, for or instance, "the only son
of John Stiles" or "the first emperor of Rome." Or the attribute connoted
may be a connexion with some determinate event, and the connexion may
be of such a kind as 'only one individual actually had; and this may be
implied in the form of the expression. ' 25 "The father of Socrates" is an
example of the one kind (since Socrates could not have had two father);
"the author of the Iliad," "the murderer of Henri Quatre," of the second.
For, though it is conceivable that more persons than one might have
participated in the authorship of the Iliad, or in the murder of Henri
Quatre, the employment of the article implies that, in fact, this was not
the case. What is here done by the word the, is done in other cases by the
context: thus, "Caesar's army" is an individual name, if it appears from

z.s Ibid. p. 102.

24
 the context that the army meant is that which Caesar commanded in a
particular battle. The still more general expressions, "the Roman army",
or "the Christian army", may be individualized in a similar manner.
Another case of frequent occurrence has already been noticed; it is the
following. The name, being a many worded one, may consist, in the first
place, of a general name, capable therefore in itself of being affirmed of
more things than one, but which is, in the second place, so limited by
other words joined with it, that the entire expression can only be
predicated of one object, consistently with the meaning of the general
term. This is exemplified in such an instance as the following: "the
present prime minister of England." Prime l'v1inister of England 1s a
general name; the attributes which it connotes may be possessed by an
indefinite number of persons: in succession however, not simultaneously;
since the meaning of the name itself imports that there can be only one
such person at a time. This being the case, and the application of the
name being afterwards limited by the article and the word present, to such
individuals as possess the attributes at one indivisible point of time, it
becomes applicable only to one individual. And as this appears from the
meaning of the name, without any extrinsic proof, it is strictly an
individual name.
Positive and negative names
The fourth principal division of names is positive and negative. 'Positive,
as man, tree, good; negative, as not man, not tree, not good. ' 26 To every
positive concrete name, a corresponding negative one might be framed.
After giving a name to any one thing, or to any plurality of things, we
might create a second name which should be a name of all things
whatever, except that particular thing or things. The negative names are
employed whenever we have occasion to speak collectively of all things
26
Ibid. p.l 03.

25
 other than some thing or class of things. When the positive name is
connotative, the corresponding negative name is connotative likewise; but
in a peculiar way, connoting not the presence but the absence of an
attribute. Thus, not-white denotes all things whatever except white things;
and connotes the attribute of not possessing whiteness. For the non
possession of any given attribute is also an attribute, and may receive a
name as such; and thus 'negative concrete names may obtain negative
abstract names to correspond to them.' 27
Names which are positive in from are often negative in reality, and others
are really positive though their form is negative. The word inconvenient,
for example, dose not express the mere absence of convenience; it
expresses a positive attribute, that of being the cause of discomfort or
annoyance. So the word unpleasant, notwithstanding its negative form,
does not connote the mere absence of pleasantness, but a less degree of
what is signified by the word painful, which, it is hardly necessary to say,
is positive. Idle, on the other hand, is a word which, through positive in
form, expresses nothing but what would be signified either by the phrase
not working, or by the phrase not disposed to work; and sober, either by
not drunk or by not drunken.
According to Mill, 'there is a class of names called privative. ' 28 A
privative name is equivalent in its signification to a positive and a
negative name taken together; being the name of something which has
once had a particular attribute or for some other reason might have been
expected to have it, but which has it not. Such is the word blind, which is
not equivalent to not seeing or to not capable of seeing, for it would not,
except by a poetical or rhetorical figure be applied to stocks and stones. A
thing is not usually said to be blind, unless the class to which it is most

27
Ibid. p.l03.
28
Ibid. p. 11 1.

26
familiarly referred, or to which it is referred on the particular occasion, be
chiefly composed of things which can see, as in the case of a blind man,
or a blind horse; or unless it is supposed for any reason that it ought to
see; as in saying of a man, that he rushed blindly into an abyss, or of
philosophers or the clergy that the greater part of them are blind guides.
The names called privative, therefore connote two things: the absence of
certain attributes, and the presence of others, from which the presence
also of the former might naturally have been expected.
Critical observation of Mill's Theory of Proper Names
We have already stated that Mill actually brings the concept of proper
names in the arena of linguistic philosophy or philosophy of language.
Even though the later development of the theory of proper names takes
different philosophical implications, but there is no question of doubt that
philosophers like Russell and Frege took clues from Mill's theory of
proper names. Even the concept of proper name that we have noticed in
Kripke's philosophy is somehow or other is Millian. We think that
Millian understanding of the concept of proper name as non-connotative
impacts a lot on those linguistic philosophers who have developed no-
sense theory of proper name. In short, there is no question of doubt that
Mill's book A System of Logic brings a unique concept of proper names
on which linguistic philosophers later on pay much attention. In recent
time some philosophers, such as, Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny raise
some objections against Mill's theory of proper names. Mill held that the
meaning of a name is just the referent of the name. In this regard, he says,
" ... proper names are not connotative: they denote the individuals who are
called by them; but they do not indicate or imply any attribute as
belonging to those individuals. " 29 Devitt and Sterenly in their book
Language and Reality: An Introduction to Philosophy of Language go
29
Mill, A System ofLogic, op. cit. p.20

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over four well-known arguments against Mill's theory. In this regard,
they follow Frege and postulate sense. However, David Cole in his recent
paper entitled "A Defense of Mill's Theory ofNames" supported Mill by
giving plausible answers to the objections raised by Devitt and Sterelny
against Mill.
The first objection that has been raised by Devitt and Sterelny against
Mill is about identity statements. According to Devitt and Sterelny, the
statement 'Everest is Everest' is not informative, whereas the statement
"Everest is Gaurisank:er" is informative. On Mill's account, they have the
same meaning by virtue of the fact that they refer to the same object.
However, according to Devitt and Sterelny, the sentences as cited above
do differ meaning. As the sentences under consideration differ in
meaning, the names containing these sentences also differ in meaning.
Accordingly, Mill view is wrong because Mill tells us that the meaning of
a name is just the referent of the name.
To overcome this objection as raised by Devitt and Sterelny against Mill,
David Cole intends to say that this objection to Mill's theory turns on
epistemic considerations that are irrelevant to the semantics of names. By
arguing that the sentences differ in meaning, Devitt and Sterelny actually
have intended to say that as these sentences play different roles in
peoples' lives, "they are epistemically and cognitively so different" 30
However, Cole claims that they do not show that any of that sentence
bears on meaning, particularly on their prefer account of meaning in
terms of truth conditions. Cole then quips: why should we suppose that
the two sentences differ in truth-conditions, given that 'Everest' and
'Gaurisank:er' co-refer? How do we know that the first sentence is true? Is
it not a contingent rule that in a single context each occurrence of a name

30
Devitt and Sterelny, Language and Reality: An Introduction to Philosophy of Language,
Basil Blackwell, 1987, p.26.

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has the same referent as every other? If it does, then that only tells us
pseudo-apriori that the first is true, not what it means. Again if it does,
then Cole observes that someone could know that the first is true without
knowing what it means. Accordingly, the meaning of the referring term
"Everest" is irrelevant to the special epistemic status that the first
sentence enjoys. It enjoys that status only because of certain knowledge
we have about how our Janguage works. According to Cole, Mill perhaps
could concur that the two sentences differ in that we might know that the
first is true but not know that the second is true. However, this does not
lead us to assume that we come to know what either means, or do we
know that they differ in meaning. Let us consider the following t\vo meta-
statements:
"Everest" and " Everest" co-refer.
"Everest" and" Gaurisankar" co-refer.
If we carefully examine these statements, it seems to us that at this meta-
level, it is true on Mill's theory that the first statement is not informative,
but the second may be an important discovery. What then is the
discovery? According to Cole, the discovery is a discovery about the
same meaning of "Everest" and "Gaurisanker". As Mill's theory assumes
that the former sentence is inconsequential but the later can be an
important discovery, the difference can hardly be cited against Mill's
theory of name. Cole then concludes by saying that it is quite possible to
assume that at times sentences under consideration have the same
meaning even though not all people know this. When this happens, the
sentence will play different roles in those people's lives and may have
different epistemic status.
The second objection is about negative existence statements. Indeed
negative existence sentence creates immense trouble in philosophy of
language. According to Devitt and Sterelny, if Mill's view of proper

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name holds good then the true sentence "James Bond does not exist",
would have a subject term having no referent at all. As a result, it can be
said that ~ill's theory of name would lack all meaning as Mill
emphatically confessed that the referent is the only meaning a name has.
Now the problem that arises here is that how a sentence would be true
even if it subject term, i.e., the name indeed lacks referent.
According to Cole, sentence about existence statement as cited above
actually concerns the exotic or striking realm of truth in fiction. Perhaps
the sentence can best be understood as saying: The "James Bond"- stories
are fictional. In such a case even though, prima-facially, the works which
appear to refer to one "James Bond", but in real sense of the term "James
Bond" does not, in fact, refer. Such way of understating has been
attributed by Quine as "semantic ascent" where one can move to the
meta-level and produce paraphrases of the original sentence. This is
similar to the way we may treat the 'nobody' constructions in the King's
confusions in Alice in Wonderland. Here we use paraphrases to clarify
and avoid unwanted ontological commitment. In the process of
paraphrasing there we notice a considerable departure. Here what appears
to be a referential position in the original sentence does not occupy that
position in the paraphrases that more clearly capture the truth-conditions.
As the sentence under consideration is fictional, the paraphrase involves
talking about certain myths and works of fiction. This moves, Cole
opines, however, does not involve us in assuming that " James Bond"
refers to a" fictional character" nor even to an idea so to speak; rather it
simply suggests that like "nobody", " James Bond" does not refer to
anyone or anything at all.
The second objection of Devitt and Sterelny about negative existence
statement actually leads to the third objection that has been termed as
Empty Names Objections. According to Devitt and Sterelny, the sentence

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 'James Bond is disgustingly successful'- is true. But on Mill's account
the sentence could not be true as the subject term of the sentence under
consideration does not denote. As the subject term fails to denote
anything, it would be meaningless and this, in tum, would make the
sentence meaningless. Devitt and Sterelny thus elevate objection by
saying that don't try to tell us it refers to a fictional character which gives
us all sense of reality or do not pretend to being it scientific or an idea.
In replying the objection raised by Devitt and Sterelny against Mill, Cole
inclines to say that this sentence and other sentences, very similar to this,
are misleading in nature which does not hamper Mill's original position
of proper names. Indeed, Cole observes, these are peculiar constructions
on which to rest a refutation of a theory. In fact, anyone who did not
know the Fleming stories would indeed suppose that there was a real
person named "James Bond" Therefore, Cole claims that prima facially
this sentence appears to be misleading. Even one should not reject out
rightly the concept of truth in fiction. Even David Lewis holds that truth
conditions are close to those in "Truth in Fiction". In case of truth in
fiction, we do enter into a little make-believe pretence where the stories
are supposed to be true. Accordingly, it has been suggested by saying that
there is no incompatibility with Mill's theory as far as handing fictional
truth we are talking about. According to Cole, if "James Bond" actually
denoted a person with the biography set forth by Fleming that person
would be disgustingly successful. Cole insists that in the original
sentence, we are not trying to refer by uttering "James Bond", rather we
are making a claim about the representations made in the novels.
The fourth objection has been termed as opacity by Devitt and Sterelny.
According to Devitt and Sterelny, sentences such as:
(a) Falwell believes Bob Dylan corrupted America and

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 (b) Falwel does not believe Robert Zimmerman corrupted America
are both true.
However, as far as Mill's theory is concerned Bob Dylan and Robert
Zimmerman are the same person because these names mean the same
thing. As a result, it can be said that both the sentences mean the same
thing ( compositionality). However, the only notable distinction is that
sentence (a) is affirmative; whereas sentence (b) is negative. However,
Devitt and Sterelny claim that on the basis of these sentences, it can be
said that Mill's theory actually suffers from contradiction. According to
Cole the problem with this objection actually lies in finding out the
correct distinction between referring and mentioning. Linguistic
philosophers often confuse in finding out the subtle distinction between
mentioning and referring. Accordingly, if we do not use the names "Bob
Dylan" and "Robert Zimmerman" in terms of referring but to use and
understand these names in terms of mentioning, then the objection that
has been raised by Devitt and Sterelny against Mill in terms of opacity
does not find its foothold. According to Cole, here we are describing a
certain mental representation that Falwell has. Even if Falwell believes
"Boby Dylan corrupted America", and also even if he believes " Bob
Dylan" is a name of a person who corrupted America, this does not make
inconsistent with Mill's view. According to Cole, in de dicta belief
attribution the attributer is not using the terms in the attribution, and
importantly is not using them to refer. Further, an atheist, Cole opines,
does not contradict himself in saying "Falwell believes God will punish
Bob Dylan". This is simply for the fact that here on account of de die to
readings of belief attribution, there is mention of terms where referring is
irrelevant. Further, let us consider a parallel argument to this objection to
Mill, which does not tum on Mill's theory but rather on ordinary
synonymy: Falwell believes telling lies is immortal, but Falwell does not

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believe mendacity is immortal. Here the term 'mendacity' and 'telling
lies' mean the same thing. Accordingly, the sentences are contradictory in
the sense that both are true even though they possess different sense. Cole
thus suggests that the problem that has been raised by Devitt and Sterelny
against Mill's theory will be solved if we do not take the opaque contexts
as use, but as mention. There is nothing wrong in claiming that two
expressions that mean the same thing might appear in otherwise identical
de- dicta belief attributions where the one be true and the other be false.
Accordingly, there is nothing surprising if this actually happens with
names. If it does, then there remains nothing wrong in Mill's theory.
Therefore, the objection that has been raised against Mill's theory in
terms of opacity fails to stand up .

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