Kantian Moral Standard

Pooja Agarwal
Assistant Professor
Department of Philosophy
Murshidabad Adarsha Mahavidyalaya
Email Id: [email protected]

Abstract:

We, the human beings, have always tried to search for a moral standard or principle which
would help us to determine what we morally ought to do and what not to do. The question of the
true and ultimate moral standard has been answered differently by different schools of moralists.
In this context, the moral theories get divided into legal or juristic theories which conceives of
the supreme standard in morality as some sort of law, rule or imperative from which we learn
what is right to do and teleological theories which conceives rather of a good or some end at
which men aim, and by reference to which their actions are to be praised or blamed. For the
German philosopher Immanuel Kant, ‘right’ is superior to ‘good’. The moral standard should be
interpreted as based on the idea of law or on the idea of rule rather than on that of an end.
However, all laws which are not simply expressions of natural uniformities may be said to be of
the nature of commands. The laws of nations, for example, are commands issued by the
government, with penalties attached to the violation of them. But moral laws even though can be
said to be commands, still here the external dictates are replaced by the internal dictates of
conscience. According to Kant, moral law intuitively apprehended by conscience or practical
reason is a Categorical Imperative or an unconditional command. What we ought to do we ought
to do irrespective of consequences, regardless of ends, unmoved by any feeling or desire, out of
pure respect for the Moral Law. This is the ultimate standard of morality which is applicable to
all rational beings. As, for example, that one should not tell lies or that one should not indulge in
unrestrained killing of human lives are laws which apply to all rational beings irrespective of
their choice. However, it is essential to take into account other considerations than mere
conformity to Kant’s principle to decide whether an action is right or wrong.

Key words: Moral standard, Goodwill, Duty, Categorical Imperative.

In Kant’s moral system the immutability and universality of the moral principle remains
non-negotiable. Now since moral principle implies absolute necessity, it cannot be merely
empirical. In other words, being rigidly universal and absolute, and also being the determinant of
what we ought to do, this moral principle cannot be originated in experience which can only
furnish contingent facts and an account of what we in fact do in contrast to what we ought to do.
Further just as moral principle cannot be originated in experience, so also it cannot emerge from
anything conditional; i.e., it cannot emerge from anything the goodness of which is contingent on
something else. The existence of a universal and absolute moral principle, therefore, requires
there to be something of absolute, unconditional value, something which is unconditionally good.
In his great treatise on Ethics (Metaphysic of Morals), Kant says that “there is nothing in the
world, or even out of it, that can be called good without qualification, except a good will”. A
good will is good without condition. The goodness of the goodwill is neither enhanced nor
diminished by its combination with any other thing, good or bad. It is, as Kant said, the only
jewel that shines by its own light. In this sense, Kant’s supreme principle of morality, being
something which is unconditionally good, is a good will – the only unconditional good. But Kant
is careful to distinguish will from mere wish. As he observes, mere wishing does not require the
subject to make any effort on his part to bring about the object he wants even if the appropriate
means is available to him. On the other hand, good will is a determined effort to realize the will’s
objective. Now when Kant says that a good will is a determined effort to realise its (the will’s)
objective he does not claim that a good will must invariably succeed in achieving its objective,
since some unforeseen contingencies may entirely frustrate its success. In other words, due to
some misfortune, a good will may fail to produce its intended result but produces the result that is
directly contrary to what the good will wills it to be. However, that does not take away the
goodness of the good will itself in that its own objective is good anyway even if the eventual
outcome is bad. Thus, it can be said that the goodness of a good will is a quality or nature of it
and not what it brings about. By upholding this notion of good will, Kant denies all teleological
theories of ethics which hold that an action is right because it leads to certain consequences.
Things may not work out as expected. However, that does not take away the moral worth of an
action if and only if it is done from good will. In order to make clear the nature of a good will
Kant proposes to examine the concept of duty. It is said here that the will that wills those actions
be done from a sense of duty is the good will. Kant is concerned with the good will under human
conditions – a will which is related to the concept of duty.

Kant distinguishes between what is done in accordance with duty yet motivated perhaps
by a natural inclination or a selfish purpose and what is done from duty. According to Kant a
person demonstrates possession of a good will not just by performing an action that is in
conformity with duty, but by performing an action from duty. For example, a shopkeeper refrains
from cheating even his most inexperienced customers because he thinks that a reputation for
honesty will be good for his business in the long run, that is just an action out of self-interest, for
which to be sure he cannot be criticized, but for which he also does not earn our esteem, because
he does not demonstrate a good will, that is the settled determination to do one’s duty. However,
generally it is agreed upon that an action done solely out of natural sympathy may be right and
praiseworthy. But for Kant such an action has no distinctive moral worth. As Kant says, the
goodness shown in helping others is all the more conspicuous if a man does this for the sake of
duty at a time when he is fully occupied with his own troubles and when he is not impelled to do
so by his natural inclinations. The point which concerns Kant here is that inclinations are too
fickle and unreliable and can sometimes incline one to do what is right and sometimes what is
wrong. Kant would thus condemn the action of a man who, out of compassion, helps his
neighbour. For such a person’s benevolence will not be regulated by an appropriate rule, and
hence he may offer help where that is contrary to duty as well as where it is required by it. Hence
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Kant concludes that nothing can be our moral duty if we simply happen to have an inclination to
pursue it.1 However, from what has been said above, it would be wrong to conclude that
according to Kant the motive of duty essentially and absolutely excludes all inclinations. Rather
what Kant says is that an action does not cease to have moral worth if it is accompanied by
inclination; it ceases to have moral worth if it is done only for the sake of inclination or only to
satisfy an inclination. Kant further claims that the moral value of an action does not also depend
on the results sought or attained. For, if an action depends for its moral value on results sought or
attained then it would have this value even if it were done only from an inclination to produce
these results. Kant, therefore says that “duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law”
rather than from any “inclination”. The respect for the supreme principle of morality needs to be
the concomitant of the process of moral life. But it is very difficult to determine whether an
action is done from duty or is done in accordance with some hidden impulse or inclination? Now,
Kant says that, it is due to the human beings enduring temptations to do otherwise than what its
reason tells it do that the cultivation of his will upto the pure moral disposition to do acts from
pure duty is to be reckoned as a constraint, that is as an “imperative”, but only for perpetual
progress.2

Now imperatives can be of several different types. The major distinction between them is
between those that are hypothetical and those that are categorical, that is, those that tells us what
we must do if we want to attain some end – these are hypothetical-and those that tell us what we
must do regardless of any such “reference to another end” – categorical imperatives. The
fundamental principle of morality, for Kant, presents itself to us in the form of this “categorical
imperative” : Categorical, because we recognize that its demands are unconditional, but an
imperative, because we recognize this law as something we ought to follow, thus as a constraint,
that is, not something we always want to follow. 3 The moral law further can tell us nothing more
than that we are to act in a way that is conformable to law. And this means simply that the
principles on which we act, the subjective principle of one’s action, one’s maxim, should
conform to the objective law valid for all rational beings. Therefore, Kant contends, there is only
a single categorical or moral imperative: “Act only on that maxim which you can at the same
time will that it should become a universal law”. Kant gives a variety of examples to illustrate the
application of this formula of Universal Law. In one of his illustrations, he supposes that A
makes a promise but is ready to break it if this suits his purposes. A’s maxim then may be
expressed thus, “when it suits my purposes I will make promises, intending also to break them if
this suits my purposes”. But A cannot consistently will this maxim to be universally acted on,
says Kant. For with such a maxim universally acted on there would be no promises at all. No one
would place any reliance on promises; instead promises would be viewed, in Kant’s words, as
“vain pretenses”. Thus, the maxim would necessarily destroy itself as soon as it was made a
universal law. Kant concludes, therefore, that it is wrong to make deceitful promises. The upshot

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of all this is that we need to examine the maxims of our contemplated actions and to accept or
reject them according as they can or cannot be willed as Universal Laws – that is, as laws valid
for all men, and not as special privileges of our own. It is only in this way, as Kant says, that a
disciplined moral order can be brought about.

For Kant there is no scope of moral exception or moral dilemma in morality guided by
categorical imperatives. Always speak the truth – this moral principle has no alternative. Now
we, no doubt, do have a duty to tell the truth. But the important point is that, under situational
constraints, there might be stronger grounds for rejecting truth-telling as a duty and accepting the
stronger duty of saving an innocent life. In this way other considerations need to taken into
account than merely confirming to Kant’s principles of universalizability in deciding whether an
action is right or wrong.

References

1. See Tirthanath Bandyopadhyay, Kantian Ethics : A Brief Introduction, Kolkata., Ebang

2. Ibid pp 37-39.

3. Paul Guyer, Kant, London, New York. Routledge, 2006, pp 179.180.