POLITICAL LAW

(STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT)

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

I. IN GENERAL

A. Political Law Defined

POLITICAL LAW has been defined as “that branch of public law, which deals with
the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define
the relations of the state with the inhabitants1 of its territory”.(People vs. Perfecto,
43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922])

"The supreme power of the State to govern persons and things within its territory” and
“AUTO LIMITATION”.

Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its
authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is
beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount.
Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That
is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has
to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.

It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a
restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is
a power plenary in character. 2

That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of

Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of
legal self-determination and self-restriction."3

A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is
illimitable competence.

DEFINITION / EFFECTIVITY

Case: Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte. The complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5,
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation, having been
organized to engage in business. Said Article provides that:

Article 14 -The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can
they hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in
commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in
which they discharge their duties:

1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public
prosecution in active service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal
judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily
discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney. xxxx

5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a
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determinate territory.
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1
This includes not only citizens as there are rights protected by the Constitution for Inhabitants
2
G.R. No. L-26379 December 27, 1969 WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC., vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
respondent
3
Jellinek as quoted in Cohen, Recent Theories of Sovereignty, p. 35 (1937).

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Rule: It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code
of Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the
nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public
officers and employees, like justices and judges.

Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and
operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the
inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922…. Specifically, Article 14
of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it
regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in
business: hence, political in essence. It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce
is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made by the "Commission
de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by the
Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.

Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United
States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed
to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the
former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically
abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.

Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:

By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either
following a conquest or otherwise ... those laws which are political in their nature and pertain
to the prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon the transfer of
sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).

While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the new
sovereign continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the
political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the
prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new sovereign,
may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-
in-chief during the war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States,
171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of
Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said:

On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the
inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former sovereign
are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the government which has
acquired their territory. The same act which transfers their country, transfers the allegiance
of those who remain in it; and the law which may be denominated political, is necessarily
changed, although that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals,
remains in force, until altered by the newly- created power of the State.

Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general
principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded
region are totally abrogated”

There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated
provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the
Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. Macariola vs. Asuncion,
114 SCRA 77, - A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982

Hence, As to Laws Which are not Political in Nature;

Rule: As to whether the Indeterminate Sentence Act was in force during the occupation, the
answer is in the affirmative. A proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces of
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January 2, 1942, directed that "so far as the military administration permits, all the laws now in
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force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

effective for the time being as in the past." This was nothing more than a confirmation of the well-
known rule of the Law of Nations that municipal laws, as contra-distinguished from laws of political
nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty. (Kim Cham vs. Valdes Tan Keh and Dizon
(75 Phil., 113) The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not a political law. It does not affect political
relations. In fact, it is a part of the Commonwealth's criminal and penal system directly related to
the punishment of crime and the maintenance of public peace and order, which Article 43 of
Section III of the Hague Regulations of 1907 compels the belligerent occupant to take all steps in
his power to reestablish and insure as far as possible .G.R. No. L-1352 April 30, 1947 ALFONSO
MONTEBON vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

Case: On May 22, 1944, Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao executed a deed of donation
propter nuptias in favor of their son, respondent Benito Locquiao and his then prospective and
eventual bride By the terms of the deed, the donees were gifted with four (4) parcels of land,
including the land in question, in consideration of the impending marriage of the donees.
Herminigildo and Raymunda died on December 15, 1962.

Years later, the donation was questioned by the Petitioner as allegedly it did not observe the form
required by law as there was no written acceptance on the document itself or in a separate public
instrument. The issue to be threshed out is whether acceptance of the donation by the donees is
required.

Rule: It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable
thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect.
Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code which applies in this case since the donation propter nuptias
was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. The fact that
in 1944 the Philippines was still under Japanese occupation is of no consequence. It is a well-
known rule of the Law of Nations that municipal laws, as contra-distinguished from laws of political
nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty. This Court specifically held that during the
Japanese occupation period, the Old Civil Code was in force. As a consequence, applying Article
1330 of the Old Civil Code in the determination of the validity of the questioned donation, it does
not matter whether or not the donees had accepted the donation. The validity of the donation is
unaffected in either case. G.R. No. 122134 October 3, 2003 ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA
and CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO

B. Scope of Political Law:

a. The law of PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. This deals with the organization and
management of the different branches of the government

b. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Deals with the guaranties of the constitution to

individual rights and the limitations on governmental action

c. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. Deals with the exercise of executive power in the

making of rules and the decision of questions affecting private rights

d. The law on PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. Deals with the governmental agencies

for local government or for other special purpose

C. Constitutional Law defined

Constitutional law is a term used to designate the law embodied in the constitution
and the legal principles growing out of the interpretation and application made by
courts of the constitution in specific cases. (Sinco, Phil. Political Law)

It “is a body of rules resulting from the interpretation by a high court of cases in
which the validity, in relation to the constitutional instrument, of some act of
government, has been challenged.” (Bernas)

Constitutional law consist not only of the constitution, but also of the cases decided
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by the Supreme Court on constitutional grounds, i.e., every case where the ratio
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decidendi is based on a constitutional provision. (Defensor-Santiago)

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Constitutional law is the study of the maintenance of the proper balance between
authority represented by the three inherent powers of the State and liberty as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. (Cruz, Constitutional Law)

D. Constitution Defined

A constitution is both a legal document and a political plan. It, therefore, embodies
legal rules as well as political principles. And so when we speak of constitutional law
in the strict sense of the tern, we refer to the legal rules of the constitution.4

It is defined by Judge Story to be a fundamental law or basis of government. It is

established by the people, in their original sovereign capacity, to promote their own
happiness, and permanently to secure their rights, property, independence, and
common welfare. (McKoan vs. Devries, 3 Barb., 196, 198 [quoting 1 Story, Const.,
secs. 338, 339];Church vs. Kelsey, 7 Sup. Ct., 897, 898; 121 U. S., 282; 30 L. ed.,
960.)

A constitution is delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first
principles of fundamental laws are established. The constitution is certain and fixed.
It contains the permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of the land. It
is paramount to the legislature, and can be revoked or altered only by the authority
that made it. (Vanhornes's Lessee vs. Dorrance, 2 U. S. [2 Dall.] 304, 308; 28 Fed.
Cas., 1012;1 L. ed., 391.)

A constitution is an act of extraordinary legislation by which the people establish the

structure and mechanism of their government, and in which they prescribe
fundamental rules to regulate the motions of the several parts. (Eakin vs. Raub [Pa.]
12 Serg. & R., 330, 347.)A constitution is the written charter enacted and adopted
by the people of a state through a combination of representatives, or in any way the
people may choose to act, by which a government for them is obtained and
established, and by which the people give organic and corporate form to that ideal
thing, a state, for all time to come, or during the life of the state. (Lynn vs. Polk, 76
Tenn. [8 Lea], 121, 165.)

It is a law for the government, safeguarding individual rights, set down in writing.
(Hamilton) It may be more specifically defined as a written instrument organizing the
government, distributing its powers and safeguarding the rights of the People
(Tañada and Fernando).According to Schwartz, “it is seen as an organic instrument,
under which governmental powers are both conferred and circumscribed.” Such
stress upon both grant and limitation of authority is fundamental in American theory.
“The office and purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of
governmental activity.” (Fernando)

Comprehensive Definition: That body of rules and maxims in accordance with which
the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised. (Cooley) –This covers written and
unwritten constitutions. (Cruz, Constitutional Law)

American sense: A constitution is a written instrument by which the fundamental

powers of government are established, limited, and defined and by which these
powers are distributed among several departments, for their more safe and useful
exercise, for the benefit of the body politic. (Justice Miller)

With particular reference to the Philippine Constitution: That written instrument

enacted by direct action of the people by which the fundamental powers of the
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government are established, limited and defined, and by which those powers are
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4
Mendoza Notes

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

distributed among several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the
benefit of the body politic. (Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 6)

E. Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

In Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board,5 the Court held that, "It is
basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution,
that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to
which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution."

In Sabio v. Gordon6, the Court held that, "the Constitution is the highest law of the
land. It is the ‘basic and paramount law (to which all other laws must conform.’"

In Atty. Macalintal v. Commission on Elections7, the Court held that, "The

Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other
laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the
Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional

In Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, the Court held that:

Rule: A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration
of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from
which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation.
It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on
which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private
rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus,
since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract. G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997 MANILA
PRINCE HOTEL vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM - quoting 8 Wall.
603 (1869)

“…When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall
be void and the latter shall govern” Art 7, New Civil Code’’

Rule: As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with
the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or
executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the
laws of the Constitution." It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being
supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
CIR v. San Roque Power Corp., G.R. No. 187485, 8 October 2013

F. Foreign Jurisprudence and Constitutional Law

Rule: American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of
dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited
persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of
Garcia vs. COMELEC, (227 SCRA 100 (1993).)"In resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court]
should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because
they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs." Indeed, although the
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Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development
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have long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical

5
G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658, 3 November 2008, 570 SCRA 410
6
G.R. No. 174340, 17 October 2006, 504 SCRA 704.
7
453 Phil. 586 (2003).

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

cord." G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003 FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES

Rule: Foreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they
are persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisions. We should not place undue
and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which
we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own endowments. We live
in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and
needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept
of law and justice. Our laws must be construed in accordance with the intention of our own
lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of
other local legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own
public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that
our public interest is distinct and different from others. G.R. No. 167614 March 24, 2009
SERRANO vs. .GALLANT MARITIME

G. Types of Constitution

1. In relation to the amendment process:

RIGID CONSTITUTION - is one that can be amended only by a formal and usually
difficult process. This may not be amended except through a special process
distinct from and more involved than the method of changing ordinary laws. The
constitution is rendered difficult to change and thereby acquires a greater degree
of stability;

FLEXIBLE CONSTITUTION - is one that can be changed by ordinary legislation.

(Cruz, Constitutional Law p 5). It may be changed in the same manner and
through the same body that enacts ordinary legislation. Example: British
Constitution.

2. As to its adaption:

WRITTEN CONSTITUTION - is one whose precepts are embodied in one document

or set of documents. The provisions have been reduced to writing and embodied
in one or more instruments at a particular time8.

UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION - consists of rules which have not been integrated

into a single, concrete form but are scattered in various sources, such as statues
of a fundamental character, judicial decisions, commentaries of publicists,
customs and traditions, and certain common law principles. (Cruz, Constitutional
Law pp 4-5) Such has not been committed to writing at any specific time but is
the accumulated product of gradual political and legal development.9

3. As to its enactment

ENACTED or CONVENTIONAL CONSTITUTION - is enacted, formally struck off at

a definitive time and place following a conscious or deliberate effort taken by a
constituent body or ruler;

CUMULATIVE OR EVOLVED - is the result of political evolution, not inaugurated at

any specific time but changing by accretion rather than by systematic method.
(Cruz, Constitutional Law p 5)
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4. Others:

8
They have been also called conventional or enacted because they are given definite form by a steadily constituted body,
the constitutional convention, at a particular time. Example: U.S. and Philippine Constitution
9
They are also known as cumulative or evolved because they are not formulated at any definite time but are rather the
outcome of a political evolutionary process. Example: English Constitution

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

 NORMATIVE - adjusts to norms, those that function more truly as prescriptive
documents, such as the Constitution of the United States, are called normative
constitutions.

NOMINAL – not yet fully operational. Constitutions such as that of the former
Soviet Union are called nominal constitutions. The Soviet Constitution claimed to
guarantee Freedom of Speech, press, and assembly, but in practice the Soviet
government continually repressed those who sought to express those freedoms.

SEMANTIC – A Fundamental law for the perpetuation of power. (pseudo-

constitution), enforced to formalize and legalize the monopoly of power in
authoritarianism or even totalitarianism.

What is the Philippine Constitution? The Constitution of the Philippines is written,

conventional and rigid.

H. Qualities of a Good Constitution

 BROAD. Because it provides for the organization of the entire government and
covers all persons and things within the territory of the State and also because it
must be comprehensive enough to provide for every contingency. (Cruz,
Constitutional Law pp 5-6)

Case: A constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but is
to endure through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate
sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a continuing
instrument to govern not only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future.
Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time
of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand for
a great length of time, to be progressive and not static. G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA vs. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Case: Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events. They
should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of
its drafters that a Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the same
time bend with the refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding events. As one
eminent political law writer and respected jurist explains:

“The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the blossom,
the base and frame-work only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the core of the dream
that must take shape, not in a twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly "in the crucible
of Filipino minds and hearts," where it will in time develop its sinews and gradually gather its
strength and finally achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution cannot, like the goddess
Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure by
mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and march
apace with the progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism
and vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law attuned to
the heartbeat of the nation.” Taňada vs. Angara G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

Example

• Is there any provision in the 1987 Constitution that refers to the internet,
despite the development of the technology only years thereafter?

Yes. “ Section 10. The State shall provide the policy environment for the full
development of Filipino capability and the emergence of communication
structures suitable to the needs and aspirations of the nation and the balanced
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flow of information into, out of, and across the country, in accordance with a
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Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

 policy that respects the freedom of speech and of the press.” Art XVI (The
Braid Provision” from its proponent Florangel Rosario Braid)

This provision entrenched in the Fundamental Law, as proposed by Florangel

Rosario Braid of the Constitutional Commission which Drafted the present
Constitution, may have foreseen the nation’s need for innovative and efficient
communications services, including the internet as we know today.

 BRIEF. It must confine itself to basic principles to be implemented with legislative

details more adjustable to change and easier to amend. (Cruz, Constitutional Law
pp 4-5)

 DEFINITE. To prevent ambiguity in its provisions which could result in confusion

and divisiveness among the people. (Cruz, Constitutional Law pp 4)

I. Essential Parts of a Good Constitution

Constitution of GOVERNMENT. The series of provisions outlining the organization of

the government, enumerating its powers, laying down certain rules relative to its
administration and defining the electorate. (ex. Art VI, VII, VIII and IX)

Constitution of LIBERTY. The series of proscriptions setting forth the fundamental

civil and political rights of the citizens and imposing limitations on the powers of
government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights. (Ex. Article III)

Constitution of SOVEREIGNTY. The provisions pointing out the mode or procedure in

accordance with which formal changes in the fundamental law may be brought about.
(Ex. Art XVII)

J. Philosophical View of the Constitution

a. Social Contract:

The Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the
people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest
the officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the
servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. G.R. No. 88211
September 15, 1989 FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS

The question may be asked: In the process of negotiating peace with the MILF, why cannot the
Executive commit to do acts which are prohibited by the Constitution and seek their ratification
later by its amendment or revision?

Many philosophical perspectives have been advanced in reply to this question. Yet, no theory has
been as influential, nor has been as authoritative, as the social contract theory, articulated by
John Locke, viz:

For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community,
they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which
is only by the will and determination of the majority: for that which acts any community,
being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one
body to move one way; it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater
force carries it, which is the consent of the majority: or else it is impossible it should act or
continue one body, one community, which the consent of every individual that united into
it, agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by the
majority. And therefore we see, that in assemblies, empowered to act by positive laws,
where no number is set by that positive law which empowers them, the act of the majority
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passes for the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having, by the law of nature
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and reason, the power of the whole.

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

The French philosopher, Jean Jacques Rosseau stressed the non-derogability of this social
contract, viz:

But the body politic or sovereign, deriving its existence only from the sanctity of the
contract, can never bind itself, even to others, in anything that derogates from the original
act, such as alienation of some portion of itself, or submission to another sovereign. To
violate the act by which it exists would be to annihilate itself; and what is nothing produces
nothing.

Dean Vicente Sinco of the U.P. College of Law articulated these precepts in his seminal work,
Philippine Political Law, viz:

As adopted in our system of jurisprudence a constitution is a written instrument which

serves as the fundamental law of the state. In theory, it is the creation of the will of the
people, who are deemed the source of all political powers. It provides for the organization
of the essential departments of government, determines and limits their powers, and
prescribes guarantees to the basic rights of the individual.

xxxx

Some authorities have also considered the constitution as a compact, an "agreement of

the people, in their individual capacities, reduced to writing, establishing and fixing certain
principles for the government of themselves." This notion expresses the old theory of the
social contract obligatory on all parties and revocable by no one individual or group less
than the majority of the people; otherwise it will not have the attribute of law.50 (Emphasis
supplied)

In sum, there is no power nor is there any right to violate the Constitution on the part of any official
of government. No one can claim he has a blank check to violate the Constitution in advance and
the privilege to cure the violation later through amendment of its provisions. Respondents' thesis
of violate now, validate later makes a burlesque of the Constitution G.R. No. 183591, THE
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), October 14, 2008,
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION PUNO, C.J.:

b. Natural Law

"As living creatures, we have an interest in self-preservation; as animals, in procreation; and as

rational creatures, in living in society and exercising our intellectual and spiritual capacities in the
pursuit of knowledge." God put these inclinations in human nature to help man achieve his final
end of eternal happiness. With an understanding of these inclinations in our human nature, we
can determine by practical reason what is good for us and what is bad. In this sense, natural law
is an ordinance of reason. Proceeding from these inclinations, we can apply the natural law by
deduction, thus: good should be done; this action is good; this action should therefore be done.
Concretely, it is good for humans to live peaceably with one another in society, thus this dictates
the prohibition of actions such as killing and stealing that harm society." SEPARATE OPINION,
PUNO, J.: G.R. No. 104768 July 21, 2003 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and ELIZABETH DIMAANO

II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION

A- Precedents

Treaty of Paris: (signed December 10, 1898; became effective on April 11, 1899)

The Philippines was ceded by Spain to the U.S. Spain relinquished its sovereignty
over the Philippines Islands, and with this,
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 All laws of political nature were automatically abrogated.

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

  It provided that the civil and political status of all inhabitants of the islands
were to be determined by the US Congress.

 The US Constitution did not apply to the Philippines unless the US Congress
expressly enacted its provisions.

McKinley’s Instructions: (issued by Pres. McKinley on April 7, 1900 as “Letter of

Instruction to the Second Philippines Commission” under Taft)

It set up a “divided civil and military government” with the existing Military governor
as the Executive and a Philippine Commission, created on September 1, 1900, as the
Legislative. Both represented the US President as Commander-in-Chief.

 It extended to the Philippines all the rights in the Bill of Rights of the US Federal
Constitution except

o the right to bear arms10and

o the rights to a trial by jury11.

 This was the first Organic Act (a law which establishes the structure and
limitations of the government) of the Philippines. What it lacked, as a
constitution, were the ratification by the people and the right of amendment
which was reserved solely to the US President)

 The judiciary was subsequently established on 11 June 1901, with a Supreme

Court, Courts of First Instance, and Justice of Peace Courts

Spooner Amendment:

July 4, 1901: The Spooner Amendment, was actually a rider to the “Army and Navy
Appropriation Act.”

 It changed the then “divided military and civil government” into a fully civil
government under the US Congress. All acts of the Philippines Commission
would now begin: “Be it enacted by the authority of the US government,” and
no longer by authority of the US President.

Philippine Bill of 1902: (Philippines’ organic act from 1902 to 1906)

 The Governor-General retained all executive power, including the power to

suspend the writ of habeas corpus upon recommendation of the Philippine
Commission.

 The Philippine Commission was the upper house. It established an elective

lower house called the Philippines Assembly, composed entirely of Filipinos.

 It defined for the first time who are the citizens of the Philippines. They were
all the inhabitants of the Philippine islands who were subjects of Spain as of
April 11, 1989, who continued to reside therein, and all the children
subsequent thereto.
10

Jones Law (or the Philippine Autonomy Act): (passed on August 29, 1916 by the US
Congress)
Page

10
The Philippines was then in rebellion
11
Due to the distrust of the US to Filipinos

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

  It established a tripartite government with real separation of powers; this was
the prototype of our present set-up.

o The executive power was in the hands of an American Governor-

General, who was independent of the Legislature, and who was given
the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and impose martial law
without the recommendation of the Legislature. The Legislature was
composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives, all composed
of Filipinos. The judiciary continued to be made up of the Supreme
Court, the CFIs and Justice of Peace Courts.

o Under this set-up, while the Filipinos has all the legislative power, the
Americans had all the executive power and thus, also the control of the
government

Tydings-McDuffie Law: (not an organic act)

It is an enabling statute that provided the mechanism whereby the constitution of an

independent Philippines could be adopted.

This provided for:

1. The calling of Constitutional Convention to draft our Constitution.

2. The adoption of a Constitution that established a republican government, with a

Bill of Rights and a separation of Church and state.

3. Submission of the draft to the US President for certification that the Constitution
was in conformity with the condition set by the Tydings-McDuffie Law.

4. Its ratification by the people in a plebiscite.

Complete independence was to take place ten (10) years after its effectivity.

1935 Constitution: (took effect on November 15, 1935)

 This served as the charter of the Commonwealth and upon withdrawal of US

sovereignty, of the Republic.

 It provides for a tripartite government, with the executive lodged in the

President who had a 6-year term, the legislative in a unicameral National
Assembly and the judiciary in a Supreme Court, CFI’s, and Justice of Peace
Courts.

Amendments:

1. 1940. Provided a bicameral Congress, a term of 4 years for the President

with re-election, and establishment of Commission on Elections

2. 1947. Included Parity Rights Agreement which stated that Congress acting
as constituent body, needed ¾ vote to propose an amendment to the
Constitution

3. 1967. Provided the amendment of the Constitution by a Convention

1973 Constitution:
11

This was ratified by the citizens’ assembly (January 10-15, 1973 which was called by
Page

Pres. Marcos during the Martial Law. After the ratification, Proclamation No. 1102 on

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

17 January 1973, certified and proclaimed that the Constitution proposed by the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 had been ratified by the Filipino people and thereby
come into effect.

Relevant Law: PROCLAMATION NO. 1102

ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION

PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.

WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional

Convention is subject to ratification by the Filipino people;

WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards

in chartered cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31, 1972,
composed of all persons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least six months,
fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list of
Citizen Assembly members kept by the barrio, district or ward secretary;

WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the base of
citizen participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry
to express their views on important national issues;

WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
86-A, dated January 5, 1973, the following questions were posed before the Citizens
Assemblies or Barangays: Do you approve of the New Constitution? Do you still want a
plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?

WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty-one
(14,976,561) members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the
proposed Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine
(743,869) who voted for its rejection; while on the question as to whether or not the people
would still like a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million two
hundred ninety-eight thousand eight hundred fourteen (14,298,814) answered that there was
no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be
considered as a vote in a plebiscite;

WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the
members of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution, the
Katipunan ng Mga Barangay has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should
already be deemed ratified by the Filipino people;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the

powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution
proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been
ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays
(Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of
the Philippines to be affixed.

Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and seventy-three.

(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

"President of the Philippines

"By the President:

"ALEJANDRO MELCHOR
"Executive Secretary"
12

Amendments:
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Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

 1. 1976. Gave the President legislative powers even if the Interim Batasang
Pambansa was already operating.

2. 1980. Raised the retirement of justices from 65 to 70.12

3. 1980. Changed the form of government from Parliamentary to Presidential.

4. 1984. Provided for a Vice President.

B- The 1986 Revolution and proclamation of the provisional Constitution

The Transition to the 1987 Constitution, a Summary

Edgar Pascua II

Following the People Power revolt, President Corazon Aquino made several proclamations that
ultimately paved the way for the present Constitution.

First was Proclamation No. 1 as declared on February 25, 1986 that announced the assumption
of power of Aquino and Laurel. This established the Provisional Government. The popular
view was that the Aquino government was not an offshoot of the 1973 Constitution, considering
that Aquino and Laurel came into power outside the mandate of the same.

The Legitimacy of the Aquino Government however said to be not a justiceable matter. This
view was affirmed in Lawyers League v Aquino where the Supreme Court declared that the
Aquino government was a result of a "direct state action." It was not as if a small group revolted
and succeeded in wresting power in the end. Rather, the entire state revolted and overthrew
the government, so that right from the beginning, the installation was already lawful and the
government was at all times de jure13.-

Likewise relevant was Proclamation No. 3 as made on March 25, 1986 which announced the
promulgation of the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution, pending the drafting and ratification of
a new Constitution. This adopted certain provisions in the 1973 Constitution, contained
additional articles on the executive department, on government reorganization, and on existing
laws.

This was emulated the contents of the 1973 Constitution sans the provisions on the Batasang
Pambansa. Article VIII (The Batasang Pambansa), Article IX (The Prime Minister and the
Cabinet), Article XVI (Amendments), Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) and all amendments
thereto were deemed superseded by this Proclamation

President Aquino thus was the executive and legislative powers. In the interim then,
Malacañang ruled the nation centrally. Although this was the same evil shunned by the EDSA
revolution, this was not strongly opposed by the Filipinos who has just found their salvation,
and regained their democracy.

The Freedom Constitution provided for the calling of a Constitution Commission composed of
30 to 50 members, who were then to be appointed by the President within 60 days.

Subsequently made was Proclamation No. 9, which created the Constitutional Commission of
50 members. Thereafter, on October 15, 1986 was the approval of the draft Constitution by
the Constitutional Commission

On February 2, 1987, the Plebiscite was held for the proposed Fundamental law, with
Proclamation No. 58 made on February 11, 1987 proclaiming the ratification of the same, on
the date of the plebiscite itself. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February
2, 1987.
13
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12
To extend the terms of presidential allies
13
Lawyers League v Aquino (GR Nos. 73748, 73972 & 73990, May 22, 1986

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

 By virtue of the provision of Article XVIII, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution that it "shall take
effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the
purpose," the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification in
the plebiscite held on that same date. So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the
canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done
during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely the official
confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting
the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite.14

The alleged electoral fraud in the “snap presidential election” in February 7, 1986,
sparked demonstrations with the demands for the ouster of Marcos. Then Defense
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and the Armed Forces Vice-Chief of Staff command of Fidel
V. Ramos, who barricaded themselves at Camp Crame and Camp Aguinaldo,
withdrew their support from the Marcos government and called for the resignation of
the late president. With the support of the church and mass media, thousands of
Filipinos to march the street of EDSA.

1. Proclamation of the Freedom Constitution.

a. Proclamation No. 1 – February 25, 1986 (Provisional Government) Announced the

assumption of power of Aquino and Laurel

This supposed to have established the Provisional Government but Proclamation No.
3 seemed to suggest that it was a revolutionary government since in its preamble, it
announced that the “new government was installed through a direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces,” referring to
the EDSA revolution.

The popular view was that the Aquino government was not an offshoot of the 1973
Constitution for under that Constitution a procedure was given for the election of the
President – proclamation by the Batasan – and the candidate proclaimed was Marcos.
Was the Aquino Government legitimate? This was said to be not a justiceable matter.
This view was affirmed in Lawyers League v Aquino where the legitimacy of the
Aquino government is questioned on the ground that it was not established pursuant
to the 1973 Constitution

Case: The SC ruled that petitioners had no personality to sue and their petition states no cause
of action. "For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to
the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have
made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Aquino which is in effective
control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto15 government but in fact and law a
de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the
present government. All the eleven members of this Court as reorganized, have sworn to uphold
the fundamental law of the Republic under her government."
14

The Aquino government was a result of a "direct state action." It was not as if a small group
revolted and succeeded in wresting power in the end. Rather, the entire state revolted and
Page

overthrew the government, so that right from the beginning, the installation was already lawful

14
De Leon xs. Esguerra G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987
15
Kinds of de facto government: 1. The government that gets possession and control of or usurps, by force or by the voice
of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter. 2. That established as an
independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state. 3. That which
is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war and
which is denominated as a government of paramount force, like the 2nd Republic of the Philippines established by the
Japanese belligerent.
Characteristics: a. Its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories and against the rightful
authority of an established and lawful government. b. During its existence, it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters
by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as
wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government.

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

and the government was at all times de jure16.- Lawyers League v Aquino (GR Nos. 73748,
73972 & 73990, May 22, 1986

Case: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the
legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment;
they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control
of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto8 government but in fact and law a de jure
government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the
fundamental law of the Republic under her government. (Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R.
No. 73748 [Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.];
G.R. No. 73972 [People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution. etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino,
et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.])

For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis mutandis17,
there can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel
are the incumbent and legitimate President and Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines
for the above-quoted reasons, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, G.R. No. 76180
October 24, 1986 IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ

b. Proclamation No. 3 – March 25, 1986 (Provisional Constitution), announced the

promulgation of the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution, pending the drafting and
ratification of a new Constitution. It abrogated the legislative provisions of the 1973
Constitution, modified the provision regarding the executive department, and totally
reorganized the government.

It adopted certain provisions in the 1973 Constitution, contained additional articles

on the executive department, on government reorganization, and on existing laws.
It provided for the calling of a Constitution Commission composed of 30 to 50
members appointed by the President within 60 days.

EDSA 1 vs. EDSA 218

EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II

Involves the exercise of the people power of An exercise of people power of freedom of
revolution which overthrew the whole speech and freedom of assembly to petition the
government. government for redress of grievances which only
affected the office of the President.

Extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the Entra constitutional and the resignation of the
new government that resulted from it cannot sitting President that it caused and the
be the subject of judicial review, succession of the Vice President as President
are subject to judicial review.

Presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief

discourse on freedom of speech and of the
freedom of assembly to petition the government
for redress of grievance which are the cutting
edge of EDSA People Power II is not
15

inappropriate.
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16
In this regard, it must be noted that there is no such thing as a constitutional right of revolution. A revolution, from the
point of view of a State, is always lawful since a State can never go wrong; it can change its government in whatever way
the sovereign sees fit. But this right of revolution, inherent in sovereignty, cannot be recognized in a Constitution, for this
would be self-destructive. The nature of a Constitution is to set-up a government and provide for an orderly way to change
this government. A revolution contradicts this nature.
17
With necessary changes in points of detail (Black’s Law Dictionary)
18
G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001 JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. ANIANO DESIERTO

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

 The government of Aquino is revolutionary The government of Arroyo is not revolutionary in
in character character

C- Adoption and Effectivity of the Present Constitution

1. Adoption of the Constitution.

 Proclamation No. 9, creating the Constitutional Commission of 50 members

 October 15, 1986 - Approval of the draft Constitution by the Constitutional
Commission
 February 2, 1987 - Plebiscite held for the present constitution

2. Article V of the Provisional Constitution

Section 1: Within sixty (60) days from date of this Proclamation, a Commission shall be
appointed by the President to draft a New Constitution. The Commission shall be
composed of not less than thirty (30) nor more than (50) natural born citizens of the
Philippines, of recognized probity, known for their independence, nationalism and
patriotism. They shall be chosen by the President after consultation with various sectors
of society.

Section 2: The Commission shall complete its work within as short a period as may be
consistent with the need both to hasten the return of normal constitutional government
and to draft a document truly reflective of the ideals and aspirations of the Filipino people.

Section 3: The Commission shall conduct public hearings to insure that the people will
have adequate participation in the formulation of the New Constitution

Section 4: The plenary sessions of the Commission shall be public and recorded.

Section 5: The New Constitution shall be presented by the Commission to the President
who shall fix the date for the holding of a plebiscite. It shall become valid and effective
upon ratification by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite which shall be held within
a period of 20 days following its submission to the President.

3. Section 27. Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution

“This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous
Constitutions.

The foregoing proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines was approved by
the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the twelfth day of October, Nineteen hundred
and eighty-six, and accordingly signed on the fifteenth day of October, Nineteen hundred
and eighty-six at the Plenary Hall, National Government Center, Quezon City, by the
Commissioners whose signatures are hereunder affixed.”

4. Proclamation No. 58 – February 11, 1987 - proclaiming the ratification of the

Constitution

Rule: The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date,
therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having
become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III,
thereof

By virtue of the provision of Article XVIII, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution that it "shall take
effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the
16

purpose," the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification in the
plebiscite held on that same date.
Page

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the
mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the
proclamation of the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was
actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the
date of the plebiscite. DE LEON vs. ESGUERRA G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987

(As compared to the effectivity and the Publication of laws: Taňada vs. Tuvera 136
SCRA 27 - 1985)

Context: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This
Code shall take effect one year after such publication. (New Civil Code)

Rule: Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties
for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or the people, such as tax and revenue measures,
fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or
class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound
by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not
been published, shall have no force and effect. (Taňada vs. Tuvera G.R. No. L-63915 April 24,
1985)

Rule: After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original
petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause
"unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without
its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law
does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The
subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may
question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a
law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires19act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the
public interest even if It might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people
only, and to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless
17

a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

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19
Beyond the powers or if within the powers are not binding due to lack of consent of stakeholders

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President
in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature
or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel
of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential
decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored
individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the
details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social
Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the
head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of
office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code.

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere
mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g.,
"with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official
Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This
was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential
decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital
law.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows
with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

It is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as
soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only
after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. Taňada vs. Tuvera G.R. No. L-63915 December 29,
1986

Case: During the interregnum (after the successful 1986 revolution, but before the provisional
constitution took effect, search and seizure were made on the premises of persons suspected of
having ill-gotten wealth.

On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at respondent’s residence a search
warrant captioned "Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition." He was not present during
the raid but Dimaano’s cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in
the seizure receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team
seized these items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition;
one pistol, caliber .45; communications equipment, cash consisting of ₱2,870,000 and
US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.

Are these searches and siezures legal?

18
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Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Rule: No. We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during
the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant
and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the
supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders.
With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal
law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the
interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there
was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the
interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on
Good Government ("PCGG") before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration
orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere executive
issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of
the Bill of Rights.

During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of
the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum.

Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the
interregnum, absent a constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of
Rights, would clearly render all sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless,
even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the
Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed
responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is
a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect and to ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant." Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to
insure that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence."

The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." Although the signatories to the Declaration did
not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the
Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the
State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe
the rights of individuals under the Declaration.

Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that no
one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence .The Declaration provides in its Article 17(2) that no one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property. Thus, the revolutionary government is obligated under
international law to observe the rights of individuals under the Declaration

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued
by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted
them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated
the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively
sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant,
issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The
warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant. G.R. No.
104768 July 21, 2003 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR
GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and ELIZABETH DIMAANO
19

Law: E.O. 200 June 18, 1987 Amending Article 2 of the Civil Code
Page

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

 “Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.”

Online publication

Case: The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,50 otherwise known
as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the
internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In
other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original)
of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium
for publishing laws, rules and regulations. G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008, GARCILLANO
vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES

Summary

Treaty of Paris Spain relinquished its - the civil and The US

April 11, 1899 sovereignty over the political status Constitution did
Philippines Islands, of all not apply to the
and with this, inhabitants of Philippines
the islands unless the US
All laws of political were to be Congress
nature were determined by expressly
automatically the US enacted its
abrogated. Congress. provisions.

McKinley’s It extended to “divided civil and military The judiciary was subsequently
Instructions the Philippines government” with the established with a Supreme Court,
April 7, 1900 all the rights in existing MILITARY Courts of First Instance, and Justice
the Bill of Rights governor as the Executive of Peace Courts
of the US and a Philippine
Federal Commission as the
Constitution Legislative.

Spooner a fully civil government under the US Congress

Amendment
July 4, 1901
Philippine Bill It defined for the first time who are the The Governor-General retained all executive power
of 1902 citizens of the Philippines. They were all
the inhabitants of the Philippine islands Philippine lower house called the Philippines
who were subjects of Spain as of April Commission was the Assembly, composed entirely of Filipinos
11, 1989, who continued to reside upper house
therein, and all the children subsequent
thereto.

Jones Law A tripartite government

Executive Legislature was judiciary
power was in composed of the Senate
the hands of and the House of
an American Representatives, all
Governor- composed of Filipinos.
General
Tydings- - calling of Constitutional Convention to draft our Constitution
McDuffie Law - Complete independence was to take place ten (10) years after its effectivity.

1935 - withdrawal of US sovereignty, of the Republic.

Constitution - a tripartite government, with the executive lodged in the President who had a 6-year term, the legislative and the judiciary

1973 - This was ratified by the citizens’ assembly which was called by Pres. Marcos during the Martial Law.
Constitution - Proclamation No. 1102 on 17 January 1973, certified and proclaimed that the Constitution had been ratified by the Filipino
people and thereby come into effect.

1986 - Proclamation No. 1 – February 25, 1986 (Provisional Government) Announced the assumption of power of Aquino and
Provisional Laurel
Constitution - The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter - Lawyers League v Aquino
- Proclamation No. 3 – March 25, 1986 (Provisional Constitution), announced the promulgation of the Provisional (Freedom)
Constitution, pending the drafting and ratification of a new ConstitutionIt provided for the calling of a Constitution
Commission composed of 30 to 50 members appointed by the President within 60 days.

1987 - February 2, 1987 - Plebiscite held for the present constitution

Constitution - Proclamation No. 58 – February 11, 1987 - proclaiming the ratification of the Constitution
- “1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on that same date.” DE
LEON vs. ESGUERRA G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987
20
Page

III. Judicial Elaboration of the Constitution

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

A. Construction

- IN CASE OF DOUBT, THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED SELF-

EXECUTING RATHER THAN NON-SELF-EXECUTING

Case: The controversy arose when respondent GSIS, decided to sell through public bidding 30%
to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC (Manila Hotel). In a close bidding
only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the
execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28
September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad and
subsequently sent a manager's check Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, which
respondent GSIS refused to accept. Hence, the case.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an
earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and
its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and
purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony Petitioner also argues that since 51% of
the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned
by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of
respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly
covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution,
applies.

Rule: Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII20of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions
command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely
establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental
machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which
lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually
not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed
are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,
prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection
of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the
exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a
penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a
21

provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any
express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that
Page

it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the

20
“In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.” (NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY)

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation
must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it
more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. (G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM)

Also the case of GAMBOA VS TEVES* reiterates the ruling of Manila Prince Hotel v.
GSIS

Case: Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the Constitution expressly
reserving to Filipinos specific areas of investment, such as the development of natural resources
and ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising business, is self-executing. There
is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions of the Constitution. The
rationale why these constitutional provisions are self-executing was explained in Manila Prince
Hotel v. GSIS, thus:

x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a

constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate
of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has
always been, that —

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-
self-executing. . . .Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion
to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless
by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.

In Manila Prince Hotel, even the Dissenting Opinion of then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno,
later Chief Justice, agreed that constitutional provisions are presumed to be self-executing.
Justice Puno stated that ”Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-
executing, rather than as requiring future legislation for their enforcement. The reason is not
difficult to discern. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental
law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress. Suffused
with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to
constitutional rights but congressional inaction should not suffocate them.” G.R. No. 176579,
June 28, 2011, WILSON P. GAMBOA vs. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES

Also, the Court explained in Tañada v. Angara, that the provisions of Article II of
the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-
executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of
action in the courts.

Case: Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals and products
of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO
"intrudes, limits and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme
Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate
of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods."

Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization? Does it proscribe Philippine integration into a global
economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These are the main questions raised in
this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus

Issue: Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
22

contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II,

Page

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

 Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.

Rule: Declaration of Principles, Not Self-Executing

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution21 is called the "basic political creed of the
nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco.22 These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing
principles ready for enforcement through the courts.23 They are used by the judiciary as aids or
as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of
laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato,24 the principles and
state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII25 are not "self-executing
provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."

In the same light, we held in Basco vs. PAGCOR that broad constitutional principles need
legislative enactments to implement Taňada vs. Angara G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

Case: Petitioner questions his being declared a nuisance candidate

Rule: Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access
to opportunities for public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold
public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is
recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the
Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable
right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or
justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment
to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision
does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of
action before the courts.

As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected
to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found
in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6452 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC
may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. G.R. No.
161872 April 13, 2004 PAMATONG vs. COMELEC

Rule: As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon
a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless
it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have
23

the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —
Page

21
Also entitled "Declaration of Principles." The nomenclature in the 1973 Charter is identical with that in the 1987's.
22
Philippine Political Law, 1962 Ed., p. 116.
23
Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, Vol. II, 1988 Ed., p. 2. In the very recent case of Manila
Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, p. 8, it was held that "A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing."
24
246 SCRA 540, 564, July 17, 1995. See also Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455 and consolidated cases,
August 25, 1995.
25
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should
be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine
when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of
the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute. G.R. No. 193459February 15, 2011 MA. MERCEDITAS N.
GUTIERREZ vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE. et. al.

 The system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of

the Constitution is not self-executory

Case: Article XVII, Section 2. Provides:

“Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum
of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every
five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.”

This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, stated:

“Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of
amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the
last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.”

Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress
provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or
granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide
for its implementation.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. This amendment
was approved and is the text of the present second paragraph of Section 2. The conclusion then
is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article
XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997 MIRIAM
DEFENSOR SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC

Some more examples:

In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991),
this Court declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section
2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions.

The petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869 (PAGCOR Charter). They allege
that the same is "null and void" for being "contrary to morals, public policy and public order,"
monopolistic and tends toward "crony economy", and is violative of the equal protection clause
and local autonomy as well as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11
(Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1
(Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution.

In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance (G.R. No. 115455 August 25, 1994 and October 30,
1995, on MR), the Court referred to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. These
provisions, which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from other constitutional
24

provisions as non self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts;
they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights
Page

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

OTHERS;

There are three well-settled principles of constitutional construction:

 First, VERBA LEGIS, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution should be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed;

 Second, where there is ambiguity, RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA, meaning that
the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the
intent of its framers; and

 Third, UT MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT, meaning that the Constitution is

to be interpreted as a whole.26

1. The Constitution has to be Interpreted as a Whole (UT MAGIS VALEAT

QUAM PEREAT)

Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be

allowed to defeat another.27

Rule: Economic Nationalism should be read with other constitutional mandates to attain Balanced
Development of Economy.

It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System,
et al., this Court held that "Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rule for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require
any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable." However, as the
constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to "the grants of rights,
privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony" and not to every aspect of
trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here is not whether
this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a
rule, there are enough balancing provisions28 in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.

All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor
and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of
the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only
against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. The Constitution did not intend to
pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited
entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either.
In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair. Taňada vs. Angara G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
25

Rule: x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision
of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect
Page

others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should

26
Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003.
27
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991).
28
Secs. 1 and 13 Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income,
and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged. The
State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform,
through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition
and trade practices. In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given
optimum opportunity to develop. . . . xxx xxx xxx Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general
welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with
all other provisions of that great document. Chiongbian v. De Leon 82 Phil 771 (1949).

Rule: The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit
of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article
I-XB which, for easy reference is quoted anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment
in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries."

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution

is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the
great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered
and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section
is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to
stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words
idle and nugatory. Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,194 SCRA 317 (1991)

2. Plain Meaning Rule. Whenever Possible the Words Used in the

Constitution Must Be Given their Ordinary Meaning Except When Technical
Terms are Employed. (VERBA LEGIS)

Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.29

The fundamental principle in constitutional construction however is that the primary

source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the
provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. In other words,
verba legis prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and
equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and
interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or
Convention to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision
being construed. 30

Rule: “In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba legis, "that is, wherever
possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed." G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012 DATU MICHAEL ABAS
KIDA vs. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Rule: We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of
course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the
people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense
they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that
26

the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for
construction is reduced to a minimum. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration
Page

31 SCRA 413 (1970)

29
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010 CYNTHIA S. BOLOS vs. DANILO T. BOLOS.
30
Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC, 412 Phil. 308, 338-339, June 26, 2001, per Panganiban, J., citing JM Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. LTA, 31 SCRA 413, 422-423, February 18, 1970, as cited in Agpalo, Statutory Construction (1990), pp. 311 and 313.

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Case: Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at least
one (1) year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections.

Allegedly, counting, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent registered at Precinct No.
4400-A, up to and until the day of the elections on May 11, 1998, respondent lacks the one (1)
year residency requirement provided for candidates for Member of the House of Representatives
under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.

Rule: Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime
in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara,
Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the 3rd
District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively
abandoned his "residence" in Quezon City and has established a new "domicile" of choice at the
Province of Sarangani.

It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications
for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention31. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever
absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. "Domicile" is a
question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must
be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when
once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence
or domicile at a time.

As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved
and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No
change of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile
without actual residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact
of physical presence without intention.

The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a change
of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani
but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original
domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long,
without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus the date of
the contract of lease of a house and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January
1997, cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-
year residence requirement.

Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further
strengthened by his act of registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting
is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in
this case where DOMINO registered in his former barangay.

Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate public assertion of the fact of residence,
and is said to have decided preponderance in a doubtful case upon the place the elector claims
as, or believes to be, his residence. G.R. No. 134015 July 19, 1999 JUAN DOMINO vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Case: R.A 10354, otherwise known as RH Law, was enacted by Congress on 2012. This was
challenged the constitutionality of RH Law, as purportedly such violates the right to life of the
unborn and compromises Right to life

Rule:The traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and defined by all
27

reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.Records of the Constitutional
Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used
Page

31
Verba Legis - Plain meaning rule. Whenever possible the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except when technical terms are employed.

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment
of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:

Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:

"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the
moment of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the
sperm that there is human life. x x x.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute
are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non
est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words
in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and
second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the
people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule
of law to prevail.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to thwart
the Legislature from passing a measure allowing abortion. The Court cannot interpret this
otherwise. The Reproductive Health Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion.
By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the said Law prohibits not only drugs
or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction
of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has
life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it. James M. Imbong v. Hon. Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014

Case: Invoking the Court's original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution
in relation to the special civil action under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General filed the present Petition for the issuance
of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void respondent's appointment as Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court and to oust and altogether exclude respondent therefrom.

Respondent opposed the petition and anchors her position that she can be removed from office
only by impeachment, based on jurisprudence.

Rule: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected
impeachable official may be removed from office.

ARTICLE XI provides Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.

It is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is
neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional
convention, for its interpretation. The provision uses the permissive term "may" which, in statutory
construction, denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. We have
28

consistently held that the term "may" is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.
The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise.
Page

An option to remove by impeachment admits of an alternative mode of effecting the removal.

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA
vs. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO. G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

Facts: These consolidated petitions under consideration essentially assail the failure and/or
refusal of respondent Congress of the Philippines composed of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, to convene in joint session and therein deliberate on Proclamation No. 216
issued on May 23, 201 7 by President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (President Duterte). Through
Proclamation No. 216, President Duterte declared a state of martial law and suspended the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period not e:xceeding sixty
(60) days effective from the date of the proclamation's issuance.

In the instant cases, both Houses of the Congress separately passed resolutions, in accordance
with their respective rules of procedure, expressing their support for President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216.

According to petitioners, it is obligatory for the Congress to convene in joint session following the
President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, under all circumstances, as Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution provides that

"The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be
set aside by the President."

Rule: A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt
or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.
According to the plain-meaning rule or verba legis, when the statute is clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is
expressed in the maxims index animi sermo or "speech is the index of intention[,]" and verba legis
non est recedendum or "from the words of a statute there should be no departure

The provision in question is clear, plain, and unambiguous. In its literal and ordinary meaning, the
provision grants the Congress the power to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and prescribes how the Congress
may exercise such power, i.e., by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members, voting jointly, in
a regular or special session. The use of the word "may" in the provision - such that "[t]he Congress
x x x may revoke such proclamation or suspension x x x" - is to be construed as permissive and
operating to confer discretion on the Congress on whether or not to revoke, but in order to revoke,
the same provision sets the requirement that at least a majority of the Members of the Congress,
voting jointly, favor revocation.

It is worthy to stress that the provision does not actually refer to a "joint session." While it may be
conceded, subject to the discussions below, that the phrase "voting jointly" shall already be
understood to mean that the joint voting will be done "in joint session," notwithstanding the
absence of clear language in the Constitution, still, the requirement that "[t]he Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, x x x"
explicitly applies only to the situation when the Congress revokes the President's proclamation of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Simply put, the
provision only requires Congress to vote jointly on the revocation of the President's proclamation
and/or suspension.

Hence, the plain language of the subject constitutional provision does not support the petitioners'
argument that it is obligatory for the Congress to convene in joint session following the President's
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, under
all circumstances. G.R. No. 231671 ALEXANDER A. PADILLA vs. CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES,

3. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with

the intent of its framers (RATIO LEGIS ET ANIMA)
29
Page

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Still, it is a basic principle in statutory construction that the law must be given a
reasonable interpretation at all times32. The Court may, in some instances, consider
the spirit and reason of a statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, or injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law
makers.33Applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of the constitution
may render its provisions meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd
situation, or an injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle
that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be made to the
rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.34

Following the verba legis doctrine, (a) law must be applied exactly as worded (if) it
is clear, plain and unequivocal.35

Interpretation according to spirit. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted

in accordance with the intent of the framers.

Rule: Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read
according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not
within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute.
Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute
as if within the letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless
within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an
interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators. G.R. No. 180050 April 12,
2011 RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA36

Rule: Truly, law must be understood not by "the letter that killeth but by the spirit that giveth life."
Law should not be read and interpreted in isolated academic abstraction nor even for the sake of
logical symmetry but always in context of pulsating social realities and specific environmental
facts. Truly, "the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal
technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick
in the ultimate development of the social edifice." Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295, p.
56, June 28, 1996

Rule: As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of
law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much
as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according
to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the
courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.
Thus these are cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.

However, where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted
in accordance with the intent of its framers or ratio legis et anima. A doubtful provision must be
examined in light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances surrounding the
framing of the Constitution. In following this guideline, courts should bear in mind the object sought
to be accomplished in adopting a doubtful constitutional provision, and the evils sought to be
prevented or remedied. Consequently, the intent of the framers and the people ratifying the
constitution, and not the panderings of self-indulgent men, should be given effect. Macalintal v.
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783, 797-
799. cited in G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013 CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
30

Rule: Ratio legis est anima. "A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing
Page

a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the

32
Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 110524, July 29, 2002.
33
People v. Manantan, G.R. No. 14129, July 31, 1962, citing Crawford, Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294
34
Navarro v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010
35
G.R. No. 183880 January 20, 2014 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. TOLEDO POWER, INC.
36
Citing League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, and 178056, December
21, 2009, 608 SCRA 636, 644-645

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light
of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was
framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to
enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that
purpose. G.R. No. 207851 July 8, 2014 ANGEL G. NAVAL vs.COMELEC

Case: A local elective official pleaded exemption from the application of the three-term limit on
the ground that there was an interruption in his service after the penalty of suspension was
imposed upon him.

Rule: As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an
elective official’s stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of
the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X. Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period
of time – three years – during which an official has title to office and can serve.

This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the circumstances
surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to make term limitation a high
priority constitutional objective whose terms must be strictly construed and which cannot be
defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less than equal constitutional worth. We view preventive
suspension vis-à-vis term limitation with this firm mindset.

Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension
should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond
three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the
suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions
and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended
official’s continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the
authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists. G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009 SIMON
B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N. TALABONG vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO

"A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the

provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition
and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to
ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to
effect that purpose.37

- OTHER CASES

Case: Petitioners allege that the Health Sector Reform Agenda should be declared void, since it
runs counter to the aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution.
They claim that the HSRA’s policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue
enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III;
Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution.
Such policies allegedly resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and free medical services.
This contention is unfounded.

Rule: As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do
not require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing,
31

the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However,
some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non-self-executing.
Page

37
Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 885-886 (2003), citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317, 325.

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

  In Tanada v. Angara, the Court specifically set apart the sections found under Article II of
the 1987 Constitution as non-self-executing and ruled that such broad principles need
legislative enactments before they can be implemented:

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." x x
x. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise
of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.

 In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, this Court declared that
Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV
of the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, the Court referred to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. These
provisions, which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from other
constitutional provisions as non-self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause
of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights

Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the
Constitution -- specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 -- the provisions of which the Court
categorically ruled to be non-self-executing in the aforecited case of Tañada v. Angara.

Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the
equal protection and due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in
connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees
were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the
petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA.

In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV,
the State accords recognition to the protection of working women and the provision for safe and
healthful working conditions; to the adoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health; to the Filipino family; and to the right of children to assistance and special protection,
including proper care and nutrition. Like the provisions that were declared as non-self-executory
in the cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation and Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, they are mere statements of principles and policies. As such, they are mere
directives addressed to the executive and the legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy
will not lie with the courts; but rather, the electorate’s displeasure may be manifested in their
votes.

The rationale for this is given by Justice Dante Tinga in his Separate Opinion in the case of
Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission:

x x x However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full
exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of the ideals therein expressed, would
be impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency of
being overbroad and exaggerated. x x x Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the
parameters of these guaranteed rights. x x x Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial
bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the
Constitution.G.R. No. 167324 July 17, 2007 TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION vs. CA

A LIVING CONSTITUTION?

The Living Constitution is a magical tree. The metaphor of a tree connotes what is
living and organic; The tree sits above a parchment copy of the Constitution,
suggesting that the real Constitution grows out of and transcends the ancient text.
Branches of the tree radiate in all directions, and in place of ordinary leaves there
are stars, perhaps standing for famous judicial decisions. The real constitution in is
32

not its text, but a living, growing thing beyond the text that has evolved through
Page

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

common-law decision making, and that its central features and many of its proudest
accomplishments are judicial decisions.38

Interpreting the Constitution in accordance with its original meaning or may be not
acceptable as a policy matter in the face of contemporary circumstances. The
Fundamental law is flexible and broad enough for judicial and legal interpreations.

This however opposed by the idea that changes in the meaning of the Constitution
must not be with the Court, but must be done under the legally established modes
of amendments and revisions.

B. Theory of Judicial Review

1.The Theory and the Basis

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm
of the Constitution, that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by
the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes, is null
and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract.39As such, the law provides therefore that “…When the courts
declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and
the latter shall govern”40

Judicial review guarantees that all laws, or governmental actions must conform to
the Constitution. Otherwise, they may be struck down due to the contradiction.

The power of judicial review is an aspect of judicial power that allows this Court every
opportunity to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.41

Thus, it covers either

1. Judicial Actions: “Final judgments and orders of lower courts”, and;

2. Executive and Legislative issuances or directives: “whether or not there has

been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government”.

It finds its basis from the Constitution;

“All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive

agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and
all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en
banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation
of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and
other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon.” (Article VIII Section 4 (2)
33
Page

2. Judicial Review and Separation of Powers

38
THE ROOTS OF THE LIVING CONSTITUTION, JACK M. BALKIN∗
39
G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
40
Art 7, New Civil Code
41
G.R. No. 138268 May 26, 1999 JURRY ANDAL, RICARDO ANDAL and EDWIN MENDOZA, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Mostly, Judicial Review is sparingly used by the courts because of deference or
respect for the other branches of government.

The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence
stem from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid
concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would
avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the
citizenry.42

Case: Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles
controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional.

Rule: The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries
the assurance that "the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government." Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question
doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr applies when there is found, among
others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or "the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial
discretion." Cast against this light, respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the
best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the
specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at
this stage."1

Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions
which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure." The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent
upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the
Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon.710 SCRA 1.G.R. No. 208566
November 19, 2013 BELGICA et.al. vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO
N. OCHOA et. al, G.R. No. 208493 SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON
S. ALCANTARA, vs. DRILON et.al. G.R. No. 209251 NEPOMUCENO, vs. PRESIDENT
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III*

Case: For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program(DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related
issuances of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing the DAP. This
followed after Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate of the
Philippines to reveal that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional P50
Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona.

The DBM issued a public statement explaining that the funds released to the Senators had been
part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic
expansion. DBM cited that this had been sourced from savings generated by the Government,
and from unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had been derived from (1) the pooling of
unreleased appropriations and 2) the withdrawal of unobligated allotments also for slow-moving
programs and projects that had been earlier released to the agencies of the National Government.
34

At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, a provision
Page

of the fundamental law that firmly ordains that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The tenor and context of the challenges posed

42
Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012, 678 SCRA 1, 9-10, citing Carl Baar, Separate But
Subservient: Court Budgeting In The American States 149-52 (1975), cited in Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence,
Adequate Court Funding, and Inherent Judicial Powers, 52 Md. L. Rev. 217 (1993).

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

by the petitioners against the DAP indicate that the DAP contravened this provision by allowing
the Executive to allocate public money pooled from programmed and unprogrammed funds of its
various agencies in the guise of the President exercising his constitutional authority under Section
25(5) of the 1987 Constitution to transfer funds out of savings to augment the appropriations of
offices within the Executive Branch of the Government. But the challenges are further complicated
by the interjection of allegations of transfer of funds to agencies or offices outside of the Executive.

Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and the issuances relating to the DAP
were filed. All the petitions are filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and include applications
for the issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction or temporary restraining orders.

Issue: Whether or not certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP),

Rule: The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of
the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other department; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy"
which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. x x x

What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined
under the Constitution?

The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions
for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari
exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders
or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors
of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues
and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.

Necessarily, in discharging its duty under the law to set right and undo any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge was
properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted
expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in
appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This entrustment is
consistent with the republican system of checks and balances. G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014,
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III

Case: In the elections of September 17, 1935, petitioner was proclaimed as member elect of
National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. He took his oath of office on
November 15, 1935. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a Resolution No. 8
confirming the election of its members against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On the
other hand, the electoral commission adopted a resolution on December 9, 1935 fixing said date
as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members
35

of National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made.

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Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Prior to December 9, or on December 8, 1935, respondent Ynsua, a defeated candidate, filed a
“motion of protest”, being the only protest filed after the passage of resolution No. 8, asking for
the nullification of petitioner’s election. The ‘motion to dismiss the protest' filed by petitioner was
denied. Hence, this present petition for the issuance of a writ of prohibition.

Issues: 1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to
the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

Rule: Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted
facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent
of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua
against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National
Assembly of December 3, 1935 cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing
of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and
distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the
Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this
assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a
bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-
thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the
right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the
National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore,
in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define
their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the
judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively
checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to
declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of
power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The
overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of
social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the
only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of
the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
36

boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
Page

assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy"
which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this
manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the governments of the government.. G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL
CASTILLO and DIONISIO C. MAYOR

Rule: The cardinal postulate explains that the three branches must discharge their respective
functions within the limits of authority conferred by the Constitution. Under the principle of
separation of powers, neither Congress, the President, nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields
allocated to the other branches of government. The legislature is generally limited to the
enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws, and the judiciary to their
interpretation and application to cases and controversies.

The role of the Courts is to ascertain whether a branch or instrumentality of the Government has
transgressed its constitutional boundaries. But the Courts will not interfere with executive or
legislative discretion exercised within those boundaries. Otherwise, it strays into the realm of
policy decision-making.

In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, the Court added;

x x x [A] court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is not empowered
to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President. It may, however, look into the
question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion.

In Francisco, Jr. v. UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation, the Court elucidated the co-equal status
of the three branches of government:

Considering the co-equal status of the three branches of government, courts may not tread into
matters requiring the exercise of discretion of a functionary or office in the executive and
legislative branches, unless it is clearly shown that the government official or office concerned
abused his or its discretion. x x x

Furthermore,

"x x x courts, as a rule, refuse to interfere with proceedings undertaken by administrative bodies
or officials in the exercise of administrative functions. This is so because such bodies are generally
better equipped technically to decide administrative questions and that non-legal factors, such as
government policy on the matter, are usually involved in the decisions."

Corollary to the principle of separation of powers is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction that the
courts will DEFER to the decisions of the administrative offices and agencies by reason of their
expertise and experience in the matters assigned to them. Administrative decisions on matters
within the jurisdiction of administrative bodies are to be respected and can only be set aside on
proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.

The only instance when the Courts ought to interfere is when a department or an agency has
acted with grave abuse of discretion or violated a law. G.R. Nos. 177857-58 September 17, 2009
PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED) vs. REPUBLIC OF
37

THE PHILIPPINES
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Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

While each branch of government is governed by the Separation of Powers, the
supremacy of the Constitution may allow the Courts to look into transgressions of the
Fundamental Law in the carrying out of their official mandates.

Rule: There is no "reasonable and legitimate" ground to violate the Constitution. The Constitution
should never be violated by anyone. Right or wrong, the President, Congress, the Court…. have
no choice but to follow the Constitution. Any act, however noble its intentions, is void if it violates
the Constitution. This rule is basic.

In Social Justice Society, the Court held that, "In the discharge of their defined functions, the three
departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed." In Sabio, the Court held that, "the
Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is ‘the basic and paramount law to which x x x all
persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however
noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution.’" In Bengzon v. Drilon, the Court held that,
"the three branches of government must discharge their respective functions within the limits of
authority conferred by the Constitution." In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that,
"The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic]
entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to [the Constitution’s] commands. Whatever limits
it imposes must be observed."

Police power does not include the power to violate the Constitution. Police power is the plenary
power vested in Congress to make laws not repugnant to the Constitution. This rule is basic.

In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., the Court held
that, "Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution." In
Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, the Court held that,
police power "is ‘the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances x x x not
repugnant to the constitution.’" In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court
held that, "police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the
Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances x x x not repugnant to the Constitution."

When the effect of a law is unconstitutional, it is void. In Sabio, the Court held that, "A statute may
be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or
establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates
the Constitution or its basic principles." The effect of Section 47 violates the Constitution, thus, it
is void.

In Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock Securities Limited, the Court held that,
"This Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution." In Bengzon, the Court
held that, "The Constitution expressly confers on the judiciary the power to maintain inviolate what
it decrees." In Mutuc, the Court held that:

“The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity
of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a
postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority
accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments
of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but
to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in
the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether
substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore
or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases,
the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its
power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the
course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is
paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby
38

there is a recognition of its being the supreme law. G.R. No. 166471 March 22, 2011 TAWANG
MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE vs. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT
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Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

In the absence of any transgression of the Constitution by the other branches of
government, Courts must respect the boundaries established by the Fundamental
Law

Rule: The courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justice’s determination of probable cause
only through a special civil action for certiorari. That happens when the Secretary of Justice acts
in a limited sense like a quasi-judicial officer of the executive department exercising powers akin
to those of a court of law. But the requirement for such intervention was still for the petitioner to
demonstrate clearly that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Unless such a clear demonstration is made, the intervention is
disallowed in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers. G.R. No. 191567 March 20, 2013
MARIE CALLO-CLARIDAD vs. PHILIP RONALD P. ESTEBAN and TEODORA ALYN
ESTEBAN

Rule: Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide
matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the
Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented
in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere
with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to
act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility. x x x Metrobank vs. Tobias III G.R. No. 177780
January 25, 2012

3. Judicial Review and Presumption of Constitutionality

When confronted with a constitutional question, it is elementary that every court

must approach it with grave care and considerable caution bearing in mind that every
statute is presumed valid and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of
its constitutionality. The policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional
questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain,
this presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon
each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The
theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law
has been carefully studied, crafted and determined to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally enacted.43

Note the following:

1. It is disputably presumed that official duty has been regularly performed

Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if

uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

….(m)That official duty has been regularly performed; xxx Rule 131 (Rules of Court)

2. Interpretation of laws: The New Civil Code provides;

Art. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

Case: Petitioner Zenon R. Perez seeks a review of his conviction by the Sandiganbayan
for malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
39
Page

43
G.R. No. 169364 September 18, 2009 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. EVANGELINE SITON y SACIL

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

 Petitioner contends that the law relied upon in convicting him and the sentence imposed
is cruel and therefore violates SECTION 19 OF ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS) OF THE
CONSTITUTION, considering that there was already payment of the shortaged amount.

Rule: First. What is punished by the crime of malversation is the act of a public officer
who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same, or shall take and misappropriate or shall consent, or through
abandonment or negligence shall permit any other person to take such public funds or
property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property.

Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation; it may only

be considered as a mitigating circumstance. This is because damage is not an element of
malversation.

Second. There is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes.

It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony

with, rather than in violation of, the Constitution. The presumption is that the legislature
intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than
may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. It is presumed that the
legislature has acted within its constitutional powers. So, it is the generally accepted rule
that every statute, or regularly accepted act, is, or will be, or should be, presumed to be
valid and constitutional.

He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probandi to show why such law
is repugnant to the Constitution. Failing to overcome its presumption of constitutionality, a
claim that a law is cruel, unusual, or inhuman, like the stance of petitioner, must fail. G.R.
No. 164763 February 12, 2008 ZENON R. PEREZ vs .PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and SANDIGANBAYAN

3. Passage of laws: A Bill before becoming a law passes the necessary readings as
well as the assessment of the President. Hence, the presumption of Constitutionality.

Rule: To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and
unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency
of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because "to
invalidate [a law] based on xx x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only
of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it. "This
presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there
was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached
by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot
escape, that the challenged act must be struck down. G.R. No. 204429 February 18,
201 4SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MALVAR, BATANGAS

4. As to government actions: Sovereignty belongs to the people, and the Constitution

is the written instrument through which the people entrust to government a measure
of its own sovereignty and no more., What is entrusted to government is limited
power. Hence every act of government must conform to the terms of the
empowerment (Bernas)

It is not constitutionally impermissible for the people to act through their

elected representatives. Nothing less than the paramount task of drafting our
Constitution is delegated by the people to their representatives, elected either
to act as a constitutional convention or as congressional constituent assembly.
Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, 227 SCRA 100 (1993).

Should there be no transgression, the Court shall not declare a law to be

40

“constitutional” as it enjoys that presumption, It shall only declare the same to be

“not unconstitutional”
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Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Case: It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units)
enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction.
In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt
exists, even if well-founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.
Tana v. Hon. Gov. Socrates: 343 Phil. 670 (1997) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].

Ordinances are products of "derivative legislative power" (City of Manila v. Hon.

laguio, 495 Phil. 289, 308- 2005)in that legislative power is delegated by the national
legislature to local government units. They are presumed constitutional and, until
judicially declared invalid, retain their binding effect.

Further reference: Annotation: Judicial Review, 583 SCRA 142

C. Conditions for the Exercise of Judicial Review

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. - Article VIII,
1987 Constitution

1. Judicial Power

The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable" but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." It has thereby expanded the concept of judicial
power, which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual
controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and enforceable.44

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy. 45In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can
be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."46

The Constitution provides for this Court's expanded power of judicial review to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government This proviso was borne out of our country's experience under Martial
Law, to extend judicial review "to review political discretion that clearly breaches
fundamental values and principles congealed in provisions of the Constitution." (See
J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 208566,
November 19, 2013, 710 SCRA I, 290 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].)
Under the present Constitution, this Court has the power to resolve controversies
involving acts done by any government branch or instrumentality with grave abuse
of discretion.
41

Rule: Judicial power is "the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse
Page

litigants Muskrat vs. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).

44
G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014, MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
45
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581,
178890, 179157, and 179461, October 5, 2010, 632 SCRA 146, 175.
46
Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP),
G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, and 183962, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402, 450.

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Rule: Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights
that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for
violations of such right. G.R. No. L-25716 July 28, 1966 FERNANDO LOPEZ vs. GERARDO
ROXAS and PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

2. Grave Abuse of Discretion

Rule: “We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or
tribunal violates and contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. By grave
abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. The word "capricious," usually used in tandem
with the term "arbitrary," conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking
the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of
discretion is imperative.” G. R. No. 174350 August 13, 2008 BALANGAUAN vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

Rule: "Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part
of the public officer concerned which is equivalentto an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse
of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Singian,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 195011-19, September 30, 2013

3. Actual Case and Controversy

In People v Vera, 66 Phil 56 (1937), J. Laurel laid down the doctrine that judicial
review can only be exercised in an actual case and controversy.

According to Fr. Bernas;

 The Court cannot pass upon issues of constitutionality through advisory

opinions
 Courts cannot resolve feigned or hypothetical constitutional problems
 Courts cannot resolve friendly suits collusively arranged between parties
without real adverse interests
 Moot cases, as they have no more “flesh and blood”

The following must be avoided:

(i) political questions,

(ii) advisory opinions,
(iii) moot and academic issues, and
(iv) no standing.

Rule: The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of
the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy"
which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
42

argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
Page

questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the governments of the government. G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL
CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR

Rule: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount
to an advisory opinion. The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions
to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be
justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right,
on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and
not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. James M. Imbong v. Hon.
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014

An ACTUAL CASE AND CONTROVERSY requires the following;

(1) a PARTY with a PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST,

(2) an APPROPRIATE CASE,

(3) a CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION raised at the EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME,

and

(4) a constitutional question that is the VERY LIS MOTA OF THE CASE, i.e. an
unavoidable question.

To elaborate;

(1) A PARTY WITH A PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST

General Concept:

A party has a standing in a case if his interest is such that he stands to be benefited
if the case is resolved in his favor, and he stand to be really injured if it is decided
against him. Standing is established by two nexuses: the party's status and the type
of legislative act being questioned, or his status and the precise nature of the
constitutional infringement. The test of standing is whether the party has alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure such concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.47

A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of persons who desire
to litigate constitutional issues is economic in character. Given the sparseness of our
resources, the capacity of courts to render efficient judicial service to our people is
severely limited. For courts to indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits
and suitors is for them to unduly overburden their dockets, and ultimately render
themselves ineffective dispensers of justice.
43

The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
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47
Baker v Carr 369 U.S. 186, 7 L. Ed. 2d 633 [1962]

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.48A person has standing to
challenge the governmental act only if he has a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.49

Case: This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing
Republic Act (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of 2005) which intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials
and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of
RA 9335, tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and
incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards.
Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally
mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

Rule: The Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality
in favor of RA 9335.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims susceptible of judicial adjudication50.A closely related requirement is ripeness, that is, the
question must be ripe for adjudication. And a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when
the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
it.51Thus, to be ripe for judicial adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal stake in the
outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the
Court.52

In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial controversy
by the mere enactment of the law even without any further overt act, petitioners fail either to assert
any specific and concrete legal claim or to demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on
them. They are unable to show a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to
themselves. ABAKADA vs. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008

GENERAL THE ELEMENTS OF STANDING:

Rule: Indeed, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when

1. He can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government;

2. The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and

3. The injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy brought about by the party. G.R. No. 132922
April 21, 1998 TELECOMMUNICATIONS BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Case: Petitioners, holders of permits, contend that the right of a citizen to own and operate a
school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval
or permit, as in the case of the questioned law (Act 2706) before such person could exercise said
44

right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and
government.
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48
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION vs. JOSE O. VERA
49
Mendoza
50
Cruz, Isagani, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1995 edition, p. 23.
51
Bernas, Joaquin, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 edition, pp. 848-849.
52
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 904 (2000). (Vitug, J., separate opinion)

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Rule: None of the petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them have permits
to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits. Courts will not pass upon the
constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its
operation. The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of
litigant require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a
hypothetical threat being insufficient. G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955 PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

Case: All thirty-five (35) art lovers, petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and
Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from proceeding with the auction sale
scheduled on 11 January 1991 by Christie's of New York of the Old Masters Paintings and 18th
and 19th century silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and
placed in the custody of the Central Bank, the same being part of Filipino heritage.

Rule: The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a
party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing"
means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term
"interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest
of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional
right of some third and related party.

They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons from different parts
of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-
stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. The foundation's chairman was
former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis,
the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members
thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings
when they were placed on exhibit. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the
artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any
clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition. G.R. No. 96541
August 24, 1993, JOYA vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG)

Standing of Taxpayers, Voters Legislators, and Citizens, GENERALLY

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo53, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before
the so-called "non-traditional suitors" may be extended standing to sue, thus: If in
cases involving constitutional issues;

1.) For TAXPAYERS, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds
or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;

2.) For VOTERS, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of
the election law in question;

3.) For CONCERNED CITIZENS, there must be a showing that the issues raised
are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and

4.) For LEGISLATORS, there must be a claim that the official action complained
of infringes their prerogatives as legislators.

Case: In this case, petitioner seeks judicial intervention, in questioning the composition of the
JBC, as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a nominee to the position of Chief Justice of the
45

Supreme Court. As a taxpayer, petitioner invokes his right to demand that the taxes he and the
rest of the citizenry have been paying to the government are spent for lawful purposes. According
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to petitioner, "since the JBC derives financial support for its functions, operation and proceedings

53
G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 161.

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

from taxes paid, petitioner possesses as taxpayer both right and legal standing to demand that
the JBC’s proceedings are not tainted with illegality and that its composition and actions do not
violate the Constitution."

Rule: Anent locus standi, the question to be answered is this: does the party possess a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that there is real, concrete and legal conflict
of rights and duties from the issues presented before the Court? In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo
(522 Phil. 705 in 2006), the Court summarized the rules on locus standi as culled from
jurisprudence. There, it was held that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may
be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1) cases involve
constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public
funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of
obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there
must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled
early; and (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes
upon their prerogatives as legislators.

In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a "public right" in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no differently from
any other person, and can be suing as a "stranger," or as a "citizen" or "taxpayer." Thus, taxpayers
have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Of greater import than the damage caused
by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law
by the enforcement of an invalid statute.

Clearly, petitioner has the legal standing to bring the present action because he has a personal
stake in the outcome of this controversy.

The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue
because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a "personal
stake" on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees
for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being
unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit
heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the
highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country
may be affected by the Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of
nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The Court considers
this a constitutional issue that must be passed upon, lest a constitutional process be plagued by
misgivings, doubts and worse, mistrust. Hence, a citizen has a right to bring this question to the
Court, clothed with legal standing and at the same time, armed with issues of transcendental
importance to society. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is
an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the
right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

With respect to the question of transcendental importance, it is not difficult to perceive from the
opposing arguments of the parties that the determinants established in jurisprudence are
attendant in this case: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the
presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with
a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised. The allegations of constitutional
violations in this case are not empty attacks on the wisdom of the other branches of the
government. The allegations are substantiated by facts and, therefore, deserve an evaluation
from the Court. The Court need not elaborate on the legal and societal ramifications of the issues
raised. It cannot be gainsaid that the JBC is a constitutional innovation crucial in the selection of
the magistrates in our judicial system. G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ
vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

Case: Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary
46

Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation
of Executive Order No. (EO) 7 issued by the Office of the President on September 8, 2010.
Page

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Petitioner Jelbert B. Galicto asserts that EO 7 is unconstitutional for having been issued beyond
the powers of the President and for being in breach of existing laws.

Based on the findings of the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises that "officials and governing boards of various [GOCCs] and [GFIs] x x x have been
granting themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other
benefits [as well as other] irregular and abusive practices," the Senate issued Senate Resolution
No. 17 "urging the President to order the immediate suspension of the unusually large and
apparently excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the
governing boards of [GOCCs] and [GFIs]."

Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, entitled
"Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification System in the
[GOCCs] and [GFIs], and for Other Purposes." EO 7 provided for the guiding principles and
framework to establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and
GFIs. A Task Force was also created to review all remunerations of GOCC and GFI employees
and officers, while GOCCs and GFIs were ordered to submit to the Task Force information
regarding their compensation. Finally, EO 7 ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in the
salaries and other forms of compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO
900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President, and (2)
a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of
Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010.

The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of EO

7, which was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Rule: Petitioner lacks locus standi. – To support his claim that he has locus standi to file the
present petition, the petitioner contends that as an employee of PhilHealth, he "stands to be
prejudiced by [EO] 7, which suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grants of salary increases
or new or increased benefits to officers and employees of GOCC[s] and x x x curtail[s] the
prerogative of those officers who are to fix and determine his compensation." The petitioner also
claims that he has standing as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in
ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued and
implemented.

In the present case, we are not convinced that the petitioner has demonstrated that he has a
personal stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is
speculative and based on a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future increases in
his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent events or expectancies.
To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right
deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7.

If the asserted injury is more imagined than real, or is merely superficial and insubstantial, then
the courts may end up being importuned to decide a matter that does not really justify such an
excursion into constitutional adjudication.

Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioner’s claim that he is instituting the
present petition as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that
laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued. This supposed
interest has been branded by the Court in Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) v. Hon. Zamora, "as
too general an interest which is shared by other groups and [by] the whole citizenry." Thus, the
Court ruled in IBP that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and
nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in that case G.R.
No. 193978 February 28, 2012 JELBERT B. GALICTO vs. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO
SIMEON C. AQUINO III

- As Legislators:

Rule: In Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Morato (246 SCRA 540 [1995]), we held that members of Congress
47

may properly challenge the validity of an official act of any department of the government only
upon showing that the assailed official act affects or impairs their rights and prerogatives as
Page

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

legislators. G.R. No. 138298 June 19, 2001 RAOUL B. DEL MAR vs. PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, ET. AL (OPINION of MELO, J.

Rule To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a
case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the
validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislator G.R.
No. 192935 December 7, 2010 LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION OF 2010

Just for perspective, an example of deprivation of Legislative prerogative, read G.R. No. 127383
August 18, 2005 THE CITY OF DAVAO, CITY TREASURER AND THE CITY ASSESSOR OF
DAVAO CITY vs. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XII, DAVAO CITY AND THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS)

“ It is a basic precept that among the implied substantive limitations on the legislative
powers is the prohibition against the passage of irrepealable laws. Irrepealable laws
deprive succeeding legislatures of the fundamental best senses carte blanche in crafting
laws appropriate to the operative milieu. Their allowance promotes an unhealthy stasis in
the legislative front and dissuades dynamic democratic impetus that may be responsive
to the times. As Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno once observed, "[t]o be sure,
there are no irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is
the predicate of progress and we should not fear change."

Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to

have the ability to bind the actions of future legislative body, considering that both
assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do the same plenary
powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a legislative body, and
a legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments
labors under delusions of omniscience”

- As Taxpayers:

A taxpayer has a standing to sue if

1. He has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by

taxation

2. He will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement.

Rule: Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that "the expenditure of public funds by an officer
of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication
of such funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. G.R. No. 71977 February
27, 1987 DEMETRIA vs. ALBA

Case: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the
constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004
(GAA of 2004). Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), a group of lawyers
who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social
monopoly in the country, also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondent Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
48

(DBM) from making, and, thereafter, releasing budgetary allocations to individual members of
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Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Congress as "pork barrel" funds out of PDAF. LAMP likewise aimed to stop the National Treasurer
and the Commission on Audit (COA) from enforcing the questioned provision.

The GAA of 2004 contains the following provision subject of this petition:

PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUND

For fund requirements of priority development programs and projects, as indicated

hereunder – P 8,327,000,000.00
xxxx

Special Provision

1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used to fund
priority programs and projects or to fund the required counterpart for foreign-assisted
programs and projects: PROVIDED, That such amount shall be released directly to the
implementing agency or Local Government Unit concerned: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That
the allocations authorized herein may be realigned to any expense class, if deemed
necessary: PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, That a maximum of ten percent (10%) of the
authorized allocations by district may be used for procurement of rice and other basic
commodities which shall be purchased from the National Food Authority.

According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct
allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It
does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and
projects to be funded out of PDAF.

In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as
citizens and taxpayers. According to LAMP, the practice of direct allocation and release of funds
to the Members of Congress and the authority given to them to propose and select projects is the
core of the law’s flawed execution resulting in a serious constitutional transgression involving the
expenditure of public funds. Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely
affected by this. A finding of unconstitutionality would necessarily be tantamount to a
misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords
"ripeness" to the present controversy.

Further, the allegations in the petition do not aim to obtain sheer legal opinion in the nature of
advice concerning legislative or executive action. The possibility of constitutional violations in the
implementation of PDAF surely involves the interplay of legal rights susceptible of judicial
resolution. For LAMP, this is the right to recover public funds possibly misapplied by no less than
the Members of Congress. Hence, without prejudice to other recourse against erring public
officials, allegations of illegal expenditure of public funds reflect a concrete injury that may have
been committed by other branches of government before the court intervenes. The possibility that
this injury was indeed committed cannot be discounted. The petition complains of illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there
indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.

Issues: Whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this
case;

Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required
in taxpayers’ suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed
and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be
allowed to sue.

Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public
interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the
consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition. G.R. No.
164987 April 24, 2012 LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP) vs. THE
49

SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

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Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Case: This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order pursuant to Section 7, Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution, seeking to annul and set aside Commission on Audit (COA) Circular No. 89-299,
which lifted its system of pre-audit of government financial transactions.

The rationale for the circular was, first, to reaffirm the concept that fiscal responsibility resides in
management as embodied in the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines; and, second, to
contribute to accelerating the delivery of public services and improving government operations by
curbing undue bureaucratic red tape and ensuring facilitation of government transactions, while
continuing to preserve and protect the integrity of these transactions.

As a taxpayer, Petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He alleges that the pre-
audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is
a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. He further
claims that, because of the lack of pre-audit by COA, serious irregularities in government
transactions have been committed, such as the P728-million fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in
the P550-million call center laboratory project of the Commission on Higher Education, and many
others.

Rule: Standing - This Petition has been filed as a taxpayer’s suit. A taxpayer is deemed to have
the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds from taxation
have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Petitioner claims that
the issuance of Circular No. 89-299 has led to the dissipation of public funds through numerous
irregularities in government financial transactions. These transactions have allegedly been left
unchecked by the lifting of the pre-audit performed by COA, which, petitioner argues, is its
Constitutional duty. Thus, petitioner has standing to file this suit as a taxpayer, since he would be
adversely affected by the illegal use of public money. G.R. No. 180989 February 7, 2012
Gualberto J. Dela Llana vs. The Chairperson, Commission on Audit, The Executive
Secretary and the National Treasurer

Case: Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles
controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional.

1. On August 28, 2013, petitioner Alcantara, President of the Social Justice Society, filed a Petition
for Prohibition, seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of
prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents as the incumbent Senate President
and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation
appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever name it may
be called, and from approving further releases pursuant thereto.

2. On September 3, 2013, petitioners Belgica et.al. filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and
Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of
the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary
funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they
pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents who are the incumbent Executive Secretary,
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and National Treasurer, or their agents,
for them to immediately cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that
the Court order the foregoing respondents to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the
complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years
2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or
individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum,
discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances
from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient
entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto."Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary
deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-sum, discretionary funds
including, but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
50

PAGCOR."109
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Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

3. On September 5, 2013, petitioner Nepomuceno filed a Petition dated, seeking that the PDAF
be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining President Aquino
and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their
release to fund priority projects identified and approved by the Local Development Councils in
consultation with the executive departments, such as the DPWH, the Department of Tourism, the
Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, and Communication and the National
Economic Development Authority.

The three cases were consolidated.

Issues: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to sue;

Rule: Locus Standi. -Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as
citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the
National Treasury. "Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the
validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and
continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been
allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money
is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.

Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the
issues they have raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest. "Indeed, of greater import
than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted
upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. G.R. No. 208566 November
19, 2013. BELGICA et.al. vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 208493
SJS, vs. DRILON et.al. G.R. No. 209251 NEPOMUCENO, vs. AQUINO III*

- As Citizens

1. When the issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues
raised are of paramount importance to the public

2. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate
its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. Section 18, Article VII, 1987
Constitution

3. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be

recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such stations
as may be provided by law. (Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution) Access to
public documents and records is a public right, and the real parties in interest are the
people themselves. G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ
vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG)

Case: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to permanently enjoin the sale of the
Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to Korea Water Resources Corporation (K-Water)
which won the public bidding conducted by the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
Corporation (PSALM) a government-owned and controlled corporation created by virtue of
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Republic Act No. 913654(EPIRA).

Page

54
"Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 - Said law mandated PSALM to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and
privatization of NPC generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and Independent Power Producer (IPP)
contracts with the objective of liquidating all NPC financial obligations and stranded contract costs in an optimal manner

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Sometime in August 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of the 246-megawatt (MW)
AHEPP located in San Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Bulacan. After a post-bid evaluation, PSALM’s
Board of Directors approved and confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award to the highest
bidder, K-Water.

As such, the present petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction was filed by The Petitioners

Petitioners contend that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when, in the conduct of the bidding
it disregarded and violated the people’s right to information guaranteed under the Constitution, as
the same was granted sans any transparency.

Petitioners reiterate their legal standing to file the present suit in their capacity as taxpayers, or
as Filipino citizens asserting the promotion and protection of a public right, aside from being
directly injured by the proceedings of PSALM.

Issues: Legal standing of petitioners;

Rule: We rule that petitioners possess the requisite legal standing in filing this suit as citizens and
taxpayers.

"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance.

Moreover, we have held that if the petition is anchored on the people’s right to information on
matters of public concern, any citizen can be the real party in interest. The requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the
general public which possesses the right. There is no need to show any special interest in the
result. It is sufficient that petitioners are citizens and, as such, are interested in the faithful
execution of the laws. G.R. No. 192088 October 9, 2012 INITIATIVES FOR DIALOGUE AND
EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SERVICES, INC. (IDEALS, INC.) vs.
POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM)

- More cases, and instances on standing;

a. “Transcendental Importance” and “Paramount Public Interest”

Case: This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction, which seeks to prohibit and restrain the
implementation of the "Contract of Lease" of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO executed by
the latter and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC).

Petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated (KILOSBAYAN) avers that it is a non-stock domestic

corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are
committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal. The rest of the petitioners, except
Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Tañada and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in
their capacities as members of the Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and
concerned citizens. Senators Webb and Tañada and Representative Arroyo are suing in their
capacities as members of Congress and as taxpayers and concerned citizens of the Philippines.

Rule: We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it
raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many
of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social,
economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and
the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as
staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners
deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside
the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of. G.R. No. 113375 May 5,
52

1994 KILOSBAYAN vs. GUINGONA

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Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Rule: We rule that petitioners possess the requisite legal standing in filing this suit as citizens and
taxpayers.

"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance. The gist of the question
of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." This Court, however, has
adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an
issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount
importance to the public. Thus, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the
mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

There can be no doubt that the matter of ensuring adequate water supply for domestic use is one
of paramount importance to the public. That the continued availability of potable water in Metro
Manila might be compromised if PSALM proceeds with the privatization of the hydroelectric power
plant in the Angat Dam Complex confers upon petitioners such personal stake in the resolution
of legal issues in a petition to stop its implementation. G.R. No. 192088 October 9, 2012
INITIATIVES FOR DIALOGUE AND EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ALTERNATIVE LEGAL
SERVICES, INC. (IDEALS, INC.) vs. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM)

Rule: The Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence,
can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when
the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-
applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi
requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or
with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of
transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural
technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing
non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the
public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act. James M. Imbong v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819, 8
April 2014

Case: Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354,
otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. Shortly after the President placed his
imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the
doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience.

Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces this
controversy, as presented in fourteen petitions and two petitions- in-intervention, persons and
entities in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor
children; on behalf of the generations unborn as members of the Bar, and as one as an accredited
political party.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of
RH Law on the following GROUNDS:

• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The
petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a
53

product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).

• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26(1), Article VI of the
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Constitution

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

• The RH Law violates Natural Law.
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for
reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the
powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No.
9054.54

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer
patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full
and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their
religious beliefs and convictions. It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation
of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious
beliefs.

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the
dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that some petitioners lack standing to question
the RH Law

The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It
contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed
law has yet to be enforced and applied against them, and the government has yet to distribute
reproductive health devices that are abortive.

The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their
status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.

Rule: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge
the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits
one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of
third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party
standing.

Transcendental Importance. Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on
standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter
is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest."

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-
applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi
requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or
with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of
transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural
technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing
non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the
public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act.

In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to
the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH
Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of
religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the
54

issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a
broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of
Page

transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly,

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the
Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in
the Constitution are being imperiled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or
her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences. Imbong v.. Ochoa. G.R. No.
204819, 8 April 2014

b. “Intergenerational Responsibility”

Rule: This case, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent
their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept
of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of
nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993 OPOSA
VS. FACTORAN

Case: Before Us are two consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
concerning Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which allowed the exploration, development, and
exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated
between the islands of Negros and Cebu

Among others, Petitioners collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the
petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit
the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are joined by Ramos and Eisma-Osorio as their
legal guardians and as friends who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the
aforementioned marine species.

Incidentally, recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our
courts for violations of our environmental laws:

SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under
environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which
shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring
all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15)
days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a
general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
(A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, effective April 29, 2010 RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL CASES)

Rule: Even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental · Cases became effective, this Court
had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In
Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn "based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is concerned." Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that
does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been
eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to
enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties
in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards,
Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of
laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess
the legal standing to file this petition. RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED
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SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT V. ANGELO REYES, ET AL. G.R. NO. 180771 & 181527, 21
APRIL 2015
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Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Concurrent opinion: The expansion of what constitutes "real party in interest" to include minors
and generations yet unborn is a recognition of this court's ruling in Oposa v. Factoran. This court
recognized the capacity of minors (represented by their parents) to file a class suit on behalf of
succeeding generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility to ensure the
future generation's access to and enjoyment of [the] country's natural resources.

To allow citizen's suits to enforce environmental rights of others, including future generations, is
dangerous for three reasons:

First, they run the risk of foreclosing arguments of others who are unable to take part in the suit,
putting into question its representativeness. Second, varying interests may potentially result in
arguments that are bordering on political issues, the resolutions of which do not fall upon this
court. Third, automatically allowing a class or citizen's suit on behalf of minors and generations
yet unborn may result in the oversimplification of what may be a complex issue, especially in light
of the impossibility of determining future generation's true interests on the matter.

The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of environmental claims lies in its
potential to diminish the value of legitimate environmental rights. Extending the application of "real
party in interest" to the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, through a judicial
pronouncement will potentially result in allowing petitions based on mere concern rather than an
actual enforcement of a right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what their concerns are.
At best, humans can only surmise the extent of injury inflicted, if there be any. Petitions invoking
a right and seeking legal redress before this court cannot be a product of guesswork, and
representatives have the responsibility to ensure that they bring "reasonably cogent, rational,
scientific, well-founded arguments" on behalf of those they represent. RESIDENT MARINE
MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT V. ANGELO REYES, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 180771 & 181527, 21 APRIL 2015

Note: Environmental Law Case Doctrine

In RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS V. REYES, Petitioners raised the Public Trust

Doctrine.
Allegedly, the Government, had failed in its duty to protect the environment pursuant
to the public trust doctrine.

the Public Trust Doctrine, while derived from English common law and American
jurisprudence, has firm Constitutional and statutory moorings in our jurisdiction. The
doctrine speaks of an imposed duty upon the State and its representative of
continuing supervision over the taking and use of appropriated water. Thus, "[p]arties
who acquired rights in trust property [only hold] these rights subject to the trust and,
therefore, could assert no vested right to use those rights in a manner harmful to the
trust.“ These exigencies forced the public trust doctrine to evolve from a mere
principle to a resource management term and tool flexible enough to adapt to
changing social priorities and address the correlative and consequent dangers
thereof. The public is regarded as the beneficial owner of trust resources, and courts
can enforce the public trust doctrine even against the government itself. [G.R. No.
224469, January 05, 2021] DIOSDADO SAMA VS. PEOPLE

Case: Petitioners here question the validity of the Social Security System premium hike, which
took effect in January 2014. Maintaining that a majority of them are Social Security System
members directly affected by the premium hike, petitioners assert having the requisite locus standi
to file the Petition. They maintain that the hike do not characterize as a valid delegation of powers
(see discussion on the legislative powers, refer to the course syllabus) and exercise of police
power.

Petitioners argue that they have the legal standing to file the Petition since: (1) a majority of them
are Social Security System members and are directly affected by the increase in contributions;81
and (2) other petitioners argue that the standing requirement must be relaxed since the issues
56

they raise are of transcendental importance.

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Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Rule: Petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno, Anakpawis Party-List, Center for Trade Union and Human
Rights, and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno all failed to show how they
will suffer direct and material injury from the enforcement of the assailed issuances.

However, jurisprudence is replete with instances when a liberal approach to determining legal
standing was adopted. This has allowed "ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic
organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations[,]
and rulings."

This Court has provided instructive guides to determine whether a matter is of transcendental
importance: "(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence
of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent
agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct
and specific interest in the questions being raised."

Here, the assailed issuances set the new contribution rate and its date of effectivity. The increase
in contributions has been in effect since January 2014. As such, the issue of the validity of
increase in contributions is of transcendental importance. The required legal standing for
petitioners must be relaxed.

It is worth noting that this issue affects millions of Filipinos working here and abroad. A substantial
portion of members' salaries goes to the Social Security System fund. To delay the resolution of
such an important issue would be a great disservice to this Court's duty enshrined in the
Constitution.

For all these reasons, and despite the technical infirmities in this Petition, this Court reviews the
assailed issuances. KILUSANG MAYO UNO vs. Hon. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, April
2, 2019, G.R. No. 210500

(2) AN APPROPRIATE CASE

In KILUSANG MAYO UNO vs. Hon. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III55, the Supreme
court held that Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court provides remedies to
address grave abuse of discretion by any government branch or instrumentality,
particularly through petitions for certiorari and prohibition:

SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.

SECTION 2. Petition for Prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings
in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.

While these provisions pertain to a tribunal's, board's, or an officer's exercise of

discretion in judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, Rule 65 still applies to
57

invoke the expanded scope of judicial power. In Araullo v. Aquino III, this Court
Page

differentiated certiorari from prohibition, and clarified that Rule 65 is the remedy to

55
April 2, 2019, G.R. No. 210500

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

"set right, undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government,
even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial[J or ministerial functions."

Political Question.

An issue is a political question when it does not deal with the interpretation of a law
and its application to a case, but with the very wisdom of the law itself. When a judge
attempts to resolve a political question, he is not exercising a judicial function, but is
rather supplanting his conscience to that of the political branch of the government.

Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 (1962) has attempted to formulate some guidelines for
determining whether a question is political or not.

Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found;

- a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a political

department;

- or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;

- or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind

clearly for non-judicial discretion;

- or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without

expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;

- or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already

made, or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.

Case: Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles
controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional.

Issues: Whether or not (the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not
subject to judicial review

Rule: Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine. The "limitation on the power of judicial
review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries the assurance that "the courts will not intrude
into areas committed to the other branches of government." Essentially, the foregoing limitation
is a restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v.
Carr applies when there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light, respondents
submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related
reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as
such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage."

Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions
which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure." The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent
upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the
58

Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013.
BELGICA et.al. vs. OCHOA et. Al.
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Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Advisory Opinion. A case becomes an advisory opinion when there is no actual case
and controversy that demands constitutional construction for its resolution. It is not
wise for the court to engage in an advisory opinion because:

a) This only leads to dialectics or contentions, to abstract legal arguments and

sterile conclusions (Laurel quoting Frankfurter)

b) The judicial function is impoverished since it thrives on facts that draw out the
meaning of the law.

Advisory Opinion vs. Declaratory Relief

Declaratory Relief. Section 1, Rule 63 (Rules of Court) Declaratory Relief

By whom? Any person who;

1. Has interests in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or
2. Has rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance,
or any other governmental regulation may

When? Before breach or violation thereof bring an action in the appropriate RTC

Reason: To determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a

declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

Now, an action for declaratory relief is only proper when the following requisites
are present:

1. There must be a justiciable controversy;

2. The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
3. The person seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy;

Rule: the appellant not being one of the contracting parties to the deed of sale executed
by the appellees spouses but took part only as notary public before whom they
acknowledged the execution thereof is not entitled to file an action for declaratory judgment.
G.R. No. L-16474 January 31, 1962 TOMAS B. TADEO vs. THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL
OF PANGASINAN

4. The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.

Read: G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010, SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE

ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC. vs. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL

(3) A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION RAISED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME

Ripeness. A constitutional question may come to the court either too early or
prematurely, so that it is still abstract (advisory opinion), or too late, so that the
court's decision would no longer affect the parties (mootness). The court must resolve
constitutional issues only when they come to it at the right time.

Rule: “The general rule is that the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity, so that if it is not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial;
and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. APEX MINING CO., INC.,
vs. SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP, G.R. Nos. 152613 & 152628 November
20, 2009

A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
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adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
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adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself
as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of.

In THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO V. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF

THE PHILIPPINES, (589 Phil. 387, 481 (2008).) where the constitutionality of an
unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was
put in question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues
raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the
petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the
fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial
duty.

Rule: In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the
plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An alternative road to review similarly taken would
be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or performed by a branch of
government before the courts may step in. G.R. No. 187883, June 16, 2009 ATTY. OLIVER O.
LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-ENDRIANO, vs. SPEAKER PROSPERO C.
NOGRALES

Case: Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354,
otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. Shortly after the President placed his
imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the
doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience.

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the
dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that there is no actual case or controversy and,
therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not present any actual case or
controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. They claim that the questions raised
by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with
violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has
been adversely affected by its operation. In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH
Law is premature.

Rule In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the
same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules
have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier,
when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations
thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014

Mootness. A case becomes moot when there are facts, injuries and heated arguments
but for some reason the legal problem has become stale. When a case is moot and
academic, it ceases to be a case and controversy. Any decision reached by the court
60

would not be conclusive on the parties. Although moot, the Court may still resolve
the issue if the question is capable of repetition and evasive of review; if there exists
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a mere possibility of collateral legal consequences if the court does not act; if by

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

voluntary cessation from the wrongful act by the defendant, if he is free to return to
his old ways.

Case: The Sugar Regulatory Administration issued Sugar Orders which provided a lien on all raw
sugar quedan-permits, as well as on any other form of sugar in order to fund the Philippine Sugar
Research Institute, Inc.

Questioning the validity of the Assailed Sugar Orders, Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition and
injunction. It alleged that the Assailed Sugar Orders are unconstitutional in that: (a) they were
issued beyond the powers and authority granted to the SRA by EO 18, s. 1986; and (b) the amount
levied by virtue of the Assailed Sugar Orders constitutes public funds and thus, cannot be legally
channeled to a private corporation such as PHILSURIN.

In response, the SRA and PHILSURIN filed their respective motions to dismiss on the ground of
forum-shopping. The SRA alleged that there is a pending case for declaratory relief in the Quezon
City-RTC and that the main issue raised in both the Naga and QC Cases is the validity of the
Assailed Sugar Orders. The Naga City-RTC denied SRA and PHILSURIN’s motions to dismiss.

In a Decision dated April 19, 2013, the CA nullified and set aside the Orders of the Naga City-
RTC and ordered the dismissal of the case a quo on the ground of forum-shopping. Hence this
Petition.

In the interim, during the pendency of the instant petition, the SRA has issued Sugar Order No.
5, s. 2013-2014, which revoked the Assailed Sugar Orders. As a result thereof, all mill companies
were directed to cease from collecting the lien from all sugar production, effective immediately.

Rule: A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration
on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial
relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the
petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of
mootness. This is because the judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical
legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced.

In this case, the supervening issuance of Sugar Order No. 5, s. 2013-2014 which revoked the
effectivity of the Assailed Sugar Orders has mooted the main issue in the case a quo - that is the
validity of the Assailed Sugar Orders. Thus, in view of this circumstance, resolving the procedural
issue on forum-shopping as herein raised would not afford the parties any substantial relief or
have any practical legal effect on the case.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds it appropriate to abstain from passing upon the
merits of this case where legal relief is no longer needed nor called for. G.R. No. 208660 March
5, 2014 PEÑAFRANCIA SUGAR MILL, INC. vs. SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION

Rule: For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or
controversy — one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal
or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and
academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the case before us. G.R. No. 185053
February 15, 2012 EUSTAQUIO CANDARI vs. ROLAND DONASCO

Some Cases

Case: Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles
controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional.

Issues: Whether or not the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy
61

Rule: Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy. The Court finds that there exists an actual
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and justiciable controversy. For there to be an exercise of the Judicial Power, there must be a

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence. Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
"ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for
adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the
challenged action. Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory
opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions

The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of
the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these
consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions
allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya
Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently
existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as
a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been
rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot
when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served
in passing upon the merits. Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents‘
proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful
purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013
PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither
will the President‘s declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on
PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority
to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a
law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court,
through a declaration of unconstitutionality.

Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and
academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving
a case." The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest
is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles
to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.

The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they
essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of
separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability
and local autonomy.

The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved

– the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have
been and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional
character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have
been lodged at a time when the system‘s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court‘s
mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the
government‘s own recognition that reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of the
PDAF" demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of
the matter. It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners‘ claims as not merely theorized,
speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by
the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government.

The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a
definitive ruling on the system‘s constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the
62

CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office
in connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Leonen
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pointed out that all of these would eventually find their way to the courts. Accordingly, there is a

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated
disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public
funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.

Finally, the application of the third exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation
and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence.
The relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free
budget for 2014." The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations
throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners‘ claim that "the same
dog will just resurface wearing a different collar." In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, the
government had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the
"capable of repetition but evading review" exception in order "to prevent similar questions from
re- emerging." The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues
underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most
opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review. G.R. No.
208566 November 19, 2013 BELGICA vs. OCHOA

Case: Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation
of Executive Order No. (EO) 7 issued by the Office of the President on September 8, 2010.
Petitioner Jelbert B. Galicto asserts that EO 7 is unconstitutional for having been issued beyond
the powers of the President and for being in breach of existing laws.

Rule: We resolve to DISMISS the petition for its patent formal and procedural infirmities, and for
having been mooted by subsequent events. The petition has been mooted by supervening events.
- Because of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed out that the present case has
already been rendered moot by these supervening events: (1) the lapse on December 31, 2010
of Section 10 of EO 7 that suspended the allowances and bonuses of the directors and trustees
of GOCCs and GFIs; and (2) the enactment of R.A. No. 10149 amending the provisions in the
charters of GOCCs and GFIs empowering their board of directors/trustees to determine their own
compensation system, in favor of the grant of authority to the President to perform this act.

All told, in view of the supervening events rendering the petition moot, as well as its patent formal
and procedural infirmities, we no longer see any reason for the Court to resolve the other issues
raised in the certiorari petition. G.R. No. 193978 February 28, 2012 JELBERT B. GALICTO, vs.
H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III

Case: The petition asks whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the
ban on the President from "any reelection." Private respondent was elected President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the
presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C.
Pormento opposed private respondent’s candidacy and filed a petition for disqualification.

Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran.

Rule: Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will be premised
on a person’s second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or
controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case
no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court
in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for
the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is
sorely lacking in this case.

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not
empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of
law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words,
when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.
63

An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the
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issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised
again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof
has been overtaken by subsequent events. G.R. No. 191988 August 31, 2010, ATTY. EVILLO
C. PORMENTO, vs. JOSEPH "ERAP" EJERCITO ESTRADA and COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS

Case: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to permanently enjoin the sale of the
Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to Korea Water Resources Corporation (K-Water)
which won the public bidding conducted by the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
Corporation (PSALM) a government-owned and controlled corporation created by virtue of
Republic Act No. 9136(EPIRA).

Sometime in August 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of the 246-megawatt (MW)
AHEPP located in San Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Bulacan On after a post-bid evaluation, PSALM’s
Board of Directors approved and confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award to the highest
bidder, K-Water.

As such, the present petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction was filed by The Petitioners

Petitioners contend that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when, in the conduct of the bidding
it disregarded and violated the people’s right to information guaranteed under the Constitution, as
the same was granted sans and transparency.

Petitioners reiterate their legal standing to file the present suit in their capacity as taxpayers, or
as Filipino citizens asserting the promotion and protection of a public right, aside from being
directly injured by the proceedings of PSALM.

Issues: Mootness of the petition;

Rule: PSALM’s contention that the present petition had already been mooted by the issuance of
the Notice of Award to K-Water is misplaced. Though petitioners had sought the immediate
issuance of injunction against the bidding commenced by PSALM -- specifically enjoining it from
proceeding to the next step of issuing a notice of award to any of the bidders -- they further prayed
that PSALM be permanently enjoined from disposing of the AHEPP through privatization. The
petition was thus filed not only as a means of enforcing the State’s obligation to protect the
citizens’ "right to water" that is recognized under international law and legally enforceable under
our Constitution, but also to bar a foreign corporation from exploiting our water resources in
violation of Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution. If the impending sale of the AHEPP to K-
Water indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to annul the contract award as
well as its implementation. As this Court held in Chavez v. Philippine Estates Authority,
"supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a
decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution." G.R. No. 192088 October 9, 2012
INITIATIVES FOR DIALOGUE AND EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ALTERNATIVE LEGAL
SERVICES, INC. (IDEALS, INC.) vs. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM)

Case: In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65, Dennis A. B. Funa challenges
the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the Commission on
Audit and accordingly prays that a judgment issue "declaring the unconstitutionality" of the
appointment.

Villar, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of seven (7) years
which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to
February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that
position.

Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011 addressed
to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from office upon the
64

appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his position when President
Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This
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development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein moot and academic.

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Rule: A case is considered moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, or when it
ceases to present a justiciable controversy owing to the onset of supervening events, so that a
resolution of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such
instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which will
anyway be negated by the dismissal of the basic petition. As a general rule, it is not within Our
charge and function to act upon and decide a moot case. However, in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,
We acknowledged and accepted certain exceptions to the issue of mootness, thus:

The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:

FIRST, there is a grave violation of the Constitution,

SECOND, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved,

THIRD, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public, and

FOURTH, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the resignation
of Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the requirements for review of a moot and
academic case, since it asserts at least four exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David,
namely: there is a grave violation of the Constitution; the case involves a situation of exceptional
character and is of paramount public interest; the constitutional issue raised requires the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; and the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review. The situation presently obtaining is definitely of such
exceptional nature as to necessarily call for the promulgation of principles that will henceforth
"guide the bench, the bar and the public" should like circumstance arise. Confusion in similar
future situations would be smoothed out if the contentious issues advanced in the instant case
are resolved straightaway and settled definitely. There are times when although the dispute has
disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be addressed. To borrow from Javier v.
Pacificador, "Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right,
though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint in the future. "G.R. No. 192791 April
24, 2012 DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs. THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REYNALDO A.
VILLAR

Case: In the 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. She won over the other contender, Olivia
Paras.

Petitioner Renald F. Vilando, as taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered voter of the
congressional district concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong
before the HRET. These petitions were consolidated by the HRET as they both challenged the
eligibility of one and the same respondent. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese
citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed. They alleged that she was
born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who
acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter. Also, they
invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of Limkaichong’s citizenship, which
necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of the naturalization certificate of Julio Sy.

For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. She averred
that the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and in order and had already
attained the status of res judicata. Further, she claimed that the validity of such citizenship could
not be assailed through a collateral attack.

HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the
House of Representatives. The petitioners sought reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, but
65

it was denied by the HRET. Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by Vilando
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Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Rule: The petition may be dismissed for being moot and academic. It should be noted that
Limkaichong’s term of office as Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental from June
30, 2007 to June 30, 2010 already expired. Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for
Members of the House of Representatives, however, may be questioned at anytime. For this
reason, the Court deems it appropriate to resolve the petition on the merits. The question on
Limkaichong’s citizenship is likely to recur if she would run again, as she did run, for public office,
hence, capable of repetition. G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149 August 23, 2011 VILANDO vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

(4) A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION THAT IS THE VERY LIS MOTA OF THE CASE, I.E.
AN UNAVOIDABLE QUESTION.

In constitutional law terms, this means that we ought to refrain from resolving any
constitutional issue "unless the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case."

The constitutional challenge must be squarely addressed and threshed out in its
entirety because the constitutionality of the law itself is the very lis mota of the case.
In People v. Vera (65 Phil. 56 (1937).), this court first presented the idea of lis mota:

It is a well-settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not
be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in
appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu
[1915], 30 Phil., 563, 568; 6 R. C. L., pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780-782, 783.)30

Case: Before the Court are the Consolidated Petitions for Quo Warranto, and Certiorari and/or
Prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction filed by General. The petitioner seeks to declare unconstitutional the appointments of
Urro, de Guzman and Escueta to the NAPOLCOM, and to prohibit then Executive Secretary and
Department of Interior and DILG Secretary from enforcing the respondents’ oath of office.
Particularly, the petitioner asks that respondent Urro be ousted as NAPOLCOM Commissioner
and he be allowed to continue in office.

Rule: Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action." This last requisite of judicial review
is simply an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the executive and legislative acts of
our co-equal branches of the government. Ultimately, it is rooted in the principle of separation of
powers. Given the presumed validity of an executive act, the petitioner who claims otherwise has
the burden of showing first that the case cannot be resolved unless the constitutional question he
raised is determined by the Court.

In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondents’ appointments is not the lis mota of
the case. From the submitted pleadings, what is decisive is the determination of whether the
petitioner has a cause of action to institute and maintain this present petition – a quo warranto
against respondent Urro. If the petitioner fails to establish his cause of action for quo warranto, a
discussion of the constitutionality of the appointments of the respondents is rendered completely
unnecessary. The inclusion of the grounds for certiorari and/or prohibition does not alter the
essential character of the petitioner’s action since he does not even allege that he has a personal
and substantial interest in raising the constitutional issue insofar as the other respondents are
concerned. G.R. No. 191560 March 29, 2011 HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL,
Commissioner, National Police Commission vs. HON. ALEJANDRO S. URRO

Rule: As a rule, the courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a law, if the controversy can be
settled on other grounds. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and
to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid, absent a clear and unmistakable
showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of
separation of powers. This means that the measure had first been carefully studied by the
legislative and executive departments and found to be in accord with the Constitution before it
was finally enacted and approved.
66

The present case was instituted primarily for accounting and specific performance. The Court of
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Appeals correctly ruled that PNB's obligation to render an accounting is an issue, which can be

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

determined, without having to rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579. In fact there is nothing
in P.D. No. 579, which is applicable to PNB's intransigence in refusing to give an accounting. The
governing law should be the law on agency, it being undisputed that PNB acted as petitioners'
agent. In other words, the requisite that the constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis
mota of the case is absent. Thus, we cannot rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579. G.R.
No. 128448 February 1, 2001 SPOUSES. MIRASOL vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

Case: The CA upheld the Order of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-
Pollution Adjudication Board (DENR-PAB to fine N. Dela Merced & Sons, Inc. (for violation of
Section 28 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9275 (The Clean Water Act of 2004). The appellate court,
however, reduced the fine from ₱3.98 million to ₱2.63 million.

The petition of Dela Merced & Sons

1. questioned the fine imposed upon it and

2. is contesting the constitutionality of the provision on the imposition of the fine.

Issue: Whether Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 on the imposition of fines is unconstitutional under Section
19(1), Article III of the Constitution for being excessive.

Rule: The Constitutionality of Section 28 of R.A. 9275 Was Not Properly Questioned. The
contention of Dela Merced & Sons is that Section 28 of R.A. 9275 violates Section 19 (1), Article
III of the Constitution, because the former section provides for the imposition of excessive fines.

We note at the outset that Dela Merced & Sons' attempt to assail the constitutionality of Sec. 28
of R.A. 9275 constitutes a collateral attack. This is contrary to the rule that issues of
constitutionality must be pleaded directly. Unless a law is annulled in a direct proceeding, the
legal presumption of the law's validity remains.

Nevertheless, even if the issue of constitutionality was properly presented, Dela Merced & Sons
still failed to satisfy the fourth requisite for this Court to undertake a judicial review. Specifically,
the issue of constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 is not the lis mota of this case.

The lis mota requirement means that the petitioner who questions the constitutionality of a law
must show that the case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional question
is unavoidable. Consequently, if there is some other ground (i.e. a statute or law) upon which the
court may rest its judgment, that course should be adopted and the question of constitutionality
avoided.

In this case, Dela Merced & Sons failed to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless
the constitutional issue it has raised is resolved. Hence, the presumption of constitutionality of
Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 stands. G.R. No. 201501 REPUBLIC vs. DELA MERCED & SONS, G.R.
No. 201658 DELA MERCED & SONS, vs. REPUBLIC

4.Judicial Discretion and the Power to Review

Case: Petitioner, an association of real estate developers and builders in the Philippines assails
the validity of the imposition of minimum corporate income tax (MCIT) on corporations and
creditable withholding tax (CWT) on sales of real properties classified as ordinary assets.

Whether or not this Court should take cognizance of the present case;

Rule: Courts will not assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question unless the following
requisites are satisfied: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review;
(2) the question before the court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the
validity of the act must have standing to do so; (4) the question of constitutionality must have been
67

raised at the earliest opportunity and (5) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.56
Page

56
Jumamil v. Cafe, G.R. No. 144570, 21 September 2005, 470 SCRA 475, 486-487. Citations omitted.

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Respondents aver that the first three requisites are absent in this case. According to them, there
is no actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power and it is not yet ripe for adjudication
because [petitioner] did not allege that CREBA, as a corporate entity, or any of its members, has
been assessed by the BIR for the payment of [MCIT] or [CWT] on sales of real property. Neither
did petitioner allege that its members have shut down their businesses as a result of the payment
of the MCIT or CWT. Petitioner has raised concerns in mere abstract and hypothetical form
without any actual, specific and concrete instances cited that the assailed law and revenue
regulations have actually and adversely affected it. Lacking empirical data on which to base any
conclusion, any discussion on the constitutionality of the MCIT or CWT on sales of real property
is essentially an academic exercise.

Perceived or alleged hardship to taxpayers alone is not an adequate justification for adjudicating
abstract issues. Otherwise, adjudication would be no different from the giving of advisory opinion
that does not really settle legal issues.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal
claims which is susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute. On the other hand, a question is considered ripe for adjudication when the
act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.

Contrary to respondents’ assertion, we do not have to wait until petitioner’s members have shut
down their operations as a result of the MCIT or CWT. The assailed provisions are already being
implemented. As we stated in Didipio Earth-Savers’ Multi-Purpose Association, Incorporated
(DESAMA) v. Gozun:

By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act.
Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty.

If the assailed provisions are indeed unconstitutional, there is no better time than the present to
settle such question once and for all.

Respondents next argue that petitioner has no legal standing to sue:

Petitioner is an association of some of the real estate developers and builders in the Philippines.
Petitioners did not allege that [it] itself is in the real estate business. It did not allege any material
interest or any wrong that it may suffer from the enforcement of [the assailed provisions].

Legal standing or locus standi is a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case such that it
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged.

In any event, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirements of an actual case, ripeness or legal standing when paramount public interest is
involved. The questioned MCIT and CWT affect not only petitioners but practically all domestic
corporate taxpayers in our country. The transcendental importance of the issues raised and their
overreaching significance to society make it proper for us to take cognizance of this petition. G.R.
No. 160756 March 9, 2010 CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS' ASSOCIATIONS,
INC. vs. THE HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO

D. Functions of Judicial Review

1. Checking - invalidating a law or an executive act that is found to be contrary to

the Constitution.

Rule: The acts complained of in this case pertain to the HRET’s exercise of its discretion,
an exercise which was well within the bounds of its authority.

The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of
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independent branches of the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a

denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less
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than the Constitution calls for remedial action.

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

 In the exercise of its checking function, the Court should merely test whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction,
not that it erred or had a different view. G.R. No. 185401 July 21, 2009 HENRY "JUN"
DUEÑAS, JR. vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
ANGELITO "JETT" P. REYES

2. Legitimating (legitimizing) - upholding the validity of the law which results from a
mere dismissal of a case challenging the validity of that law.

When the Court exercises this function, it uses the double negative by declaring that
the law is "not unconstitutional". This is no mere semantics. The Court cannot declare
the law constitutional for it enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, so that a
declaration to that effect by the court would not make it more constitutional. On the
other hand, anyone who challenges the validity of a law has the burden of proof to
show its invalidity. Declaring that the law is not unconstitutional is tantamount to
saying that the challenger has not met the burden required.57

3. Symbolic- to educate the bench and bar as to the controlling principles and
concepts on matters of great public importance

Rule: The petitioner went to the COMELEC to question the canvass of the election returns.
His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the
said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was
void because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc.

The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, the
petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. The nation, already
indignant over the obvious manipulation of the presidential elections in favor of Marcos,
was revolted by the killing, which flaunted a scornful disregard for the law by the assailants
who apparently believed they were above the law. This ruthless murder was possibly one
of the factors that strengthened the cause of the Opposition in the February revolution that
toppled the Marcos regime and installed the present government under President Corazon
C. Aquino.

The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute
between the petitioner and the private respondent-both of whom have gone their separate
ways-could be a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are larger
issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal
ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible
terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and
tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.

The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the
conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also
give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant
the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according
to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this
case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only
for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as
a restraint upon the future. G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986 EVELIO B.
JAVIER vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR

Rule: “A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
69

However, Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
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paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires

57
Mendoza

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

 formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth,
the case is capable of repetition yet evading review, none of which are present in the
instant case. Hence, since what is sought to be done by COMELEC has been
accomplished, there is nothing else that the Court can order the COMELEC to perform.”
G.R. No. 177927 February 15, 2008 FLORANTE S. QUIZON vs HON. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS

Case: On April 21, 1998, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc issued
Resolution No. 98-1419 to wit;

RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or

any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey
and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same.

The Resolution was issued by the COMELEC allegedly upon "information from a reliable
source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct
radio-TV coverage of the elections . . . and to make an exit survey for the elections for
national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be
broadcasted immediately." The electoral body believed that such project might conflict
with the official COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National
Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). It also noted that it had not authorized or
deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.

The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May
11, 1998 election has already been held and done with. Allegedly, there is no longer any
actual controversy before us.

Issue: Whether or not the case is moot.

The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May
11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression
transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our
democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set
aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up
again in future elections

In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Paño, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has
the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines,
or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection
given by constitutional guarantees."58Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of
the press are being invoked here, we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity,
whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived
therefrom.59G.R. No. 133486 January 28, 2000 ABS-CBN BROADCASTING
CORPORATION, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

E. All Courts Can Exercise Judicial Review

According to Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx
70

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Page

Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

58
134 SCRA 438, 463, February 18, 1985; per Gutierrez Jr., J.
59
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, ... Assailed Minute Resolution No. 98-1419 issued by the Comelec en banc on
April 21, 1998 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

 a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.

b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.

c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

The review power of the SC implies that it has appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments of lower courts on cases with constitutional issues. If so, inferior courts
have original jurisdiction over constitutional cases although they decide the case only
at first instance, their decision being always reviewable by the SC.

Rule: “Plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in
cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final
judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue.” G.R.
No. L-18128 December 26, 1961 J. M. TUASON & CO., INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

In Ynot v IAC, 148 SCRA 659, the SC reversed the RTC's holding that it had no
authority to rule on the validity of EO 626-A, banning the transporting of carabaos
from one province to another. The Court pointed out, that since it has jurisdiction to
review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm final judgments of lower courts in
constitutional cases, then the lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in
the first instance.

Rule: “This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same
whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under
the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases
involving the constitutionality of certain measures.” G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 YNOT vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

However, such decisions of the lower courts only bind the parties. Only decisions of
the Supreme Court become part of the legal system of the Philippines.

Case: For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program(DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related
issuances of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing the DAP. This
followed after Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate of the
Philippines to reveal that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional P50
Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona.

In their memorandum, the respondents further contend that there is no authorized proceeding
under the Constitution and the Rules of Court for questioning the validity of any law unless there
is an actual case or controversy the resolution of which requires the determination of the
constitutional question; that the jurisdiction of the Court is largely appellate; that for a court of law
to pass upon the constitutionality of a law or any act of the Government when there is no case or
controversy is for that court to set itself up as a reviewer of the acts of Congress and of the
President in violation of the principle of separation of powers; and that, in the absence of a pending
case or controversy involving the DAP and NBC No. 541, any decision herein could amount to a
71

mere advisory opinion that no court can validly render

Page

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

The respondents argue that it is the application of the DAP to actual situations that the petitioners
can question either in the trial courts or in the COA; that if the petitioners are dissatisfied with the
ruling either of the trial courts or of the COA, they can appeal the decision of the trial courts by
petition for review on certiorari, or assail the decision or final order of the COA by special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court

Rule: The respondents’ arguments and submissions on the procedural issue are bereft of merit.

Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Thus, the Constitution vests judicial power in the Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. In creating a lower court, Congress concomitantly determines the jurisdiction
of that court, and that court, upon its creation, becomes by operation of the Constitution one of
the repositories of judicial power. However, only the Court is a constitutionally created court, the
rest being created by Congress in its exercise of the legislative power.

Necessarily, in discharging its duty under the Rules, to set right and undo any act of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge was
properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted
expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in
appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This entrustment is
consistent with the republican system of checks and balances.

Following our recent dispositions concerning the congressional pork barrel, the Court has become
more alert to discharge its constitutional duty. We will not now refrain from exercising our
expanded judicial power in order to review and determine, with authority, the limitations on the
Chief Executive’s spending power. G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014, MARIA CAROLINA P.
ARAULLO vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III

Other Cases;

Case This case originated from a complaint filed by private respondents against petitioner on
Regional Office of the MOLE, Region XI, Davao City for non-compliance with the provisions of
Wage Order No. 5. After due healing the Regional Director rendered a decision dated November
16, 1984 in favor of private respondents. Judgment having become final and executory, the
Regional Director issued a Writ of Execution whereby some movable properties of the hospital
(petitioner herein) were levied upon and its operating expenses kept with the bank were
garnished. The levy and garnishment were lifted when petitioner hospital paid the claim of the
private covering the period from June 16 to October 15, 1984.

After making said payment, petitioner hospital failed to continue to comply with Wage Order No.
5 and likewise, failed to comply with the new Wage Order No. 6 which took effect on November
1, 1984, prompting private respondents to file against petitioner another complaint, which is now
the case at bar.

Issues having been joined, the Regional Director rendered a decision on April 12, 1985 in favor
of the complainants (private respondents herein) declaring that petitioner (respondent therein) is
estopped from questioning the acquisition of jurisdiction because its appearance in the hearing is
in itself submission to jurisdiction and that this case is merely a continuance of a previous case
where the hospital already willingly paid its obligations to the workers on orders of the Regional
72

Office. On the matter of the constitutionality of the Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6, the Regional Director
declared that only the court can declare a law or order unconstitutional and until so declared by
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the court, the Office of the Regional Director is duly bound to enforce the law or order.

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Rule Anent the issue involved in the instant case, petitioner's contention that the constitutionality
of Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6 should be passed upon by the National Labor Relations Commission,
lacks merit. The Supreme Court is vested by the Constitution with the power to ultimately declare
a law unconstitutional. Without such declaration, the assailed legislation remains operative and
can be the source of rights and duties especially so in the case at bar when petitioner complied
with Wage Order No. 5 by paying the claimants the total amount of P163,047.50, representing
the latter's minimum wage increases up to October 16, 1984, instead of questioning immediately
at that stage before paying the amount due, the validity of the order on grounds of constitutionality.
The Regional Director is plainly without the authority to declare an order or law unconstitutional
and his duty is merely to enforce the law which stands valid, unless otherwise declared by this
Tribunal to be unconstitutional. On our part, We hereby declare the assailed Wage Orders as
constitutional, there being no provision of the 1973 Constitution (or even of both the Freedom
Constitution and the 1987 Constitution) violated by said Wage Orders, which Orders are without
doubt for the benefit of labor. G.R. No. 74621 February 7, 1990 BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL, INC. vs. THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT AND
BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES AND WORKER'S UNION-FFW

Case: Due to the imposition of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, Respondent wrote a letter to
petitioners informing them that they were occupying stalls in the newly renovated municipal public
market without any lease contract, as a consequence of which, the stalls were considered vacant
and open for qualified and interested applicants. Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was the
“Municipal Revised Revenue Code." The Code contained a provision for increased rentals for the
stalls and the imposition of goodwill fees for stalls. The same Code authorized respondent to enter
into lease contracts over the said market stalls, and incorporated a standard contract of lease for
the stall holders at the municipal public market.

This prompted petitioners, together with other similarly situated stall holders at the municipal
public market, to file before the RTC a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for Issuance
of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, against respondent.

The RTC ruled for the respondents

Upon the appeal of the losing party, The Court of Appeals held that petitioners’ resort to a petition
for prohibition was improper, since respondent’s acts in question herein did not involve the
exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, as required under Section 2, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. Also, the filing by petitioners of the Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus before
the RTC was premature, as they failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior thereto.

Rule: The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court from
arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case where the issue raised
is a purely legal question, well within the competence; and the jurisdiction of the court and not the
administrative agency, would clearly constitute an exception. Resolving questions of law, which
involve the interpretation and application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise of judicial
power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such lower courts the Legislature
may establish.

In this case, the parties are not disputing any factual matter on which they still need to present
evidence. The sole issue petitioners raised before the RTC in Civil Case No. 25843 was whether
Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was valid and enforceable despite the absence, prior to its
enactment, of a public hearing held in accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Local Government Code. This is undoubtedly a pure question of law, within
the competence and jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve.

Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly establishes the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court, and impliedly recognizes the original jurisdiction of lower courts over
cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance:
73

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx
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Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

 (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question. (Emphases ours.)

In J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos, the Court has affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC
to resolve questions of constitutionality and validity of laws (deemed to include local ordinances)
in the first instance, without deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy. G.R. No.
182065 October 27, 2009 EVELYN ONGSUCO and ANTONIA SALAYA vs HON. MARIANO
M. MALONES

F. Effect of a Declaration of Unconstitutionality

Civil Code, Art. 7. - When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Rule: Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be contrary to
the Constitution, it is null and void. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law
to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution." The above provision of the Civil Code reflects the
orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is not a law, confers
no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection. This doctrine admits of qualifications,
however. As the American Supreme Court stated: "The actual existence of a statute prior to such
a determination [of constitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, — with respect to particular regulations,
individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official."

The orthodox view finds support in the well-settled doctrine that the Constitution is supreme and
provides the measure for the validity of legislative or executive acts. Clearly then, neither the
legislative nor the executive branch, and for that matter, much less, this Court, has power under
the Constitution to act contrary to its terms. Any attempted exercise of power in violation of its
provisions is to that extent unwarranted and null.

The growing awareness of the role of the judiciary as the governmental organ which has the final
say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid leads to a more appreciative
attitude of the emerging concept that a declaration of nullity may have legal consequences which
the more orthodox view would deny. That for a period of time such a statute, treaty, executive
order, or ordinance was in "actual existence" appears to be indisputable. What is more appropriate
and logical then than to consider it as "an operative fact." G.R. No. L-21114 November 28, 1967
FEDERICO FERNANDEZ, vs. P. CUERVA and CO.

The effect of a declaration that a law is unconstitutional is to make the law either
void or voidable.

First View (Orthodox view) GENERAL RULE - It is void if on its face, it does not enjoy
any presumption of validity. As such, it produces no effect whatsoever, creates no
right or office, it imposes no duty. Whatever penalty was paid during the period of
its operation must be remitted.

Rule: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been
passed. It is therefore stricken from the statute books and considered never to have existed at all.
Not only the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality which
74

means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in
subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total nullity. G.R. No. 102232 March 9, 1994 Violeta
Page

Aldovino, et al. vs. Rafael Alunan III, et al.

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Second View (Unorthodox view) - But a law declared unconstitutional is only voidable
if, on its face, it enjoys the presumption of validity. In this case, it becomes
inoperative only upon the judicial declaration of its invalidity. And even so, the
invalidation produces no retroactive effect, since it would be unjust to hold that the
law did not produce any effect at all prior to its nullification. From the time the law
was promulgated to the time it was declared invalid, people would have entered into
various transactions and relations, expecting and in fact compelled to presume that
the law is valid. Thus, to now hold that the law never produced any effect would
penalize those who in faith believed the laws passed by their representatives to be in
accordance with their solemn duty under the Constitution.

Case: Plaintiff obtained the loan from defendant Bank, secured by real estate mortgage duly
registered covering her land. Subsequently, defendant instituted extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings in the office of defendant Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan for the recovery of the
balance of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with her suit against both defendants on
the main allegation being that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen
years having elapsed from the date of maturity. She sought and was able to obtain a writ of
preliminary injunction against defendant Provincial Sheriff, which was made permanent in the
decision now on appeal. Defendant Bank in its answer prayed for the dismissal of the suit as even
on plaintiff's own theory the defense of prescription would not be available if the period from March
10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent
legislative act extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from
the computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan.

Rule: The period from 1945 when the law was promulgated, to 1953 when it was declared
unconstitutional should not be counted for the purpose of prescription since the Debt Moratorium
Law was operative during this time. In effect, only 7 years had elapsed (1944-45, 1953-59).
Indeed, it would be unjust to punish the creditor who could not collect prior to 1953 because the
Debt Moratorium Law was effective, only to be told later that his respect for an apparently valid
law made him lose his right to collect.

It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or
executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the
judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect.
Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting
than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or
executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a
doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is
merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which
has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time
may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration
of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no
recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.Serrano de Agbayani v PNB, 38
SCRA 429 (1971),

Case: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of
Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA)60, is challenged in this original petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of
public funds by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached to the office

Rule: Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:

“No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
75

office or position during his tenure.

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60
Respondent Gordon appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA is questioned
here

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.”

As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant
to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains
Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may
be considered a de facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law,
upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public
and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised . . . . under color of a known
election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want
of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its
exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public . . . . [or] under
color of an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the
same is adjudged to be such (State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn., 499; Wilcox vs. Smith, 5 Wendell [N.Y.],
231; 21 Am. Dec., 213; Sheehan's Case, 122 Mass, 445, 23 Am. Rep., 323)." G.R. No. 104732
June 22, 1993 ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. ALO, DOMINGO
A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ and MANUEL P. REYES vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
Executive Secretary, and RICHARD J. GORDON

“THE OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE”

Rule: Pertinently, the "operative fact" doctrine realizes that, in declaring a law or executive action
null and void, or, by extension, no longer without force and effect, undue harshness and resulting
unfairness must be avoided. This is as it should realistically be, since rights might have accrued
in favor of natural or juridical persons and obligations justly incurred in the meantime. The actual
existence of a statute or executive act is, prior to such a determination, an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot justly be ignored; the past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration.

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior
to such a determination of [unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects,–
–with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and
official." x x x

That the operative fact doctrine squarely applies to executive acts––in this case, the approval by
PARC of the HLI proposal for stock distribution.

The "operative fact" doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated
that a legislative or executive act, prior to its being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is
valid and must be complied with. G.R. No. 171101 July 5, 2011 HACIENDA LUISITA
INCORPORATED vs. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL

However, in another case;

Rule: In Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management (G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011), the Operative
Fact Doctrine was discussed in that:

As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The
general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.
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The doctrine of operative fact serves as an exception to the aforementioned general rule. In
Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, we held:
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Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

 The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter
of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that
the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always
be erased by a new judicial declaration.

The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden
on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a
declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo
the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it. (Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s
Management, G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011)

…. the Operative Fact Doctrine will not be applied as an exception when to rule otherwise would
be iniquitous and would send a wrong signal that an act may be justified when based on an
unconstitutional provision of law. (See e.g. Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management, G.R. No.
179532, May 30, 2011)

The Court had the following disquisition on the concept of the Operative Fact Doctrine in the case
of Chavez v. National Housing Authority (G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007, 530 SCRA 235.):

The "operative fact" doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated
that a legislative or executive act, prior to its being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is
valid and must be complied with, thus:

As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts,
orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the
Constitution." It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and
paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be
sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such
challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This
is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to
obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions.
What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been
done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all
respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact
must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is
the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive
measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial
review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of
fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication.

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior
to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects,
with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and
official." This language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill and the
decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores. An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice
Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (Emphasis supplied.)

The principle was further explicated in the case of Rieta v. People of the Philippines, thus:

In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in
Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank to wit:
77

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been
found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights
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and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree…. It is

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

 quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications.

The actual existence of a statute, prior to [the determination of its invalidity], is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always
be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity
may have to be considered in various aspects –with respect to particular conduct, private
and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the
light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination.
These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention
of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Moreover, the Court ruled in Chavez that:

Furthermore, when petitioner filed the instant case against respondents on August 5,
2004, the JVAs were already terminated by virtue of the MOA between the NHA and RBI.
The respondents had no reason to think that their agreements were unconstitutional or
even questionable, as in fact, the concurrent acts of the executive department lent validity
to the implementation of the Project. The SMDRP agreements have produced vested
rights in favor of the slum dwellers, the buyers of reclaimed land who were issued titles
over said land, and the agencies and investors who made investments in the project or
who bought SMPPCs. These properties and rights cannot be disturbed or questioned after
the passage of around ten (10) years from the start of the SMDRP implementation.
Evidently, the "operative fact" principle has set in. The titles to the lands in the hands of
the buyers can no longer be invalidated.

From the foregoing, it is highly inappropriate to apply the operative fact doctrine to the UCPB
shares. Public funds, which were supposedly given utmost safeguard, were haphazardly
distributed to private individuals based on statutory provisions that are found to be constitutionally
infirm on not only one but on a variety of grounds. Worse still, the recipients of the UCPB shares
may not actually be the intended beneficiaries of said benefit. Clearly, applying the Operative Fact
Doctrine would not only be iniquitous but would also serve injustice to the Government, to the
coconut industry, and to the people, who, whether willingly or unwillingly, contributed to the public
funds, and therefore expect that their Government would take utmost care of them and that they
would be used no less, than for public purpose. G.R. Nos. 177857-58 January 24, 2012
PHILIPPINE COCONUT, PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED) vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES

Case. The PAPs under the DAP remain effective under the operative fact doctrine. As a general
rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act carries with it the illegality of its effects.
However, in cases where nullification of the effects will result in inequity and injustice, the
operative fact doctrine may apply. In so ruling, the Court has essentially recognized the impact
on the beneficiaries and the country as a whole if its ruling would pave the way for the nullification
of the P144.378 Billions worth of infrastructure projects, social and economic services funded
through the DAP. Bearing in mind the disastrous impact of nullifying these projects by virtue alone
of the invalidation of certain acts and practices under the DAP, the Court has upheld the efficacy
of such DAP-funded projects by applying the operative fact doctrine. For this reason, we cannot
sustain the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the petitioners. MARIA CAROLINA P.
ARAULLO, ET AL. V. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, ET AL., G.R. NO. 209287,
FEBRUARY 3, 2015
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Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II