Marr, 2007
Marr, 2007
ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Compounding the importance of these uncertain conditions are the potential large
consequences of unexpected performance by the facility. Unexpected performance
may adversely impact the project, neighboring structures and utilities, and people.
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FMGM 2007: Seventh International Symposium on Field Measurements in Geomechanics © 2007 ASCE
Unexpected performance may delay the project, increase its cost, and lead to lengthy
and expensive litigations.
Urban work amplifies these issues because there are more structures within the
potential influence zone, urban structures tend to be more significant, there are more
people to be impacted, the population tends to be less tolerant, and more unknowns
exist due to previous activities at the site. Additionally, one may be working in and
around existing structures that must stay in operation or joining new construction to
existing facilities and completed sections of the work.
During design we have data that represent an indication of the true state of nature.
We use our knowledge and judgment to combine these data with models to predict
ultimate performance. If the predicted ultimate performance is unacceptable the
Engineer alters the design. Traditional design treated predictions as discrete values
but in fact every prediction has uncertainty. Measured performance is nature’s
indication of the true condition. Measured performance reduces the range of
uncertainty caused by all the unknowns present during design.
Geotechnical instrumentation programs are used to save lives, save money and/or
reduce risks by giving advanced notice of unexpected, undesirable performance. In
concept, these are simple and easy to understand benefits. In practice, they may be
benefits that are difficult to quantify or substantiate.
Table No.1 summarizes the principle technical reasons one might recommend a
geotechnical instrumentation program for a project. Dunnicliff (1988, 1993)
discusses some of these points. Each of these is discussed below in the context of
today’s practice of geotechnical engineering.
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the hardware, collecting data, interpreting results, preparing reports and acting on the
conclusions.
Geotechnical facilities can fail with catastrophic consequences to life and property.
Such failures may be the result of excessive loads, design errors, construction
deficiencies, unknown or different conditions, deterioration, operational errors or
intentional action. Geotechnical instrumentation has been widely used to detect the
onset of failure in dams, slopes, embankments and excavations. Such monitoring
may have different purposes. It may be to issue a warning to evacuate people and
move equipment. It may be to initiate action to forestall the failure. It may provide
feedback when causing an
intentional failure, such as for a Table No. 1: Reasons to Monitor Performance
mining operation or a field test. 1. Indicate impending failure.
2. Provide a warning.
Geotechnical 3. Reveal unknowns.
instrumentation programs may 4. Evaluate critical design assumptions.
save lives by giving advanced 5. Assess contractor’s means and methods.
6. Minimize damage to adjacent structures.
warning in time for people to 7. Control Construction.
get to a safe area. A good 8. Control Operations.
instrumentation program may 9. Devise remedial measures to fix problems.
reveal an unknown condition 10. Improve performance.
early enough that changes can 11. Advance state-of-knowledge.
12. Document performance for assessing damages.
be made that greatly reduce the 13. Inform stakeholders.
risk of failure. Instrumentation 14. Satisfy regulators.
can save money and reduce risk 15. Reduce litigation.
by decreasing the likelihood of 16. Show that everything is OK.
an unexpected failure that
destroys or delays the project.
Provide a Warning
In these cases, the geotechnical instruments are a vital part of a warning system
that is used to get people out of harm’s way or initiate preemptive actions to avoid an
undesirable event. The instrumentation saves money by reducing the risk of a loss of
life and/or property, or by reducing delays.
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Reveal Unknowns
The foundations of the geotechnical discipline were built on the use of field
measurements to reveal unknowns during construction and head off disaster. The
work of Terzaghi and Peck in Chicago to measure the forces on excavation support
systems is a classic example. In fact, one might argue that the driving force that leads
to the development of most of the instrumentation we use today was a need to
measure something to reveal unknowns.
Where the consequence of these unknowns might threaten the success of a project,
we instrument to measure the actual performance of our design. We use the
measurements to identify potential undesirable outcomes, including failure, and make
plans to take preemptive action early. The measurements help us answer questions
and reduce uncertainty. Terzaghi was a strong advocate of this approach. Peck
(1969) defined and illustrated its use as the Observational Method, a concept used in
underground construction world-wide.
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FMGM 2007: Seventh International Symposium on Field Measurements in Geomechanics © 2007 ASCE
We might for example assume that a sand layer at the middle of a clay deposit will
provide drainage to hasten consolidation of the clay under the weight of a new
embankment. If our assumption is wrong, the project could be delayed by years. A
single piezometer placed in the sand layer beneath the fill would tell us how good our
assumption was early enough to take corrective action and minimize adverse
consequences.
The outcome of some geotechnical projects depends on the means and methods of
the contractor. The job requirements may be in the form of a performance
specification where the contractor is required to provide the design and complete the
work. Maintaining the stability of the bottom of a deep excavation against uplift is
one example. The specifications might require that the contractor maintain a
minimum factor of safety against bottom heave due to uplift of at least 1.1.
Piezometers installed to measure pore water pressures beneath the excavation would
indicate whether the contractor is meeting this important requirement.
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Underground construction can have adverse consequences that reach beyond the
project boundary. These consequences may affect adjacent property with undesirable
results. Expensive repairs, bad relations and protracted litigation can result.
Control Construction
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Control Operations
In these situations, data from the instrumentation permit the operations of the
facility to be pushed closer to their limits without causing a failure. As a result, the
owner realizes an economic gain from the higher utilization or more efficient
operation of the facility.
Improve Performance
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Advance State-of-Knowledge
Many of the advances in the theories of geotechnical engineering have their roots
in data from geotechnical instrumentation on full-scale projects. The data give us
insight into how things are performing and causal relationships. Historically, a
significant amount of geotechnical instrumentation was performed as part of a
research effort to improve our state of knowledge. Much of this was paid for by
governmental agencies with a mission to improve practice.
Claims for damages by third parties represent one of the substantial risks
encountered in geotechnical projects. Some claims may include charges for damages
unrelated to the construction. Others may be inflated, such as a claim for structural
damage when only minor architectural damage has occurred.
Data from geotechnical instrumentation can help establish the validity of such
claims. For example, if the instrumentation shows that an adjacent building has not
moved during construction, it becomes more difficult for the owner to claim that
cracks in the building resulted from the construction activity.
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Inform Stakeholders
Construction in developed areas may affect numerous parties, all of who seek a
role in controlling the adverse impacts of the project. People tend to anticipate the
worst outcomes and fear construction impacts. Data from geotechnical
instrumentation can provide solid evidence of the true construction impacts. It can
provide powerful responses to the questions and fears of stakeholders.
Satisfy Regulators
It is not always easy to see how instrumentation saves money when installed to
meet a regulatory requirement. For the specific project, it may not save money,
especially if the only reason the equipment was installed was to satisfy the regulatory
requirements. Unfortunately, many of those involved see such instrumentation only
as an added cost. With the instrumentation properly installed and the data carefully
collected and evaluated, it can become a valuable resource in maintaining and
rehabilitating the facility at some later time.
Reduce Litigation
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facility. Where subsurface conditions are involved, data from a good geotechnical
instrumentation program may provide powerful evidence to help get to a fair
resolution of such claims. I have been involved in a number of cases where the entire
basis for a differing site condition claim could have been refuted if only a few key
measurements had been taken during construction. A common claim is that
excessive water was encountered due to a differing site condition. Unfortunately,
measurements of actual quantities of flow, or the flow conditions in the vicinity of the
contested region are rarely taken. A few key measurements could quickly establish
the validity of the contractor’s claim.
I’m waiting for the corollary to this idea to develop as well, that is the case where
someone sues a contractor or engineer for not using geotechnical instrumentation to
warn of undesirable performance. Doctors have been sued for not requesting certain
diagnostic tests or collecting certain data when the methods for making such
measurements were readily available. Considering the parallels between medical and
engineering practice, how long can it be before a similar concept is applied to sue an
engineer for failing to require instrumentation to identify and avoid undesirable
performance?
In this use, data from an instrumentation programs helps maintain the various
parties’ confidence in the performance of the work and frees them to focus on other
issues. I find more clients desiring performance monitoring systems that are
comprehensive and robust but with instant reporting as simple as a green light to
indicate that everything is in an acceptable state.
To this point, the paper has discussed the engineering reasons for why we monitor
performance. These are the talking points in engineer-to-engineer exchanges.
They’re the language we put into proposals and demonstrate in publications. But
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they’re not the language of business. They’re not the language of most owners or
contractors, or designers, or regulators. They can read and understand the rationale
outlined above but they have trouble translating the words into perceived benefits that
give them value.
This section provides an approximate method to quantity these benefits. While the
suggested method is not precise, it is generally sufficient to decide how much of an
instrumentation program is worthwhile for many situations. The suggested method is
based on concepts of decision theory and risk analysis.
Decision theory provides a framework for managers to make decisions when faced
with incomplete and uncertain information. It uses probabilistic analyses to estimate
likely outcomes. Decisions are based on the desirable outcomes with the highest
likelihood of success or lowest chance of failure. Most graduate level business
programs teach decision theory as a recognized decision making tool.
Risk analysis embodies a wide range of scientific theory and engineering analyses
to identify potential sources of risk, determine the probability of each source, and
estimate the consequences from each source of risk. Total risk is the summation of
the probability of each source of risk occurring times the consequences of that
occurrence. Risk can be decreased by actions that reduce the probability of a source
of risk occurring or reduce the consequence of that event occurring. As an example,
consider two dams of similar construction in a similar setting. Both dams might have
the same probability of failure. But suppose Dam A is located 10 miles upstream of a
major city sited on the banks of the river and Dam B outlets directly to the ocean 10
miles away. Clearly Dam A poses a much higher risk than Dam B even though they
have a similar probability of failure. Dam B could have an even higher probability
of failure than Dam A; yet pose less overall risk. However, risk is in the wallet of its
recipient. While failure of Dam B might present much less societal risk, its risk of
failure might still be unbearable to its shareholders who would suffer from the
physical loss of the facility.
Risk analysis provides input for decisions using decision theory. A manager may
choose a course that minimizes risk, or the manager may choose a course in which
the benefits achieved by lowering risk outweigh the costs of achieving that reduction.
In its simplest form, the approach outlined here to help quantify the benefits of
instrumentation is as follows:
1. Determine all ways by which the project can fail or experience undesirable
performance from a geotechnical cause.
2. Estimate the probability of occurrence of each of these events during the
period of interest, Pi.
3. Define the consequences of each event and estimate the potential cost of each
consequence, Ci.
4. Estimate the reduction in probability of occurrence of each event that a
geotechnical instrumentation program could produce, Pi.
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FMGM 2007: Seventh International Symposium on Field Measurements in Geomechanics © 2007 ASCE
Engineers seem to be able to use adjectives to describe their judgment about how
much uncertainty exists in their design. Table No.2 assigns probability ranges to
some of the more common adjectives used to describe uncertainty or risk. To
simplify risk calculations, the ranges given in Table No.2 for probability of
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occurrence are rounded to the highest value associated with each group of descriptive
adjectives. These simplified probability states are sufficient to produce reasonable
estimates of risk cost for most geotechnical instrumentation applications. Of course,
this simplified procedure can always be replaced with a more rigorous risk
assessment if the project conditions justify the extra expense.
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The middle column of Table No.3 gives the design engineer’s subjective estimate
of the likelihood of the undesirable outcome occurring during the life of the project.
A factor of safety for global stability of 1.3 was computed using strengths estimated
from SPT data. These conditions indicate a Lambe-Silva-Marr Engineering Level III
condition (Silva, et. al., 2007). The corresponding probability of failure is 0.03.
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that removes the likelihood of a global stability failure occurring. The same system
might help reduce some of the risk cost from excessive deformation due to shear.
The risk costs estimated for the other two outcomes are relatively small so it would
be difficult to justify much more than visual monitoring and precautionary
construction steps to control these two failure modes.
This example shows one simplified approach to evaluating how much to spend on
a geotechnical instrumentation program. Used consistently over a number of
projects, it provides a consistent way to estimate the monetary value of geotechnical
instrumentation programs. However, it is not the final answer to any particular
project. There may be factors that cause significant undesirable consequences that
cannot be easily monetized. Loss of life, political fallout from delays, loss of
reputation and bad press are examples that come to mind. Any of these may provide
sufficient cause to justify a more extensive geotechnical instrumentation program.
The approach described above can be made much more complete using principles
and tools of probabilistic analysis and decision theory. Complete event trees and
fault trees can describe each likely failure scenario in considerable detail. Rigorous
activities can be used to establish probabilities. An excellent example of an event
tree for the failure of an earthen dam by cracking was provided by R.V. Whitman
(Whitman, 1984) in his Terzaghi lecture.
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Professor Whitman laid out an event tree for failure of an earthen dam due to
cracking. Figure 2 illustrates his event tree, which included the effects of
instrumentation on the probability of failure. He assigned probabilities to various
events based on his engineering judgment. His event tree was for the hypothetical
case of “good, conservative design practice” and it included monitoring to detect
oncoming failure. It shows an expected lifetime probability of failure of the dam by
cracking of 5*10-5.
This event tree includes two branches where monitoring plays a role: “piping
detected” and “high pore pressure detected.” In his assessment, good conservative
design practice would have a 99% chance of detecting piping and a 100% chance of
detecting high pore pressure before they caused failure. These high probabilities
imply a comprehensive and vigilant monitoring program. They also provide a way
for us to assess what happens to the probability of failure for the dam with a relatively
ineffective monitoring program.
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Consider the situation where the design follows good, conservative practice but
there is little to no monitoring of construction and operation or the information from
the monitoring effort is ignored. This might reduce the chances of detecting piping
and detecting high pore pressure to less than 10%. Figure 3 shows the event tree with
these revised probabilities. The lifetime probability of failure of the dam increases
from 5*10-5 to 0.002, a 40-fold increase. Looked at in reverse, an effective
monitoring program is reducing the lifetime probability of failure of a good,
conservative design by a factor of 40.
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FMGM 2007: Seventh International Symposium on Field Measurements in Geomechanics © 2007 ASCE
The Central Artery/Tunnel Project is the largest, most complex highway project in
American history. The $15 billion project consists of 161 lane miles of urban
highway – about half underground in a 7.5-mile corridor – through the heart of one of
America's oldest and most historic cities. The main portion of the Project replaced
Boston's aging, elevated Central Artery (I-93) with a modern eight-to-ten lane
underground expressway. The Project also extended the Massachusetts Turnpike (I-
90) to Logan Airport, built a dramatic 10-lane cable-stayed bridge across the Charles
River, created a state-of-the-art incident response and traffic management system,
constructed five major highway interchanges and has the largest vehicular tunnel
ventilation system in the world. The work for the CA/T Project was unprecedented,
with the majority of the construction taking place in the middle of downtown Boston
which houses the main financial and historical areas that must remain open and
accessible for businesses, residents and tourists.
More than 150 significant structures exist within the potential construction impact
zone of the CA/T Project. These include several high-rise buildings located on mat
foundations within tens of feet of proposed deep excavations, many multi-story brick
and masonry structures of historic value, major transportation infrastructure, and
completed portions of the project.
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adjacent to the Project included the 33 floor main tower of the Federal
Reserve Bank Building, the 46 floor high rise building at One Financial
Center, the historic MBTA South Station and the AMTRAK South Station
rail yard system.
• Major damage to structures due to a failure of the excavation support system
resulting in business disruptions lasting for a significant period of time.
• Architectural damage to the many historic structures along the work
alignment due to excessive deformations from excavation or ground water
lowering.
• Claims from contractors for construction delays related to damage to adjacent
structures, which resulted in work stoppage and delays.
A total collapse of a major building was unlikely to occur, but with the type of
construction performed on the CA/T Project, the possibility of a total collapse had to
be considered. The consequences of such a disaster are hard to quantify but based on
costs of other major disasters, a value of several billion dollars in damage and
economic losses is a reasonable estimate. I used $5 billion to represent the average
loss that might be anticipated if one of the several major facilities close to the project
totally collapsed. This number does not include the potential for loss of hundreds of
lives and many injuries. For the CA/T Project it seemed very unlikely that such an
event could occur before significant distress was noticed and work was stopped.
However, collapses of excavations have been known to occur with little to no
warning. Given the number of major structures that could be affected and the
extended length of time of the Project, the likelihood of occurrence of a total collapse
was estimated to be about 0.03 without a monitoring program in place. This value
was determined by using an approximation of the number of significant structures
within the construction impact zone whose complete collapse would cause billions of
dollars in damage (10) times the average number of years each structure would be
exposed to subsurface work (3) times the annual probability of a major structure
collapsing due to underground work occurring without monitoring. I estimated this
last value to be approximately 0.001 based on his knowledge of the likelihood of a
major collapse of a significant structure exposed to excavation close to its foundation
without a monitoring program. Based on risk theory, one measure of risk is
consequence multiplied by likelihood. Therefore, the risk cost to the Project of a
collapse of a major building could be estimated as the value of $5 billion multiplied
by 0.03 or about $150,000,000, not including the potential for substantial loss of life
and injury.
Major damage and disruption to one or more structures would have less
consequence than a complete collapse but a higher likelihood of occurrence. I
estimated that the potential consequences of major damage to a structure like the
MBTA South Station would be in the $700 million range accompanied with some
loss of life and injuries. This event is estimated to have a likelihood of one
occurrence during the life of the project of about 0.3 without a monitoring program in
place. The probability of occurrence of major damage to one significant structure
was estimated with the same approach used to obtain the probability of a total
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As previously discussed, the original project designers were very concerned about
the potential consequences from architectural and/or structural damage caused by
construction. It was very likely that structures along the alignment could be damaged
by the construction if careful controls were not applied. I estimated that the potential
consequences of architectural and minor structural damage could be in the range of
$100,000,000 with a likelihood of almost one without a monitoring program in place.
This gives an estimated risk cost of $100,000,000 from architectural and/or structural
damage to adjacent structures.
The results of these very approximate estimates give a total risk associated with
damages to adjacent structures from construction related ground movements of about
$550 million, not including the potential for significant loss of life and injury. There
is some evidence to suggest that a good performance monitoring program can
decrease geotechnical risk by about one order of magnitude as documented by
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This simple risk analysis indicates a rough estimate of risk to the Project resulting
from damage to adjacent structures and delays from unexpected ground performance,
of about $550 million dollars, not including the potential for significant loss of life
and injury, but $500 million of this could be removed with a good geotechnical
performance monitoring program. Each entry in Table No. 3 involves subjective
engineering judgment. Some will argue that any one of these entries is too low while
others will argue that they are too high. Each entry is based on the subjective
estimate of experienced engineers knowledgeable with the geotechnical aspects of the
project and the consequences of underground construction on existing structures. A
thorough risk analysis would change every entry in Table No. 5; however I firmly
believe that the conclusion drawn from the results in the table will not materially
differ.
The approximate total cost for instruments, installation, monitoring and evaluation
was about $60 million. At the time of substantial completion of the underground
work, payments for repairs and damages to adjacent structures total approximately $9
million. There were no major failures from ground movements. Engineers working
on the project experienced numerous instances where the monitoring program
showed problems and deficiencies in time for corrective action to be taken. My
estimate of the monetary benefit to the project from the geotechnical performance
monitoring program is about $500 million. The estimated financial benefits from
avoiding ground failures, damage to adjacent structures and delays to the Project
exceeded the cost of the geotechnical monitoring program by about eight times.
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We must find better ways to convey the benefits and value of performance
monitoring to the larger community in concepts and terms they understand. Too
many good plans for performance monitoring are reduced or removed at higher
decision levels or poorly implemented by disinterested contractors with the task of
installing and monitoring instruments. As described and illustrated above,
performance monitoring has an important roll on many projects. We must find better
ways to educate the project team on the role and benefits of performance monitoring
to the success of a project.
Looked at in a broader perspective, almost all of the reasons given in the first part
of this paper for performance monitoring seek to answer questions about uncertain
things. We monitor performance because we are uncertain what actual behavior of
the site will be. Uncertainty produces risk. Performance monitoring offers the
project team a key tool to help monitor and manage risk during the construction
process.
Uncertainties and large consequences produce risk. Owners and contractors don’t
like risk. They are increasingly employing ways to manage and reduce risk to control
budget and completion time. Figure 4 illustrates the process of risk management.
Many of today’s so-called risk management programs for infrastructure projects
identify and assess risks, then seek to lay them off on someone else, usually the
Contractor or the insurer. This is risk allocation and not risk management. In the
long run, the Owner pays a higher price through higher insurance premiums and more
costly construction. True risk management adds steps to plan strategies that
minimize likelihood and control consequences, measure anything that can indicate
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The costs under Curve 1 give no consideration to risk costs. Risk costs result from
unexpected events and conditions not anticipated in the design that increase the cost
of construction, produce delays and/or cause damages to people and property. These
costs are higher for low levels of investigation and design because the probability of
failure is higher due to the large uncertainty in the information used for design.
These costs decrease with increasing level of investigation and design, largely
because the uncertainty in predicted performance decreases due to the additional
investigation. When we add the possible risk costs to the total cost picture, we get
Curve 2. The optimal level of investigation and design increases to Point B. The
optimal total cost has increased because we have increased the level of investigation
and we have included risk costs; however the optimal total cost is significantly less
than at the level of investigation for Point A, if we include risk costs, e.g. Point C.
The really interesting observation is what happens when we consider the effect on
total cost of performance monitoring. There is some evidence to indicate that an
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“effective” monitoring
program can reduce risk
by an order of
magnitude (Lambe,
Silva and Marr, 1981).
This reduction comes
from reduced
uncertainty in predicted
performance and
reduced consequences.
Curve 3 shows total
costs when the costs of
a monitoring program
are added to
investigation,
construction and
reduced risk costs. The
optimal level of
investigation shifts to
Point D. The optimal
level of investigation is
Fig. 5: Total Cost Optimization
somewhat higher than
for the case where we
ignore risk costs (Point A), but much less than the case where we include risk costs
but do not monitor (Point C). The total costs with “effective” monitoring (Point D)
are significantly less than those without monitoring (Point B). Point D represents true
optimization of the design-construction process by employing an appropriate level of
investigation and design to remove costly conservatism and using “effective”
monitoring to reduce uncertainty about performance and better control the
consequences of unacceptable performance.
Risk can be quantified. For a specific event, risk is the likelihood that the event
will occur times the consequences of that event. We can manage risk by controlling
the likelihood, altering the consequence or doing both. For constructed facilities, the
consequences can be quantified in terms of money, lives lost, damage level, etc.
Likelihood is more difficult to obtain. It may come from historical data or frequency
or failures of similar projects with similar events. It may come from a formal risk
assessment where experts identify and characterize all sources of uncertainty and
develop a model of the project event to calculate a probability of the event. It may
come from expert opinion by which someone very familiar with the specific issues
opines on the likelihood that the event will occur or possibly provides a numerical
estimate of the probability of the event occurring.
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indicators as they develop that something is happening. This presents the opportunity
before the event actually happens for the process to be disrupted and altered so that
the probability changes, or precautions can be taken to minimize the consequences.
Performance monitoring seeks to monitor these key indicators to detect early
warnings before the event happens.
With performance monitoring, our aim is to get sufficient warning that we can
alter the probability of an event to 0 if the consequences are undesirable, or 1 if the
consequences are desirable, or else manage the consequences. Since altering
probabilities and consequences consume resources, we only want to intervene when
the monitoring system gives indicators that an uncertain event is becoming more
likely to happen. To the pure probabilists, performance monitoring provides the
factual data set to do Bayesian updating of the probability of an event occurring.
Surprising performance can have significant impacts on project cost and schedule,
(plus and minus). Performance monitoring can be a useful construction management
tool to detect surprise performance sufficiently early to manage its impacts on the
project. For performance monitoring to work as an effective component of risk
management, the information must be timely, reliable and presented so others can
understand what the data mean quickly, correctly and efficiently. By working with a
higher level in the project organization charged with construction management, we
have a better opportunity to influence the outcome and add more value with the
results of performance monitoring.
CONCLUSIONS
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The third approach looks at the project in broader terms to identify all events that
could impact the schedule and cost for the project, thereby producing risk. The aim is
to find ways to manage risk. The level of risk posed by each event is quantified by
some means. Key risk indicators are identified and ways to measure the level of risk
for each are found. A real-time monitoring program is used to monitor the key risk
indicators as the project progresses. Corrective actions are taken when the
measurement system indicates approaching undesirable performance. This approach
is an expansion of Peck’s Observational Method.
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Today, far too many well-thought-out monitoring programs are being decimated
during execution because those managing the project don’t have a clue about why the
performance monitoring is important. We must do a more thorough job in the early
phases of a project to clearly define the purposes and importance of the performance
monitoring program. The definitions must be given in terms that all members of the
Project Team can understand how each instrument is important to the success of the
project. I advocate the development of a Performance Monitoring Manual for each
instrumentation program that describes in lay terms the purpose(s) of the monitoring
program, the anticipated benefits, the types of instruments and why they are
important to the success of the project, the significant elements of the instrumentation
specifications and why they are important to the success of the monitoring program, a
listing of each instrument, its purpose and why it is important to the project, limits
values for each instrument, frequency of monitoring and why the required frequencies
are important, and any other material that justifies why a particular aspect of the
monitoring program is important and should not be waived or removed.
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the effects of site conditions. The construction management team can be in the
position to provide incentives and impose penalties on contractors so they support a
successful performance monitoring program.
REFERENCES
Lambe, T.W. and Whitman, R.V. (1969), Soil Mechanics, Wiley & Sons, NY
Lambe, T.W., Silva-Tulla. F. & Marr, W.A (1981). “Key Features of the
Geotechnical Safety Program of the Amuay Cliffside,” Geotechnical
Engineering, Vol. II, pp.97-121
Silva, F., Lambe, T.W., and Marr, W.A. (2007). “Probability and Risk of Slope
Failure,” accepted for publication in ASCE:JGGE.
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