Pakistan-China Relations: Beyond CPEC

Muhammad Faisal*

In recent years between 2013-18, Pakistan-China relations witnessed a qualitative

transformation as the bilateral ties expanded from defence to the economic sphere. The
cooperation under the framework of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is increasing
Chinese investments in Pakistan’s energy and infrastructure sectors. Expanding avenues of
bilateral cooperation has led to emergence of new dynamics in the bilateral relations. With
increased inter-dependence, both countries are also navigating major power international
politics. Beijing and Islamabad have increased their coordination for peace and stability in
Afghanistan as well as at the multilateral forums including the United Nations (UN) and
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Traditional strategic cooperation is deepening to meet new
geo-strategic challenges. Beyond CPEC, closer strategic engagement will determine the
future direction of bilateral relations. Thus, it is crucial to take stock of the evolving geo-
political dynamics and their impact on strategic dimensions of the bilateral relations. This
paper aims to move forward from this standpoint and seeks to explore what developments
have taken place in bilateral relations beyond CPEC during past five years (2013-2018). Most
crucially, it explores how Pakistan-China relations have evolved in an era of geo-political
tensions. It analyses how CPEC dynamics have influenced the course of broader relationship.
Similarly, the growing coordination of two countries at the multilateral forums is also
explored as they attempt to navigate the major power politics.

Keywords: Pakistan-China Relations, Geopolitics, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

(CPEC), Defence.
*
The author is Research Fellow at China-Pakistan Study Centre (CPSC), Institute of Strategic Studies
Islamabad.

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Introduction

Pakistan-China relations have been resilient for decades despite monumental shifts and
transformations in the geo-strategic landscape of South Asia. Islamabad-Beijing ties have
maintained their strategic direction and stability due to the convergence of interests and
mutual trust. With commencement of development work under China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), both countries also
increased their strategic coordination and converged on emerging issues in the regional
security environments and at multilateral forums. Similarly, in the recent years CPEC-centric
cooperation has been the focus of scholarly debate and analysis. Various dimensions of
CPEC i.e., from a transit corridor to industrial development initiative have been discussed.
Similarly, the analysts have explored how CPEC will influence domestic and regional politics
particularly in South Asia. As China’s interests and influence have expanded to South Asia so
has the analysis been focused more on CPEC. In a way, focus on CPEC meant that CPEC is
central to Pakistan-China relations.
In recent years, few notable works have emerged on the evolving Pakistan-China relations.
Andrew Small taking stock of the historical evolution of the bilateral relationship argued that
both countries are pursuing a strategic partnership which is expanding to economic domain
1
with the goal to influence emerging geo-political environment. Javid Hussain evaluates
expanding Pakistan-China ties and situates them in the broader global politics, particularly
transforming the world order. He argues that the rising China is an opportunity for Pakistan to
expand its strategic space in the region and undertake economic development to bridge the
2
gap with neighbouring India.

Khan and Kasi review the bilateral relationship with the focus on developments in economic
and security domains since the year 2000. They contend that during past two decades, the
focus of bilateral engagement has been on finding avenues to expanding the economic
component. Further, rise of China inevitably impacts global politics as focus of great power
1
Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitic, (London: Hurst & Company, 2015).
2
Javid Husain, “China’s Rise and the Global Order,” in Pakistan and a World in Disorder (Palgrave Macmillan
US, 2016).

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3
competition gradually shifted from the West to East. Rakisits analysed China’s Pakistan
strategy through the prism of geo-strategic objectives of CPEC. He contends that the CPEC
gives China the operational control of the Gwadar port, a highly crucial strategic location. It
will make Pakistan a key linkage in China’s larger geo-strategy of accessing Indian Ocean by
constructing a network of ports through Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road.
Access of Gwadar will enable China to directly link with Middle East and beyond,
4
particularly, through a country with which Beijing has a special relationship.

In a comprehensive report, Zahid Hussain analysed the emerging Pakistan-China relationship,

its economic dimension and intersection with regional politics. He argued that as bilateral
5
relationship has deepened, it has been caught in the vortex of conflictual regional dynamics.
Pakistan-China relations have been studied by scholars in recent years. Much attention,
however, has not been paid to growing coordination of Islamabad and Beijing on multilateral
diplomacy issues and major power competition in the region. Beyond CPEC, strategic
dimension of ties has gained a new meaning. It is here that this study will be an addition to
the growing body of literature on bilateral relations.

With this background, present study critically analyses state of bilateral relationship,
coordination on geo-strategic issues and deepening strategic and military cooperation in
recent years. On the basis of this analysis, the paper suggests policy recommendations for
Pakistan. This study is a qualitative analysis of the emerging dynamics and trends in the
bilateral relationship and its likely evolution in near future. Therefore, this study is based on
secondary resources, government documents and statements of officials in both countries.
3
Minhas Majeed Khan and Mirwais Kasi, “Pakistan-China Relations: Developments in Economic and Security
Areas in the 21st Century,” Strategic Studies 37, no. 3 (2017):.55-75

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This study is divided into four sections. First section elaborates theoretical framework to
analyse inter-state relations i.e., Neorealism. Second section situates the bilateral relations in
geo-strategic landscape of the region. Third section focuses on Pakistan-China cooperation in
strategic and defence sector and explores the bilateral engagement at multilateral forums as
they attempt to navigate major power competition. Lastly, policy recommendations for
Pakistan are suggested.

Theoretical Framework for Inter-State Relations: Neorealism

Of all the paradigms that have been developed to understand international and state-to-state
relations, realism and its variants place a state at the centre of war and peace. Neorealism or
Structural Realism assumes that the states operate in an anarchical international environment.
Cooperation, thus, is sought from fellow states on the basis of common and shared threats.
While responding to a major power, other states tend to balance against it which is essential
for maintaining stability in the region. The goal of such balancing is to prevent the emergence
of a hegemon in the region or at international level. This is “a situation in which one state
amasses so much power that it is able to dominate the rest of the states in the system which
would put an end to the multistate system.”

In Neorealism, the structure of international system is the driving force behind the state’s
quest to seek power and security. As per Realist scholar, John Mearsheimer, five assumptions
form the core of Realist framework:

1. a) International system is anarchic in nature.

2. b) States are capable of militarily attacking one another.
3. c) Intentions of other states are uncertain.
4. d) Survival is driving force behind state behaviour.
6
5. e) States continue to look for ways to ensure their own survival.

Additionally, in the anarchic world, a superior authoritative power that dominates all great
powers is absent and similarly, the assurances of security are non-existent. In such a world,
the sole legitimate interest of every state is to ensure self-preservation by all means at its
disposal
6
John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3
(1994):10.

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including building alliances and amassing power. The states, thus, define their interests in
terms of power and security.

Neorealism explains Pakistan’s quest for security while being locked in a protracted conflict
with India. Pakistan’s decision to build a defence- oriented relationship with China has been
the face of Pakistan-China relationship for decades. To put simply, the pursuit of survival and
security is the core of Sino-Pak ties. Moreover, Neorealists do not link the type of regime and
cultural outlook of a nation with its quest for security and survival. It is that the types of
government do not address the underlining structural causes that determine nature of relations
between states. To Neorealists, it is the relative power which influences the relations between
states. In case of Pakistan and China, both are seeking to protect and project their interests in
South Asia vis-à-vis India and the US.

Current Developments in Sino-Pakistan Relations: Strategic Context

The strategic context of recent developments in Pakistan-China relations is rooted in gradual

emergence of two dyads in South Asia over the last decade: India and the US on one hand,
and Pakistan and China on the other. Over the past 15 years, the Asian geopolitical
environment has undergone a huge transformation. India and the US have engaged in
7
political, military, and economic cooperation to deepen their strategic partnership. It
commenced in 2005, when Bush administration publicly stated that the strategic goal of
helping India is to become a “major world power” in the coming decades. In July 2005, India
and the US concluded a civil nuclear deal and signed a 10- year military cooperation
8
agreement. The Obama administration continued America’s engagement with India. In
January 2015, President Obama renewed the 10-year military cooperation agreement. Six
months later, a new

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9
defence framework agreement was concluded between them, which paved the way for
synchronising American and Indian militaries while developing protocols to grant each other
the use of their respective logistical facilities.

Similarly, in India, Narendra Modi after becoming Prime Minister in 2014, also accelerated
the pace of newly found engagement with the US. His national security team quickly
removed bureaucratic obstacles in finalising several defence cooperation and technology
10
transfer related agreements. With Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI), New
Delhi and Washington are moving towards joint development and production of weapon
systems. Meanwhile, Indo-US ‘Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Region”
underscores the need for “safeguarding maritime security ensuring freedom of navigation and
11
over flight throughout the region especially in the South China Sea.” This has led to
building consensus on collaborating in maritime domain including undertaking joint military
exercises. Washington has been pursuing enhanced defence engagement with India as part of
rebalance to Asia-Pacific strategy to check the rise of China and its growing military presence
in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
Meanwhile, the unresolved border dispute between India and China and tensions on the issue
of Tibet have further perpetuated trust deficit. Linked with this is the expanding political,
defence and economic engagement of both countries in the neighbourhood i.e., India’s
growing ties with the Southeast Asian and East Asian nations, and, China’s expanding
cooperation with the South Asian nations and increasing presence in IOR. Sino-Indian
tensions reached their peak during the Doklam border crisis when the Indian and Chinese
12
troops faced off against each other in the summer of 2017. Similarly, the apparent bonhomie
between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping during
Wuhan Summit has not yet
9
“US, India Sign 10-Year Defense Framework Agreement,” Department of Defence, June 4, 2015,

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yielded a resolution of contentious issues. Held in April 2018, the summit was an attempt to
reset Sino-Indian relations by leadership of both countries but the mutual mistrust still
13
prevails.

Taken together, the build-up of Indian military capabilities and the growing US military
footprint in the region undermines strategic balance of power in South Asia and poses a
geopolitical challenge to China and Pakistan. The policymakers in Beijing fear that
Washington is pursuing the ‘containment of rising China’ strategy in concert with its allies in
the region. The goal, China has assessed, is to exploit its strategic vulnerability in the
maritime arena. In May, 2015, China issued a Military Strategy White Paper reflecting these
14
concerns. The Paper outlined a new maritime policy of ‘active defence’ to project naval
power to protect “maritime rights and interests” along with securing “national security and
development interests.”It also emphasised ensuring protection of Sea Lines of
15
Communication (SLOCs) across the Indian Ocean.”

It is this evolving geo-strategic context that has led to reinvigoration of Pakistan-China

relationship in the recent years. Both, in South Asia and Indian Ocean Region, geo-strategic
significance of Pakistan seems to have been reinforced for China, yet again. Beijing has
repeatedly emphasised that Pakistan-China relationship is a ‘model inter-state relationship’ to
be emulated by other states. Meanwhile for Pakistan, the rising China presents an opportunity
to leverage the growing economic and military prowess of China and advance its interests in
South Asia and IOR.

For decades, Pakistan-China relationship has been underpinned by mutual interest to balance
India. This has been led by multifaceted defence and security cooperation to ensure peace and
stability in South Asia by providing support for Pakistan’s defence capabilities, reinforced in
recent years with extensive military and technological cooperation. In parallel, China’s
relationship with India has deteriorated in recent years — Doklam crisis, Indian opposition to
CPEC and BRI projects — while China-Pakistan
13
Chun Han Wong, “Indian and Chinese Leaders Vow Better Communication, More Trade,” Wall Street
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ties experienced a broad-based shift. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, the unique position of

China ─ being close to Pakistan ─ has been employed by all sides (the US, Afghan
government and Taliban) to pursue their respective interests during the peace process.
However, Islamabad has focused on expanding its strategic space in Afghanistan through
close coordination with China as peace process progressed during period 2015-16.

Regional Security and Bilateral Engagement

China and Pakistan have closely coordinated in maintaining a stable regional environment.
Both sides extend all-out support to safeguard each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity
and refrain from interfering in domestic affairs. The bilateral coordination has been most
prominent on the issues related to conflict and instability in Afghanistan, where China’s
interests, influence and role have increased manifold in recent years.

As the US began drawdown of its troops from Afghanistan in 2014, China’s concerns about
looming instability in Afghanistan and its fallout on its restive western region of Xinjiang
deepened. Beijing decided to increase its engagement with Islamabad and Kabul. The
Chinese objective was to initiate peace and reconciliation by involvement of major regional
countries. Just as Washington does, Beijing also recognises that Pakistan is a key stakeholder
for peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan. In early 2015, China offered ‘facilitation’ to
reconcile Afghan government and ‘political factions,’ while emphasising that Pakistan was
16
ready for a ‘constructive’ role in peace process. In 2016, China along with Pakistan,
Afghanistan and the US joined a Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) to commence
17
talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. This came after back-channels talks
hosted by Beijing between representatives of Afghan government

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18
and Taliban. It showcased China’s willingness to commit additional political capital for a
result-oriented peace process in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, these efforts fell apart as Taliban
refused to take part in the talks after a US drone strike killed group’s leader Mullah Akthar
Mansour and also the fact that, Taliban refused to hold direct negotiations with the Afghan
government.

In June 2017, the Chinese Foreign Minister undertook shuttle diplomacy to address the
mistrust between Islamabad and Kabul. To this end, China instituted a trilateral dialogue at
the Foreign Ministers level on the issues of security, counterterrorism and development.
These efforts showcase that as China has increased its engagement with Afghanistan and
Pakistan so has Islamabad closely coordinated with Beijing to foster regional stability and
ensure a peaceful environment for economic development.
India-Pakistan conflict is a big element of instability in the South Asia region which affects
China. Beijing has been active at the diplomatic front to manage India-Pakistan tensions in a
19
bid to ensure stability in the region. When tensions spiked between Islamabad and New
Delhi in September 2016, China urged both sides to ‘exercise restraint, avoid escalation’ and
20
address tensions through bilateral ‘dialogue.’ Similarly, despite reservations from India on
the CPEC route which transverses through Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) region that is part of
Kashmir territory under administration of Pakistan, Beijing has maintained that its formal
position on Kashmir dispute remains unchanged while de-linking economic development
21
initiative like CPEC from Kashmir issue. China has maintained that Kashmir dispute is a

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“leftover from history” and it needs to be resolved peacefully through “dialogue based on UN
22
Charter, the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and bilateral agreements.” Chinese
non-confrontational approach was on display during February 2019 crisis. After an attack on
Indian forces in Kashmir region, India and Pakistan tensions escalated to the point that first
dogfight between air forces of both countries took place and Pakistan downed Indian jet
while capturing the pilot. At the peak of crisis, Beijing called on both sides to “exercise
23
restraint and take actions...to stabilise situation.” After Pakistan had retaliated, China
24
publicly stated that “all countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity shall be respected.”

In August 2019, New Delhi withdrew special autonomous status of Kashmir region under its
control and bifurcating the region into two territories of Ladakh and Jammu and Kashmir.
Through changes in the legal framework, India for practical purposes has amalgamated the
Kashmir region into Indian Union and now intends to directly rule them from New Delhi.
These changes were accompanied by a security and communications lockdown imposed in
Kashmir. Pakistan vehemently criticised the Indian actions, recalling its High Commissioner
from New Delhi and suspending bilateral trade. Beijing criticised India’s “unilateral actions”
to change status quo, specifically, it opposed change of administrative status of Ladakh
25
region. China vowed that India’s actions are “unacceptable and will not come into force.”
The initial pushback was followed up by high-level engagement with Pakistan on Kashmir

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issue. In an unprecedented move, Beijing raised the development related to Kashmir at the
UNSC session, and Security Council held a closed- door meeting to discuss peace and
security in Kashmir.

Aside from India factor, Pakistan’s disillusionment with the US progressively pushed it to
seek support from China. During 1950s, Pakistan joined the US-led Central Treaty
Organisation (CEATO) and South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SENTO). It led to
extensive American support for building-up Pakistan’s military capabilities while Islamabad
expected Washington to support its position on Kashmir. Both India and Pakistan engaged in
a general war over Kashmir in 1965. To Pakistan’s surprise, during the war, Washington
imposed an arms embargo, halting supplies of defence equipment and spares. This led to
erosion of the mutual trust. Soon after the war, Pakistan deepened relationship with China
leading to extensive defence cooperation. This trend has continued for decades now leading
to high-degree of mutual trust between China and Pakistan. In contrast, Islamabad-
Washington ties are transactional in nature, while mutual trust remains absent. Pakistan seeks
to maintain a working relationship with the US as it is a great power with extensive presence
in Pakistan’s neighbourhood.

Growing Coordination at Multilateral Forums

Bilateral trust and support between Pakistan and China is most evident at multilateral forums,
particularly, in the various bodies of the UN such as Conference on Disarmament (CD).
China has spent political capital in supporting Pakistan’s interests at the UN. At the same
time, it is not a blank cheque rather the support has had its limits. Before limitations,
however, comes the special kind of support both countries extend to each other. Since 1971,
when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) assumed the seat in the UNSC, China rarely
used its veto. In 1972, Beijing used its first veto to support Pakistan when it opposed a
26
resolution to admit the new state of Bangladesh as a UN member. Such support has been a
constant. A look at voting record of countries at the UN General Assembly
26
“Official Record of 1660th Meeting of United Nations Security Council,” August 25, 1972, United Nations,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.1660(OR).

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resolutions, from 1971-2017, shows that Pakistan has voted 90 per cent of the time similar to
27
China.

In recent years, Chinese support at the UN has been most evident at the UNSC 1267
Sanctions Committee. In 1999, the UNSC had adopted a Resolution-1267 and constituted an
al-Qaeda-Taliban Sanctions Committee to its freeze financial assets and impose travel
restrictions on the individuals and entities linked to al-Qaeda and Taliban. After the
November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India accused Lashkar-i-Tayyaba (LeT), a
Pakistan-based militant group, of orchestrating the attacks. Since then, India has been
consistently referring selective individuals linked with LeT to the 1267 Sanctions Committee
28
seeking to list them as terrorists. Gradually, the Indian list has expanded to include founder
29
of Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), Maulana Masood Azhar. Pakistan contends that India has
been attempting to ‘politicise’ the workings of the 1267 Sanctions Committee. For years,
thus, Pakistan has relied on China’s support. Beijing has repeatedly placed technical hold on
Indian proposals citing procedural grounds i.e. asking for more information before it could
30
make final determination. In a visible push back, China blocked the US-led effort to
31
sanction Maulana Masood Azhar in February, 2017. It was a high-stake political
commitment shown by China when it turned down a proposal by Trump administration to put
pressure on Pakistan. Later in 2019, however, after Pulwama crisis, China lifted its technical
hold and Masood Azhar has been put on the list of sanctioned individuals by the UNSC 1267
Sanctions Committee.

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Deepening Traditional Defence Cooperation

Wide-ranging defence cooperation between Pakistan and China has been at the core of
bilateral relationship for decades. Defence cooperation has deepened to complement CPEC,
particularly, in maritime and counter- terrorism domain. While, in other areas, it is balancing
expanding India-US defence cooperation and restoring a strategic balance between Islamabad
and New Delhi. The bilateral defence relationship can be gauged from the fact that at present
China is the source of more than 70 per cent of Pakistan’s cumulative arms import. Arms
import from China peaked in 2016 when it reached almost 83 per cent. This shows Pakistan’s
deepening dependence on China as a reliable source of defence procurement. Meanwhile,
data also shows that Pakistan is the major recipient (around 35 per cent) of China arms
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exports.

Strategic Studies

Table No. 1

Indicator Values of Arms Exports to Pakistan (2013-2018)

Source: SIPRI Trend Indicator Values of arms exports to Pakistan, 2013- 2018. Expressed in Millions
Generated from SIPRI Trade register, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php

Defence Procurements from China Since 2014

Historically, Pakistan has relied on extensive assistance in defence production to meet its
requirements of defence equipment. As Pakistan is undertaking a modernisation of its Army,
Navy and Air Force, its dependence on China has increased. The bilateral collaboration has
expanded to transfer of technology, joint production and regular sharing of emerging Chinese
advances in military technologies. An example of successful collaboration is JF-17 combat
aircraft, jointly produced by both countries. JF-17 is becoming the mainstay of Pakistan Air
Force (PAF) that is now being manufactured in Pakistan. Collaboration is continuing on

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designing and producing an advance version with improved avionics capability of the
33
aircraft.

Similarly, Pakistan Navy (PN) has collaborated with People’s Liberation Army Navy
(PLAN) and its associated partners as part of its fleet modernisation and expansion plans.
34
Since 2013, PN has taken delivery of three Azmat Class Fast Attack Craft (Missile Boats).
35
These speed boats have been constructed on transfer of technology basis. Meanwhile, in
April2015, Pakistan concluded an agreement for procuring eight Yuan-class diesel-electric
36 37
submarines, with four to be built in China and remaining four in Karachi. Purchase of
these submarines will enhance Pakistan’s ability to deploy a nuclear triad and naval power
projection capabilities. Next, in 2017 and 2018, Pakistan signed contracts for construction of
four T054A frigates to be delivered by 2021. These guided-missile frigates are capable of
38
conducting variety of anti-surface and anti-air warfare missions. Such acquisitions will
significantly boost Pakistan’s naval capabilities as PN seeks to protect the ensure maritime
security, safeguard commercial shipping and project its naval power in the Arabian Sea while
undertaking nuclear missions.

Meanwhile, the Pakistan Army has also augmented its air defence capabilities by inducting
39
LY-80 Low-to-Medium Altitude Air Defence System. It enables Pakistan to track and
destroy incoming missiles aimed at counter-force targets at low and medium altitude. In a

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development, Pakistan army also conducted extensive trials of Chinese VT- 4 Main Battle
40
Tank to complement Al-Khalid series tanks during 2018. The negotiations are in process
and a deal has yet to be concluded.

Aside from conventional military equipment, Pakistani and Chinese militaries have also been
collaborating in jointly manufacturing armed drones. In October 2018, Pakistan Aeronautical
Complex (PAC) and Chengdu Aircraft Industrial Group concluded a transfer of technology
agreement under which Pakistan will procure 48 armed drones called Wing Loong-II. Also,
41
in future, both countries will also jointly manufacture the drones.

Revamped Military Exercises

As a testimony of close defence ties, both countries regularly hold military exercises. A new
system of exercises commenced in 2012. It included annual exercises of special forces, naval
forces and air forces. Joint training enables the armed forces of both countries to hone their
operational preparedness and foster closer coordination when operating together. The goal is
to foster inter-operability between armed forces of both countries. Recently, the PAF and the
People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) held Shaheen-VII joint air exercise concluded
42
in Karachi. Their objective is to boost interoperability between two aerial forces and attain
highest combat readiness in various aerial combat scenarios. Similarly, Special Services
Group (SSG) of Pakistan Army and Special Forces People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has
been jointly undertaking counter-terrorism trainings since 2013. These exercises have been
named as Warrior series. Warrior-VI commenced in December, 2018 in Pakistan with the
43
goal to share experience in counter-terrorism operations.

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As noted earlier, maritime collaboration has also increased between PN and PLAN after the
emergence of CPEC. In 2014, annual bilateral exercises were instituted. So far, five rounds of
exercises have been held. Three such exercises were held in North Arabian Sea while two
were conducted in East China Sea in waters off Shanghai. Both navies have been undertaking
extensive maritime and naval operations to improve interoperability and maintain a secure
44
maritime environment for economic development.

Global Nuclear Politics and Bilateral Cooperation

In the recent years, Pakistan and China have deepened their historically close nuclear and
strategic cooperation. Since 2013, Islamabad and Beijing have undertaken extensive
cooperation in the field of nuclear energy. Expanding nuclear cooperation emerged as a
counterpoint to the Indo-US nuclear cooperation. For Pakistan, American civil nuclear
cooperation with India had given the latter an edge over it in terms of its status as a nuclear
state. Meanwhile, the Chinese civil nuclear cooperation with Pakistan provided Chinese
nuclear industry an opportunity to present its emerging advances in nuclear reactor
technology to the wider world through Pakistani platform.

Consequently, both countries concluded agreements on construction of two nuclear power

plants based on ACP-1000 design each with generation capacity of 1100 MWs in Pakistan in
45
2013. China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) is providing extensive assistance in
46
construction and finance (US$6.5 billion out of US$9.59 billion) of two power plants being
47
built in Karachi. Construction of K-2 and K-3 will be completed in 2020 and 2021
respectively. Next in November 2017, both countries concluded agreements to construct

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48
another large nuclear power reactor in Chashma. It will also have the capacity of 1100MWs,
based on same ACP-1000 design. This will be the fifth nuclear power plant in Chashma
already site of existing four small nuclear power reactors built with Chinese cooperation.
Once these power reactors are completed and made operational, Pakistan will have installed
49
nuclear power generation capacity of around 5000MWs.

A second major development is deepening Sino-Pakistani coordination on the issue of India

50
and Pakistan’s entry into the 48-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Pakistan and India
have been seeking membership of NSG which is an inter-government body and sets rules for
trade in nuclear energy technology. In 2015-16, the US pledged open support to India’s
membership into the NSG. Pakistan also sought the same, but Washington refused to
support.NSG operates by consensus and typically signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
is a requirement for entry into the group. India and Pakistan, however, are not signatories to
NPT which governs the use of nuclear weapons and technology for peaceful purposes. India
and Pakistan developed nuclear weapons outside the non-proliferation regime. However, now
both countries are seeking entry into export control regimes and become part of global civil
nuclear market.

During the NSG plenary meetings, Beijing made the case that, before deciding on the
applications of India and Pakistan, NSG member should reach a consensus on the manner and
criteria of admission of non-NPT signatories into the club. India and its supporters, on the
other hand, posited that first India’s application should be decided on its own merit and
51
Pakistan’s application could be taken up later. Islamabad, however, fears that once India
gets into the NSG it will not vote in favour of Pakistan’s application. It is in Pakistan’s
interest to

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seek simultaneous entry into the NSG. China also argues that, if an exemption is being made
for India, it should apply to Pakistan as well. Islamabad and Beijing have maintained close
dialogue on NSG issue and other non-proliferation matters in recent years. It was unusual for
Beijing to come out openly in support of Pakistan at the NSG and defend its position. China
has staked its reputation on backing Pakistan, and it will not back down easily. At the
52
moment, a deadlock persists at the NSG over this issue.

Science and Technology Cooperation

The bilateral cooperation in science and technology arena has been expanded, particularly, in
space sector. For decades, Pakistan’s space programme has lagged behind regional countries.
In 2012, Pakistan’s Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) and
China National Space Administration (CNSA) agreed to a 2012-2020 programme for joint
cooperation. Under this programme in 2013, Pakistan adopted Beidou, China’s indigenous
satellite navigation system, for military applications. These included access to satellite
53
imagery, precision-guided targeting, tracking of enemy forces, deployments and equipment.
A base station has been constructed at Karachi with the goal to ensure coverage of whole
54
territory of Pakistan. In November 2018, China launched new satellites Beidou-3, an
55
enhanced version with the goal to rival America’s Global Positioning System (GPS).

In 2016, Pakistan and China inked an agreement to develop and launch Pakistan Remote
56
Sensing Satellite (PRSS-1) system aimed at civilian and defence applications. Two years
later in July 2018, PRSS-1 and a domestically

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developed Pakistan Technology Evaluation Satellite-1A (PakTES-1A) were launched into the
57
orbit with assistance from China. Similarly, in March, 2018, SUPARCO concluded an
agreement with China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) to jointly manufacture and
launch a communication satellite (Paksat-MM1). In the interim, a satellite has been put into
58
the orbit to serve as a stopgap measure. These satellites are contributing to socio- economic
development; meeting national security requirements of the country and opening new vistas
in space technology development in Pakistan.

Visible Trends and Likely Future Course

Pakistan-China bilateral relations have expanded to economic realm while cooperation has
been deepened in traditional strategic and defence sectors. This has been guided by converge
of geo-strategic interests, while tactfully navigating major power competition in Asia and
IOR. CPEC has been beneficial to both countries. It has enabled Beijing and Islamabad to
shift the focus on bilateral relationship away from strategic and defence collaboration to
economic engagement, trade, connectivity and Afghanistan-centric issues. On the other hand,
in relationship with India, CPEC emerged as an additional irritant for both Pakistan and
China due to different reasons.

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Despite this, Chinese analysts have argued that Pakistan is China’s “one real ally,” and
policy-makers see the bilateral relationship as a ‘model of state-to- state relations,’
60
particularly, of ‘good neighbourly friendship.’ An alliance treaty does not underpin the
bilateral relationship, yet there is convergence of interests on the issues of regional peace and
stability. As CPEC and other economic cooperation has been the focus of bilateral
relationship in the recent years, a quiet and substantive cooperation has taken place in
defence and

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Pakistan-China Relations

strategic sectors. It enhances Pakistan’s military capabilities, by giving it access to high-tech

weapons and new Chinese technologies. This trend is likely to continue and will enable
Pakistan to match India’s growing military prowess in the region. It will also keep India tied
down in the region, and enable China to focus on balancing the US in its core regions. This is
China’s way to rebalance strategic competition in South Asia.

Increasingly, Pakistani policy-makers are prioritising geo-political objectives over economic

goals in the bilateral relationship. Amid increased Indo-US pressure over its national security
policies, Pakistan views Islamabad- Beijing ties as a strategic counter-balancer in the region.
Pakistan’s goal is to deflect the US pressure while defying India. For Islamabad, the question
emerges that will Beijing go an extra mile for Pakistan and exert pressure on India? Given its
own security and economic relationship with India, the Chinese support to Pakistan will have
limitations. China’s interests are more global than Pakistan’s, and it often requires support
from the US and India at the UN bodies and other international forums. If forced to choose
between protecting Pakistani interests or its national and strategic interests at international
bodies, China will prioritise its own interests as a rising power.
In its own way, China has also gained geo-political advantages through deepening
cooperation with Pakistan. As a rising great power, China is competing with the US. In this
competition, China needs friends in its neighbourhood and other regions of the world.
Strategic cooperation has been at the heart of Pakistan-China relations for decades and now
Beijing is capitalising on it. It is also a testament to commitment of rising power to its friends
that it is a trustworthy partner.

Conclusion

Pakistan-China relations have evolved in recent years. New dynamics are influencing the
course of bilateral ties. Pakistan-China relations have been employed in regional geo-strategic
issues, most notably, in Afghan peace process and India-centric issues. In Afghanistan, China
agreed to play a larger role in Afghanistan conflict, bringing additional geo- strategic clout
and economic resources to incentivise regional stakeholders. Islamabad and Kabul supported
engagement by Beijing to advance their own respective interests. Meanwhile, on the issues
related to India, Pakistan and China have maintained close coordination.

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Strategic Studies

Beijing has attempted to manage tensions with India through high-level diplomacy, yet,
mistrust has not been addressed. New Delhi remains opposed to Chinese initiatives and
presence in South Asia, particularly, decades old Pakistan-China security cooperation. As the
regional security environment has evolved, Pakistan’s relationship with the US, the
preeminent great power, has soured due to differences over on-going conflict in Afghanistan
and US regional policy in South Asia. In contrast, Pakistan’s relationship with China has
deepened in recent years. However, this broadening of cooperation does not make China a
substitute of the US for Pakistan. Islamabad needs to pursue engagement with the US while
expanding relations with China.

Meanwhile, Pakistan-China relationship has progressed from diplomatic and defence centric
cooperation to development and trade focused engagement. Present cooperation is much
more comprehensive and wide- ranging than before. But it also brings with it new set of
complications. It requires realistic assessment from both sides. In this context, it is important
for Islamabad to identify foreign policy goals which are its paramount national interest and
only seek support for those from China at the multilateral forums. It will demonstrate that
Pakistan is cognizant of Chinese limitations and interests and seeks to avoid putting
unnecessary pressure on Beijing. This will give more depth to the relationship while
rationalising expectations on both sides.