Republic vs.

Iyoy The Court upheld the role of the Solicitor General in representing the State's
Facts: The case "Republic of the Philippines v. Iyoy" involves a petition for the interest in such cases, as mandated by the Administrative Code of 1987 and
declaration of nullity of marriage. Respondent Crasus L. Iyoy @iled the petition supported by jurisprudence.
against his wife, Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy, citing psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code. Crasus and Fely were married on December 16, 1961, in The decision of the RTC and the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the marriage
Cebu City and had @ive children. In 1984, Fely left for the United States, leaving between Crasus and Fely was declared valid and subsisting.
their children behind. Fely later requested Crasus to sign divorce papers, which
he ignored. Fely remarried an American and acquired U.S. citizenship in 1988. Llorente v. CA
G.R. No. 124371
On March 25, 1997, Crasus @iled a complaint alleging Fely's psychological November 23, 2000
incapacity due to her abandonment and in@idelity. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cebu City declared the marriage null and void, a decision af@irmed by the Court PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F.
of Appeals. The Republic, represented by the Of@ice of the Solicitor General, LLORENTE, respondents.
sought a reversal of this decision, arguing that the evidence was insuf@icient to
establish psychological incapacity and that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Facts: Lorenzo and Paula Llorente, both Filipinos, were married in 1937. Before
Code was inapplicable. the outbreak of the Paci@ic War, Lorenzo departed for the United States, leaving
his wife in the Philippines. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo became a citizen of
Issue: Does the evidence presented suf@iciently establish Fely's psychological the United States. When he came back to the Philippines in 1945, he found out
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the that his wife, Paula, was living with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. The two had a
Family Code? child together. Lorenzo then returned to the United States and on November 16,
1951, he @iled for divorce in the State of California. On December 4, 1952, the
Is Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code applicable to the case, allowing divorce decree became @inal.
Crasus to remarry under Philippine law?
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Llorente, a Filipino, in Manila. They
Does the Of@ice of the Solicitor General have the authority to intervene in were married for 25 years, producing three children. On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages? executed a last will and testament, giving all his properties to Alicia and their
three children. On June 11, 1985, Lorenzo died. In September 4 of the same year,
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the evidence presented was insuf@icient to Paula @iled for a petition to be the administrator of Lorenzo’s property, contending
establish Fely's psychological incapacity. The Court held that Article 26, that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse.
paragraph 2 of the Family Code was not applicable to the case.
Issue: Is Paula Llorente correct in saying that she is the surviving spouse of
The Court af@irmed the authority of the Of@ice of the Solicitor General to intervene Lorenzo and therefore should have a part of the latter’s properties?
in such proceedings.
Ruling: No. Lorenzo Llorente had become a United States citizen long before his
Ratio: The Supreme Court found that the totality of evidence presented by Crasus, divorce from Paula, marriage to Alicia, the execution of his will, and his death. The
primarily his testimony and a few documents, failed to meet the stringent divorce granted to him in the United States is binding in the Philippines.
requirements for proving psychological incapacity under Article 36. Therefore, he is no longer bound by marriage to Paula, as the latter contends.

The Court emphasized that psychological incapacity must be grave, juridically

antecedent, and incurable, which was not suf@iciently demonstrated in this case. ISSUE: W/N the divorce is valid and proven
The Court clari@ied that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code applies only
when a Filipino spouse is divorced by an alien spouse, which was not the situation HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED. REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial
here as Fely was still a Filipino citizen when she obtained the divorce. Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the
deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in
and for the County of San Diego, made @inal on December 4, 1952. REMANDS the
cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo
N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing should be determined under California Law and that under said law, illegitimate
proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all children are not entitled to anything. On the contrary, counsel for Helen claims
deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of that in determining the validity of the will, Philippine Laws should be applied
the Rules of Court. because the same is provided for by the California Law itself for cases wherein
the decedent is domiciled outside California at the time of his/her death.
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.:
o nationality principle in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine Laws should be applied in the instant case.
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality HELD: Yes. Philippine Law shall apply in the instant case. Hence, the case is
o Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid remanded to the lower court for the determination of the validity of the will. A
according to their national law close reading of the California Law on successional rights reveal that the law has
two aspects: the internal law which applies to Californians domiciled in California
Quita v. Court of Appeals: at the time of their death and the con@lict rule for Californians domiciled outside
o once proven that NO longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce, of California at the time of their death. Edward Christensen at the time of his death
the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable was undeniably a US/California citizen domiciled in the Philippines, hence, the
law of his domicile, the Philippines, must be followed. In coming up with this
Divorce of Lorenzo H. Llorente from his @irst wife Paula was valid and recognized ruling, the Supreme Court made use of the renvoi doctrine: The recognition of the
in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the con@lict of laws are to be understood as
succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country,
determination of the trial court. but its rules of the con@lict of laws as well. According to this theory ‘the law of a
country’ means the whole of its law.
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and
children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to ELIZABETH DIAZ V. ENCANTO, ET AL. G.R. NO. 171303 JANUARY 20, 2016
frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on “family DOCTRINE: Good faith is always presumed. Bad faith is never presumed, for
rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity. whoever alleges bad faith has the burden of proving it.

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are FACTS: A professor at the University of the Philippines applied for a sabbatical
issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. leave with pay, but it was denied. This issue was brought to court where there was
a @inding that the grant or denial of such leave is not a matter of right as it is
Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is subject to the exigencies of the service, like acute shortage of teaching staff. Even
answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated. the Of@ice of the Ombudsman has similar @indings with the CA that the grant of
leave is not a matter of right and that there was no bad faith on the part of the
Adolfo Aznar vs Helen Christensen Garcia of@icials of the UP in denying it. Yet, before the SC, the applicant insisted that the
concerned of@icials acted in bad faith. Sustaining the @indings of the CA and the
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where Ombudsman, the SC.
he resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he
became a domiciliary until his death. In his will which he executed here in the ISSUES: Whether the denial of the sabbatical leave was attended by bad faith?
Philippines, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor HELD: No. There are no traces of bad faith or malice in denying the application
of Helen Christensen Garcia (according to his will, not related to him). Adolfo for sabbatical leave. They processed the application in accordance with their
Aznar was the executor of the estate and after complying with the terms of the usual procedure. While the RTC declared that petitioner Diaz should have been
will, he submitted to the court the approval of said will. Helen @iled an opposition granted a sabbatical leave, it is important to note that the RTC awarded damages
on the ground that she is being deprived of her legitime especially considering to petitioner Diaz merely for the unreasonable and unconscionable delay in the
that the Supreme Court, in a decided case, declared her as an acknowledged resolution of her sabbatical leave application. It is an elementary rule in this
illegitimate heir of Edward – hence, to her, the will is void. Aznar and Maria Lucy jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith
objected to the opposition. Aznar and Maria argued that the validity of the will rests upon the party alleging the same.
California Clothing, Inc. vs Shirley Quiñones @ides in its dealings with Tocoms, in connection with the expiration of their
Distribution Agreement.
In July 2001, Shirley Quiñones, after receiving an of@icial receipt from the cashier
as proof of payment for a pair of jeans, went out of the Guess USA Boutique FACTS: Tocoms was appointed as Philippines distributor of Philips Domestic
(California Clothing, Inc.) located in Robinsons Cebu. A few moments later, Appliance by respondent PELI and its principal Philips Singapore, which was
Michelle Ybañez and another Guess employee ran after Quiñones. When they renewed on a yearly basis from 2001 and 2008. In its complaint to which the
caught up with her, they asked Quiñones if she already paid for the pair of jeans. distributorship agreement (agreement) was attached, Tocoms claimed that it had
Quiñones said she did as she even has the receipt and the pair of jeans. consistently delivered and even surpassed its targets before the end of 2012.
Further, Tocoms stated that it has made disclosures of its plans for 2012 in
Unconvinced, the Guess employees wrote a letter to Quiñones’ employer (Cebu preparation for the renewal of the agreement.
Paci@ic) and its human resources department seeking help and accusing Quiñones
of not paying for the pair of jeans. However, on January 2 2013, PELI called for a meeting and terminated the
agreement, to the surprise of Tocoms. As a result of this sudden termination,
Due to these incidents, Quiñones felt humiliated and so she sued Guess and its Tocoms said that its strongest client Western Marketing was set to return its
employees for moral damages. inventory worth PHP 5 million ($103 million), and that it was going to lose PHP
2 million from other dealers. Tocoms also alleged that PELI offered unreasonable
ISSUE: Whether or not there was abuse of right on the part the Guess employees. terms to buy back its inventories where it stood to lose about PHP12 million and
was pressuring Tocoms to accept the terms by recalling the Import Commodity
HELD: Yes. The employees, when they initially cannot locate the payment made Clearance (ICC) needed to sell said products in the Philippines. Moreover, Tocoms
by Quiñones, had the right to confront Quiñones if she indeed paid the pair of also alleged that the new distributor Fabriano had been selling the licensed
jeans – they have the right to do so despite the fact that Quiñones was holding a products at a much lower price even before the termination of the agreement, and
receipt and the pair of jeans. had prodded Western Marketing to return the products it purchased from
Tocoms, to the injury of the latter.
What constituted abuse of right was their act of writing the employer of Quiñones
as well as the employer’s HR Of@ice. A reading of the letter revealed it to be ISSUE: Was PELI in bad faith?
accusatory and and its tenor showed that the Guess employees intended not only
to ask for assistance in collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish the HELD: The Supreme Court, reversed the CA's decision and ruled that if the
reputation of Quiñones in the eyes of her employer. To malign Quiñones without allegations made by Tocoms were hypothetically admitted, the acts constitute bad
substantial evidence and despite the latter’s possession of enough evidence in her faith on the part of PELI and the court may validly award damages in favour of
favor, is clearly impermissible. Tocoms. The SC further observed that PELI, not having @iled its answer, has not
yet been able to prove that its acts were done without malice and bad faith. The
The rule is: a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and SC ruled that the concept of bad faith denotes a dishonest purpose, moral
good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability. Every person must, in the deviation, and a conscious commission of a wrong and that bad faith under the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give law cannot be presumed – it must be established by clear and convincing
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. evidence. As such the case must be reinstated so that PELI may prove good faith
in its dealings with Tocoms in the context of the expiration of its distributorship
Tocoms Philippines, Inc. v. Philips Electronics and Lighting, Inc. agreement.

DOCTRINE: The legal concept of bad faith denotes a dishonest purpose, moral The legal concept of bad faith denotes a dishonest purpose, moral deviation, and
deviation, and a conscious commission of a wrong. It includes "a breach of known a conscious commission of a wrong. It includes "a breach of known duty through
duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. It is,
fraud. It is, therefore, a question of intention, which can be inferred from one's therefore, a question of intention, which can be inferred from one's conduct
conduct and/or contemporaneous x x x statements. " Bad faith under the law and/or contemporaneous x x x statements. " Bad faith under the law cannot be
cannot be presumed; it must be established by clear and convincing evidence. As presumed; it must be established by clear and convincing evidence. As such, the
such, the case must be reinstated so that PELI may once and for all prove its bona case must be reinstated so that PELI may once and for all prove its bona @ides in
its dealings with Tocoms, in connection with the expiration of their Distribution request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no
Agreement. intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. Moreover, another problem
with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that it is unsupported.
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO
REYES, a.k.a. “AMAY BISAYA,” respondent. A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained
G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005 of must be intentional. As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr.
Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. These
FACTS: Roberto Reyes (AKA Amay Bisaya), @iled an action for damages under Arts. two people did not know each other personally before the evening of 13 October
19 and 21 against petitioners. He alleged that at around 6:00 in the evening of 13 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged
October 1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, he was abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being single at 44 years old,
spotted by his friend, Dr. Violeta Filart. Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a had a very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly in@luenced by
birthday party of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka, and that she will her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen. The lameness
vouch for him. He then carried Filart’s present (basket of fruits) to the party. of this argument need not be belabored.
However, while lining up at the buffet table, Reyes was stopped by Ruby Lim
(Executive Secretary for Hotel Nikko) and in a loud voice, was told to leave the Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was
party. Filart was within hearing distance but completely ignored him when he likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. Not being liable for
said that he was invited by Filart. Thereafter, he was escorted out by a Makati both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be
policeman. made answerable for exemplary damages.

Ms. Lim said that she approached the captain waiter, Dr. Filart’s sister (Ms. Fruto), Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr.,
and Capt. Batung regarding his presence, and requested Fruto & Batung to tell G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013
Reyes to leave. Because he still lingered, she then approached Reyes when he
went to a corner to eat and requested him to leave, but when she turned around, DOCTRINE: Art. 26 (1) of the New Civil Code speci@ically mentions “prying into
Reyes began making a big scene. Filart, on the other hand, stated that she never the privacy of another’s residence.” This does not mean, however, that only the
invited Mr. Reyes to the party and that it was Reyes who volunteered to carry the resident is entitled to privacy, because the law also covers “similar acts”. A
basket as he was also going to take the elevator, but he was going to a different business of@ice is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded
@loor. therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in.

The RTC dismissed the complaint, but the CA reversed the same. Hence, this FACTS: Petitioner and respondent owned parcel of lands adjacent to each other.
petition for review. Petitioners contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti Respondent owned Aldo, Inc. which constructed an auto-repair shop in the lot
non @it injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes they owned. Petitioner constructed a fence and respondent alleged that it was
assumed the risk of being asked to leave for being a gate--crasher. without proper permit and that the said construction caused damage to the
former's property. Petitioner claims that respondent installed surveillance
ISSUE: WON Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes to leave the party. cameras in order to gather evidence against them and that an employee of the
shop took photos of the construction site. Petitioner @iled a complaint for a writ
HELD: NO. We @ind more credible the lower courts @indings of fact. We are dealing of preliminary injunction and damages for respondents violation of the former's
with a formal party in a posh, @ive--star hotel, for--invitation--only, thrown for the right to privacy under the Art. 26(1) of the NCC. Respondent counterargued that
hotel’s former Manager. To unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr. the provision of the New Civil Code cannot be applied as the property in question
Reyes would certainly re@lect badly on Ms. Lim’s ability to follow the instructions is not a residence. The trial court granted the petition but was reversed by the CA,
of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the hotel’s personnel. hence this petition.
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes
and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout ISSUES: Whether the petitioner's right to privacy was violated even though the
at him from a very close distance. property in question is not a residence.

Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the
latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the
HELD: Yes. The Court ruled that the CA erred in reversing the decision. The court before the DOJ. These were all denied. The RTC also denied the petition on the
held that the right to privacy is violated when the reasonable expectancy of ground that there was no prejudicial question and the appeal to the CA was
privacy is violated. dismissed.

The test is 1) whether the individual exhibited an expectation of privacy and ISSUE: W/N THE VALIDITY OF THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT COULD IS A
2) that expectation is one that society recognized as reasonable. Although PREJUDICIAL QUESTION HELD: The petition is meritorious. THE determination
surveillance cameras are installed everywhere, it should not cover places where of whether the proceedings may be suspended on the basis of a prejudicial
there is reasonable expectation of privacy unless consented. In the case at bar, the question rests on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the civil
court found that the area being monitored by the respondent only showed the case are so related with the issues raised in the criminal case such that the
roof of their property and more of the petitioner's property. Hence there was a resolution of the issues in the civil case would also determine the judgment in the
violation of the right to privacy under the constitution and under the Civil Code. criminal case. A perusal of the allegations in the petition to annul judgment shows
that CA-G.R. SP No. 87222 pending before the Court of Appeals is principally for
Although Art. 26 (1) provides that a party is entitled to an action for relief when the determination of the validity of the compromise agreement, which did not
another is "prying into the privacy of another's residence", the court held that a include Peter, Catherine, and Fannie as heirs of Bella. Peter, Catherine, and Fannie
business of@ice is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded presented evidence to prove that they are also biological children of Bella and
therefrom and only such individuals are allowed to enter may come in. The CA Alejandro. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 343812 to 343814 before the
erred in limiting the application of Art. 26 to only residential places and therefore MeTC involve the determination of whether petitioner committed falsi@ication of
includes the property of the parties. public documents in executing pleadings containing untruthful statements that
she and Rosemary were the only legal heirs of Bella. It is evident that the result of
De Zuzuarregui vs Hon. Villarosa et al, GR 183788, Apr. 5, 2010 the civil case will determine the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal
cases for falsi@ication of public documents. The criminal cases arose out of the
FACTS Krizia and Rosemary entered into a compromise agreement to settle the claim of Peter, Catherine, and Fannie that they
estate of Bella. In the compromise agreement, they represented that they were
the only two surviving heirs of Bella. Peter, Catherine, and Fannie, who all claimed De Zuzuarregui vs Hon. Villarosa et al, GR 183788, Apr. 5, 2010
to be also biological children of Bella, found out about the compromise agreement
from which they were excluded. They @iled an action for the annulment of the are also the legal heirs of Bella. If it is @inally adjudged in the civil case that they
compromise agreement. While the action for annulment of judgment was are not biological children of the late Bella and consequently not entitled to a
pending before the CA, Fannie @iled a complaint for falsi@ication and perjury share in her estate as heirs, there is no more basis to proceed with the criminal
against petitioner and Rosemary. Fannie alleged that petitioner and Rosemary cases against petitioner who could not have committed falsi@ication in her
falsely and maliciously stated in the pleading @iled before the RTC of Pasig City pleadings @iled before the RTC of Pasig City, the truth of her statements regarding
that the late Bella had only two (2) heirs. Petitioener and Bella @iled a joint motion the @iliation of Peter, Catherine and Fannie having been judicially settled.
to suspend the preliminary investigation on the ground of a pending prejudicial
question before the CA. They argued that the issue of whether Peter, Catherine, PIMENTEL vs. PIMENTEL G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010
and Fannie are related to Bella and therefore legal heirs of the latter was pending
before CA Investigating prosecutor denied the joint motion and found probable Facts:
cause against petitioner and Rosemary for 2 counts each of falsi@ication The Respondent @iled a criminal case against his husband Petitioner of parricide.
prosecutor held that the issue before the Court of Appeals is the validity of the During the pendency of the case, respondent instituted a civil action of nullity of
compromise agreement, which is not determinative of the criminal case for her marriage with the petitioner on the ground of Psychological Incapacity.
falsi@ication. On December 20, 2005, three (3) informations against petitioner Petitioner @iled an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC on
and Rosemary were thus @iled with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that
City, Branch 61. since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in
parricide, the outcome of Civil Case would have a bearing in the criminal case @iled
De Zuzuarregui vs Hon. Villarosa et al, GR 183788, Apr. 5, 2010 against him before the RTC. RTC and CA denied the motion of the petitioner
@inding that there was no Prejudicial Question. Hence this case.
Petitioner @iled a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and a
motion to defer proceedings before the MeTC on the ground of the pending appeal
Issue: Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a seven criminal cases of the respondent’s violation of BP Blg. 22 is different from
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for the administrative case at hand. The former refers to the issuance of bouncing
frustrated parricide against petitioner checks, while the latter refers to the dishonesty of the respondent in the payment
of his debts.
Held: No, The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted @irst before the Yes. Atty. Moya is guilty of Gross Misconduct and violation of the Code of
@iling of the criminal action. In this case, the Information for Frustrated Parricide Professional Responsibility. His refusal to pay his monetary obligations His
was @iled before the Civil Case was instituted. Clearly, the civil case for annulment refusal to pay his monetary obligations without justi@iable cause, despite
was @iled after the @iling of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the acknowledging said obligations and doing so without remorse, fails to comply
requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was with the expectation of lawyers to be honest in their dealings – be it in their
not met since the civil action was @iled subsequent to the @iling of the criminal professional or private affairs. What is more, his failure to @ile his answer and
action. veri@ied position paper despite extensions of time is a manifestation of his
disrespect for judicial authorities. For his acts, he was then sentenced to be
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would suspended from practice for two years.
warrant the suspension of the criminal action.
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO,
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the respondents. G.R. No. L--16439 July 20, 1961
crime of parricide, which punishes any person “who shall kill his father, mother,
or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or FACTS: In 1950, before Nita Villanueva and Oscar Lazo were married, Villanueva
descendants, or his spouse.” The relationship between the offender and the victim became pregnant. To conceal her pregnancy from her parents and upon her aunt’s
distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder or homicide. However, the issue advice, she had an abortion by Antonio Geluz, a physician. After Villanueva and
in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in Lazo got married, she became pregnant for the second time. As she was an
the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and employee of the Commission on Elections and found it inconvenient, she had her
the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. second abortion by Geluz in October 1953. In less than two years, she again
became pregnant. On 21 February 1955, Villanueva went to the clinic of Geluz in
Case Digest: Quirino Tomlin II vs. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II Manila accompanied by her sister and her niece. Unknown to Lazo and without
23 February 2006 his consent, his wife had an abortion for the third time, an abortion of a two-
-month old fetus. Villanueva paid Geluz @ifty pesos. At that time, Lazo was in
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J. Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board.

FACTS: Atty. Salvador Moya II allegedly issued seven postdated checks to Quirino On the basis of the last abortion, Lazo instituted an action in the Court of First
Tomlin II as partial payment for the P600,000.00 that the former borrowed from Instance of Manila against Geluz. The trial court ordered Geluz to pay Lazo
the latter. When Tomlin realized that all the said checks were dishonoured by the damages, attorney’s fees and costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
bank, he made several demands to Moya but the latter still refused to pay his debt. sustained the decision of the trial court. Hence, Geluz @iled a petition for certiorari
Thereafter, the complainant @iled seven counts of violation of Batas Pambansa to the Supreme Court.
Bilang 22 to the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan as well as an instant
case for disbarment against Moya. ISSUE: Did the unborn child acquire civil personality?

ISSUES: Whether or not the administrative case for the respondent’s disbarment
should be dismissed for violation of the rule on non-forum shopping; and HELD: No, the unborn child did not acquire civil personality.

Whether or not Atty. Moya is guilty of Gross Misconduct and violation or the Code Article 40 of the Civil Code expressly limits the provisional personality by
of Professional Responsibility. imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive:
“provided it be born later with the condition speci@ied in the following article.” In
HELD: No. The instant petition for disbarment was not a violation of the rule this case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its
against forum shopping. Forum shopping is only applicable to judicial cases or mother’s womb.
proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings. Furthermore, the main object of the
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury of death 3. Eventually, the issue was submitted for arbitration and both parties agreed to
pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such have Atty. Allan Montaño act as the arbitrator. a. Montaño ruled that Hortillano is
damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the entitled to his claims. The Court of Appeals af@irmed the decision of Montaño.
injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents
or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, 4. On appeal, Continental Steel insisted that Hortillano is not entitled because
the same was extinguished by its pre--natal death since no transmission to under the CBA, death bene@its are awarded if an employee’s legitimate dependent
anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical has died; but that in this case, no “death” has occurred because the fetus died
capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). inside the womb of the mother, that a fetus has no juridical personality because it
was never born pursuant to Article 40 of the Civil Code which provides a
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. conceived child
But such damages must be those in@licted directly upon them, as distinguished
from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased child, his right to life and acquires personality only when it is born; that the fetus was not born hence it is
physical integrity. Because the parents cannot expect either help, support or not a legitimate dependent as contemplated by the CBA nor did it suffer death as
services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages contemplated under civil laws.
for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the
foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the Issues: 1. Whether or not the fetus is a legitimate dependent? 2. Whether or not a
disappointment of their parental expectations as well as to exemplary damages, person has to be born before it could die?
if the circumstances should warrant them.
Held: 1. Yes. In the @irst place, the fact of marriage between Hortillano and his wife
In this case, however, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found was never put in question, hence they are presumed to be married. Second,
any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee’s childrenconceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant Hence, the unborn child (fetus) is already a legitimate dependent the moment it
herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his was conceived (meeting of the sperm and egg cell).
parental hopes and affections. Even after learning of the third abortion, the
appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal 2. No. Death is de@ined as “cessation of life”. Certainly, a child in the womb has life.
cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at There is no need to discuss whether or not the unborn child acquired juridical
obtaining from the doctor a large money payment. personality – that is not the issue here. But nevertheless, life should not be
equated to civil personality. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides
Hence, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that
dismissed. only those who have acquired juridical personality could die. In this case,
Hortillano’s fetus had had life inside the womb as evidenced by the fact that it
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HON. clung to life for 38 weeks before the unfortunate miscarriage. Thus, death
ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and occurred on a dependent hence Hortillano as an employee is entitled to death
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION- bene@it claims as provided for in their CBA.
SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND
REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.

Facts: 1. In January 2006, the wife of Rolando Hortillano had a miscarriage which
caused the death of their unborn child.

2. Hortillano, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, then @iled

death bene@its claim from his employer, the Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation which denied the claim.