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TABLE of CONTENTS
No.

I. INTRODUCTION:

II. Doctrine of Constitutional Interpretation:

A) Doctrine of Territorial Nexus
B) Doctrine of Harmonious Construction
C) Doctrine of Pith and Substance
D) Doctrine of Repugnancy
E) Doctrine of Colourable Legislation

III. CONCLUSION:

BIBLIOGRAPHY:
Doctrine of Constitutional Interpretation -

I. INTRODUCTION

The constitution is the supreme and fundamental law of our

country. Since it is written in the form of a statute, the general
principles of statutory interpretation are applicable to the
interpretation of the constitution as well. As is the case with any
other statute, the court tries to find out the intention of the
framers of the constitution from the words used by them.
For example, in the case of State of Bihar vs Kameshwar Singh
AIR 1952, SC used one of the standard principles of interpretation
that where more than one reasonable interpretation of a
constitutional provision are possible, that which would ensure the
smooth and harmonious working of the constitution shall be
accepted rather than the one that would lead to absurdity or give
rise to practical inconvenience, or make well existing provisions of
existing law nugatory while interpreting the constitution.
However, even if an argument based on the spirit of the
constitution is very attractive, it must be validated with the spirit
of the constitution as reflected by the words of the constitution.
In the same case mentioned above, SC observed that the spirit of
the constitution cannot prevail if the language of the constitution
does not support that view.

II. Doctrine of Constitutional Interpretation:

A) Doctrine of Territorial Nexus

Under the Indian conception of federalism, a state law that has

operation outside the given state is invalid. The doctrine of
territorial nexus is invoked to find out if the law in question has
an operation beyond its jurisdiction. This doctrine stipulates that:

1. Territory: The object to which a particular law applies does

not have to be located within the strict territory of the state.
Instead, it needs to have a sufficient territorial connection to
the enacting state.
 2. Subject: There needs to be a territorial nexus between the
state enacting the law and the law‟s subject matter. The
connection must be real and not illusory, as laid down
in Shrikant Bhalchandra Karulkar v. State Of Gujarat, 1994.
Moreover, the liability imposed must be pertinent and
relevant to the connection.

State of Bombay v. RMDC, 1957

In the given case, a lottery was conducted via a newspaper. This

newspaper had wide circulation within the State of Bombay, but
quite a bit outside the state too. The Bombay Government levied
a lump sum tax on lotteries. The tax extended to the circulation
and distribution of newspapers that were published outside the
state. This tax was challenged in court. The Apex Court reasoned
that even though newspapers were published and had wide
circulation outside the state, collectors of the entry fees for the
competition were within Bombay. Thus, there was sufficient
territorial nexus and the tax was held to be valid.

State of Bombay v. Narayandas Mangilal, 1957

In the mid-1950s, the Bombay legislature criminalized bigamous

marriages, including marriages entered into outside the state if
one party was domiciled in Bombay. In the State of Bombay v.
Narayandas Mangilal, (1957), the Supreme court struck down this
law due to lack of sufficient territorial nexus concerning marriages
performed outside the state, even if one person lived in the state.

B) Doctrine of Harmonious Construction

The doctrine of harmonious construction applies to cases where

provisions of the same statute seem to contradict. The doctrine is
based on the presumption that-
  The legislature did not intend to give one provision
importance and consequently neglect another; or

 To cause or maintain any contradiction between the two.

This doctrine was profusely explained in the case of Sultana

Begum v. Premchand Jain, (1996). The Hon‟ble Supreme Court
said that these conflicting provisions should be understood in a
way to ensure that neither is ignored. In Jagdish Singh v. Lt.
Governor, Delhi, (1997), it was held that this doctrine requires
reading the statute as a whole construing it in a way in which
neither is ineffective.

Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, 1951

Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, (1951) addressed the

objective of this doctrine. It said that in the case of two articles
that are widely phrased and conflict in their operation, the
doctrine of harmonious construction requires them to be
controlled and qualified by the other.

Ram Krishan v. Vinod, 1951

In the given case, there was a contradiction between

the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Section
33 empowered government servants to nominate candidates
seeking election. However, Section 123 prescribed that no
government servant can assist any candidate to an election
except by way of casting votes.

The Supreme Court harmoniously construed both the provisions.

It allowed government servants to nominate as well as vote for
candidates. However, no other forms of assistance could be
provided.
Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, 1955

The given case conceded the limits of this doctrine. It held that in
cases of conflict between provisions, they should be construed in
a way in which both are effective and in harmony. However, in
case this harmony is not possible, the useless provision can be
ignored if there is no compulsion of its adoption.

C) Doctrine of Pith and Substance

Perhaps the most widely applied doctrine, „pith and substance‟

means the „true nature and character‟. It is used to determine
what the true nature of an enactment is and which list or
legislative domain it falls under. To determine this, the court
needs to look at:

1. The enactment as a whole;

2. Its main objects; and

3. The effect and scope of its provisions.

If a legislature encroaches on the field of another legislature, the

court looks at whether this encroachment is in fact, in substance
or merely incidental to the statute. The primary essence and
object are differentiated from its ultimate or incidental results.

In determining the true nature, the name given to the statute is

immaterial. Even if the purpose laid down in its Statement of
Object and Reasons is wrong, it would not per se render the
statute invalid. Instead, the statute needs to be viewed as an
organic whole.

This doctrine allows some flexibility to the rigid scheme of

distribution of powers in the Indian Constitution. The rationale
provided is that if every slight or incidental encroachment is
struck down, the legislature‟s power would be severely curtailed.
and it would not be able to carry out its duties.
Premchand Jain v. R.K. Chhabra, 1984

In case the encroachment is merely incidental, the act would not,

as a rule, be invalid. This was reiterated in Premchand Jain v.
R.K. Chhabra, (1984). The Apex Court held that if an enactment
substantially falls within the powers conferred by the Constitution
upon the enacting legislature, it cannot be held to be invalid
merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters assigned to
another legislature.

State of Bombay v. Narottamdas, 1950

In the given case, it was held that to save the incidental

encroachment, it needs to be proven that the pith and substance
of the law fall within its enacting legislature. In other words, the
validity of the statute is not determined by the degree of
encroachment (though it is a relevant consideration) but by the
true nature of the enactment. If the pith and substance fall under
the enacting legislature‟s domain, the law is upheld.

Krishna v. State of Madras, 1956

In 1937, the Madras Prohibition Act was passed. Over a decade

later, this act was challenged for laying down procedures and
principles of evidence for the trial of the accused. The appellants
claimed contradiction between the procedure and principles in the
madras act as opposed to the central Criminal Procedure Code,
1973. However, the court upheld the law on the grounds that the
given law was simply ancillary to the central one. This law, in pith
and substance, was related to intoxicating liquors, a matter under
the state list.

The given case embodies a censure of this doctrine. Critics claim

it gives the judiciary too much discretion. Courts are empowered
to affix their interpretation of the character of law and determine
its validity.

D) Doctrine of Repugnancy

Article 254(1)

Article 254(1) stipulates that if a state law is repugnant, i.e.,

incompatible with a law that:

 the Parliament is competent to enact, or

 an existing law under the concurrent list.

Then, the central or existing law prevails over one made by the
state. The state law is void to the extent of such repugnancy.
Which law was enacted earlier is not considered.

In the case of repugnancy, the repugnant provisions of the state

law do not become ultra vires. They simply eclipse. If the central
law is repealed, they become operative again.

The doctrine of Pith and Substance is utilized to determine if the

true nature falls to a matter under the concurrent list. In case the
repugnancy is to central law, it is considered if the parliament
intended to lay down an exhaustive code on the matter. If not,
any qualification or restriction can not be considered repugnant to
the state law.

Article 254(2)

However, Article 254(2) can save a state law under the

concurrent list if there arises any repugnancy to a central law on
the same matter. Presidential assent to the state act would allow
it to override any provisions of the central act. However, the
inconsistent provisions must be applied to the state only.
Moreover, the laws must be on the same matter, not two
different fields. If there is no central law on the matter under the
concurrent list, the state law would stand.

While obtaining presidential assent, it needs to be specified that

assent is sought for repugnancy to a particular act. Failure would
make the state law invalid. However, the Parliament can not
repeal any state law in the Concurrent list if it is not repugnant to
the central law on the same matter.

The Supreme court placed yet another limit on the state act.
In Pt. Rishikesh v. Salma Begum (1995), it held that if a state act
has received the assent of the President and subsequently, the
centre enacts another law conflicting with the state act, the
central law would prevail.

Srinivasa Raghavachar v. State of Karnataka, 1987

The present case dealt with a state law restricting legal

practitioners from appearing before land tribunals. The state was
held invalid on grounds of repugnancy to the Advocates Act,
1961.

Sukumar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, 1993

The West Bengal State Health Service Act, (1990) barred any
member of the state health service from carrying on private
practices. This was disputed in Sukumar Mukherjee v. State of
West Bengal, (1993) on the grounds that it was repugnant to
the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956. Enacted by the centre
under the concurrent list, the 1956 Act allowed any practitioner
on the Indian Medical Register to practice in any part of the
country.

The Apex Court held that this case was different from
the Srinivasa Raghavachar v. State of Karnataka, (1987) case
since legal practitioners did not, through a voluntary act of
consent, give up the rights to practice for joining the state
service. In this case, they did. The state law did not intend to
regulate the medical profession in general, only its health service.
Thus, the state law was upheld.

Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka, 1990

The given case held that repugnancy must only concern a matter
in the concurrent list. Additionally, if the subject matters of the
legislation were different, they would stand together. However,
the dissenting opinion claimed that the two provisions would “run
on a collision course”, and be irreconcilable. Thus, the state law
must be struck down. The doctrine of Pith and Substance does
not need to be applied here.

Variyar Thavathiru Sundara Swamigal Medical Education &

Charitable Trust v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1996

This case is one where repugnancy between a central and state

statute is ambiguous. A Tamil Nadu statute dealing with the
affiliation of medical colleges was challenged on grounds of
repugnance against the Indian Medical Council Act. Both laws
were enacted under the concurrent list. However, the provisions
of the state act did not collide with the central one and it was
possible to follow both.

However, the Court held that the parliament intended to lay down
an exhaustive code on the subject for the entire country. This
made it repugnant to the state act, which was consequently
declared invalid.
E) Doctrine of Colourable Legislation

The doctrine of Colourable Legislation is based on the maxim

„what cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly‟. It
restricts legislatures from indirectly doing something which, due
to want of jurisdiction, they can not do directly. This
encroachment may be direct or indirect. In the case of the latter,
the expression „colourable legislation‟ is applied. In other words,
colourable legislation is a „fraud on the constitution‟.

The court employs the doctrine of Pith and Substance to

determine if the legislature is competent to enact the disputed
statute. The extent of encroachment is a relevant factor while
determining if the enactment is colourable legislation.

State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, 1952

The current case was to dispute the constitutional validity of

the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. The law provided that rent for
the landlord‟s land, before the date of acquisition of his holding,
was to vest with the state. However, half of this was to be given
to the landlord as compensation.

The Supreme Court opined this was naked confiscation as taking

of the whole and returning a half means nothing other than
taking half. While its purported object was to lay down principles
for compensation, the actual object was simply confiscation- a
subject under the concurrent list. The Bihar Land Reforms Act
was thus a piece of colourable legislation and hence, void.

Naga People‟s Movement for Human Rights v. Union of India,

1997

In this case, the Supreme Court clarified that the doctrine of

Colourable Legislation is applicable only in cases where-

1. The real intention is camouflaged; and

 2. With the motive to encroach into the domain of another
legislature.

The purpose of legislation may be different from what it appears.

However, it is not a case of Colourable Legislation if it does not
deal with the competency of the legislature to enact it. The
doctrine does not take into account if the law was enacted
with bona fide or mala fide motives. The only question that merits
consideration is if the substance of a statute falls under the
enacting legislature‟s domain or not.

IV. Conclusion

Though borrowed from principles and ideas from across the

world, the given doctrines were adapted to suit the Indian
context. The Indian model of centre-state relations is neither
unitary nor federal. It is a hybrid of both, best described by the
phrase „quasi-federal‟. This has caused commenters to remark
that the Indian Constitution is ‘federal in structure and unitary in
spirit‟.

The comment seems to be justified if one looks at the theories of

constitutional interpretation with respect to centre-state relations
in India. These doctrines are chosen, modified and applied in a
way to give the centre‟s opinion more weight than the state‟s. As
we have observed, in cases of infringement of its legislative
competence, the doctrines tend to be biased towards the union
legislature. This proves that India is „a federal state with a unitary
bias‟.
 C BIBLIOGRAPHY:
i.
ii.
iii. https://blog.ipleaders.in/what-are-the-doctrines-under-the-indian-
constitution/
iv. https://blog.ipleaders.in/theories-of-constitutional-interpretation-
concerning-centre-state-relations-in-india/
v. https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/principles-of-constitutional-
interpretation
vi. https://thelawcommunicants.com/principles-of-constitutional-
interpretation/
vii. https://www.scribd.com/document/353958392/1-Principles-of-
Constitutional-Interpretation-1