IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OMITTED FOR ANONYMITY

On October 11th of this year, the US government reported they had uncovered a plot to assassinate a Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States (Savage). This essay will venture to prove that the escalation of tension between the United States and Iran associated with this alleged assassination plot is unlikely to bring about effective international cooperation in sanctioning Iran. I will prove this through an analysis of the present situation through two frameworks: realism and Institutionalism. This essay is divided into five sections. First, I will discuss which of the two theories is more appropriate for analyzing the present case. Second, I will consider how a realist would describe the situation. Third, I will argue that a realist would conclude the likelihood of cooperation for international sanctions is low. Fourth, I will alternatively consider how an institutionalist would describe the relations involved in this event. Fifth, I will argue that an institutionalist would also consider the likelihood of cooperation to be low. Section 1: A comparison of each theorys appropriateness in analyzing the event In this section, I will argue that realism is a more suitable framework than institutionalism to analyze this event. Because both theories rest on similar core assumptions (states are the most important actors in international politics, International relations takes place in a state of anarchy, states act in a rational capacity, weighing the costs and benefits of their choices), the suitability of either theory must be assessed at the point of greatest diversion between the two theories following these core assumptions. I have identified this point to be the possibility of long-term mutual gain between states. In a realist framework, states are concerned primarily about their own security, and can never be certain of the intentions of other states. Thus, any gains made by one state in terms of security that arent reciprocated by other states reduce the relative security and power of all other states in comparison with the first state. As a result of

Page 1

IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OMITTED FOR ANONYMITY

this, the interests of states do not overlap; helping another state gain power decreases your own relative power. The nature of international relations is, subsequently, zero-sum. Conversely, an institutionalist framework concludes that sometimes the interests of states do overlap, creating the possibility (but not the guarantee) of cooperation. If one state ends up better off as a result of collective action than other states, it is not of significant concern. These mutual benefits are usually conceived of as economic benefits for states. When it comes to the Iranian assassination plot, the impact of sanctions follows a realist, rather than institutionalist logic. Sanctions would effectively cripple the economy and nuclear weapons program of Iran, decreasing their power relative to other states, and subsequently improving the relative security of all other states. This would be the primary impact of sanctions, and fits in clearly with realist thinking. On the other hand, mutual non-zero benefits for all cooperating nations would not be realized if sanctions were implemented. This is because the benefits of sanctioning Iran would be the reduction of a threat. This benefits all actors, regardless of whether or not they cooperated, and intentionally harms Iran. Effective international cooperation is necessary for the sanctions benefits to be realized, but these benefits arent exclusive to just the states that chose to cooperate. Further, benefits under institutionalism are not usually framed as harming another state, but rather as helping the states who cooperate. Therefore, because the primary impact of sanctions would be a reduction in relative power for the State of Iran in a zero-sum world, rather than mutual benefits for all cooperating states derived from sanctions in a non-zero sum world, realism is more applicable to this situation. Thus, my realist analysis is presented as my primary analysis, and my institutionalist analysis is presented as a secondary alternative in the event you reject a realist framework. Section 2: A Realist Description of the Iranian Assassination Plot

Page 2

IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OMITTED FOR ANONYMITY

A realist would look at this situation and identify at least four major factors at work. First, Irans development of nuclear weapons indicates that it is trying to gain a significant capacity for power in the Middle Eastern region. In other words, it is striving for hegemony. In response, the US is attempting to maintain its preeminence in the region by calling for sanctions to disrupt Iran, preventing the rise of a potential hegemon in a currently multipolar system. Second, the realist motives of the US are cloaked in the rhetoric of a moral mission, as has been the case historically under political moralism. As explained by Hans Morgenthau, moral principles were nothing but the political interests formulated in moral terms, and vice versa. They fit the interests as a glove fits the hand. (Morgenthau 846). In the case of the present situation, the United States is really intending to balance a rising power, but putting on airs that this action is about a moral mission to punish what the Saudi Arabian Government labeled a despicable violation of international norms, standards and conventions (Savage). Third, the morals in which this call to action is cloaked are actually morals based on the English Schools conception of international society. In this case, a norm of diplomacy is being violated, as violent action is being plotted against diplomats in a manner that flagrantly ignores the norms of diplomacy established as a means of relations within the international society. Fourth, in response to the accusation of the US government, the government of Iran is accusing the United States of engaging in the strategy of bait and bleed. As explained by Layne, bait and bleed is the attempted incitement of violence between two or more rising powers in the region in an attempt to reduce the relative power of all those who engage in the conflict, and increase another states (in this case the United States) relative power in the process (Layne). Iran has denied the accusations of an assassination plot, and claimed that the US is trying to start a war between Saudi Arabia and Iran to ensure its own

Page 3

IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OMITTED FOR ANONYMITY

continued power in the region. These four factors would likely be identified by a realist analyzing the situation. Section 3: A Realist Analysis would Find that the Likelihood of Cooperation is Low The chances for cooperation under a realist assessment of the situation are low for three reasons. First, the chances of cooperation are low because economic sanctions against Iran would harm the relative security of many states that chose to comply with a call for sanctions. As admitted by the governments of both China, and Russia, sanctioning Iran would hurt commercial interests (Cooper). China and Russia would be harmed significantly more if they were to cease trade with Iran, than would the United States, who does little to no trade with Iran presently. As a result, China and Russias economies would be harmed to a greater extent than would the United States, reducing their ability to modernize and mobilize military power, and subsequently reducing their relative power and relative security in comparison with the United States. Because China, Russia, and other nations that trade with Iran want to preserve their relative power against the United States, the chances of widespread, effective sanctions are low. Second, modified defensive realist theory would conclude that sanctions would actually increase the hegemonic ambitions of Iran. A modified defensive realist, according to Layne, argues that the reason a state would strive for global hegemony, despite the fact that it will invariably fail, is that something becomes wrong with the government itself. This is a significant break with other forms of realism (Layne). By not engaging with Iran economically, states are increasing the likelihood that Iran will become an aggressive power, striving for more violent, conquering hegemony than they would if they had an economy integrated in international trade with other states. Thus, because states would not want this situation to occur, the chances for cooperation are low. Third, if some countries engage in sanctions, while others do not, the states that continue

Page 4

IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OMITTED FOR ANONYMITY

to trade with Iran will gain in relative power over states that choose sanctions. This is because the more states that engage in sanctions, the more desperate Iran will become to find export markets. This will reduce the price of Iranian imports for nations who dont choose sanctions, increasing those states wealth, and subsequently their relative power. Because states do not want other states to gain in relative power, and do want their own states to increase their relative power, most states would choose not to engage in sanctions, making the likelihood of cooperation low. Section 4: An Institutionalist Description of the Situation A Institutionalist would describe the US call for sanctions as a mixed motive game in which each state has both incentives to cooperate (stop trading with Iran) and incentives to defect (continue trade, or increase trade with Iran). Institutionalists argue that International Organizations, such as the UN in this case, help to encourage states to cooperate by reducing transaction costs, and improving the quality of information that states have available to them for making the decision of whether or not to cooperate. The mutual benefit from these sanctions is a little murky, as explained in section one, but an institutionalist might potentially identify the goal as increased stability and security by crippling a threatening Iran. Section 5: An Institutionalist Analysis would Find that the likelihood of cooperation is low Even if my primary realist analysis is rejected, there are at least five reasons, under an institutionalist framework, that the likelihood of defection is high. First, the direct economic cost of cooperation will decrease the likelihood of cooperation. Under a realist analysis, this cost was prohibitive because it would unequally reduce the relative power of some states. Under this analysis, the problem is simply that states want to avoid direct economic costs. The more economically integrated with Iran a state is, the greater the costs imposed by sanctioning Iran.

Page 5

IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OMITTED FOR ANONYMITY

This provides a massive disincentive for cooperation from some states, decreasing the likelihood of effective sanctions against Iran. Second, unlike mixed motives games that take place over long periods of time, with multiple instances of play, this issue is single-shot. A nation will either choose sanctions or not, and has time pressure to do so, if the goal is to contain Iran. Thus, states have significantly fewer plays available to them, and in prisoners dilemma modeling, this increases the uncertainty of the actions of others, and increases the tendency to defect (Keohane). Third, institutionalism relies on international organizations to provide quality information to governments about motives and facts, reducing the costs of obtaining high quality information. As explained by Keohane, this increases the tendency to cooperate (Keohane). However, in the present case, UN nuclear inspectors have not released data on the Iranian weapons program, because it is classified (Sanger). Thus, states dont have high quality information, so the tendency to defect is increased (Keohane). Fourth, as explained in the third point of section three, the potential gains from defection increase as more states choose to cooperate. The fewer export markets available to Iran, the lower the price for Iranian goods, as Iran becomes increasingly desperate. The tendency to defect increases as the number of states who cooperate increase, because the economic benefits of cheap resources from Iran become more and more tempting. Thus, even in the case of some cooperation, the chances for widespread effective sanctions are further decreased. Fifth, because sanctions must be in place firmly to exert pressure on Iran to stall their military buildup, the chances of escape valve clauses for sanctions are essentially non-existent. As explained by Martin, these clauses allow states to temporarily defect as a method of easing domestic political pressure to defect (Martin). Because the inclusion of an escape valve clause is either unlikely, or will decrease the effectiveness of sanctions, this factor also deceases the likelihood of effective sanctions against Iran.

Page 6

IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OMITTED FOR ANONYMITY

Works Cited Cooper, Helene. "Obama Says Facts Support Accusation of Iranian Plot." New York Times. 13 Oct. 2011. Web. 24 Oct. 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/14/us/obama-calls-for iran-sanctions-following-alleged-plot.html>. Keohane, Robert O. "The Demand for International Regimes." International Organization 36.02 (1982): 325-55. Print. Layne, Christopher. "The Influence of Theory on Grand Strategy." Rethinking Realism in International Relations: between Tradition and Innovation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2009. 103-35. Print. Martin, Lisa L. "Neoliberalism." International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. 109-26. Print. Morganthau, Hans J. "The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions." The American Political Science Review 44.4 (1950): 833-54. Print. Sanger, David E., and Mark Landler. "To Isolate Iran, U.S. Presses Inspectors on Nuclear Data." New York Times. 15 Oct. 2011. Web. 24 Oct. 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/world/middleeast/white-house-says-data-shows iran-push-on-nuclear arms.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=to%20isolate%20Iran%20U.S.&st=cse>. Savage, Charlie, and Scott Shane. "Iranians Accused of a Plot to Kill Saudis' U.S. Envoy." New York Times 11 Oct. 2011. Print.

Page 7