JURY NULLIFICATION

A VIEW OF THE UNTOLD TRUTH FOR SPC/HDC;

ARE YOU LEGAL AND EQUITY TITLE OWNER
OF YOUR ESTATE OR ARE YOU A LEGALLY INCOMPETENT MINOR?

04/17/2023

"It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen from
falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the
Government from falling into error." American Communications v Douds,
339 US 382 (1950)

Luke: 11:46 “And you experts in the law, woe to you, because you load
people down with burdens they can hardly carry, and you yourselves
will not lift one finger to help them.”

People ask me all the time, how do I get out of jury duty? Well,
that’s a loaded question, so I ask them are you a 14 th amendment legal
fiction US Citizen, aka legally incompetent minor in the nature of 31
CFR 363.6 that is unable to judge both the facts and the law? If yes,
well…then, you qualify for jury duty and you should absolutely serve
to perpetuate the fraud of our so called non-constitutional article 1,
administrative courts that charge legal fictions (in res) with a
commercial crime and make the living man the responsible party (in
rem) as the surety to go to jail and refuse his remedy in equity.

For SPC/HDC people, you have been awakened to the facts that something
isn’t right about our courts and you are seeking your remedy. So let’s
take a basic look of how to solve this riddle of jury duty and jury
nullification, then juxtapose it against what the courts want you to
believe.

First, we know that regulatory infraction, legislative jurisdiction

“LJ” issues fall under 27 CFR 72.11 “commercial crimes defined” – no
injured party and nobody claiming a debt to settle. This does NOT
include murder, rape, or arson as those are common law crimes. All LJ
cases are technically offenses against the revenue laws due to the
secret statute staple Miller Act court bond (GSA SF 24, 25, 25A, 28,
273, 274, 275). See IRS 1099 A, C Instructions (page 3 “who must file”
and page 4, “when is a debt canceled”)

Commercial crimes. Any of the following types of crimes (Federal

or State): Offenses against the revenue laws; burglary;
counterfeiting; forgery; kidnapping; larceny; robbery; illegal
sale or possession of deadly weapons; prostitution (including
soliciting, procuring, pandering, white slaving, keeping house of
ill fame, and like offenses); extortion; swindling and confidence
games; and attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, or
 compounding any of the foregoing crimes. Addiction to narcotic
drugs and use of marihuana will be treated as if such were
commercial crime.

Second, we know that the court pleadings and charges are always
brought as THE STATE OF X v JOHN INCOMPENT MINOR, which can be
properly interpreted as THE eSTATE OF X v JOHN INCOMPETENT MINOR
ESTATE, with the caption box below as john:competent-major, living
man, Real Party in Interest, Third Party Intervenor, Secured Party
Creditor, Holder In Due Course.

eSTATE OF CALIFORNIA, )
Plaintiff. )
)
v. )
)
JOHN INCOMPETENT MINOR ESTATE,)
Defendant. )
______________________________)
john:competent-major, )
living man, sui juris, )
Real Party In Interest, )
Third Party Intervenor, )
Secured Party Creditor, )
Holder In Due Course )
______________________________)

We know this when you understand the case Hale v Henkel, 201 US
43 (1906):

“Furthermore, there is a clear distinction between an

individual and a corporation, and that the former has the
right to stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen.
He is entitled to carry his private business in his own way.
His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the
United States, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond
the protection of his life and property. His rights are such
as exists by the law of the land long antecedent to the
organization to the State and can only be taken away from
him by due process of law, and in accordance with the
constitution.”

We know this when you understand the case Penhallow v. Doane’s

Administrators, 1 L Ed 507, 3 Dall 54 (1795) as the courts can
only deal with fictions:
 “In as much as every government is an artificial person, an
abstraction, and a creature of the mind only, a government
can interface only with other artificial persons, the
imaginary, having neither actuality nor substance, is
foreclosed from creating and attaining parity with the
tangible. The legal manifestation of this is that no
government, as well as any law, agency, aspect, court, etc.,
can concern itself with anything other than corporate,
artificial persons and the contracts between them.”

The Court, Judge, respondent, all BAR members involved in this

case, and all applicable Law Enforcement admit, acknowledge, and
stipulate, that the premises are true and correct.

Congress, before and after the articles of confederation, had

authority to institute a Court of Appeals, with jurisdiction to
hear and determine all appeals from courts of Admiralty in their
respective states, in cases of capture page 79 to 85, 91, 109,
113.

Being the highest court, its decision was final, and could not be
opened or reviewed collaterally in another court, as to
jurisdiction, or errors, or irregularities page 85, 86, 96, 103,
116.

Congress, during the revolution, had the supreme sovereign power

of war and peace page 80, 95, 111.

The district court and jurisdiction of a libel to carry into

execution a decree of the Court of Appeals, and a prize case,
after the latter court has expired. Page 86, 97, 98.

Third, we know that post Erie Railroad v Tomkins, 304 US 64; the
courts finally allowed the legal fiction into a common law court – a
natural person filed suit against a corporation. Law and equity were
officially combined to create Civil Law. Then in 1966 Civil Law was
joined with the Uniform Commercial Code [PL 88-243] and the
transformation was complete. If you want further proof refer to the
definition of a person per 26 USC § 7701(a)(1) “individual) (aka
“minor”; 31 CFR § 363.6) vs. 28 USC 3002(10); and you will see
the “natural person” appear in the definition of a person.

This now begs the question of how do you get out of jury duty
and/or invoke jury nullification?
Depending on how you interpret this, your job may be to protect
the rights of the named Defendant from the corrupt tyrants.
During the process of voir dire, ie. jury selection, you will be
asked a series of questions to see if you are in/competent to
serve. Your first response is to inform the Court that you cannot
possibly be a legal fiction 14th amendment US Citizen, which was
created by and owned by the bankrupt debtor United States Inc.
See Florida Secretary of State Business filing number 100009:

https://search.sunbiz.org/Inquiry/CorporationSearch/
SearchResultDetail?inquiryType=DocumentNumber&aggregateId=domp-
100009-5f172c55-c788-4f81-aa28-
1a68b778486b&directionType=Initial&searchNameOrder=UNITEDSTATES
%201000090&searchTerm=100009

and is domiciled in Washington DC as a debtor – see location of

debtor UCC § 9-307(h). There is a diversity issue in the nature
of 28 USC § 1332 in regard to whether your estate can be
domiciled in Washington DC and you serve in the STATE OF X at the
same time. Of course, this begs the question of whether or not
you corrected your status to that of a State National, which is
out of scope for this discussion. See also:

“A citizen of the United States is a civilly dead entity

operating as a co-trustee and co-beneficiary of the Public
Charitable Trust, the constructive, cestui que trust of the
United States, Inc. under the 14th Amendment, which upholds the
debt of the United States of America and the United States,
Inc.” Congressional Record, June 13, 1967, pp. 15641-15646.

Second, you are a secured party creditor and holder in due course
of your estate. You have revoked and revested legal and equitable
title under the merger rule away from your common-law trustee.
You are the legal and equity title owner of your estate and are
competent to judge both the facts and the law because you are not
a legally incompetent minor in the nature of 31 CFR § 363.6. The
United States Attorney General, alien property custodian, common
law trustee, per 50 USC § 4312, is not the legal title owner to
your estate. However, he would be the proper party to serve on
behalf of the named Defendant, which is an estate and the natural
person is the beneficiary.

Third, you should ask the Prosecutor and Judge what the 6 th
Amendment “nature” of the case is. The only possible answer is
“commercial” as you learned above from 27 CFR 72.11. You should
inform the Judge that if it is commercial, then there must be a
remedy. This technically falls under Faretta v California, 422 US
806 (1975), and the Defendant is supposed to present this
question to the Judge for a written response. If there is no
response it is a reversible major error that can be used to
vacate the case on appeal.

Fourth, you should ask the Prosecutor and the Judge to tell you
which of the four (4) law form jurisdictions the Defendant is
being tried under. According to the U.S. Constitution, Article 3,
§ 2, there are only 4 law for jurisdictions; law, equity,
admiralty, and maritime. The law only affords the court to bring
a criminal charge against the Defendant under 2 criminal
jurisdictions. The first one being under the common-law. And the
second one being under admiralty. However, there is a conundrum
here. Post Erie Railroad v Tomkins, 304 US 64. Federal common law
no longer exists. So it can’t possibly be a common-law crime even
if the Defendant did injure another living wo/man because you are
not in an Article III constitutional, common-law court!
Therefore, the only possible option is colorable admiralty
jurisdiction (aka ”statutory”). In my personal view, the court
“does not get their cake and get to eat it too.” Since they
created a bid bond (evidenced by the IRS 1099 A and CUSIP) to
open the case trust, which is a security at bar, and took the
secured property from the minor account, that means the only real
issue before the court is the accounting. Once the court is
instructed to setoff, settle, balance the account to zero $0,
discharge, and adjudicate the claims (28 USC § 2041, 31 CFR §§
203, 225.7, 363.6, 28 USC § 2045) there is no controversy and
therefore the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. If you
have ever been to a sentencing, you’ll see the case trustee
(Judge) reads the charges into the record and then finishes with
an accounting, which is triable and collectable upon the
commencement of a civil trial. The real question is did the
Judge, Prosecutor, and Defense Attorney (Trustees for the
Defendant’s Estate) sign the J&C file (Judge’s order and
confinement) and accept the commercial liability? The J&C file is
never signed because of their fiduciary liability to the named
Defendant, who is the Beneficiary of the case trust securities.
The proof is you can request a copy of the J&C file from the
Clerk of the Court. The Defendant is literally in jail/prison
voluntarily.
 Matt 5:25-27
“Settle matters quickly with your adversary who is
taking you to court. Do it while you are still together
on the way, or your adversary may hand you over to the
judge, and the judge may hand you over to the officer,
and you may be thrown into prison. Assuredly I say to
you, you will by no means get out until you have paid
every last penny.”

Other resources: Mixed Jurisdiction: Common Law vs.

Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified), Prof. William
Tetley, Q.C. (1999). Arrest, Attachment, and Related
Maritime Law Procedures, Prof. William Tetley, Q.C.
Tulane Law Review, Vol. 73: 1895-1985.

Fifth, you should ask the Prosecutor and Clerk of the Court to
produce all the exculpatory evidence of the IRS 1099 A, MoneyNet
Daily Transfer Log 120, CUSIP and statute staple Miller Act Bond
under Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963) and the unclean hands
doctrine (See Writ of Mandate section 31:17 and UCC § 8-114 – the
signatures on the bond documents were forged) for your inspection
of the facts of the case. Technically, the Prosecutor has
committed a felony by opening the case with a forged bond by
violating 18 USC §§ 472, 475, 2073, and SEC Rule 10B-5 The
Omnibus Crime Control Act, and US v Giordano 416 US 505. The
USAG/DOJ and Congress never authorized the Prosecutor, Clerk of
the Court, or the State to create and sell forged securities to
the United States. The Prosecutor and Clerk of Court are engaged
in trespassing (Erie Railroad v Tomkins, 304 US 64) on the
Defendant’s minor estate in restraint of trade per 15 USC §§ 1-2.
You can demand to go into chambers with the Judge and inspect the
bond securities “in camera” using his securities terminal (TT&L
31 CFR § 203).

You can also demand that a court of equity be enacted to deal

with the bonds and the accounting and that you as the jury will
take on the role of a Master in Chancery and to examine everyone
under oath of penalty of perjury.

Remember, your job is to inspect ALL the FACTS and this is

evidence of FACTS.
Sixth, you can inform the Judge that unless your questions are
answered, you will invoke jury nullification as your sovereign
authority under Chisolm v Georgia, 2 US 419, Guaranty Trust v
Henwood, 307 US 247 and Perry v United States, 294 US 330
“sovereignty resides in the people” and you are demanding the
remedy be applied in the nature of 40 STAT 411 § 7e, HJR 192, PL
73-10, 48 STAT 112, currently codified at 31 USC § 5118(d)(1,2)
and 26 USC § 6325 “Release of lien or discharge of property”. If
the Judge refuses to invoke the remedy, you should come pre-
prepared with an IRS Form 56 (attached for reference) and
instruct him to fill out all the IRS forms in accordance with 31
CFR § 225.7, 31 CFR § 203, 31 CFR § 363.6, and 28 USC § 2041 to
adjudicate the clams of the creditors that have invested in the
bonds and pay/discharge the bond’s penal sum amount. He is to
immediately probate the estate of the Defendant to setoff,
settle, balance the account to zero $0, and discharge the
liabilities and end the case. If he refuses, you can instruct him
that you are revoking and revesting legal and equity title of the
Defendant’s cestui que trust and collapsing his trust so he can
discharge the liabilities. If he still refuses, you can revoke
his power of attorney over the Defendant’s Estate. If you have
the CUSIP for your Birth Certificate Bank Note Bond you know that
his could be in the millions of dollars. He has a right to have
the bond or its value returned to him as the owner of the
property in the nature of Norton v Shelby County, 118 US 425
(1886). This can be accomplished by filing IRS Forms 1099 A -> B
or OID -> C for the Defendant Estate.

Seventh You can demand that the Clerk of the Court, the
Magistrate, the Prosecutor, and the defense counsel place their
oath to the constitution and their surety bond on the public side
of the court or admit that the court is operating outside the
constitution as an article 1 administrative court under the
contract clause of the constitution (US Const. Article 1, Section
10, CA Const. Article 1, Section 9). That what they are actually
doing is probating the decedent estate under the authority of the
Trust Indenture Act 1939. That the court is operating in
ministerial capacity and not in judicial capacity by regulatory
infraction, legislative jurisdiction.

While you’re at it, you can inspect more facts and demand that
all the BAR actors produce a state issued license to practice
law.
Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall 333, 370 (1866), authorizes only the
practice of law in the courts as an officer of the court and a
member of the judicial branch of government, to represent wards
of the court such as infants [aka “minor” see 31 CFR 363.6] and
persons of unsound mind [i.e. fictions at law] and as a public
defender in criminal cases.

These are NOT article III judicial courts. They are article 1
administrative courts!

A state “. . . cannot license an occupation of common right . . .

,” Redfield v. Fisher, 292 P. 813, 817-819.

Corpus Juris Secundum; Volume 7, Section 4 – Attorney & client:

The attorney’s first duty is to the courts and the public, not to
the client, and wherever the duties to his client conflict with
those he owes as an officer of the court in the administration of
justice, the former must yield to the latter.”

Their first duty is therefore to probate the decedent’s estate.

Trinsey v Pagliaro D.C.Pa. 1964, 229 F. Supp. 647. Attorneys

cannot testify. The attorney was not a first hand witness. “An
attorney for the Plaintiff cannot admit evidence into the court.
He is either an attorney or a witness.”

“The practice of law cannot be licensed by any State.” Schware v.

Board of BAR Examiners, 353 US 232

“The practice of law is an occupation of common right.” Sims v

Aherns, 271 SW 720.

So what kind of simulated legal process are these non-judicial

courts? It’s all fake color-of-law, charging a legal fiction
(res) as a natural person (rem) to probate and embezzle money
from their minor account and refuse the remedy to setoff and
discharge the debt. Why would you even want to be a part of this
fraud if you didn’t intend to be on a jury to strike down every
single commercial case and to send a clear message to the
legislature that we are onto their bondage crimes against the
people?

Eighth Only a US Citizen can serve on a jury. That means that you
admit that you are a legal fiction under the 14th Amendment and
you admit that you are perpetuating the fraud of the bankrupt
debtor called the [corporate] United States. See 28 USC §
3002(15) “United States means…a Federal corporation” and UCC § 9-
307(h) “Location of the debtor… the United States is located in
the District of Columbia”. Is your estate [ie. not you as the
natural person] located/residing in DC??? Whatever kind of fraud
they are trying to pull off in terms of location and residency,
“individual” [26 USC 7701(a)(30), (a)(1)] being a Grantor Trust
operating under the USAG as your common law trustee 50 USC § 4312
vs. a natural person [28 USC § 3002(10)] they can suck it!

Next look toward what is a citizen. See 8 USC § 1101(a)(21) “The

term “national” means a person owing permanent allegiance to
a state.”

vs.

What they want you to believe under 8 USC § 1101(a)(22) is “The

term “national of the United States” means (A) a citizen of
the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of
the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United
States.”

Do you reside in and owe a permanent allegiance to a bankrupt

debtor???

What kind of citizen are you? Jones v Temmer, 829 F. Supp. 1226
(1993);
"The privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protects very few rights because it neither incorporates any of
the Bill of Rights nor protects all rights of individual
citizens. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 21
L.Ed. 394 (1873). Instead, this provision protects only those
rights peculiar to being a citizen of the federal government; it
does not protect those rights which relate to state citizenship."

Finally, realize that your choice of citizenship falls under the

case Afroyim v Rusk, 387 US 253, which held that citizenship is
protected under the 14th amendment and that the United States
cannot force citizenship onto you and that you have a right to
expatriate under 8 USC § 1481. As many of you know, those who are
SPC/HDC have taken this step to correct their citizenship status
to that of a State/American National to separate themselves from
the legal fiction. Now, that does not exclude you from being held
responsible for breaking any [commercial, 27 § CFR 72.11] laws,
but it’s one step closer to them recognizing that the USAG under
50 USC § 4312 is no longer your common law trustee [holding legal
title] for your estate and therefore, they do not have in
personam jurisdiction over you as a natural person. For the over
achiever you can also research 18 USC § 112, PL 94-467, and PL
92-539 if you want to become an “internationally protected
person” as a full sovereign creditor.

Nineth The last trick I like to pull on the Clerk of the Court,
the Magistrate/Judge, the Prosecutor, and the Defense Counsel is
to bring in an IRS Form 56 Notice Concerning Fiduciary
Relationship and hand it to each of them and have them sign it
and put it on the public side of the court as a matter of
formality as they are already the Trustees under 50 USC § 4321 /
28 USC § 281. Let them know that the named Defendant is a
decedent estate and they are required to setoff and discharge the
liabilities in accordance with 31 USC § 3218 Proof of Death to
Support Payment and 26 USC § 2002 Liability for Payment “The tax
imposed by this chapter shall be paid by the executor.” If the
magistrate/judge is the executor, it is clearly his job to pay
the taxes on the court bond per 31 CFR 203, 31 CFR 225.7, 31 CFR
363.6 and to adjudicate the claims of the creditors under 28 USC
§ 2041. Or we could simply fill out a GSA Bond and arrest and
attach their BAR bond to the case CUSIP securities and force the
discharge under 31 USC § 3123; UCC § 3-419, 48 CFR Ch. 1 §
53.228, “Good as Aval”, as the accommodation party.

Note: every case that I have given you is Shepardized, which

means they are currently in use by the US Supreme Court and all
lower courts.

I have personally had 2 entire jury pools thrown out for asking
these questions of law, equity, admiralty, and maritime
jurisdiction!

Below is a brief on the history of what they [BAR actors and

Judges] want you to believe. Of all places, I must admit that
Wikipedia actually has a decent interpretation and historical
reference. You won’t find much else on this topic if you do
further research. This should be more than sufficient. Notice
that there is so much controversy involved with the concept of
jury nullification that it should be intuitive to believe that
there is something inherently wrong with the legislature and the
judicial branch as they progress away from a constitutional
republic to democratic socialism and communism. See Article 4, §
4 U.S. Constitution which “…guarantees a republican form of
government to every state.”

Luke 11:52 – BAR MEMBERS AND JUDGES

“Woe to you lawyers! For you have taken away the key of
knowledge. You did not enter in yourselves, and those who were
entering in you hindered.”

Matthew 23:12 - LEGISLATORS

“Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, you hypocrites! You shut the
kingdom of heaven in men's faces. You yourselves do not enter,
nor will you let in those who wish to enter.”

Luke 11:46 – USAG ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN COMMON LAW TRUSTEE

"Woe to you as well, experts in the law!" He replied. "You weigh

men down with heavy burdens, but you yourselves will not lift a
finger to lighten their load.”

Jury nullification (US/UK), jury equity[1][2] (UK), or a perverse

[3][4]
verdict (UK) occurs when the jury in a criminal trial gives a not
guilty verdict regardless of whether they believe a defendant has
broken the law. The jury's reasons may include the belief that the law
itself is unjust,[5][6] that the prosecutor has misapplied the law in the
defendant's case,[7] that the punishment for breaking the law is too
harsh, or general frustrations with the criminal justice system. Some
juries have also refused to convict due to their own prejudices in
favor of the defendant.[8] Such verdicts are possible because a jury has
an absolute right to return any verdict it chooses.[9]
Nullification is not an official part of criminal procedure, but is
the logical consequence of two rules governing the systems in which it
exists:

1. Jurors cannot be punished for passing an incorrect verdict.[10]

2. In many jurisdictions, a defendant who is acquitted cannot be
tried a second time for the same offence under the 5th Amendment.
[11]

A jury verdict that is contrary to the letter of the law pertains only
to the particular case before it. However, if a pattern of acquittals
develops in response to repeated attempts to prosecute a particular
offence, this can have the de facto effect of invalidating the law.
Such a pattern may indicate public opposition to an unwanted
legislative enactment. It may also happen that a jury convicts a
defendant even if no law was broken, although such a conviction may be
overturned on appeal. Nullification can also occur in civil trials,
[12]
but (unlike in criminal trials) if the jury renders a not liable
verdict that is clearly at odds with the evidence, the judge can issue
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or order a new trial.[13]

BACKGROUND
In the past, it was feared that a single judge or panel of government
officials might be unduly influenced to follow established legal
practice, even when that practice had drifted from its origins. In
most modern Western legal systems, judges often instruct juries to act
only as "finders of fact", whose role it is to determine the veracity
of the evidence presented, the weight accorded to the evidence,[14] to
apply that evidence to the law as explained by the judge, and to reach
a verdict; but not to question the law itself. Similarly, juries are
routinely cautioned by courts and some attorneys not to allow sympathy
for a party or other affected persons to compromise the fair and
dispassionate evaluation of evidence. These instructions are
criticized by advocates of jury nullification. Some commonly cited
historical examples of jury nullification involve jurors refusing to
convict persons accused of violating the Fugitive Slave Act by
assisting runaway slaves or being fugitive slaves themselves, and
refusal of American colonial juries to convict a defendant
under English law.[15]
Jury nullification is the source of much debate. Some maintain that it
is an important safeguard of last resort against wrongful imprisonment
and government tyranny.[16][17] Others view it as a violation of the right
to a jury trial, which undermines the law.[17] Some view it as a
violation of the oath sworn by jurors. In the United States, some view
the requirement that jurors take an oath to be unlawful in itself,
while still others view the oath's reference to "deliverance"
to require nullification of unjust law: "will well and truly try and a
true deliverance make between the United States and the defendant at
the bar, and a true verdict render according to the evidence, so help
[me] God". United States v. Green, 556 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
[18]
Some fear that nullification could be used to permit violence
against socially unpopular factions.[19] They point to the danger that a
jury may choose to convict a defendant who has not broken the letter
of the law. However, judges retain the rights both to decide sentences
and to disregard juries' guilty verdicts, acting as a check against
malicious juries. Jury nullification may also occur in civil suits, in
which the verdict is generally a finding of liability or lack of
liability (rather than a finding of guilty or not guilty).[20]
The main ethical issue involved in jury nullification is the tension
between democratic self-government and integrity.[21] The argument has
been raised that prosecutors are not allowed to seek jury
nullification, and therefore defendants should not be allowed to seek
it either.[22] However, for a prosecutor to nullify a law in this
context would require negating the presumption of innocence. (For this
reason, prosecutorial nullification is typically defined as declining
to prosecute.)[23]
Nevertheless, there is little doubt as to the ability of a jury to
nullify the law. Today, there are several issues raised by jury
nullification, such as:

1. whether juries can or should be instructed or informed of their

power to nullify.
2. whether a judge may remove jurors "for cause" when they refuse to
apply the law as instructed.
3. whether a judge may punish a juror for practicing jury
nullification.
4. whether all legal arguments, except perhaps on motions in
limine to exclude evidence, should be made in the presence of the
jury.

In some cases in the United States, a stealth juror will attempt to

get on a jury in order to nullify the law. [24] Some lawyers use a shadow
defense to expose the jury to information that would otherwise be
inadmissible, hoping that evidence will trigger a nullification.[25][26]

COMMON LAW PRECEDENT

The early history of juries supports the recognition of the de
facto power of nullification. By the 12th century, common law courts
in England began using juries for more than administrative duties.
Juries were composed primarily of "laymen" from the local community
and provided a somewhat efficient means of dispute resolution with the
benefit of supplying legitimacy.
The general power of juries to decide on verdicts was recognised in
the English Magna Carta[27] of 1215, which put into words existing
practices:
No free man shall be captured, and or imprisoned, or disseised of his
freehold, and or of his liberties, or of his free customs, or be
outlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed, nor will we proceed
against him by force or proceed against him by arms, but by the lawful
judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.
For a trivial offence, a free man shall be fined only in proportion to
the degree of his offence, and for a serious offence correspondingly,
but not so heavily as to deprive him of his livelihood. In the same
way, a merchant shall be spared his merchandise, and a husbandman the
implements of his husbandry, if they fall upon the mercy of a royal
court. None of these fines shall be imposed except by the assessment
on oath of reputable men of the neighbourhood.
Largely, the earliest juries returned verdicts in accordance with the
judge or the Crown. This was achieved either by "packing the jury" or
by "writ of attaint". Juries were packed by hand-selecting or
by bribing the jury so as to return the desired verdict. That was a
common tactic in cases involving treason or sedition. In addition, the
writ of attaint allowed a judge to retry the case in front of a second
jury when the judge believed the first jury returned a "false
verdict". If the second jury returned a different verdict, that
verdict was imposed, and the first jury was imprisoned or fined.
That history is marked by a number of notable exceptions. In 1554, a
jury acquitted Sir Nicholas Throckmorton but was severely punished by
the court. Almost a century later, in 1649, in the first known attempt
to argue for jury nullification, a jury likewise acquitted John
Lilburne for his part in inciting a rebellion against Oliver
Cromwell's regime. The theoretician and politician Eduard
Bernstein wrote of Lilburne's trial:
His contention that the constitution of the Court was contrary to the
fundamental laws of the country was unheeded, and his claim that the
jury was legally entitled to judge not only as to matters of fact but
also as to the application of the law itself, as the Judges
represented only 'Norman intruders', whom the jury might here ignore
in reaching a verdict, was described by an enraged judge as 'damnable,
blasphemous heresy'. This view was not shared by the jury, which,
after three days' hearing, acquitted Lilburne—who had defended himself
as skillfully as any lawyer could have done—to the great horror of the
Judges and the chagrin of the majority of the Council of State. The
Judges were so astonished at the verdict of the jury that they had to
repeat their question before they would believe their ears, but the
public which crowded the judgment hall, on the announcement of the
verdict, broke out into cheers so loud and long as, according to the
unanimous testimony of contemporary reporters, had never before been
heard in the Guildhall. The cheering and waving of caps continued for
over half an hour, while the Judges sat, turning white and red in
turns, and spread thence to the masses in London and the suburbs. At
night bonfires were lighted, and even during the following days the
event was the occasion of joyful demonstrations.[28]
In 1653, Lilburne was on trial again and asked the jury to acquit him
if it found the death penalty "unconscionably severe" in proportion to
the crime he had committed. The jury found Lilburne "not guilty of any
crime worthy of death".[29]
In 1670, a petit jury refused to convict William Penn of unlawful
assembly. The judge held the jury in contempt of court, which was
ruled inappropriate by the Court of Common Pleas in Bushel's Case.
In 1681, a grand jury refused to indict the Earl of Shaftesbury. In
1688, a jury acquitted the Seven Bishops of the Church of
England of seditious libel. Juries continued, even in non-criminal
cases, to act in defiance of the Crown. In 1763 and 1765, juries
awarded £4,000 to John Wilkes and £300 to John Entick in separate
suits for trespass against the Crown's messengers. In both cases,
messengers had been sent by Lord Halifax to seize allegedly-
libellous papers.
In Scotland, jury nullification had the profound effect of introducing
the three-verdict system including the option of "not proven", which
remains in Scotland to this day. In 1728, Carnegie of
Finhaven accidentally killed the Earl of Strathmore. As the defendant
had undoubtedly killed the Earl, the law, as it then stood, required
the jury merely to look at the facts and to pass a verdict of "proven"
or "not proven", depending on whether it believed that the facts
proved the defendant had killed the Earl. If the jury brought in a
"proven" verdict, that would lead to Carnegie's hanging though he had
not intended any harm to the Earl. To avert that injustice, the jury
decided to assert what it believed to be its "ancient right" to judge
the whole case, not just the facts, and rendered the verdict of "not
guilty". Over time, juries have tended to favour the "not guilty"
verdict over "not proven" and so the interpretation has changed. The
"not guilty" verdict has become the normal verdict when a jury is
convinced of innocence, and the "not proven" verdict is used only if
the jury is not certain of innocence or guilt.
The standard jury trial practice in the United States during the
Founding Era and for several decades afterward was to argue all issues
of law in the presence of the jury so that it heard the same arguments
as the bench in reaching its rulings on motions. That is evidenced by
such decisions as the 1839 case Stettinius, which held, "The defense
can argue law to the jury before the court gives
instructions."[30] Later, judges began to demand the parties submit
motions in writing, often before the jury was empaneled, to be argued
and decided without the jury being present. The transition began with
motions in limine to exclude evidence on which it was felt the jury
should not hear the argument because it would be informed of the
evidence to be excluded. Later, that was expanded to include all legal
argument and so that today, the earlier practice of arguing law before
the jury has been largely forgotten, and judges even
declare mistrials or overturn verdicts if legal arguments are made to
the jury.

UNITED STATES
In the United States, jury nullification first appeared just before
the American Revolutionary War, when colonial juries frequently
exercised their nullification power, principally in maritime cases and
cases implicating free speech. Jury nullification became so common
that many British prosecutors gave up trying maritime cases since
conviction seemed hopeless.[46] Before the American Civil War, juries
sometimes refused to convict for violations of the Fugitive Slave Act.
Later, during Prohibition, juries often nullified alcohol control
laws.[47] That resistance may have contributed to the adoption of
the Twenty-first Amendment, which repealed Prohibition and
the Eighteenth Amendment.
In a well-known example of jury nullification, at the end of Wild Bill
Hickok's trial for the manslaughter of Davis Tutt in 1865,
Judge Sempronius Boyd gave the jury two instructions. He first
instructed the jury that a conviction was its only option under the
law. He then instructed them that they could apply the unwritten law
of the "fair fight" and acquit. Hickok was acquitted; the verdict was
not popular with the public.[48][49]
There have been contemporary instances of activists being arrested for
informing jurists of their right of jury nullification in front of
court houses, with subsequent rulings that arresting people for this
activity is unconstitutional.[50]

FUGITIVE SLAVE ACT

Juries across the North acquitted defendants who had clearly breached
the Fugitive Slave Act in the 1850s. Part of the Compromise of 1850,
it had been passed to mollify Southern slaveowners, who were otherwise
threatening to secede from the Union.
Secretary of State Daniel Webster was a key supporter of the law as
expressed in his famous "Seventh of March" speech. He wanted high-
profile convictions, but the jury nullifications ruined his
presidential aspirations and his last-ditch efforts to find a
compromise between North and South. Webster led the prosecution when
defendants were accused of rescuing Shadrach Minkins in 1851 from
Boston officials who intended to return Minkins to his owner. The
juries convicted none of the men. Webster tried to enforce a law that
was extremely unpopular in the North, and his Whig Party passed over
him again when it chose a presidential nominee in 1852.[51]

AFTER CIVIL WAR

White defendants accused of crimes against black people and other
minorities were often acquitted by all-white juries, especially in the
South, even in the face of irrefutable evidence.[52]

21ST CENTURY
In the 21st century, many discussions of jury nullification center on
drug laws, which some consider unjust in principle or because they are
seen to discriminate against certain groups.[53] A jury nullification
advocacy group estimates that 3–4% of all jury trials involve
nullification,[54] and a recent rise in hung juries is seen by some as
being indirect evidence that juries have begun to consider the
validity or the fairness of the laws themselves.[55]

JUDICIAL OPINION
In the 1895 case of Sparf v. United States, written by Justice John
Marshall Harlan, the US Supreme Court held 5-4 that a trial judge has
no responsibility to inform the jury of the right to nullify laws.
[56]
That decision, often cited, has led to a common practice by US
judges to penalize anyone who attempts to present a nullification
argument to jurors and to declare a mistrial if such argument has been
presented to them. In some states, jurors are likely to be struck from
the panel during voir dire if they do not agree to accept as correct
the rulings and instructions of the law as provided by the judge.[57]
In later rulings the courts continued to prohibit informing juries
about jury nullification. In a 1969, Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision, U.S. v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir.1969), the
Court affirmed the concept of jury nullification, but upheld the power
of a court to refuse to permit an instruction to the jury to this
effect.[58] In 1972, in United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit issued a ruling similar to Moylan that affirmed the de
facto power of a jury to nullify the law but upheld the denial of the
defense's chance to instruct the jury about the power to nullify.[59]
In 1988, the Sixth Circuit upheld a jury instruction: "There is no
such thing as valid jury nullification." In United States v.
Thomas (1997), the Second Circuit ruled that jurors can be removed if
there is evidence that they intend to nullify the law. The Supreme
Court has not recently confronted the issue of jury nullification.
In 2017, a jury was instructed: "You cannot substitute your sense of
justice, whatever that means, for your duty to follow the law, whether
you agree with it or not. It is not for you to determine whether the
law is just or whether the law is unjust. That cannot be your task.
There is no such thing as valid jury nullification. You would violate
your oath and the law if you willfully brought a verdict contrary to
the law given to you in this case." The Ninth Circuit upheld the first
three sentences of the jury's instruction and overruled the remainder
but deemed that instruction a harmless error and affirmed the
conviction.[60]

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ORGANIZATIONS

 FIJA - The Fully Informed Jury Association, an activist group that

encourages educating potential jurors about jury nullification

ARTICLES AND OTHER WORKS

 "Cromwell and Communism" aka Socialism and Democracy in the Great

English Revolution
 Jury Nullification by Doug Linder Archived January 23, 2011, at
the Wayback Machine
 Jury Nullification: Why you should know what it is by Russ Emal
 Essay on the Trial by Jury by Lysander Spooner
 Bushell's Case, history of Bushell's Case and jury nullification in
its aftermath
 How to Get Out of Jury Duty (Satirical defense of jury powers)
 History of Trial by Jury, William Forsyth. (1875)
 Idiot Legal Arguments: A Casebook for Dealing with Extremist Legal
Arguments