Chapter 3: Why are there Wars?

1) What is the Purpose oI War?

a) War: an event involving the organized use oI military Iorce by at least two parties that
satisIies some minimum threshold oI severity.
i) Organization diIIers it Irom rioting, two sides distinguishes it Irom mass killings,
ii) Interstate war: a war in which the main participants are states.
iii)Civil war: a war in which the main participants are within the same state, such as the
government and a rebel group
b) The purpose oI warIare is not to Iight but rather to obtain, through Iighting or the threat
oI Iighting, something the state wants.
i) Over the last 3 centuries over halI (83/155) the wars involved conIlict over territory
(1)Might contribute to the wealth oI the state
(2)Military or strategic value
(3)Might be valuable Ior ethnic, cultural, or historical reasons (indivisible)
ii) War can also arise out oI conIlicts over states policies one state enacts a policy that
beneIits it but harms the interests oI another.
(1)War may be used to replace the oIIending regime with a Iriendlier one that will
pursue diIIerent policies, as in the cases oI Iraq and AIghanistan.
iii)ConIlicts over regime type, or the composition oI another country`s government.
(1)Such conIlicts (including those above) spring Irom deeper conIlicts that give rise
to concerns about relative power.
c) Bargaining describes a class oI interactions in which actors try to resolve disputes over
the allocation oI a good.
i) In many cases states assume 'all or nothing bargaining position.
ii) A crisis occurs when at least one state seeks to inIluence the outcome oI bargaining
by threatening to use military Iorce in the even that it does not get what it wants.
(1)Purpose oI threats is to seek to wrest concessions Irom the other side by making
the alternative seem unacceptably costly.
(2)Costs and likely outcome oI a war deIine the range oI acceptable outcomes Irom
crisis bargaining.
iii)Coercive diplomacy: (coercive bargaining) the use oI threats to inIluence the outcome
oI a bargaining interaction.
iv) Since a state has the option to wage war iI it determines that it is in its interests to do
so, a state will only accept a bargain that gives it at least as much as it can expect to
get Irom war.
(1)Because war is costly, a settlement that all sides preIer to war generally exists.
v) Bargaining range: the set oI deals that both parties in a bargaining interaction preIer
to the reversion outcome. When the reversion outcome is war, the bargaining range is
the set oI deals that both sides preIer.
d) Compellence and Deterrence
i) II a state is already getting Irom the status quo at least as much as it expects to get
through war, then it generally cannot gain by threatening war to change the status
quo.
ii) ClassiIy threats according to whether they are intended to preserve or change the
existing relationship between states.
iii)Compellence: an eIIort to change the status quo through the threat oI Iorce.
iv) Deterrence: an eIIort to preserve the status quo through the threat oI Iorce.
(1)General deterrence the eIIort to deter attack on ones own country.
(2)Extended deterrence the threatener attempts to extend protection to another
state.
2) Do Wars Happen By Mistake? War Irom Incomplete InIormation
a) When states have poor and incomplete inIormation about one another`s willingness and
ability to wage war, two mistakes are possible.
(1)A state conIronted by demands may mistakenly yield too little or not at all
(a) One Ieels that it can achieve more through Iighting than the other is willing to
oIIer in negotiations.
(2)A state may demand too much under the mistaken belieI that the other side will
cave in.
ii) Uncertainty about one another`s willingness to wage war can prevent such a
settlement Irom being reached.
b) Incomplete InIormation: a situation in which parties in a strategic interaction lack
inIormation about other parties` interests and/or capabilities.
i) Arises in crisis bargaining when states cannot readily observe or measure the key
political and military Iactors that determine their adversaries` expected value Ior war.
(1)Capabilities reIers to the state`s physical ability to prevail in war (the number oI
troops it can mobilize, the number and quality oI its armaments, the economic
resources it ahs to sustain the war eIIort.
(2)Resolve: the willingness oI an actor to endure costs in order to acquire some
good.
(a) Total war states mobilize their entire military and economic resources.
(b)Limited wars states Iight with something less than their Iull potential, oIten
because their aims are limited or oI relatively low value.
c) Incomplete inIormation about the capabilities and/or resolve oI their opponents can
resulting in Iailure to achieve a peaceIul settlement when bargaining.
i) Risk-return tradeoII: essentially, there is a tradeoII between trying to get a good deal
and trying to minimize the possibility that war will break out.
(1)A state can improve bargaining outcome Ior itselI only by embracing a higher risk
oI war.
3) Incentives to Misrepresent and the Problem oI Credibility
a) Crises are generally characterized by diplomatic exchanges, threats, and counterthreats,
mobilization oI Iorces, movement oI troops and weaponry.
i) Military purpose one cannot wage war without Iirst mobilizing the necessary Iorces
and putting them in place.
ii) Political purpose they are the language oI coercive diplomacy, the vocabulary that
states use to convince one another that they are willing to back their bargaining
positions with the threat oI Iorce.
b) Credibility: believability. A credible threat is a threat that the recipient believes will be
carried out. A credible commitment is a commitment or promise that the recipient
believes will be honored.
i) Credibility oI the threat reIers to the targets belieIs, not the actual intentions oI the
state issuing the threat.
ii) Why is credibility hard to achieve?
(1)Carrying through on threats is costly
(2)Even though states have a common interest in avoiding war, each also wants the
best possible deal Ior itselI, and this means that they have incentives to hide or
misrepresent their inIormation.
iii)For threats to be credible, they have to be costly in such a way that the sender would
only make the threat iI it really intended to carry the threat out.
iv) Two primary mechanisms that states use to make their threats credible: brinkmanship
and tying hands.
v) Thomas Schelling although it was understood that no state would intentionally
bring about its own destruction by starting a total nuclear war, these weapons could
nonetheless be wielded Ior diplomatic eIIect through a strategy known as
brinksmanship
(1)Brinksmanship: a strategy in which adversaries take actions that increase the risk
oI accidental war, with the hope that the other will blink, or lose its nerve, Iirst
and make concessions.
(a) The tension oI a nerve-wracking crisis might cause leaders to give into
passion and Iury and lose their cool, rational heads. The willingness to court
this risk credibly separates the genuinely resolved opponents Irom the
bluIIers.
vi) Trying hands making threats in ways that would make backing down diIIicult.
vii)Audience costs: negative repercussions Ior Iailing to Iollow through on a threat or to
honor a commitment.
(1)Two audiences might impose these costs
(a) International audience other states that might doubt Iuture threats made by
the president or by the country.
(b)Own country voters and political opponents who might seek to punish a
president who has tarnished the country`s honor and reputation by making
empty threats.
(2)Leaders tie their hands because threats are costly to carry out, and by doing so
they blunt the temptation to back down Irom their treats and thereby tie their own
hands.
viii) Problems oI incomplete inIormation are more likely to be overcome when states
can Iind costly ways to signal their intentions and thereby convince their adversaries
to make concessions.
4) Can and Adversary be Trusted to Honor a deal? War Irom Commitment Problems
a) Even iI there is a deal that is preIerable to war now, iI this deal will lead to a change in
capabilities that can be exploited later on, the state would be rendered weaker may decide
to Iorgo that deal and gamble on a war.
b) Prevention: War in response to changing power
i) Problem arises iI the balance oI military capabilities is anticipated to change because
oI Iactors external to the bargaining process.
(1)II a state is growing much more rapidly than its adversary, then the military
capabilities that it can bring to bear in Iuture disputes will be greater than those it
can bring to bear today.
(2)Source oI large shiIts in military capabilities is the development and acquisition oI
new technologies, such as nuclear weapons. (can lead to shiIt in states capacity to
impose costs on its adversaries)
ii) Preventive War: a war Iought with the intention oI preventing an adversary Irom
becoming stronger in the Iuture. Preventive wars arise because states whose power is
increasing cannot commit not to exploit that power in Iuture bargaining interaction.
c) Preemption: War in response to Iirst-strike advantages
i) Commitment problem that can prevent states Irom reaching negotiated settlements oI
their disputes arises due to Iirst-strike advantages.
(1)First-strike advantage: the situation that arises when military technology, military
strategies, and or geography give a signiIicant advantage to whichever state
attacks Iirst in a war.
(a) Occurs when military technologies enable a state to launch a blow that
disarms the other state`s military or renders it incapable oI responding
eIIectively.
ii) Preemptive war: a war Iought with the anticipation that an attack by the other side is
imminent.
iii)Common problem is the diIIiculty oI committing not to use one`s power to one`s
advantage in the Iuture.
iv) Predictions about the conditions under which war is more or less likely to occur:
(1)More likely to occur when the good in dispute is a source oI power to those who
possess it.
(2)Preventive incentives arise when there are relatively rapid and dramatic changes
in the military balance between two countries.
(3)Bargaining Iailures are more common when the military strategic situation creates
substantial advantages Ior striking Iirst.
5) Is compromise always possible? War Irom Indivisibility
a) Problem that can prevent states Irom reaching mutually beneIicial settlements oI their
disputes arises Irom whether or not it is a good that can be divided.
b) Indivisible good: a good that cannot be divided without diminishing its value.
i) One state must get nothing, and iI both states preIer war to getting nothing, then war
becomes inevitable.
6) How can we make war less likely?
a) Raising the costs oI war can expand the set oI settlements that all sides preIer to Iighting.
i) Disincentives Ior engaging in war include the abhorrent human, economic, material,
and psychological costs it imposes.
b) Mechanisms that increase the transparency oI states can reduce some oI the dangers oI
miscalculations
i) Transparency reIers to the ability oI outsiders to peer into a state and learn about the
Iactors that inIluence its decision making about war and peace.
c) Having a third party interact can reduce war by monitoring and enIorcing agreements, by
providing security guarantees to one or both sides, and sometimes by interposing their
Iorces directly between two potential combatants.
d) When war results in disputes over indivisible goods they might reduce chances oI war by
i) Joint or shared control oI indivisible good.
ii) Compensation on another issue (paying the other Ior the good)