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Shreya Singhal V Union of India

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62 views4 pages

Shreya Singhal V Union of India

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y21190550
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Shreya Singhal v Union of India [2015] 5 SCR 963

Bench:
 Justice R.F. Nariman
 Justice J. Chelameswar

Case title:
 Shreya Singhal v Union of India

Order Dated:
24.03.2015

Relevant case:
Section 66(A) of the IT Act :- Section 66(A) of the Act criminalises the sending of offensive
messages through a computer or other communication devices. Under this provision, any
person who by means of a computer or communication device sends any information that is:
1. grossly offensive;
2. false and meant for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger,
obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will;
3. meant to deceive or mislead the recipient about the origin of such messages, etc,
shall be punishable with imprisonment up to three years and with fine.

Case Note:
The Supreme Court of India invalidated Section 66A in its entirety after a petition
argued that it was unconstitutionally vague and overly broad. The petitioners
contended that the language of the provision was too ambiguous, encompassing a
wide range of actions that could lead to criminal charges, including those that were
not necessarily harmful or offensive. The Court agreed with the petitioners'
arguments, stating that Section 66A did not provide clear definitions for terms like
"annoyance" or "inconvenience." Without clear definitions, there was a risk that
legitimate forms of expression could be stifled or punished unfairly. Additionally, the
Court found that the language used in the provision was not narrowly tailored to
protect against specific types of harm that could justify restrictions on freedom of
expression under Article 19(2) of the Constitution.
Case background:
In 2012 two women - Shaheen dhada and Rinu srinivasan – were arrested by the mumbai
police . They had posted a certain comment expressing their displeasure at a bandh called in
the
wake of death of shiv sena chief bai thackerey. The police had invoked powers under Section
66A of Information Technology Act 2000.

Facts:
 Police arrested two women for posting allegedly offensive and objectionable
comments on Facebook about the propriety of shutting down the city of Mumbai
after the death of a political leader.
 The police made the arrests under Section 66A of the Information Technology Act of
2000 (ITA), which punishes any person who sends through a computer resource or
communication device any information that is grossly offensive, or with the
knowledge of its falsity, the information is transmitted for the purpose of causing
annoyance, inconvenience, danger, insult, injury, hatred, or ill will.
 Although the police later released the women and dismissed their prosecution, the
incident invoked substantial media attention and criticism. The women then filed a
petition, challenging the constitutional validity of Section 66A on the ground that it
violates the right to freedom of expression.

Issues:
 Whether Section 66A of the Information Technology Act is constitutionally valid or
not?
 Whether Section 69A and the Rules are unconstitutional?
 Whether Section 79(3) (b) and Information Technology “Intermediary Guidelines”
Rules, 2011 is constitutionally valid or not?

Rationale:
 In its decision to invalidate Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, the
Supreme Court of India underscored the fundamental importance of freedom of
speech and expression, as enshrined in the Constitution's Preamble.
 The Court emphasized that in a sovereign democratic republic like India, liberty of
thought and expression is paramount. It delineated the concepts of discussion,
advocacy, and incitement, stating that only speech reaching the level of incitement
could be restricted under Article 19(2) of the Constitution.
 Critically, the Court found Section 66A's language to be nebulous and vague, lacking
clear definitions that could lead to arbitrary enforcement and chilling effects on free
speech. It argued that the provision's broad scope risked stifling legitimate
expression, thus contravening constitutional principles.
 The Court also scrutinized the procedural safeguards for blocking online content,
finding them adequate, but raised concerns about the provision's reference to
"unlawful acts" extending beyond permissible restrictions.
 Ultimately, the Court held Section 66A unconstitutional due to its vagueness,
overbreadth, and potential infringement on free speech, aligning with previous
jurisprudence and constitutional principles.

Argument by the petitioner :


1. The petitioners argue that Section 66A of the Information Technology Act is so
vaguely worded that it fails to provide clear guidance on what actions constitute an
offense. This lack of clarity poses problems for both individuals accused of violating
the law and authorities tasked with enforcing it. Without clear definitions,
determining whether a particular communication crosses the legal boundary
becomes challenging.
2. The petitioners challenge Rules 3(2) and 3(4), which pertain to the liability of
intermediaries (such as internet service providers or social media platforms) for user-
generated content. They argue that these rules place undue burden on
intermediaries to exercise judgment in policing content, which goes against their role
as neutral platforms. Additionally, the petitioners contend that these rules lack
safeguards found in previous regulations (such as those under Section 69A of the IT
Act), making them prone to abuse. Furthermore, they argue that these rules are not
aligned with the permissible restrictions on free speech outlined in Article 19(2) of
the Indian Constitution.

Argument by the respondent :


 The argument put forth by the learned Additional Solicitor General highlights the
unique characteristics of the internet as a medium of communication, contrasting it
with traditional forms such as print media, television, and movies.
 Unlike print media, which is typically limited to a single state or country, the internet
has a global reach with no boundaries. Content posted online can potentially reach a
vast audience worldwide.
 While print media requires literacy for comprehension, the internet can be accessed
by both literate and illiterate individuals with a simple click. This accessibility means
that objectionable content can easily be disseminated and accessed.
 Unlike television serials and movies, which undergo pre-censorship to ensure
compliance with social interests, there is no such regulation for internet content.
Each individual effectively acts as a publisher, producer, and broadcaster without
statutory oversight.
 Additionally, the argument mentions the Doctrine of Severability, which suggests that
if the court finds certain expressions or provisions unconstitutional, they may be
severed or separated from the rest of the law, leaving the valid portions intact.

Judgement:
 The Division Bench of Justices J. Chelameswar and R.F. Nariman declared Section 66A
of the Information Technology Act, 2000 unconstitutional as it violated Article 19(1)
(a) of the Indian Constitution, which guarantees the right to freedom of speech and
expression.
 They ruled that Section 66A was not saved under Article 19(2), which allows the state
to impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of this right.
 The court found that Section 66A was problematic because it used vague and
ambiguous language, making it difficult for individuals to understand what
constituted an offense. The judges noted that what might be considered offensive to
one person may not be offensive to another, highlighting the subjective nature of the
law's application.
 Furthermore, the court clarified the distinction between speech that merely
advocates certain ideas or viewpoints and speech that directly incites violence or
public disorder.
 Justice Nariman, speaking on behalf of the Court, emphasized that restrictions on
freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(2) should apply only to speech
that directly incites imminent violence or public disorder, not to mere advocacy of
certain ideas or opinions.
 This distinction is crucial because it ensures that individuals have the freedom to
express their opinions and ideas without fear of censorship or punishment, as long as
their speech does not pose an immediate threat to public order.
 The Court's decision in Shreya Singhal v Union of India reaffirmed the importance of
protecting freedom of speech and expression while also recognizing the need for
reasonable restrictions in certain circumstances to maintain public order and safety.

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