His Excellency,

The Executive Governor, Bayelsa State

Government House Ovom,
Yenagoa

Dear Sir,

SECURITY COORDINATION CENTRE PROPOSAL

We would like to humbly propose the setup and operation of a world
class SECURITY COORDINATION CENTER that will DRASTICALLY
IMPROVE BAYELSA STATE SECURITY PERSONNEL’S ABILITY TO FIGHT
CRIME and protect infrastructure by implementing a more robust and
dogged approach to community policing.
The Security Coordination Center (SCC) is intended to encourage the
citizenry of your state to participate in community policing with useful
technology available in today’s world. The SCC will help with the
identification of problem individuals and areas, allowing for a targeted
approach that will SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE CRIMINAL ACTIVITY across
Bayelsa State.
Often, information attained from the most benign source can prevent a
disaster or an event occurring. The SCC will serve as a central point for
emergency response to crime. The Center will also have attached to it a
SPECIAL TASK FORCE with the possibility of relevant security agencies
involved.
This Task force will be responsible for emergency response to ongoing
crimes and will serve as a deterrent to crime and criminality.
The SCC will also serve as an intelligence hub, where further link
analysis and validation can occur from a number of different
perspectives. This will allow for active exchange of information with the
goal of maximizing relevant security agencies in the state detect,
prevent, investigate and respond to criminal activity. The SCC will allow
Bayelsa state operate proactively by knowing about and preventing
crimes before they occur.
This service will be of minimal cost to the state as existing
infrastructure will be utilized. A few enhancement tools will be
introduced and through focused training.
We humbly request the opportunity to present this proposed concept
to you and shed more light on how this can work aptly.

Sincerely,
INTRODUCTION
SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING NIGERIA TODAY
Keeping our environment safe is indeed a challenging business. Now
more than ever, Statesmen, Security executives and security managers
face the task of balancing multiple agendas; weighing real and
perceived threats and finding reasonable ways to address both; and
making our States safe- all within budget.
Our Security Consulting Services include procedures to respond to
security risks and imminent threats and will be reviewed and updated
regularly. In addition, new threats have emerged, adding complexity to
planning for State/regional security and making it more crucial to set an
effective strategy.
Our Security Consulting services will focus on the following threats
being experienced in Bayelsa state today:
 Cultist Attacks
 Civil Unrest
 Abduction & Kidnapping
 Armed Robbery
 Assassination
 Kidnapping
 Pipeline Vandalization
 Active Shooter Threats
 Political Thuggery
 Rape
 Car Snatching/Theft
 Illegal Possession of Firearm
 Illegal Bunkering
 Sea Piracy

AIM AND OBJECTIVE

The aim and objective of this proposal is to enable Government take
proactive and preventive measures to protect the safety and security of
lives and properties in the State. Each of the security plans to be
proposed will be designed locally with the help of law enforcement,
emergency management, public health officials and all other key
stakeholders.
To achieve our objectives, only an integrated program involving these
elements, can be effective.

PEOPLE

TECHNICAL
INFORMATION EQUIPMENTS

PROCEDURES TRAINING

OVERVIEW
Bayelsa state is located in the South South region of Nigeria and has 3
Senatorial Districts (Bayelsa Central, Bayelsa East, Bayelsa West). The
state is bordered from the East, Rivers State and the West, Delta State
with an estimated population of 1,933,925 people. The state is about
70% in the coastline of Niger Delta.
Among the estimated population figure, between 12 and 17 age bracket
is estimated to be 20% while 18 to 45 age bracket is estimated to be 30%
and 46 to 55 is estimated to be 15%.

The communites in the coastline spreads along rivier Niger and River Nun
which empty its waters into the Atlantic ocean. It is worthy of intrest to
also note that the state is made up of Eight (8) LGAs. The state is
dependent of civil servants and political appointees for a living. There are
no industries or large companies that can employ the teaming youths
which has led to the increase in crime and criminality in the state.

This report aims to highlight some of the most reported cases of security
threats in the state with emphasis on Nembe, Bassambiri, Ogolomabiri,
Southern Ijaw, Ekeremor and Yenagoa. It will highlight the crime
hotspots, highlight trends tactics used successfully to carry out criminal
activities. In addition, a list of risk mitigation and recommended
measures to avert such crimes.

SECURITY THREATS IN BAYELSA STATE

The prevailing threats to security which are mostly referred to as crimes
are;
(a) Kidnapping
(b) Sea Piracy
 (c) Assassination
(d) Armed Robbery
(e) Pipeline Vandalization
(f) Illegal Bunkering/Crude Oil Theft
(g) Cultism
(h) Rape
(i) Breaking and Entering
(j) Communal Crisis and Chieftaincy Tussle
(k) Car/Tricycle Theft
(l) Political thuggery
(m) Sea Piracy
(n) Assault
(o) Illegal Possession of Firearms

Persons involved in the above highlighted crimes and criminality in the

state are further divided into the following categories;
CATEGORY (A) 13 TO 17 AGE BRACKET
This category of youths are more involved in rape cases, breaking and
entering, cultism and its related crimes, armed robbery, substance
abuse, phone snatching, stealing and illegal possession of fire arms.
They are 7% of the estimated population in the state.
CATEGORY (B) 18 TO 35 AGE BRACKET
This category of youths are more involved in illegal bunkering, sea
piracy, rape cases, breaking and entering, political thuggery, cultism
and its related crimes armed robbery, substance abuse, sales of illegal
drugs, phone snatching, stealing and illegal possession of fire arms.
They are 5% of the estimated population in the state.
CATEGORY (C) 36 TO 50 AGE BRACKET
This category of persons are mostly the sponsors, instigators and
partakers of the above mentioned crimes. They are 3% of the estimated
population in the state.

CRIME STATISTICS
This statistics is making reference to incidents that occurred in some
communities between the period of 2012 - 2019.
SN LGA / COMMUNITY TYPE(S) OF CRIME
1 BRASS LGA Cultism, Sea Piracy, Kidnapping, Armed Robbery,
TWON BRASS Rape, Political Thuggery. These are the types of
crimes generally committed in the area between
2012 -2019.
2 BRASS/ ODIOMA Communal and Chieftaincy Crisis, Political
Thuggery, Substance Abuse.
3 OKPOAMA Cultism, Sea Piracy, Kidnapping, Armed Robbery,
Rape, Political Thuggery. These are the types of
crimes generally committed in the area between
2012 -2019.
4 EWOMA Communal Crisis, Substance Abuse, Political
Thuggery.
5 AKASSA Sea Piracy.
6 EKEREMOR LGA Substance Abuse, Political Thuggery, Cultism,
EKEREMOR TOWN Stealing.
7 NDORO Sea Piracy, Cultism, Cultism, Stealing.
8 PERETORU-GBENE CDC Chairmanship Crisis, Cultism, Civil Unrest
9 EGBEMO-ANGALABIRI Sea Piracy, Kidnapping
10 AZAGBENE Cultism, Sea Piracy, Kidnapping, Armed Robbery,
Rape, Political Thuggery. These are the types of
crimes generally committed in the area between
2012 -2019.
11 AMATU 1 & 2 Crude Oil Theft, Cultism, Chieftaincy Tussle
12 KOLOKUMA/OPOKUMA Cultism, Stealing and Substance Abuse.
LGA
KAIAMA
13 ODI Cultism, Stealing and Substance Abuse.
14 SABAGRIA Cultism, Stealing and Substance Abuse.
15 NEMBE LGA Crude Oil Theft, Cultism, Chieftaincy Tussle,
BASSAMBIRI Armed Robbery, Stealing, Kidnapping, Political
Thuggery and Substance Abuse.
16 OGOLOMABIRI Crude Oil Theft, Cultism, Chieftaincy Tussle,
Armed Robbery, Stealing, Kidnapping, Political
Thuggery and Substance Abuse.
17 OLUASEIRI Crude Oil Theft, Cultism, Chieftaincy Tussle,
Armed Robbery, Stealing, Kidnapping, Political
Thuggery and Substance Abuse.
18 OGBIA LGA Cultism, Armed Robbery, Stealing, Political
OTUOKPOTU Thuggery and Substance Abuse.
19 ONUEBUM Cultism, Kidnapping, Armed Robbery, Stealing,
Political Thuggery and Substance Abuse.
20 OTUASEGA Cultism, Armed Robbery, Stealing, Political
Thuggery and Substance Abuse.
21 ORUMA Communal Crisis, Illegal Bunkering
22 OGBIA TOWN Cultism, Kidnapping, Armed Robbery, Stealing,
Political Thuggery, Illegal Possession of Firearms
and Substance Abuse.
23 SAGBAMA LGA Cultism, Armed Robbery, Stealing, and Substance
SAGBAMA MAIN TOWN Abuse.
24 AGBERE Chieftaincy Tussle, Cultism, Stealing, Political
Thuggery and Substance Abuse.
25 SOUTHERN IJAW LGA Cultism, Kidnapping, Armed Robbery, Stealing,
AYAMA IJAW Political Thuggery, Illegal Possession of Firearms
and Substance Abuse.
26 OPOROMA Cultism, Kidnapping, Stealing, Political Thuggery,
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Substance
Abuse.
27 PEREMABIRI Sea Piracy, Oil Theft, Assassination, Chieftaincy
Tussle, Cultism, Kidnapping, Armed Robbery,
Stealing, Political Thuggery, Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Substance Abuse.
28 KOROKOROSEI Sea Piracy, Oil Theft, Assassination, Chieftaincy
Tussle, Cultism, Kidnapping, Armed Robbery,
Stealing, Political Thuggery, Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Substance Abuse.
29 LOBIA Oil Theft, Assassination, Chieftaincy Tussle,
Cultism, Kidnapping, Armed Robbery, Stealing,
Political Thuggery, Illegal Possession of Firearms
and Substance Abuse.
30 OLOGBOBIRI Sea Piracy, Oil Theft, Chieftaincy Tussle, Cultism,
Kidnapping, Armed Robbery, Stealing, Political
Thuggery, Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Substance Abuse.
31 KOLUAMA Illegal Bunkering, Sea Piracy, Oil Theft and
Cultism.
32 AMASSOMA Cultism, Kidnapping, Armed Robbery, Stealing,
Political Thuggery, Illegal Possession of Firearms
and Substance Abuse.
33 YENAGOA LGA Sea Piracy, Oil Theft, Assassination, Chieftaincy
YENAGOA METROPOLIS Tussle, Cultism, Kidnapping, Armed Robbery,
Stealing, Political Thuggery, Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Substance Abuse.

DEPLOYMENT OF ASSETS
LAND COMPONENTS
The following Toyota Hilux are required to be deployed communities
for quick response to distress calls. The vehicles should be able
accommodate one (1) Team leader and (6) six men.
DEPLOYMENT OF VEHICLES TO PIN DOWN POINTS
1. Patani Junction
2. Sagbama Junction
3. Opokuma Junction
4. Sabagria Town
5. Sampou Junction
6. Glory Land Drive (Welcome to Bayelsa)
7. Igbogene Roundabout
8. Nedugo
9. Okolobiri
10. Polaku
11. Tombia Town
12. Air Port Junction
13. Amassoma Town
14. Law School (Agudama)
15. Tombia Roundabout
16. Okutukutu
17. Opolo Roundabout (by the expressway)
18. Erepa Junction
19. Ekeki
20. Amarata
21. Ovom
22. Obele
23. Down Yenagoa
24. Oil Mill
25. Swali Market
26. Ayama Ijaw
27. Ogbogoro Roundabout
28. Famgbe
29. Swali Town
30. Oxbow Lake
31. Azikoro Town Road
32. Goodnews Street
33. Agbura
34. Oneubum
35. Otuoke
36. Kolo
37. Ogbia
38. Nembe
39. Imiringi
40. Elebele
41. Otuasega
42. Okarki
43. Bayelsa Palm Road

MARINE COMPONENTS
The marine assets will be deployed in line with communities seen as
flash points. Each gun boat is expected to station in specific water route
that will have interconnectivity to several of the tributaries. Each
gunboat will be manned by a Commander and Six (6) men.

1. BRASS LGA
SN LOCATION No. OF GUN BOAT(S) No. OF MEN
1 Twon Town 1 1x6
2 Akassa 1 1x6
2. EKEREMOR LGA
SN LOCATION No. OF GUN BOAT(S) No. OF MEN
1 Ayamasa 1 1x6
2 Azagbene 1 1x6
3 Ndoro 1 1x6
4 Letugbene 1 1x6

NEMBE LGA
SN LOCATION No. OF GUN BOAT(S) No. OF MEN
1 Bassambiri 1 1x6
2 Oluaseiri 1 1x6

OGBIA LGA
SN LOCATION No. OF GUN BOAT(S) No. OF MEN
1 Ogbia Town 1 1x6
2 Onuebum 1 1x6
3 Ologi 1 1x6

SOUTHERN IJAW LGA

SN LOCATION No. OF GUN BOAT(S) No. OF MEN
1 Ayama Ijaw 1 1x6
2 Peremabiri 1 1x6
3 Amassoma 1 1x6
4 Korokorosei 1 1x6
5 Olokpobiri 1 1x6
6 Azuzuama 1 1x6
7 Lobia 1 1x6

COMMUNITY POLICING
VIGILANTE COMPONENTS
10 able men will be recruited per community to play the role of
vigilante members/community policing. They will also act as sources to
the security coordination centre. The men will be handled by the
security coordinators from the respective Local Government Area. Daily
security reports will also be submitted through the security
coordinators to the SA Security.

SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BAYELSA STATE

STATE-OWNED SECURITY COORDINATION
CENTER (SCC)
A State-Owned Security Coordination Centre (SCC) is a cutting-edge
form of community policing. This form of policing is not only done by
the police, but it gets the whole citizenry involved in policing.
The Security Coordination Centre (SCC) serves as the coordination hub
for incident response. This facility, although identified by many names
(command centre, command post, war room, etc.), provides a central
intelligence arena for decision makers and response team personnel to
gather critical information, coordinate response activities, and manage
personnel as the emergency dictates. A safe location equipped with
effective technology allows for communication with staff and response
teams.
The SCC, whether a simple conference room or an extravagant mission
control facility, should be capable of serving as the central coordination
point for:
 All emergency operations.
 Information gathering and dissemination.
 Coordination with all security agencies, volunteer organization
(e.g. vigilante groups and others) local governments and the like.

TASK FORCE:
A special Task Force will be attached to the office of SA Security and will
be supervised by the Security Coordination Centre for their day-to-day
field operations:
 The Task Force Commander must be a serving senior police officer
eg. Assistant Commissioner of Police.
 The Operation of the Task Force must be Police based. However,
other components such as the Army, Civil Defense, NDLEA will be
part of the Task Force.
 The Task Force will operate with permission from the office of the
Inspector General of Police.

 The Task Force will liaise with the Commissioner of Police and the
existing Divisional Police Headquarters in the state.
 It should comprise of all security agencies with the police as the
head.
  It should be responsible for emergency incident response.
 The task force will be deployed to different locations around the
state at different locations for swift emergency response.
 The teams in the task force will work with the Police Stations
within the jurisdiction of their Pin down points respectively.

THE ARMY COMPONENT

The Army component of the Task Force should be led by the rank of a
Captain, while his 2i/c will be a Warrant Officer.

CIVIL DEFENCE COMPONENT (NSCDC)

The Civil Defence component of the Task Force should be led by the
rank of a DSA, while his 2i/c will be an ASP 1.

THE NATIONAL DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY

(NDLEA) COMPONENT
The NDLEA component of the Task Force should be led by a ranking
officer equivalent of that of the Civil Defence.

INVESTIGATION UNIT
The investigation unit of the Task Force will be comprised of an
investigation team from the State Headquarters of the Nigeria Police
Force. The leader of the unit will be the rank of a DSP while the 2i/c will
be the rank of an ASP.

MARINE COMPONENTS:
 (a) The marine component of the Task Force will be headed by
a Superintendent of Police which duties will include; the
day-to-day running of the recommended gun boats
deployed in the creeks and waterways in the state.
(b) He is to supervise the men and report to the Task Force
commander and also brief the SA Security on the waterway
security operations.
(c) Daily marine security operations reports be forwarded to
the SA Security through the Commander of the Task Force.
(d) He is also to liaise with the locals in the creeks in intelligence
gathering and forward same to the SA Security through the
Commander of the Task Force.

TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

COMMANDER (ACP)

PA/SECRETARY

ARMY COMPONENT CIVIL DEFENCE COMPONENT NDLEA ADMIN OFFICER

CAPT RANK EQUIVALENT RANK EQUIVALENT

MWO MEN 2i/c MEN 2i/c MEN

MARINE COMPONENT HEAD DRIVER

SP DRIVERS

2i/c MEN
PERSONNEL:
The office of the Governor’s Adviser on Security should be responsible
for the employment of staff of this organisation. All staff of the
organisation will be civilians preferably with a security background and
must have representation from each LGA in the state. They must also
have thorough knowledge of their LGAs and should be computer
literate.
These are the positions and duties of the operational staff of the
Security Coordination Centre (SCC):
 Special Adviser to the Governor of Bayelsa State: Responsible for
the day-to-day security operations of the state.
 To coordinate with service commanders and the commissioner of
Police assigned to the State and prepare brief for the Governor in
the State Security Council office.
 To brief the Governor current security challenges and recommend
measures to avert future occurrence of such crime.
 To receive daily briefings from security coordinators and
supervisors and oversee the meetings of the security coordination
centre.

 To direct and task the recruitment of sources, supervise the

vetting of sources and receive daily security report from the field
officers.

 Security Coordinator:

(a) Responsible for daily operations within the operations room

and in direct liaison with the men in the field. This will be
 done on their scheduled day of duty. They will also be
responsible for delivery of daily reports to management.
(b) Responsible for the management of sources and report to
the SA Security on daily evaluated security report.
(c) Liaise with sister agencies on general security.
(d) Prepare minutes of security brief for the SA Security.
(e) Carryout security investigations and evaluate monthly
security appraisals and report back to the SA Security on
progress made.
(f) Directly involved in counter sabotage and espionage
activities where necessary.

 Duties of Supervisors:
(a) Manages the operations of the Call agents and despatchers
within the operations room and reports to the Security
Coordinator.
(b) Undertakes on any other assigned duties.

 Despatch/Call Agents:
(a) With the availability of toll free lines, the call agents receive
emergency calls from the public, identify location and urgency of
the call and pass the necessary information to the Despatch unit
deploy the task force in the field where necessary.
(b) The role of the call agents will also involve data entry on
incidents that occur during their scheduled duty.
  Information Analysts: Analyse data compiled in the central
database.

Figure 1: Shows the Operational Structure of the SCC

Figure 2: Shows the SOP in the Operations room

Figure 3: Shows the SOP for dissemination of intel to relevant
agencies
One of the advantages of the SCC is to foster public awareness to
security “SEE SOMETHING SAY SOMETHING” with the provision of TOLL
FREE emergency lines.
Public participation will provide volumes of data which will be assigned
to a central database. This database will be analysed by Information
analysts in the SCC who will help identify and provide:
 Intelligence Information that will be sent back to the relevant
security agencies.
 Operational Information that will be shared among Commands.
 Strategic Intelligence that will be disseminated to the higher-level
Police and State Government decision making.

OPERATIONS ROOM
The Operations Room, is where the representatives of agencies will
assemble and provide the essential requirements of the job function. It
must be large enough to provide sufficient space. The Operations Room
must also incorporate the following features:
1. Desktop computers, telephone lines (TOLL FREE) and
Incident/Whistle blower data portal.

2. Status display capability (manual or video with large format).

 Maps indicating locations and fleet management.
 Charts showing crime statistics per location.
 Electronic surveillance of the facility or designated areas in the
state.
 Computer, Internet, and network needs for automatic data
processing.
 Work station space for all emergency response staff.

Figure 4: Shows a sample of an Operations Room

EMERGENCY POWER
  An emergency electrical power generator must be provided which
is large enough to power the SCC facilities (computer systems,
radios, monitor screens, H-VAC, etc.)

 There should also be alternate power options like solar, gas and
inverters. This should guaranty uninterrupted power.

CONCLUSION

Upon consideration of this proposal, we would present a detailed plan

on how we intend to deploy a security framework for the state.