Futures 44 (2012) 277–291

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Futures
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/futures

Futures and culture

Neil MacDonald *
Humanitarian Futures Programme, Policy Institute, Kings College, Strand Bridge House, 138-142 Strand, London WC2R 1HH, UK

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Article history: Are there, in scenario analyses, recurring narratives about the future that tend to converge
Available online 15 October 2011 on a small number of archetypes? If so, what are they, and what are their characteristics?
This question was examined in a sample of 20 scenario sets constructed between 1990 and
2008, containing 64 stories, and representing five countries, and six different themes. Eight
repeating archetypes were identified, and named as progress, catastrophe, reversion and
transformation. Each of these main types exists in two variants: the causal variant is driven
by forces of ‘‘natural law’’, while the intent variant is driven by social intentions. The
archetypes are present in scenarios produced by different methods. It therefore seems
unlikely that they are an artefact of the method used. The question is considered as to
whether the identified archetypes are ‘‘hard-wired’’ into our narrative imagination, or
whether they are created by our culture. Evidence is analysed suggesting that there is a
strong influence of culture. Most strikingly, analyzing the societies envisaged in the
narratives reveals some anomalous rule breaking which strongly suggests that cultural
influence is at work. Only further cross-cultural work will reveal whether there are
possible narratives that are hidden from us.
ß 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Scenario analysis has become, since the 1980s, an essential tool in foresight and planning in situations of complexity,
pioneered by Herman Kahn, developed in its modern form by Royal Dutch Shell, the critical futures school, and others, and
now widely used in both the private and public sectors. Overviews of scenario thinking can be found in Refs. [4,5,6,28,19,23].
Scenarios are alternative plausible narratives about the future. Scenarios certainly assist with identifying alternative
evolutions of identified trends. They have been more challenged in their ability to identify discontinuities, moments where
the world changes irrevocably. Recent studies by van Notten [22] and by Greeuw et al. [13] found that much scenario
practice is based on observable trends and deals poorly with discontinuity. This raises the question ‘‘what shapes the stories
we are able to tell ourselves about possible futures?’’
A commonly reported experience of scenario practitioners is that certain stories recur in scenario exercises. This study
systematically examines this empirical intuition. It identifies and characterizes the underlying narrative archetypes and the
relationships between them. Discussion considers whether these archetypes are universal and fixed, or whether they may be
given in our ‘culture’ (defined in the social anthropological sense as the differing manner in which societies classify and
encode their experiences symbolically, and communicate and transmit these socially); and in the latter case, whether
apprehensions of the future might vary between cultures.

* Corresponding author at: Gondwana Development Associates, 12 Ball & Wicket Lane, Farnham, Surrey GU9 0PD, UK. Tel.: +44 01252 719273.
E-mail address: [email protected].

0016-3287/$ – see front matter ß 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.futures.2011.10.011
278 N. MacDonald / Futures 44 (2012) 277–291

2. Methods

2.1. The sample

A sample of scenario exercises was chosen to cover a range of time periods, and types of commissioning organizations.
Sixty-four stories from 20 scenario sets1 were examined. They cover the period 1992–2008, are derived from five different
countries, and cover a range of focus: business, government, environment, development/humanitarian, not-for-profit, and
public dialogue. A modification of a typology developed by van Notten [22] has been used to classify the scenarios. The van
Notten method classifies scenarios according to macro-characteristics of goal (whether exploratory or for decision-support),
process design (whether intuitive or analytical) and scenario content (whether simple or complex). A number of micro-
characteristics supplement each macro component.
The van-Notten typology.

Macro characteristics Micro characteristics

Goal Function: process vs product

 Exploratory Descriptive vs normative
 Pre-policy research Subject: area/issue-based vs institution-based
Process design Input: qualitative vs quantitative
 Intuitive Method: participatory vs model-based
 Analytical Group composition: inclusive vs exclusive
Scenario content Temporal nature: Chain vs snapshot
 Complex Factors: heterogeneous vs homogeneous
 Simple Interaction: integrated vs isolated

The results are plotted on a scatter diagram (Fig. 1).

The modification introduced here has been to elaborate the classification of the method used to develop of the scenarios.
This has been done in order to be able to test the proposition that any narrative regularities are created by the method rather
than being a product of cultural archetypes. Methods have been classified as shown below.

Method: intuitive Formal

 Judgment  Normative (good bad and ugly)

 Mind-mapping  Trend extrapolation (3 bears)
 Shell  Critical uncertainties (global business network)
 Exhaustive comparison (Manoa)
 Event sequences (trees)
 Modelling
 Quantitative (La Prospective)
 Pre-made (Incasting)
 Critical analysis (Causal Layered Analysis)

The intuitive methods follow no set methodological rules. References describing them can be found in the bibliography.
More formal methods are described in: Miller [33] who is responsible for the enticing ‘‘good bad and ugly) and ‘‘three bears’’
nomenclature; Curry [30]; List [32]. Ogilvie and Schwartz [34]

2.2. Narrative analysis

The narratives have been analysed using three different types of tools. Firstly, archetypes have been analysed using a
typology or taxonomy of narrative classes. Secondly, the outcomes described have been analysed using a modified ‘‘semantic
differential’’. Thirdly, the types of social organization described in the outcomes have been plotted against the ‘‘grid-group’’
classification developed by social anthropologist Mary Douglas.

1
Scenario exercises create multiple stories of alternate plausible futures (often four). The group of related stories created by a scenario exercise is referred
to here as a set.
 N. MacDonald / Futures 44 (2012) 277–291 279

Fig. 1. The van Notten scatter diagram.

2.2.1. The taxonomy

The intuition is deeply rooted that there are archetypes that generate narratives. There is a long tradition in comparative
mythology and literary criticism of the search for universal narratives, running from Frazer’s The Golden Bough [11] to
Northrop Frye’s Anatomy of Criticism [12]. These comparative and universalistic approaches to understanding narrative are
now unfashionable in a post-structuralist and post-modern context which emphasizes the particular over the comparative.
And indeed there are good reasons to question their universality. The field of comparative literature now largely eschews its
universalist and Western-oriented origins and adopts a cross-cultural approach, provoked particularly by growing
assertiveness of scholars in India and China. For an overview of the recent impact of a multi-cultural approach to
Comparative Literature see Ref. [2]. The debate about universality notwithstanding, techniques adapted from Comparative
Literature have been employed in this study for the analysis of the narratives.
Two different methods were developed to analyse the underlying structures of the narratives. The first method, an a priori
taxonomy, was derived using as a template Northrop Fry’s Anatomy of Criticism. This was supplemented by a second method,
a ‘‘generative’’ taxonomy derived from the ‘‘sense making’’ approach to narrative developed for organizational knowledge
management by SparkNow (http://www.sparknow.net/). This method fragments the narrative into conceptual elements and
looks for regular relationships between the elements. The two methods together triangulate any variation.
The resulting taxonomy recognizes four broad classes of narrative, according to the nature of the outcomes for the goals of
the commissioning organization.

(1) Progress: A story is classified as a progress story if its outcomes advance or realize the goals of the entity commissioning
the scenarios.
(2) Catastrophe: A story is classified as a catastrophe story if its outcomes impede or prevent the goals of the entity
commissioning the scenarios.
(3) Reversion: A story is classified as a reversion story if its outcomes involve a return to previous conditions in order to
maintain viability.
(4) Transformation: A story is classified as a transformation story if its outcomes result in a significant change in the ‘‘rules of
the game’’ underlying the topic of concern.

There are in turn four possible subclasses of each of the main classes:

(1) Descriptive: A story is classified as descriptive if it is static and contains no motion. It is a description of a resting state, in
which present trends continue unchanged into the future.
280 N. MacDonald / Futures 44 (2012) 277–291

(2) Causal: A story is classified as causal if the main drivers of change are those which operate with the force of ‘‘natural law’’,
independent of the volition of the human actors. These drivers may indeed be natural law, for example in scenarios about
climate change or about the impact of science and technology. Or they may be drivers which are really social institutions,
but whose operation takes the form of ‘‘law-like’’ phenomena independent of human will. An example of the latter might
be the economy or social structures.
(3) Intent: A story is classified as intent if the main drivers of change are human and social choices. Stories driven by policy
goals are an example here.
(4) Prophetic: A story is classified as prophetic if it describes only the end state without specifying the means of getting there.
Like the descriptive story type, it is static. But unlike the descriptive story it outlines a change.

The narrative taxonomy.

Progress Catastrophe Reversion Transformation

Descriptive
Causal
Intent
Prophetic

2.2.2. ‘‘Semantic differential’’ analysis

The nature of the outcomes has been mapped on a grid inspired by semantic differential analysis. The outcomes were
classified against recurrent dimensions that appear in analysis of the emergent taxonomy:

 Coherent versus fragmented governance

 Rule by consent versus rule by force
 Collective versus individual society
 Global versus local focus
 Income high versus income low
 Social inclusion versus social exclusion
 Social diversity versus social uniformity
 Consumption versus conservation
 Material focus versus wellbeing focus
 Secure versus insecure
 Negotiation versus conflict
 High tech versus low tech

2.2.3. Social organization – the grid-group analysis

Douglas [10] developed the grid-group analysis as a way of classifying social types. It has been used here to classify the
types of social world described in the scenarios. It uses two variables, grid and group. Grid is a measure of the degree to which
the described world contains structures of governance or regulation. Group is a measure of the degree to which the described
world involves relationships of social interdependence. The two variables together create a two-by-two matrix, defining four
social world types

High Governance
High Regulation
Individualist Positional

Individual Isolate Enclave Collective

Low Governance
Low Regulation
 N. MacDonald / Futures 44 (2012) 277–291 281

Table 1
The scenario sample.

1990–2001 2002–2008 Number of stories Country

Development/humanitarian
Foreign Ministry (2001) 4 Holland
Outsights poverty scenarios (2004) 4 UK
Humanitarian Futures Programme (2008) 3 UK
Civil society
Local service providers (Global Business Network) 4 US
Local service providers (Global Business Network) 4 US
NCVO (2007) 4 UK
Carnegie UK (2007) 4 UK
Government
Hemingford National Health Service (1994) 4 UK
Chatham House (2005) 2 UK
National Intelligence Council (2004) 4 US
Business
Shell (1992) 2 UK
ICL (1994) 2 UK
Shell (1995) 2 UK
Shell (1998) 2 UK
Shell (2001) 2 UK
Shell (2005) 3 UK
Shell (2008) 2 UK
Environment
Southern African Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 5 South Africa
Public interest
Mont Fleur (1992) 4 South Africa
(2003) 3 Tanzania

Totals
9 11 64 5

3. Findings

3.1. The scenario sample

The sample covers two time periods: nine scenario sets cover the period between the end of the Cold War and the
September 11, 2001 attack, and 11 sets cover the period between September 11 and the financial crisis of 2007/8 (Table 1).
The graphic plots the sample on the typology grid.
Scenario sets in red are unclassifiable (Fig. 2). Though the sample covers the range of complex scenarios, it is deficient as
regards simple scenarios.

3.2. Narrative analysis

The 64 stories were classified using the narrative analysis tools developed. The results were as follows (Table 2).
Ten stories were unclassifiable. There were two reasons for stories being unclassifiable. In the case of the ICL and NCVO
scenarios, the focus was on the immediate operating environment of the commissioning organizations, with insufficient
analysis of the surrounding society. The Outsights scenarios were judged to be unclassifiable since the four stories were
independent of each other, as extrapolations of different trends, without a common logic that bound them into a set. For this
reason they were discarded from the analysis though it would have been possible to have classified them as unrelated
progress stories.
Comparing the two historical periods under study, catastrophe stories are proportionally more common after 2001,
making up 37% of stories up to 2001 and 46% after 2001. Reversion stories appear only after 2001 (Table 3).

Table 2
Archetypes in the scenarios.

Progress Catastrophe Reversion Transformation

Descriptive – – – –
Causal 10 10 2 4
Intent 5 12 1 9
Prophetic – – – –
Total 15 22 3 13
282 N. MacDonald / Futures 44 (2012) 277–291

Fig. 2. Scenario types in the sample.

Stripping away the particularities of each story, the underlying archetypal narratives are as follows.

3.2.1. Progress
Progress stories are stories about the defence or perfection of society. They correspond to the epic mode in literary
narratives. Success is ultimately the triumph of good over evil.
In the causal variant, present trends play out positively. There is greater market liberalization and new opportunities. This
world is highly volatile but with a trend towards greater prosperity and freedom, though at the same time often with
considerable inequality. Power may be diffused throughout a globalized world. But in many of these stories, the world is a
mono-polar world with the US, though challenged by rising Asian powers, remaining the only superpower. Values are
‘‘Individual Freedom’’, ‘‘Competition’’, and ‘‘Aspiration’’. A competitive economy, despite turbulence and inequality, offers
many the possibility of improved lives. New green industries may emerge to make saving the planet profitable. An enabling
state provides the conditions for achieving aspirations. The underclass may adopt oppositional identities.

Table 3
Archetype pattern by historical period.

Progress Catastrophe Reversion Transformation

1990–2001 8 10 0 9
2002–2008 7 12 3 4
 N. MacDonald / Futures 44 (2012) 277–291 283

Examples:

In Shell’s Business Class, the world is run by interconnected global elites, not by business but as a business, with focus on
efficiency and freedom of choice. There is some resentment in economy class though most are willing to accept inequality if it
means they can expect to improve their lives and have the liberty to pursue their own dreams. The economy is volatile with
short-term crises. Gas is the great game in the energy industry.

The intent variant is a story of policy change (sometimes in the face of threats to global stability, security or
sustainability). The new agenda promotes global initiatives to solve the challenges. A new global architecture promotes and
supports social progress and regulates the operation of markets to achieve this. Values are Cooperation and Social Justice. The
price of this heightened cooperation is often a decrease in the ability for any organization to initiate independent action.
The economy promotes equitable and sustainable development. Wellbeing is increased and poverty is reduced, though
not eliminated. An interventionist state operates with considerable social legitimacy, backed by citizen participation, which
may make the pace of change slow. The security agenda concentrates on resolving underlying causes of conflict, though
tensions remain over scarce resources and the anger of the dispossessed. Society celebrates diversity and inclusion, though
diversity remains a source of potential conflict.

Examples:

In the Humanitarian Futures Project’s Happy Families, a series of threats and opportunities bring about a global pragmatism
that makes collaboration easier in the goal of reducing poverty. Global wellbeing increases, though poverty continues to
deepen. Multilateral institutions are enhanced with improved oversight and enforcement.

3.2.2. Catastrophe
Catastrophe stories are about the disintegration of society. They parallel tragedy in literary narratives. Like tragedy, these
stories may feature inexorable fate, or the fatal flaw of hubris. Success here is not possible, though there may be some
nobility.
The causal variant is an inexorable and catastrophic consequence of present trends, or the failure to respond to
challenges. This leads to a world of competition and social exclusion, brutally divided into winners and losers. The state
safeguards the rules for the winners. Free market forces hold sway leading to an increasing division of world into rich and
poor. Economic activity is threatened by sharply reduced output or sharply increased costs, though it may be high (for the
winners). This is a world of rivalry, with weak institutions for cooperation. State authority and capacity is weakened.
Politicians act only when forced to, with their limits of manoeuvre often circumscribed. There is a loss of faith in government.
Values for the winners are ‘‘Individualism’’ and ‘‘Acquisitiveness’’; for the losers, ‘‘Survival’’, and traditional or oppositional
identities (which may themselves start to break down). This world is inequitable and prone to conflict (over resources,
between communities, and between rich and poor).

Examples:

In UNEP’s Market Forces, there is unbridled private sector economic activity linked to globalized markets for products and
labour. Many state functions are privatised. Countries and economies are largely controlled by big business. The majority of
people remain poor and survive in the informal economy. Economic growth benefits mainly the elite, and occurs at the cost of
the environment.

In the intent variant, the dream founders on an insurmountable threat or obstacle (terrorism, arms proliferation, poverty,
environmental pressures, etc.). This leads to local or oppositional identities and conflict. There is fragmentation and
polarization: people distrust those with whom they cannot identify. A gap grows between the state and community.
Opposed groups try to capture the state for their own purposes or governments wave the national flag. The state adopts
authoritarian measures to contain threats. Security pursued through isolation and gated communities. The social order
fragments or even collapses. The economy falters and is subject to resource crises. Values are ‘‘Identity’’, ‘‘Religion’’, and
‘‘Nation’’. There is a brutal division into winners and losers. Politics is the autocratic rule of the strongest, and economic
activity is a competition for survival. Within strongly functioning communities there may be protection for the vulnerable,
but it is an inequitable world of diversity-based conflict, both domestically and internationally. Almost half the stories (46%)
284 N. MacDonald / Futures 44 (2012) 277–291

cluster tightly on a recognizable subset of the archetype, which we call Fortress World, exemplified by the Solitary
Strongholds story from the Dutch Foreign Ministry. In this world, people withdraw into defensive regional groupings. This
world is assessed as unstable, and liable to inflect into another narrative.

Examples:

In the Mont Fleur scenario, Icarus, written at the time of the negotiations in South Africa about the transition from apartheid,
the majority rule government attempts to satisfy pent up popular demand too quickly. A short period of deficit-financed
economic growth is followed by economic collapse and inability to respond to the needs of the people.
In the Dutch Foreign Ministry’s Solitary Strongholds, the world is a frightened world. Fear of terrorism, diseases affecting
human health and the food chain, and trade wars cause closure of borders. The international architecture fails. Many
countries retreat into regional groupings and strong groupings do reasonably well. Outside the walls of the strongholds there
is only famine, conflict and barbarism.

3.2.3. Reversion
Reversion stories are about the drawing together of society, and the harmonization of conflicting forces. They have no
direct parallel in literature but have some elements in common with comedy. Success here is about social bonding.
There is a considerable similarity between the causal and the intent variants of reversion stories. This is largely because
the stories are shaped by forces beyond people’s immediate control. This should not be taken to mean that these forces are
necessarily causal forces (forces of natural law). Conflict, for example, might just as easily shape such a story.
In these stories there is an external threat or pressure. Things can no longer be managed in the existing way. There is a
drawing inward. Society moves towards a simpler (and often an earlier) state. Links between communities and the wider
world become more tenuous, while local networks increase in importance. In the intent story, values are ‘‘Simplicity’’,
‘‘Tranquillity’’, ‘‘Well-being’’, ‘‘Equality’’, ‘‘Community’’, ‘‘Sustainability’’, ‘‘Back to basics’’, ‘‘Self-reliance’’, and ‘‘Solidarity’’.
Within any one community these values are highly shared. In the natural law story, ‘‘Tradition’’ may be more important, with
the struggle for survival dominating, and people thrown back on traditional structures and leaders. Politics is local as is
economic activity. Economic activity lessens, with shorter supply chains, and less dependence. In the causal story, economic
output may be significantly reduced. New locally based solutions are found and there may be significant development of
appropriate technology. Rule tends to be by consent, though it may be patriarchal. The dark underside of the tightly knit local
communities is that there may be reduced diversity, and exclusion and intolerance of those who are different. Conflicts
between communities are more important than those within communities Security is about managing external threats.

Examples:

In SAfMA’s African Patchwork, a causal story, the threat comes from ineffective governance, economic decline and local
conflicts. This is a highly unequal world. Most people live in a parallel society beyond government reach. Formal employment
and services are only for the elite. People survive by reliance on traditional structures. Self-help, family and community are
strong values. Agricultural production suffers, intensified by climate change, and the environment is degraded, despite
locally based innovative management of ecosystem services.
In the Carnegie Foundation’s Local Life, an intent story, rising energy prices and economic decline lead people to spend more
time in their communities. High-speed travel is a thing of the past. Now people value frugality, wellbeing, community,
sustainability, and intimacy. More is produced close to home and with decentralized politics there is a greater civic
involvement.

3.2.4. Transformation
Transformation stories are about the construction of society. There is no obvious parallel in literature, though mythology
that involves creator/destroyer archetypes may relate. Success here is about pioneering new game rules and transgressing
boundaries.
As might be expected, transformation stories tend to be more protean than the other three categories, and hence
archetypes are harder to specify here. This archetype has to be described more abstractly. At this level of abstractness, the
causal and intent variants differ from each other only slightly.
In these stories, the forces of natural law or of intent operate with unexpected or accidental consequences. The
transformational essence of all the variants is the transgressing of boundaries, significantly altering the nature of the game.
The practices that form the focus of the story are transformed. The road to embracing these outcomes may be contested and
turbulent. Values are ‘‘Change’’, ‘‘Pioneering’’, ‘‘Adapt or Die’’, ‘‘Redefine Purpose’’. Those unable to adapt may be excluded.
 N. MacDonald / Futures 44 (2012) 277–291 285

In the causal variant, the forces of natural law operate with unexpected results. Practice is transformed.

Examples:

In the Hemingford National Health Service story, Science Makes the Big Push, Biomedical and information technology
transform roles within the health system, collapsing the distinction between general practitioners and specialists. Nurses
become medical technicians, freeing doctors’ time to become high-tech healers, spending more quality time with each
patient.

In the intent variant, a new (social, economic) paradigm emerges (often in the face of a threat or challenge). Visionary
leadership is usually a feature of the emergence and adoption of the new paradigm. The paradigm is embraced as people
realize it allows them to face the fears of a new future with greater confidence. Greater cohesion and cooperation, and vibrant
citizen power are often strong features of such stories. Practice is transformed. There is again a strongly recurrent sub-type of
this, which may be called ‘‘Rainbow’’, driven by social and cultural diversity. In its global versions, the rise of the Asian
economies is challenging US hegemony and creating globalization with an Asian face. In versions at national level,
communities and regions gain more independence. Social cohesion is negotiated not legislated.

Examples:

In UNEP’s Great Transitions, the conviction grows of the need for a new African Renaissance, which can dig the continent out
of poverty, inequality and environmental degradation. A new continental leadership follows a strategy, which is nurturing
and people intensive. Markets are managed to achieve social, cultural and environmental goals. The old obsession with
possessions gives rise to a new simpler life with greater quality. Values are simplicity, tranquillity and community. There is
greater regional cooperation and the environment begins to recover.

3.3. The structure of the stories

The stories can be visualized as having distinct and characteristic structures through the use of the ‘‘semantic differential’’
analysis. When scores are assigned to each of the dimensions, the patterns are as shown in Fig. 3.
The objective reality of these generic plots can be seen when all the stories of one class are plotted together as shown in
Fig. 4. It will be seen that they have a common shape.

3.4. Grid-group analysis

Whereas the taxonomy is ‘‘subjective’’ in the sense that assessment of ‘‘progress’’ or ‘‘catastrophe’’ depends on the desired
outcomes for the commissioning entities, the mapping of resultant societal types is ‘‘objective’’ in the sense that it is
independent of the volition of the commissioning entities (Tables 4 and 5).

Table 4
Grid-group analysis by main narrative type.

High Governance
High Regulation
Individualist Positional

Progress 69% Progress 50%

Catastrophe 25% Catastrophe 10%
Reversion 0% Reversion 0%
Transformation 6% Transformation 40%
Individual Collective
Isolate Enclave

Catastrophe 100% Progress 0%

Catastrophe 44%
Reversion 12%
Transformation 44%

Low Governance
Low Regulation
286 N. MacDonald / Futures 44 (2012) 277–291

Fig. 3. Semantic differential analysis of the narrative archetypes.

Fig. 4. Stacked plot of progress causal stories.

 N. MacDonald / Futures 44 (2012) 277–291 287

Table 5
Grid-group analysis by narrative sub-type.

High Governance
High Regulation
Individualist Positional

Causal 88% Causal 20%

Intent 12% Intent 80%

Individual Collective
Isolate Enclave

Causal 25% Causal 25%

Intent 75% Intent 75%

Low Governance
Low Regulation

4. Discussion

The findings clearly demonstrate that there are archetypal stories with reproducible characteristics, which can be
analysed with the tools developed.

4.1. Other attempts to characterize archetypes

The literature contains a few previous attempts to characterize scenario narrative archetypes. The Hawaii Research
Centre for Futures Studies has for many years used an explicitly archetypal approach, using four futures derived from
examination of the stories people tell about the future, and described by Dator [7] as ‘‘Continued Growth’’, ‘‘Collapse’’,
‘‘Discipline’’ and ‘‘Transformation’’. Inyatullah [15] argues that this schema has deep psychological resonance. Dator’s
scenarios have great similarities to the archetypes described in this paper, derived also from an examination of scenarios.
Several authors, drawing on the Hawaii critical futures tradition, have explored archetypes. Schultz [25] identified six
archetypes. Inyatullah [16] closely parallels her approach, identifying five archetypes. From a separate starting point [26]
working on the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, identified five. The quasi-archetypal ‘‘aspirational futures’’ method of
the Institute for Alternative Futures generates four futures as described by Bezold [3]: the ‘‘official future’’, ‘‘what could go
wrong’’, ‘‘a visionary future’’ and an ‘‘alternative path to the visionary future’’. Though apparently different, all these schemas
can be mapped onto each other, suggesting confirmation of their insights (Table 6).
The present study has extended the previous studies by an empirical demonstration of the pattern of occurrence of the
archetypes, which will be discussed below.
Of the sixteen possible classes of story identified by the typology, only eight have in fact been encountered. All four main
classes are found – progress, catastrophe, reversion and transformation. But only two of the subclasses are found – causal and
intent. It is not particularly surprising that descriptive and prophetic stories have not been found in this study. Both of these
types of story describe resting states, and contain no movement. They are visions of the future but offer no clues as to the
drivers of change that produce these futures. Since most scenario work is done for planning purposes, descriptive and
prophetic stories would not be helpful in illuminating choices, though they might be expected to occur occasionally in public
interest work.

Table 6
Mapping the different archetype schemas.

Author Archetypes

MacDonald Progress Catastrophe Reversion Transformation

Dator Continued growth Collapse Discipline Transformation
Bezold Official future What could go wrong Visionary future
Schultz Business as usual Ideological exclusionism Hi-tech transformation
Environmental sustainability Collapse Spiritual transcendence
Inyatullah Evolution and progress Collapse Back to the future Gaia
Globalism
Scoles and Biggs Market forces Fortress world Local resources Value change
Policy change
288 N. MacDonald / Futures 44 (2012) 277–291

4.2. Are the archetypes an artefact of the scenario method?

It might be suggested that the results encountered are not the expression of narrative imagination, but rather that they
are an artefact of the methods used to generate the scenarios. An analysis of the sample using the typology tool suggests that
this is unlikely to be the case. As shown in Fig. 1, the scenarios examined represent a broad (though not complete) spread of
scenario types. A more detailed examination of the methods offers no support to the null hypothesis that the pattern of
archetypes is a consequence of method. As can be seen in Table 7, the archetypes occur across scenarios generated by
different methods. Only normative and quantitative modelling methods are not represented. It may be significant that
certain archetypes are more common in particular methods, for example it may be that reversion stories do not appear in sets
created by the most common methods (intuitive and critical uncertainties) but only in pre-built scenarios and critical
analysis methods and that transformation stories are more commonly generated by intuitive methods. However the sample
is too small to be certain that these and other apparent correlation are real.
The archetypes therefore do appear to be a real representation of the structure of our narrative imagination. In practice,
this can be mapped onto corresponding classes of organizational strategy. Progress stories correspond to organizational
strategies of playing the game to win, catastrophe to defensive survival strategies, reversion to focusing on core business to
create leaner and fitter organizations, and transformation to game-changing innovation strategies. In part, a similar insight
informs a comparison of literary narrative and business strategies by Barry and Elmes [1].

4.3. Are the archetypes universal or culturally determined?

The question then arises whether these archetypes are universal and ‘‘hard-wired’’ into our narrative-making capacities, or
whether they are a product of our culture. There is reason to believe that the latter may be the case. The sample has been divided
into two historical periods: 1990–2001 and 2002–2008. The first period runs from the end of the Cold War up to the Al Qaeda
attack on the twin towers in New York. The ‘‘zeitgeist’’ of the two periods was significantly different. The period from 1990–
2001 was the period of triumphant globalization and a free-wheeling wealth creating free market. By contrast, the period after
9/11 has been a period of greater uncertainty: the period of the war on terror against an unknown enemy. The distribution
pattern of archetypes reflects this difference, as shown in Table 3, with catastrophe stories becoming more common, and
reversion stories making their appearance. The second period ends with the global financial collapse of 2007–2008.
On the basis of the above argument it is possible to make a prediction: in the wake of this collapse and a sense of other
threats such as security and climate change, progress stories will tend to disappear and the common pairing will be of
catastrophe and transformation stories until a new world order manifests itself. This prediction is born out by the most
recent set of scenarios from Shell, a pioneer and leader in the use of scenarios. Shell’s predominant pattern since 1991 has
been to create a pair of stories, progress and catastrophe, or progress and transformation. But the 2008 set [54], reaffirmed
and updated in 2010 [55], contains a catastrophe story and a transformation story. Similarly, the Chatham House [37] global
scenarios comprise catastrophe, reversion and transformation stories.
The impact of culture on narrative form has been the subject of significant study in the field of literature. Non-Western
scholarship on comparative literature has tended to emphasize the role of culturally distinct metaphysics of time and of
causality in structuring the narrative. Asian cultures stress emergence and interpenetration of things, and several, such as the
Hindu tradition, have a cyclical rather than a linear notion of time. Gu [18] argues that these differences underlie differences
between Chinese and Western literature, accounting for the dominant Western literary mode being realism and that of China
being fantastic.
‘‘The most striking contrast between Chinese and Western fiction is that whereas in the Western tradition the
dominant mode of representation is realism and its variations, in the Chinese tradition the most eye-catching mode of
representation is the fantastic and its variations . . . The artistic differences arose from the differences in cultural
conditions, especially the differences in metaphysical thought . . . Ontologically, the Western worldview, colorful as it
is, has been dominated since Plato by what has been described as the ‘metaphysics of presence’ – the notion of the
world as constituted by some properties or essence enduringly present in things. By contrast, the Chinese worldview

Table 7
The pattern of archetypes analysed by method used.

Narrative method Number of sets Progress Catastrophe Transformation Reversion Unknown

Intuitive 0.33 0.37 0.21 0.42 0.00 0.00

Normative 0
Critical uncertainties 0.39 0.37 0.34 0.38 0.00 0.67
Exhaustive comparison
Event sequences 0.11 0.00 0.26 0.17 0.00 0.00
Quantitative modelling 0
Pre-built scenarios 0.06 0.15 0.13 0.00 0.33 0.00
Trend extrapolation 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33
Critical analysis 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.67 0.00
 N. MacDonald / Futures 44 (2012) 277–291 289

may be characterized as the ‘metaphysics of absence’. It views the world as consisting not so much in substances as in
the nonsubstance that gives rise to being . . . Epistemologically, Western metaphysics has since Aristotle divided the
world into two separate realms: the subjective world and the objective world. Thus us exemplified in René Descartes’
paradigmatic dualism between res extensa and res cogitans, a dualism that may be recast as a division between the
human being as the thinking subject who observes and the world as observed objects. By contrast, Chinese
metaphysics conceives of the world as a totality of interconnections, interpenetrations and transformations between
the human and the natural realms . . . the Western ontology of presence and epistemology of dualistic division have
not only promoted the zeal for scientific discoveries but may also have aided the development of realism and its
variations like naturalism, critical realism and psychological realism. All of them seem to have grown out of the
creative impulses to observe, describe, and enquire into life, society and the human mind. By contrast the Chinese
ontology of nonbeing and epistemology of totality may have helped to bring about persistent authorial intrusions,
simulated narrator–reader interactions, the mixture of narrative modes, the interconnections between the human and
non-human realms, and the kaleidoscopic nature of Chinese fiction.

As the only narrative form that systematically deals with the future, science fiction writers certainly deserve systematic
attention in this context. In the Cold War era, the science fiction of the United States and of the Soviet Union dealt with
similar themes in strikingly different ways, that reflecting the core ideas of their cultures (see [17,14]). There is a striking
difference between the way in which the ‘‘alien encounter’’ story was handled by Western and Soviet science fiction during
the cold war. In the West, this encounter was often portrayed as hostile and conflictive. The conflict generated the essential
drama of the works. However for Soviet writers, official ideology made this source of drama impossible. Soviet literature held
that any alien species advanced enough to have achieved interstellar travel must also, by definition, have achieved
communism. Such species could therefore not be imperialist or threatening. Instead, the drama in the Soviet works is
provided by incomprehension. The novel ‘‘Roadside Picnic’’ [29] provides an excellent example. Aliens have visited the Earth,
leaving behind the Zones, places of immense danger where incomprehensible technological wonders can be found. A frontier
culture has developed around these areas, where ‘‘stalkers’’ risk their lives in illegal expeditions to extract items. One of the
characters eventually compares the site to a roadside picnic. After the picnickers depart, nervous animals venture forth from
the adjacent forest and discover the picnic garbage: spilled motor oil, faded unknown flowers, a box of matches, a clockwork
teddy bear, balloons, sweet wrappers, etc. He concludes that humankind finds itself in a situation similar to that of the
curious forest animal. The result is a powerful but understated portrayal of mankind facing the unknown.
A further glimpse of the impact of cultural categories at work emerges from grid-group analysis in Tables 4 and 5. The
pattern is striking in some respects. All stories describing societies in the Isolate box are catastrophes. No stories describing
societies of low governance are progress stories. Transformation stories are vastly more likely to be set in societies with
collective structure. Almost no Individualist society is transformational. Reversion stories are only found in stories
describing Enclave societies. As might be expected, stories set in societies of high collectivity are disproportionately stories of
the Intent type. However, at the low collectivity end of the scale the reverse relationship is not fully true. While stories in the
Individualist quadrant do conform to this symmetrical expectation and are disproportionately of the Causal type, stories in
the Isolate quadrant, contrary to what might be expected, are overwhelmingly of the Intent type. This makes the Isolate (low
governance, low collectivity) quadrant doubly anomalous, both for its association with Catastrophe and its association with
Intent.
It should be emphasized that these are not necessarily facts about the cultural world. These are facts from the cultural
world. They are an indication of the worldview behind the narrative. They are evidence of the story-making machinery at
work in our cultural imagination. The fact of the absolute uniformity, unique in the four quadrants, of Isolate societies being
sites of catastrophe is remarkable. It should be remembered that the categories are all subjective, in the sense that they
depend on seeing the world from the standpoint of the organization creating the stories. Thus it might be expected that the
subjective story types would be scattered throughout the objective matrix of cultural types. The conditions that mean
progress for one organization may be catastrophe for another. And this is evident in the pattern. No one quadrant is uniquely
associated with progress. Yet there is something in our imaginative machinery that makes the bottom left quadrant
catastrophic. It is also true that reversion is only found in the bottom left, Enclave type. This may be because such societies
tend to be materially poor.
The Isolate society is a space of low grid and low group, no social control and no group structure. In Douglas’ work and the
Cultural Theory of Risk to which it has given rise, this culture is given very little attention. It is said to be a space of apathy and
fatalism. Douglas saw this culture as having something to tell us about people marginalized by social and economic change,
particularly in the developing world. Yet the apparently anomalous and dangerous character of this quadrant may suggest
that powerful cultural values are in play. There is a more interesting interpretation possible of this cultural space. Nomads
and hunter–gatherers may belong to this type of culture. It is a culture with very little in the way of taboo, and one that values
human fellowship, as acknowledged by Douglas [9]. Douglas herself gives an interesting characterization of this space: ‘‘This
is the zero start where everything has to be negotiated ad hoc’’. (It should be noted of course that the normal order of the
Isolate and Individualist quadrants in the grid-group classification has been inverted here and Douglas was talking about the
individualist quadrant.) Might it not then be expected that such a space might be one in which a potential for transformation
might be found? Transformation is associated with crossing of boundaries. Douglas’s earlier work, particularly ‘‘Purity and
Danger’’ [8], is very eloquent about the anthropological significance of boundary breaking: taboos are all about the crossing
290 N. MacDonald / Futures 44 (2012) 277–291

of boundaries, the mixing of things that classification systems keep apart she argues. Pollution taboos tend to be very strong
in highly structured societies, and people at the margins of society are often seen as dangerous in such cultures. However
boundaries are much less strongly patrolled in less structured societies and taboos are much weaker. Hence the Isolate
cultures in the bottom left quadrant are much more tolerant of ‘‘the wild man in the woods’’ and the ‘‘trickster’’ figures. The
anomalous nature of this quadrant in the scenario analysis, including the breaking of the expected rule that this quadrant
should contain primarily causal stories, may suggest that our own cultural fears are preventing us exploring the full meaning
of this space.
The present sample contains scenario sets from five countries, three Western and two African countries, as shown in Table
1. Comparing the Western and non-Western stories reveals no underlying differences that could be attributable to cultural
variations. However, this is not decisive, since the African stories were guided by Western facilitators. A full cross-cultural
study of scenario sets would be necessary to decide the issue. It remains a possibility that there are potential stories about the
future that our culture prevents us from recognizing. This would have profound implications for the capacity of scenario
exercises to anticipate moments of change.
Further work in the future will explore such a cross-cultural comparison. It is possible that causal layered analysis [31],
with its distinction between myth, world-view, social causation and litany, may offer a useful approach to thinking about the
relationship between culture and specific narratives.

5. Conclusions

The research confirms that there are regular ‘‘archetypes’’ that underlie the diversity of the narratives analysed. These
archetypes show up in narratives generated by a range of different methods, and therefore do not seem to be an artefact of
the method used to generate the scenarios. The question is discussed of whether the archetypes are culturally determined or
‘‘hard-wired’’ into our narrative imagination. Since scenario analysis is essentially a Western activity, the cultural diversity of
the sample was insufficient to test this directly, though argument is advanced for thinking that the archetypes may indeed be
culturally determined. Among these reasons is the fact that the pattern of narratives shifts from one historical period to
another. Very telling also is the fact that the grid-group analysis identifies the low grid low group quadrant as aberrant: it is
the only quadrant that is uniformly of one type and it violates the expectation that most narratives here will be of the causal
subtype. The inference is that these aberrations reflect cultural values at work. Further work will be needed to test for
cultural variation, and to identify whether there are possible narratives that are hidden by a Western viewpoint. If this were
the case, learning from other cultures would potentially allow the development of better tools to surface those futures that
are hidden from us. It would also speak to Sardar [24] memorable call to action
‘‘The future has been colonized. It is already an occupied territory whose liberation is the most pressing challenge for
the peoples of the non-West if they are to inherit a future made in their own likeness’’.

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Further reading

Scenario methods

[30] A. Curry, Acting on the future, in: B. Sharpe, K. Van der Heijden (Eds.), Scenarios for Success: Turning Insights into Action (2007), John Wiley and Sons, 2007,
offers a typology of scenario methods.
[31] S. Inyatullah (Ed.), The Causal Layered Analysis Reader: Theory and Case Studies of an Integrative and Transformative Methodology, Tamkang University,
Tamsui, 2004.
[32] Dennis List, Scenario Network Mapping: The Development of a Methodology for Social Inquiry, Ph.D. Thesis, University of South Australia, 2005, available at
http://www.audiencedialogue.net/snm.html, provides an overview of methods.
[33] R. Miller, Futures Literacy: A Hybrid Strategic Scenario Method, 2006, the source of the enticing ‘‘good bad and ugly’’ and ‘‘three bears’’ descriptions of
normative and trend analysis methods.
[34] J. Ogilvie, P. Schwartz, Plotting Your Scenarios, Global Business Network, undated, describes the most widely used method for generating scenarios, the 2  2
grid of critical uncertainties.

The scenario sample

[35] Carnegie UK Trust, Scenarios for Civil Society, Dunfermline, 2007, http://www.carnegieuktrust.org.uk/files/main/Scenarios%20for%20civil%20society_1.pdf.
[36] Chatham House, Scenarios for 2030, London, 2005, http://www.chforum.org/scenarios/new/scen9.html.
[37] Chatham House, Scenarios for 2040, London, 2009, http://www.chforum.org/scenario2009/scenarios2009.shtml.
[38] P. Clayton, J. Dowsett, S. Parker, G. Ringland, Scenarios for information markets in 2005, ICL, in: G. Ringland (Ed.), Scenario Planning: Second Edition, John
Wiley and Sons, Chichester, 1995, pp. 365–379.
[39] Humanitarian Futures Programme, Strategic Humanitarian Action Resource Pack: HFP Global Scenarios, Kings College, London, 2008.
[40] P. Leroux, V. Mahai, et al., The Mont Fleur Scenarios, Deeper News, Global Business Network, 1992http://www.generonconsulting.com/publications/papers/
pdfs/Mont%20Fleur.pdf.
[41] Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Scenarios, Island Press, Washington, DC, 2008http://www.millenniumassessment.
org/documents/document.332.aspx.pdf.
[42] N. Williams, M. Griffiths, Advice in the Future, National Council for Voluntary Organizations Third Sector Foresight, London, 2007 http://www.ncvo-
vol.org.uk/3sf/trends/?id=5090.
[43] National Health Service, The Hemingford Scenarios, in: G. Ringland (Ed.), Scenario Planning: Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons, Chichester, 1994 , pp.
385–397.
[44] National Intelligence Council 2020 Project, Mapping the Global Future, Washington DC, 2004, http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020.html.
[45] Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy Planning Unit, Poverty in the World of 2015: Four Scenarios, 2001.
[46] Outsights, Scenarios for the Poorest: the View From 2030, 2004, http://www.futurestudio.org/scenario%20documents/Scenarios%20for%20the%20poorest%
202030.pdf.
[47] D. Scearce, K. Fulton, What If? The Art of Scenario Thinking for Non-Profits, Global Business Network, 2004 http://www.gbn.com/ArticleDisplayServlet.
srv?aid=32655.
[48] R.J. Scoles, R. Biggs, Ecosystem Services in Southern Africa, Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, Pretoria, South
Africa, 2004 pp. 11–12 http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents_sga/SAfMA_Regional_Report_-_final.pdf.
[49] Shell, Global Scenarios 1992–2020, 1992 http://www-static.shell.com/static/aboutshell/downloads/our_strategy/shell_global_scenarios/global_scenarios_
1992_2020.pdf.
[50] Shell, Global Scenarios 1995–2020, 1995 http://www-static.shell.com/static/aboutshell/downloads/our_strategy/shell_global_scenarios/global_scenarios_
1995_2020.pdf.
[51] Shell, Global Scenarios 1998–2020, 1998 http://www-static.shell.com/static/aboutshell/downloads/our_strategy/shell_global_scenarios/shell_global_
scenarios_1998_2020.pdf.
[52] Shell, People and Connections: Global Scenarios to 2020, 2001 http://www-static.shell.com/static/aboutshell/downloads/our_strategy/shell_global_
scenarios/people_and_connections.pdf.
[53] Shell, Global Scenarios to 2025, 2005 http://www-static.shell.com/static/aboutshell/downloads/our_strategy/shell_global_scenarios/exsum_23052005.pdf.
[54] Shell, Energy scenarios to 2050, in: London, 2008 http://www-static.shell.com/static/aboutshell/downloads/our_strategy/shell_global_scenarios/SES%20
booklet%2025%20of%20July%202008.pdf.
[55] Shell, Signals and Signposts, 2010 http://www-static.shell.com/static/aboutshell/downloads/aboutshell/signals_signposts.pdf.
[56] Society for International Development Tanzania Chapter, Tutafika: Imagining Our Future Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 2003http://www.tutafika.org/.
[57] Society for International Development and Institute for Economic Affairs, Kenya at the Crossroads, 2000 http://www.kenyascenarios.org/pdf/scenarios.pdf.
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