1 Executive Summary

2 This paper discusses the difference in the operations management approach taken by
3 Boeing and Airbus with respect to the 787 Dreamliner and the A380 program. It will also
4 delve in the competitive interactions between Boeing and Airbus and their competition to
5 for the Large Commercial Aircraft (LCA) and the supply chain methodology used for the
6 respective programs.
7
8 A conclusion will be provided emphasizing on Boeings adoption of an updated supply
9 chain model for the 787 Dreamliner program which represent a significant break from past
10 programs. This allowed Boeings third party vendors an unprecedented role in terms of
11 their contribution to the design, development and production of the allocated component.
12 Airbus, with the A380 program relied heavily as well on its major suppliers to finish the
13 program, but acted as the main integrator following a more traditional model and exercised
14 better control of all designs.
15
16 Introduction to the Chosen Organizations
17 Boeing and Airbus are the two leading aviation companies based in the United States and
18 some of the European Union State’s respectively. Boeing the leader in aerospace is also
19 the largest builder of commercial and military planes and for over 40 years has been the
20 vanguard of civil aviation. Boeing initially supported the world war II by manufacturing
21 B17s and B29s through the B52s of the Cold War. By leveraging its manufacturing and
22 defense experience Being has become the world’s leading commercial aircraft company.
23 It manufactures passenger fleet aircraft across 5 categories consisting of 14 models. A big
24 part of their success is that about 85% of the airline industries current fleet and, until
25 recently, regularly captured 60-80% of orders and deliveries. The flagship of the Boeing
26 fleet, the 747-400, holds 412 passengers in the standard three-class configuration and as
27 many as 550 in certain “high-density,” all-coach configurations used mainly on Asia
28 routes. Boeing’s clientele extends to 145 countries around the world, and it is the number
29 one U.S. exporter in terms of sales. Headquartered in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., Boeing
30 employs more than 153,000 people in more than 67 countries. On the other hand,
31
32 Fig. 1 – Total Order of Airbus vs Boeing 2007 to 2018 type
 33 Airbus rolled
34 out the A300 a
35 first of its kind
36 a wide-body
37 twin engine
38 passenger jet
39 35 years ago.
40 Founded in
41 1970 the
42 Airbus
43 Industrie was a
44 consortium of
45 aerospace
46 companies in
47 Germany
48 (Deutsche
49 Aerospace,
50 now a Daimler-
51 Chrysler
52 subsidiary known as DASA), France (Aerospatiale Matra), England (Britain’s Hawker
53 Siddeley, later BAE Systems), and Spain (Construcciones Aeronauticas, CASA). With a
54 headquarter in Toulouse, France, Airbus, produces a wide- range of passenger aircraft and
55 employs 55,000 people worldwide. All of its airplanes employ “fly-by-wire” technology
56 which is a mechanical link between the pilot and the aircraft’s control surfaces rather than
57 computerized control. This technology along with a common cockpit design help describe
58 why Airbus received over half the orders for large aircraft for the first time in 1999, even
59 though its share of deliveries was only 33% by number and 30% by value that year.
60
61 Explain the aspects of Operations Management that both Boeing and Airbus have,
62 how they differ and which aspect of their OM practices contribute to the failure of
63 Boeing 787 Dreamliner.
64
65 AIRBUS A380
66 The Airbus A380 was designed to challenge Boeings’ market share on the large wide
67 body aircraft. The program positioned the A380 to take full advantage of the Hub and
68 Spoke model, wherein Airbus expects more traffic between international hubs, with the
69 large airports’ constraints in slots, the A380 maximizes the yield per slot for each
70 connecting flight. The Airbus A380 program contrasting facility focused its supplier
71 coordination in countries based mostly in Europe. France, Germany, Britain and Spain
72 represent the main countries where Airbus subassemblies where outsourced. Unlike
73 Boeing, Airbus kept inhouse the development of the core skills for the A380 program.
74 The program worked closely with their suppliers and usually refers with them during the
75 initial phase itself. This allowed the A380 program to include their suppliers all through
76 the initial stage of the project and was able resolve right away any remaining
 77 manufacturing issues. The suppliers underwent a manufacturing training provided by
78 Airbus, as such was keep a close track on the financial as well as the technical capabilities
79 of each supplier (Mocenco, 2015). In addition, selected suppliers take full responsibility
80 of the program assigned to them unlike the risk sharing approach taken by Boeing. To
81 better improve coordination within the A380 program, Airbus streamlined its information
82 system within the network wherein a single platform portal was created for document
83 and specification sharing as well as to manage inventory levels and orders.
84
85 BOEING 787 Dreamliner
86 The initial plans for the promised 787 Dreamliner which was once referred to as the most
87 cutting-edge and sophisticated airplane to be manufactured (Marsh, 2009). This was
88 supported by an article of Venables (2013) who stated that the 787 Dreamliner program
89 had a world class standard design with the main goal of providing exceptional service to
90 passengers. Adapting this decision for the 787 Dreamliner program was supported by
91 various airline companies with an overwhelming response. In 16th November, 2008, a total
92 of 895 Dreamliner was ordered from Boeing Company coming from highly reputable
93 airline organization. With a planned delivery date of September 2009, Boeing was only
94 able to make its first delivery of 787 Dreamliner two years later on September 2011. The
95 initial business strategy that was formulated for the 787 Dreamliner program was not up to
96 standard and this was exacerbated by suppliers lack of communication.
97
98 These issues that happened during the development stage and their deviation to the
99 traditional supply chain strategy, which was adapted for the 787 Dreamliner program (Fig.
100 2) are among the factors that drove the 787 Dreamliner to go over budget thus creating an
101 unfavourable circumstances for Boeing (Fig 3).
102
103 Fig.2 Traditional SC Management vs. 787 Dreamliner SC Management

104
105
106 Compared to the 737 Boeing program the 787 Dreamliner outsourced 70% of its
107 components (Fig. 4). From the manufacturing sectors development point of view, Boeings
108 main suppliers in Spain and Japan lacked responsibility and expertise as they were
109 unsuccessful in the development and manufacturing of the essential components
110 themselves nor did they take any measures to finish the parts that were listed as primary
111 components from other suppliers thus causing delay to the entire process, such incident
112 affected the testing the quality of the components delivered and ultimately had to be re-
113 engineered and calibrated which greatly affected the programs schedule(Sodhi & Tang,
114 2012).
115
116 Fig. 3 – Boeing 737 vs. 787 Dreamliner SCM Strategy
Components 737 Program 787 Program

Sourcing strategy Outsource 35-50% Outsourced 70%

Traditional supplier relationship Strategic partners with Tier-1
Supplier Relationship
(purely contract based) suppliers
Develop and produced parts for Develop and produce entire
Supplier responsibilities
Boeing section for 787 program
Thousands of suppliers supplying Approximately 50 tier-1 strategic
Number of suppliers
directly partners
Supply contracts Fixe price contract with delay penalty Risk sharing contracts
30 days from Boeing to perform final 3 days assembly of complete
Assembly operations
assembly section
117 Fig. 4 – Outsourcing Strategy – Supply Chain Problems
118 Expounding on the lack
119 of oversight while
120 adapting a new supply
121 chain model and the poor
122 vendor selection the
123 following factors
124 contributed to the delay
125 of the 787 Dreamliner. It
126 was on the 10th of
127 November 2013 that the
128 first sign of faultiness The
129 first sign of faultiness was
130 discovered by Japan
131 Airlines. The 787
132 Dreamliner developed a
133 serious problem with the
134 battery component which
135 obligated the airline to ground the Dreamliner flights operated by Japan airlines This gave
136 rise to a significant cost overrun and interruption in flight services (Williard et. al, 2013).
137 It was later discovered after careful investigation that the lithium ion batteries used on the
138 1st batch of 787 Dreamliner generated a severe amount of heat when used under the thermal
139 runaway. The conducted examination determined that due to mechanical deformations,
140 several cells of the lithium ion batteries failed which caused the vent discs to burst. Another
141 factor that delayed the program was due to the shortage of fasteners in October 2007. The
142 procedure to order the fasteners became a tough approach as it was being used by the
143 supplier to get a better rate for the component thus resulted in further delays. Due to this
144 delay the aircrafts major systems was not fitted and calibrated in the proposed time. Gates
145 (2008) added that the 787 Dreamliner program suffered additional delays when some of
146 the fasteners were installed improperly. Unprofessional work ethics was prevalent among
147 the suppliers and one of the major factors that contributed behind these delays as they did
148 not document their work properly as per the standard of the federal authorities (Elahi,
149 Sheikhzadeh, & Lamba, 2012).
150
151 Fig. 5 – Global Origins of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner

152
153 5 Dreamliner sub assembly plan (Source: Everet, Washington Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
154 Seattle)
155
156 Examine the need for any suitable change in Boeing’s Operations plan.
157
158 Supply Chain Leadership – For the manufacturing process to be effective, risk
159 coordination is required between Boeing and its supliers for them to be successful in
160 adapting the multi-tier supply chain. Having adopted this supply chain model, it is
161 paramount to have a leader who has the expertise and experience to lead the program
162 team. Without the appropriate experience and skills to bring about the proper
163 implementation of the unconventional supply chain, by not hiring the proper people to
164 Boeing was bound to make the mistakes they have suffered during the planning and
165 development of the program.
166
167 Improved Supplier Selection, Training and Integration - It is vital to have strict
168 supplier screening process to guarantee the qualification, expertise and the capacity to
169 deliver of the vendor in order for the program to achieve its goals. Similarly, all third-
170 party partners should have been provided with suitable training for them to perform the
171 standard and deliver the expected component without compromise.
172 Risk Assessment – One of the advantages of outsourcing is that it allows risk sharing
173 between the client and the third-party as such it is used commonly to mitigate risks.
174 Boeing extensively used the outsourcing model for the 787 Dreamliner program, having
175 outsourced 70% of the production and development of whole airple component prior to
176 conducting an in-depth risk assessment of its suppliers capability (Denning, 2013a).
177 Though this approach initially decreases the estimated financial risk of Boeing, due to
178 the poor selection and integration of suppliers it increased it execution risk. With the
179 inherent technological complexity of the 787 Dreamliner program along with numerous
180 miscommunications done by the program management team including its engineers
181 caused disorder and delay in the systems and parts assembly. Boeing could have avoided
182 multiple developmental and production issues and should have put the program in a better
183 position if they were able to do consider and address the risk involved in the 787
184 Dreamliner program. (Mahmoodi 2009)
185
186 Cost Estimation – Having full understanding of all the cost involved in the program is
187 a critical input to be considered for decision making to avoid cost overrun. Though the
188 outsourcing model was suppose to save Boeing money, what was not considered in the
189 cost estimation was the hidden cost of integration, cooperation and collaboration which
190 augmented the total cost of the program and time needed to make the any necessary
191 design changes as the new process had to go through multi-tiered suppliers.
192 Consideration should also be taken to include underlying costs specially when adapting
193 new models that would affect the planning and eventually the end result of your product.
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206 Develop an operations strategy that could solve the problems of Boeing in this 787 Dreamliner program.
207 Fig. 6 – Fishbone Diagram
Human Machine Measurement

Lack of expertise and technical training Lack of Q/A equipment Inadequate testing of components

Human error during testing of components Poor integration of 3rd party machines No inventory oversight

Poorly written instructions by Boeing

engineers confused and misled its workforce

Dismal planning and forecasting

Labor union strikes

Faults - Boeing
787 Dreamliner
Process Materials Environment

Selected SCM was unproven for the scale of Inaccurate guidelines on required materials Third Party did not have capital to start
the project manufacturing
Poor quality on selected materials
Poor vendor selection and integration Prolong discussion on manufacturing to get a
better pricing
Inadequate tracking of documentations,
revision and solutions Third part does not have the expertise for the
manufacturing of the components awarded
Structural flaw in design and engineering
208 No manufacturing/production area
209 Understand and evaluate the current supply chain management practices and
210 suggest any improvement if needed.
211 With a plan to reduce upto 57% of the cost to to develop the 787 Dreamliner program,
212 from USD7.3 billion to USD 4.2 billion and manufacturing time of 2 years (B.D.
213 Pritchard and Macpherson 2004) Boeing adapted a new supply chain management model.
214 Boeing based their new supply chain model on a revised version of the Toyota supply
215 chain which has not been applied by aviation industry. To complete an approximate of
216 50 components for the 787 Dreamliner program the unconventional supply chain relied
217 on numerous suppliers before Boeing can complete the assembly of the aircraft. This
218 practice was far different from the tradional “build-to-print” model followed by Boeing
219 from their previous projects. With the “build-to-print” model their suppliers are provided
220 components or parts description that were then delivered to complete the assembly which
221 was done in the Boeing premises (B.D. Pritchard and Macpherson 2004).
222
223 Paramount to a manufacturing process of a multi-tier supply chain is risk coordination
224 with partners (Denning 2013a). With a turn over time of only three days to complete the
225 aircraft, it is crucial for the program to have a synchronized information sharing on their
226 supply/demand, logistics and including delays.
227
228 Fig. 7 - Redesigned supply chain for the Dreamliner program

229
230 Source: (Airwaysnews.com, 2014)
231
232 • The visibility in the supply chain process must be enhanced to ensure that
233 problems are resolved in a timely manner as per the schedule. It has to be
234 considered that adapting new outsourcing models adds complexity requiring the
235 need for better visibility and control.
236 • Improve supplier selection and training procedure. It is crucial to have a firm
237 supplier selection procedure to guarantee the vendors qualifications in relations
238 to:
239 o Expertise
240 o Quality of product
241 o Capacity to delivery on time
242
243 To ensure potential problems are minimize, Boeing needs to provide it’s expertise to its
244 suppliers in the form of quality inspection, supplier management as well as technical
245 support (Dr. L.J. Hart-Smith).
246
247 A comprehensive screening and selection method would have alleviated some of the
248 damages caused. The evaluation of the capabilities and the expertise in supply chain
249 management of each suppliers necessitates more scrutiny than what was allocated (Tang
250 and Zimmerman 2009)
251 • Provide a shared template and process that various groups, departments and
252 suppliers can adhere to and an audit mechanism to ensure that all steps taken in
253 solving a problem or any new project development are adhered to resulting in a
254 uniform approach in finding solutions.
255 • Plan and manage program tracking and reporting, taking into consideration
256 cultural practices of its multinational supply chain. Also, arrange an appropriate
257 incentive for all suppliers to use the Boeing a singular platform to ensure accurate
258 data and timely knowledge sharing.
259
260 Fig. 8 – PERT/CPM

2 ES -1
EF - 1 3 ES -1
EF - 7 5 ES -7
EF - 8
6
ES -8
EF - 10

1 ES - 0
EF - 0 1015 ES -

EF -
16

4 ES - 1
EF - 1 7 ES - 1
EF - 2 8 ES - 5
EF - 6 9

261
Expected Time /
Activity No. Name of the work ES EF LS LF Slack
Month(s)
1-2 Process Chart Development 1 0 1 0 1 0
2-3 Finding of Error(s) 6 1 7 1 7 0
1-4 Selection of Vendor 1 0 1 0 1 0
3-5 Error Report Summary 1 7 8 7 8 0
5-6 Engineering of Parts 2 8 10 8 10 0
4-7 Recalibration 1 1 2 1 2 0
 6-8 Parts Procurement 3 10 13 10 13 0
7-8 Parts Testing 1 5 6 13 14 6
9-10 Parts Calibration 1 14 15 14 15 0
10-11 Final Testing 1 15 16 15 16 0
Finish

262 Figure 9 - Gantt Chart – Activities

Activity 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18

Finding of Fault

Vendor Analysis

Final Fault Report

Re-engineering

Re-assessment of vendor

Ordering and Supply

Testing of Parts

Re-integration Testing

Testing
263
264
265 Critical analysis of the tools that Boeing and Airbus make use of.
266 SAP ERP/Information System – This tool provides extremely important information
267 where it is continuously monitored on levels of supply chain including the production
268 process performance, operations, financial aspect and strategy. Based on Kachelmaier
269 (2017) with the SAP application management contract, both Boeing and Airbus service
270 advisors grant remote help for company staff to troubleshoot problems that occur in the
271 current system operation. In addition to this Airbus also uses SupplyOn for its supply
272 chain IS with the aim to improve the logistic process through a practical platform that
273 ensure transparency with suppliers.
274
275 Material Management Service – As per the Supply Dynamics article (2018) both
276 airlines use material demand aggregation which is the practice on improving cost,
277 catalogue, service levels, cycle time across the extended supply chain. This is done by
278 focusing on the component demand of third party suppliers in connection to raw material
279 and off-the shelf items.
280
281 Inventory Management – Both companies developed their own inventory management
282 systems which enables their inventory department to automatically replenish automatic
283 low-value inventory and repairable parts. Satair (2017) added to optimized procurement
284 of inventories, consumption should be managed based on historical data along with
285 agreed inventory levels. With this system Airbus was able to reduce cost related to
286 inventory replacement and avoided unnecessary storage of outmoded items.
287
288 Systems Integration – Systems engineering was the original concept where systems
289 integration was derived from; it is the work of organizing and bringing together various
290 processes of the development and production of complex new products i.e. systems
291 (Johnson, 1997). It was conceptualized from the 1940s to 1960s to provide better
292 coordination and control in the development of complex aerospace and computing systems
293 predominantly used by the US government. Mainly, an engineering element of production
294 process, systems engineering was the latest stage of methodology of product development,
295 it is the final integration of the part built by third parties involved in a program. It also
296 includes an audit process of the final product once all the components are assembled
297 (Johnson, 2003). In it lies upon the commitment of third-party suppliers to collaborate
298 with other partners with the willingness to develop required capabilities and expertise.
299
300 Lean Management - Both companies applies the Lean by Design thinking in their
301 production and non-production departments. Lean management increases value through
302 processes that eliminate or greatly diminish waste. Rather than viewing lean principles
303 simply as a cost cutting practice, the main intention for its adoption was to add greater
304 value to the end product. By implementating an amalgamation of Lean strategies , this
305 action has shown significant improvement on the over all manufacturing processes.
306 Boeing has achieved 70% improvements in its resource productivity this is compared to
307 30% resource productivity prior to the implemention of the Lean initiatives, While
308 Airbus, went to Porsche to assist them with the training, planning of the lean principle.
309 With Lean Management Airbus was able to improve operational control through
310 introduction of standard operating procedures. Enhancing their supplier capability
311 assessments and improved synchronization of extended supply chain activities.
312
313 The role of IT in the case of both Boeing and Airbus.
314 Technological advancement has been the driving force behind the aviation industry in
315 general. Both Boeing and Airbus takes advantage of this technology to provide significant
316 impact on the safety, efficiency, capability, capacity, financial performance and handling
317 of big data.
318
319 Boeing
320 Base on Boeings’ own site, the aircraft company uses a cloud-based system environment
321 which integrates data directly with the airline’s systems which then provides real-time
322 performance data which is used by the numerous departments in. The data gathered from
323 the software allows the airline to make the necessary corrections to planning, with the
324 objective of maintaining a proper aircraft. The system is also configured in managing the
325 supply chain across multiple strategic partners which was established to monitor numerous
326 activities carried out by sub-contractors. In a bid to accomplish efficient synergy between
327 all its partners in different parts of the world, this can be accomplished by providing a
328 timely control over the supply and demand as well as other forward or reverse process.
329 Below are some examples of the tools currently in use and can be accessed thru
330 MyBoeingFleet.com.
331
332 Maintenance Performance Toolbox. This tool offers operators with real time fleet
333 maintenance report using intelligent documents and visual navigation systems. This allows
334 streamlining the distribution and management of technical components, including
335 instructions at the point of use by airline operators.
336
337 Airplane Health Management (AHM). This online application allows operators to access
338 real-time information of an airplane during flight. When faults occur the data provided by
339 AHM is also used by the operator to get the plausible reasons and provides relative actions
340 including the efficiency of the solution based on historical data.
341
342 Electronic Flight Bag (EFB). The EFB is a general-purpose software application on the
343 flight deck that is also incorporated to the airplane’s avionics and communications. This
344 application is was created to to improve and reduce the cost for taxiway and flight deck
345 safety by providing calculations of the airplane’s performance figures which in turn helps
346 improve awareness on the location of the aircraft. It also enhances the use of flight entry
347 strategies and serves as a gateway for operators for stored documents that can be retrieved
348 electronically.
349
350 Electronic Log Book. This application, which is built-in both the aircraft and on multiple
351 ground components, allows the airplane’s system to connect with the airline IT
352 infrastructure, providing data to the multiple departments giving them the capability to
353 schedule the airplane operation and maintenance and resolve reported issues during a time
354 when the airplane is available which in turn alleviate the cost to the airline.

355 Airbus

356 Is adapting the Internet of Things technology to its products as well as its manufacturing
357 process. This led to the so-called “cyber-physical” approach—which Airbus calls its
358 “Factory of the Future”. This technology helps streamline thousands of steps in the
359 assembly of an airplane, which can have as many as 400,000 bolts and screws alone and
360 uses more than 1,100 different tools. By adapting this innovative technology an Airbus
361 worker on the factory floor can now use a tablet or smart glasses to scan the metal skin of
362 an airplane and determine the size of the bolt and the required torque to install it for a given
363 hole. The same information can also be programed to a robotic tool, which will then
364 complete the task.

365 Another technology that Airbus has excelled on is the use of RFID in the Value Chain
366 Visibility program. It is in this field that Airbus have commanded the use of radio frequency
367 identification technology, to monitor components, logistics containers, subassemblies and
368 other critical assets. By being the first company to build this technology it has greatly
369 effected their value chain by providing better visibility and actionable information.

370 Conclusions and Recommendations.

371 An argument can be raised that Boeing tried to do too much at the same time, from building
372 a new aircraft with new materials and technology, adapting a new supply chain,
373 maintaining quality control and solving a long list of issues. It has to be noted as well that,
374 it is one thing to outsource non-core functions of your program to mitigate risk from the
375 company, but Boeing decided to outsource 70% of its program including design and
376 construction of the core program. It failed to comprehensively select and integrate their
377 third-party suppliers into their system, which in hindsight should have been a top priority
378 for the program. Relying heavily on an outsourcing model to accomplish majority of the
379 components required for this type program, supplier management is paramount. As such
380 the biggest take away from this paper is how vital it is to have a properly managed supply
381 chain more so for a program of this scale. It should also be taken into consideration for the
382 core functions/components to be done in-house or in close proximity of the main assembly
383 to have better quality control. Lastly, it is recommended for Boeing to consider a well-
384 seasoned leader in supply chain to manage such programs.

385 Task 2
386 1. Develop a project network diagram to visually display the whole project and
387 describe the project network diagram– (10 marks)
388 a. Total time required to complete the project if no delays occur – 44 Weeks
389 (Fig 3 & 5)
390 b. The start and finish of individual activities to meet the project completion
391 deadline – Fig 4 & 5
392 c. The start and finish of individual activities if no delays occur – Fig 3 & 5
393 d. Critical activities where any delays must be avoided to prevent delaying
394 project completion – Fig 5
395 e. The delay that can be tolerated for other activities, without delaying
396 project completion. – Fig 3
397
PATH LENGTH
Start A B C D G H M Finish 2 + 4 + 10 + 6 + 7 + 9 + 2 = 40 WEEKS
Start A B C E H M Finish 2 + 4 + 10 + 4 + 9 + 2 = 31 WEEKS
Start A B C E F J K N Finish 2 + 4 + 10 + 4 + 5 + 8 + 4 + 6 = 43 WEEKS
Start A B C E F J L N Finish 2 + 4 + 10 + 4 + 5 + 8 + 5 + 6 = 44 WEEKS
Start A B C I J K N Finish 2 + 4 + 10 + 7 + 8 + 4 + 6 = 41 WEEKS
398 Start A B C I J L N Finish 2 + 4 + 10 + 7 + 8 + 5 + 6 = 42 WEEKS
399
 Fig. 1 - Project Network for ABC Construction

Start

D E I

G F

H J

M K L

Finish
400
 Fig. 2

Start

ES = 0
2 A
EF = 2

ES = 2
4 B
EF = 6

ES = 6
10 C
EF = 16

ES = 16 ES = 16 ES = 16
6 D 4 E 7 I
EF = 22 EF = 20 EF = 23

ES = 22 ES = 20
7 G 5 F
EF = 29 EF = 25

9 H 8 J

2 M 4 K 5 L

6 N

Finish

401
 Fig. 3

Start

ES = 0
2 A
EF = 2

ES = 2
4 B
EF = 6

ES = 6
10 C
EF = 16

ES = 16 ES = 16 ES = 16
6 D 4 E 7 I
EF = 22 EF = 20 EF = 23

ES = 22 ES = 20
7 G 5 F
EF = 29 EF = 25

ES = 29 ES = 25
9 H 8 J
EF = 38 EF = 33

ES = 38 ES = 33 ES = 33
2 M 4 K 5 L
EF = 40 EF = 37 EF = 38

ES = 38
6 N
EF = 44

ES = 44
Finish
EF = 44

402
 Fig. 4

Start

LS = 0
2 A
LF = 2

LS= 2
4 B
LF = 6

LS = 6
10 C
LF = 16

LS = 20 LS = 16 LS = 18
6 D 4 E 7 I
LF = 26 LF = 20 LF = 25

LS = 26 LS = 20
7 G 5 F
LF = 33 LF = 25

LS = 26 LS = 25
9 H 8 J
LF = 33 LF = 33

LS = 42 LS = 34 LS = 33
2 M 4 K 5 L
LF = 44 LF = 38 LF = 38

LS = 38
6 N
LF = 44

LS = 44
Finish
LF = 44

403
 Fig. 5

S=0
Start
F=0

S=0
2 A
F=2

S=0
4 B
F=6

S=6
10 C
F = 16

S = 16, 20 S = 16 S = 16, 18
6 D 4 E 7 I
F = 22, 26 F = 20 F = 23, 25

S = 22, 26 S = 20
7 G 5 F
F = 29, 33 F = 25

S = 29, 33 S = 25
9 H 8 J
F = 38, 42 F = 33

S = 38, 42 S = 33, 34 LS = 33
2 M 4 K 5 L
F = 40, 44 F = 37, 38 LF = 38

S = 38
6 N
F = 44

S = 44
Finish
F = 44

404
405