System Issues and

Software Changes
System Issues

Objective – Aligning expectations…

• To provide a highlight on technical issues of the world wide fleet
• Affecting the operational routine
• Requiring operational actions

This presentation does not cover:

• Commercial aspects
• For your reference, a summary of all available
solutions is included in the end of the book

Technical Support Follow-up reports

• Can be found on flyembraer.com - > E-Forum
Agenda

• Air Management System

• Electrical and Avionics
• Flight Controls
• Interiors
• Landing Gear
• Structures
• New ACFOG-5774
Air Management
System
Agenda

Air Management System

• EMBRAER 190/195 Bleed Valve

• EMBRAER 170/175 Bleed Valve
• Cabin/Cockpit Temperature
Control
• AMS Black Label 14
• BLEED 1(2) FAIL Procedure
Agenda

Air Management System

• EMBRAER 190/195 Bleed Valve

• EMBRAER 170/175 Bleed Valve
• Cabin/Cockpit Temperature
Control
• AMS Black Label 14
• BLEED 1(2) FAIL Procedure
EMBRAER 190/195 Bleed Valve

Issue
• LH/RH Bleed pressure oscillations observed during cruise, on aircraft post-mod
NAPRSOV PN 1013952-5
• No CAS or CMC messages posted
• Pressure oscillations between 8 and 50 psi (typically)

BLEED PRESSURE
OSCILLATION
DURING CRUISE

• Different from oscillation (during take-off/climb) addressed by AMS Black Label 13

EMBRAER 190/195 Bleed Valve
0 to 100 psi oscillations 8 to 50 psi oscillations
Premature wear of during take-off/climb phases during cruise
internal components at high engine thrust

Fixes
E170 E190 E190 E190
NAPRSOV NAPRSOV NAPRSOV
Improved 1013952-1 Improved 1013952-5
1001246-3
SB 190-36-0005
Reliability SB 190-36-0018
Reliability SB 190-36-0020

BL08 BL09 BL11 BL13 BL14

Oct Dec Jun Nov Sep Dec Apr

06 06 09 10 12 13 14
EMBRAER 190/195 Bleed Valve

Immediate Action
FOL170-2014-036 – Issued in Jul/14
• Oscillations between 8 and 50 psi have minor impact in the pneumatic system
• No operational procedures are required to avoid or minimize the number of these events
• However if oscillation is followed by any EICAS message, follow QRH

• If oscillation is out of this range or affects

passenger or flight crew comfort,
report to maintenance staff for troubleshooting

SNL190-36-0018 Rev.6 - Issued in Jul/14

• Includes information about bleed pressure
cruise oscillation and troubleshooting
maintenance recommendation
EMBRAER 190/195 Bleed Valve

Investigation
• Embraer systems rig and flight test aircraft
• Didn’t reproduce the oscillations yet, even equipped with affect valves returned from field

• From computer model analysis

• Intermittent ring leakage caused by increased friction is suspected root cause for cruise
oscillations

• 80% of removed valves have < 200 FH

• Recommended leaving 1013952-5 valves with > 200 FHs on-wing
• Wear improvements expected to provide longer life than previous valves
Next Steps
• Test rig being upgraded to more closely simulate aircraft conditions
• Additional valves removed due to oscillation -> will be installed in flight test aircraft
• Technical Support Follow-up available on E-Forum: F190-36-008
Agenda

Air Management System

• EMBRAER 190/195 Bleed Valve

• EMBRAER 170/175 Bleed Valve
• Cabin/Cockpit Temperature
Control
• AMS Black Label 14
• BLEED 1(2) FAIL Procedure
EMBRAER 170/175 Bleed Valve

Issue
• BLEED 1(2) FAIL and/or BLEED 1(2) OVERPRESS events due to the failure of PN
1001246-3 bleed valves
• NAPRSOV position accounts for the majority of all valve removals

Investigation
• Events often caused by excessive piston ring wear (reduced sealing effectiveness)
• The original plan for improving E170/175 NAPRSOV reliability was to incorporate the
new E190/195 NAPRSOV PN 1013952-1
• Risk of introducing bleed pressure instability in the E170/175

Status
• Embraer and UTAS to introduce improvements to the E170/175 NAPRSOV once the
root cause for the E190/195 oscillations are identified
• Technical Support Follow-up available on E-Forum: F170-36-007
Agenda

Air Management System

• EMBRAER 190/195 Bleed Valve

• EMBRAER 170/175 Bleed Valve
• Cabin/Cockpit Temperature
Control
• AMS Black Label 14
• BLEED 1(2) FAIL Procedure
Cabin/Cockpit Temperature Control

Issue
• Troubles with temperature control:
• Temperature variations in the cabin/cockpit under the
same settings
• Temperature not achieving the set value

Investigation
• Possible contributors:
• Temperature sensor errors
• Low efficiency of air conditioning mixer (H-duct)
• Failure of parts that contribute directly to the temperature control
• Fan-Air valve
• By-pass valve (and/or Trim Valve - optional)
• Disconnection of ducts
• Clogged ducts
• Single and dual-zone aircraft are equally affected
Cabin/Cockpit Temperature Control

Investigation (cont’d.)
• Cabin/cockpit temperature monitored at two different operators
• In Europe and Latin America
• Temperature variations monitored in flight
• Wireless temperature sensors (i-buttons) installed along the cabin and cockpit

i-buttons installed during investigation

Cabin/Cockpit Temperature Control

Solution
• New H-duct (applicable to E190/E195 only)
• Provides better air flow distribution along
NEW
the cabin
• Approximately 40% more mixing volume
than current design
New H-duct
• Successfully in-service evaluated (Mar/2013)
• SB 190-21-0039 (Dec/2013)
• Applicable to single and dual zone configurations
• In-production effectivity from a/c SN 190.666 and on

NEW
• New temperature sensor ejector duct
• Venturi geometry optimization to increase airflow to cabin temperature sensor
• Successfully in-service evaluated (Sep/2013)
• SB 170-21-0059 and SB 190-21-0045) (Jul/2014)
• Applicable to E170/175 and E190/195, single and dual zone configurations
• In-production effectivity from a/c SN 170.406, 190.672 and on
 Cabin Temperature Control

Solution (cont.)
• Temperature readouts from the In-service evaluation
• Aircraft (bottom graphics) equipped with new H-duct and new temperature sensor ejector duct
• Cabin temperature set to 22ºC
*** (Old H-Duct) *** (Old H-Duct)
Pre-mod
Temperatures at the PSU - FWD
Pre-mod
Temperatures at the PSU - AFT

LH Temp at FWD cabin Temp at AFT cabinOLD H‐DUCT

30 30

25 25 OLD EJECTOR
20 RH 20 TEMP. SET TO
15 15
22°C
10 10
FLIGHT PROFILE FLIGHT PROFILE
5 CRZ @ 38kft 5 CRZ @ 38kft
0 0
8:50:00 9:04:24 9:18:48 9:33:12 9:47:36 10:02:00 8:50:00 9:04:24 9:18:48 9:33:12 9:47:36 10:02:00

***
Pos-mod ***
Pos-mod
Temperatures at the PSU - FWD Temperatures at the PSU - AFT
Temp at FWD cabin Temp at AFT cabin
30 30
25 25
20 20
15 15
10 10
FLIGHT PROFILE FLIGHT PROFILE
5 CRZ @38kft 5 CRZ @38kft
0 0
11:00:00 11:14:24 11:28:48 11:43:12 11:57:36 12:12:00 11:00:00 11:14:24 11:28:48 11:43:12 11:57:36 12:12:00
Agenda

Air Management System

• EMBRAER 190/195 Bleed Valve

• EMBRAER 170/175 Bleed Valve
• Cabin/Cockpit Temperature
Control
• AMS Black Label 14
• BLEED 1(2) FAIL Procedure
AMS Black Label 14

Ram Air Inlet Door (RAID) control logic

• On airplanes equipped with Ram Air Inlet Door (RAID), Black Label 14 controls the RAID
deflection, optimizing the amount of ram air sent to the packs
• This modulation decreases drag and fuel consumption
• RAID is part of the Fuel Burn Package

• RAID installation requires Black Label 14 on the aircraft, but the opposite is not true
• If you don’t have RAID installed, you can benefit from installing BL14 (see next slides)
AMS Black Label 14

Improved HPSOV CMC fault messages reliability

• Spurious LH/RH HPSOV (CLOSED) [C1/2]/WRG FAULT message on the CMC, post-
AMS Black Label 11
• Difficult troubleshooting
• Instances when the alarmed HPSOV is still operational, causing unnecessary valves removal

• Black Label 14 revises HPSOV fault logic eliminating spurious HPSOV failed closed
faults
AMS Black Label 14

Pressurization control at Top of Descent (applicable to 190/195 only)

• Revised HPSOV/NAPRSOV control logic to reduce cabin pressure fluctuation during
descent when
• Thrust levers reduced to IDLE
• HPSOV commanded to OPEN

NAPRSOV
HPSOV
AMS Black Label 14

Pressurization control at Top of Descent (applicable to 190/195 only)

Pre-mod BL14 Pos-mod BL14

38000 38000
37000 37000
36000 Pressure Altitude (ft) 36000 Pressure Altitude (ft)
35000 35000
35 40 45 50 55 00 05 10 15 20 25 30 35 35 40 45 50 55 00 05 10 15 20 25 30 35
6500 6350

6000 5850
Cabin Altitude (ft) Cabin Altitude (ft)
5500 5350
35 40 45 50 55 00 05 10 15 20 25 30 35 35 40 45 50 55 00 05 10 15 20 25 30 35
1500
1500
1000
1000
500
500
0
0
Cabin Rate (ft/min) Cabin Rate (ft/min)
-500 -500
-650 ft/min
-1000 -1000
-1100 ft/min
-1500 -1500
35 40 45 50 55 00 05 10 15 20 25 30 35 35 40 45 50 55 00 05 10 15 20 25 30 35

• E190/195 pos-mod Black Label14 behave similar to E170/E175 at Top of Descent

AMS Black Label 14

Misbehavior
• PACK 1 OFF during first engine start
• Related to the emergency ram air valve
built-in test
• Takes approximately 1min30s to
disappear

• FOL 170-2014-023 released in August, 2014

• To be fixed in a future AMS Black Label

software
Agenda

Air Management System

• EMBRAER 190/195 Bleed Valve

• EMBRAER 170/175 Bleed Valve
• Cabin/Cockpit Temperature
Control
• AMS Black Label 14
• BLEED 1(2) FAIL Procedure
BLEED 1(2) FAIL Procedure

Issue
• Editorial error on July/14 revision of ANAC and FAA QRH’s
• Informed via Operational Bulletin 170-001/14 (Jul 31, 2014)
• ANAC and FAA QRH’s revised end of October

BLEED 1 (2) FAIL MESSAGE REMAINS EXTINGUISHED?

Wrong Procedure Correct Procedure

Electrical
and
Avionics
Agenda

Electrical and Avionics

• Printer / LAN issues

• ACARS Freeze on MCDU
• RAT FAIL
• EPIC™ Load Roadmap
• Expanded use of passenger
PEDs
Agenda

Electrical and Avionics

• Printer / LAN issues

• ACARS Freeze on MCDU
• RAT FAIL
• EPIC™ Load Roadmap
• Expanded use of passenger
PEDs
Printer / LAN Issues

Issue
• Printer failures

Investigation
• Test campaign - 2013
• On-wing, Lab, and ground/in-flight testing identified:
• LAN jumper
• LAN lock-up failure mode
Printer / LAN Issues

Actions
• LAN jumper
• Improved new LAN Jumper PN 171-18362-401 available in the Nov/2013
• Larger Radius
• New identification tag tie-down strapping

NEW

Old PN New PN
170-19522-401 171-18362-401
Printer / LAN Issues

Actions
• LAN lock-up failure mode
• Some instances of LAN degradation leading to CMC communication port lock up,
causing interruption of CMC printer spooling
• LAN drop recovery (automatic reset) implemented on EPIC Load 25.5.0.1
• Not final solution, effectiveness expected at approximately 10 -15% reduction in printer failure

Next steps
• Additional investigation supported by a North American Operator – Sep/2014 to
Oct/2014
• Focus on identifying root causes related to CMF
• ACARS uplink messages not being printed
• Lab/on-wing tests with Operator’s Configuration

• Technical Support Follow-up available on E-Forum: F190-23-001

Agenda

Electrical and Avionics

• Printer / LAN issues

• ACARS Freeze on MCDU
• RAT FAIL
• EPIC™ Load Roadmap
• Expanded use of passenger
PEDs
ACARS Freeze on MCDU

Issue
• ACARS page freeze on MCDU

Investigation
• Laboratory findings revealed that the
CMF (Communication Management Function)
stack algorithm was not properly handling
two specific messages

Immediate Action
• Ground reset
• Fault Isolation Manual – FIM TASK 23-24-00-810-868-A
• AOM 13-60: Open the following CB, wait 5 s, then reset: RHCBP MAU 3 PWR 2

Final Resolution
• Embraer is planning a future Epic Load to implement the fix
• Technical Support Follow-up available on E-Forum: F190-23-001
Agenda

Electrical and Avionics

• Printer / LAN issues

• ACARS Freeze on MCDU
• RAT FAIL
• EPIC™ Load Roadmap
• Expanded use of passenger
PEDs
RAT FAIL

Issue #1
• RAT FAIL message without CMC correlation during aircraft power up
Investigation
• RAT FAIL events on aircraft with EICC K5 relay incorporated in the field
• Silicate contamination found on RAT Line Contactor (RLC) auxiliary contacts resulting in not
enough current to close EICC K5 during RAT system PBIT
• Silicone lubricant used on the RLC is the root cause for silicate build-up

Final Resolution NEW

• SB 170-24-0055 and 190-24-0024 released in Jul/2014
• New RLC Part Number (PN 998CA01Y02)
• Lubricant of the Contactor Armature was changed from silicone to fluorine
• EICC Part Number re-identification (new PN) after SB incorporation

• SNLs 170-24-0048 and 190-24-0043 provide further information about new RLC PN
RAT FAIL

Issue #2
• RAT FAIL without CMC correlation after 24 hours of continuous operation

Investigation
• SPDA MICROCOMM command swap (ACTIVE/STANDBY) after 24 hours of continuous
operation
• Command swap occurs to minimize time exposure to dormant failures

Immediate Action
• Aircraft reset (FIM Task 24-23-00-810-806-A)
• SNLs 170-24-0044/190-24-0039 - Recommendations for RAT FAIL events

Final Resolution NEW

• Embraer SB 170-24-0056 /190-24-0025 introducing SPDA Block 12.1 – Oct/2014

• SPDA MICROCOMM command swap will be extended to 50 hours
Agenda

Electrical and Avionics

• Printer / LAN issues

• ACARS Freeze on MCDU
• RAT FAIL
• EPIC™ Load Roadmap
• Expanded use of passenger
PEDs
EPIC® Load Roadmap

Summary

25.5.0.1 27.1 27.2

(PM / PII) (PM) (PM)

ENG REF ECS DSG

ACT
114.
PRE
IVE DM
1
SET E
90 TES
HOL
TFD
DT

Advanced
Fixes NG FMS
Features
EPIC™ Load Roadmap
25.5.0.1 27.1 27.2
(PM/PII) (PM) (PM)

ENG REF ECS DSG

Pentium M&II Configuration

EPIC™ Load 25.5.0.1 – Oct/2014
• Hybrid Pentium II and Pentium M Load
• Printer (LAN drop recovery - automatic reset)
• FCND CMC Fault messages improvements
• Green dot symbol update to consider Ice condition
• Provisions for Engine FADEC Cooling fan
• Provisions for LOPS (Low Oil Pressure Switch)
• Fix ENG REF ECS DISAG
Note: the last 3 features are already available on Load 25.3 for Pentium II aircraft5
Note: FAA aircraft should install Load 25.5.0.1 only after FAA releases revised MMEL with LOPS
Upcoming Load 25.5.0.1 (PII & PM)

FMS fixes for Pentium M aircraft

• Vertical speed at TOD on page PROGRESS 2/3
• Lateral DIRECT-TO with abeam
• Vectors to final course not aligned correctly
• Unmatched window constraints not separated with discontinuity
• Early sequencing of direct legs (Item J of Honeywell SIL D201011000003)
• FMS anticipates CF legs sequencing (Item K of Honeywell SIL D201011000003)
• Incorrect turn due to incorrect leg sequence (Item M of Honeywell SIL D201011000003)

Note: For Pentium II aircraft all these items are already fixed on EPIC Load 25.3

• New Honeywell webportal: pilots.honeywell.com

(select Lineage aircraft)
EPIC™ Load Roadmap

25.5.0.1 27.1 27.2

(PM/PII) (PM) (PM)

ENG REF ECS DSG

Pentium M Configuration
EPIC™ Load 27.1 – Planned Dec/2015
• New Functionalities
• NG FMS
• FANS2
• SmartLanding / SmartRunway
EPIC™ Load Roadmap
25.5.0.1 27.1 27.2
(PM/PII) (PM) (PM)

ENG REF ECS DSG

Pentium M Configuration
EPIC™ Load 27.2 – Planned Dec/2016
• Advanced Features (Requires DU HW 3)
• SmartView
• All terrain related information rendered “behind” PFD indications
• INAV
• Weather Radar RDR4000
• Predictive Windshear detection and Automatic control of antenna tilt for reduced pilot
workload
• Electronic Charts
• Provides the pilot the ability to view electronic charts on the MFD (All Airports, SIDs,
STARs, Approaches, Noise and Airspaces)
Agenda

Electrical and Avionics

• Printer / LAN issues

• ACARS Freeze on MCDU
• RAT FAIL
• Smart Probe™(ADSP) Altitude
Split
• EPIC™ Load Roadmap
• Expanded use of passenger
PEDs
Expanded use of passenger PEDs

InFO 13010, issued by FAA Oct/13

• Method for expanding the allowance of PED use throughout various phases of flight
• PEDs switched ON in Flight Mode, from gate to gate

Process Overview

Aircraft PED Immunity - Technical evaluation of the aircraft

• Back Door Interference Assessment
• PED radio frequency transmissions that are radiated within the aircraft and received by aircraft electronic
systems through their interconnecting wires or equipment enclosures
• Front Door Interference Assessment
• PED radio frequency transmissions that are radiated within the aircraft and are received by aircraft radio
receivers antennas
Expanded use of passenger PEDs

Back door interference

assessment table
• The aircraft system
HIRF and lightning
protection provide
sufficient immunity to
the back door effects of
PEDs

• E-Jets are type

certificated according to
FAA and EASA HIRF
special
Expanded use of passenger PEDs

Front Door Interference

• Embraer performed Interference Path Loss measurements in several antennas to check
if aircraft systems meet FAA RTCA/DO-307 Section 4

• Conclusion of these measurements will be provided under customer request,

commercial conditions apply
• Please contact your Customer Account Manager
Expanded use of passenger PEDs

If compliance with
FAA RTCA/DO-307
Section 4 is not
documented, use
of PED during
Descent and
Approach phases
is limited
• Operator shall
develop
mitigations
according to PED
ARC report,
Appendix F
Flight Controls
Agenda

Flight Controls

• FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH

• SLAT FAIL
• Aileron/Elevator Disconnect
Handles - Inadvertent Actuation
Agenda

Flight Controls

• FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH

• SLAT FAIL
• Aileron/Elevator Disconnect
Handles - Inadvertent Actuation
 FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH

Issue
• FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH resulting from FCS integrity checks

EMBRAER 170/175 EMBRAER 190/195

GS MODULE, 3, 1%
MAU Transitory, 3,
HSTA, 10, 3%
ACMP, 6, 2%
1% P-ACE ACMP, 9, 3%
HSTA, 7, 2% MAU Transitory, 5,
1%
MFS PCU, 18, 5% 65, 19%
P‐ACE, 65, 19% GS MODULE, 9, 3% RESET/RTS, 66, 20%
FCM, 30, 9% Others, 19, 6%
FCM, 26, 8%

Others, 36, 11%

MFS PCU, 28, 8%

P‐ACE, 64, 19%

RESET/RTS, 65, 19%

P-ACE
64, 19%
HS‐ACE, 48, 14%
HS‐ACE, 46, 14%
HS-ACE HS-ACE ELEV/RUD PCU, 52,
ELEV/RUD PCU, 54,
46, 14% ELEV/RUD PCU 16% 48, 14% ELEV/RUD16%PCU
52, 16%
54, 16%
FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH

Tiger Team overview

• Investigation of top Fault Monitors driving Delays & Cancellations (70% major events)
• Tiger Team target for L3M failure rate: 0.046 events/100 SF (E170) & 0.042 events/100
SF(E190)

• CMC Fault messages improvements implemented in EPIC Load 25.5.0.1 NEW

• P-ACE Fault
• P-ACE/PCU/WRG Fault
• MAU/FCM/Fault
• MAU FCM (Can Wrap) Fault
• FCM/LVDT/WRG Fault
• PN Mismatch (P-ACE)
• Aileron surface rigging tolerance increase

• Best Practices & NFF Reduction

• FCND Best Practices SNL released in Nov/2013
• Revised in Jul/2014 to include resets scenario

• Technical Support Follow-up available on E-Forum: F170-27-024

FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH

Solutions Available (Latest Releases) HS-ACE

• HS-ACE (E190) NEW

• New PN 416500-1009 Æ Final solution – Dec/2013
• Embraer SB 190-27-0035 - AC Power Supply monitor resolution

P-ACE
• E170/190 P-ACE NEW
• New Mod E released in Jul/2014
• Honeywell SB A21-1243-009 – Change electronic potentiometer
power supply to prevent loss of P-ACE rigging data when battery
discharges
 FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH

Solutions Available
• Several solutions have been put together in the past years
• Check with your technical teams the status of implementation
in your fleets!
0.18 E‐JETs WWF – Jan/2009 to Aug/2014 – Interruptions Rate – L12M
0.16

0.14
Solutions available
Failure Rate/100 SF

0.12 MFS PCU suffix D

0.1 P-ACE Mod E 0.096

0.08 P-ACE Mod C/D 0.069

0.06 ACMP -4 0.066

0.04 Load 25
0.02 HS-ACE -1005 (E170)
0 HS-ACE suffix B-1009 (E190)
Mar

Mar

Mar

Mar

Mar

Mar
May

May

May

May

May

May
Apr

Apr

Apr

Apr

Apr

Apr
Jan
Feb

Jun

Sep

Jan
Feb

Jun

Sep

Jan
Feb

Jun

Sep

Jan
Feb

Jun

Sep

Jan
Feb

Jun

Sep

Jan
Feb

Jun
Oct

Oct

Oct

Oct

Oct
Nov

Nov

Nov

Nov

Nov
Dec

Dec

Dec

Dec

Dec
Jul
Aug

Jul
Aug

Jul
Aug

Jul
Aug

Jul
Aug

Jul
Aug
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
E170 WWF L12M excl OP1 and OP2 E170 WWF L12M E190 WWF L12M Target
Agenda

Flight Controls

• FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH

• SLAT FAIL
• Aileron/Elevator Disconnect
Handles - Inadvertent Actuation
SLAT FAIL

Issue

• Post-mod outboard slat skew sensors and Gore-Tex harnesses connectors corrosion
due to moisture ingression

Slat Connector with corrosion inside Gore-Tex harness with broken pins
SLAT FAIL

Background
• Significant reduction of SLAT FAIL events on aircraft equipped with
• Gore-Tex harnesses (Nov/2009)
• New Outboard Slat Skew Sensor design (Apr/2011)
ASR EVENTS RATE ‐ SLAT SYSTEM (L12M)
0,009
SLAT HARNESS

0,008

SF‐ACE R.15
0,007
SLAT ACT. SEALING
0,006
RATE PER 100FH

SLAT SKEW SENSOR

0,005

0,004

0,003

0,002

0,001

0
SLAT FAIL

Actions taken
• Improved AMM Task 27-83-01-400-801-A (Outboard Slat Skew Sensor - Installation)
• Corrosion prevention compound application
• Connector torque application

Final Resolution
• New part numbers to include additional sealant protection

Sealant application

Harness Skew sensor

Solution Availability
• Harness – new PN available on AIPC – PIL to be released in Oct/2014
• Skew sensor – new PN available on AIPC – PIL to be released in Dec/2014
Agenda

Flight Controls

• FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH

• SLAT FAIL
• Aileron/Elevator Disconnect
Handles - Inadvertent Actuation
Aileron/Elevator Disconnect Handles - Inadvertent Actuation

Issue
• Inadvertent actuation of the disconnect handles causing delays and cancellations
• Most actuations occur when crew is leaving the cockpit
• Pants cuff hooking
• Boots or shoes hits
• Crew bags hits

Elevator
Aileron
Aileron/Elevator Disconnect Handles - Inadvertent Actuation

Background
• Original handle design was equipped with a trigger underneath the handle which
made it susceptible to get broken and inadvertently actuated
• Current design (2006) brings a push button on the top of the handle and showed to be
robust against hits, however still receiving reports of inadvertent actuation

Original design Current Design

Aileron/Elevator Disconnect Handles - Inadvertent Actuation

Background (cont’d)
• Aileron and Elevator handles can be actuated without pressing the push button,
however, this operation requires higher pull out force
Aileron/Elevator Disconnect Handles - Inadvertent Actuation

Next Steps
• Study to develop a protection in order to prevent inadvertent handle actuations
• Solution must be interchangeable with current handle/pedestal panel design
• Quick application
• Robust against lateral hits

Protection under
evaluation

• Technical Support Follow-up available on E-Forum: F190-27-017

Interiors
Agenda

Interiors

• Escape Slide New Design

• Cockpit Door -
Electromechanical Latch
• Pilot Seat - Lumbar Support
• Lavatory Oxygen Supply
Agenda

Interiors

• Escape Slide New Design

• Cockpit Door -
Electromechanical Latch
• Pilot Seat - Lumbar Support
• Lavatory Oxygen Supply
Escape Slide New Design

Issue
• FWD doors escape slide experienced door stall and pack drop issues

Door stall Pack drop

Interim Actions
• FWD door escape slide reduction of maintenance interval
• SB 4A4030-25A402 (E170) and SB104003-25A403 (E190) –Jul/2011
• Repacking, slide lacing and lower cover flap replacement - every 18 Months
• SB instructions do not reset time since overhaul – every 36 Months
• FAA AD 2011-18-04, ANAC AD 2011-12-01 & 2011-12-02 released in 2011
• No airplane may operate with the forward door escape slide with 18 months or more since
date of manufacture or last repack
Escape Slide New Design

Solution
• New design incorporating a modified release mechanism
• No impact on door structure
• No tooling required to install
• No changes in operational procedures

Current Design Upgraded Design

Packboard

Soft Cover

NEW
• E170/E175 – Goodrich SB4A4011-25-429/SB4A4030-25-428 released Jul/2014
• E190/E195 – Goodrich Service Bulleting expected by 4Q/2014
Escape Slide New Design

Maintenance Requirement Improvement

Current
• FWD escape slide
• 18 MO Repacking
• 36 MO Standard Overhaul
• AFT escape slide
• 36 MO Standard Overhaul

New Design
• FWD/AFT escape slide
• 60 MO Standard Overhaul
• Repacking is not required

Overhaul cycle improvement of 67%

Agenda

Interiors

• Escape Slide New Design

• Cockpit Door -
Electromechanical Latch
• Pilot Seat - Lumbar Support
• Lavatory Oxygen Supply
Cockpit Door - Electromechanical Latch

Issue
• Cockpit ElectroMechanical Door Latch (EMDL) events related to
• Cockpit door locking/unlocking intermittently
• Considerable number of unscheduled removals

Current EMDL PN AS20000075

Manufacturer: Avionics
Cockpit Door - Electromechanical Latch

Final Resolution
• Cockpit Door Control System developed by Adams Rite
• Keeps the same electrical harness, electrical connections and attachment points
• More robust system avoids damages in case of handle “emergency only“ is used inappropriately
• Additional alternative Lock/inhibit Knob

Alternative Lock
Inhibit Knob (manual) EMDL
Door Lock Idle position
Handle

RCDL
Manual
Lock /
unlock
knob

Alternative Lock / Inhibit

Adams Rite - Major components of locking system
Agenda

Interiors

• Escape Slide New Design

• Cockpit Door -
Electromechanical Latch
• Pilot Seat - Lumbar Support
• Lavatory Oxygen Supply
Pilot Seat - Lumbar Support

Issue
• Lumbar support inflating/deflating complaints
• There are two lumbar support designs with different
behavior:
• PN 180300-930-0 has a single vent valve installed
• Volume changes with cabin ΔP (take-off/climb and
landing/approach)
• PN F0449997 has three valves installed
• Volume is maintained whenever pilot’s back is resting against
lumbar support, regardless of ΔP
• New vent valve adjustment is necessary if no pressure against
the backrest for some time (30s to 1 min)
Actions taken
• Zodiac Services SIL 180-09 released in Mar/2013
• Test procedure to evaluate lumbar support PN F0449997
proper functioning in order to avoid unnecessary part
replacements New PN F0449997
Pilot Seat - Lumbar Support

New Mechanical Lumbar Support

• Requires minor modification on the current seat structure
• Provides vertical and bending adjustment
• Backrest foam is designed to have the same external shape of the pneumatic support
• SB expected by Nov/2014

New Sheet
metal

Pneumatic Lumbar Support

Lumbar
Support

Mechanical Lumbar Support Fwd/Aft

Up/Down
New Mechanical Lumbar Support
Video
Agenda

Interiors

• Escape Slide New Design

• Cockpit Door -
Electromechanical Latch
• Pilot Seat - Lumbar Support
• Lavatory Oxygen Supply
Lavatory Oxygen Supply

Issue
• FAA AD 2011-04-09 (Feb/2011) & ANAC AD 2011-02-02 (Mar/2011)
• Requiring lavatory chemical oxygen generators (COGs) to be rendered inoperative
• FAA AD 2012-11-09 (Aug/2012) & ANAC AD 2012-08-04 (Oct/2012) supersede
previous ADs
• Requiring installation of a new lavatory oxygen system in 37 months from release date
• EASA: not applicable

Final Resolution
• Replacement of the current lavatory COGs by Gaseous Oxygen supply source

Current
Lavatory Proposed
Oxygen Lavatory Oxygen
Supply Supply System
System Design (Mock Up)
Design
Lavatory Oxygen Supply

Final Resolution (cont’d)

• New lavatory oxygen system has the same functionality as the current COG
• Sealed and one time use only concept
• Service life (15 years)
• Same activation method
• New mask PN 289-301 Series

• Developed in two sizes: 12 min or 22 min

• Service Bulletins released in Jun/2014

• SB 170-35-0008
NEW
• SB 190-35-0008

New gaseous O2 bottle

Landing Gear
Agenda

Landing Gear

• E170/E175 Shimmy Events

(MLG Radial Tires replacement)
E170/E175 Shimmy Events (MLG Radial Tires replacement)

Issue (E170/E175)
• Main Landing gear significant vibration (shimmy) on E170/E175
E170/E175 Shimmy Events (MLG Radial Tires replacement)

• Although shimming may be strong enough to cause landing gear structural

damage, there is no complete collapse of the MLG strut
• Two Mechanical Fuses:

Shimmy Damper Fuse MLG Shock Strut Crack

E170/E175 Shimmy Events (MLG Radial Tires replacement)

The greater the number of cycles the greater the damages to

the main landing gear

Allowing the airplane to run the runway without reducing speed increases
the number of cycles

Therefore, the best a pilot can do is to apply brakes at

maximum deceleration levels
E170/E175 Shimmy Events (MLG Radial Tires replacement)

Investigation
• Two main aspects to be considered for a shimmy event:

• Landing Speed:
• Higher ground speed, lesser MLG stability
• High and hot airports
• STALL PROT ICE SPEED
• Abnormal landing procedures with inoperative system, i.e. Flap/Slat

• MLG assembly oscillation damping capability:

• Shimmy Damper proper installation and servicing
• MLG backlash: gaps at upper and lower torque links installations within limits
• Tire disturbance capability (ability to generate lateral forces and moments)
• cornering stiffness / self-aligning moment / relaxation length
• For E170/E175 MLG the tire contribution is relevant
E170/E175 Shimmy Events (MLG Radial Tires replacement)

MLG Radial Tire M19601

• Tire was certified based on shimmy modeling fed with tire properties provided by its
manufacturer
• Flight tests, performed in 2014, showed inconsistence with theoretical results:
• Results not complying with 4 % minimum damping criteria
• For a MLG with no backlash with radial tire PN M19601, the ground speed limit should be
reduced from 195 KTAS to only 135 KTAS

Next Steps
• Radial tire PN M19601 removal from AIPC (Jan/2015)

• MLG Backlash inspection / SB

• Improved AMM Task for MLG backlash check (Jun/2015)
• SB 170-32-0066 will be revised to incorporate this new inspection

• New Radial Tire PN

• Bridgestone Radial tire is under final development phases with positive
preliminary results:
• For E170/E175 fleet
In-Service Evaluation starts in Feb/2015
Fleet availability through AIPC by Jul/2015
Structures
Agenda

Structures

• Hard Landing Detection and

Inspection
 Hard Landing Detection - Vertical CG Acceleration Limits

2.6
E170/175 2.6
E190/195
2.5 2.5
Hig
2.4 2.4
ht
2.3 2.3
hre
sho 1
2.2 2.2 ld
2.1 1 2.1
Low
thr
g2 g 2 esh
1.9 1.9
ol d 2
1.8 1.8

1.7 1.7

1.6 1.6

1.5 1.5
21000 24000 27000 30000 33000 36000 39000 28000 31000 34000 37000 40000 43000 46000 49000 52000
Weight (kg) Weight (kg)

1 Do the Phase-II inspection within 10 Flight Cycles, provided no damage is

found on Phase-I

Do the Phase-II inspection at the next scheduled maintenance opportunity

2 (not exceeding 6,250 FC or 7,500 FH) or when 50 hard landing events occur,
whichever occurs first

Reference: AMM 05-50-03-200-801-A HARD LANDING AND OFF-TEMPERATURE ENVELOPE

Hard Landing Detection - ACMF Application

Description (currently available for E190/195 with Pentium M only)

• Hard Landing Aircraft Condition Monitoring Function (HL ACMF) is a Level E data-driven
software application that runs on CMC (the aircraft Central Maintenance Computer)
• HL ACMF monitors ASCB data to determine if any HL condition is satisfied. Once the
trigger condition is satisfied, the snapshot is stored in the CMC and then transmitted via:
• ACARS
• Printer

• HL ACMF does not replace, supersede or have any priority over the hard landing reports
from the flight crew or over the approved method of determination of hard landing
(AMM).
• But it is an additional source of information and may help to avoid possible AOG’s
HL reported HL by DVDR/QAR
by crew (Above High Threshold)

Do Phase-I 10 FC
Yes passed
inspection
since event?
Possible AOG
No
Do Phase-I
Any
Yes Do Phase-II inspection
discrepancy
found? inspection

Any
No Yes discrepancy
found?
10 FC to perform
DVDR/QAR No
analysis 10 FC
after event
HL reported HL triggered HL by DVDR/QAR
by crew by ACMF (Above High Threshold)

Optional ACMF anticipates

this possible AOG
Do Phase-I 10 FC
Yes passed
inspection
since event?
Possible AOG
No
Do Phase-I
Any
Yes Do Phase-II inspection
discrepancy
found? inspection

Any
No Yes discrepancy
found?
10 FC to perform
DVDR/QAR No
analysis 10 FC
after event
Hard Landing Phase I Inspection

General Visual Inspection (GVI) to detect obvious damage, failure or irregularity

on:
• MLG and NLG
• Look for distortions, fractures, leaks, tires condition
• Fuselage
• Look for fluid leaks and damages on wing stub
• Open and close pax and service doors
• Wing
• Look for fuel leak
• Flight Controls
• Flaps retracted and extended
• Flight controls check
• Inspection of the flap rod mechanism
• Engine
• Look for fan blade chafing signs on inlet-cowl

No tool required
Task to open the radome to inspect antenna was moved to Phase II inspection
 New
ACFOG-5774
Previous ACFOG’s

Previous ACFOG’s
Motivation to change
• No easy way to verify applicability of ACFOG‐2247 (170/175)
features and misbehaviors to your fleet ACFOG‐2605 (190/195)
configuration

• Need to provide an applicability/effectivity

table similar to the Operational Bulletins
record

• One ACFOG for E170/175 and other for

E190/E195
• No good for mixed fleet operators
New ACFOG-5774

NEW
ACFOG‐5774
(170/175/190/195)

ACFOG-5774
New ACFOG-5774

Applicability of implemented changes

New ACFOG-5774

Applicability of software misbehaviors

New ACFOG-5774

Previous ACFOG’s New ACFOG

ACFOG‐2247 (170/175) ACFOG‐5774

(170/175/190/195)
ACFOG‐2605 (190/195)

Format and language improvement

Air Management
System
Air Management System – Solutions Available
Issue Follow up Number Related Publication Implementation Main Expected
Efficacy Assessment
(Solution) (E-FORUM - FIP) (Issuance Date) Plan Benefits

New pack by-pass valve, with a

new filter configuration, with an F170-21-022
increased filtering capacity. (ATA 21 - Pack By- SB 170-21-0055
Refer to SB for
Prevents valve failures due to the Pass Valve PN SB 190-21-0043
conditions
premature filter clogging, and 820914-6 Low (Dec/2012)
cabin/cockpit temperature control Reliability) It is expected a Expected Conclusion Date:
difficulties. reduction of 90% in Mar/2015 (re-scheduled to allow an
the rate of PBV and increase of the fleet exposure to the new
FAV removals filters.
caused by
contaminated air Current Status: Solution implementation
New fan-air valve, with a new filter filters. on-going.
configuration, with an increased F170-36-016 SB 170-36-0021
Refer to SB for
filtering capacity. Prevents valve (ATA 36 - Fan-Air SB 190-36-0022
conditions
failures due to the premature filter Valve Low Reliability) (Dec/2012)
clogging.

New h-duct to improve the air flow

distribution inside the cabin, thus SB 190-21-0039
preventing cabin temperature (Dec/2013)
control difficulties. Expected Conclusion Date:
It is expected a Dec/2015.
reduction of 70% in
F170-21-013
reports of cabin Current Status: Preliminary analysis
(ATA 21 - Cabin
Chargeable unable to be concluded in Feb/2014, through an in-
Ambiente
controlled not service evaluation of post-mod aircraft,
Temperature)
associated with showed positive results with cabin
New cabin temperature sensor hardware faults. temperatures differences < 6°C between
ejector-duct to improve the air SB 170-21-0059 the fwd and aft cabin sections.
sampling from the cabin, thus SB 190-21-0045
preventing cabin temperature (Jul/2014)
control difficulties.
Air Management System – Solutions Available
Issue Follow up Number Related Publication Implementation Main Expected
Efficacy Assessment
(Solution) (E-FORUM - FIP) (Issuance Date) Plan Benefits

Expected Conclusion Date:

New BL-14 AMS processor
Dec/2015.
software, which main purpose is
BL-14 expected to
adding the new ram-air door
F170-36-017 SB 170-21-0058 reduce approx. 75% Current Status:
configuration (fuel efficiency pack). It FOC
(ATA 36 - HPSOV SB 190-21-0049 of HPSOV-closed Incorporation of 1% in the WWF (ref.
also addresses the so-called E-190 Active
Closed Message) (May/2014) CMC messages hits. Sep/2014)
pressure bump, and reduces the
Preliminary analysis of available FHDBs,
HPSOV-closed CMC messages
from in-factory incorporated aircraft, shows
hits.
no HPSOV-closed messages.

Reduction greater Solution Proved to Be Effective.

New ODS accessories to make
than 75% in the
the ODS sensors less susceptible F170-36-013 FOC
SB 190-36-0019 number of bleed leak Measured reduction of, at least, 80% in the
to vibrations at the pylon fwd area, (ATA 36 - Bleed Active
(Aug/2012) events at the pylon number of bleed leak events at the pylon
thus preventing BLEED LEAK CAS Leak) (Exp. Sep/2014)
area, due to ODS- area due to ODS-short events.
messages.
short events.

Solution Proved to Be Effective.

New pack outlet ducts and
F170-21-008 It is expected no
belows configuration to prevents SB 170-21-0051
(ATA 21 - Pack FOC events of pack outlet Analysis confirmed no events on aircraft
the disconnection of the pack outlet SB 190-21-0037
Ducts On-Attrition ducts disconnection equipped with the new pack ducts
ducts, and consequent total/partial (Dec/2011)
Disconnection) on post-mod aircraft. configuration.
loss of air flow into the aircraft.
Electrical
and
Avionics
Electrical and Avionics - Solutions Available

Follow-up
Related
Issue Report Productio Implementatio Main Expected Efficacy
Publication
(Solution) (E-Forum – n cut-in n Plan Benefits Assessment
(Issuance date)
FIP)

Solution proved
RAT FAIL events to be effective
correlated to RAT 90% reduction of
GCU CMC UTAS SB Free of Charge RAT FAIL CAS No reported RAT
message RAT GCU
ERPS37G-24-1 On attrition message Fail events
F170-24-017 SN 952
(RAT GCU MOD (MOD DOT 1) From Apr/2011 correlated to related to the
and on RAT GCU
DOT 1 with (Mar/2011) to Mar/2014 RAT GCU during
improved internal a/c power up scenario in post-
circuit) mod A/C as of
Aug/2014

Seal installation
To keep humidity
APU GEN SNL 170-24-0047 is not controlled.
/ electrolyte
Corrosion Efficacy will be
17000374 SNL 190-24-0042 Free of Charge elements out of
F170-24-020 evaluated after
19000645 UTAS SIL 578 Until Dec/2015 the Gen and
(New improved new APU GEN
(Dec/2013) APU gearbox
Seal Plate) housing solution
interface.
is released.
Electrical and Avionics - Solutions Available

Follow-up
Related
Issue Report Productio Implementatio Main Expected Efficacy
Publication
(Solution) (E-Forum – n cut-in n Plan Benefits Assessment
(Issuance date)
FIP)
SNL 170-34-0028
Solution proved
SNL 190-34-0026 to be effective
ADSP UTAS VSIL 95% reduction on
ADSP S/N Current Status:
Delamination 59885-34-0003 Free of Charge delamination
F170-34-009 4326 and 68% of
(Silver Braze UTAS SB On attrition findings in post-
on potentially
removal) 2015G2H2H-34- mod units
affected units
10
retrofitted
(Oct/2010)
SNL 170-34-0028
SNL 190-34-0026 Solution proved
Free of Charge 55% reduction on to be effective
UTAS VSIL
ADSP Heater ADSP S/N On attrition ADSP HTR FAIL
59885-34-0003
Fail (Heater F170-34-011 3018 and From events, after the Current Status:
Element Mod) on UTAS SB retrofit is Retrofit 96%
Aug/2010 to
2015G2H2H-34- concluded complete as of
Dec/2013
09 Aug/2014
(Sep/2009)
Electrical and Avionics - Solutions Available

Follow-up
Related
Issue Report Productio Implementatio Main Expected Efficacy
Publication
(Solution) (E-Forum – n cut-in n Plan Benefits Assessment
(Issuance date)
FIP)

Display Unit
Solution proved to
HW#2 Blanking Display Honeywell SIL be effective
Free of Charge
and Unit D201112000057 No related
On Attrition Current Status:
SW Loading - HW#2 SN Honeywell SB events caused by
from May/2012 Retrofit 71%
1107B165 7037620-31-0002 poor solder joints
to May/2017 complete as of
(HW - MOD 'G' and on (May/2012) Aug/2014
and 'H‘)

Display
Display Unit Addresses
Unit Honeywell SB Free of Charge Expected
HW#3 Blanking issues related to
F190-31-004 HW#3 SN 7036340-31-0004 for units under conclusion date:
blink/blank and
1306XXX (Sep/2014) warranty Dec/2016
(HW - MOD ‘E’) inop faults
X
Electrical and Avionics - Solutions Available

Follow-up
Related
Issue Report Productio Implementatio Main Expected Efficacy
Publication
(Solution) (E-Forum – n cut-in n Plan Benefits Assessment
(Issuance date)
FIP)

Solution proved to
70% reduction of be effective
MCDU HW#1 Honeywell SB
For field Free of Charge MCDU removals
Keyboard F170-34-013 7025725-34-0009 Current Status:
only On Attrition due to keyboard Retrofit 98%
(HW - MOD 'D') (Dec/2008)
failure complete as of
Aug/2014

Solution proved to
MCDU HW#2 MCDU 70% reduction of be effective
Keyboard S/N Free of Charge MCDU removals
F170-34-013 NA Current Status:
(HW Version 8 09020853 On Attrition due to keyboard Retrofit 100%
or higher) and on failure complete as of
Aug/2014
Electrical and Avionics - Solutions Available

Follow-up
Related
Issue Report Productio Implementatio Main Expected Efficacy
Publication
(Solution) (E-Forum – n cut-in n Plan Benefits Assessment
(Issuance date)
FIP)

Honeywell SIL Solution proved

D201205000077 No events of to be effective
MCDU HW#1 MCDU removals
For field (Jun/2012) Free of Charge
Blanking F170-34-013 of Mod 'E' related Current Status:
only Honeywell SB On Attrition
(SW - MOD 'E') to screen Retrofit 96%
7025725-34-001 complete as of
blanking
(Jan/2013) Aug/2014

Solution proved
Free of Charge No events of to be effective
MCDU On Attrition
MCDU HW#2 Honeywell SB MCDU removals
S/N
Blanking F170-34-013 C24-3642-009 from May/2011 of Mod 'E' related Current Status:
11043652
(SW - MOD 'E') (May/2011) to Apr/2016 to screen Retrofit 65%
and on
blanking complete as of
Aug/2014
Flight Controls
Flight Controls - Solutions Available
FCND
Related
Issue Follow-up Report Implementation Main Expected
Publication Efficacy Assessment
(Solution) (E-FORUM - FIP) Plan Benefits
(Issuance Date)

Expected to reduce Expected conclusion date: Nov/2014. First

Command Comparison partial efficacy assessment showed no
E170 / E190 Monitor events which failures.
FLT CTRL NO DISP FOC on attrition basis,
F170-27-019 HNY FSB A21-1243-008 represents 3% (E170) Current Status (Jun/2014): 6% of the fleet
(P-ACE Mod D) until Aug/2018
(Jul/2013) and 10% (E190) of P- retrofitted (E170/E190).
ACE interruptions.
Embraer recommends its application

Expected conclusion date: Dec/2015

Expected to reduce loss
E170 / E190 of rigging events which
FLT CTRL NO DISP FOC on Attrition for 36
F170-27-019 HNY FSB A21-1243-009 represents 13% (E170) Current Status (Jun/2014): Few units
(P-ACE Mod E) months manufactured so far.
(Jul/2014) and 4% (E190) of P-ACE
interruptions.
Embraer recommends its application

Expected conclusion date: Mar/2015.

SB 170-27-0046
Five -1005 boxes were removed up to
(Feb/2013) Feb/2014 and all of them were NFF.
E170 Expected to reduce 60%
FOC upon shop return See Tiger Team update for details.
FLT CTRL NO DISP of HS-ACE removals
F170-27-004 A/C equipped with Retrofit upon operator
(HS-ACE 170) (considering 70% of Current Status (Aug/14): 1%. The low
EPIC Load: discretion
solution effectiveness). implementation number may be explained
25.4 (Pentium M)
due to LOAD requirement.
25.3 (Pentium II)
Embraer recommends its application
Flight Controls - Solutions Available
FCND (Cont’d)
Issue Follow-up Report Related Publication Implementation Main Expected
Efficacy Assessment
(Solution) (E-FORUM - FIP) (Issuance Date) Plan Benefits

Expected conclusion date (final solution): : Dec/2014

E190 Some HS-ACE units with interim solution (suffix B)
were removed due to "AC PWR SUPPLY“ resulting
Interim Solution: Parker SB 416500-27-
Expected to reduce AC in 56% of efficacy (Jun/14).
001 (Jun/2013)
FLT CTRL NO DISP Final Solution: FOC PWR Supply events
F190-27-007 Cut in SN 4500 Up-to-date there are no -1009 removals due to AC
(HS-ACE 190) proactive, until Nov/2016 which represents 30% of
Suffix B for field units PWR Supply monitor.
HS-ACE interruptions.
Final Solution: SB 190-27-0035
Current status for -1009 (Aug/2014): 6% of the fleet
(Dec/2013) retrofitted.

Embraer recommends its application

Conclusion date: Jun/2014
Expected to reduce 2% of
SB 170-29-0027 the FCND events (E-190 Solution proved to be effective. FCND with TP
FOC retrofit on wing overall rate) and 6% of sensor CMC msg correlation has decreased by 95%
SB 190-29-0025
FLT CTRL NO DISP FOC upon shop return in the FCND events (E-170 after SB170-29-0027 and SB190-29-0025
F170-29-008 (Sep/2012)
(Improved ACMP) high pressure failure overall rate). PN (-04) is implementation.
Available until Aug/2015 expected to reduce 70%
Field Implementation only Current Status (Jun/2014): E-170: 57%, E-190: 34%
of FCND messages due
of the fleet retrofitted.
to ACMP.
Embraer recommends its application

Conclusion date: Aug/2014

Parker Expected to reduce 7%
(E170) and 8% (E190 ) of Solution proved to be effective. MTBUR trended up
FLT CTRL NO DISP SL 414800-27-001SL
F170-27-020 On attrition basis the FCND events. Aiming and no shop findings results showing LVDT moisture
(MFS PCU) Cut in SN 6400
to mitigate moisture intrusion (suffix D units).
Suffix D for field units ingression on LVDT.
Current Status: (Jul/2014): 23%

Pentium II (LOAD 25.3)

SB 170-31-0051
Current Status: FAA, ANAC and EASA approved
SB 190-31-0049 FLT CTRL FAULT (MMEL 27-00-00).
FLT CTRL FAULT
NA FOC Active Advisory EICAS message
(LOAD 25.3 and 25.4) Embraer recommends its application
Pentium M (LOAD 25.4) can be dispatched
SB 170-31-0047
SB 190-31-0045
Interiors
Interiors - Solutions Available

Related Commercial
Follow-up Report Production Publication Condition & Main Expected
Issue Efficacy Assessment
(E-FORUM - FIP) cut-in (Issuance Parts Benefits
Date) Availability

Conclusion: Dec/2013
Efficacy: Expected 80%
reduction of the events caused
PILOT SEAT - Lumbar 170: SN Sicma SBs Chargeable Comfort by lumbar support
F170-25-013 331and on 180-25-017 On attrition improvement Final Measurement: It was
Support
Pilot Seat Comfort 190: SN 461. (Dec/2012) basis Installation of new considered a non effective
Issues 481, 484, 180-25-018 (refer to Sicma valves better solution by Operators but in
489 and on (Dec/2012) SIL 180-06) pressure stability terms of project design it is
effective.
Current Status: Mechanical
Lumbar support as optional
Conclusion: Dec/2013
Cargo Compartment Floor Avoid flight Efficacy: Expected 90%
F170-25-003 170: SN 312 Chargeable
Finishing (LEXAN) SB 170-50-0009 delays/maintenance reduction of the events of panel
Cargo Compartment and on (FOC condition
SB 190-50-0009 actions due to floor finishing ripping in service
Floor Panel Finishing 190: SN 360 expired)
Enhanced LEXAN® (Jul/2010) panel finishing Current Status: It has decreased
Wearing Out and on
Flooring Solution ripping in service the number of events in the
world wide fleet in 79%.
Conclusion: Dec/2013
Cargo Compartment Floor Avoid flight Efficacy: Expected 90%
F170-25-003 170: SN 329, Chargeable
Finishing (AERMAT™) SB 170-50-0011 delays/maintenance reduction of the events of panel
Cargo Compartment 337 and on (FOC condition
SB 190-50-0010 actions due to floor finishing ripping in service
Floor Panel Finishing 190: SN 480 expired)
Enhanced AERMAT™ (Aug/2011) panel finishing Current Status: It has
Wearing Out and on
Flooring Solution ripping in service decreased the number of events
in the world wide fleet in 79%.
Interiors - Solutions Available

Related Commercial
Follow-up Report Production Publication Condition & Main Expected
Issue Efficacy Assessment
(E-FORUM - FIP) cut-in (Issuance Parts Benefits
Date) Availability

Slide 170/190 Conclusion: Aug/2019

SB4A4011-25- Chargeable Early Measurement: Aug/2017
Promote more
Escape Slide Stuck and Door 170: SN 366 429 SB4A4030- Efficacy: Eliminate events with
F170-25-001 consistent escape
Stall and on 25-428 Bustle 170/190 door stall and slide stuck
slide performance
SB170-25-0145 FOC until Current Status: Operators are
Jul/2024 incorporating the new slide

170: SN 366,
410 and on
SB 170-35-0008 Comply with the
Lavatory Oxygen Generator F170-35-003 190: SN 672, Chargeable Not Applicable
SB 190-35-0008 FAA requirement
673, 677 and
on
Comply with
Portable Fire Extinguisher PN SN: 371and European
F170-26-005 AIPC Chargeable Not Applicable
RT-A1200 on Regulation
requirement
Conclusion: Jul/2017
Improved overall
Early Measurement: Jul/2015
AMM25-27-01-04 sequence of
Cockpit Door - Installation F190-52-005 Efficacy: Reduction of 85% of
N/A AMM52-51-01-05 N/A installation &
Review Pirep rate in terms of hinge
adjustment
failure and difficult operation
from installation
Landing Gear
Landing Gear - Solutions Available
Issue Follow-up Number Production Related Publication Implementation Main Expected Efficacy
(Solution) (E-Forum – FIP) Cut-in (Issuance date) Plan Benefits Assessment

Solution proved to
170: SN 318 Expected to eliminate
Delay upon LG SB 170-32-0046 be effective
and ON potential missed
Extension (New and FOC for items
F170-32-004 approaches and/or
MLG Uplock SB 190-32-0039 under warranty No reports on post-
190: SN 385 emergency landings
Roller (Sep/2010) mod fleet
and ON cause by this issue

Steering Failure
Solution proved to
on approach
170: SN 328 be effective
(annunciated by SB 170-32-0051 Expected to reduce
and ON
EICAS and FOC on-atrition 75% of annunciated
F170-32-024 80% reduction of
message) or SB 190-32-0044 basis until Jul/2015 events; 100% of non-
190: SN 438, annunciated events
during landing (Jul/2011) annunciated
452 and ON and no non-
(non-
annunciated event
annunciated)

Solution proved to
E190/195 Pylon
be effective
Tube Damage /
Fitting Leakage
Expected to eliminate No reports on post-
(New clamp
190: SN 406, SB 190-29-0023 FOC (until events of hydraulic mod fleet
installation and F190-29-002
409 and ON (Jan/2011) Jan/2014), active leakage at the Leakage at different
replacement of
addressed point point in the same
tubes/fittings if
region under
damaged or
investigation by
misaligned)
FUP190-29-006
Landing Gear - Solutions Available

Issue Follow-up Number Production Related Publication Implementation Main Expected Efficacy
(Solution) (E-Forum – FIP) Cut-in (Issuance date) Plan Benefits Assessment

Expected to eliminate Solution proved to

E190/195 MLG events of retraction be effective
F190-32-006
Retraction 190: SN 340 SB 190-32-0037 FOC (limited to actuator damages at
and
Actuator and ON (Oct/2010) 12,000 FC), active attachment point, No reports on post-
F190-32-020
Damage reducing maintenance mod fleet
cost

Findings
• Reported few cases of chipping and/or damage of sealing on the slot of the bearing
(different from the original issue)
• Limitation is only related to possibility of hard particles contamination of the bearing
• Actuators found with the seal of the bearing slot area, fully or partially damage, may
continue operating in the existing condition for 2,000 FC
• AMM TASK 32-31-00-210-801-A (Main-Landing-Gear Extension/Retraction - General Visual
Inspection ) incorporates fly-by – AR Available since Sep/2014
Landing Gear - Solutions Available

Issue Follow-up Number Production Related Publication Implementation Main Expected Efficacy
(Solution) (E-Forum – FIP) Cut-in (Issuance date) Plan Benefits Assessment

PN -03: FOC kits Solution proved to

170: SN 348, Expected to reduce in
SB 170-29-0027 for on-wing mod. be effective
ACMP 353 and ON 90% events of FCND
and OR chargeable if
Overpressure F170-29-008 due to pump
SB 190-29-0025 NFF for shop mod. No reports on post-
(New ACMP -04) 190: SN 579 overpressure.(Up to
(Sep/2012) PNs -01 and -02 mod fleet
and ON 6% of total FCND)
shop mod only

170/190: A/C No post-mod events

delivered from Expected to reduce of hose breakage
AIPC
Dec/2011 FOC for items 90% events of hose registered
New Brake Hose F170-32-031 (Dec/2011)
under warranty breakage and
(Fracture + and And
170: SN 370 / Chargeable loosening, thus Efficacy regarding
Loosening) F170-32-008 AIPC/AMM
and ON reducing leakage and loosening will be
(Jun/2013)
190: SN 636 LGND measured in
and ON Dec/2014

FOC
Final measurement
(until Jun/15 if out
E190/195 MLG Expected to reduce in Dec/2017
190: SN 625 SB 190-32-0054 R01 of warranty,
Internal Nitrogen F190-32-008 90% events of MLG
and ON (Jun/2013) otherwise warranty
Leakage internal leakage No reports on post-
period +2 years),
mod fleet
on attrition basis.
Landing Gear - Solution Available

Issue Follow-up Number Production Related Publication Implementation Main Expected Efficacy
(Solution) (E-Forum – FIP) Cut-in (Issuance date) Plan Benefits Assessment

Expected to reduce in Solution proved to

Solution
Emergency 90% events of be effective
Vendor Production implemented from
Parking Brake Emergency Parking
F170-32-044 NA Process Improvement switch PN 52-
(EPB) Wrong Brake (EPB) Wrong No reports on post
Jul/2012 615500 / SN 2413
Indication Indication SN fleet
and on.
Structures
Structures - Solutions Available
Related Commercial
Issue Follow-up Report Production Publication Condition & Main Expected
Efficacy Assessment
(Solution) (E-FORUM - FIP) cut-in (Issuance Parts Benefits
Date) Availability

Robustness
FOC
170: SN 325 improvement of Conclusion: Feb/2012
Vertical F170-55-001 SB 170-55-0008 SB 190-55-0003
and on 190: vertical stabilizer Efficacy: 100% effective in eliminating crack
Stabilizer Skin Vertical Stabilizer TE SB 190-55-0003 (FOC condition events
SN 398 and skin area to prevent
Crack Skin Crack (Mar/2011) valid until Current Status: No "post-mod" events reported
on cracks avoiding
May/2015)
maintenance actions

Conclusion: Sep/2016
Efficacy: Expected reduction of 60 to 80%
Floor Structure of floor structure corrosion at the basic check visit
170: SN 273 Avoid the corrosion intervals (6,000 FH)
Corrosion I SB 170-53-0075
F170-25-004 and on 190: process and Early measurement: Sep/2012 and Oct/2014
(Mar/2009)
Floor Structure SN 210, 226, Consumable consequent Current Status: ACFT with combined solution
Cabin Floor SB 190-53-0037 (panels and structure tapes) have reached:
Corrosion 258-260, 263 maintenance actions
Panels (Dec/2009) - Heavy Check (B1) : Around 90% less corrosion
and on and costs
Protection at the protected areas
Heavy Check (B2) : Expected to be measured in
Oct/2014

Conclusion: Sep/2016
Efficacy: Expected reduction of 60 to 80% of floor
structure corrosion at the basic check visit
Floor Structure 170: SN 307 Avoid the corrosion intervals (6,000 FH)
Corrosion II F170-25-004 and on 190: SB 170-53-0085 process and Early measurement: Sep/2012 and Oct/2014
Floor Structure SN 343, 345, SB 190-53-0045 Consumable consequent Current Status: ACFT with combined solution
Floor Beam Corrosion 347, 349 and (Mar/2010) maintenance actions (panels and structure tapes) have reached:
Protection on and costs - Heavy Check (B1) : Around 90% less corrosion
at the protected areas
Heavy Check (B2) : Expected to be measured in
Oct/2014
Structures - Solutions Available
Related Commercial
Issue Follow-up Report Production Publication Condition & Main Expected
Efficacy Assessment
(Solution) (E-FORUM - FIP) cut-in (Issuance Parts Benefits
Date) Availability
AMM TASK
Conclusion: Oct/2013
54-50-00-200- Provide deferral
Efficacy: Expected reduction from 60 to 80%
Aerodynamic Seals 801-A instructions for
on delays for deteriorated seals at affected
Issues AMM TASK minor damage,
F170-57-004 operators. Reduction around 20% of seal
55-00-00-200- avoid premature
Aerodynamic Seals N/A N/A parts replacement during heavy maintenance
801-A replacement
Issues checks.
Operational AMM TASK reducing operational
Conclusion: Up to 67% less interruptions for
Impacts 57-00-00-200- and maintenance
most affected operator and over 30% less
801-A cost impact
replacements in the HMC
(Nov/2011)

New windshield
solution
incorporates slightly
Windshield Conclusion: Sep/2019
design
Delamination & F170-56-002 170: SN 374 Efficacy: Expected improvement in 25% of
improvements in
Shattering Windshield and on AIPC Rebate program average in service life of the equipment.
order to enhance
Delamination & 190: SN 642 (Sep/2013) (PPG) Early measurement: Sep/2015 & Sep/2017
the barrier against
New improved Shattering and on Current Status: Solution just released and
moisture
Windshield under incorporation
deterioration and
extend in service life
of units

New improved cable Conclusion: Dec/2016

SB 170-52-
presents less motion Efficacy: Eliminate events of escape slide
0058
Escape Slide NEW 190: SN 570 Discount for and better selaing cable failures on POST MOD aircraft
F170-52-015 SB 190-52-
Flexball Cable and on proactive retrofit capability to avoid Early measurement: May/2015
0042
premature damage Current Status: No "post-mod" events
(Dec/2012)
or deterioration reported
Structures - Solutions Available

Follow-up Related Commercial

Main
Issue Report Producti Publication Condition &
Expected Efficacy Assessment
(Solution) (E-FORUM - on cut-in (Issuance Parts
Benefits
FIP) Date) Availability
FOC
190: SN Efficacy: No Post mod events is expected
Spoiler Actuator Fitting SB 190-57-0049 (FOC condition To eliminate crack
F190-57-012 639, 640, Current Status: No "post-mod" events
Failure (Dec/2013) valid until in the Fitting
655 and on Reported
Sep/2017)

FOC
190: SN To eliminate crack Efficacy: No Post mod events is expected
Wing Upper Panel Crack SB 190-57-0049 (FOC condition
F190-57-010 639, 640, in the upper panel Current Status: No "post-mod" events
at Trailing Edge (Dec/2013) valid until
655 and on at trainling edge Reported
Sep/2017)

170: SN Conclusion: Dec/2015

358 thru To avoid damaged Early measurement: Nov/2014
PAX & Service Doors SB170-52-0061
F170-52-010 360, 374 harness and strap Efficacy: 90% reduction of delays on harness
Harness and Bonding SB190-52-0046 Chargeable
and on associated with and strap damage
Strap (Nov/2013)
190: SN delays Current Status: No "post-mod" events
645 and on reported
Conclusion: Nov/2015
Bonding Jumpers 170: SN
F170-52-012 Reduction of flight Efficacy: None flight interruptions due to broken
360,374 and SB170-52-0061
PAX and Service interruptions due bonding jumpers
New bonding straps and on SB190-52-0046 Chargeable
Doors Bonding 190: SN 645 to broken bonding Early Measurement: Nov/2014
the sensor harness (Nov/2013)
Strap Damages and on jumpers Current Status: Operators are incorporating
protector
the new solution
 Structures - Solutions Available
Follow-up Related Commercial
Main
Issue Report Producti Publication Condition &
Expected Efficacy Assessment
(Solution) (E-FORUM - on cut-in (Issuance Parts
Benefits
FIP) Date) Availability

190: SN
Conclusion: Dec/2016
637 and on SB 170-53-0104
To avoid corrosion Efficacy: Expected reduction of 80% for
Cargo Door Frame Area I (Sep/13)
F170-53-011 Chargeable in the cargo door corrosion at the basic check (6,000 FH)
Drain holes and sealing 170: SN SB 190-53-0067
seal Current Status: No "post-mod" events
358 , 360 , (Sep/2013)
reported
373 and on

190: SN Conclusion: Dec/2016

655 and on SB 170-53-0105 To avoid corrosion Efficacy: Expected reduction of 80% for
Cargo Door Frame Area II
F170-53-011 SB 190-53-0068 Chargeable in the cargo door corrosion at the basic check (6,000 FH)
Sill rubber barriers & seal
170: SN (Feb/2014) seal Current Status: No "post-mod" events
385 and on reported

SB190-51-0002
Polyurethane Films Considerable cost Conclusion: Feb/2015
170: SN (Mar/2013)
F170-00-002 reduction of parts Efficacy: expectation of maintenance cost
324 and on SB190-51-0003
Plan film material instead F190-00-004 compared to pre- reduction related to polyurethane film
190: SN (Nov/2013) Consumable
of pre-formed boot and Polyurethane formed boot films Early Measurement: Sep/2014
425 and on SB170-51-0003
new installation procedure Films and durability Current Status: Operators are incorporating the
(May/2013)
increase new solution

FOC
To protect the water
and waste box
(190: FOC Conclusion: Apr/2016
190: SN 536 against corrosion
SB190-53-0056 condition valid
and on with this new Efficacy: Expected reduction from 60 to 80%
(Apr/2012) until Apr/2014)
Water and Waste box F170-53-012 SB170-53-0095
installation, of corrosion at the basic check visit intervals
170: SN 352 avoiding water (6,000 FH)
(Aug/2012) (170: FOC
and on accumulation and Current Status: No "post-mod" events reported
condition valid
premature corrosion
until Aug/2014)
as a consequence.
Expired