BEFORE THE MEMBER MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS

TRIBUNAL AURANGABAD

Review (Appl) No. 0f 2024

Appasaheb Radhakisan Dange & other

"

Ankush Kisan Naik & Other

ADDRESS MEMO
i

The address of the above named complainants for the purpose of service of
notice is as follows:-

R/o .Lohgaon Tal,Paithan Dist. Aurangabad.

Aurangabad, dated this 21* of November 2024.

Submitted by,

Adv.Aniket V.Patil

(Advocate for Applicant)

 £2024

1) Appasaheb Radhakisan Dange

Age:Major Occ:Service R/o
Lohgaon Tal-Paithan
Dist:Chh.Sambhaji Nagar

2) Ganesh S/o. Jagannath Shinde (died)

Through Lrs,

2.1) Ashwini W/o. Ganesh Shinde,

Age : 35 years, Occu.Household,
R/o. Gajanan Nagar,Bidkin,
Tq.Paithan, Dist.Aurangabad.

2.2) Kalyani d/o. Ganesh Shinde,

Age : 13 years, Occu.Education,
R/o. Gajanan Nagar,Bidkin,
Tq.Paithan, Dist. Aurangabad.

2.3) Sakshi d/o.Ganesh Shinde

Age : 13 years, Occu.Education,
R/o. Gajanan Nagar,Bidkin,
Tq.Paithan, Dist.Aurangabad.

2.4) Sandhya d/o. Ganesh Shinde

Age : 13 years, Occu.Education,
R/o. Gajanan Nagar,Bidkin,
Tq.Paithan, Dist.Aurangabad.

V/S
 1) Ankush Kisan Naik,
Age : 45 years, Occu: Labour,
R/0.Ghodegaon Tq. Paithan
Dist.Aurangabad.

2) Sou.Kamal W/o. Ankush Naik,

Age : 40 years, Occu:Household,
R/0.Ghodegaon Tq. Paithan
Dist.Aurangabad.

REVIEW APPLICATION IN THE MATTER OF MACP

CLAIM NO.436/2015 DECIDED ON 31.07.2024

Respected sir,

1. The applicant in the subject matter hereby most humbly files this
review application against order award of this Hon'ble court dated

31/07/2024 challenging through specific grounds .(MACP

486/2015)

2 The applicants are original respondents In the against whom

award is passed and the respondents are original complainant who
are decree holders.

3. The applicant states that this Hon'ble court has passed on

order & award which is as follows - Specifically in Claus no. 2
Respondent No. 1 & 2.1 to 2.4 do pray Rs"6,70,500/- Jointly &
severally, Including NFL amount if any, to the claimant with
interest@6% per annum from the date of petition to fill its
 realization ~ of the amount of compensation. Petition till Its
realizations of the amount of compensation.

4. The award itself is contrary to the contentions made as

respondent no. 2 owner of vehicle crashed in accident since the
owner of vehicle died and vehicle is not in possession of his hairs
therefore how come such a huge claim can be imposed on
applicants 2.1 to 2.4, it indicates that this Hon’ble court have failed
to decide joint and several liability while delivering award.

5. The applicant submits that, even though during the course of

accident original respondent no 2.1 to 2.4 was not even aware of the
facts that where and in what Condition the vehicle is because of the
vehicle registration is not in the name of any of this applicant;
subsequently no such claim is pending regarding succession of said
vehicle by and through any of the applicant.

6. The applicant submits that there are huge contradictions in the time
of accident and dated 30.3.2015, the crime details show the
occurrence at 7.00 pm contrary to the Past mortem report which
shows 18:00 hours i.e. 6. PM. which is almost an hour's time
difference. Therefore the issue of alibi is not decided validly and
came to be totally ignored.

7. That, applicant no. 1 is made liable only for insignificant

evidence and statements made by witnesses however the nun of the

witness has identified respondent no.1 therefore this Hon'ble Court

has failed to demonstrate appropriate corroboration of evidence.
 8. The applicant submits that, the claim filed by the claimant
himself declares that the deceased was returning from work and at
that occasion of accident took place, where it is ample clear that this
entire claim does not fit into the ambit of MV. Accident claim. but
the jurisdictional authority to decide this issue is the Hon'ble
Labour Court.

9. The entire facts and preliminary issue starred in the claim of

applicant describes employer and worker relationship of deceased;
therefore the award made by this Hon'ble Court is unwarranted on
the ground of appropriate jurisdiction.

10. Applicant submits that the applicant craves liberty to amend,

alter, delete or to modify the contents of any paragraph or
paragraphs of complaint with the kind permission of this Hon'ble
court, which will help the Hon'ble court for proper adjudication of
the said matter in the interest of justice.

11. After the exercise of due diligence was not within the
- knowledge of the applicant.

Hence It is therefore prayed that:-

A. Review application may kindly be allowed.

 B. The amount of Rs.6,70,500/- Imposed on applicants
may kindly be withdrawn by sctting aside the award dated: ===~
31-7.2024

C. Any other favorable & cquitable order may kindly

be passed in favor of the applicant as this Hon'ble Court
may this fits & oblige.

Date: 2| —\\ — ez

Place: cchh. ;.Mg,,,-jmc\j\q’ M"

Deponents

N
ADV. ANIKET V.PATIL Appasaheb R. Domge
(Advocate for applicant)
 VERIFICATION

I,Appasaheb Radhakishan Dange , Age:39 , Occu: Farmer

R/o.Lohagon, Tal Paithan Dist Aurangabad, do hereby state

on solemn affirmation for myself and that contents of this
petition in Para Nos. 01 to o6 are the facts, Para Nos. o% to

\\_ are legal submissions and Para No. & & _¢ are prayer
clauses are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. I have
not suppressed any material facts.

Hence, verified at Aurangabad on this 2\t day of Sept, ™oV

2024.

Identified and Deponent

Explained by

(Aniket V. Patil) ) (Appasaheb R. Dange)

ADVOCATE
 VAKILPATRA / AUTHORITY

BEFORE THE HON’BLE_COURT M 6T0R A CCFOGHVT CLhimy

TR RO NAL AURANGABAD
DISTRICT:
(Re-\ncud (AR N
€ASE NO. /2024

Complainant/Appellant/
Agpasahel R. Demeje & orhver Rev.Petitioner/Applicant/
Caveator/Second Party

A\

Respondents/Opponents/
Aruoshy K- NedW & o¥hrer Non-Caveator/First Party

I/We._-A?fi.flézhzk._.fimmfi\pmlab.S/o...‘@en.@&_

c-Age 3%)-Years, Occu"-fk-’-‘?fl’-"-%d»—--Post Taluka —Q--—Hf“”\

--------District --AWW in the present/said matter do

hereby authorise.

To appear and act for me as my/our advocate in the said matter.

Witness my hand this ¢8 8 day of Oct, 2024
Witness
Aurangabad
Signature
Accepted @ W
?‘W-‘é‘kfl R R Talal %\}\‘
/

ADV.ANIKET V. PATIL
Flat No.12, Suyog Residency [GIRCARETC RN SR ISR 3!1—“—29?;(%
Nathpuram Itkheda,
Aurangabad.
Contact: 9172077606 G aheindl) By (RN abint

@%—uefl(} T G\E\@J

@ oS erdy ;’a’\‘-\l_A\ Q,’é e @fl(

BEFORE THE MEMBER MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL AURANGABAD
Review (Appl) No. 0f 2024

Appasaheb Radhakisan Dange & other

\S]

Ankush Kisan Naik & Other

LIST
DOCUMENTS
OF

Sr.No Particulars Page No.

1To 13
0l. Certified copy of order dated:31/07/2024

*02. | Copy of Citation order dated 11 july 2024 Rajasthan | 14 To 22

High Court

Date:21/11/2024

Ptace:Aurangabad

Submitted by,

by
Adv.Aniket V.Patil

(Advocate for Applicant)

 MHAU010037782015
a]u[m

]
Presented on : 07.07.2015
Registered on : 05.08.2015
Decided on :31.07.2024
Duration : 9Y OM 24DS

BEFORE THE MEMBER, M Al

AURANGABAD,
( Presided over by D.H.Keluskar )

M.A.C.P No.436/2015. Exh. No.73/A

1] Ankush s/o. Kisan Naik,
Age: 45 Years, Occu.: Labour,
R/0. Gadhegaon, Tq. Paithan,
Dist. Aurangabad.

2] Sou. Kamal w/o. Ankush Naik,

Age: 40 Years, Occu.: Household,
R/0. As above.
VERSUS
1] Appasaheb Radhakisan Dange,
Age : Major, Occu. Driver,
R/o0. Lohgaon, Tq. Paithan,
Dist. Aurangabad.

2] Ganesh s/o. Jagannath Shinde (died

through Lrs.)

2.1] Ashwini w/o. Ganesh Shinde,

Age : 35 years, Occu. Household,
R/0. Gajanan Nagar, Bidkin,
Tq. Paithan, Dist. Aurangabad.
 2.2] Kalyani d/o. Ganesh Shinde,
Age : 13 yrs, u/g. mother claimant no.1

2.3] Sakshi d/o. Ganesh Shinde,

Age : 13 yrs, u/g. mother claimant no.1

2.4] Sandhya d/o. Ganesh Shinde,

Age : 7 yrs, u/g. mother claimant no.1
All R/0. Gajanan Nagar, Post Bidkin,
Tq. Paithan, Dist. Aurangabad. espondents

CLATM; Under Section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

HAHF KA KKK KA Ak ek &k Kok koo o o o
Mr. Milind C. Patil - Advocate for claimants
Mr. PS.Tandulje- Advocate for Respondent Nos.1
XA KAk ARk & 2.
Kk ok ok ko

JUDGMENT
" ( Delivered on 31.07.2024)

This vls‘van application under section 166 of the Motor

Vehicles Act,'1988 for grant of compensa
tion by parent of deceased
Pandurang Ankush Naik on accidental death
on 30.03.2015.

2. Facts pleaded by the claimant are briefly stated as

under:
On 30.03.2015 son the claimants, was travelling on
Hero Honda motorcycle bearing registrati
on no. MH-20-BE-9601 on
Gadhegaon road, at that time one TVS motorcycle bearing
registration no. MH-20-BZ-3698 (hereinafter referred as ‘offending-
vehicle’) came from opposite direction in very high and excessive
speed and in rash and negligent mann
er and gave forcible dash to
the motorcycle of deceased. Due to which he sustained severe
I~y
 3 Judgment in MACP No.100436/2015
¢
injuries, he was immediately shifted to the GHATI hospital,
Aurangabad, but after examination doctor declared him dead. The
FIR is registered against driver of offending-vehicle i.e. respondent
no.1 in police station Bidkin under Sect. 304-A, 279, 337, 338 of the

I.PC. vide Crime no.I-85/2015.

3. At the time of accident deceased was 22 years old and

was having good health. Deceased was doing mason and labour
work and was earning Rs.12,000/- per month. The claimants were
dependent on income of deceased.

4. Due to death of deceased, claimants sustained financial

as well as mental loss. The respondent no.1 is driver of offending
vehicle and it was owned by respondent no.2 at the time of accident.
Therefore, they prayed for compensation from both the respondents
jointly or severally.

5. During pendency of claim-petition, respondent no.2 died

therefore, his Legal Representatives were brought on record as per
order passed below Exh.29.

6. The respondent no.1 has filed his Written Statement at

Exh.12 and denied the claim of claimants in toto. It is further
contended that accident not occurred due to his negligence and in
fact at the time of accident, he was at his duty place and his name is
falsely involved ir the crime. Further claimants have not given any
document on record in respect of age, occupation and income of
deceased and prayed for dismissal of claim-petition against him.
 7. The Legal Representatives of deceased respondent no.2
i.e. 2-1 to 2-4 appeared and filed their written-statement at Exh.34
and denied the claim of claimants. They further contended that the
alleged accident occurred at 07.30 a.m. and in the FIR time of
accident is mentioned as 07.30 p.m. and at that time respondent
no.1 was on duty. They further denied age, occupation and income
of the deceased. Hence, prayed for dismissal of claim-petition
against them.

8. I have framed issues at Exh.35, together with my

findings thereon and reasons for the same are stated as below -

ISSUES FINDINGS
1) Whether th claimants prove that the : Yes.
death of Pandurang Ankush Naik caused
due to rash and negligent driving of
offending vehicle TVS motorcycle bearing
registration no. MH-20-BZ-3698?

2) Whether respondents prove that in : No.

accident the vehicle bearing registration
no. MH-20-BZ-3698 not involved ?

3) Whether claimants are: entitled to Yes,

compensation ? If so, to what extent ? Rs.6,70,500/-,

4) Who is liable to pay compensation ? Both the

respondents
jointly or
severally.
5) What order? : The petition is
partly allowed.
 5 Judgment in MACP No.100436/2015

REASONS

9. Claimant no.1 has filed his evidence affidavit at Exh.37.

Claimants also relied upon documentary evidence i.e. true copies of
report Exh.38, printed FIR Exh.39, spot panchnama Exh.40, inquest
panchnama Exh.41, postmortem report Exh.42, RC book of
offending-vehicle Exh.43, driving licence of respondent no.1 Exh.44,
RC book of vehicle driven by deceased Ex.45, Form-AA Exh.46.

10. The respondents have examined Appasaheb s/o.

Radhakisan Dange as RW1 at Exh.54, Gahininath @ Shravan
Damodhar Shinde as RW2 at Exh.47, Pramod Ramesh Shinde as
RW3 at Exh.62, Ashok Punjaram Thorat as RW4 at Exh.64, Ganesh
s/0. Laxman Gavande as RW5 at Exh.68, Subhash s/o. Reva Rathod
as RW6 at Exh.69 and Ashwini w/o. Ganesh Shinde as RW7 at
Exh.71.

11. The submission of applicant's advocate is that accident is

occurred due to rash and negligent driving of driver of offending
vehicle i.e. respondent no.1 and FIR is also registered against him.
The respondent to avoid the liability of paying compensation, taken
false defence of non-involvement of offending-vehicle. Due to
influence of respondent no.1, who gave their statements before
police about occurrence of accident and negligence of respondent
no.1, denied the occurrence of accident and involvement of
offending-motorcycle. All those witnesses deposed falsely occurrence
of accident. After investigation charge-sheet is filed against
respondent no.1. Respondent no.1 taken custody of vehicle from
 6

Court. The deceased was only earning member of their family.

They were depending on his income Therefore, prayed for just and

reasonable compensation.

12. On the contrary, submission of respondents’ advocate

that the claimants failed to prove the involvement of offending-
vehicle and further negligence of respondent no.1. The alleged eye
witnesses denied the involvement of offending-motorcycle and,
therefore, claimants failed to prove the involvement of offending-
vehicle and, therefore, the respondents are not liable to pay the
compensation.

SSUE NOS.1 AND 2 :-

13. Both these issues are interlinked, hence, taken together
for consideration.
Claimant no.1 Ankush Naik deposed that accident
occurred due to rash and negligent driving of respondent no.1 and
FIR is registered against him. After investigation, charge-sheet is
also filed against the respondent no.1 for driving vehicle rashly and
negligently and caused death of Pandurang Naik. The postmortem
report shows cause of death due to head injury. It also appear that
the accident is occurred on 30.03.2015. Initially deceased was taken
to Government Hospital Bidkin for primary treatment and then he
was referred and admitted to G.M.C.H. Aurangabad and during
treatment he succumbed to injuries on 02.04.2015. In the evidence
of claimant, policc p: jers and medical papers are proved and
exhibited.
 7 Judgment in MACP No.100436/2015

14. The respondents examined in all total 7 witnesses to

prove that the offending-vehicle was not involved in the accident.

A-- The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Janabai wd/o.

Dinkarrao Ghorpade and others Vs. ICICI Lombord Insurance Co.
Led, (2022) 10 Supreme Court Cases 512, held that while deciding
cases arising out of motor vehicle accident, the standard of proof

must be of preponderance of probabilities and not strict standard of

proof beyond all reasonable doubts, which is follow in criminal cases.

15. From record it appears that the accident was occurred

on 30.03.2015, during treatment deceased died on 02.04.2015 cause
of death of deceased is head injury. After death of deceased, FIR
registered on 12.04.2015. As per contents of FIR, informant-
claimant no.1 came to know from Shravan Shinde (DW2) that

Pramod Shinde and Ravi Shinde admitted deceased in the hospital.

On inquiry with Shravan Shinde, he came to know that deceased and
Shravan were coming towards house from Gadhegaon on motorcycle
and respondent no.1 came from opposite direction and gave dash to
their motorcycle. The accident was head on collusion.

16. . The spot panchnama carried out on 02.04.2015 in

A.D.No0.11/2015. It appears there is damage from front side to the
motorcycle driven by deceased. If there was no involvement of other
vehicle, in that case there is no reason to cause damage to
motorcycle from front side. It shows that there was head on
collusion.
 8

17. It is the case of respondent no.1 that false case s filed

against him. He further stated that on the day of incident he was on
duty at MAK Industries as Watchman. During his cross-examination
he admitted that at the time of accident, he was in possession of
offending-vehicle. ~He purchased said motorcycle from Ganesh
Shinde. He has not challenged the criminal proceeding before the
Higher Authority. He further admitted that he has not filed any
document to show that he was on duty at the time of incident.

18. It has came in the evidence of Ashwini Shinde (DW7)

that offending motorcycle was in the name of her deceased husband
Ganesh Shinde, respondent no.1 is her real brother and he was
driving said motorcycle. Said motorcycle was in the custody of her
brother respondent no.1. She and her brother taken custody of said
vehicle from police. From evidence of above said both witnesses
shows that respondent no.1 having possession of offending vehicle at
the time of accident and deceased Ganesh Shinde i.e. respondent
no.2 was registered owner at the time of accident and the
respondent nos.2.1 to 2.4 are his legal representatives.

19. The respondents also examined DW2 Gahininath @

Shravan Shinde, who was accompany with deceased on motorcycle,
also denied involvement of respondent no.1 and offending-vehicle.
In examination-in-chief, he claimed that he taken lift from deceased,
however, in cross-examination he admitted that motorcycle was
driven by deceased is purchased by him from he sister’s husband
Ravindra Jadhav. In his police statement he has ' ot narrated that
accused was under influence of liquor and there is non involv
ement
 9 Judgment in MACP No.100436/2015

of vehicle. He admitted that respondent no.1 is relative of his uncle.

From testimony of said witness it appears that he has not narrated
the true fact, though the motorcycle driven by deceased is owned by
him, he deposed that he has taken lift from deceased. There is no
reason to seek lift from deceased on his own motorcycle. It shows
that he is falsely deposing at the instance of respondent.

20. DW3 Pramod and DW4 Ashok deposed that they saw
the deceased and Shravan Damodhar Shinde were fell on road and
having smell of liquor. Police statements of both witnesses were
recorded. Till deposition before Court they have not stated anyone
that deceased was having liquor smell and no other vehicle was
involved in the accident. They are not eye witnesses of the actula
accident, but they came at spot of incident subsequently shifted
deceased to hospital. Their oral contention about smell of liquor to
deceased is not supported by medical evidence, therefore, much
importance cannot be given to the testimony of said witness.

21. DWS5 Ganesh deposed that he was working with

respondent no.1 in MAK Industry. On 30.03.2015 respondent was on
duty from 07.00 a.m. to 07.30 p.m. In cross-examination he stated
that he is not aware who is owner of said company. The register and
all documents of company is in the custody of company. The
respondent no.1 first time raising issue of alibi. There is no concrete
evidence to accept the contention of respondent no.1 and this
witness.
 \0

10

22. The respondent also examined RW6 Subhash Rathod,

who is panch witness on arrest panchnama. Said witness also denied
the contents of arrest panchnama and stated that he only signed the
panchnama and he is not aware about the contents of panchnama.
There is no reason to respondent to examined this witness, however,
it appears that for any how he want to show that all police witnesses
are not genuine.

23. From overall evidence of respondents, it appears that to

prove the fact about non-involvement of offender-vehicle in the
accident, the alleged eye witnesses of accident as well as the formal
witnesses such as panch witness on arrest panchnama also retracted
their police statements. It shows that the said witnesses are fully
under influence of respondent no.1 and, therefore, their testimony
cannot be relied upon.
From police statement and contents of charge-sheet, it
appears that there is head on collusion of motorcycle riding by
deceased and respondent no.l. The fact remained that after
occurrence of accident, the FIR is lodged against the respondent no.1
and after conducting investigation, charge-sheet is also filed against
him. The respondent no.1 has not challenged the validity of charge-
sheet before any Court of law. From overall material on record, it
appears that there was dash between motorcycle of deceased and
motorcycle of respondent no.1, since there was head on collusion
between both the motorcycles, [ hold that the accident is occurred
due to 50% contribution of both motarcy le driver. Hence, I answer
issue nos.1 and 2 accordingly.
 n

11 Judgment in MACP No.100436/2015

AS TO ISSUE NOS.3 AND 4 :-

24. The claimant further deposed that deceased was doing
mason work and labour work and was earning Rs.12000/- per

month. Except the oral contention of claimants, there is no other

material on record about occupation and income of the deceased.
Considering the deceased was 22 years old at the time of incident,
for maintaining himself and his family members, he must having
doing some labour work. Considering the labour charges in
surrounding area is more than Rs.400/- per day, I hold the notional
income of deceased as Rs.8000/- per month.

25. The claimant deposed that deceased was 22 years old.

In police papers as well as medical papers, age of deceased is
mentioned as 22 years. Therefere, I hold that age of deceased was
22 years old on the date of his death. For said age group multiplier
of 18 is applicable. The deceased was unmarried and, therefore, %
amount is required to be deducted towards the personal expenses of
deceased. Therefore, monthly dependency of claimant is Rs.4000,/-

26. Considering the deceased was below the age group of

40 years old and was self employed, therefore, in view of decision in
the case of Pranay Sethi, 40% future prospects is required to be
added. After the adding 40% future aspect the monthly loss due
to
accidental death of deceased came as Rs.1600/-, so monthly
loss of
claimants come to Rs.5,600/- (Rs.4000 + 1600 = Rs.5600).
Considering the age of deceased 18 multiplier apply therefore loss
due to accidental death of deceased came as Rs.5,60
0/- x 12 x 18 =
Rs.12,09,600/-.
 \2

12

27. In view of decision in the case of Janabai widy/o.

Dinkarrao Ghorpade (Supra), both the claimants are entitled for filial
consortium of Rs.40,000/- each as decided in the case of Pranay
Sethi. In the decision of case of Pranay Sethi, it has observed that in
every three years there should be increase of 10% amount in the
heads of consortium. As on today 6 years are completed, hence, 20%
additional amount is required to be added.

28. Claimant no.1 is mother and claimant no.2 is father of

the deceased. Therefore, they are entitled for consortium of
Rs.40,000 + 20% = Rs.48,000/- each (i.e. Rs.96,000). Claimant also

entitled Rs.15,000 + 20% = Rs.18,000/- towards funeral expenses

and Rs.15,000 + 20% = Rs.18,000/- towards loss of estate.

Therefore, loss due to accidental death of deceased came as

Rs.13,41,600/- rounded off Rs.13,41,000/-.

29. Considering the accident is occurred due to 50%

contributory negligence of deceased and 50% driver of offender-
vehicle i.e. respondent no.1, the 50% amount from compensation is
required to be deducted, which comes of Rs.6,70,500/-. Since at the
time of accident, the respondent no.1 was driving offender-vehicle
and same was owned by husband of respondent no.2-1 and father of
respondent no.2.2 to 2.4, therefore, they are liable to pay the
compensation jointly or severally. The claimants are also entitled to
get interest @6% p.a. from the date f filing of claim-petiton till
realization of compensation amount. 7 herefore, | answer issue no.2
accordingly and proceed to pass following order.
 13

13 Judgment in MACP No. 100436,/2015

ORDER
1] Claim Petition is allowed.

2] Respondent nos. 1 and 2.1 to 2.4 do pay Rs.6,70,500/-,

jointly or severally, including the NFL amount, if any, to
the claimants with interest @6% per annum from the
date of petition till its realisation of the amount of
compensation.

3] The determined amount of compensation shall be

deposited in the following bank account maintained by
MACT, Aurangabad -
a) Type of Account : Saving Account
b) Account No. : 40777009568
c) Account Name EX-OFFICIO MEMBER,
MOTOR ACCIDENT,
CLAIM TRIBUNAL
AURANGABAD.
d) IFSC Code : SBIN0021112
e) MICR Code 3 431002044
) Bank Name & Br. : STATE BANK OF INDIA, -
MAHVEER CHOWK,
AURANGABAD.
4] Upon deposit of the compensa(iofi amount,
it be paid equally to the claimant nos.1 and
2;
by account payee cheques.
5] Award be drawn up accordingly after payment
of
deficit Court fees, if any.
6] Dictated and pronounced in open Court.

Dlyly
(D.H.Keluskar)
Date : 31.07.2024.
Member, MACT,
Aurangabad.
 14
United India Insurance Company vs Smt. Jamna Devi And Ors on 11 July, 2024

United India Insurance Company vs Smt. Jamna Devi And Ors

on 11 July, 2024

Author: Nupur Bhati

Bench: Nupur Bhati

[2024:RJ)-1D:28508]

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT

JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 913/1999

United India Insurance Company, Udaipur Branch (Raj.)

----Appellant
Versus
1. Smt. Durga Devi, w/o Satya Narayan Singh Rajput,
resident of Kurabgarh, Tehsil Girwa, District Udaipur (Raj.)
s/o Motilal Chaudhary, resident of
2. Poonam Chand
Kurabgarh, Tehsil Girwa, District Udaipur (Raj.)
Anooplal Chaudhary, resident ol
=18 Bhanwar lal s/o
Savinakhera, District Udaipur (Raj.)
----Respondent/Non-Claimant
Connected With
S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 915/1999
United India Insurance Company, Branch Udaipur (Raj.)
----Appellant
Versus
Smt. Jamna Devi, w/o Mangidas, son, Dhanram, resident of
-

Buthel, Tehsil Girwa, District Udaipur (Raj.)

2. Charandas s/o Mangidas, resident of Buthel, Tehsil Girwa,
pistrict Udaipur (Raj.)
s/o Motilal Chaudhary, resident ol
3. Poonam Chand
Kurabgarh, Tehsil Girwa, District Udaipur (Raj.)
Anooplal Chaudhary, resident ol
4. Bhanwar lal s/o
Savinakhera, District Udaipur (Raj.)
----Respondent/Non-Claimant

: Mr. L.M. Lodha

For Appellant(s)
Mr. vishal Singhal
H Mr. Dilip Kawadia
For Respondent(s)
Ms. Nidhi Singhvi

HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE NUPUR BHATI

/2024 [2024:RJ»JD:28508] (2 of
Order Reportable Reserved on: 01/07/2024 Pronounced on: 11/07,
15) [CMA-913/1999]
Indian Kanoon - http:/indiankanoon.org/doc/127086535/
 United India Insurance Company vs Smt. Jamna Devi And Ors on 11 July, 2024

1. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant/insurance company under Section 173 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ('MV Act') assailing the validity of the judgment and award dated
16.09.1999 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Udaipur (‘Tribunal’)in Claim Petition
Nos. 493/90 and 494/90, whereby the learned Tribunal had reviewed its own order and awarded
compensation in favour of the respondent/non-claimants to the tune of Rs. 1,42,200/- each along
with interest @ 8% per annum and an additional claim of Rupees 1,17,000 was passed in review
petition to be paid within 2 months from the date of the award failing which the claimants will be
entitled to get 12% interest per year till the payment of the award is made.

2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that claim petition nos. 493/90 and 494/90 were filed by
claimant-respondent Durga Bai(mother of the deceased, Nathu Singh) and others and Jamna Bai
(wife of the deceased, Mangidas) and others respectively, before the learned Tribunal, Udaipur in
respect of the accident that took place on 23.05.1990 in which a bus no. RJS 7253 collided with a
truck and Durga Devi's Son Nathu Singh along with Jamna Bai's husband died while travelling in
the aforementioned bus. The learned Tribunal Udaipur decided aforementioned claim petition along
with many other claim petitions vide order dated 08.02.1999 and the claimant was paid no fault
claim of Rupees 25,000 along with interest.

3. Thereafter, the claimant filed a review petition under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC before the learned
Tribunal Udaipur in Claim Petition No. 493/90 and claimed additional compensation in addition to
the no fault claim of Rupees 25,000 that was paid in [2024:RJ-JD:28508] (3 of 15) [CMA-913/1999]
the claim petition No. 493/90. In the review petition learned Tribunal issued notice to the United
Insurance Company and the United Insurance Company submitted objections to the review petition
on 14.09.1999 alleging therein that the review petition under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC is not
maintainable for review of the order dated 08.02.1999 by which claim petition is finally adjudicated
and the claimant cannot get more than 25000 rupees that was awarded as no fault claim. Thereafter
the matter was placed for arguements on 15.09.1999 and the award of Rupees:1,42,000 was passed
in favour of the claimant on 16.09.1999 and an additional claim of Rupees 1,17,000 was passed in
review petition to be paid within 2 months from the date of the award failing which the claimants
will be entitled to get 12% interest per year till the payment of the award is made. Thus the appellant
being aggrieved of the judgment and award dated 16.09.1999, filed the present appeal.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that review petition filed by the claimant is not
maintainable under the Motor Vehicles Act as it is a special Act and does not contain any provision
for review of a decision or award passed by the Claims Tribunal and the provisions of CPC are not
applicable to the award passed by the Claims Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act and thus review is
not maintainable under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC in an award passed under Motor Vehicles Act and such
review petition is without jurisdiction and the Claims Tribunal becomes functus officio after it had
passed the award.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that review cannot be filed as there is no
provision specifically [2024:RJ-JD:28508] (4 of 15) [CMA-913/1999] mentioned for the same in the
statute and the learned Tribunal has committed an error in allowing the review of the claimants. He
further submitted that the first award operates as res judicata and thus second award cannot be

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/127086535/ 2

 16
United India Insurance Company vs Smt. Jamna Devi And Ors on 11 July, 2024

passed or adjudicated on the same facts and law. He also submitted that the claimant failed to
produce any evidence or witness in support of the claim and thus the claimant could not be awarded -
additional compensation.

6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there were a total of 18 claims
which were decided by the learned Tribunal vide order dated 08.02.1999, and it has been observed
that in all these claims, no evidence has been led, however, learned counsel for the resopondents
submitted that the claims filed by them under Claim petition nos. 493/90 and 494/90, evidence has
been led and therefore, the respondent/claimants filed an application for review of the award of the
Tribunal.

7. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that even in the absence of a statutory
provision, the Tribunal cannot be rendered powerless and that, the Tribunal holds an inherent
power to review its own order by acting as a civil court as prescribed under Section 169 of the MV
Act while deciding an application under Order 47 in cases where review is sought due to a
procedural defect, or inadvertant error committed by the Tribunal, in order to prevent abuse of
process. He also placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh Court in
the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Lachhibai urf Laxmibai and Ors. reported in AIR
1997 MP

172. The relevant paras of the judgment is reproduced as under:

[2024:RJ-JD:28508] (5 of 15) [CMA-913/1999] "11. The expression ‘review’ is used in

two distinct senses, namely (i) a procedural review which is either inherent or
iraplied in a Court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a
misapprehension by it and

(ii) review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is
apparent on the face of record. In the case of Narshi Thakershi's case (AIR 1970 SC
1273) it is held that no review lies on merits unless the statute specifically provides
for it. Obviously, when a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent
error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito justitiac to prevent the
abuse of its process and such power inheres in every Court or Tribunal. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court has given a limited power of review to the Tribunal and while
considering the scope of Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 11, it was held that the
review is maintainable. Similarly, in Satnam Verma's case (AIR 1985 SC 294) (supra),
considering the scope of powers of the Tribunal under Section 11 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, it was held that the Tribunal is endowed with such ancillary or
incidental power as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the
purpose of doing justice between the parties. The jurisdiction vested in the Tribunal
under the wide powers cannot be denied by the Tribunal itself.

the
12. From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the power of review vests with
Act though
Tribunal in its inherent power under Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles

Indian Kanoon - http/indiankanoon.org/doc/127086535/

3 United India Insurance Company vs Smt. Jamna Devi And Ors on 11 July, 2024

Rule 240 of the M.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 has not expressly provided for
application of Order 47, C.P.C. A review application is maintainable when it is sought
due to a procedural defect, or inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal, to
prevent abuse of is process. Such power inheres in the Tribunal. The contention of
the learned counsel for the non-applicant cannot be accepted that power of review is
not provided by the statute, therefore, it cannot review its own order. As considered
by me earlier, wide powers are vested with the Tribunal under Section
[2024:RJ-JD:28508] (6 of 15) [CMA-913/1999] 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
Therefore, review on limited grounds as mentioned above is permissible.”

8. Learned counsel for the respondents further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble
Kerala High Court in the case of Asmat Khan v Chandrahasa Bangara reported in 2007 ACJ 1071,
wherein it has been observed that the Tribunal can review its own order, even when the Statute as
well as the Rules do not provide for review in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of
record. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced as under:

"4. Even though there is power to review in appropriate circumstances in the interest
of justice, if the circumstances mentioned under Order XLVII are existing, the
Tribunal has no power to sit in appeal over his own award in the guise of review. As
held by the Apex Court in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmalakumari Choudhary the review
proceedings is not equivalent to an appeal or revision and review petition can be
entertained only on the ground of error apparent on the face of record. See also the
decision in Thungabhadra Industries Lid. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh . Here in
this case, when petitions were filed, the Tribunal found that the original award
contained error apparent on the face of the record which can be corrected without
considering any additional material, but by merely looking at the record and would
not require any long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may be
conceivably of two opinions. Here, the appellant has also no case that any new
document was considered by the Tribunal. Actually Tribunal corrected only apparent
errors in the original award. Even otherwise when the appeal was heard, we have, as
appellate court, considered the matter and came to the view that the review award
requires no interference. The original award contained full of patent errors and hence
the award was reviewed. Further, the [2024:RJ-JD:28508] (7 of 15) [CMA-913/1999]
appellant-claimant was given more amounts than the original amount awarded and
he cannot contend that error can be corrected only at the claimant's instance.
Considering the total amount granted for a fracture of left leg below knee, the
Tribunal awarded Rs. 2,49,520/- by the review award and the amount awarded is not
inadequate in any view of the matter. The insurance company has not filed any
appeal. The appellant is not at all aggrieved by the impugned award."

9. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that even when there has been no express
provision granting the power of review to the Tribunal, nevertheless, Section 169 of the MV Act
provides for the Tribunal to have the powers of a Civil Court and therefore, the learned Tribunal in
the present case has rightly acted as a Civil Court under the CPC, while reviewing its own order

Indian Kanoon - http//indiankanoon.org/doc/127086535/

4
 18
United India Insurance Company vs Smt. Jamna Devi And Ors on 11 July, 2024

under Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC.

10. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that the award passed by the learned
Tribunal in both the claim petition nos. 493/90 and 494/90 may be enhanced as per the judgment
passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of NICL v. Pranay Sethi [Special Leave Petition (Civil)
No. 25590 of 2014 decided on 31.10.2017], even in the absence of cross-appeal and objections filed
by the respondents/claimants. He also relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court
in the case of Ranjana Prakash v. Divisional Manager and Anr. reported in (2011) 14 SCC 639, to
seek enhancement of the compensation.

11. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that the word ‘review’ had been used
inadvertently instead of 'recalling', and that, the respondents filed the application under Order 47
[2024:RJ-JD:28508] (8 of 15) [CMA-913/1999] Rule 1 seeking recalling of the order passed by the
learned Tribunal dated 08.02.1999 and thus, merely on the ground of stating the wrong provision,
the respondents cannot be made to suffer.

12. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused material available on record and judgments cited
at the Bar.

13. This Court finds that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as well as the Rajasthan Motor Vehicle Rules,
1990 does not contain any provision pertaining to review of the award passed by the Tribunal. It is
also seen that review is the creation of a statute and in the absence of clear provision, the learned
Claims Tribunal, being a Tribunal established by the statute, does not have the power to review its
own order. For the purpose of the same, this Court takes into consideration the judgment passed by
the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Mithilesh Kumar v. Joga Ram [S.B. Civil Writ
Petition No. 7985 of 2011 decided on 27.07.2017], wherein the judgement passed by the Coordinate
Bench in the case of Smt. Imiya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. [S.B. Civil Writ Petition
No. 2404 of 2005 decided on 18.11.2008] has been considered and it has been categorically held
that the powers of a Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are limited to its
statutory provisions and the rules framed thereunder. Thus, in the absence of provision providing
the Tribunal the power to review its own award, the learned Tribunal could not have reviewed its
own award by allowing the review application filed by the claimant/respondents.
[2024:RJ-JD:28508] (9 of 15) [CMA-913/1999] The relevant paras of the judgment passed by the
Coordinate Bench in the case of Mithilesh Kumar (supra.) are reproduced as under:

"9. Rule 10.27 of the Rules, makes provision that the power vested in the Civil Court
under Sections 30, 32, 34, 35(a), 75(a) and (¢), 76, 77, 94, 95, 132, 133, 144, 147, 148,
149, 151, 152 & 153 may be exercised by the Claims Tribunal so far as they may be
applicable, subject to the provisions of Section 174 of the Act of 1988. By virtue of
Rule 10.28, the provisions of Order 21 CPC, are also made applicable to the
proceedings before the Claims Tribunal. But then, the provisions of Section 114 CPC
or Order 47, Rule 1 CPC relating to the powers of review have not been made
applicable to the proceedings before the Tribunal. This court had occasion to deal
with the issue relating to power of the Tribunal to review the award in 'Smt. Imiya v.

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1 27086535/

\9
United India Insurance Company vs Smt. Jamna Devi And Ors on 11 July, 2024

United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors." (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.2404/05),
decided on 18.11.08. After consideration of the provisions of the Act of 1988 and the
Rules, the court held:

"The Tribunal as constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act while dealing with the
claim application even when having the trappings of the Civil Court, its jurisdiction is
specifically denied by the statutory provisions and the rules framed thereunder. So
far as the powers of the Civil Court that are vested in the Claims Tribunal and
procedure to be followed by the Claims Tribunal are concerned, such aspects have
specifically been delineated in Section 169 of the Act and Rule 10.27 and Rule 10.28
of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1990. Significant it is to notice that the
provisions of Section 114 CPC or Order 47, Rule 1 CPC, relating to powers of review
have not, as such been made applicable to the proceedings before the Claims
Tribunal. The Tribunal, in the opinion of this Court, had no jurisdiction to deal with a
so- called review application moved under Order 47 CPC and the impugned order,
passed on a so-called review application, cannot be upheld.""

14. This Court also observes that the argument of the respondent that the power of review can be
invoked the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal by virtue of Section 169 which provides for Claims
[2024:RJ-JD:28508] (10 of 15) [CMA-913/1999] Tribunal to have the powers of a Civil Court and
thus, the Claims Tribunal can review its own order under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, is devoid of merits inasmuch as Section 169(2) of the MV Act clearly provides that
the Claims Tribunal shall have powers of a civil court only for the purpose of taking oath and
enforcing attendance of witnesses and compelling the discovery and production of documents as
well as material objects. The provision also states that the Claims Tribunal shall have the powers of
the Civil Court for such other purposes, only if it has been prescribed, and upon bare perusal of the
statute, it becomes clear that there is no provision that prescribes the Claims Tribunal to act in the
capacity ofa Civil Court for the purpose of reviewing its own order. Section 169 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 is reproduced as under:

"169. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunals.

(1) In holding any inquiry under section 168, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any
rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit.

(2) The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of
taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of
compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for
such other purposes as may be prescribed;

195 and
and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of section
rules thzft may
Chapter XXV1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). (3) Subject to any
be made in this behalf, the Claims Tribunal may, for the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim for
to
compensation, choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of any matter relevant
) 6
Indian Kanoon - http:/findiankanoon.org/doc/127086535/
 United India Insurance Company vs Smt. Jamna Devi And Ors on 11 July, 2024

the inquiry to assist it in holding the inquiry." In furtherance of the same, this Court takes
into
consideration the judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench of this-Court-in-the
-~
[2024:RJ-JD:28508] (11 of 15) [CMA-913/1999] case of Hanuman Sahai v. Judge, Special Court
(Communal Riots)/MACT, Jaipur, [S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7296 of 2011 decided on 15.09.2011].
The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced as under:

"4. A perusal of the MV Act does not indicate that the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal has the power to review its own order. Reference may be made to Section
169 of the MV Act which deals with the procedure and powers of the Claims Tribunal.
Abare look at Section 169 of the MV Act shows that the Claims Tribunal has powers
of a Civil Court only for the purposes of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the
attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of
documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed
and the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section
195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There is no power under
Order 47, Rule 1 CPC vested in the Tribunal. The Tribunal is a creature of statute with
limited jurisdiction and unless power of review is conferred on the Tribunal, the
Tribunal cannot invoke the said powers. Thus, in my considered opinion, the review
petition before the Claims Tribunal against the Judgment/Award dated 18.4.2011 was
not maintainable. The review petition ought to have been dismissed on this ground
alone."

15. Moreover, this Court also observes that the submission of the respondents-claimants that the
remedy of review availed by them cannot be fatal as it can be presumed that the word 'review' has
been used inadvertently instead of 'recalling', however, admittedly the respondent, with open eyes
have mentioned in the application that the said application had been filed under Order 47 Rule 1 of
the CPC, which provides for application for review of the judgment. The said provision reads as
under:

[2024:RJ-JD:28508] (12 of 15) [CMA-913/1999] "ORDER XLVII

1. Application for review of judgment.--

(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved--

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal
has been preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the
discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due
diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time
when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/127086535/ 7

2\
United India Insurance Company vs Smt. Jamna Devi And Ors on 11 July, 2024

apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain
a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of
judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.

(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of
judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except
where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or
when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he
applied for the review. [Explanation.--The fact that the decision on a question of law
on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the
subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for
the review of such judgment.]

16. Furthermore, this Court finds that the claimant/respondents are not entitled to seek for
enhancement of the compensation in the absence of filing a cross-appeal before this Court and for
the purpose of the same, this Court takes into consideration the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Ranjana Prakash v. Divisional Manager and Ors. reported in (2011) 14 SCC 639,
which has also been reiterated in the judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the
case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bhagwati Devi [S.B. Civil [2024:RJ-JD:28508] (13 of 15)
[CMA-913/1999] Appeal No. 542/2003 decided on 31.01.2024] wherein it has been observed that
the appellate court, i.e. the High Court in the present case, can pass an order under Order 41 Rule 33
of the CPC, which ought to have been passed by the trial court in cases where respondents have not
filed cross-appeal, however, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ranjana Prakash (supra.)
simultaneously laid emphasis on the fact that in an appeal led by the owner/insurer, the claimant
cannot lead a new ground without filing a cross-appeal, in order to enhance the award passed by the
Claims Tribunal and also that, the power to pass the said order cannot be invoked under Order 41
Rule 33 to get a larger or higher relief. The relevant para of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of Ranjana Prakash (supra.) is reproduced as under:

"6. We are of the view that High Court committed an error in ignoring the contention
of the claimants. It is true that the claimants had not challenged the award of the
Tribunal on the ground that the Tribunal had failed to take note of future prospects
and add 30% to the annual income of the deceased. But the claimants were not
aggrieved by Rs.23,134/- being taken as the monthly income. There was therefore no
need for them to challenge the award of the Tribunal. But where in an appeal filed by
the owner/insurer, if the High Court proposes to reduce the compensation awarded
by the Tribunal, the claimants can certainly defend the quantum of compensation
awarded by the Tribunal, by pointing out other errors or omissions in the award,
which if taken note of, would show that there was no need to reduce the amount
awarded as compensation. Therefore, in an appeal by the owner/insurer, the
appellant can certainly put forth a contention that if 30% is to be deducted from the
income [2024:RJ-JD:28508] (14 of 15) [CMA-913/1999] for whatsoever reason, 30%
should also be added towards future prospects, so that the compensation awarded is
not reduced. The fact that claimants did not independently challenge the award will

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/127086535/

 22
United India Insurance Company vs Smt. Jamna Devi And Ors on 11 July, 2024

not therefore come in the way of their defending the compensation awarded, on other
grounds. It would only mean that in an appeal by the owner/insurer, the claimants
will not be entitled to seek enhancement of the compensation by urging any new
ground, in the absence of any cross-appeal or cross- objections.

7. This principle also flows from Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure
which enables an appellate court to pass any order which ought to have been passed
by the trial court and to make such further or other order as the case may require,
even if the respondent had not filed any appeal or cross-objections. This power is
entrusted to the appellate court to enable it to do complete justice between the
parties. Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code can however be pressed into service to make the
award more effective or maintain the award on other grounds or to make the other
parties to litigation to share the benefits or the liability, but cannot be invoked to get
a larger or higher relief. For example, where the claimants seeks compensation
against the owner and the insurer of the vehicle and the Tribunal makes the award
only against the owner, on an appeal by the owner challenging the quantum, the
appellate court can make the insurer jointly and severally liable to pay the
compensation, along with the owner, even though the claimants had not challenged
the non-grant of relief against the insurer. Be that as it may."

Thus, under the present circumstances, this Court deems it fit to not enhance the award and
judgment passed by the learned Tribunal, Udaipur dated 16.09.1999 in the absence of cross-appeal
filed by the respondents.

[2024:RJ-JD:28508] (15 of 15) [CMA-913/1999]

17. Thus, it is observed that in the absence of a clear provision in the statute, i.e. the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988, the Tribunal is not empowered to review its own order. Also, the powers of a Civil Court
are vested with the learned Tribunal, as per Section 169 of the MV Act, which clearly prescribes the
matters where learned Tribunal can act as a Civil Court, however, in the said provision too, the
power to review its own order has not been provided and in such circumstances, the learned
Tribunal has erred in reviewing its own order.

18. Therefore, in light of aforequoted provisions and judgments, the present civil miscellaneous
petition deserves to be allowed and it is hereby allowed and the impugned award and judgment
dated 16.09.1999 is quashed and set aside. The claimants would be at liberty to avail the appropriate
remedy for laying a challenge to the award and judgment dated 08.02.1999, within a period of 30
days from today.

19. Record be sent back forthwith.

(DR. NUPUR BHATI),J 49-Devesh/-

Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

Indian Kanoon - hitp://indiankanoon.org/doc/127086535/ 9