CHAPTER

20
I M M AN UE L KAN T
Rehabilitating Reason (Within Strict Limits)

D
avid Hume had published A Treatise of from his analysis; these, we can imagine, are what
Human Nature at the youthful age of wake Kant from his “dogmatic slumber.”
twenty-three, whereas Immanuel Kant Human thought seems naturally to recognize no
(1724–1804) published the first of his major limits. It moves easily and without apparent strain
works, The Critique of Pure Reason, in 1781, when from bodies to souls, from life in this world to life
he was fifty-seven. He enters the great conver- after death, from material things to God. One aspect
sation rather late in life because it has taken him of Enlightenment thought is the acute consciousness
some time to understand the devastating critique of how varied thoughts become when they move out
of Hume, “that acute man.” beyond the ground of experience—and yet how
certain most people feel about their own views. This
Since the beginning of metaphysics, . . . no event is the dogmatism (or superstition) that Hume tries
has occurred which could have been more decisive
to debunk. Stimulated by Hume, Kant, too, feels
in respect of the fate of this science than the attack
which David Hume made on it. (P, 64)1 this is a problem. It is true that in mathematics we
have clear examples of knowledge independent of
I freely admit: it was David Hume’s remark that
experience. But it does not follow (as thinkers such
first, many years ago, interrupted my dogmatic
slumber and gave a completely different direction as Plato suppose) that we can extend this knowl-
to my enquiries. (P, 67) edge indefinitely in a realm beyond experience.
Kant uses a lovely image to make this point.*
Kant sets himself to solve what he calls “Hume’s prob-
lem”: whether the concept of cause is indeed objec- *Plato believes that the nonsensible, purely intelligible
tively vacuous, a fiction that can be traced to a merely world of Forms is not only knowable but also more intel-
subjective and instinctive habit of human nature. We ligible than the world of experience and more real, too. See
have seen the skeptical consequences Hume draws pp. 152–155.

465
466   CHAPTER 20   Immanuel Kant: Rehabilitating Reason (Within Strict Limits)

The light dove, cleaving the air in her free flight, wrong with Hume’s analysis. What we need, Kant
and feeling its resistance, might imagine that its says, is a better critique of reason—a critique
flight would be still easier in empty space. It was that will lay out its structure, explain its relationship
thus that Plato left the world of the senses, as set- to its objects, and delineate the limits within which it
ting too narrow limits to the understanding, and can legitimately work. Hume thinks that we need
ventured out beyond it on the wings of the ideas,
a science of human nature. Kant agrees, but he sets
in the empty space of the pure understanding. He
did not observe that with all his efforts he made no out to do a better job of it than Hume did.
advance—meeting no resistance that might, as it Awakened from his dogmatic slumber, recog-
were, serve as a support upon which he could take nizing that, like the dove, he can no longer try to
a stand, to which he could apply his powers, and so fly in empty space, Kant makes an absolutely revo-
set his understanding in motion. (CPR, 47) lutionary suggestion:
Could the dove fly even better in empty space? Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowl-
No, it could not fly there at all; it absolutely de- edge must conform to objects. But all attempts to
pends on some “resistance” to fly. In the same way, extend our knowledge of objects by establishing
Kant suggests, human thought needs a medium something in regard to them a priori, by means of
concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in fail-
that supplies “resistance” to work properly. In a ure. We must therefore make trial whether we may
­resistance-free environment, everything is equally not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics,
possible (as long as formal contradiction is avoided), if we suppose that objects must conform to our
and the conflicts of dogmatic believers (philosophi- knowledge. . . . We should then be proceeding
cal, religious, or political) are inevitable. precisely on the lines of Copernicus’ primary hy-
Kant is convinced that Hume is right to pinpoint pothesis. Failing of satisfactory progress in explain-
experience as the only medium within which reason ing the movements of the heavenly bodies on the
can legitimately do its work. But Kant doubts that supposition that they all revolved round the spec-
Hume has correctly understood experience. Why? tator, he tried whether he might not have better
Because Hume’s analysis has an unacceptable con- success if he made the spectator to revolve and the
sequence. We did not explicitly draw this conse- stars to remain at rest. A similar experiment can
be tried in metaphysics, as regards the intuition of
quence when discussing Hume (because he does
objects. (CPR, 22)
not draw it). But if Hume is right, Newtonian sci-
ence itself is basically an irrational and unjustified This requires some explanation. Nearly all previ-
fiction.* Recall that for Hume all our knowledge ous philosophy (and science and common sense,
of matters of fact beyond present perception and too) has made a very natural assumption—as natu-
memory is founded on the relation of cause and ral as the assumption that the heavenly bodies re-
effect. And causes are nothing more than projec- volve around us. But perhaps it is just as wrong.
tions onto a supposed objective world from a feel- What is that assumption? It is that we acquire
ing in the mind. knowledge and truth when our thoughts “conform
Kant is convinced that in Newtonian science to objects.” According to this assumption, objects
we do have rationally justified knowledge. And if are there, quite determinately being whatever they
Hume’s examination of reason forces us to deny are, completely independent of our apprehension
that we have this knowledge, something must be of them. To know them our beliefs must be brought
to correspond to these independently existing things.
*You can see that Hume ends up exactly where Aristotle’s classical definition of truth expresses this
Descartes fears to be, with science indistinguishable from assumption perfectly: to say of what is that it is, and
a dream. To escape this fate, Descartes thinks you need to of what is not that it is not, is true.* The assumption
prove the existence of a nondeceptive God. But by under-
mining such proofs, Hume finds himself unable to escape
from solipsism—except by joining a game of backgammon
and ignoring the problem. *See Aristotle’s discussion of this on p. 187.
 Critique   467
is a basic part of the representational theory of objects known; it is imposed on them—but not ar-
knowledge and perception (p. 372). bitrarily, because the very idea of an object not so
But Hume has argued that you can’t think structured makes no sense.
about representation in this way. Ideas that have This is Kant’s Copernican revolution in
their origin in experience (e.g., green, warm, philosophy. To the details of this novel way of
solid) can go no further than experience. And thinking we now turn.
ideas that don’t (e.g., cause) are mere illusions.
By using such concepts, we can know nothing at
all about objects. All this follows if (1) we are ac- Critique
quainted only with the ideas in our experience, If we are going to take seriously this possibility
(2) objects are thought to exist independent of that objects are partially constituted by the ratio-
our experience, and (3) knowledge requires that nal mind, we must examine how that constitution
we ascertain a correspondence between ideas and takes place. We need to peer reflectively behind
objects.* the scenes and catch a glimpse of the produc-
But what if this assumption has it exactly tive machinery at work—at the processes involved
backward? What if, to be an object at all, a thing in knowing anything at all. A prior question, of
has to conform to certain concepts? What if ob- course, is whether we can know anything at all, but
jects couldn’t exist unless they were related to Kant thinks that Newton’s science has definitely
a rational mind, set in a context of rational con- settled that question. Assuming, then, that a ratio-
cepts and principles? Think about the motion of nal mind can have some knowledge, we want to
the planets in their zigzag course across the sky. ask, How does it manage that? We need to engage
On the assumption that this motion is real, ac- in what Kant calls “critique.” A “critical” philoso-
curate understanding remains elusive. Coperni- phy is not one that criticizes, in the carping, cen-
cus denies this assumption and suggests that the sorious way where “nothing is ever right.” Critique
motion is only apparent. On this new assumption, is the attempt to get behind knowledge claims and
we are able to understand and predict the behav- ask, What makes them possible?
ior of these objects. The objects of human knowledge seem to fall
Perhaps, Kant is suggesting, the same is true into four main classes. We can see what Kant is up
in the world of the intellect. Perhaps the objects to if we frame a question with respect to each of
of experience are (at least in part) the result of a these classes.
construction by the rational mind. If so, they have
1. How is mathematics possible?
no reality independent of that construction. Like
the apparent motions of the planets, the objects of 2. How is natural science possible?
3. How is metaphysics possible?
our experience are merely apparent, not indepen-
4. How is morality possible?
dently real. If this is so, it may well be that con-
cepts such as causation, which cannot be abstracted These are, in Kant’s sense, “critical” questions.
from experience (the lesson of Hume), still apply We are not going to develop mathematics, phys-
to experience, simply because objects that are not ics, metaphysics, or morality. But in each case
structured by that concept are inconceivable. The we are going to look at the rational foundations
suggestion is that the rational mind has a certain on which these disciplines rest. What is it, for in-
structure, and whatever is knowable by such a stance, about human reason that makes it possible
mind must necessarily be known in terms of that to develop mathematics? What structure, capacities,
structure. This structure is not derived from the and concepts must reason have for it to be able to do
mathematics?
*Montaigne compares the problem to that of a man who These are reflective questions, which together
does not know Socrates and is presented with a portrait of constitute a critique of reason, a critical examina-
him. How can he tell whether it resembles Socrates? tion of the way a rational mind works. Kant also
468   CHAPTER 20   Immanuel Kant: Rehabilitating Reason (Within Strict Limits)

calls this kind of investigation transcendental.* 1. Epistemological

A transcendental inquiry reaches back into the ac- 1a. A judgment is a priori when it can be
tivities of the mind and asks how it produces its known to be true without any reference to
results. If this kind of investigation succeeds, we’ll experience. “Seven plus five equals twelve”
know what the powers of reason are—and what is an example.
they are not. We can, Kant thinks, determine the 1b. A judgment is a posteriori when we
limits of rational knowledge. And if we can de- must appeal to experience to determine
termine both the capacities and the limitations of its truth or falsity. For instance, “John
human reason, we may be able to escape both of F. Kennedy was assassinated” cannot be
those evils between which philosophy has so often known independent of experience.
swung: dogmatism on the one hand and skepticism
2. Semantic
on the other. From Kant’s point of view, these
2a. A judgment is analytic when its denial
extremes are well illustrated by Descartes and
yields a contradiction. Here is an exam-
Hume, respectively.
ple Kant gives: “All bodies are extended.”
This is analytic because the predicate
“extended” is already included as part
1. What is the problem with the representational theory of the subject, “bodies.” To say that there
of knowledge and perception that Kant thinks can be
resolved by imitating Copernicus? How does a is some body that is not extended is, in
“Copernican turn” help? effect, to claim there can be some ex-
2. What does a critique of reason try to uncover? In tended thing that is not extended. And
what sense will the answers be transcendental? that is contradictory. If an analytic judg-
ment is true, it is necessarily true. The
opposite of an analytic judgment is not
possible. Since it is analytic that every
Judgments father has a child, it is not even logically
Because all our claims to know are expressed in the possible that there should be a father
form of judgments, the first task is to clarify the without a child. Thus, every father nec-
different kinds of judgments there are. Hume had essarily has a child.
divided our knowledge into relations of ideas and 2b. A judgment is synthetic when it does
matters of fact.† Kant agrees that this is roughly more than simply explicate or analyze a
right, but not precise enough. Hume’s distinction concept. Here are some examples: “Every
runs together two quite different kinds of consid- event has a cause,” “Air has weight,” and
eration. (1) There is an epistemological question in- “John F. Kennedy was assassinated.” Con-
volved: Does a bit of knowledge rest on experience sider the first example. The concept having
or not? (2) There is also a semantic question: How a cause is not part of the concept being an
do the meanings of the words we use to express event. This is something Hume teaches us.*
that knowledge relate to each other? Kant sorts So it is not contradictory, though it may
these matters out, and the result is a classification be false, to say of some event that it has
of judgments into four groups rather than into no cause. The opposite of every synthetic
Hume’s two. judgement is possibly true.

*Recall Hume’s claim that “all events seem entirely

*The term “transcendental” must be carefully distin- loose and separate.” Neither experience nor reason, he
guished from the similar term “transcendent.” See p. 480. claims, ever discloses that necessary “connexion” that might
†Hume’s discussion of these is found on pp. 445–446. link them inseparably together. See p. 450.
 Judgments   469
judgments (e.g., “The water in the tea kettle is
boiling”) to general laws (e.g., “Water always
boils at 100°C at sea level”).
• Synthetic a priori: This is a puzzling and contro-
versial class of judgments. If we were to know
such a judgment as true, we would have to be
able to know it quite independent of experi-
ence. This means that if such a judgment is
true, it is true no matter what our experience
shows us. Even if the events of experience were
organized in a completely different way, a true
judgment of this kind would remain true. And
yet it is not true because it is analytic; its denial
expresses a logical possibility.
We can represent these types in a matrix:

A priori A posteriori

“Every mother
Analytic has a child.”

“There is a
Waterloo in
Synthetic “?”
both Iowa
“Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing and Wisconsin.”
admiration and awe . . . the starry heavens above me
and the moral law within me.”
–Immanuel Kant
There is something very odd about synthetic
a priori judgments. Consider a judgment that is
about experience. Suppose that it is synthetic, but
These two pairs can be put together to give us that we can know it a priori. Because it is synthetic,
four possibilities: its opposite is (from a logical point of view) a real
• Analytic a priori: “All bodies are extended.” This possibility. And yet we can know—without ap-
is analytic, as we have seen, because “extended” pealing to experience—that this possibility is never
is part of the definition of “body.” It is a priori realized! How can this be?
because we don’t have to examine our experi- Kant believes that the solution to the dilemmas
ence of bodies to know it is true; all we need is of past philosophy lies precisely in the recognition
to understand the meanings of the terms “body”
that we possess synthetic a priori judgments. It is
and “extended.”
• Analytic a posteriori: This class seems empty; if his Copernican revolution in philosophy that makes
the test for analyticity is examining a judgment’s this recognition possible. Think: On the assump-
denial for contradiction, it seems clear that we tion that objects are realities independent of our
do not also have to examine experience. Every knowing them, it would be crazy to suppose that
analytic judgment must be a priori. we could know them without experiencing them
• Synthetic a posteriori: Here belong most of our in some way; our thoughts about them would be
judgments about experience, from particular one thing, the objects something quite different;
470   CHAPTER 20   Immanuel Kant: Rehabilitating Reason (Within Strict Limits)

and they could vary independently.* What could constituted by synthetic a priori judgments. The
possibly guarantee that things would match our objects we encounter are—in part—constructions.
thoughts a priori? On the traditional correspon- And these judgments are principles for the construc-
dence assumption, then, a priori knowledge that is tion of objects.
synthetic would be impossible. Kant sometimes calls a priori judgments “pure.”
But suppose that objects are objects only be- By this, he means that they are not “contaminated”
cause they are structured in certain ways by the by experience. We can now restate his questions
mind in the very act of knowing them. Then it is with a transcendental twist:
plausible to think that there might be principles of
1. How is pure mathematics possible?
that structuring and that some of these principles
2. How is pure natural science possible?
might be synthetic. And those principles could be
3. How is pure metaphysics possible?
known a priori—independent of the objects they
4. How is pure morality possible?
are structuring. So if Kant’s Copernican revolution
makes sense, there will be a priori synthetic prin- Let’s examine his answers.
ciples for every domain of objects.
Kant’s examples of such principles may surprise
you. He takes the following to be synthetic a priori: 1. Can you give examples of your own for each of the
four types of judgment?
• all the judgments of mathematics and geometry; 2. Explain the idea of a synthetic a priori judgment,
• in natural science, such judgments as “Every showing clearly both its semantic and its
event has a cause”; epistemological aspects.
• in metaphysics, “There is a God,” and “The soul 3. What makes a priori synthetic judgments puzzling?
is a simple substance, distinct from the body”;
• in morality, the rule that we should not treat
others merely as means to our own ends.
This is not to say we know all these judgments or
Geometry, Mathematics, Space,
that they are all true. That remains to be seen. But and Time
if you examine them, you should be able to see that It would be useful to have a criterion by which we
they are all examples of judgments that would have could distinguish a priori knowledge from a poste-
to be known a priori (i.e., not from experience), if riori knowledge. Kant suggests that there are two
at all. And examination should also confirm, Kant tests we can use: necessity and universality.
thinks, that they are all synthetic. None of them is
Experience teaches us that a thing is so and so, but
true simply in virtue of how the terms are related
not that it cannot be otherwise. First, then, if we
to each other. have a proposition which in being thought is thought
Kant wants to understand how mathematics, as necessary, it is an a priori judgment. . . . Secondly,
natural science, metaphysics, and morality are pos- experience never confers on its judgments true or
sible. In the light of his Copernican revolution, strict, but only assumed and comparative universal-
we can see that he is asking how the rational mind ity, through induction. . . . Necessity and strict uni-
structures its objects into the objects of mathemat- versality are thus sure criteria of a priori knowledge,
ics, natural science, metaphysics, and morality. and are inseparable from one another. (CPR, 43–44)
Implicit in the foundations of all these disciplines, As Hume has taught us, necessity cannot be discov-
Kant thinks, are some judgments that do not arise ered by means of experience; as far as experience
out of experience but prescribe how the objects tells us, all events are “entirely loose and separate.”
of experience must be. All four of these areas are Further, because experience is limited in extent,
it cannot guarantee that a proposition is univer-
*Compare Ockham’s reflections on God’s omnipotence, sally true (i.e., true everywhere and at all times).
pp. 336–337. It follows that if we find a judgment that is either
 Geometry, Mathematics, Space, and Time   471
necessarily true or universally true, we can be sure mysterious or occult. By “intuition” Kant simply
that it does not have its justification in experience. means the presentation of some sensible object to
Such a judgment must be a priori. the mind, such as our five fingers. We must “add
Mathematical truths are both necessary and successively” the units presented in the intuition:
universal. They are, therefore, clear examples of a We count, one finger at a time. Knowing that
priori judgments. But are they analytic or synthetic? seven plus five equals twelve is a process. We con-
One might indeed think at first that the proposition
struct mathematics by inscribing it on a background
7 + 5 + 12 is a merely analytic proposition, which composed of objects or sets of objects.
follows according to the principle of contradiction But we need to understand these objects more
from the concept of a sum of seven and five. But if clearly. If mathematics were only about the objects
we look more closely, we find that the concept of of experience, it could be neither necessary nor
the sum of 7 and 5 contains nothing further than universal. We might know that these five oranges
the unification of the two numbers into a single and those seven oranges happen to make twelve or-
number, and in this we do not in the least think anges. But we wouldn’t know that all such groups
what this single number may be which combines of oranges (examined or not) make twelve and
the two . . . and though I may analyze my concept must make twelve. If we know this with necessity
of such a possible sum as long as I please, I shall and universality (as we surely do), the objects that
never find the twelve in it. We have to go outside
justify mathematical truths must themselves be
these concepts by resorting to the intuition which
corresponds to one of them, our five fingers for known in a purely a priori manner. There must be
instance . . . and thus add to the concept of seven, pure intuitions, forms of pure sensibility. But what
one by one, the units of five given in intuition. . . . could they be?
Nor is any principle of pure geometry analytic. Now space and time are the two intuitions on which
That the straight line between two points is the pure mathematics grounds all its cognitions and
shortest is a synthetic proposition. My concept of judgements. . . . Geometry is grounded on the pure
the straight contains nothing of magnitude but only intuition of space. Arithmetic forms its own con-
a quality. The concept of the shortest is therefore cepts of numbers by successive addition of units in
wholly an addition, and cannot be drawn by any time. (P, 90)
analysis from the concept of the straight line. Intu-
ition, by means of which alone the synthesis is possi- Think about space a moment. According to
ble, must therefore be called in here to help. (P, 74) our ordinary experience, space is filled with things.
But suppose you “think away” all these things—
Hume suggests that the truths of mathematics
all the household goods, the clothes, the houses,
are simply matters of how ideas are related to each
the earth itself, sun, moon, and stars. Have you
other—that they are analytic and can be known
thought away space? Kant thinks not. (Newton
by appeal to the principle of contradiction. Kant
would have agreed.) But you have “subtracted”
argues that this is not so. For “seven plus five equals
everything empirical—that is, everything that gives
twelve” to be analytic, the concept “twelve” would
particular content to our experience. All that is left
have to be included in the concept “seven plus five.”
is a kind of container, a form or structure, in which
But all that concept tells us, if Kant is right, is that
empirical things can be put. But, since you have
two numbers are being added. It does not, of itself,
gotten rid of everything empirical, what is left is
tell us what the sum is.
pure. And it can be known a priori. Geometry is the
What can tell us what the sum is? Only some
science of this pure intuition of space.*
intuition, Kant says.* An intuition is not anything

*Kant is the ancestor of a school in the philosophy of

mathematics that still has distinguished adherents. The view- *Kant is referring to Euclidean geometry, of course.
point is called “intuitionism” but might more accurately be Various non-Euclidean geometries were discovered—or
termed “constructivism.” constructed—in the nineteenth century.
472   CHAPTER 20   Immanuel Kant: Rehabilitating Reason (Within Strict Limits)

But what is the status of the intuition itself? Consequently I do indeed admit that there are
Could space simply be one more (rather abstract bodies outside us, i.e. things which, although
and esoteric) object independent of our perception wholly unknown to us, i.e. as to what they may
of it? Kant doesn’t think so. And the reason is this: be in themselves, we know through the repre-
The truths of geometry, like those of mathematics, sentations which their influence on our sensibility
provides for us, and to which we give the name of
are necessary. If you ask, “How likely is it that any
bodies. This word therefore merely means the ap-
given straight line is the shortest distance between pearance of that for us unknown but nonetheless
its end points?” you demonstrate that you haven’t actual object. (P, 95)*
understood geometry! Moreover, that a straight
line in a plane is the shortest distance between two Just as space is the pure intuition that makes
points is something we know to be universally true. geometry possible, time is the pure intuition that
If space were an object independent of our minds, makes mathematics possible. Geometrical figures
knowing this would be impossible. We would have are constructed on the pure (spatial) intuition in
to say that this is true for all the spaces we have exam- which external objects are experienced. Numbers
ined, but beyond that—who knows? Geometers do and their relations are constructed on the pure
not proceed in this manner. They neither make ex- (temporal) intuition in which any objects (includ-
periments concerning space nor suppose that unex- ing mental events) are experienced. An elementary
amined space could have a different structure. Yet example of constructing in time is counting, where
geometry is the science of space. How can this be? we construct one number after another.
The explanation must be this: Space is not Kant has now answered his first question. Pure
something “out there” to be discovered; space is a geometry and mathematics are possible because
form of the mind itself. It is a pure intuition pro- their objects—space and time—are not independ-
viding a “structure” into which all our more deter- ent of the mind that knows them; space and time
minate perceptions must fit. When you handle an are pure forms of sensible intuition. He has shown,
apple, your experience is constituted on the one moreover, that geometry and mathematics essen-
hand by sensations (color, texture, weight, and so tially involve judgments that are synthetic (because
on) and on the other hand by a structure into which they are constructive) and a priori (because they
these sensations fit (the pure intuition of space). are necessary and universal).
The apple is not an object entirely independent Because experience is always in time—and in
of our perception of it. Part of that perception is space as well if it is of external objects—it is a prod-
constituted by the intuition of space, which we do uct of contributions from two sides: the objective
not abstract from the experience, but bring to the and the subjective. Nowhere can we know things as
experience. they are in themselves. It is not as Descartes thinks,
This has an important consequence. We cannot that we know things-in-themselves in a confused
experience the apple as it is in itself, independent and inadequate way that can be continually im-
of our perception of it. Why not? Because part of proved. We do not know them at all! Of the ob-
what it is to be an apple is to be in space; and space jects we do experience, we can know a priori just
is an aspect of our experience that comes from the what we ourselves, as rational minds, necessarily
side of the subject. So we know the apple as it ap- supply in experiencing them.
pears to us, not the apple as it is in itself. What goes
for the apple goes for the entire world. We can
only know how things appear.
Things are given to us as objects of our senses *Note that this conclusion squares with Locke’s belief
situated outside us, but of what they may be in about the unknowability of substance. Here, however, that
themselves we know nothing; we only know their conviction is set in a much more rigorous framework and
appearances, i.e. the representations which they is much more adequately argued for. See pp. 418–419 for
bring about in us when they affect our senses. Locke on substance.
 Common Sense, Science, and the A Priori Categories   473
object through these representations. . . . Through
1. Explain why Kant thinks that mathematical and the first an object is given to us, through the second
geometrical propositions are both a priori and the object is thought. . . . Intuition and concepts
synthetic. constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowl-
2. What is Kant’s argument that space and time must edge, so that neither concepts without an intuition
be “pure” or a priori forms of intuition? in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition
3. How do Kant’s reflections on space and time lead to without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may
the conclusion that we can know things only as they be either pure or empirical. When they contain
appear to us, not as they are in themselves? sensation (which presupposes the actual presence
of the object), they are empirical. When there is no
mingling of sensation with the representation, they
are pure. (CPR, 92)
Common Sense, Science, Kant’s general term for the contents of the
and the A Priori Categories mind is representation. He is here telling us
Pure mathematics does not exhaust our knowl- that our representations can be of several different
edge. We know many things in the course of our kinds: pure or empirical, intuitive or conceptual.
ordinary life and through Newtonian science. What In fact, this gives us a matrix of four possibilities;
is the application of Kant’s Copernican revolution let us set them out with some examples:
in these spheres? One implication is that what-
ever common sense and science may reveal, they Representations
cannot penetrate the veil of our pure sensible intu- Pure Empirical
itions, which structure all possible objects in space
and time. Our knowledge will concern how these
things appear to us, not how they are in themselves. Intuitions Space and Sensations of
To deal with his second question, how pure (from time red, warm,
sensibility) hard, etc.
natural science is possible, Kant needs to clarify a
distinction between two powers of the mind. He
calls them sensibility and understanding. The Straight, Cherry pie,
Concepts cause, otter, water,
former is a passive power, the ability to receive im- (from the sun,
pressions. The latter is an active power, the power to substance,
understanding) God, the soul unicorn,
construct a representation of objects using concepts. etc.
A concept, Kant tells us, is a kind of rule for
operating on intuitions. In itself, it needn’t have
any sensuous content at all. To have a concept is We have not determined whether all these rep-
to have an ability. And in the use of concepts the resentations actually represent something, but we
understanding is active, not passive. Think of the know that any concept that does represent some-
concept viper. To possess this concept is to be able thing will do so in tandem with some intuition.
to sort snakes into vipers and nonvipers. Having For “neither concepts without an intuition . . . nor
the concept is not having an image or a Lockean intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge.”
abstract idea in your mind, as the empiricists be- The dove cannot fly in empty space.
lieved. To have the concept is to be able to use a Kant has contrasted sensibility with under-
rule for dividing the snakish parts of our experience standing, intuitions with concepts. But he is also
into categories or classes of things. Kant says, convinced that they must work together.
Our knowledge springs from two fundamental To neither of these powers may a preference be
sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of given over the other. Without sensibility no object
receiving representations (receptivity for impres- would be given to us, without understanding no
sions), the second is the power of knowing an object would be thought. Thoughts without content
474   CHAPTER 20   Immanuel Kant: Rehabilitating Reason (Within Strict Limits)

are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It the ­understanding brings something of its own to
is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts experience. In neither dimension is the mind just
sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intu- “white paper” on which experience writes, as Locke
ition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, to claimed. It is this rich source of structure in our ex-
bring them under concepts. . . . The understanding perience, this transcendental organizing power, that
can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only
Kant wants to uncover through his critique of reason.
through their union can knowledge arise. (CPR, 93)
The question then forces itself upon us: What
In addition to the pure intuitions that can be concepts do we have that apply to objects but are
known a priori (i.e., space and time), we have em- not derived from them? We are searching for a set
pirical intuitions—what Locke calls “sensations” of concepts we use necessarily in thinking of an
and Hume calls “impressions.” Kant thinks of sen- object. These will be a priori concepts. Kant calls
sations as the matter of sensible objects. We can il- them categories because they will supply the
lustrate by imagining a square cut out of wood. The most general characteristics of things: the charac-
spatial properties of a square (four equal straight teristics it takes to qualify as a thing or object at all.*
lines, four right angles) can be known a priori, We discover these concepts through critical
quite independent of its color or texture. But it philosophy, which is reflective or transcendental in
can only be some particular square if it is either red nature. So we need to reflect on our thinking, to
or some other color, either smooth or less than see whether there are some features of our thinking
smooth. Our sensations determine which it is. about objects that must be present no matter what
They provide the “filling” or content for the purely the object is.
formal intuition of a square.* Let’s begin by asking, What is it to think of
Are concepts like this, too? Do we have pure an object, anyway? Consider the contrast between
concepts, as well as empirical concepts? Well, sup- these two judgments:
pose there were concepts that we necessarily made
a: “It seems as if there is a heavy book before me.”
use of whenever we thought of any object at all.
b: “The book before me is heavy.”
Remembering that necessity is one of the marks of
the a priori, we would have to conclude that we What is the difference? In a certain sense, they both
have pure or a priori concepts. This is, in fact, just have the same content: book, heavy, before me.
what Kant thinks; he is convinced that we make Yet there is a crucial difference. B is a judgment
use of pure concepts all the time. In fact, these about an object, whereas A pulls back from making
­concepts—these a priori rules—do for our under- a judgment about that object. A is a judgment, not
standing exactly what the pure intuitions of space about the book, but about my perception; it has only
and time do for sensibility: They give it structure what Kant calls “subjective validity.” B, however,
and organization. They make it possible for us to ex- is a judgment about the book. It is an “objective”
perience objects and not just a chaos of impressions.
Just as there are empirical intuitions, there are
empirical concepts. Just as there are pure intu- *You can see that Kant is embarked on a project similar
itions, there are pure concepts.† Like sensibility, to that of Aristotle: to discover the characteristics of being
qua being. Aristotle also produces a set of categories, dis-
playing the most general ways in which something (anything)
*The pattern of thought here should remind you of the can be. (See p. 185.) Kant goes about the project in a roughly
distinction between matter and form in Aristotle and Aqui- similar way: He looks at the language in which we talk about
nas; sensation plays the role of matter, and concepts play the objects. Between Kant and Aristotle, however, there stands
role of form. Though there is a structural similarity, there is the Kantian Copernican revolution—and that makes a tre-
a fundamental difference: In Kant both members of the pair mendous difference. Kant’s “categories,” the universal and
have their being only relative to a mind. In this Kant shows his necessary features of objects, originate in the structure of
debt to Locke and his successors. And in this Kant is charac- thinking about those objects. They apply not to being as such,
teristically “modern.” but to being as it is knowable by rational minds such as ours—
†Check the examples again in the preceding chart. that is, to appearance.
 Common Sense, Science, and the A Priori Categories   475
judgment; whether true or false, it makes a claim this by canvassing all the possible forms objective
that an object has a certain characteristic. judgments can take. And he thinks he can do that
What makes this difference? It can’t be the because he assumes that logic (the science of the
empirical concepts involved, because “book” and forms of judgment) is a closed and finished science;
“heavy” and “before me” are the same in A and B. no essential changes, he observes, have occurred in
Nor can the difference be anything derived from my it since Aristotle.* For each possible form of judg-
experience in the two cases, since my experience ment, he finds an a priori concept that we bring
may be exactly the same in each. So the difference to bear on sensations. In each case, the applica-
must be an a priori one. It seems to be a difference tion of this concept produces an a priori charac-
in the manner in which the judgments are made, or teristic of the objective world of our experience.
in the form of the judgments. If we can isolate the Kant identifies twelve such categories—twelve
feature that distinguishes B from A, we will have general ways we know that any objective world
put our finger on the contribution the understanding must be. The fact that the world of our experi-
makes to our experience of an objective world. ence must be structured in terms of substances-
In this case, Kant tells us, the distinguishing having-­properties is just one of these ways.
feature is that in B we are thinking in terms of a The a priori concept of substance gets an op-
substance together with its properties. These portunity, so to speak, to apply to experience be-
concepts are not derived from what is given in my cause sensations come grouped together in various
sensations (since the sensations are exactly the same ways in space. Considered just as sensations, my ex-
in A). These concepts are brought to the experience perience of what I call the book hangs together in
by the understanding in the very form of thinking of a certain way; the color, texture, shape, and so on
the book as an object. The book is a substance that move together across my field of vision. If this were
has the property of being heavy. But this means that not so, I could scarcely unify these sensations under
the concepts “substance” and “property” are a priori one concept and experience one object, the book.
concepts—and that is just what we are looking for. In a similar way, sensations also appear successively
The point is this: In thinking of an objective in time. This provides a foothold for another of the
world, thinking necessarily takes certain forms of categories: causation.
organization. One of these forms consists of a kind We have examined Hume’s powerful argument
of logical function or rule: Structure experience in that our idea of cause is not an empirical idea—that
terms of substances having properties.* Unless thoughts it is not abstracted from our experience.† Because
take this logical form, Kant says, a world of objects it contains the notion of a necessary connection be-
simply cannot be conceived at all. Without the ap- tween cause and effect, Hume concludes that the
plication of these a priori concepts, there can be idea is a fiction, a kind of illusion produced in us by
no objective world for common sense or science custom. So we cannot really know that objects are
to know. So a world of objects is, like the world related to each other by cause and effect.
of sensible intuitions, a composite. There is an em- But what if there simply couldn’t be objects at
pirical aspect to it (expressed in empirical concepts all unless they were set in causal relations with each
such as “book” and “heavy”). But there is also an a other? What if the concept of causation (like the
priori aspect to it (expressed in nonempirical con- concept of substance) is a necessary aspect of any
cepts such as “substance” and “property”). Experi- world of objects? This is the possibility that Kant’s
ence of an objective world requires both. Copernican revolution explores. If nothing could be
Kant works out an entire system of such a objective for us without appearing in a context of
priori concepts or categories. He thinks he can do
*We now know that Kant’s list of the possible forms
*To see the importance of this rule, contrast it with the of judgments is not, as he thinks, complete. Logic has gone
way that Buddhist philosophers understand the world around through a revolution since Kant’s time.
us. See p. 41. †Review this argument on pp. 447–451.
476   CHAPTER 20   Immanuel Kant: Rehabilitating Reason (Within Strict Limits)

causal relations, we could know that every event has principles, Kant believes, lie at the root of both
a cause—and avoid Hume’s skeptical conclusions. commonsense knowledge and Newtonian science.
Can Kant convince us that this is so? Again This, Kant says, is how science of nature is pos-
Kant shows us that there is a difference between sible. It is possible because nature itself (the objec-
judgments that refer only to our perceptions and tive world that is there to be known) is partially
objective judgments. It may seem to us that one constituted by the concepts and principles that a
thing follows necessarily upon another, but once rational mind must use in understanding it. We
we affirm the idea of a world of objects, we are know a priori that nature is made up of substances-
committed to there being a rule that it must be so. having-properties, though only through experience
Suppose that something unusual happens. What can we know which substances have what proper-
will we do? We will search for its cause. Will we ties. We know a priori that the world is a causally
allow the possibility that this event had no cause? ordered whole, though only through experience
Certainly not. But what if we search and search and can we know which particular events cause what
do not discover its cause? Will we finally conclude other events. Science, together with its pure or a
that it has no cause? Of course not. No degree of priori part, is possible only because it is the knowl-
failure in finding its cause would ever convince us edge of an objective world that is not independent
that it has no cause. Every event has a cause. of our minds. Natural science is possible only on
How do we know that? We have seen that it is the basis of Kant’s Copernican revolution.
not analytic. Nor can our confidence be based on an Let us just remind ourselves once more of the
induction from past successes in finding causes, for as consequence: We have, and can have, no knowl-
Hume argues, that would never justify our certainty edge whatever about things as they are “in them-
that even unexamined events must have causes. If selves.” Do things-in-themselves—independent of
we know that every event has a cause, we know it how we know them—occupy space? We have no
because part of the very idea of an objective world idea. Are they located in time, so that one event
is that events in it are structured by rules of succes- really does happen after another? We have no idea.
sion we don’t control. There could not be an objective Are there things (substances) at all? Does one event
world that was not organized by cause and effect. really cause another? We have no idea. Our knowl-
The concept of causality does apply to the world edge is solely about the way things appear to us.
we experience—not because we discover it there, But, we must add, it does not follow that our
but because we bring it with us to the experience. knowledge is in any way illusory. It is not like a
dream or a fancy of our imagination. The dis-
This complete solution to the Humean problem . . . tinction, in fact, between illusion and reality is
thus rescues their a priori origin for the pure con- one drawn by us within this objective world of
cepts of the understanding, and their validity for the
universal laws of nature . . . but in such a way that it
­appearance—not between it and something else.
limits their use to experience only. (P, 117–118) We are not capable of knowing anything more real
than the spatiotemporal world of our experience,
Let us sum up. The principle that every event structured as it is by the categories of the pure un-
has a cause is, as we have seen, synthetic (the con- derstanding. This world may be “transcendentally
cept of causation is not included in the concept of ideal” (that is, its basic features are not independent
an event but is added to it). And Hume is right that of the knowing mind), but it is empirically real.
the causal principle cannot be known a posteriori, This, perhaps, needs a bit more explanation.
from experience. But we know that the principle
applies universally and necessarily to all experi-
ence. We know that because, as Kant says, experi- Phenomena and Noumena
ence is derived from it. The principle that every “Thoughts without content are empty,” Kant says,
event has a cause is, then, one of the synthetic a priori and “intuitions without concepts are blind” (CPR,
judgments. Such purely rational, nonempirical 93). Thoughts are made up of concepts united in
 Phenomena and Noumena   477

BARUCH SPINOZA

E xpelled with curses from the Amsterdam syna-

gogue in 1656, Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677)
has been characterized both as a “God-intoxicated
body, there is an idea; the idea corresponding to a
human body is what we call the mind. It follows that
every bodily change is a mental change and vice versa.
man” and as an atheistic naturalist. Fundamentally, Because everything that happens is a necessary
he is one of the most rationalistic of philosophers. expression of the immutable divine nature, there is
In his major work, The Ethics, Spinoza aims to at- no free will in the ordinary sense. Freedom, Spinoza
tain a secure happiness by approaching as closely as claims, is just the power to act from one’s own
possible an adequate understanding of absolutely nature, unconstrained by anything outside oneself.
everything. God (or Nature), then, is the only completely free
He defines “substance” as what exists “in itself” being, since God is the only thing for which there is
and requires nothing beyond itself for its being. He nothing outside itself.
argues that substance must be infinite and that there We, for the most part, are in “bondage,” since
cannot be two such substances (otherwise each we are controlled by emotions (desire, love, hate)
would limit the other and defeat the infinity). So that we passively suffer; emotions are caused in us.
there can be but one substance, which can equally But our freedom expands as we act from “adequate
well be called God or Nature. This means that the ideas” that are part of our own nature. Since the
individuals of our experience—from stones to only truly adequate ideas are those in God’s mind,
­ourselves—are not substances, but modifications of we move toward freedom by the intellectual love
the one infinite substance. of God, coming to see the necessities of the world
Mind and body are not substances, as Descartes as God sees them. Such knowledge is the source of
thought, but attributes under which the one sub- power to act (rather than react), of virtue, and of joy.
stance can be conceived. In fact, for every natural Thus we can approximate the blessed life of God.

various ways. But unless those concepts are given beyond the boundaries of possible experience. In
a content through some intuition, either pure (as fact, nearly all previous philosophers think we can
in geometry) or empirical (as in physics), they are do that! Plato, for example, is convinced that real-
“empty”—sheer rules that for all we know may ity is composed of substances (the Forms) that cannot
apply to nothing. They provide us with no knowl- be sensed but are purely intelligible. Descartes asks
edge. However, merely having an intuition of about the cause of his idea of God. One of the as-
space, or of blue-and-solid, provides no knowledge sumptions of traditional metaphysics is that these
either. Intuitions without concepts are “blind.” To concepts can take us beyond the sphere of experi-
know, or to “see” the truth, we must have concepts ence.* But, if Kant is right, these concepts
that are applied to some matter.
Kant insists on this point again and again, for
we are *Notice how Kant has turned completely upside down
subject to an illusion from which it is difficult to Plato’s claim that knowledge is restricted to the purely
escape. The categories are not, as regards their intelligible world of Forms. For Kant, this realm beyond any
possible sensory experience cannot be known at all; what we
origin, grounded in sensibility, . . . and they seem, can know is the changing world of the senses, about which
therefore, to allow of an application extending Plato thinks we can have only opinions. Here we have yet
beyond all objects of the senses. (CPR, 266) another example of the radical consequences of modern
science for traditional epistemology and metaphysics; for
We have ideas of “substance,” for example, and “cause.” Kant’s confidence in knowledge of the sensory world rests
And it seems there is no barrier to applying them even ultimately on the achievement of Newton.
478   CHAPTER 20   Immanuel Kant: Rehabilitating Reason (Within Strict Limits)

GOTTFRIED WILHELM VON LEIBNIZ

M athematician, physicist, historian, theolo-

gian, and diplomat, Gottfried Wilhelm von
Leibniz (1646–1714) wrote voluminously; among
knew any monad completely, you would know
everything.
“Flower in the crannied wall, . . .
his most philosophically important works are Dis-
if I could understand
course on Metaphysics (1686) and Monadology (1714).
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
As an inventor of calculus, Leibniz was poised
I should know what God and man is.”
to make use of the principles of continuity and
—Alfred, Lord Tennyson (1809–1892)
infinity in his philosophical work. He objected
to the purely quantitative, geometrical account Because each monad mirrors all the others, a
of matter (as extension) given by Descartes change in one would necessitate a change in all the
and Spinoza. Sheer extension does not account others. The sum total of all the substances that are
for resistance, solidity, and impenetrability, he possible along with a given monad—mirrored in
argued, so there must be some real qualitative it—constitute a possible world. There are many pos-
thing to be extended. A new concept of substance sible worlds, many families of possible monads; this
was needed, and Leibniz offered one: A substance actual world is just one of the possibilities. Contrary
is a being capable of action. This makes reality to Spinoza, then, Leibniz held that the actual uni-
intrinsically dynamic; the ultimate substances are verse does not exist of necessity.
points of activity (force), each with an inherent Why is this world, of all the many possible worlds,
tendency toward motion (in his view, rest is just the actual one? We can figuratively imagine God—
infinitesimally small movement). He called these the one being that exists necessarily—contemplating
simple substances monads. all the possible worlds and choosing one to actualize.
Though each monad is intrinsically simple, He would clearly choose the “best” one, the one most
each has infinitely many properties—namely, the like God himself. This would be the universe that
ways it is related to each of the infinitely many combines the most actuality (the richest variety of
other monads. So each monad, in a way, mirrors content) with the greatest simplicity of laws. In that
or reflects the entire universe; in certain monads, sense, Leibniz believed, we live in the best of all pos-
this reflection is perception and the mind. If you sible worlds.

are nothing but forms of thought, which contain similar. They are merely operators, the function of
the merely logical faculty of uniting a priori in which is to unite “in one consciousness the mani-
one consciousness the manifold given in intu- fold given in intuition.” If a certain manifold of
ition; and apart, therefore, from the only intu- sensations is given, our possession of the concept
ition that is possible for us, they have even less “substance” allows us to produce the thought of a
meaning than the pure sensible forms [space and
book; a different manifold of sensations produces
time]. (CPR, 266)
the thought of a printing press; and the category
The categories, Kant claims, cannot be used of “causation” allows us to think a causal relation
apart from sensible intuitions to give us knowl- between the two. Objects are the result of the ap-
edge of objects. Why not? Because they are merely plication of the categories as operators to some
“forms of thought.” Compare them to mathemati- sensible material.
cal functions, such as x2. Until some number is As we have seen, a concept is just a formal rule
given as x, we have no object. If a content for x for structuring some material. The material is sup-
is supplied, say two or three, then an object is plied by our intuitions. Without the sensible intu-
specified—in these cases the numbers four or nine. itions, there are no objects. But it can seem as though
The categories of substance, cause, and the rest are there are. This is the illusion.
 Reasoning and the Ideas of Metaphysics: God, World, and Soul   479
CAPACITIES OF THE RATIONAL MIND*

SENSIBILITY UNDERSTANDING REASONING

by which objects by which objects by which we strive to

are given are thought think the unconditioned

in intuition via concepts through the

ideas of pure reason

pure empirical pure empirical pure only

SPACE blue, warm, [SUBSTANCE] [BLUE], [WARM], [GOD], [SOUL],

TIME soft . . . [CAUSALITY] [SOFT] . . . [WORLD IN ITSELF]

(no objects given except (no objects thought except (concepts not fillable by
through the intuitions via the pure concepts: intuitions; so no knowledge
of space and time) categories) of these objects)

The categories . . . extend further than sensible 2. Explain the role Kant assigns to the categories,
intuition, since they think objects in general, illustrating it with the examples of substance/properties
without regard to the special mode (the sensibil- and cause/effect. How are these a priori concepts
ity) in which they may be given. But they do not related to the objects of our common experience?
thereby determine a greater sphere of objects. 3. Explain the famous Kantian dictum: “Thoughts
(CPR, 271) without content are empty, intuitions without
concepts are blind.”
One common form of the illusion is the claim 4. Explain the notion that our a priori concepts are
that we can know things as they are, apart from the source of a powerful illusion—the illusion of
the way they appear to us. This is the illusion of speculative metaphysics.
speculative metaphysics. The illusion is reinforced
because we do have the concept of things-in-
themselves. Kant even gives it a name: Something Reasoning and the Ideas of
as it is in itself, independent of the way it reveals
itself to us, is called a noumenon. This contrasts Metaphysics: God, World,
with a phenomenon, its appearance to us.
But this concept of a noumenon is not a concept
and Soul
with any positive meaning. Its role in our intellec- Kant’s third question concerns metaphysics. The
tual life is purely negative; it reminds us that there term “metaphysics” has a precise meaning for Kant.
are things we cannot know—namely what the Metaphysics contrasts sharply with both common
things affecting our sensibility are like, indepen- sense and science. We have seen that the entire
dent of our intuitions of them. The ­phenomenal range of possible experience is governed by the
world of appearance is all we can ever know. pure intuitions of space and time, as well as by the
pure categories of the understanding. These, to-
gether with sensations, constitute the way things
1. What does it mean that the dove cannot fly in appear to us, the realm of phenomena. Beyond this
empty space? Relate this aphorism to the notions of
concept and intuition. *Concepts are indicated in square brackets.
480   CHAPTER 20   Immanuel Kant: Rehabilitating Reason (Within Strict Limits)

realm, our understanding is without footing. We Reason is always searching for the unconditioned.
know there are things that appear to us, but we are We can think of this as Kant’s version of the search
completely at sea about what they may be in them- for first principles. This has always been the task of
selves. “Out there,” the dove cannot fly. first philosophy, or metaphysics. The search is for
Metaphysics looks in two directions. Under- something intelligible in itself, which explains or
stood in the traditional way, it tries to gain knowl- makes intelligible all the rest.
edge about things apart from their appearance to Reason can never be completely satisfied by any use
us. It is the attempt to go beyond experience in a of the rules of the understanding in experience, this
transcendent direction, toward the noumenal world, use always remaining conditioned; and when reason
which transcends all possible experience. But meta- demands completion of this chain of conditions, it
physics can also look in the opposite direction: to drives the understanding out of its sphere, partly
the structures on the side of the subject that condi- to represent objects of experience in a series so far
tion the being of objects. In this case, Kant calls it extended that no experience whatever can compre-
transcendental. It is just that critique of pure reason hend it, partly even (in order to complete it), to
we have been examining; it tries only to discern the seek noumena quite outside experience, to which the
a priori conditions of experience. chain can be fastened; whereby reason, independent
Not surprisingly, Kant thinks the transcendent at long last of the conditions of experience, can nev-
ertheless make its hold complete. (P, 137)
kind of metaphysics is impossible. But his discus-
sion of the reasons for the impossibility are full of We can understand only what lies within the
interesting insights. First, Kant claims to be able bounds of possible experience. But reason cannot
to explain why the quest for metaphysical knowl- be content with that. If those bounds are reached,
edge recurs with such inevitability and why it is reason still wants to ask why. Why is experience
so difficult to give up. Second, he finds a positive as a whole the way it is? Why is there experience
use for the fundamental metaphysical ideas—God, at all? But this question can be answered only by
the world, and the soul—even though he denies transcending those boundaries. To ask for the
that these ideas can give us knowledge. Finally, condition that explains the absolute totality of all
Kant’s examination of these ideas propels us into possible experience is no longer asking for the
the fourth of his major concerns, the practical use explanation of one phenomenon in terms of an-
of reason, or morality. other. It is asking for something absolute, for the
The notion we can get knowledge of things-in- unconditioned, which will necessarily involve
themselves is, Kant says, “a natural and inevitable knowledge of things-in-themselves.
illusion” (CPR, 300). Something in the very struc- And so arise, naturally and inevitably, those
ture of rationality gives us that notion; it has to do concepts of God, the world in itself, and the know-
with reasoning. The aim of reasoning is to supply ing subject or soul. These concepts are different
“the reason why” something is true. As we have from all others. They are not empirical concepts
seen numerous times already, the why question abstracted from sensations. Nor are they a priori
can always be repeated; we can ask for the reason concepts structuring our experiences. Kant gives
for the reason. Kant talks of this process as one that them a special name: Ideas of Pure Reason.*
seeks the conditions that account for a given truth.
Grass is green. Why? In answering this question,
we refer to some condition in the world that ex-
plains that fact. Why is that condition the way it is? *Kant has Plato explicitly in mind here. In Plato the
Again, we can supply a condition that explains that “Forms” or “Ideas” are purely intelligible entities that can be
condition. And we could go on. understood but not sensed. For Kant, of course, the Ideas
are concepts, not realities; and they can give us no knowl-
As you can see, the quest for reasons will not be edge. But they are concepts that aim to present realities
satisfied until it finds some condition that doesn’t beyond sensory experience. For Plato on the Forms,
need to be explained by a further condition. see pp. 152–155.
 Reasoning and the Ideas of Metaphysics: God, World, and Soul   481
Ideas lie in the nature of reason, as categories in the thought? Could this “I” be simply a property or
nature of the understanding, and if ideas carry with characteristic? Of what? The idea that you might
them an illusion which can easily mislead, this illu- be just a property of some other substance doesn’t
sion is unavoidable, although “that it shall not seduce seem to make sense. You are the absolute subject
into error” can very well be achieved. (P, 133) of all these determinations. But this is just what we
Reason can try to trace out the ultimate con- mean by substance; a substance is, by definition,
ditions in three different directions: back into the that which cannot be predicated of anything else
subject (trying to construct an absolute psychologi- but is the subject of properties.* So you, as a think-
cal Idea), out into the world (trying to discover the ing thing, must be a substance.
cosmological Ideas), and toward the absolute condi- This seems a persuasive argument, but, if Kant
tion of anything at all (searching for the theological is right, it is a mere sophism. Remember that “sub-
Idea). And so we find reason inevitably construct- stance” is one of the a priori categories. This means
ing the ideas of soul, world, and God. that it is a concept that is purely formal in itself,
without any content. Its whole function is to serve
as a kind of rule for organizing sensible intuitions
The Soul into experience. But where is the intuition that
Descartes, we saw, finds he cannot doubt his own corresponds to the “I”? Kant agrees with Hume,
existence. And when he asks himself what he is, who claims not to be able to find any perception
the answer seems obvious: a thing that thinks. He of the self when he introspects.† When you say “I
“knows” that he is a substance whose essential char- think,” you are not peering at or describing your
acteristic is to think. Descartes, as we have seen, self. The whole content of what you think is ex-
further claims that this substance is simple (indivis- pressed in what comes after that phrase.
ible), distinct from the body, unchanging through The “I” is indeed in all thoughts, but there is not in
time, and immortal. this representation the least trace of intuition, dis-
It is clear that Descartes is not doing empiri- tinguishing the “I” from other objects of intuition.
cal psychology here; there are no experiments, We do not have, and cannot have, any knowl-
and he gathers no data. Kant calls this kind of thing edge whatsoever of any such subject. (CPR, 334)
­rational psychology. Rational psychology is an
attempt to understand the fundamental nature of Reason is always searching for the conditions
the self by rational reflection on what the self must that make experience possible. In looking back and
be if experience is to be possible. It is a quest for back into ourselves, we seem to come upon the idea
the unconditioned condition on the side of the sub- that there is a substance to which all these mental
ject. Kant is convinced that rational psychology is activities belong. But this is a kind of grammatical
illusory, that there can be no such knowledge. But or logical illusion. Just because you need to express
he also thinks that the illusion is a powerful one your thinking by using subject/predicate forms in
and difficult to resist. It arises from what Kant calls which the “I” occurs, you cannot infer that noume-
“the sole text of rational psychology,” the judgment nal reality is structured that way. We cannot trans-
“I think” (CPR, 330). Reflection on this judgment form a semantic necessity in the way we represent
alone seems to be enough to yield all the conclu-
sions desired by the rational psychologist.
Is the soul a substance? It seems as though you *This idea of substance can be traced back to Aristotle’s
can conclude that you are a substance. Here is the discussion of the categories of being. Substance is basic in
argument. Every thought you have can be preceded the sense that all other modes of being (qualities, relations,
(at least implicitly) by the phrase, “I think.” When and so on) depend on substance. See pp. 186–187 for a brief
discussion of this point.
you say to yourself, “I think roses are lovely,” this †For Hume on the self, see “The Disappearing Self,” in
thought belongs to you; they are qualities or prop- Chapter 19. See also the Buddhist doctrine of anātman
erties of your self. But what about the “I” in your (pp. 41–45).
482   CHAPTER 20   Immanuel Kant: Rehabilitating Reason (Within Strict Limits)

ourselves into a metaphysical necessity concerning be something noumenal—the world in itself lying
our natures. behind the world we experience.
Kant says that the “I” in “I think” is just a kind As we have seen, we cannot know whether the
of formal marker. Concepts such as this (others are categories by which we structure our experience
“now” and “here” and “this”) are sometimes called also apply to the world in itself. In particular, we
“indexicals”; what is peculiar about them is that can have no idea whether that world is causally or-
they have no determinate content but merely indi- dered. This opens an interesting possibility in the
cate something relative to the circumstances of ut- long debate about freedom of the will. Descartes
terance. About the term “I,” Kant says, “we cannot argued that our wills are free because our souls lie
even say that this is a concept, but only that it is a outside the causal network of the physical world.
bare consciousness which accompanies all concepts” This leaves our wills as absolutely free as God’s.
(CPR, 331). All knowledge, however, is through Hobbes and Hume locate our minds within the
concepts. So the “I” is nothing more than an empty physical world, where they are as subject to the
representation of an unknown X, “this I or he or it laws of nature as a stone is. They try to rescue free-
(the thing) which thinks” (CPR, 331). What we are dom of the will by reanalyzing the idea of freedom.
in ourselves is completely unknown to us. For all As long as you can do what you want to do, they
that rational reflection can tell you, this X that you say, then you are free, even if the causes of your
are may be anything at all. The self or soul, then, is action reach back and back and back in an unbro-
merely that unknown X to whom the world appears ken chain to the time before you were born. In this
and by which it is structured into objects.* way, they hope to reconcile freedom of action with
Similar reflections undermine the claims about the new physics.*
the soul’s simplicity, its unchanging nature, and its From Kant’s point of view, Descartes, Hobbes,
immortality. In each case a merely subjective condition and Hume all share an important presupposition:
of thinking is transformed into a concept of a nou- they take themselves to be describing things (in this
menal object. The “I,” however, the transcendental case the will, or human action) as they are, inde-
ego, is not an object and cannot be known as an pendent of our knowing them. What happens if we
object. The “I” is a subject and resists objectification. recognize that things-in-themselves are unknown
As far as rational knowledge goes, the subject of to us and that all we can know is their appearance?
thinking remains merely an X, which must express Doing so, Kant thinks, will resolve this puzzle in
itself as if it were a simple substance, continuously the nicest possible way: We can agree with Des-
the same through time, and so on. But what it is in cartes that freedom is exemption from causality,
itself remains a complete mystery. The concept of but we do not have to carve out a part of the world
“soul” is an empty idea. in which causal law does not apply.
This surely seems like the best of both views!
The World and the Free Will We avoid Descartes’ dubious exemption of the
will from causal determination. But we also avoid
In seeking the conditions that explain what we ex-
Hobbes’ and Hume’s questionable definition of
perience, reason drives us back to more and more
freedom. If Kant can preserve human freedom
fundamental conditions and eventually to some
and still allow science unlimited scope, what more
condition that is supposed to explain the phenom-
could we ask?
enal world as a whole. This condition could only
What makes this possible, of course, is the dis-
tinction between things as they appear to us and
*Remember that Locke says we do have the idea of things-in-themselves.
ourselves as spiritual substances, but we don’t know the real
nature of those substances. (See p. 419.) Kant’s analysis of a
priori concepts forces him to go one step further: We don’t *Review the discussion by Descartes in Meditation IV,
know that the metaphysical concept of substance or soul ap- p. 385. For Hume’s view, see “Rescuing Human ­Freedom,”
plies to us at all! in Chapter 19.
 Reasoning and the Ideas of Metaphysics: God, World, and Soul   483
Is it a truly disjunctive proposition to say that every We need to be very careful, however. Kant
effect in the world must arise either from nature or does not claim he has proved that there are free
from freedom; or must we not rather say that in actions or that he has evidence that such free ac-
one and the same event, in different relations, both tions exist. Remember, the will as free is the will
can be found? (CPR, 466) considered noumenally, and about the noume-
Every action, even every act of will, has two nal world we can know nothing at all. Kant does
aspects: (1) It is something that appears in the not even claim to have proved that such freedom
world of our experience, and (2) it is something is possible; the most he will say is that “causality
in itself. As an appearance, part of the world of through freedom is at least not incompatible with
nature, it is governed by all the principles that nature” (CPR, 479). There is no contradiction in
constitute that realm, including causality. In this thinking of an act as free in itself, but determined
aspect, every action is causally determined. But as as appearance.
a thing in itself, we cannot even say that it occurs This means that, from the viewpoint of critical
in time! And the category of causality does not theory, freedom remains merely an Idea of Reason.
extend to what occurs beyond the bounds of expe- It is the Idea to which reason is driven when it asks
rience. By considering actions under both of these about how it can itself make a difference in the
aspects, we can say that an act can be both free world. Although no empirical filling of that con-
and determined: free in itself (since the category cept is available to give us knowledge, we can say
of causality does not reach so far) and yet causal something more positive about freedom when we
as it appears to us. The notion that an act couldn’t come to the topic of morality.
possibly be both is simply due to considering the
things we experience as things in themselves. And
that is a mistake that critical philosophy can keep God
us from making. We have seen how reason, in asking the why ques-
tion, runs through a series of conditions that aims
All actions of rational beings, insofar as they are at completeness. The endpoint of each such series
appearances . . . stand under natural necessity; the must be the concept of some being that is, in itself,
same actions however, merely with respect to the a foundation for phenomena and a natural stopping
rational subject and to its faculty of acting according
place. We have seen how this process generates the
to reason alone, are free. . . . Freedom thus hinders
the law of nature . . . by as little as the law of nature Ideas of the soul and of the world in itself. Kant’s
takes away from the freedom of the practical use of conclusion in both cases is, of course, that these
reason. (P, 148) Ideas are merely ideas. Because we have no intuitions
providing content for these concepts, knowledge
The “practical use of reason” is freedom in of them is impossible. Experience is the only soil
action, freedom to decide what events should our intellect can cultivate. And experience is es-
occur in the world. This freedom, Kant is con- sentially open ended; no closure, no completeness
vinced, is closely tied to reason and acting for rea- will be found there. So the Ideas are sources of il-
sons. We can act freely when we act for a reason lusion. We are drawn to think we can know some-
and not just in response to nonrational causes. thing about them, but we are mistaken.
You can see that Kant is thinking of reason itself, There is one more pattern of reasoning we
in the form of a rational will, as a certain kind of simply cannot avoid. It leads to the concept of God.
(spontaneous) causality. When you act for good Kant agrees with Descartes and the tradition that
reasons, you bring into being events that appear the idea of God is the idea of an all-perfect being,
in the causal order of the world, but in themselves but he has a very interesting analysis of the way
may have a completely noncausal—but rational— reasoning leads us to that idea. Like the ideas of
origin. The order of reasons is not the same as the soul and world, the idea of God is not an arbitrary
order of causes. invention. Nor is it something we might or might
484   CHAPTER 20   Immanuel Kant: Rehabilitating Reason (Within Strict Limits)

not invent, as Hume claims. Nor is it, as some in an analysis of what we are doing when we say that
the Enlightenment hold, a priestly or political trick something exists.
foisted on people to keep them in subjection. For “Being” is obviously not a real predicate: that is, it
any being that reasons, it is an absolutely unavoid- is not a concept of something which could be added
able concept. to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of
Reason asks for the reason why and eventually a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in
asks, Why is there anything at all? It seems that there themselves. (CPR, 504)
must be some being that is the foundation for what-
ever there is. This is a difficult thought, but we can make it
This is how reason inevitably comes upon the clear by reflecting on definitions. Suppose we have
Idea of God. But the Idea is empty.* No experi- a certain concept x. If we want to know what that
ence, no intuition could ever fulfill the require- concept is, we are asking for a definition. And the
ments of this Idea. Moreover, it is the Idea of definition will be given in terms of certain predi-
something that cannot just be another phenomenal cates, say f, g, h. So we will be told that an x is
being; since it is the foundation for the determi- something that is f, g, and h. A triangle, for ex-
nate character of all phenomenal things, it must be ample, is a closed plane figure bounded by three
noumenal—a thing-in-itself. But since things-in- straight lines. Could “being” or “existence” be on
themselves are unknowable, the concept of God is such a list of predicates? This is what Kant denies.
just an Idea of Reason. To say that a triangle is a figure is one thing. To
Kant adds a critique of the major arguments say that a triangle exists is to say something of an
that purport to prove the existence of God. He di- altogether different kind. If we say that a triangle
vides the arguments into three types: cosmologi- exists, we are not expressing one of the properties
cal, design, and ontological. He argues that each of the triangle; existence is not the kind of thing
of the first two types makes use of the principle of that should be named in a list of those properties.
the ontological argument at a crucial stage. So let To say that a triangle exists is to “posit” something
us focus on that. that has all the properties of a triangle. It is to say
that the concept (together with the properties that
define it) applies to something.
The Ontological Argument If Kant is right, it follows that every judgment
We met Descartes’ version of this argument in the of existence is synthetic. None of them is simply
fifth meditation; the argument is originally pre- analytic of the concept expressed by the subject of
sented by Anselm of Canterbury in the eleventh the judgment—because existence is not a normal
century.† You will remember that this argument predicate and cannot be part of the subject term’s
presupposes nothing but our idea of God as a most definition. And that means that in no case is the
perfect being. From that idea alone, a priori, as denial of a judgment asserting existence a contra-
Kant would say, the existence of God is supposed diction. But this is exactly what the ontological ar-
to follow. gument claims.*
Kant’s critique of this argument is famous The fundamental mistake of the argument is the
and multifaceted, but we will examine only one assumption that existence is a predicate like others
part of it. That part of Kant’s criticism rests on and that the concept of a perfect being would have
to include it. But if I say that God does not exist, I
am not denying in the second part of the sentence
*Remember the slogan, “Thoughts without content are
empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.” The Ideas are
thoughts without content. *Modern logic agrees with Kant here. The two propo-
†For a discussion of the original argument as given by sitions “Dogs bark” and “Dogs exist” may look very much
Anselm, see pp. 412–415. Also see the argument as pre- alike, but their logic is very different. In symbolic notation,
sented by Descartes in Meditation V. the first is (x)(Dx ⊃ Bx). The second is (∃x)(Dx).
 Reason and Morality   485
what I have implicitly asserted in the first part. I am 3. Explain how the distinction between noumena
simply refusing to “posit” an object of the sort the and phenomena allows Kant to claim that we can
sentence describes. Atheism may be wrong, but it reconcile causality with freedom.
is at least not a logically incoherent view. So the 4. Why is it, according to Kant, that the idea of God is
ontological argument fails. an unavoidable idea for any reasoning being?
5. Kant says, “‘Being’ is obviously not a real
The attempt to establish the existence of a supreme predicate.” What does this mean? How does
being by means of the famous ontological argument Kant use this principle to criticize the ontological
of Descartes is therefore so much labour and effort argument for the existence of God?
lost; we can no more extend our stock of [theor- 6. If the Ideas of Pure Reason (God, the soul, the
etical] insight by mere ideas, than a merchant can world in itself) are such powerful sources of
better his position by adding a few noughts to his illusion, what good are they?
cash account. (CPR, 507)
Is it Kant’s purpose to make atheism possible?
Not at all. In another famous line, Kant says, Reason and Morality
I have therefore found it necessary to deny know- So far, we have seen Kant examining in his criti-
ledge, in order to make room for faith. (CPR, 29) cal way our capacities for knowing. The critical
investigation into knowledge looks at reason in its
What sort of faith he has in mind we will discover theoretical aspect; it is concerned with the a priori
in examining his moral philosophy. foundations of mathematics and physics, together
Let us sum up this section with some with the temptations of transcendent metaphysics.
reflections on the positive function of these Ideas We are now turning to see what Kant has to say
of Reason: soul, world, and God. We have seen about our actions. The critical inquiry into action
that in no case can we have knowledge of the concerns reason in its practical aspect. It deals with
things-in-themselves these Ideas point to. Taken the a priori foundations of morality.
as sources of knowledge, the Ideas are illusory. Kant takes pains to distinguish his treatment
But they do express an ideal that reason cannot from a common way to look at morality—as just
disregard: the ideal of knowledge as a complete, one more empirical phenomenon to be under-
unified, and systematic whole, with no loose stood. If we take this point of view, we examine
ends and nothing left out. It is this that drives what people in fact praise and blame and what mo-
reason forward in asking its why-questions; and tivations (e.g., sympathy) explain these facts. To
it is this goal that, in their various ways, the Ideas look at morality this way, Kant says, is to do “prac-
of soul, world, and God express. If reason could tical anthropology” (G, 190). This is the way Hume
complete its search, it would have to end with looks at morality.*
such concepts. Because experience, the field in There is nothing wrong with studying prac-
which reason can successfully labor, is essentially tical life this way, but Kant is convinced that a
open ended, the search cannot be completed. merely empirical study of morality will miss the
But these ideals can serve a regulative purpose, contribution of reason to our practice; and it will
representing the goal toward which rational crea- be impossible to find the moral law. All you will
tures like ourselves are striving. We want to un- get is a collection of different, probably overlap-
derstand completely. ping, practices or customs. No universality can be

1. What is it about reasoning, in Kant’s view, that

drives us inevitably to the concepts of God, the
soul, and the world in itself? *To make sure you understand the contrast, look back at
2. How does Kant attack the Cartesian claim that we the way Hume does moral philosophy—as part of his science
are thinking things? of human nature, pp. 460–462.
486   CHAPTER 20   Immanuel Kant: Rehabilitating Reason (Within Strict Limits)

found this way; nor will the necessity that attaches It is impossible to imagine anything at all in the
to duty appear.* world, or even beyond it, that can be called good
Kant, of course, wants to apply his Coperni- without qualification—except a good will. (G, 195)
can revolution to practice, as well as to theory. We Many earlier philosophers have suggested a
need a transcendental inquiry into the foundations connection between being a morally good person
of our practical life to complement the critique of and being happy. Plato, for instance, argues that
our theoretical life. Morality, he believes, is not the just man is the happy man.* Kant, more real-
just a set of practices in the phenomenal world. It istic perhaps, disagrees. If happiness correlates (as
has its foundation in legislation by pure reason. Moral- Hobbes claims) with the satisfaction of desires,
ity, like mathematics and natural science, is consti- there is no guarantee that moral goodness will
tuted in part by a priori elements originating in the match perfectly with happiness. Think of the image
nature of reason itself. To work out a “pure moral in Plato’s Republic of the perfectly just man lan-
philosophy” (G, 191), Kant aims guishing in prison; it is just too hard, Kant seems to
to seek out and establish the supreme principle of suggest, to imagine that he is also perfectly happy!
­morality. (G, 193) There is a relationship, however.
This is an ambitious aim. You can see that if Kant It goes without saying that the sight of a creature
succeeds, he will have undercut the moral relativ- enjoying uninterrupted prosperity, but never feel-
ism that seems to be the result of empirical an- ing the slightest pull of a pure and good will, cannot
thropology. He will have found a criterion of moral excite approval in a rational and impartial spectator.
Consequently, a good will seems to constitute the
value that is nonrelative.
indispensable condition even of our worthiness to
be happy. (G, 195)
The Good Will
It may not be the case that happiness correlates
One way into such a “pure moral philosophy” is to perfectly with a good will in this world, but it should
ask whether there is anything at all that could be be so. Any “impartial spectator” will feel uneasy at
called good not just in some respect, but without the sight of some really rotten person who is really
qualification. happy. Goodness may not guarantee happiness, but
Intelligence, wit, judgement, and the other mental it seems to constitute the condition for deserving
talents, whatever we may call them, or courage, it. This opinion is reflected in common sayings,
decisiveness, and perseverance, are, as qualities of such as “She deserves better.”†
temperament, certainly good and desirable in many We cannot, then, solve the problem about the
respects; but they can also be extremely bad and nature of moral goodness by inquiring (as Aristo-
harmful when the will which makes use of these tle, Epicurus, and Augustine do) into happiness. If
gifts of nature . . . is not good. It is exactly the same
with gifts of fortune. Power, wealth, honour, even
the only thing good without qualification is a good
health and that total well-being and contentment will, we must examine that directly. So let us ask,
with one’s condition which we call “happiness,” can What is a good will?
make a person bold but consequently often reckless We need first to clarify the notion of will. We
as well, unless a good will is present to correct their will not go far wrong if we think of an act of will
influence on the mind. (G, 195) as a kind of internal command with a content of
None of these things is good without qualification;
*See pp. 172–176. Plato is not the only one to pursue
they are good only if used well. Think of a healthy,
this tack. We find it in Aristotle (pp. 208–213), Epicurus
wealthy, and smart terrorist! (pp. 239–240), the Stoics (pp. 241–245), and Augustine
(pp. 283–284).
*For universality and necessity as marks of the a priori con- †This connection between moral goodness and hap-
tributions of reason to experience, see p. 470. What goes for piness is important for what Kant calls “rational religion.”
experience goes for action, too. See pp. 493–494.
 Reason and Morality   487
this kind: “Let me now do A!” But not every such Her will sparkles “like a jewel,” even if the action it
imperative qualifies as an act of will. If I do A on a produces goes wrong.*
whim, just because I feel like it, this will be acting But this just raises the question with more ur-
from inclination, not from will. Only internal gency. What makes a will good? If a good will cannot
commands that come at the end of a process of be defined by anything external to it, something about
rational deliberation qualify as acts of will. In fact, the willing itself must make it good. We have seen that
it is not too much to say that will is just reason in every act of will has an intelligible content, express-
its practical employment. In its theoretical employ- ible as the maxim of that act. Only the maxim, in
ment, the outcome of a process of reasoning is fact, differentiates one act of will from another. So a
a descriptive statement (e.g., “Bodies fall accord- good will must be one with a certain kind of maxim.
ing to the formula v = 1⁄2 gt2 ”). But when reason But what kind?
deliberates about practical matters, the outcome
is an imperative (e.g., “Let me now help this suf-
fering person”).
As this example makes clear, every act of will “Always do right. This will gratify some
has a certain content. If we spell out the “A” in people, and astonish the rest.”
one of the will’s commands, we get what Kant Mark Twain (1835–1910)
calls a maxim. Maxims are rules that express the
subjective intention of the agent in doing an action.
For instance, we might get maxims of the follow- Kant finds a clue in the concept of duty. We
ing sort: “Let me now keep the promise I made act out of a good will when we try to do the right
yesterday” or “Let me now break the promise I thing. In trying to do what is morally right, we
made yesterday.” do not have our eyes on some advantage to our-
We can think of Kant’s moral philosophy selves, but only on the rightness of the action.†
as the search for a criterion, a rule for sorting We want nothing else but to do our duty. What
maxims into two classes: those that are morally is duty?
okay and those that are not. If he can find such a Duty is the necessity of an act done out of respect
rule, he will have found “the supreme principle of for the law. (G, 202)
morality.”
Now we return to the question, What makes an Duty and law go together. The law tells us what
act of will good? Kant first makes a negative point. our duties are. The law says, “You must do A”—the
It is not the consequences of a good will that make it “must” expressing the “necessity” Kant refers to. If
good. In determining what makes it good, we must an action is done out of a good will, then, it is one
altogether set aside what it actually accomplishes that has a peculiar motivation: “respect for law.”
in the world. What law? The moral law, of course. But what
does that law say? The answer to this question is
Even if it were to happen that, because of some
the heart of Kant’s moral philosophy, but we are
particularly unfortunate fate or the miserly be-
quest of a step-motherly nature, this will were not quite ready for it yet.
completely powerless to carry out its aims; if with
even its utmost effort it still accomplished nothing,
so that only good will itself remained, . . . even
then it would still, like a jewel, glisten in its own
right, as something that has its full worth in itself. *Compare the Stoic story of the two slaves, p. 245.
(G, 196) †In T. S. Eliot’s play Murder in the Cathedral, Thomas
Becket, the archbishop of Canterbury, is meditating about
If Jane acts out of a truly good will, our estimation his possible martyrdom. He says, “The last temptation is
of her moral worth is unaffected even if an unco- the greatest treason: / To do the right deed for the wrong
operative nature frustrates the intended outcome. reason.” This is a very Kantian sentiment.
488   CHAPTER 20   Immanuel Kant: Rehabilitating Reason (Within Strict Limits)

Only the last is a case of acting from a good will.

We have an answer, then, to the question about
“Duty is the sublimest word in our language. what makes a will good. We act from a good will
Do your duty in all things. You cannot do when we act out of a sense of duty, doing what is
more. You should never wish to do less.” right solely because it is right, from respect for the
Robert E. Lee (1807–1870) moral law. Only such acts have true moral worth.

Let us note that actions can be motivated in two The Moral Law
quite distinct ways. We often act out of desires of We now need to know what the moral law says.
various kinds. These are the kinds of motivations We already know that we cannot discover it by em-
that Hobbes and Hume recognize.* Kant groups pirical investigation; the most we can get that way
all these motivations under inclinations. But he is anthropology—a description of the rules people
recognizes one other motivator: respect for law. do live by. We cannot get rules they ought to live
This is a purely rational motivation, quite different by.* At best, one might be able to cite examples to
from and possibly opposed to even the strongest imitate. But no one, Kant says, could
desire. For Kant, unlike Hume, reason is not just
give morality worse advice than by trying to derive
the slave of the passions. Like Plato, Kant thinks it from examples. For every example of morality
that reason can rule, can motivate us to override presented to me must itself first be assessed with
and control the desires.† And he believes his criti- moral principles to see whether it deserves to be
cal philosophy explains how this can be. used as an original example, i.e., as a model. By no
On the assumption that rational respect for law means can it have the authority to give us the con-
can motivate persons to do their duty, we can clas- cept of morality. Even the Holy One of the Gospels
sify actions in four ways: must first be compared with our ideal of moral
perfection before we can acknowledge Him to be
1. As done from inclination, but contrary to duty: I do such. (G, 210)
not repay the ten dollars I borrowed because
my friend has forgotten about it, and I would If there is going to be a moral law, its origin must
rather keep it. be independent of experience. It must be a priori;
2. As done from calculated self-interest, but according it must be an aspect of practical reason itself.
to duty: Common proverbs, such as “Honesty To understand the content of the moral law,
is the best policy,” often express this (partial) we need one more distinction, that between two
overlap of prudence and morality. kinds of imperatives:
3. As done from a direct inclination, but according to 1. A hypothetical imperative has this form:
duty: If I act to preserve my life out of fear, or “If you want x in circumstance C, do A.”
I am kind simply because I am overwhelmed 2. A categorical imperative has this form: “Do
with pity, I am doing the right thing, but not A (in circumstance C).”
because it is right.
4. As done from duty, even if it runs contrary to inclina- Note that there is no reference to your wishes,
tions: I keep my promise to take my children on wants, desires, ends, or goals in a categorical im-
a picnic, whether I want to or not. perative. This is what it means to call it “categori-
cal.” Given that you are in C, it simply says, “Do A.”
It is not “iffy” or conditional.
*For Hobbes, you will recall, desire for pleasure and
aversion to pain are the sole motivators. Hume adds a non-
egoistic source of action in sympathy, but this, too, is simply *Note that once more Kant is trying to solve a prob-
a passion. See pp. 410–411 and 461–462. lem that Hume poses. He is trying to answer the question,
†See pp. 458–460 for Hume’s views of passion and Where does the “ought” come from? Review Hume’s famous
reason. Plato’s opposed views are discussed on pp. 170–171. challenge on p. 461.
 Reason and Morality   489
If the moral law expresses our duty and if • It is clearly synthetic; no contradiction is pro-
there is something necessary about our duty, then duced by denying it.
it seems the moral law must be categorical. Hypo- • It is clearly a priori; it has no empirical content.
thetical imperatives are neither necessary nor uni- • It is therefore an example of pure reason at
versal; they apply to you only if your wants are work—this time legislating for actions.
those specified in the if-clause. If you don’t want If pure reason in its theoretical employment pro-
to build a bridge, then the technical imperatives of vides principles according to which things do in fact
engineering get no grip on you. But the moral law happen, we can now see that in its practical employ-
applies regardless of your wants. ment pure reason provides a principle according to
We can sum up in this way. The moral law must which things ought to happen.
• abstract from everything empirical; Let us see how it works. There are two cases.*
• make no reference to consequences of actions; Here is the first. You are considering making a
• be independent of inclinations; promise, but you have in mind not keeping it if
• be capable of inspiring respect. it runs counter to your inclinations. The maxim
of your action might be expressed this way: “Let
Now if we examine hypothetical imperatives, we me make this promise, intending not to keep it if I
find that they one and all don’t want to.”
• make reference to empirical facts; How does the categorical imperative get a grip
• concern consequences of actions; on this? It tells you that this is a morally acceptable
• express our inclinations; maxim only if you can universalize it. To universal-
• inspire, at most, approval, not respect. ize a maxim is to consider the case in which every-
Therefore, the moral law must not be a hypotheti- one acts according to it: “Let us all make promises,
cal imperative; it must be a categorical imperative. intending not to keep them if we don’t want to.”
We are getting close. The moral law is a rule Now the question to ask is, Could this be a
for choosing among maxims. It is supposed to be a universal law? It could not; for if everyone acted
sorting device, separating the morally acceptable according to this rule, no one would trust others
maxims from those not acceptable. Kant’s first to keep their promises. And if no one ever trusted
approach is to look not to the content of maxims, others to keep a promise, the very meaning of
but to their form. As an imperative, the morally promising would vanish. Saying “I promise” would
acceptable maxim has the character of law, and become indistinguishable from saying “Maybe.” So
the essential feature of a law is that it has a univer- your original maxim is not one that can be univer-
sal form.* salized; you cannot will that everyone should act
on the principle you are considering for your own
There is therefore only one categorical imperative action. It could not be a law, and it must be rejected
and it is this: “Act only on that maxim by which you as an acceptable moral principle. Whenever you act
can at the same time will that it should become a
universal law.” (G, 222)
according to this maxim, you are acting immorally.
Here is the second case. You are in the presence
Kant has reached his goal: “the supreme prin- of someone who desperately needs your help, and
ciple of morality.” This is the first formulation of you are considering the maxim: “Let me not help
the famous categorical imperative. Note several this person.” Could you universalize this maxim?
features of this rule: The first thing to note is that, unlike the promising
case, universalizing this maxim will not produce
*Think of laws in science; if a proposition is claimed to
incoherence; universal failure to provide help does
be a law, but a counterinstance is found, we conclude that it
not undermine the very maxim we are considering.
is not a law after all—because it does not hold universally.
Review what Kant says about universality and necessity being
the criteria for the a priori. (See p. 470.) *Kant considers four cases, but we will simplify.
490   CHAPTER 20   Immanuel Kant: Rehabilitating Reason (Within Strict Limits)

JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU

“M an is born free, and is everywhere in

chains.” Thus Rousseau (1712–1778)
begins The Social Contract, one of his most famous
It is not enough, however, to understand the
degradation of man in society. Rousseau wants to
find a remedy. In Émile he describes an education
works. He has in mind not just actual slavery, but that will allow the preservation of a man’s freedom
also the constraints, expectations, oppressions, and and natural goodness. And in The Social Contract he
inequalities generated in civilized societies. How did searches for principles that will legitimate a govern-
the transition from freedom to chains come about? ment that will be neither oppressive nor corrupt.
Rousseau paints a picture of “natural man” living Since might does not make right, actual control
a simple life, largely isolated from others, devoted by force cannot justify a state. Only an agreement
to satisfying his few needs in an environment that among free individuals could do that. This agree-
makes that easy to do. His self-interest is moder- ment would have to be one in which each individual
ated by compassion, he oppresses no one, and is surrenders his private right to do as he pleases to the
exploited by none.* He feels no need to satisfy whole community, which then expresses through
another’s expectations. He is free. law the “general will” of the community—that is,
But natural inequalities in strength, wit, or what is in the common interest.
enterprise are amplified when men begin to live in No one individual will be privileged by laws
society. Property (“mine,” not “thine”) comes into that everyone must agree to, so the laws will tend
being. Inequalities in wealth and power are gener- toward equality. Such a contract each will enter
ated. Comparison raises its ugly head and everyone into freely, and therefore in obeying the laws each
wants to appear esteemed by others. Hence arise will obey only himself, thus expressing in society
vanity and contempt, shame and envy—and all the freedom of the natural man.*
the pretenses and hypocrisies of modern societies.
Some become rulers, others slaves. *Kant admired Rousseau, and it is easy to see why.
The idea of laws agreed to freely by all—obedience to
which is freedom itself because they express the funda-
*Contrast this version of the state of nature with that mental nature of human beings—is obviously a foreshad-
of Hobbes, pp. 410–412. owing of the categorical imperative.

A world where no one offers another person help is ever help you. Thus, neither maxim conforms to
a possible, if unattractive, world. There is no logi- the moral law. Reason—in different ways—stands
cal contradiction in considering it. against both.
But if you universalize the maxim in ques- In either case it becomes clear that the essence
tion, you are in effect willing that you should not of acting immorally is deciding to make an exception
be helped, no matter how desperately you might for yourself from rules that you (at the same time)
need it. Since it is perfectly rational to will that an- will should be obeyed by others. You can see how
other should help when you need it, your will is close the categorical imperative comes to the tradi-
engaged in a kind of practical contradiction; you are tional Golden Rule.
saying, “Help me and don’t help me.” And that is There is only one categorical imperative, but
not a rational thing to say. You couldn’t universal- Kant thinks it can be expressed in a variety of
ize the promise-breaking maxim; you wouldn’t uni- ways. One of the most interesting makes use of the
versalize the no-aid maxim. And this is not simply notion of an end in itself. All our actions have ends;
an empirical fact about you. Rather, it would be we always act for the sake of some goal. If our end
unreasonable for you to will that nobody should is prompted by desire, the end has only conditional
 Reason and Morality   491
value. That is, it is worth something only because extending to everyone the dignity of personhood
someone desires it. Diamonds have that sort of (the second form) by respecting them as equal
worth. If no one wanted them, they would be sources of the moral law.
worthless; and how much they are worth depends
exactly on how much people want them (taking a Autonomy
certain supply of them for granted). All these ends
The moral law as categorical imperative arises from
are relative, not absolute.
pure reason. It imposes itself imperiously on me,
Suppose, however, there were something whose saying, Do this—choose your maxims according to
existence in itself had an absolute worth, some- whether they can be universalized. But since it is a
thing that, as an end in itself, could be a ground of principle of reason and I am a rational being, I am
definite laws. . . . not just subject to it. I am also the author of it. It
Now, I say, a human being, and in general every expresses my nature as a rational being. And we are
rational being does exist as an end in himself, not
led naturally to
merely as a means to be used by this or that will as it
pleases. (G, 228–229) the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will that
legislates universal law. . . . The will is therefore not
Rational beings—including extraterrestrial ratio- merely subject to the law, but subject in such a way
nal beings, if there are any—are different from that it must be considered as also giving the law to
the ends that have worth only because somebody itself. (G, 232)
desires them. How could they fail to be different?
They are the source of all the relative values there This leads Kant to the momentous conclusion
are. How could they just be another case of relative that with regard to the moral law, each of us is
values? They are ends in themselves. In terms of ­autonomous. We each give the law to ourselves.
value, then, there are two classes of entities: A law to which I cannot give my rational consent
according to the universalization principle cannot
1. Things, which have only a conditional value, be a moral law.
which we can call price; their value is relative to There are nonmoral (and even immoral) laws;
the desires for them and correlates to their use Kant calls them heteronomous—having their
as means to the satisfaction of those desires. source outside ourselves. What is characteristic
2. Persons, who have absolute worth, which we of such laws is that I have no intrinsic reason to
can call dignity; their value is not relative to what obey them. If I find them binding on me, it is only
someone desires from them; they have value as because they appeal to some interest (perhaps by
ends and command respect. threatening punishment for violations). But with
In terms of this distinction, the categorical im- respect to the moral law, no such appeal to the in-
perative can be stated this way: clinations can work. Not even promises of heaven
or threats of hell are relevant. With respect to the
Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether moral law, I do not feel bound from without, for
in your own person or in any other person, always the moral law expresses my inmost nature as a ra-
at the same time as an end, never merely as a
tional creature.
means. (G, 230)
As an autonomous legislator of the moral law,
Don’t treat persons like things. Don’t use I find myself a member of a community of such
people. Don’t think of others simply as means legislators. Kant calls this community a kingdom
to your own ends. These are all admonitions in of ends.
the spirit of Kant’s categorical imperative. You For rational beings all stand under the law that each
can see that this form of it is merely a variant of of them should treat himself and all others never
the first (universalizing) form: By restricting the merely as a means but always at the same time as an end
maxims of your own actions to those to which in himself. But from this there arises a systematic
anyone could subscribe (the first form), you are union of rational beings through shared objective
492   CHAPTER 20   Immanuel Kant: Rehabilitating Reason (Within Strict Limits)

laws—that is, a kingdom. Since these laws aim pre- Kant calls a “holy” will. A holy will would never
cisely at the relation of such beings to one another as feel that it ought to do something it didn’t want to
ends and means, this kingdom may be called a king- do because it would always want to do what was
dom of ends (admittedly only an ideal). (G, 234) right. Though we can imagine such a will, we must
Note that Kant here calls certain laws “objec- confess that it is not the will we have. We experi-
tive.” These laws contrast with “subjective” rules. ence a continual struggle between inclination and
A subjective rule or maxim is relative to inclination, duty. So a good will is something we may aspire to,
and inclinations differ from person to person. Con- but we can never be completely confident that we
sider the maxim “Let me run six miles per day.” Is have attained it.
that a good maxim? We would all agree that this We like to flatter ourselves with the false claim to a
depends on what you want; it is a good maxim for nobler motive but in fact we can never, even with
someone who wants eventually to compete in a the most rigorous self-examination, completely
marathon, but it is a poor maxim for someone who uncover our hidden motivations. For when moral
wants only to maintain basic fitness. Such maxims worth is the issue, what counts is not the actions
are neither objective nor universal; they are implic- which one sees, but their inner principles, which
itly hypothetical, relative, and personal. There are one does not see.
many such personal maxims, and Kant has no ob- I am willing to grant that most of our actions are
in accord with duty; but if we look more closely at
jection to them.
the devising and striving that lies behind them, then
But, if Kant is right, not all rules are relative everywhere we run into the dear self which is always
and subjective like this. A law legislated by the ra- there; and it is this and not the strict command of
tional will, according to the categorical imperative, duty . . . that underlies our intentions. (G, 209)
is “objective.” He means it is a law that any rational
being will agree to. The moral law for me is the
moral law for you. Any maxim approved by the
universalization test will be the same for all; it is
simply not acceptable unless it is fit to be a universal “In the moral life the enemy is the fat
law, one that each rational being can legislate for relentless ego.”
itself. Reason is not, despite Hume, just the “slave Iris Murdoch (1919–1999)
of the passions”; reason is the source of a crite-
rion for judging the passions. The inclinations may As Aristotle said, “It is a hard job to be good.”*
propose actions, together with their maxims, but
reason judges which are acceptable. Reason is leg- Freedom
islative; it is autonomous; and its laws are absolute.*
We can come back at last to the notion of a good Finally, we need to situate Kant’s moral theory in
will, the only thing good without qualification. We the general critique of reason, to see how the moral
now see that a good will is governed by the cat- law fits with his epistemology and metaphysics.
egorical imperative; a good will is one that can be The notion of autonomy is the key. An autonomous
universalized. We can even imagine a will so much will must be one that is free.
in harmony with reason that all its maxims are in The will is a kind of causality that living beings have
natural conformity with the moral law. Such a will so far as they are rational. Freedom would then be that
property whereby this causality can be active, indepen-
dently of alien causes determining it. (G, 426)
*Note that in a certain way, Kant again agrees with
Hume, this time about the fact/value distinction. There are
no values just in facts per se. Value comes from the side of the
subject. But it does not follow that it is always bestowed by
desire or passion; reason has a crucial role that provides a kind
of objectivity in morality parallel to the objectivity in science. *See p. 215.
 Reason and Morality   493
What else then can freedom of the will be but of view, then, Kant’s Copernican revolution creates
autonomy—that is, the property that a will has room for autonomy, freedom, and the moral law.
of being a law to itself? (G, 246) We are now in a position to go another step. As
You are not truly free when you are merely free agents, Kant says, we
to follow the whim of a moment, to indulge your cannot act except under the Idea of freedom. . . .
desires, or to act capriciously. To act in these ways Reason must regard itself as the author of its own
is to yield control to “alien causes,” because in a principles independently of alien influences. It
rational being like yourself, will (reason in its practi- follows that reason, as practical reason, or as the
cal employment) should be in control, not incli- will of a rational being, must regard itself as free.
nation. Freedom is “a kind of causality”—a power (G, 247–248)
of producing actions according to a rule that you
(rationally) legislate for yourself. To be free is to Whenever you face a decision, you cannot help but
be true to your nature as a rational being by giving think that it is up to you to decide. You cannot help
the law for your actions to yourself. This law is the but regard yourself as free, able to choose for your-
moral law. So freedom is not lawlessness, nor is it self despite whatever outside influences impinge on
freedom from duty. But then, duty is not some- you. Now this still doesn’t prove that you are free.
thing alien either, not something externally (heter- Freedom of the will remains a mere Idea of Pure
onomously) imposed on you. So freedom is really Reason. But it makes it not unreasonable to believe
autonomy, and “a free will and a will under moral you are free. Recall Kant saying that he “found it
laws are one and the same” (G, 246). necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room
You should remember that from a theoretical for faith” (CPR, 29). Faith in freedom is one thing he
point of view, freedom was declared to be one of has in mind—not an arbitrary faith, but one founded
the Ideas of Pure Reason, and Kant confessed that in that practical necessity to think of ourselves as
he couldn’t prove we were free. Let us use the dis- agents “under the Idea of freedom.” It is not knowl-
tinction between the phenomenal and noumenal edge, but it is a rational faith. And the distinction
worlds to remind ourselves of how the question of between things as they are in themselves and things
freedom might look from that point of view. as they appear to us is the metaphysical foundation
that makes this faith possible. We must assume we are
free; and we may do so. The assumption of freedom
Phenomenally Noumenally is a practical necessity and a theoretical possibility.
I appear to myself as an object in I am the unknown subject to Morality is the foundation of other articles of a
the world. whom the world appears. rational faith as well. We can think of morality as
All objects are organized by the The category of causality giving us the command, “Do that through which thou
a priori category of causality. does not apply. becomest worthy to be happy” (CPR, 638). As we have
I appear to act under causal I may act under rational seen, being worthy of happiness does not guarantee
laws that I do not legislate for laws I legislate for myself that we will be happy, at least not in the world of
myself (heteronomy). (autonomy). our experience. Yet goodness and happiness ought
I do not appear to be free. I am free, in that I can to go together. It wouldn’t make good sense if we
act on laws that I give to were urged by reason to qualify for a condition that
myself. would ultimately be denied to us. It seems that
reason is telling us that we have a right to hope for
Given that the noumenal world is strictly un- happiness. The fact that we belong to the noume-
knowable, we do not know the propositions on the nal, purely intelligible world opens up a possibility
right to be true. We do know, however, that there that it might be more than a mere hope.
is a world of things-in-themselves to which the cat- For it to be more than a futile hope, however,
egory of causality does not apply. So those propo- it seems that a future life must be possible (since
sitions are possibly true. From a theoretical point we see that goodness and happiness do not coincide
494   CHAPTER 20   Immanuel Kant: Rehabilitating Reason (Within Strict Limits)

in this life). It follows that we must believe in the So Kant rounds off his critical philosophy.
immortality of the soul (which is, from the point Wisdom, Kant tells us, requires indeed a cer-
of view of theoretical knowledge, a mere Idea of tain modesty about our rational powers—as both
Reason). And we must also believe that a power Socrates and Hume, in their different ways, insist.
exists sufficient to guarantee the eventual happi- But our powers are adequate to do mathematics and
ness of those who strive for moral goodness. This empirical science, and they provide a sure and cer-
power, of course, is God (also, from the point of tain guide for our practical life. For the rest, faith
view of theory, merely an Idea). and hope are at least not irrational. But knowledge is
God and a future life are two postulates which, ac-
limited to the realm of possible experience. After
cording to the principles of pure reason, are insepa- the incisive skeptical probes of Hume, “that acute
rable from the obligation which that same reason man,” Kant has grounds to claim that he has indeed
imposes upon us. (CPR, 639) rehabilitated reason—but only within strict limits.

A Pictorial Representation of Kant’s Philosophy

a
en

acceptable actions
their maxims
Inclinations

moral rules
m

categorical
imperative

Particular

Morally
nou

The

and

[The “X” represents

Space that “I or he or it
and (the thing) which thinks.”]
time

Categories The way things

ought to be
Empirical
concepts

Sensible
intuitions

The objective world

The way things are
(phenomena)

Our task as knowers: To understand the phenomena of the objective world.

Our task as doers: To make the way things are coincide with the way they ought to be (to make
the two cones overlap perfectly).
 Reason and Morality   495
Kant’s critical philosophy has a profound KEY WORDS
influence on the course of subsequent philosophy,
and, as we will see, aspects of it are still alive today. critique of reason things-in-themselves
Copernican revolution noumenon
transcendental phenomenon
1. Why can’t Kant be satisfied with the kind of view a priori unconditioned
“practical anthropology” gives us of morality? What a posteriori Ideas of Pure Reason
will be missing in such a view? analytic rational psychology
2. Kant says that the only thing good without synthetic being
qualification is a good will. What is the relation
necessity good will
between will and rationality?
3. What is the connection between a good will and the universality maxims
concept of duty? intuition duty
4. What is the supreme principle of morality? Why is space inclinations
it categorical (not hypothetical)? And why must it time respect for law
be a priori? sensibility hypothetical imperative
5. In what way does the distinction between understanding categorical imperative
conditional value and absolute value play a role in concept things
the moral law? representation persons
6. In what way are you autonomous (rather than categories autonomous
heteronomous) in the realm of morality? Why substance heteronomous
doesn’t individual autonomy precipitate social chaos? properties kingdom of ends
7. Explain the connections among autonomy,
rationality, and human freedom.
causation holy will
8. Kant says he has demonstrated the limits of possible experience rational faith
knowledge, but that this makes room for faith. Faith
in what? And on what grounds?
NOTES
1. References to Kant’s works are as follows:
P: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, ed. Günter
FOR FURTHER THOUGHT Zöller, trans. Peter G. Lucas and Günter Zöller
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
1. Kant does seem to resolve certain puzzles con- G: Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans.
cerning knowledge that are bequeathed to him Arnulf Zweig, ed. Thomas E. Hill Jr. and Arnulf
by Descartes and Hume. But there is a high price Zweig (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
to pay for these successes: We have to give up 2002).
the hope of knowing reality as it really is. Can CPR: Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, trans.
you think of a way to avoid paying this price? Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s
2. Suppose you are talking things over with Kant Press, 1956).
and he says, “Lying is wrong, you know.” And, in
the way undergraduates are apt to these days, you
reply, “Who’s to say?” What would Kant have to
say to you? And would you need to think again
about that flippant, but very popular, question?