Adverse possession—which permits land crime—has been extremely controversial.

Many
plausible explanations were offered, like financial reasons or title equality. The legal doctrine of
adverse possession is also known as squatter's rights. In accordance with common law, anyone
who have been trespassing on another's property for a particular duration of time might sue to
claim legitimate title. The following paper will cover adverse possession or its development
after LRA 2002.

UK has two land regulations: unregistered or registered. Unregistered land is property not
governed by LRA or registered on the Land Charges Registry. Deeds from every property
transfer throughout the years help identify the property's title. Land that has been quickly
controlled by LRA or where transactions or rights of others have been recorded into the land
charges register is called "registered land." Adverse possession of specified property requires a
specific criterion in each case. S.15 of Limitations Act requires squatters of registered property
to prove they have owned it for a duration of 12 years. After completing the prerequisites, the
hostile possessor receives a court ruling granting legal possession, while the original paper
owner's powers are limited or canceled. After 12 years of adverse possession (AP) leasehold
interest, the property moves totally into the AP's name, although the renter must still follow all
leasehold covenants. Even though the above scenario is unjustified, it presents a few unofficial
safety measures: if a leasehold covenant breach occurs, the landlord could terminate the lease
or acquire the AP, or either the tenant or the landlord may willingly withdraw the lease, or the
landlord may remove the AP or regrant the lease to the tenant. When an AP possessed
registered land for a period of 12 years prior to October 2003, LRA 1925 requirements apply.
When the 12 years had passed or possession began after October 2003, the LRA 2002
provisions applied.

Therefore, a property trust would have to be constituted after twelve years before October
2003. Landowner will remain the registered owner or hold the property in trust for the AP.
When any of twelve-year term passes without mistake before October 2003, the AP may be
recognized as a legal owner. When a leasehold property is involved, the AP could be awarded
with a trust in which they will have the right to receive the lease as beneficiaries at the
termination of lease's twelve-year term. Alternatively, KATO KAZUKI considered the AP a
tenant.

LRA 2002 or its predecessors aim to strengthen the mirror concept or create an undeniable
register where the government protects title. The Restriction Periods Act 1925 or Certain
Exemption to Regulation of Adverse Possession Act 2002 limit adverse possession regulations.
Adverse possession requires those who are in possession to prove that they have enjoyed
uninterrupted use of the property for a minimum of twelve years, which may be extended if the
proprietor is impaired. The 12-year period can be modified or repealed at any moment if the
genuine landowner claims his rights or the possessor acknowledges them.
The AP can apply to the register for registration within the permitted time limit. When an AP
undertakes this, the register will evaluate the factual foundation upon request. When an AP
requests, the registry checks whether the evidence is suitable. If it exists, the registrar issues a
notice to the signed-up owner with three options to prevent the AP from acquiring legal
ownership of the land: consent to possession, oppose or relate to HM's adjudication, or submit
a contrasting notice.

Although issuing a counter-notice to prevent adverse possession constituted the original

owner's best line of action, it may have rendered the claim worthless. In three cases, the
possessor may preserve legal title. 1) To show proprietary estoppel or the duty to be registered,
the AP must first prove the relevant elements. This applies when the AP built on the property
under the mistaken belief that it is his or when the owner grudgingly acknowledges the
mistake. 2) Would the land be registered for any additional reason, such as (i) if the AP acquires
the property by will, or (ii) when two parties have entered into a sale agreement or have
reached in accordance with its terms (price paid, possession offered, but the registration
criteria incomplete)? 3) Boundary exception: The subsequent four criteria must be fulfilled to
qualify: (i) the land under concern needs to legally registered for an initial period of one year;
(ii) it needs to be in close proximity to the land which was originally registered; (iii) the
boundaries in question need to be physical; and (iv) it must have been established in good faith
or instead of any form of deception.

UK's legislature abolishing adverse possession could have violated human rights, especially art.8
of convention or HRA 1998. If an individual has owned a piece of property for several years,
spending money or time, and the registered owner has not taken any action during 12-year
period, it might appear unjust to deny them an opportunity to become the legal owner. The PYE
v UK ruling states that British courts must follow the treaty. Thus, judges would violate the law
by deleting adverse possession.
In 2013, section 144 of LASPO made adverse possession in residential premises illegal and
punishable. Thus, adverse possession has been somewhat curtailed by the legislature since the
1925 LRA, which was superseded by the 2002 LRA or s.144 of LASPO. According to court
discretion, adverse possession claims might be approved or denied after 12 years. It's
appropriate to review adverse possession petitions case-by-case.

Q the Land Registration Act 2002 has entirely overhauled and watered down the law on
adverse possession, providing a new regime and procedure that will rightly result in fewer
claims succeeding?
Prior to the LRA 2002, adverse possession issues were governed by the ambiguous or imprecise
LRA 1925. The adverse owner always possessed a possibility of prevailing in their claim over
landowner. A clarity in the law was required for adverse owners, as the citizens of both England
or Wales, had issues with the present legislation regardless of holding the fundamental concept
of adverse possession to be illegal. In what sense can law assist a squatter in acquiring property
in an adverse manner whenever the registered title to the land already exists in another
person's name? In 2003, the LRA 2002 was initiated to establish legal certainty. It had been
thought that adverse possession claims of registered titles were deemed ineffective following
the LRA 2002, yet the level to which such claims still possible is arguable.
This may be shown only through an analysis of either adverse possession statutes or the
modifications that were brought to the LRA 2002; only after that would it become possible to
determine if the current system has substantially revised adverse possession regulation.
The LRA 1925 mandates that a squatter is allowed to take a piece of land via adverse possession
following 12 years of continuous possession, at which point the paper owner's rights are
abolished. Even if the land in concern has been registered under a title, if the twelve-year
period of possession is not completed by October 13, 2003, the scenario would be governed by
the LRA 1925. Even so, just as in the situation of unregistered land, such doesn't suggest that
the paper owner's rights have been abolished in registered land titles. Therefore, pursuant to
the LRA 2002, merely registered titles where the adverse possession began or concluded after
October 13, 2002 were subject to resolution.
The LRA 2002 has been introduced for the aim of registering the property of England. 15% of
the total property within England & Wales remains unregistered, whereas nearly 85% of estate
is registered with Her Majesty's Land Registry. With the context of adverse possession, LRA
2002 should primarily refer to the registered ownership. Unregistered land titles continue to be
governed by the LRA 1925, thus maintaining their significance.
The LRA of 2002 requires that squatter should have possessed the land for a time frame of ten
years. A prior squatter can't be deprived of adverse possession under LRA 2002, even though
the subsequent squatter is the former's successor by purchase or inheritance of the property.
An adverse possession of property held in trust won't prevail as per LRA 2002 until all the
beneficiaries has an interest in the property. When the squatter meets with the ten-year
deadline for submitting the formal request to the registrar, the paper owner's privileges remain
unbarred. Furthermore, the registrar informs the landowner that his property has been taken
into adverse possession. If the original owner of land disapproved or failed to respond, the
request was denied. But there exist particular situations whereby the application might get
approved without demanding the approval of land owner; these requirements have yet to be
fulfilled. In certain circumstances, including estoppel instances, the court might deem it
unethical for the registered owner to hand over possession of the squatter or could order the
squatter to reclaim the property pursuant with Paragraph 5(2) of Sch 6 LRA 2002.
Furthermore, there exists a circumstance in which the registered owner's property gets
destroyed or the squatter possesses a separate entitlement to the estate. In situations where
the squatter possesses an exclusive or distinct claim to the property, such assertion shouldn't
constitute adverse possession yet rather be founded on certain others differentiating element.
The occupant can apply for registration pursuant with Para 5 (3) of Sch.6 LRA 2002.
Another exemption refers to boundary disputes, that typically involve homes or fences that
have been erected significantly beyond their assigned hypothetical limits. Regardless of being
the registered owner of the property, a squatter can only submit an application for registration
under Para 5(4) of Sch.6 when the following conditions are met: the land must be directly next
to each other, the precise perimeter connection needs to remain undecided, or the squatter
needs to have an adequate belief for a minimum of ten years that the land is their own or that
they fail to have precise knowledge about the true owner. On completion of these stipulations,
the squatter is qualified to acquire the land.
Such are the conditions whereby a squatter can submit an application for title to land
regardless of knowledge that the land has been identified in a different individual's name,
providing they meet with the time limit given. But in instances where this exemption is true, the
owner of land receives an extra two years from the moment he becomes mindful that his
property has become adversely occupied to remove the squatter. When the land owner doesn’t
succeed to perform so within this extended time frame, the squatter can submit another
request for registration via an alternate application, that is likely to be recognized without the
disapproval of the proprietor.
The prior debate indicates that this sort of evaluation may be unjustified, as the LRA 2002
substantially changes the regulations regarding adverse possession or enhances ambiguity,
considering that it isn't applicable to the 15% of unregistered property that remains within
England and Wales. But there is an exemption for registered properties in which the squatter
may acquire the property. While LRA 2002 may be deemed marginally superior or clearer than
the prior LRA 1925, this doesn't qualify as complete preservation under the provisions of
adverse possession. Nonetheless, the state might establish this flexibility if it requires the land
to be registered or if it is going to be used by a third party. This may potentially improve their
financial endeavors.
Legislative changes introduced since the start of the 21st century have drastically curtailed
(reduce) the prospect of landowners losing out to squatters. Although this is a welcome shift
in legal direction, it remains to be seen how far it will be an improvement on the previous
legal regime governing claims to adverse possession of land with registered freehold title.’
After the Land Registration Act 2002 took effect, land owners or paper owners won't lose
possession automatically, without squatter notice. This legislation gives landowners extra
opportunity to fight squatter allegations in adverse possession cases, as per Schedule 6 of LRA
2002. Such conduct constitutes beneficial as it improves limitation period rules, while providing
direct instructions for execution. Opposing such assertions is appropriate. Neil Cobb & Lorna
Fox remarked, “These modifications correlate with the present registration framework of land
law”. The Law Commission criticized LRA 2002's benefits in March 2021.
As per LRA 1925, a squatter gains possession of property after 12 years and without opposition
from the landowner. After the squatter has past the time restriction, the paper owner is unable
to recover his property, but LRA 2002 modified this. Under the new statute, paper owners may
only reclaim their property after the squatter applies, otherwise they would lose their title. In
Pye vs UK, European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) deemed the LRA 2002's short time
restriction a “margin of appreciation”.
As per s.75 of LRA 1925, a proprietor is presumed to retain legal title after the expiration of the
specified time restriction, until the property is occupied by a squatter under a trust of equitable
title. These clauses are covered under LRA 1925 s.70(1)(f). Schedule 12, para 18 of LRA 2002
excludes trusts or allows squatters to be recognized as proprietary owners. Due to the October
2006 LRA 1925 s.70(1)(f) ending, adverse possession of squatter is currently only a main focus
under Sch.3. These regulations clarify land interest recognition or minimization without
registration.
In contrast to LRA 2002, Sch 6, Para 2, Land registry notifies the landowner or other interested
parties (like mortgagees) and gives the landowner 65 working days to appeal or reject the
squatter's application. If the paper owner does not respond, it may be deemed a consent to the
application, and the squatter may be declared the registered owner of the property at issue
(Para 4). This informs the paper owner of squatter adverse possession.
The trust or equitable interest in the contested property makes it harder to evict the paper
owner under the previous legislation. In Mount Carmel vs. Peter Thurlow, the court ruled that
just claiming possession of the land from the squatter wouldn't stop the lime limitation.
However, if the landowner attempts to recover the land through evil means, the landowner
may be held accountable for criminal trespass or a violation of Art. 7 of the ECHR (Right to
maintain personal life or family life) so the squatter is also preserved. The trust component
can't exist longer, but LRA 2002 offers an array of claims which places landowners in a strong
position to evict squatters from disputed territory even after 10 years.
Before LRA 2002, adverse possession (Edington vs Clark) required actual possession, intention
to possess (Amirtharaja vs White), or sspecifc time period (Powell V McFarlane). Before LRA
2002, there had been no complete structure for making a claim based on land category, which
increased the likelihood of landowners losing their legal title. However, the current legislation
was designed to plan the claim effectively. For instance, squatters must show estoppel, distinct
rights, or boundary difficulties. If none of these exclusions are in the application, the Land
Registry will immediately reject it when the paper owner counters. These clearly specified types
of claims have rendered adverse possession claims straightforward to process.
The burden of proof could be made easier by adding four requirements: disputed land is
adjacent to claimant's land, the required boundaries are still unknown (Dowes vs Bradford),
squatter has a frim believe that disputed land is associated with him (IAM v Chowdrey), and
application is of registered land that has been registered for more than a year (Zarb v Perry).
Thus, issues associated with reluctantly allowed boundaries are also resolved by this form of
claim, particularly in urban areas.
Law commission proposes “tersely over clarity” notwithstanding LRA 2002. They prefer
amending the term of mistake to include all supplementary mistakes from the original mistake,
updating the kinds of secured owners in possession, while establishing a 10-year long-stop
mistake after that modification would be possible in limited circumstances. After this idea, the
government declined the 10-year stop mistake, rejected the two-year genuine occupancy
requirement, and acknowledged border issues. Boundary disputes have a 12-month deadline
once he/she has reasonable trust that property belongs to them. These further adjustments
need proof, consideration of unintended consequences, or amended draft legislation, which are
suggestions. However, given the Commission's proposal focuses on technical matters to define
the new approach or prepare for electronic transactions such modifications may encourage
better ligation.
If UK parliament were to repeal the law of adverse possession, this would potentially
generate lawsuits of Human rights violations, particularly with regard to Art.8 (the right to a
private or family life) as guaranteed by the HRA 1998 or the convention. The main reasoning for
this is that, if the squatter has spent time or money in the property for several years or
landowner doesn't take any steps to stop the adverse possession, it could be interpreted as the
owner's consent to permit the squatter to create a private or family life on the plot of land.
Consequently, it would seem unjust to deny the squatter the status of legal owner of the land,
as proved from the case Pye vs. UK, where the courts are obligated to uphold the convention
when they disregard the law of adverse possession.
In conclusion, it could be argued that after LRA 1924, 2002, or s.14 of LASPO, the parliament
has enacted legislation pertaining to the law of adverse possession, in which it has increased
the duration of adverse possession. The paper owner undoubtedly benefited from the LRA 2002
in the event that the appropriate title was lost. In regard to the research, the current legislation
undoubtedly addresses earlier issues of uncertainty regarding adverse possession law, which
was contradictory with the concept of a registered method. It also provides paper owners with
the assurance that the law will be treated fairly. Even though there are a few benefits or voids
in the current legislation, certain sections of the law demand reform.

CT & Proprietary Estoppel:

Among the concept of proprietary estoppel or constructive trusts there exist a remarkable
overlap (Yaxley). As per Walker LJ each of these legal concept focus concerns the equity
involvement towards unconscionable act. This would even applicable in the situation involves
the conduct among the adjoining landowners, or among purchaser and seller or among family
members who shares some property or trustee or an interested party or any recipient towards
he/she carries a duty of trust.

After recognizing the clear similarities among the proprietary estoppel or common intention
constructive trust. Walker has also accepted that there doesn’t exist similarities in some
situation; where the trustee has gained inappropriate benefit from his/her client or in situation
where we are discussing constructive trust instead of proprietary estoppel.

At one moment, there exists a compatibility while concerning common intention trust or
proprietary estoppel. Lord Bridge noted the significance of contract, settlement or mutual
understanding among the parties who are gaining the benefit after splitting the assets in Lloyds
Bank. He claimed that in order to successfully develop the constructive trust or a proprietary
estoppel, it has to be established that plaintiff has bear some detriment or has radically altered
his/her role in reliance upon the agreement at the moment it was constructed. Thus, this
condition of adverse reliance on agreement shows the necessity of detrimental reliance upon
an assurance in proprietary estoppel. It is noted that Lord Bridge has combined these two
concepts with each other, rather the requirement of detrimental reliance on an agreement in
constructive trusts exemplifies the condition of detrimental reliance upon assurance with the
proprietary estoppel.

Once there exist a close relationship among proprietary estoppel or constructive trust, but after
the case of Stack v Dowden they are distinct from each other. He has differentiated these
approaches by asserting that proprietary estoppel usually involves the procedure of
establishing an equitable claim toward the morality of a real owner rather this could be
achieved by the least compensation required to do justice, which would likely to be restricted
to a financial award. While on the other hand, “common intention” constructive trust identifies
the real beneficial owner or owners along with the scope of that beneficial interest.

Another aspect to take into the view is that the notion of mutual intention constructive trust
has developed after Lord Bridge's declares in Lloyds Bank on the prerequisite for determining
the objective of the parties as evident through various tyes of agreement or against the notion
of determining party’s intention, as illustrates by the case of Stack & Jones case. Further this
has been strengthened by the statement of Lord Wilson, he declares that “when equity seeks to
calculate the common intention, how could it do so except through exploring the consequences
that court actually regarded as just or appropriate?” Conversely, proprietary estoppel occurs
where each of the party promised anything to the other party at which he has intention to rely
on that promise or that this reliance is usually sufficient under the situation.

As a matter of fact, it is correct that these concepts has few significant dissimilarities or it also
stated that their previous differences are beneficial due to the fact that a combination would
removed these differences.
Under a circumstance when proprietary estoppel is claimed successfully, then the court is
permitted to select the type of remedies which would “serve the estoppel”. As illustrated by
Lord Walker from the case of Stack V Dowden, where the courts objective is to grant the least
remedy required to do justice, that could proceed in giving a compensation to the plaintiff. That
has been clarified from the case of Jennings, where the court has granted an appropriate
remedy to the claimant’s detriment instead of a great degree of assurance created.
Alternatively, despite the fact there exist discretion concerning how such contribution has to be
estimated especially when they are not only monetary in nature, then the court is usually
compelling to award the party with either their profitable interest in the property is equivalent
to the property whenever there exists a common intention constructive trust, which is usually
depends upon the contributions made to the obtaining party (Jones v Kernott).

The most fundamental difference among these concepts of constructive trust or proprietary
estoppel is that a profitable interest would be made through constructive trust or it has been
recognized after the date of creation while on the other hand, after the courts ruling
proprietary estoppel would be established. P. Ferguson declares that the distinction among
methods of generating rights via constructive trust or a claim to a discretionary remedy. Yet the
abstractions are difficult as it is apparent that a constructive trust or evidential trust are distinct
from proprietary estoppel in a way that previously attempts to divide the titles either in law or
in equity. In comparison as acknowledge by Mathews, in the circumstances of proprietary
estoppel as Inwards v baker, where the plaintiff has possessed the interest which he/she
believed to retain.

Agreement for the sale of the land or removal signed on or subsequent to 27 sept 1989, needs
to be in a written form which involves all requirements accepted by each party. Problems would
be resulted if these provisions are breached. This would not likely to applied in the situation of
constructive or evidential trusts, despite the fact that they seem to include estoppel. This has
been explained in Whittaker v Kinnear which affirmed that despite the application of s.2 of LP
(MP) A 1989 law of proprietary estoppel would still remain relevant in situation of land cases.
The critical case of Cobbe mentioned the existence of statutory exemption for constructive
trust but not for proprietary estoppel in some conventional statutes. This often-led courts to
make a choice among constructive trust or proprietary estoppel when settling the defects in
legal regulations, although the fairest opinion is that this is an equitable creation which don’t
demand statutory protection.
Based upon the above discussion, it could be concluded that when the principle of proprietary
estoppel or constructive trust might seem to be associated with each other then it could not be
the case anymore. These two doctrines cold still have to be differentiated from each other to a
considerable extent, particularly when it comes to the evolution of distinctive traits such as
certainty which can be obtained by using constructive trust or the right of redress in proprietary
estoppel.
Acquisition:
The House of Lords (HL) or Supreme Court (SC) has made two efforts to review co-ownership
restrictions, which apply to all co-owned property irrespective of marital status. These points
were viewed as debatable. To assess the scope of vagueness after Kernott, one must consider
how important it is to distinguish between joint (JT) and tenancy in common (TIC), the objective
of imputation, or the best course of action throughout acquisition or quantification of several
instances. All of these concerns are receiving Court of Appeal (CoA)'s attention. Undoubtedly,
these scenarios offer some hints regarding an appropriate course of action; however, numerous
unresolved matters continue to exist such as the underlying justification for trust.
Despite the fact that the property was registered as a common tenancy, no explicit trust
confirmation has occurred in the Stack vs. Dowden case. Dowden claimed ownership of a
greater proportion of the funds generated from the sale of the property. The court held that
she must prove a constructive trust from shared intention in order to establish her case. The
judge states that the first stage is to contest an assumption that equity must follow the law "by
proving that whether there exists common intention so equitable interest would be protected
in the same manner as JT." Intention is usually explicit or implicit. In this particular instance,
there is substantial evidence of common intent based on respondent action. After establishing
intention, participants' purchase processes become clear. Lady Hale argued that the court must
examine all aspects of the relationship between the parties or the property when assessing the
share. This computation gave Ms. Dowden a fair 65% share in Stack.
In the Kernott v. Jones case, a co-owned property existed, or Ms. Jones asserted ownership
over fifty percent of the sales. The court must consider any modifications in the acquisition
circumstances when assessing the parties' shares. The court must also defend its controversial
Stack v Dowden verdict. The court agreed with Stack that the couple's post-divorce behavior
was enough to challenge the premise that Ms. Jones should acquire more than half of the
property owing to their implied shared intention.
CoA recently reviewed many unresolved questions after these judgments. First, although
constructive trust in family situations wasn't included, mixed or ambiguous remained uncertain.
Neuberger affirmed in Laskar v Laskar that the constructive trust may be employed if there
exists a substantial investment and house, regardless of domicile or family tie. In Chaudhary v
Chaudhary, the underlying trust obtained by the actual contributed price. Therefore, while
there may still be some degree of ambiguity regarding the precise definition of a suitable
environment, we are confident that the resulting trust can be utilized appropriately in the
future.
Second, there is still more to learn about single or joint ownership scenarios like Stack or
Kernott. Lloyds instance is the best example for single ownership cases, although Agrawala v
Agarwala is more persuasive. In Geary vs. Rankine, the rulings in Stack or Kernott were applied
identically to single or joint owners, but the rationale was different. This was unclear whether
the comprehensive method would be employed similarly or with a more complex
exceptionalism test. CoA's latest rule eliminates some ambiguity, which can be resolved using
the strongest anti-stack approach.
After Stack, imputation has been introduced, or we cannot determine whether the courts have
made substantial improvements in determining the small difference among assigned intent or
implied intent because of Kernott's contradictions. Before determining the precise position of
this restriction, the higher courts must give additional suggestions, thus the latter judgment
won't help.
Finally, constructive trust in current systems remains unclear. Participants' property shares may
fluctuate depending on circumstances or personal motives. Changing a fundamental
constructive trust into an ambulatory is unapparent. Remember that a common intention
constructive trust or third party may have a complicated relationship, especially if expenses
exceed each party's contribution.
Despite CoA's favorable guidelines, several areas remain unclear. However, the lack of clarity in
this statement implies that the fundamental basis for this law was not adequately established.
It is unclear what circumstances might lead to the imputation of an intention to contribute.
Because the result is unexpected, the whole establishment or restoration procedure is
ambiguous. We cannot predict whether the court would examine a proper division of equitable
title, but we may be satisfied that this would ascribe to the goal even if there isn't an explicitly
stated nor implied intention to debate about.
Thus, as a result of Kernott, we have come across a number of items in question. It is now
acknowledged that Stack will likely continue, such approaches may undergo modifications
during the acquisition or quantification steps, or that such imputation is only allowed in the
concluding phases. The criteria based on which the court might resolve issues involving sole
owners is also widely recognized to us when it comes to the rulings rendered by CoA. The exact
purpose of imputation, the operation of common intention constructive trust, or the practical
consequences of applying the principles under such conditions are entirely unclear to us. We
have to determine how the courts have explicitly established certain aspects of the matter
rather than relying on additional cases to clarify the broad extent of discretion in such
situations. The court might not always choose the correct location to determine a trust;
therefore, careful consideration or investigation is required.
The concepts of joint tenancy and tenancy in common are convoluted and obscure. By
contrast, the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 has introduced important
new ways of protecting the rights of beneficiaries to land which reach beyond the limits of
the case law.’ Discuss.
TOLATA 1996's legal impact or co-ownership is disputed. We'll thoroughly evaluate each
mechanism's merits and downsides while safeguarding beneficiaries.
Lawful co-ownership takes place whenever multiple individuals own land. TOLATA 1996
strengthened the LPA1925's co-owned property rights. Joint ownership is controlled by
common law or legislation, thus legal precedent has formed.
Simplification of the transfer method, liberation of land interests or rights, and protection of
landowners from unfair judgment have all contributed to modernize property law.
A co-owner's buyer had to pay a deposit or wait to prove joint tenancy (JT) or (TIC) ownership
before January 1, 1926. Every co-owner's opposition prevented the property from being sold or
mortgaged, regardless of benefit. With JT as sole co-owner, S. 34(1) LPA 1925 bans TIC for legal
property. Legal estates are "not capable of depending or of evolving in an integrated share in
property" under TOLATA s.1(6). The only two types of co-ownership in current law are TIC or JT,
where each joint tenant retains the whole property or operates under jus accrescendi, the right
of survivorship, where the current co-owner remains the sole beneficial owner of the land or
interest has passed on to the remaining co-owners shortly after their death. Wills or
inequalities cannot transmit co-ownership. The law restricts formal joint tenants to four
regardless of equity. This simplifies buying since the buyer doesn't have to examine four
owners. The 1925 Law of Property Act (LPA) property sale trust is inappropriate since co-
owners may maintain ownership.
The trust is legal or may have jurisdiction. Co-ownership is a trust property-keeping
arrangement under art. (1) 2 (a). Trust property is required under S. 1(1)(a). Due to its lack of
beneficial ownership, a trustee is unable to manage the property, unless a beneficiary has an
equitable interest. Beneficiaries may occupy trust land or be reimbursed under s.12 or 13 of the
1996 Act unless prohibited.
Before 1996 Act, beneficiaries' family homes might be sold for equity. Gissing vs Gissing proved
that the court will infer the woman doesn't have a beneficial stake in the marital residence if
she doesn't contribute to its title. Direct contribution to the purchase price or mortgage
payments proves equitable interest in the property, following Lloyds Bank v Rosset (1991).
However, Burns v Burns established that helping a local organization does not imply a shared
intent to transfer beneficial ownership of the property. Midland Bank v. Cooke examined all
interactions, not just direct contributions.
Stack vs. Dowden set principles for establishing equitable interest in a property when a
cohabiting couple bought an estate without disclosing their interests, unlike s. 53(1) LPA.
Residential housing owned in shared names is considered JT with similar beneficial interest, but
this might be disallowed if both spouses contributed unequally or managed their assets
separately. According to s. (1)(2), Jones vs. Kernott increased mutual trust when a cohabiting
couple bought a house with a mortgage or registered ownership rights under joint names. One
party departed or requested the property be sold for profit. Since the property was in both
names and there was no 50/50 split, Stack's contribution calculation was irrational. The court
considered each party's actions and how the benefit interest should match the financial
contribution. A property donor received 90% or 10%. Oxley v Hiscock 2015 found that share
quantification happens when the property is sold, not when both partners bought it. Marital
home shares usually explain or prevents unfair gain.
When co-owners split or declare bankruptcy, issues emerge. S.14 of the 1996 Act allows
equitable owners, mortgagees, and bankruptcy trustees to sell or take control of trust property.
Trustee disputes may be settled before or after bankruptcy. If no bankruptcy or sale request has
been filed under s. 14, the court will evaluate the parties' trust intentions under s. 15. After a
divorce or split, the court may find that the parties no longer have an equitable stake in a
marriage residence. Chin vs. Ho delayed the sale until a co-owner's schools were finished. The
same approach applies when the property must house or remain open until a specific date.
Minors and creditors fought over house transactions before 1996. In Re Holliday, an ex-wife
tried to sell the marital house where children resided under the abolished s.30 LPA. Postponing
the deal until the minors turned 18 cost the creditor. A bankrupt's registry-listed spouse may
block a sale only under unusual circumstances, not kids, according to Re Citro. S.15 rejected
s.30 LPA permits creditors to collect cash unless there is a compelling basis to prohibit sale.
Bank of Ireland v. Bell allowed the creditor's s.14 sale notwithstanding the minor's present since
the spouse failed on the mortgage payment or the sale profits wouldn't have covered his
obligations. This contradicts Williams Bank versus Boland, which said failing to safeguard
creditors should block a deal. Fred vs. Genis was a husband-only case involving children and a
wife. Sale benefitted creditors proportionately. S.14 because domicile was helpful or creditors
impacted family law since debts couldn't be recovered. First National Bank vs. Achampong
requires evidence of child harm.
A person mortgaged or defaulted on his half of the property in Mortgage Corp versus Shaire.
TOLATA s.15 was altered to trust of sale, allowing an alternative party to receive interest
payments instead of selling the property. The mortgagee gets some cash instead of none. The
legislation prioritizes family residences above creditors. In 2017, the court concluded in Amari
Lifestyle v. Warnes that a debt-securing fee is irrelevant if the collateral cannot repay. A
petition for sale filed under section 14 but not successful under section 15, it may make the
recipient bankrupt under the 335A Insolvency Act 1986. The petition benefits the creditor one
year later.
TOLATA 1996 was significantly altered to match modern culture under LPA 1925 or case law.
Despite small inadequacies in challenges to sale, developed areas safeguard beneficiaries,
creditors, and unwary co-owners.
A petition for sale filed under section 14 but not successful under section 15, so it may make
the recipient bankrupt under the s.335A Insolvency Act 1986. Courts power under this act to
make an order which they seem just or reasonable, along with considering factors like; interest
of bankrupt’s creditor, nature of property (dwelling house) or all other circumstances of case
irrespective of needs of bankruptcy.
Further, from Harrington v Bennett court has noted five characteristics of this act, which are;
Trustee would have paramount importance if application has made one year after vesting
bankrupt’s property. Court will ignore trustees’ interest only in the presence of exceptional
circumstances (Dean v Scott), further these exceptional circumstances should fall outside the
general melancholy consequences of debt or improvidence, rather these circumstances relates
to personal circumstance of one of the owners (like medical condition or needs of others). From
Re Bremmer, exceptional circumstances are defined as something which is particularly related
to bankruptcy or which is beyond the range of distressing circumstances. Courts usually require
these exceptional circumstances to be severe or unusual (Claughton v Charalambous). If court
finds exceptional circumstances then courts might delay an order for sale, as seen in the case of
Barca v Mears where court has postponed the sale for one year due to special educational
needs. Court held that a balance had to be struck among the needs of creditor or requirements
of Art.8 of ECHR (Barca v Mears).

Easement (GR):
This particular question explores the regulation of easement and this also demands to debate
upon the principles which limits the boundaries of easements. It will analytically discuss
different aspects of easements which includes implied creation of easement, criteria set out
under Re Ellenborough, Wheeldon v Burrow regulation or last but not the least, implication
under s.62 of LPA 1925.
An easement is a legal sphere where the landowner keeps the ownership title of that particular
piece of land rather this permit another individual the ability to use his/her land for certain
reasons, which could be regarded as proprietary rights or this might emerge under the s.1 of
LPA 1925 or equity rather this could also be conveyed to the subsequent owners. The exact
rights and duties are based on the conveyance authorization rather common law propose the
framework or traits connected with the easements. Normally easement constitutes two parts
of land, one of them reflects benefit while other imposes burden.
In order to assess which right could be regarded as easement, we have to consider these two
conditions; First, we must identify whether a right could be regarded as an easement. Secondly,
we have to assess if the right has been obtained legitimately. Re Ellenborough case provides
some requirement through which we would to be able to find the existence of easement. These
involves that there must exist both dominant (benefited) or servient (burdened) tenement, as
in London v Ladbroke. Further that the easement should benefit the dominant tenement as
well as there also must exist diversity of occupation (Wright v Macadam). The closeness among
the both servient and dominant tenement is essential regardless of whether the land is not
subsequent to each other directly (Bailey v Stephens). Lastly, the right permitted has not to be
of personal in nature rather this must relate to the land or this should enhance the ordinary
enjoyment of the land (Hill v Tupper).
Easements are usually created at the time of rental agreement or sale of the property or part of
it, although this could also be gained through prescription or created implicitly. Some examples
of easements are; right of way, light or parking. For an easement to be considered as legally
valid easement, it should be made at the time of freehold or leasehold rather obtained through
deed under (LPA 1925 or LMPA 1989) or registered through s.27 of LPA 2002.
The courts predominantly favor the positive easements that permits the dominant tenement to
carry out anything on the servient land. On other hand, they prohibit the negative easement
which constrains limitations upon the usage of land. Additionally, in the instance of Williams v
Arya where the court resolve that positive easements can’t be enforced by the servient
tenement. The criteria of Re Ellenborough has been broadened by involving this condition
which states that easement hasn’t permitted the absolute possession of the servient tenement
or demands consent for its usage. This development was absorbed within the method of Re
Ellenborough must now describe in relation to creation of easement.
In the absence of easement, when the usage of the land has become impossible then easement
could be obtained by implied creation method (Manjang v Drammeh). There should be an
actual necessity for the easement instead of insufficient pure advantage as in Walby v Walby in
which the court actually differentiate among true necessity or mere necessity for the objective
of reasonable enjoyment of land. Where each party has same plan for the usage of the land in a
certain manner, so this has regarded as another criteria for generating an easement which is
named as common intention method (Wong v Beaumont). As per instance of Davis v Bramwell,
in which court ruled that this common intention should be explicit or certain or it should
achieve the literal meaning of common intention.
Wheeldon v Burrows principles demand that if an individual covey a portion of his/her land to
another individual, then along with this easement would also convey with the transfer of land.
This rule won’t be applicable until certain conditions are satisfied. Firstly, the right which is
granted to the claimant needs to be continuous or apparent. Secondly, the claimed easement
should be essential for the appropriate enjoyment of property conceded. In order to assess the
necessity of alleged right under the case of Wheeler v JJ Saunders, where the courts will
examine that whether the problem has been acquired to the servient owner. Finally, the
alleged easement should be quasi-easement, which means that this alleged right has been
utilized by owner of property before or after the conveyance has taken place.
At the end, an additional method for creating easement impliedly is by s.62 of LPA 1925, which
is applicable where both the dominant or servient tenement has a same owner, but the land
has been occupied by two different owners. The distinction among the principle of Wheeldon v
Burrows or s.62 of LPA 1925 is that within Wheeldon Burrows situation is that a portion or
piece of land has been conveyed, while in s.62 there also exist diversity of occupation in a way
where both owners is identical but the occupant is different. However, s.62 of LPA is solely
applicable in the situation of conveyance which means that grants & transferring of legal estate
via deed and other means. In the instance of Wright vs Macadam, in which the court has
converted the usage of coal shed privilege into an easement unders.62 of LPA 1925. By using
s.62 of LPA 1925 the court has again changed parking privileges into an easement under the
case of Hair v Gillman.
To conclude this, the regulation or creation of easements concerns a complicated exchange of
legal principles or precedents. Though the law has given us a structure for the creation of
easements such as criteria of Re Ellenborough, Wheeldon Burrows principles or s.62 of LPA
1925, there still exist a need of reforms to ensure certainty or stability in the application of
these principles. Altogether, as the current legal system somewhat provides certainty, but
further reforms should concern the method through which these regulations become more
accessible or attainable.
“Overly complicated, controversial and ripe for reform”
How far do u agree with this assessment of the current law on a) which rights are capable of
being and easement and b) the methods by which an easement can be impliedly created?
The question at hand indicates whether easement regulations is difficult, disputed, or essential.
The legal status of easements must be examined to get a satisfactory opinion. Easements
comprise proprietary rights that are associated with a particular section of land (Dominant),
these rights grant the owner of dominant land the ability to practice certain rights on the
neighboring servient land. To determine whether such rights are easements, we must fulfill the
Re Ellenborough Park requirements.
In the context of land ownership, easement needs dominant or servient land. Dominant
tenement benefits from adjacent land, whereas servient tenement carries the burden. First
criteria restrict easement formation in “Gross,” therefore only land owner may enjoy it. Second,
easement should benefit the dominant property by making it easier to enjoy or more
accessible. This might be complicated, as in Re Ellenborough Park, when a contractor was given
permission to enjoy the general pleasure of the property, which could be regarded an
easement. Conversely, Regency Villas provides comfort or expertise in the local area for all
individuals, including time-share proprietors. Personal privileges like tennis, golf, and swimming
are only available to those who pay, making this problematic.
In Hill v Tupper, the right to reserve a pleasure boat didn't constitute as an easement because
the right was personal or didn't benefit the dominant land, but in Moody v Streggles, the
right to display a pub sign board was an easement as it profited the dominant land.
Determining whether the situation is comparable to the Moody or Hill instance is an extremely
difficult. Thomas J from Stilwell v Blackman argued that land might profit from a right like
preservation, but that no one could enjoy such properties for their own benefit. Instead, the
right must be related to societal enjoyment or use.
The third easement criterion requires that different individuals possess either servient or
dominant land (diversity of occupation). Fourth condition: the easement offered the subject
matter, which makes it easy to define the extent of right, but interpreting them between
circumstances is difficult. Bryant V Lefever ruled that the right of air flow might be an
easement, whereas Cable v Bryant reaffirmed that it could be when declared with an express
purpose.
Due of its complexity, property law easements are contentious, so courts refuse to extend
negative easements. Positive easements apply without the servient owner's activity; therefore,
courts will likely strengthen them (Hunter V Canary). Regis Property v. Redman shows that
there is no easement to acquire hot water or heating from surrounding land, even if it imposes
a positive duty. As in Crow v Wood, if the responsibility to maintain a common fence is an
easement, does this right entail a positive obligation?
Additionally, it could be grant or reserve either impliedly or expressly. The express grant
process is simple. Express reservation is when the dominant tenement carefully reserves a right
for itself, whereas express grant occurs where the servient owner intentionally provides any
privilege to dominant owner on the property. Problems arise with implied grant, whereas
implied reservation can exist as necessity or common intent. Necessity is appropriate when
there is an actual necessity, like in the instance of Re MRA Engineering. In Chaffe v Kingsley,
common intention is restricted, but in re Webbs Lease, courts have extended it. Implied
easement exists only in reserve if the benefit is acquired by the land's occupant, as in Peckham
v Ellison.
In contrast to implicit reservation, implied grant regulations are flexible. The implied grant
methods include necessity, common intent, Wheeldon vs Burrow, or LPA s.62 assumption.
Although necessity is only relevant in restricted situations, courts are lenient when finding
necessity, as seen in Wong vs Beaument Property. Common intention in implied grant tends to
be less strict than reserve, as in Stafford v Lee. This inequality in dealings increase the
complexity of the law. Martin Dixton said that the law of assumption has caused controversy in
this sphere of law or pain for landowners with unanticipated obligations.
Wheeldon v Burrow requires easement to be apparent as in Hansford v Jago, where a worn
truck proved right-way usage. In Goldberg v. Edward, the easement required fair enjoyment of
dominant property. In Millman v. Ellis, for instance, a layby that was a portion of the right of
way was deemed safer than the existing one; consequently, the court deemed this to be a
prerequisite for the proper enjoyment of the land. Wheeler v Saunders Ltd found that the
land's access was adequate for reasonable enjoyment. Additionally, the law actually brings
further complications.
This topic of law is unusually complicated because of unpredictable easement norms. S.62's
inability to provide a superior title to grantor embarrasses it, and this won't apply when parties'
intentions contradict with this concept. Thus, problems may develop when the servient
tenement's use is limited by an easement, especially upon transfer. This inequality affects
everyone's rights, notably servient tenement.
Due to parallels between s.62 of LPA or Wheeldon v Burrows, certain significant concerns
emerge. These land law regimes are similar. Martin Dixton claims s.62 is not in a properly
written conveyance. Thus, s.62 may cause conveyancing mistakes or easement of necessity
issues due to ambiguity among the parties, as in Platt v Crouch. In accordance with s.62, an
implied easement might be formed to be instinctively acknowledged as an easement regardless
of extensive easement rights. As previously stated, the parallels between s.62 or Wheeldon v
Burrows imply that a grant or legal transfer for continual or apparent easement without respect
to easements of necessity.
In conclusion, the easement legislation is complex or contentious, necessitating reforms. The
Law Commission's 2011 report proposes reforms pertaining to easements, in addition to profit
a pendre. They signify that s.62 cannot make unformal advantages legal easements. The
government promised a property bill based on commission proposals. The Law Commission
should anticipate growth and motivate the government to implement easement legislation
recommendations to reduce problems and disputes.

CONSIDER THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE COA DECISION IN FEDERATED HOMES HAS SIMPLIFIED
THE LAW RELATING TO PASSING OF BENEFITS OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS WITH FREEHOLD
LAND:
Regardless of consideration, freehold covenants in deeds are binding. Covenants have pros or
cons. The covenantor bears the responsibility of making a promise, while the covenantee
receives benefits from it. It is a proprietary interest under LPA 1925 s.1. According to the Law
Commission, s.1 LPA 1925 should be amended to provide specific covenants legitimate property
rights over the property.
Common law only permits damages, whereas equity provides compliance or injunction. Initially,
the covenantee was able to enforce it officially. He may sue for covenant's breach or seek
damages, an injunction, or specific conformance. Equity is more flexible than common law,
therefore obligations may transfer with land.
The covenant comprises two parts. Positive covenants require the covenantor to act, whereas
negative covenants prevent the landowner from doing anything on property. Hicks v Holland
Park states that substance, not phrase, determines whether a covenant is positive or negative.
Equity or common law has burden-benefit concepts. Law seldom transfers burdens. Rhone vs
Stephens along with Austerberry vs Oldham are the two exclusions. Positive covenants might
transfer, whereas restricted covenants cannot. Unbreakable chain of indemnity or Halsall v
Brisell (common benefit) applies. Hallsall v Brisell occurs where mutual benefits are enjoyed by
both parties so they should bear the burden of that alleged right. Dixon thinks the burden
should eradicate the benefit. Benefit or burden must correspond one another. This only works
if the covenantor is able to get the benefit (Thamesmead v Allotey). The next thing arises when
you take the burden. Taking benefit requires a burden.
Benefits must meet four criteria. First, the covenant should be related to land. LJ Oliver from
Swift Investment suggested some elements to examine when deciding whether the covenant
relates with property. The first question is whether non-covenantor landowners may enforce
the covenant. Second, would the covenant affect the land's value, efficacy, or use? Finally,
could covenant be personal? Land must satisfy these conditions in order to touch or concern
property.
The subsequent requirement for the benefit to transfer is whether or not it was originally
intended for the subsequent occupant. S.79 of LPA1925 presumes this, except where the
contrary is stated.
Federated Homes vs Mill Lodge Properties, Whitgift vs Stocks, or Crest Nicholson demonstrate
how s.78 LPA 1925 might annexe the covenant benefits. CoA from Federated houses
determined that s.78 annexes all positive or negative covenants to benefitting land. it requires
land should be benefit from the covenant or be identified from the deed. Federated homes
confused Chadwick LJ as McAllister intended to enforce covenants without annexes. His
lordship followed Marquess' test or ruled that the purchase contract must define the property
so the covenant may be easily recognized for statutory annexation. Federated Homes has made
most covenants annexed to the covenantee's property or available to buyers when they clearly
identify the land (Park v Holland).
An annexation may be avoided by purposefully transferring a legal covenant. S.136 LPA 1925
requires written notice of the right in deed assignment to the covenantor. Explicit annexation
renders this available.
The last criteria are that the first covenantee had a legitimate land or that the subsequent
covenantee secured title from them. These are the requirement for benefit to transfer in law.
Under Equity, Tulk vs Moxhay, restrictive covenants restricted property access. It is inhabited by
unlawful squatter. Four conditions must be met to transfer burden. The covenant must be
limited firstly. Clearly negative. Law has no limits, unlike equity.
Secondly, covenant should relate to land (Swift Investment's property). The third requirements
require the covenant to enhance the initial covenantee's land, not himself. This implies the
covenant should benefit the land, not simply the covenantee. Fourth, the limited covenant
burden must accompany the property. s.79 LPA 1925 presumes this intent unless stated
explicitly.
When benefits were expected to be transferred with the property, s.78 LPA 1925 applies, while
s.79 LPA 1925 applies to burdens. Register notices are needed for limited covenants. Without
registration, s.29 LRA 2002 says it loses precedence or can't be enforced against a buyer.
But transmitting benefits in equity is somewhat simpler than at law. Since only restrictive
covenant responsibilities could transfer, only restrictive covenants will probably to be in
problem if the initial covenantor has left with the property. The claimant frequently contends
that the benefit has also passed in equity, gafford v graham, however, restrictive covenants
burden may transfer. Actually, positive covenants or covenants at law usually pass where the
claimant files a lawsuit against the original covenantor, who bears the entire burden
The following requirements apply for equitable benefit. Again, the covenant must include land.
Otherwise, the claimant must have received benefit in three ways. By assignment, annexation,
or construction plan. Contract benefits may usually be allocated specifically. This does not need
to link to the property, so it may benefit someone else. Building schemes, on the other hand,
benefit all participants regardless of whether they signed an agreement. Elliston v Reacher
describes the criteria.
Finally, Annexation occurs when the buyer receives every benefit in the purchasing or selling
agreement. All covenant advantages now naturally annex to the covenantee's property under
Federated Homes vs Mill Lodge Properties or s.78 LPA 1925. While s.78 does not clearly declare
this, this case has understood it to suggest that if a person transfers his property, whether it is
explicit or implicit annexation is immaterial as statutory annexation is the legal concept. But this
doesn't apply if the intention was contrary (Cadha vs. Roake). Regarding Federated Homes,
Brightman LJ found that s.78 instantaneously attaches the covenant's benefit to the
covenantee's land. According to the ruling in Crest Nicholson, the covenant's benefits apply to
each piece of the land soon after the property is clearly apparent through deed. Thus, it will be
available to buyers in whole or in part. Express opposite intents are exceptions to this statutory
annexation. Federated Homes transmits benefit of covenant when parties failed to annex it in
writing, unless they intend to prohibit it.

To what extent do you think lord Templeman's speech in Street v Mountford [1985] and
subsequent case law help to clarify the distinction between a lease and a license?
Lease is one of the various kinds of ownership that could be examined in equity or law,
according to Law Property Act1925. A lease represents a deal between two or more parties that
gives land to one party in exchange for rent for a certain amount of time.
In the instance of Street vs. Mountford, it was said that a lease includes paying rent, knowing
when the lease ends, or having sole ownership of the property. S.205 of LPA 1925 says that
there is no need for rent in the instance of Ashburn vs Arnold. Following the ruling in Street v.
Mountford, each lease either requires rent to be paid or requires a lump sum payment of rent.
Rent is what keeps leases in place under Rent & the Housing Act, or from the instance of
Bostock vs. Bryant says that the rent needs to be fixed.
As mentioned previously, the second criterion for a lease seems certainty of time, which
indicates that the lease's beginning and ending times must be apparent or unambiguous. This is
illustrated by the instance of Lace vs Chantler, whereby the time for a lease is ambiguous
because it was explicitly stated that lease would terminate at the conclusion of World War II, a
vague statement given that nobody knows when war would end. This rule was loosened
in Ashburn scenario, but it was later upheld in Berrisfor vs Mexfield, or it was also made clear
from prudential insurance instance. S.149(6) of LPA 1925 enabled the remuneration of
numerous unclear leases by transformation of such leases into lifetime. Periodic tenancies, such
as weekly, monthly, or everyday tenancies, can conflict with a specific term. Courts have
determined that such lease would be deemed to be for a week or shouldn't give
causes conflicts over a certain term.
Common law rules govern the formation of leases, or statutory condition specifies the lease's
purpose. These criteria are employed to determine whether something is equitable or legal.
S.52 of LPA 1925 establishes certain conditions for leases executed for specific time periods,
such as those over three years or falling below seven years, which are established by deed. S.27
of LRA 2002 mandates the deed or registration of land when the lease term exceeds seven
years. But in the event that the participants enter into a written contract, this becomes an
equitable lease regulated by s.2 of LP(MP)A 1989. Walsh vs Lonsdale established that a
particular performance remedy is necessary for this to occur. Taylor vs Fashion established
proprietary estoppel as an exemption to the specified performance remedy, allowing for the
formation of leases.
Exclusive possession seems third condition needed for a lease described by Street. In this
regard, courts consider the parties' actual agreement rather than solely relying on the clauses
of contract, as were the instance of Mikeover v. Braddy. Establishing a lease is a crucial
prerequisite. The courts classify an agreement as a lease in accordance with the ruling of
Antoniades vs Villers instance, which stated that if it involves co-ownership, then it constitutes
a lease. The situation at hand involved a landowner who entered into two distinct agreements
with a couple in order to void the co-ownership. These agreements were deemed fraudulent by
the courts and were disregarded. However, a case involving AG Securities v. Vaughan was
resolved differently; in that instance, an individual was granted permission to use another's
property, and it was determined that the property in question constituted an exclusive
possession. Certain circumstances exist in which a component of exclusive possession has been
present but there wasn't any lease involved, such as Watts vs Stewart, where the parties had a
friendship relationship or possession was granted as a gesture of friendship; it also
encompasses other familial relationships, as in David v. LB and Carroll v. Manek, where service
occupancy was granted; these instances can also be considered as an exemption to this rule. As
previously stated, exclusive possession could be revoked under the following conditions: first,
the absence of co-ownership; or next, if the owner retains the keys; but that constitutes
as fallacious assertion, as illustrated in the Aslan v. Murphy instance.
Based on the preceding discourse, it could be concluded that leasehold holds significance for
each leasee or leasor. Firstly, it affords greater protection to the leasee due to its protected
status. Nextly, certain statutory prerequisites stipulate that to achieve the granting of a lease,
leassor should possess an estate in land, as established within London v Bruton instance, which
also accommodates the lessee.
The distinction among a lease or a license becomes clearer to the involved parties as a result of
the stipulations established in the Street vs Mountford instance.

Lease or License:
Although both leases and licenses enable tenants to utilize another's property, it's important to
distinguish the two since even a little misunderstanding about the legality of the tenancy might
have serious consequences. That's because, under LRA1925, a lease creates an absolute right in
the land that supports title transfers to higher estate interests.
Licenses or leases allow anyone to inhabit another's property, but even a small
misunderstanding about the legal basis for the tenancy might have serious implications.
LRA1925 states that a lease generates an absolute property right that survives changes in
ownership of bigger interests in the property. A license is a verbal or modified permission to
enter the licensor's territory in a certain way without trespassing. Thus, a license fails to grant
ownership rights or is easier to revoke. Lord Templeman's historic Street vs. Mountford ruling
will be the basis for the response. It will also illustrate how tangible obstacles remain in
distinguishing lease from license notwithstanding his contribution to describing the basic
requirements.
After a considerable number of cases in which courts attempted to determine what constitutes
a lease or license, Lord Templeman within Street VS. Mountford decided that the circumstances
under the contract, not the terms of the contract or the intentions of the parties, determine
whether a lease or license exists. He further stated, "when the only reasons are that a place of
residence is granted and absolute possession."
However, exclusive possession could impact the contract. Street defines tenancy as absolute
ownership of land for a specified or continuous period in exchange for rent. Absolute
possession determines contract success or failure. A tenancy occurs when one party occupies
property exclusively for a specific amount of time in return for rent. Despite these being the
"three key characteristics of a lease," Templeman argues "the criterion for distinguishing
between lease or license was substance rather than form." Street's legal position was shown in
other cases. Conversely, the Bruton vs. London Housing Trust verdict was widely criticized.
House of Lords (HL) found that Bruton and London Housing Trust's leasing arrangement, which
lacked ownership title, estate, or proprietary interest, fulfilled Street's criterion. The ruling
"extensively supports the legality of the occurrences of a leasing agreement or non-proprietary
tenancy under English law."
In Manchester Airport vs. Dutton, CoA obtained an order demonstrating possession under RSC
Order 113 to enable an authorized body to eject trespassers who weren't in real occupation or
absolute possession. Street's emphasis on rent length or the lack of a necessity to retain rent in
the common law definition of lease or LPA 1925 suggest that a lease doesn't need to be
actionable or lawful to be valid. Thus, a rent-free arrangement might constitute a lease. A
similar method was used in Anstalt versus Arnold to determine that an entity utilizing the
property while bearing its own expenses had a lease. Even if the contract didn't specify a length
period, the court's ruling is relevant. Fox LJ ruled that the contract might "be revoked by any of
the parties pursuant to situations that are unambiguous, with respect to the duration of a
period of time throughout which both parties are doubtful of their positions." The court doesn't
know what order to issue.
A license instead of a lease was determined in Stribling vs. Wickham by the court's
consideration of several factors, including the fact that each of the three tenants was
responsible for paying their own rent. It also mattered since any side may end the lease with a
28-day notice.
A numerous of evidence suggests that exclusive possession does not always rule a lease,
regardless of the express clause. Legal precedent following Street allows local authorities or
other government-controlled property owners to "could provide licenses in circumstances
where private tenants are restricted to leasing." Ogwr vs Dykes gave renters definitive
possession of the land. Alternatively, the municipal government gave exclusive ownership as
required by law. Therefore, the situation wasn’t a lease. Westminster Borough Council vs
Basson & Westminster CC vs Clarke were treated similarly.
CoA in Gray vs Taylor stated that almshouse residents were licensees, not tenants, regardless of
elusive possession. Establishing absolute possession in tenancy contracts is difficult. In AG
Securities vs. Vaughan, the owner awarded four contracts to four different people at different
times. HoL found that each of the four were licensees as none had exclusive possession. Thus,
their interests were "insignificant in establishing a joint lease." However, the ruling in
Antoniades vs. Villiers established exclusive compartment proprietorship, which translated into
a lease agreement.
Despite their license arrangements, the court found them fraudulent and meant to evade the
Rent Regulations. Slade LJ concluded in Mikeover Limited vs Brady that the other tenant or
landlord shared absolute possession, but joint tenancy was impossible without common duties.
We may conclude that Street v. Mountford is a landmark property law case notwithstanding its
narrow ratio. Implementing lease requirements may sound simple in principle, but there are
practical challenges. It provides assurance about the labels all parties put on the contract as an
official entity. Only legal relationship or exclusive ownership makes intent clear. Case law states
that absolute ownership, a contract, or rent do not imply tenancy. Since contractual permits are
leases, Bruton may have expanded Street. The distinction between lease and license remains
unclear.

Q. In Street Mountford the House of Lords assured us that a valid lease has three elements:
certainty of term; exclusive possession; and rent. Yet one is entirely unnecessary; another,
although technically necessary, can be avoided by either the draftsman’s or the court’s sleight
of hand; and the third, whilst absolutely necessary, is not always sufficient.’ Discuss
Specific question concerns lease. This requires us to discuss Street v Montford's lease elements.
This issue usually focuses on whether these lease components are essential or sufficient,
distinguishing between license (permission) or lease. After the discussion, I'll look at the present
situation regarding leasing legislation.
First, what is a lease? Leases are contractual permissions to acquire an estate, which are lawful
under s.1 of LPA 1925. It is proprietary rights tied to the property or bind other buyers or other
parties. Licenses are personal rights against landlords (Thomas v Sorrell). In Street v. Montford,
Lord Templeman declared that a legitimate lease requires “grant for a land at a rent with
exclusive possession”.
Before discussing rent, Templeman clearly referenced rent in the common law concept of lease
in Street v Montford, indicating that rent is a key component. The construction of a lease is
usually to produce rent, although it might also be for products and services (Barnes). S.205 (1)
(XXVII) LPA could also argue that rent isn't necessary for a lease. Ashburn v Arnold found that a
lease exists even without a rent since there is no clause stating that no rent equals no lease. In
certain cases, rent is needed, such as under Rent Housing Act, but today it is not. Rent must
satisfy the requirement of certainty in situations where it exists (Bostock v. Bryant). Rent may
be a benefit including performing certain services (Barnes v Barratt) or providing a token
(Ritcher v Tony).
In addition, the second requirement is a fixed or specific term but this element has been subject
to numerous criticisms since the Mexifeild vs Berrisford case. The primary criteria is that
possession be provided for an apparent or absolute period or declared at agreement creation.
This implies that participants should be aware that their possession time typically begins
straight away. Other courts try to determine the parties' purpose, but this term is established.
As per Lance v Chantler, a lease ending at WWII was questionable, hence there was no lease.
Prudential v London affirmed that an ambiguous duration excludes a lease. After all this
discussion, precise terms are factually essential. If the conditions weren't stated, the court
assumed it happened when the renter took possession of the property or began paying rent
(Say v Smith).
As previously stated, SC condemned this regulation of specific terms in Beriisford v Mexfeild,
where SC stated that where uncertain term makes agreement, it would be regarded as a lease
for life time or it could be rejected when specific incidents occur within the contracts. When
uncertain term presents under agreement for rent according to s.149 (6) of LPA 1925, lease is
transformed into 90-year lease, which can be dismissed before the complete if incidents like
death occurs. This decision has helped settle ambiguous terms, however Mexfieild only applies
where both parties wanted to establish a life-time lease (southward v Walker). This scenario
limits Mexfield's scope or doesn't address the uncertain term issue. Thus, the lease provision
requiring certainty may be avoided. The need for appropriate formalities remains unaltered
(Hardy v Haselden), so Mexfield hasn't changed anything under lease law.
Final lease component exclusive possession is challenging or controversial. This is the main
factor courts use to determine whether a lease or license exists. A tenant with exclusive
possession may exclude anybody from the property, even the owner. Exclusive possession may
depend upon the situation. It also distinguishes between a leaseholder and a lodger, who uses
landowner's services such as cleaning. Landowners visit a facility without tenant permission to
provide service, invalidating exclusive ownership. When checking the meter, cleaning, or in
emergencies, keeping of keys does not invalidate exclusive possession (Aslan v Murphy). When
the owner intentionally adds terms to invalidate exclusive ownership, they are called sham
devices. As a result of Antoniadis v. Villers, in which a deception clause was included in the
contract to prevent it from being regarded as a lease, courts typically examine possession
rather than creation of the agreement. In such cases, the participants' intent is not influenced
on the specific clause in question. Consequently, in situations where a deceptive device
attempts to divert tenants' attention away from the fact that they are entering into a tenancy,
this element becomes critical. Street v Montford further shows that a lease may not exist
notwithstanding exclusive possession of tenant. These cases include exclusive ownership during
bona fide contact. In this case, an individual gains possession of property under mortgage
terms, love or friendship (Macroft v Smith), familial situations like brother-sister (David v
Lewisham), or multiple tenants or everyone paying rent (Mikeover v Brady). Additionally, there
is no lease. Furthermore, from Gray v. Taylor, rent or exclusive possession do not create a lease,
as in this charitable case. Service providers have no lease notwithstanding exclusive occupancy
(Facchini V Bryson). In Carol v. Manek, the manager was provided a place to work more
effectively, therefore this isn't a lease regardless of exclusive ownership.
In Burton v. London, trustee was a licensee who provided plaintiff a lease. Plaintiff asserted that
defendant couldn't offer a lease since he was a licensee. Burton's sole ownership qualifies as a
non-proprietary lease. Dixon said this contradicted previous legislation or that Burton leases
don't exist. This remained problematic since Burton wasn't overruled. Exclusive possession is
the only difference between lease and license, thus it's vital. In few cases like Burton, exclusive
possession was enough for non-proprietary leasing.
‘It is clear why land law requires formalities such as deeds and contracts for the valid creation of
property rights. It is equally clear why the law recognizes the need for exceptions to their use. What
matters is that the scope, purpose and effect of exceptions should be well-defined. Regrettably, this
cannot be said about the way proprietary estoppel operates.’ Discuss.

The basic purpose of this question is Proprietary Estoppel (PE) or assess whether the regulation or case
laws of it is really beneficial or apparent.

Basically, PE is complaint of rights which has been created by one party over another’s land. This claim
would appear where an individual who has bought the complaint has honest believe that he/she have or
could hope to have some certain rights in the land which has been created upon the assurance (whether
by words or act) from the landowner. It would likely to occur when the owner gives a clear assurance
either explicitly or implicitly (Dillwyn) which needs not to be vague (Orgee) or determined (Century UK v
Clibbery) and the other party has relied on that promise (assurance), although this has not been
necessary that landowner has knowledge of this reliance (Crabb V Arun). Additionally, it is essential that
due to reliance upon the assurance plaintiff has endure some kind of detriment (Lloyd vs Dugdale).

In accordance with Lord Denning's ruling in Crab vs Arun, he said that proprietary estoppel used to
hinder any individual from asserting on his/her legal right if it has resulted from contract or through his
title deeds or by using statutory provision, where it seems to be unfair for him to do so depending upon
the recent negotiations has occurred among the parties.

Legislative regulations are placed on transactions regarding property under the law, which retracts the
equitable or lawful proprietary interest in the land only apply to those who establish these formalities.
Many of the proprietary rights could be only be granted through an act of deed or through writing which
is one of the most important method previously. In order to establish or convey legal estates or some
other interests, either by will or intravivos you must have to apply these specific methods which are;

As per s.52 of LPA 1925, creation or transfer of ever legal estate need to be through deeds which is
explained under s.1 of LP(MP)A 1989. Further few interests under the registered land has to be
registered at the moment of creation for it to be regarded as lawful property or interests as defined by
LRA 2002 s.27(2). PE according to equity occurs through s.2 of LP(MP)A 1989 in a situation where the
assignment of deed fails due to absence of requirements. Similar to that, will is essential under s.9 of
Wills Act 1837 for the convey of land after the death or the exclusion of will might lead to queries
regarding verbal assurance created.

But LPA 1925 has few exemptions to this norm, which are; Equitable or Constructive trust which arise
under s.53(2) of LPA 1925, leases which lasted 3 years or less (Legal Right). While s.2(5) of LP(MP)A 1989
asserts that situation which involves limited leases or constructive as well as equitable trust is not
governed through s.2 which demands a certified writing.

The regulation provides several reason involving decreasing the possibility of unplanned transactions or
fraud, whereby implementing a warning function which urge people to obey certain process under the
threat of possible sanctions. As per Birks, these methods could be used to alert to people concerning
how crucial is conveyance.

Depending upon a verbal agreement is risky when it comes to provide evidence as it could be inquired.
Furthermore, the demanding role assures that ordinary people acknowledge the legal procedure for
creating rights. Under “Form & Consideration”, L. Fuller pointed out the significance of conveying role in
regulation. As per the Fuller, placing transfers in a legal context enables the effective declaration of
intention.

Instead of existing regulations, unconscionability could likely to occur specifically impact those ones who
are vulnerable. Birks place it as an “inevitable stress on formalities and could contribute to problematic
situations. Thus, there exist a crucial need for exemptions to harsh rules. Under the instance of Crabb v
Arun, Lord Denning states that proprietary estoppel could use to reduce strict regulations or forbid
individuals from claiming their legal privileges when this would be unjust to do so. The actual method
for proprietary estoppel has extensively abandoned or an additional modernized method has been
explained from the case of Taylor v Liverpool focuses on flexibility or permit estoppel to be established
without harsh conditions. After this plaintiff could be able to establish PE through proving assurance,
reliance or detriment in a situation whereby rejecting remedy will be unacceptable. Modern instances
like Gillet vs Holt, Gresley vs Cooke, Jones vs Jones illustrates situations where courts have protected the
plaintiff’s rights. Instances like Cobbe v Yeoman illustrates the courts initiatives in order to sustaining
certainty or ignoring formalities regardless of whether this involves of rejecting proprietary estoppel.
Courts comfortably interprets the principle of PE as in the case of Kinane v Alimany where Arden LJ
suggested that a PE could take place when a contract don’t satisfy s.2(1) of LM(MP)A 1989.

At the end, this could be said that affirmation in the question might seems to conflict the argument
stated above in the essay, a detailed analysis would exhibit a shading perspective. Formalities or
exemptions under the legal structure is actually apparent, focusing to sustain certainty or predictability
in the scenario of legal transactions. But the essay also accepted the intrinsic rigidity among regulations
or law, especially in cases where a sensitive party might be at detriment. Instead of written nature of
formalities, courts usually struggle to provide justice by sensibly using both legal condition or equitable
norms as alike proprietary estoppel. Hence, when formalities or exemptions gives a structure for legal
proceedings, courts try to balance legal principles with fairness to verify justice has to be sustain for
this.

Q 3. ‘While the doctrine of proprietary estoppel achieves just outcomes in individual cases,
the basis for the doctrine itself is far from clear. Because different courts have apparently
decided different cases on different bases it is difficult for individual litigants to know their
rights.’ Discuss.
As per the statement, an argument is necessary regarding the equitable doctrine of proprietary
estoppel. The statement is composed of two components. The initial portion of the statement
implies that this doctrine lacks clarity, while the subsequent portion asserts that a variety of
cases with different outcomes complicates the claimant's ability to establish their rights.
As previously stated, the claimant applies this equitable doctrine when legal remedy is
unavailable. The doctrine's scope is expanding in accordance with the Cobbe vs Yeoman
decision. In response to the supplied statement, we shall examine the requirements that must
be fulfilled in order to obtain the remedy offered in equity, which are the criteria for
establishing the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. The burden of proof should rest with the
claimant to establish that the defendant should have made a presentation. This presentation
may take the form of a verbal or written promise. In accordance with the Matharu v. Matharu
case, an erroneous representation will also be enforced. In accordance to an additional
instance, Ramsden vs Dyson, a representation that is conveyed through conduct rather than
verbally will also be enforceable. Therefore, mere proof of the representation suffices. The
second criterion is that claimant's position needs to be changed as a consequence of claimant's
reliance on the defendant's presentation; the courts will presume such reliance based on the
claimant's conduct; or the claimant must demonstrate that such reliance caused some
detriment or loss. As previously indicated, in accordance with the Ramsden case, if an individual
act in reliance on the defendant's promise, he is entitled to a remedy. As previously mentioned,
the detriment or loss constitutes the third component that needs to be established. More
specifically, the loss should be caused by defendant's promise. In accordance to Rhone v.
Stevenson instance, where money is utilized, there is harm.
If claimant satisfies or proves all three of aforementioned components, or the remedy is still
unavailable, it would be unjust to him, based on Jennings vs Rice instance. Once the three
components of promise, reliance, or detriment have been established, the courts define
unconscionability using a broad approach.
This is the initial portion of the doctrine that can be deemed more certain in light of the
aforementioned stable criteria. However, the doctrine also includes the provision of judicial
remedies, which is not entirely certain. Also comprising the second portion of question's
statement. Campbell vs Griffin or Pascoe vs Turner establish that the conferred remedy may
consist of a freehold or a certain kind of compensation.
In order to grant the claimant a remedy, the courts employ a variety of tactics. The primary
concern of the courts is the effective expectation which should be conferred upon claimant.
As claimant would expect to receive the freehold, the Gillet v. Holt case dictates that he will be
granted the freehold. However, there are instances, such as Sledmore v. Delby, in which the
courts granted the remedy at their discretion rather than in accordance with what was
anticipated. The benefit that the claimant obtained by residing on the property exceeded any
potential drawbacks. In a different instance, Holman v. Howes, a husband granted his wife
permission to reside in property in exchange for a license to use it, despite the fact that she
desired the freehold. This case demonstrates that the courts have attempted to provide fair
outcomes while avoiding excessive burdens on the defendant.
Although it is clear from the preceding discussion that the courts attempted to provide fairness
for claimant, in doing so they inadvertently placed an undue burden upon defendant. As an
outcome, courts have now resolved to apply the lowest possible equity approach in order to
ensure that claimant receives fair outcomes. As illustrated in the instance of Thorner vs Major,
wherein the claimant was initially promised of receiving the entire freehold via will, but
subsequently the will provision was amended, resulting in the courts transferring a portion of
the land's freehold. This was determined to be a minimum equity because the claimant
received back what they had spent. If the entire freehold was granted, the defendant might
have been treated unjustly. Another instance of Sledmore v. Dalby where remedy was granted
because the defendant derived greater benefit than loss from the property.
Clearly, it is possible to contend that in order to receive assistance under the doctrine, the
litigant must meet the stage one criteria; however, the specific remedy available to him
remains uncertain. Although minimum equity approach is being employed to ensure justice, it
isn't possible that it will quickly become universally utilized, as alternative methods may also be
considered. Thus, it is prudent to concur with the statement that this doctrine ensures a just
outcome, although the precise compensation that litigants will receive remains uncertain.

Proprietary Estoppel or Constructive trust:

Walker LJ said in Yaxley that constructive trust or proprietary estoppel have many abstract
parallels.
Walker believed constructive trusts or proprietary estoppel included equity in protecting from
wrongful conduct. This includes nearby owners, buyers or sellers, unofficial relatives using a
home, trustees or their trustworthy duties-bound consumers or beneficiaries, or trustees or
consumers.
This may seem broad, but he was concerned by evident similarities between shared intention
constructive trust (CICT) or proprietary estoppel (PE). He acknowledged it by stating that these
ideas are still different or providing a scenario of a trustee taking an improper advantage from
his client. This discussion is about benefit trusts, nor proprietary estoppel.
Comparing proprietary estoppel or CICT was possible at one point. Lord Bridge emphasized the
significance of a shared contract, setting up, or knowledge for Lloyds Bank property sharing. He
ruled that for establishing PE or CICT, one party must show that the plaintiff acted to his loss or
materially altered his position in reliance on the contract. In finalizing his statement, Lord
Bridge seems to combine each of these concepts, or this condition of inappropriate reliance on
a contract resembles proprietary estoppel's injurious reliance on an assurance.
In Stack vs. Dowden, Lord Walker said that the two conceptions had split regardless of their
integration. He said, "Proprietary estoppel usually involves establishing an equitable right
against the ethical conduct of the "real" owner," to separate the options that are available. It is
reasonable to earn the lowest achievable reward for fairness, which may be financial only. In
contrast, CICT with "mutual intention" describes the beneficial owner or owners along
with their rights.
An additional aspect to looking at is that CICT has changed since Lord Bridge's Lloyds Bank case.
Contracts have already set the parties' goals. The Stack or Jones cases altered the concept to
"assigning" an intention to either of the parties. Lord Wilson said, "When equity appears
obliged to determine the shared intention, it can do so through an approach that the court
believes reasonable." In contrast, proprietary estoppel is established when one party conveys
to another a statement that they intentionally intend for the other party to rely on, or that
which, considering the circumstances, justifies the first party's actual reliance.
Undoubtedly, there are additional valid distinctions between these concepts therefore, it is
proposed that their most recent classification is beneficial, as the fusion would eradicate
such distinctions.
An appropriate proprietary estoppel statement allows the judge to choose a remedy. This
discretion is used to "support the estoppel," which Lord Walker remarked in Stack vs. Dowden
is "accomplished by the least compensation needed to do justice." The plaintiff may potentially
receive a reduced amount of compensation than what was initially intended. In the Jenning
case, the court awarded him a remedy because of his injury, even though he was significantly
represented. In the situation of CICT, which is based on contributions made to buy a family
home, the court must give the applicant a beneficial interest in the estate adequate to the
property, regardless of how these contributions are estimated, particularly when they aren't
financial in nature. (Dowden vs Stack & Jones vs Kernott).
An essential distinction between the two notions is that proprietary estoppel becomes
enforceable upon a court's decision, whereas an equitable interest is sufficient from the
moment it is established. Following the previous reasoning, P. Ferguson says, "The difference
lies among a method of creating a right or an argument of entitlement to a discretionary
remedy." Constructive trusts, or any trust, are distinct from proprietary estoppel because their
main goal appears to distribute titles (either equitable or legal), Matthews confirms that even if
proprietary estoppel exists, the complainant is either prevented from claiming the interest he
thought he possessed (as in Inwards v. Baker) or retained it.
Contracts which violates s.2(1) of the Land Trusts (Property and Mutual Property) Act (LTA)
1989 have caused issues. As per this law, any contracts or alternative sales of property made
before or later Sep 27, 1989, should either be in written form, include every condition
stipulated by the parties, or be witnessed by each of them. But s.2(5) isn't relevant to
constructive or resultant trusts. Therefore, if an agreement fails to fulfill the above standards, it
might be recovered by claiming that the evidence reflects a constructive trust, despite of the
findings' apparent estoppel. This happened to Yaxley. In Herbert vs. Doyle (2010), an estoppel
case was reformed as a constructive trust case to sustain a case without written evidence.
Whittaker vs. Kinnear (2011) ended this artificiality by ruling that proprietary estoppel existed
once S.2 LP(MP)A was implemented in a property deal. Proprietary estoppel has not been
eliminated by the Cobbe decision, which established that constructive trusts often have a
legislative exemption (see, for example, LP(MP)A 1989, s.2(5) and LPA 1925, s.53(2)). In the
absence of legislative processes, courts must often choose constructive trust over proprietary
estoppel, even if an entity constituted by equity does not need statutory protection.
Based on the aforementioned details, it can be concluded that although the notions of
proprietary estoppel or constructive trust may have appeared to overlap in the past, this no
longer holds true. Particularly with regard to a number of basic aspects or distinguishing
characteristics, such as the crucial element of precision, which can be acquired through
constructive trust, or the appropriate method of remedy through proprietary estoppel, the two
theories remain notably dissimilar.

Proprietary Estoppel:
This question inspects the scope of judicial discretion when deciding on a claim for promissory
estoppel. As per me, the judiciary has vast discretion in this aspect as I would prove this
through demonstrating the progress of proprietary estoppel and showing the elasticity of PE in
modern law context. Further, this also include the exemplification of the elements of PE and
after proving PE court usually adopt two approaches in order to award damages.
For creating rights, proprietary estoppel could be used as a sword instead of shield as it just
defends the claim. It must be associated with proprietary rights and it demand the
demonstration of detriment on claimant. Previously, the claim should have to fulfill the firm
probanda conditions as given by the case of Willmot v Barber. These conditions involve the
claimant mistaken belief about the right, the money spend on this mistaken belief, landowner’s
realization of his or claimant’s rights or owner must have supported claimants right by not
exercising his/her own rights. Modern cases have provided a lot more elasticity in the field of
proprietary estoppel. Oliver J from the case of Taylor’s fashion declares that such probanda
should not be apprehend as rigid rules. Furthermore, in Gregory v Mighell it was ruled that the
owner should not have to fulfill the desires irrespective of his intend, which he has generated or
supported.
This is now realized that as there doesn’t exist any of the strict criteria yet, few conditions need
to be proved while claiming for proprietary estoppel where unconscionability plays a
fundamental role (Cobbe). Firstly, there should be a representation or assurance. Whereas, in
Gillet v Holt where the court has held that making assurance at number of times could be
considered as a valid assurance as this made the assurance adequately clear. Regarding the
familial case, the court has a great discretion when assurance wasn’t clear in the situation as in
the case of Thornier v Major, where the claimant helped his son on his farm regardless of there
hasn’t been clarity regarding the assurance among each party court ruled that there exists a
clear assurance in the situation. On the other hand, court adopted a rigid approach regarding
commercial cases as of Cobbe v Yeoman in which court ruled that promises or assurance which
was made in respect of business interactions before the contract was actually created then in
such situation’s assurance might not establishes. This case considerably restricts the scope of
estoppel in commercial cases.
Secondly, the plaintiff should have undergone some kind of loss or detriment which created the
conduct unconscionable. Court have adopted a wider approach in explaining what could be
regarded as detriment (loss), this could be something which won’t be financial in nature.
Detriment isn’t a narrow rather this is a technical concept. However, in Greasley spending the
whole life in taking care of family was adequate to be regarded as detriment. Further in Davies
v Davies, where the court held that spending life working on familial property would be
adequate enough to be constituted as detriment.
Lastly, upon reliance claimant has bear some kind of detriment. If the plaintiff hasn’t taken any
action in reliance upon assurance under the course of proprietary rights then we won’t be able
to affirm estoppel as he/she hasn’t undergone through detriment (Coombes v Smith). In
comparison to this, conflicting intentions also don’t prohibit estoppel (Campbell v Griffin). Lord
Walker stress that assurance should be the only the cause for the conduct to be sufficient if
they act as attractiveness. Furthermore, owner need not necessarily to be aware of and
intended for reliance whereas the word can logically be rendered as intention to taken seriously
(Thorner).
Remedies would be granted for estoppel when as of these conditions has been
proven/satisfied. One of these remedies are that you should provide anything which you have
promised or assured to the plaintiff (Dillwyn) or second condition is that the claimant must be
compensated upon what he suffers upon detrimental reliance (Baker v Baker). There has been
symmetrical balance among the expectation or compensation. Under the modern era, courts
cultivate remedies on the basis of detriment tolerated by the plaintiff instead of expectation. As
per instance of Crabb in which court ruled that remedies for proprietary estoppel needs to be
minimal possible justice available for the plaintiff. Yet in few cases the court has used its
broader discretion as within the instance of Jennings v Rice which states that when the
expectation would be reasonable then the remedy for proprietary estoppel should be awarded
on that basis.
To conclude this, under commercial cases courts usually takes a rigid approach. In such case
they frequently compensate plaintiff for their actual detriment instead of their expectations.
But in some cases, court has utilized their broader discretionary authority (Jennings) while
courts are usually lenient while granting remedies for proprietary estoppel under the familial or
non-commercial scenarios. Cases like Thorner has simplified the assurance to be proven under
the context of non-commercial scenarios whereas sometimes clear words are not used and this
would likely to motivate more plaintiffs to brought such claims like never before although the
condition of assurance/representation, reliance or detriment should be fulfilled. Proprietary
estoppel might be profitable in situations when the loss (detriment) is not related to the
acquisition of the land or its worth or is extremely small in contrast to the benefit assured. Here
the question would arise that would it be suitable for courts to make decision concerning what
should likely to be included in the will of any individual (Davies v Davies).
PE (Guest):
The 2022 Supreme Court opinion in Guest v. Guest clarified property estoppel arguments and
gave plaintiffs and criminal experts a framework. Like proprietary estoppel, this crucial finding
applies to family-owned farms, which have long been the focus of these disputes. Despite the
fact that proprietary estoppel claim status quo has grown more established, scholars still
disagree how to solve this complicated problem. Guest v. Guest (2022) teaches us about
legitimate claims and solution complexity."
The criminal case Guest v. Guest (2022) involves David and Josephine Guest's Tump Farm and
their kids Andrew, Ross, and Jan. Andrew, the eldest kid, has painted and employed 33 years on
a farm to inherit it once his parents die. Andrew's parents probably implied this. This was vital
to the case. Whether to keep Andrew's promises or pay them off gradually was the challenge.
People must examine expectations and compensate for undue reliance when dealing with
proprietary estoppel.
The Supreme Court debated whether to realize Andrew's expectations or reward him for his
trust, demonstrating the complexity of proprietary estoppel in both practice and philosophy.
The bulk judgement was improved by Lord Briggs' "spectrum" of expectancy and harm. The
depth and intensity of Andrew's negative dependency should be considered while choosing a
therapy, not merely his expectations and compensation. This spectrum approach offers many
treatment alternatives, but its feasibility and efficacy in real life are questionable.
Most assessments include intricate assurances, reliance, and enforceability. Lord Briggs says
proprietary estoppel comes from a sense of injustice from a violated promise. A remedy must
recognize and correct this injustice. However, Lord Leggatt supports reimbursement for injury
or loss. This argument highlights how difficult it is to prove a legal claim and choose a remedy.
The majority and minority agree that these pledges are not contracts. They pondered whether
depending on people in good times is like paying attention, which requires specialized
performance. Lord Briggs' spectrum analysis reveals overreliance may be hazardous. Applying
contractual concepts raises proprietary estoppel difficulties.
Focusing on expectations is excellent in theory but difficult to implement. Andrew's 33 years on
the farm show that the price of expectations may be easier to predict than the difficult harm
over time. Courts may struggle with sophisticated and subjective harm calculations.
Expectation-targeted methods may artificially reduce damage assessment costs and
capabilities.
Guest v. Guest (2022) established that parents need financial and non-financial options. This
deviation from the usual remedy complicates it since claimants must decide. The article notes
that this option provision's explanation is ambiguous and contradicts remedy allocation. Thus,
this unique element raises major considerations concerning the fairness and equity of this
conflict resolution method.
Guest v. Guest (2022) created a thorough proprietary estoppel dispute resolution structure.
Although progress has been made, corrections experts criticize the expectation-based strategy.
Lord Briggs' spectrum hypothesis has yet to be tested in practice. Courts' future use of this
approach's flexibility is unknown. This method's efficacy depends on several circumstances. The
primary question is whether a basic intellectual property estoppel framework speeds up
criminal court proceeding. It will save time and money by minimizing party conflicts and
encouraging settlements.
Guest v. Guest (2022) addressed proprietary estoppel. The expectation-primarily-based
approach's conceptual beginnings are debated. It will be helpful if Lord Briggs' spectrum
technique streamlines court procedures, minimizes disagreements, and simplifies future
settlements. Guest v. Guest (2022) affects proprietary estoppel and more. It reexamines fair
remedies in famous situations and illuminates what we anticipate and what we hurt. In other
fair remedies, this "spectrum" may obscure performance and payback. It is unclear how the
courts will use this greater authority in future equitable comfort cases.
Guest v. Guest (2022) allows parents to select between financial and non-financial answers,
unlike before. This novel treatment allocation technique may set a new norm. Whether this
option clause is enlarged in proprietary estoppel or other areas of law is questionable but
plausible.
The famous Guest v. Guest (2022) case establishes customization. Courts may have trouble
using the spectrum concept and aligning cases. Judges may also examine negative reliance's
length and features to find answers. Being flexible might cause courtroom misunderstanding
and heated disputes. It examines negative dependency and questions if expectations justify
performance requirements. The change in focus may require a deeper review of the claimant's
reliance and equitable factors in proprietary estoppel cases. Criminal proprietary estoppel
claims should be thoroughly assessed for legality and practicality.
Guest stressed that justice must adapt. This incident illustrates how individuals handle injustice
fairly. Equitable standards must develop with society and its belongings to meet new problems.
The flexibility to adapt assures justice in the ever-changing criminal system and meets current
requirements.
Guest case redefined proprietary estoppel. It is systematic and brings fascinating issues and
complexities. A "spectrum," choosing remedies based on maternal and paternal influence, and
destructive reliance will affect proprietary estoppel claims. Understanding how this verdict may
affect fair remedies and the "spectrum" approach to equality is key.

In this essay, it will be proposed that the important ruling of Rhone vs Stephens developed
that burden of freehold covenants cannot be transferred with land. While it may be a subject of
conflict or evident debates in conceptual terms, it has little significance on contemporary
professional conveyancing due to exemptions or conveyancing equipment’s. Thus, this
legislation is adequate or does not require considerable revision.
Consider why the rule arises or what it implies first. In the instance of Rhone vs Stephens, it had
been stated that nobody should be bound by a promise created with another individual even
though they hadn't created that promise themselves. When a non-party (i.e., non-original
covenantor) could be accountable on a contract, it would violate English law. This makes sense
for typical contractual duties, although freehold covenants are different. These are legal duties
that have to do with the land, so they can become truly attached to land or belong to it. Would
freehold covenants vary from basic contractual obligations?
Actually, equity intervened here. Regarding Tulk v Moxhay, burden of negative covenants,
which prevent the landowner from using their property in a specific manner, could be
transferred to covenantor's successors based on certain situations. For example, the covenant
must: (i) relate to land; (ii) have been made to help the initial covenantee's land; (iii) be meant
to go with land; or (iv) be properly protected, that is, noticed. Despite seeming burdensome,
these conditions are simple to meet since freehold covenants are property rights.
In fact, if covenant was unconnected to property, not formed for land's benefit, or just binding
on initial covenantor, it wouldn't qualify as private. Since these burden-passing conditions are
easy to meet or match similar benefit-passing requirements, equity restrictive covenants
typically become enforceable among successors of initial covenantor or initial covenantee. As
equity provides a number of remedies, such as an injunction or a particular performance, but
the law only allows damages, implementing a restrictive covenant under equity is possible,
plausible, or possibly desirable.
Since positive covenants aren't covered by Tulk, Rhone v Stephens' ruling may be that positive
covenants cannot pass. This could potentially be a good thing. Restricted covenants demand no
response from covenantor's successors in title, while positive covenants usually involve service
or payments. Positive covenants hold one liable for completing contractual duties committed by
another (which violates the overall spirit of English legislation), while restrictive covenants only
require not breaching such obligations and maintaining the status quo. English law recognized
that a successor in title to the covenantor could not escape a positive covenant in certain cases.
In Halsall v Brizzel, this exception established mutual benefit or burden. This idea states that
everyone who benefits from a right must also endure its burden. Thus, if the right or burden
were granted in identical transaction, when they are actually mutual because there isn't any
right rather than burden, or if the individual meant to carry the burden can decline the benefit
(as provided by Thamesmead Town vs Allotey), they must carry the burden when they keep
to get the benefit. This idea is unambiguous: one is unable to enjoy a right without contributing
to its preservation. This shows that Rhone principle only precludes positive covenants that fail
to fulfil the shared benefit or burden conditions, thus limiting its applicability.
Finally, a rental fee combined with privilege of rejoining may successfully render every owner
liable for paying a specified amount for worry about dropping his or her interest in land, the
unnaturally long lease, or conveyancing device mos. The first kind of covenant chain is
indemnities. The initial covenantor covenants with their short-term successor (in addition to so
on) that their successor will protect him against any allegations or damages experienced as a
consequence of an action for an infringement of covenant (due to initial covenantor stays
accountable for harms at law to the current owner of benefited land, stipulated that the benefit
has been transferred to them). Although useful, the linkage of indemnities' fundamental
drawback is that damages constitute as sole remedy. The current owner of benefited land
constitutes a greater probability to want the covenant carried out than declaring losses (until
the condition is for making a payment, whereas damages could possibly be estimated more
readily), so it may be an insufficient remedy for covenant enforcer.
The subsequent conveyancing instrument, which is most frequently employed, permits
every positive covenant to become legally binding by any proprietor of the benefited land
regarding every proprietor of burdened land. The initial covenantor must covenant that either
he or she will adhere to a positive covenant or require their successor in title to
convey covenant to the current owner of beneficial. After that contract, a limitation may be
(and is) put in the property Registry, barring future property deals if the covenant is not
satisfied. This serves as a straightforward or efficient approach to make any covenant legally
enforceable, thus competent conveyancing always uses it.
Given the aforementioned, particularly the fact that following rulings, the doctrine of mutual
benefit or burden, or particular conveyancing equipment’s have made the framework laid out
in Rhone vs Stephens present a couple of logistical challenges, I would argue that freehold
covenant law doesn't require to be changed. Note that the regulation was created to uphold a
longstanding English legal idea that nobody must be accountable for another's positive
commitments, which is a reasonable purpose. The aforesaid chain of covenants or property
Register limitation guarantee that each succeeding owner of burdened property voluntarily
enters into an independent agreement with the owner of benefitted land or assumes an
additional duty under which he is accountable. I think Rhone vs Stephens improved
conveyancing procedures while retaining English law, hence it shouldn't be modified.