The Requirements for Reflection

In this chapter we examine key requirements for reflection or reflective

practice to prevail. We name these as dialogue, intention, process, model-
ling and the notion of personal stance. In achieving this we will need to
examine these terms. Each of these key terms and actions contribute to the
effectiveness of reflection by the learner and therefore the quality of their
learning.
We examine the term reflection more closely in this chapter. We are
using the term reflection in two senses. First, the process or means by which
an experience, in the form of thought, feeling or action, is brought into
consideration, while it is happening or subsequently. Secondly, deriving
from the first, the creation of meaning and conceptualization from experi-
ence and the potentiality to look at things as other than they are. The latter
part of the second definition can embody the idea of critical reflection.
Before examining these conditions we will refer to the idea of learning as
embodying relationship.

Relationship
Underlying the capacity for teachers to engage in reflection with learners is
the explicit recognition of the interaction as a relationship with learners.
Without explicit recognition of the interaction as embodying a relation-
ship, then in working with these conditions we may be less effective. We
have already referred in Chapter 1 to the tendency in higher education for
knowledge to be treated as static, disembodied, as a product rather than pro-
cess where students may be detached from the knowledge being imparted.
In recognizing the interaction for dialogue as constituting a relationship
between teacher and learner and between learners we are saying that knowl-
edge that is the material of the interaction comes through communication.
As one writer has expressed it: 'and what is implicit in communication is
the sense that the other person can understand and make sense of what
 The Requirementh for Reflection 57 .

is being said. Where this sense is absent, what is ostensibly being offered is
unlikely to be assimilated' (Salmen, 1990:14).

Dialogue
Our purpose in this chapter is to describe wliat we mean by dialogue and
set the conditions for promoting reflective dialogue. It is through reflective
dialogue that critical learning can be encouraged. The skills required for
reflective dialogue in the teacher and ultimately in the students are detailed
in Part 2 chapters and in our chapter on facilitation.
The notion of dialogue has a long history in the West from the Greeks
onwards (see Chapter 2). The body of knowledge held as valuable in the
medieval university was subject to continual revision, by 'disputation', a
form of dialogue where the existing body of knowledge was tested against
the standard rationality of the time. We noted earlier, that the participants
in such a university were a select group of males who could be relied upon
to maintain the religious status quo, and that rationality was defined by its
time. Dialogue was limited by the embedded intellectual and social para-
digms of the time just as the modern equivalent, the seminar, may be. The
student is in a game of guessing the disciplinary paradigm to satisfy the
requirements of the curriculum without being 'moved' in his own para-
digm. A parody, yes, but near to many a student's experience! In Barnett's
(1990) terms the seminar is limited to the internal critique of the discipline
rather than the external critique which challenges the assumptions within
which the discipline resorts. The traditional seminar necessarily invites the
student to be deferential to but internally critical of the discipline.
As teachers it could be said that we engage in dialogue all the time. But
is this synonymous with critical reflective learning? Not necessarily. For us
dialogue that is reflective, and enables critically reflective learning, engages
the person at the edge of their knowledge, their sense of self and the world
as experienced by them. Thus their assumptions about knowledge, them-
selves and their world is challenged. By this we mean that the individual is
at the edge of their current understanding and the sense of meaning they
give to and with the world. Existing assumptions about understandings, self
and the world are challenged. That learning becomes reflectively critical
when the emergent ideas are related to existing senses of knowledge, self
and the world and a new understanding emerges.
For the individual learner there will be points at which the prevailing
view of the world becomes dislodged, certainty may be eroded with uncer-
tainty, chaos becomes apparent rather than stability. There may be loss and
mourning. There.may be exhilaration and release or euphoria. That these
circumstances prevail in life is plainly evident for all of us, often triggered
by an event that may have been unanticipated such as the death of a loved
one; the reality of having a child as opposed to thinking what it will be
like in advance; the recognition, through feedback, of a positive quality in
58 Learning and Reflection

oneself not previously personally acknowledged, such as a capacity to really

listen to others.
We can be informed about the potential impact of these ways of seeing
the world (or ways in which we do not see the world!) but each person has
to make their own journey. For some the reality say, of sexism and racism is
something which they experience every day personally and with consequent
oppressions of varying degrees. We may Understand the idea of sexism and
racism yet not personally experience the effects, and we may unconsciously
exhibit sexist and racist behaviour. Only with the challenge of others may
I be able to really understand what it is like to be sexist or racist. I have a
choice. I am faced with a new way of seeing the world that I can be sexist
and racist in my behaviour. The choice I have is to change my behaviour or
not. With that recognition comes further choices about how I relate to the
world as a white male in future. Understanding sexist and racist behaviour
intellectually may not have made the slightest difference to my behaviour.
Someone calling attention to my behaviour is similarly futile unless the
challenge is constructive and enables me to make the move. We discuss
constructive challenge in Chapter 11.

Dialogue as social engagement

We distinguish internal dialogue, within individuals, from dialogue between
individuals and with others. For, without dialogue, reflection is limited to
the insights of the individual (which are not to be underestimated). Personal
reflection demands detachment on the part of self, to look at another part
of self,, and in this there is a danger of self-deception (Habermas, 1974). On
the other hand, dialogue that takes place with others reflects our view that
learning is not merely an individualistic process. Jarvis (1987:15) stresses that:
learning always takes place within a social context and . .. the learner is
also to some extent a social construct, so that learning should be re-
garded as a social phenomenon as well as an individualistic one.
In the requirements for reflection we have set out one of the preconditions
as being aware of the personal stance of the learner and educator. Learners
and educators do not operate in a social vacuum and hence learning does
not take place in a vacuum. We are all imbued with the influences of our
personal biography and the social and economic forces that mediate the
way we 'see' the world and ourselves in it: 'The interaction of these give rise
to assumptions, beliefs, perceptions and ways of construing and acting upon
experience' (Weil and McGill, 1989:247).

Different forms of dialogue

Dialogue does occur quite naturally between people. However, this does
not necessarily equate with the intentional reflective dialogue which is
 The RequiremenA for Reflection 59 .

conducive to the potentiality of critically reflective learning. Dialogue, where

the speakers intentions are to hold forth didactically at one another in
order to convey their position or knowledge on or about a subject is 'a form
of dialogue that is unlikely to lead to some new understanding. This didac-
tic form of dialogue is often characterized by one party claiming to be
expert in interaction with other(s) who may not be. Indeed, the Shorter
Oxford Dictionaiy in its primary meaning defines didactic as 'having the
character or manner of a teacher; characterized by giving instruction' of
which the lecture, where the transmission of knowledge and ideas is the
purpose, is a good example. For the receiver what is received may be signifi-
cant, but the mode is primarily one way.
Dialogue can be among any number of people, not two as may be im-
plied from the first syllable, which means 'through' and the second syllable,
which means 'the word'. As Bohm conveys: 'this derivation suggests .. . a
stream of meaning flowing among and through us and between us ... out of
which may emerge some new understanding' (1996:6, original italics).
Dialogue that is reflective and enables shifts in assumptions about a per-
son's sense of reality will be grounded in their experience and interactive.
It will be a dialogue engaging the participants' realities as opposed to that
which is simply didactic. Belenky et al. (1986) suggest that women come to
know and to learn from a position of constructed knowledge, that is, one
that takes knowledge as contextual (see our commentary in Chapter 3 on
their epistemological categories). Women create knowledge by valuing their
subjective experience as well as the objective features. We believe that dia-
logue which does not take into account the subjective experience as well as
the objective will be less effective in promoting reflective learning. It will be
what Belenky et al. refer to as 'didactic talk' rather than 'real talk'. For us
the talk or dialogue will be 'out there' detached from the learner and we
suggest from the talker too!
While Belenky et al. referred to the position of women in higher educa-
tion we would maintain that this stance is not restricted to women:
In didactic talk, each participant may report experience, but there is
no attempt among participants to join together to arrive at some new
understanding. 'Really talking' requires careful listening; it implies a
mutually shared agreement that together you are creating the opti-
mum setting so that half-baked ideas can grow. 'Real talk' reaches deep
into the experience of each participant; it also draws on the analytical
abilities of each.
(Belenky et al., 1986:144)
Thus holding forth didactically, may have its purpose in the occasional
lecture, where the speaker is transmitting information, ideas, and concepts,
but to achieve real learning the approach may be found to be wanting. We
would exception from this the lecture that does reveal the presence and
inspirational qualities of the speaker that actually relates to and moves the
listener.
60 Learning and Reflection

Another form of dialogue is that which may be described as adversarial.

Here the, often implicit, intention is a winlose engagement where each
contributor sets out to defeat the other in argument: 'in which the "other"
becomes an opponent to be annihilated' (Weil, 1996:10).
Such a style can be underpinned by:
Appeals to abstract polemic and grand theory [which] can be experi-
enced as completely disconnected from experience, and resistant to
contradictions between rhetoric and lived experience . . [and] how
.

prevailing modes of academic discourse have rendered so many voices

as insignificant.
(p. 10)
Here the latter reference is to the dominance of some modes of discourse
such as the adversarial and didactic, at the expense of other voices who
become silenced or find that the only way to have a voice (albeit somewhat
disconnected) is to engage in the form of dialogue that prevails. The form
of the discourse (not necessarily the content) thus deeply affects the social
interaction and may be reflected in seeing students as objects rather than
independent subjects (Beleriky et aL, 1986).
Thus dialogue as social engagement has another implication in respect of
the power relations that exist between parties to a dialogue. To be reflective
the dialogue should make explicit the social power relations between the
parties. In the context of higher education the teacher is afforded a power
in relation to the learner through her position of authority and her exper-
tise in the subject or discipline area as well for the process by which the
learners engage with the teacher. How the teacher uses her authority to
create a learning climate" that creates a process of dialogue that enables,
rather than disables' (adapted from Weil and McGill, 1989:2) will influence
the quality of the dialogue and model conditions appropriate for reflective
dialogue. This is not to deny the expertise of the teacher. There is virtue in
making that power explicit because it enables the learner to recognize the
teacher's authority bounded by qualities that can enhance learning or inhibit
learning, in the exercise of her power.

Intentional reflective dialogue

It is clear that in some of the situations described so far, dialogue that
affects our way of seeing the world, happens through the sheer experience
of life. The specific condition we are addressing for facilitating learning in
higher education, is reflective dialogue that has as its intention the provision
of a context and support for reflective learning.
We describe the notion of intentionality in relation to teaching and learn-
ing interactions that takes place between the teacher and the learner. We
are using this term to emphasize the quality or fact of being intentional, as
an explicit act with purpose or volition. This contrasts with what happens

70
 The Requirementi for Reflection 61

without intention. The explicit intention to engage in reflective dialogue is

suggested as a requirement for such dialogue.
Our reason for making intention explicit is that if we are to engage in
reflective dialogue we need to be clear what the purpose of that kind of
interaction is intended. By understanding my purpose I can more con-
sciously attend to the means by which I achieve that purpose. If my inten-
tion is to transmit knowledge then engaging In reflective dialogue will be
probably inappropriate. If my purpose is to engage in transformatory learn-
ing (Harvey and Knight, 1996) where the focus on the learner is as a whole
potentially critical being (Barnett, 1997), then engaging in reflective dia-
logue is likely to be appropriate. It is only by explicitly examining my inten-.
tions, and behind those, my values, that I can begin to aim for my intentions
to be congruent with my practice. We will assume that the teacher is en-
deavouring, through reflection on and in her actions, to ensure that her
espoused practice (that which she believes in) is as close as possible to her
practice in-use. An example of espoused practice being incongruent with
in-use practice would be an articulated belief in transformatory learning
while Liing transmittive methods! (Harvey and Knight, 1996).

Naming that which is unnamed

If I am going to undertake, say, a traditional lecture with a group of stu-
dents, I may have articulated to myself what is my purpose and what the
content will be to fulfil that purpose. Mso, I may have decided how I am
going to undertake the session. I may have done similar sessions like this
one before 'and I will, perhaps, from habit and experience, adopt the same
approach again because it appeared to 'work'.
As teachers we would expect there to be some explicit intention for the
session and that an intention is also identified by the student learners whom
I expect to come to the session. Such intentions may not be explicit or
apparent. Ask students why they are going to the lecture and the answer
may be because like Everest it's there! The teacher may be giving a lecture
because it is part of the course and she has always done it. Given explicit
intentions, in addition, there may be a whole range of unintended happen-
ings on my part (let alone the students) of which I am not entirely aware.
Assume that I am aware of the content, intention and the purpose of the
lecture. Let us look at how I intend te organize the session. Here we are
referring to the process by which I engage with the learners to enable them
to understand, appreciate, and learn about the content and its relation to
the rest of the curriculum and the course.
Given explicit intentions, say, of task and purpose, what is happening at
levels where there is an absence of intention or where intention is not
evident? There is certainly not a vacuum. There could be inadvertent conse-
quences arising out of the intended. More fundamentally and beyond the
latter, we can ask: what may be inadvertently happening that has not been
62 Learning and Reflection

intended and yet is implicitly happening in the session? With this last cat:
egory there may be no articulation of what is happening. There may be
'silence' in the sense that what is happening is not overtly apparent but is
nevertheless influencing the situation (and potential learning). To borrow
a phrase, what is happening may be unknown and therefore not be named.
However, because it is not named, is unknown, yet is happening, 'it' may be
influencing what is going on. In our experience we have all been in (and
can still be in) situations like this. Unless we can name it, we cannot work
with or assess the significance of that which has not been named. This can
happen for the teacher as well as the learner. We will examine one signifi-
cant example of that which is often unnamed, process and consider the
effects this can have on learning. We will then relate the term process more
closely to intentionality.

Process
By process we refer to how a task is undertaken as opposed to the task itself.
When we make explicit the process in which we are working as opposed to
the task we are undertaking, we begin to explain the way in which we are
working. What is the distinction between task and process? The task is what
I do, the process is how I do it. This may appear obvious but we do find a
barrier in the identification of task and process in teaching as opposed to
other professional contexts. For example, an engineer will be able clearly to
explain the distinction between constructing a road and an optimum process
by which that road gets built. The teacher lecturing on that topic about task
and process in relation to road building may be totally unaware and/or give
little emphasis to how the session can best be undertaken (process) to achieve
effective student learning (purpose) on the construction of a road (task).
Each lecture or session with learners will have a purpose (s) which may or
not be explicit. The task derives from the purpose. For example, in Eco-
nomics the purpose for students may be to acquire an understanding of
the theory of perfect competition. The task will be, inter alia, to explain the
operation and effects of supply and demand in conditions of perfect com-
petition. We have, then, purpose and task. What we do not have as yet is the
process, how this is undertaken between the teacher and students. That
process may be intentional, articulated to the students and performed. The
word performed is used in order to convey an aspect of the teacher's role
that is crucial. In order to carry out my part of the task as teacher, I
perform, act, do a set of activities in relation to and with the learners who
are in the same room. That performance, activity, and doing, with the
learners is one where I relate in a particular way with the learners. Whatever
I am doing to carry out my part in the session I am 'modelling' a process
with particular sets of behaviours, qualities, values and skills in relation to
and in the presence of the learners. We now need to examine the term
modelling which is intrinsic to process in situations of teaching and learning.

7 ,)
 The Requirementi for Reflection 63 .

Modelling
Let us take an example from the experience of one of us in the early years
of our teaching.
In the early years of teaching in higher education, I adopted a model of
teaching of which I was not really conscious. I could name it as a lecture but
not much else. Yet, if I could have 'stood ouaiile it' I may have been able to
explain the characteristics of that model. However, at the time I did not
and could not recognize process, let alone understand that what I modelled
as the process was the process I just did and was it: Now when I look back
with some hindsight and embarrassment, I realize that I adopted that which.
prevailed around me. I adopted that which I had myself experienced at
university and what I had seen was the norm in the institution in which I
now worked. I did not question the lecture as a model appropriate to what
I wished to achieve. Of course, I knew that I was preparing a lecture and
that was what I intended but I was not aware of some of the implicit features
that I was modelling within the category of interaction called a lecture. I
had some notions about an optimum lecture like enthusing about the con-
tent and bringing in my personal experience. I realized, even then, that
being a good entertainer and involving students in the session at least made
the session less boring for all of us. I am not sure what the effect on their
learning was. Our point here is that even though I did not realize it, I was
'modelling' a process that was inadvertent and unintentional in the sense
that I was not aware that it was a model complete with a whole range of
values and behaviours implicit in the model. It is likely that the students
may well have adopted, emulated or imitated 'my' model albeit one I was
not consciously modelling.
Another example of the unintentional being modelled by me was my
explanation of the theory of perfect competition to students as if the theory
was, by simply explaining it, obvious or apparently obvious. I thus modelled
implicitly the absence of struggle on my part when I learned about the
theory. This behaviour and stance can convey a myriad of meanings and
feelings to the student learner!
Thus whatever we do in relation to the teaching/learning situation we
are modelling the process we use by doing it. There is not only the com-
plexity of the content of what we are saying but a whole wealth of 'things'
that are happening that are 'concealed', inadvertent and, in the sense above
unintentional. If we can begin to explain what and how we are working,
with learners, then in giving voice and 'explanation' to how we are doing it,
we can then begin to explain aspects of the relationship between the teacher
and learners. When we can do this for ourselves as teachers, with our col-
leagues and with learners particularly, we can then begin to understand
and therefore influence, that relationship for the purpose, inter alia, of
asking the question: how is the process I am using and the relationship I am
creating (having) with the students enabling their learning? Moreover, once
I have insight into what it is I am modelling in the process, I begin to have
64 Learning and Reflection

choice in how I model process. I have revealed what is happening (or at

least partially) and can more consciously influence how I model my process
and therefore my practice toward teaching and learning.
More important, in being explicit as teacher with the learners about the
process going on between us, we begin enabling the learners to be explicit
about that process. Once we engage in this dialogue about the process
something else happens. In making explicit the process that is occurring
(i.e. saying what we think is going on over and above the interaction itself)
we are also describing the process that can be adduced 'above' the inter-
action between teacher and student. Once we ,have described the process,
we can then engage in discussion and analysis of process, that is meta-
process. This is one aspect of what we mean by reflection on our practice
reflective practice. This reflection derives from the desire to 'know' what is
going on 'above' the content (task) and purpose of the session. At this
point it is necessary to refer to that aspect of process that is significant to
the relationship and interaction between teacher and learner modelling.

Modelling as imitation
We have already alluded to the notion that in modelling we are conveying
to the learners a way of being and doing. It is important, too, that the
teacher is conscious and intentional in relation to the modelling of her
process. Another aspect of modelling that is useful, particularly for the
learner, is that of imitating the teacher in her practice. This is most obvious
in those teaching situations where the learning is explicitly around a skill,
say in music, where the playing of an instrument is the skill under attention.
Here the learner will, among other things, imitate and emulate the teacher.
Sch6n (1987) attached significance to modelling that yields effective imita-
tion and is part of the process of engaging in action that enables the
learner to begin to understand what he is doing and to reflect upon it.
Thus, the teacher by intentionally modelling her process, and for our
purposes, reflective practice, by explicitly drawing attention to the process
by which reflective practice can be undertaken, enhances the possibility of
the learner engaging in reflective practice. The modelling of the process of
reflective practice becomes a necessary condition for this to occur (but not
as we shall see a sufficient condition). The conscious imitation (by drawing
attention to the modelling) can enable the learner to acquire the skills to
do it herself. In addition, by considering and reflecting upon the process,
the learner can acquire a conceptual understanding that is grounded in
practice.
We will return to the notion of modelling as creating effective imitation
not just in terms of the content or knowledge and skills the learner acquires
but also in the teacher engaging in modelling by enabling initially, imita-
tion in the learner to engage in reflective practice.
 The Requirementi for Reflection 65

The 'black box' within process

Barnett (1992a:99), referred to his work as opening up the black box of
higher education. Barnett's `black box' is the: 'institutional space (between
entry and exit) .. . a collection of intentional and unintentional, happen-
ings oriented toward changing the student in various ways' where entry
refers to entry into and exit refers leaving higher education.
Playing on the metaphor, we explore an inner more elusive black box.
We seek to open up the black box of process hidden in teaching and
learning that, we believe, can, if opened up and made much more explicit,
promote learning more effectively. Within process lies a 'black box' of signifi-.
cance, a repository of the often unexplained, unnamed and invisible.
This is another way of explaining one of the purposes of our writing this
book to make explicit and to explain the significance of the content of
the black box of process by sharing our knowledge and practice. We recog-
nize that there may be aspects of the black box which we as authors may not
be aware. Public knowledge on process may still be limited, with aspects still
to be unravelled and added to the pool of public consciousness.
We distinguish public knowledge from the personal subjective knowledge
of the individual as teacher. Another way of explaining this is that each
teacher lives their own journey about their teaching. Our purpose is to
endeavour to make some of that journey explicit by (wherever possible)
relating to that journey and offering meaning to the reader who is also a
teacher or who is an actor in the higher education arena. By explicating
some of that journey the teacher can become more conscious of her prac-
tice in enabling others' learning.
Another way of saying the above is that there will be (and has been) an
area of `innocence' about aspects of my teaching. That innocence is partly
a result of my own background and influences and partly an innocence on
the part of all of us until that which has been unnamed is named. For
example, it is only in the last decade that teachers, academics and writers
have articulated the notion of reflection and its implications for learning.
Now that reflection has been named, and shown to be a more complex idea
than previously existing notions of reflection, the concept has been given
more meaning. We can now use it consciously to attend to the quality and
effectiveness of learning more rigorously. (This despite the fact that as
thinking, feeling and acting individuals and colleagues we had done this
in the past but not consciously.) Another example is the recognition of the
innocent but nevertheless powerful impact of gender bias in, inter alia,
education. Once the bias has been named we can begin to work on coun-
tering it and learning from it.
Once I am aware of my process practice I have insight. That insight
destroys my innocence, my ignorance and, possibly, my collusion. Until my
process 'practice' is brought to my consciousness I do not know about it.
Until my process practice is brought to my attention I do not know. My lack
66 Learning and Reflection

of knowledge and awareness of my process will influence my ability to

reflect upon my practice. As soon as I am aware of process and aspects of
process then and only then do I have choice and can then influence that
practice. Once I am aware of process, I can incorporate process into my
intentions for the sessions I am undertaking with learners. While I remain
unaware of my practice then I cannot reflect upon it and therefore cannot
act on the reflections. It is possible to imagine the teacher who does engage
in reflective practice herself and with students but is unaware of it in the
sense that it is not named. Naming 'it' is important in order to have power
in using it (Griffin, 1987). If I am aware of reflective practice but do not
do it or am unwilling to do it then I am letting the learners down. I am
potentially limiting learners in their opportunity to engage in their reflec-
tive practice. However, this paragraph has stepped into reflection and we
have yet to place meaning on the term as we intend in Chapter 5.
There is an array of 'invisibles' in the black box of process. Among some
of the invisibles we are aware of that we can call attention to in process are:
the values a person holds in use as opposed to espoused
the extent to which we are aware of the modelling of our values, pro-
cesses, and how we use our power
the feelings we as teachers may have at any one time
the extent of our own levels of learning in our domain, discipline or
subject
the impact the above have on the learners
the feelings learners may bring to the situation
the implicit power relations that exist in the situation between teacher
and learners, between learners and in the wider context, the discourse
that maintains these
the stance we as teachers convey to students and the stance they are each
and collectively having towards us
the impact all the above have on the teaching/learning situation.
An example of the values that a teacher may display of which she may not
be aware, is the teacher's mental stance (exhibited in her behaviour to the
learners) about the learners' resources. She may believe learners to have an
abundance of experience upon which to draw in a learning situation. Altern-
atively, she may believe learners to be empty repositories to be filled!
We aim to work with some of the above invisibles above across the book.
However, there is one significant 'invisible' that we consider is necessary to
bring into this chapter as it is such an important condition for learning
personal stance.

Personal stance
One aspect of the 'black box' within process and therefore one of the
conditions that influences learning is personal stance. Here we draw upon
 The Requirements for Reflection 67

Salmon (1989) for highlighting the significance of personal stance as one

part of the process by which we all learn. For Salmon:
because personal stance refers to the positions which each of us takes
up in life, this metaphor emphasises aspects of experience which goes
deeper than the merely cognitive, and which reflect its essentially rela-
tional, social and agernic character.
(p. 231)
For Salmon, human learning is highly particular; there is fundamentally no
distinction between what is personally understood and what is personally,
intimately experienced through living. Salmon continues:
But, as yet, I do not think we have gone very far in understanding how
it is that individual learners actually come to construct their own unique
material. This because the material of learning has been traditionally
viewed in different terms from those that define the learner.
(p. 231, original italics)
There are two dimensions to personal stance. The first relates to the con-
tent of what we learn. The second relates to the context that teachers and
learners bring to the process of learning.
Taking the first dimension, that relating to the content of learning, Salmon
(1989) states:
In the conventional understanding of learning or teaching, content is
viewed as essentially 'out there', independent of the persons of both
learner and teacher. Because of this, there is typically quite a massive
disregard of the inescapably personal meaning of every curriculum.
(p. 235, original italics)
Thus part of the problem has been exactly that the material of learning has
been treated as if it could be detached from the learner's context.
The second dimension attends to the learner's context. We are taking as
a given that learners will bring their social contexts as necessary influences
with them to any teaching and learning situation in order to make the
following statements. Within that situation there is then the context in
which the teaching and learning takes place. Salmon captures this well:
'How we place ourselves, within any given learning context, whether formal
or informal, is fundamental' (p. 231, original italics).
The learning context is a relational one. Let us take the learner. The
learner may come to the session with their own attitude to the potential
material. How then will the personal stance of the learner towards the mater-
ial be affected by the teacher? Salmon shows that even before the teacher
teaches the material the learner will have formed, usually unconsciously,
some personal stance towards the teacher. That stance may be about the
teacher's class, race, age and apparent disposition towards the learners in
the eye of the learner. The learner will necessarily be engaged in the 'deli-
cate act of "reading" someone' (Salmon, 1989:232) which is a way of the
68 Learning and Reflection

learner implicitly placing themselves towards that person. The learner's

interpretations of how she 'sees' the teacher and what the latter says will
inevitably frame the learners' understanding of the curriculum as inter-
preted by the teacher.
What of the teacher's personal stance towards the teaching/learning situ-
ation? When we teach we set out to convey what we know, understand and
have experienced, that is, we set out to cbmmunicate our knowledge and
understanding. We:
convey our own position, our own stance toward it. This means that, as
teachers, we do not just pass on the curriculum; we actually represent,
even embody it. Knowledge understanding is no more separate
from teachers than from learners.
(Salmon, 1989:233)
For example, in the earlier discussion about process we referred to the
lecture where the teacher conveys rio sense of the struggle he may have had
in acquiring the knowledge himself when trying to come to understand and
learn the material. The teacher, in teaching and relating the subject as
lucidly and fully as possible by means of the lecture, may convey uncon-
sciously that the material was, and therefore is, easy to acquire, understand
and learn. This may be perceived by some learners to mean that the mater-
ial should be 'easily' acquired, absorbed and learned.
Again, when we teach we may not intend to but we vary in our enthusi-
asm towards particular parts of a subject or discipline. We may be teaching
a part of the curriculum that we are personally at odds with or find boring
and possibly repugnant yet try to teach it in a dispassionate way. The true
feelings the teacher may be trying to hide will no doubt spill over. The
inauthenticity of the way in which the material is taught will come over.
Contrast the situation where the teacher is deeply inspired by their enthusi-
asm for the subject where there is a strong relation between the content
and how they feel about and 'deliver' it.
In terms of our endeavour to invite teachers to engage in reflective dia-
logue with learners we would add that, in addition to the personal stance
towards the content of any course programme or discipline, the same
authenticity applies to the processes we use that are intended to be con-
ducive towards learning. If I feel resentment towards a particular approach
to learning, for example, leading groups, then that will affect the learning
situation.
We are conscious that for learners and teachers we are advocating poten-
tial changes in the way in which both parties relate to each other in learn-
ing through using and adapting process that may be at odds with previous
experience. By articulating the context we are making it possible for pro-
cess to be explicitly acknowledged, spoken of, and shared so that teacher
and learner can make their own meanings. It is not enough to convey to
learners that personal stance affects our learning. That would be insuffi-
cient and another example of 'out there'. The key is for both teachers and
 The Requirements for Reflection 69

learners to engage with the realities of the struggle to understand and learn
as it happens by constructing their own knowledge with each other.
Transparency about process implies openness in terms of personal inter-
action as a teacher or learner and this is a deeply personal matter with a
degree of personal risk. However, only through a healthy dialogue between
teachers and learners with openness, trust, respect and mutuality can the
dependence model inherent in transmission be superseded by collaboration.

Summary
We can now set out the conditions for reflection as a contribution to
transformative learning of students. We have noted the different forms that
dialogue can take. Prior conditions for reflection require the teacher to be
aware of process and intentionality about that process as well as the form of
the dialogue. The teacher also needs to be aware that she is modelling the
process she uses. In the next chapter we explore reflection in more detail.
For the teacher to create the conditions for critically reflective learning
she needs to attend to modelling the processes that are conducive to the
encouragement of that learning. In particular, if part of the process is to
engage in reflective practice, she will be more likely to enable the learners
to achieve that if she models it herself.
In the next chapter we will also develop the meanings of reflection and
reflective practice and show how they contribute to transformative learning
in the learner. In Chapters 7 and 8 we show how teachers and student
learners can become engaged in reflective dialogue. In Chapter 9 we show
how reflection by learners requires to be effectively modelled by teachers
and that modelling reflection requires effective facilitation by teachers.
Reflection and Reflective
Practice

In this chapter our purpose is to set out our meanings of reflection and
reflective practice and convey their importance to learning in higher educa-
tion in promoting the potential for deep and significant learning. What
does it mean to engage in reflection? What do we mean when we engage in
reflective practice? When can we refer to ourselves as 'reflective practition-
ers'? How can reflective practice encourage the deeper levels of learning to
which universities and colleges aspire?
We will make the journey through development of the notion of reflec-
tive practice as a means to convey our meanings. Before embarking on this
journey we make a note about the chapter for readers. We wish to explain
the ideas on reflective practice as clearly as possible. In doing so, we realize
that we are using a cognitive, analytical and fairly rational means in order to
make the explanation as accessible as possible to readers. In the description
we may inadvertently convey the idea that once cognitively understood as a
concept, then reflective practice is a straightforward and rational process. A
cognitive understanding of reflective practice is a step towards what is in
practice a complex and more holistic endeavour.
Barnett (1992a) uses the phrase, 'We're all reflective practitioners now'.
There is a continuous search for knowledge; there is no end point. More-
over, this applies to how we practice in that the criteria by which we prac-
tice require constant evaluation. We need to be aware, therefore, of our
actions in order that we may evaluate them. The capacity to engage in
reflective practice becomes one of the means of enhancing the quality of
the educational process and of promoting learning appropriate to higher
education. We endorse that view as an aspiration which is as yet generally
unrealized.
Engaging in reflective practice for Barnett is a means by which the stu-
dent learner can be:
enabled to develop the capacity to keep an eye on themselves, and to
engage in critical dialogue with themselves in all they think and do . . it
.

is a reflexive process in which the student interrogates her/his thoughts

 Reflection and Reflective Practice 71

or actions. The learning outcome to be desired, from every student, is

that of the reflective practitioner.
(Barnett, 1992a:198, original italics)
We will comment and qualify his meaning later but first we will go to the
origin of the contemporary meaning of reflective practice. Barnett relied
upon Schôn's (1983, 1987) contribution to the idea of reflective practice as
a means of enhancing a learner's critical and reflective abilities. We offer
and adapt our reading of Sch6n as a basis for our use of reflective practice
in the context of critically reflective learning in higher education.

Schön's reflective practitioner

Schön, in developing the notion of 'reflective practice', drew largely upon
applied areas of university programmes where students were receiving an
education designed to equip them directly into professional occupations
such as architectural design, music and medicine. Schön set out the limita-
tions of those teaching disciplines in universities that were in the business
of creating and promulgating largely propositional knowledge (learning
that, about things, concepts, ideas) in a technically rational value frame-
work. Propositional knowledge is even more evident in courses where there
is no vocational element where there is likely to be no action on which to
apply the knowledge, e.g. philosophy.
Schön suggested that propositional knowledge, on its own, is of limited
value for the emerging professional, e.g. lawyer, social worker, physician.
Propositional knowledge is limited because it does not take into account
the realities of professional life and practice.
Yet the emergent professional does go into practice and many of them
are effective 'despite' their professional training. They develop practice experi-
ence and professional knowledge and excellence. This practice experience
includes the propositional knowledge they acquired in order to qualify but
is also more than that. So what is it that is more than propositional knowl-
edge that nevertheless enables professionals to engage in their practice
effectively?
Schön unpacked the means by which professionals enhance their prac-
tice while they engage in it. He referred to this as professional artistry,
where professionals deal with the unique, the unanticipated, the uncertain,
the value conflicts and indeterminate conditions of everyday practice for
which there was no 'textbook' response. Reference to such enhancement as
'artistry' is not much help. It is like asking a person how he does something
who replies, 'Oh, y'know'. Sch6n, not satisfied with this apparently intuitive
means of learning, set out to describe tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1967). He
looked to those relatively unusual institutions where reflecting in and on
professional practice was an intrinsic part of the professional's training. He
went to the 'margins' of academia and to 'deviant' parts (Sch6n, 1987) of
those marginal institutions to find examples of the reflection on practice

o .
72 Learning and Reflection

that he was beginning to articulate. For example, within medical schools

('marginal' institutions, in terms of mainstream traditional universities)
attached to mainstream universities he found 'deviant' practice among
clinicians working with medical students dealing with questions that had
not come up in the lecture theatres but were essential to professional
understanding, knowledge and real practice.
Schôn found the teachers and students engaged in reflection on emergent
practice that was to underpin their learning and therefore enhance their
practice. Putting it more simply, students learned by listening, watching,
doing and by being coached in their doing. Not only did they apply what
they had heard and learned from lectures, books and demonstrations but
when they did an action that was part of their future profession, e.g. using
a scalpel, they also learned by reflecting themselves and with their tutors,
how the action went. They reflected on their practice. In addition, they would
'take with them' that reflection on their previous action as a piece of 'knowl-
edge' or learning when they went into the action the next time. Thus in the
next action they would be bringing all their previously acquired under-
standing and practice and be able to reflect in the action as they did it,
particularly if a new circumstance came up.
Thus for the moment we have built up a meaning for reflective practice
as reflection-on-action and reflection-in-action. We also adopt Schön's use
of the hyphen to suggest two things. One is to convey interaction between
action, thinking and being. The second is to suggest an immediacy inher-
ent in reflection and action. This is particularly apposite in relation to
reflection-in-action where the professional may well be 'thinking on her
feet' as we say.

Reflective practice in higher education

Transferring these ideas to higher education, we would assert that whether
trained as a teacher or not, the teacher (and student) engages in reflective
practice at some level. But we wish to go beyond what is perhaps an 'un-
aware' use of reflective practice to that which is explicit and intentional.
Our purpose is to articulate the components of reflective practice in the
context of learning in higher education for three main reasons.
First, consciously engaging in reflective practice enables the teacher to
learn from and therefore potentially enhance their practice and learning
about their practice. Practice here can include teaching, encouraging learn-
ing, research, scholarship, course design and management. Indeed, it can
include any of the myriad activities of the professional teacher. For exam-
ple, by reflecting on my approaches to how I teach and to what purposes I
teach, I can potentially learn more about the efficacy of my approaches, the
underlying models of teaching and learning that I am using, and how my
practice may contribute to student learning.
Secondly, by engaging in reflective practice, I as teacher can uncover,
unravel and articulate my practice with a view to learning from that reflection.

82
 Reflection and Reflective Practice 73

Through that engagement, I may then come to an understanding of the

process of reflective practice (as opposed to what I learned about my prac-
tice). In understanding and knowing the process I may be able to convey
that understanding, model it and in doing so, make it accessible as an idea
and a practice to students. Because I have engaged in reflective practice
myself I may be able to speak about it from a standpoint of really knowing.
In addition because I have experienced reflective practice as a corpus of
knowledge, action and real practice, I will be able to model how reflective
practice is done.
Thirdly, making reflective practice accessible to student learners, enables
the latter to become more conscious of their own approaches to their
learning and thereby promote critically reflective learning (see Chapter 3)
via reflection on their practice and learning about their learning. For the
student learner practice could include doing laboratory experiments, pro-
jects, for example. As a teacher, through reflective practice, I can not only
engage with students about their learning in relation to the discipline or
subject/course they are experiencing but relate with them about how they
are learning about their learning. As a student learner, by engaging in
reflective practice, I can ask myself (and with others) key questions about
my learning in my discipline as well as asking (again with others) about how
I go about my learning.
The key for us is that reflective practice is a core attribute of critically
reflective learning (Chapter 3) which we have been using in our own work
with students at undergraduate and postgraduate levels. Barnett (1992a)
-has underpinned Schön as far as learning in universities is concerned by
submitting the idea that all students can engage in reflective practice. If all
students whatever the discipline can engage in reflective practice then we
have a means by which learners can potentially achieve critically reflective
learning. We agree with Barnett's proposition. Returning to our main
purpose in writing this book we would assert and wish to show that a key
condition for such learning to happen is for teachers to engage in reflective
practice themselves, to be able to articulate and model that practice for
learners in order that learners can engage in reflective practice too. Hence
the significance we conveyed in the last chapter to the teacher being
explicit about intention, recognizing the importance of process and model-
ling a process that yields reflective practice in the learner.

Reflective practice: further exploration

We will now extend and deepen the meaning of the terms we are using in
order to convey the significance for engaging in reflective practice.
What then do we mean by reflective practice? Here we define our terms
and in doing so also set out some of Schôn's category of terms to construct
a vocabulary and typology of reflection that together, enables a professional
teacher to be a reflective practitioner. The terms will also be useful for our
purposes in the rest of the book.

r)
 74 Leal-rung and Reflection

1. 'Knowing that'. This is another way of defining propositional knowledge

and is that which the professional student acquires in the mainstream
part of their professional study at university. This can also be referred to
as textbook knowledge or 'knowing about'.
2. 'Knowing-in-action' and 'knowledge-in-use'. That which comes from profes-
sional practice. Schön refers to this kind of knowledge as knowledge-in-
action, a description or construction of that knowing-in-action that is tacit,
spontaneous and dynamic. Knowing-in-action is hyphenated by Schiin
probably to emphasize that 'the knowing is in the action' (Schön, 1987).
Knowing-in-action becomes knowledge-in-action when we describe it! Until
we describe it we just do it intelligent knowing-in-actions that we perform
in all manner of situations from sawing a piece of wood in a straight line,
to riding a bicycle, to a surgeon making an incision. Once we know how to
do these actions we do them spontaneously without putting words to them.
The knowing-in-action is tacit . . . yielding outcomes so long as the
situation falls within the boundaries of what we have learned to treat
as normal.
(Schön, 1987:28)
3. Reflection-in-action happens when we are in the midst of an action and in
doing and being reflective-in-action we are, for example, saying:
something is happening that surprises me it is not usual
is what I am doing appropriate at this moment?
do I need to alter, amend, change what I am doing and being in order
to adjust to changing circumstances, to get back into balance, to attend
accurately, etc?
I must check with myself that I am on the right track
if I am not on the right track, is there a better way?
For Schön what distinguishes reflection-in-action from other forms of re-
flection 'is its immediate significance for action . . . the rethinking of some
part of our knowing-in-action leads to on-the-spot experiment and further
thinking that affects what we do in the situation in hand and perhaps also
in others we shall see as similar to it' (Schön, 1987:29). To the outsider, and
even for the skilled individual engaged in the act, it will appear a smooth
act without apparent hesitation or thought. This meaning signifies reflect-
ing while the action is happening a kind of checking function and if there
is to be any modification arising from the reflection-in-action, adjustment
will take place to resume normal service!
However for Schön, reflection-in-action has an additional meaning:
a critical function, questioning the assumptional structure of knowing-
in-action. We think critically about the thinking that got us into this fix
or this opportunity; and we may, in the process, restructure strategies
of action, understandings of phenomena, or ways of framing problems.
(Schön, 1987:28)
 Reflection and Reflective Practice 75

This latter meaning of reflection-in-action is very different. As Eraut (1994)

has suggested, this is more difficult to 'fit' into the more intuitive reflection-
in-action posited by Schôn. In Eraut's view this is because Schön tends to be
less clear about the time scale in which reflection-in-action may occur. For
Eraut it all depends upon how the action is defined in terms of time and
what is determined as the action: 'is the action a scene, an act or a whole
play? Or is it reflection-in-action while the actors are on stage and reflection-
on-action when they are not' (Eraut, 1994:147). This raises definitional
problems of when our practitioner is reflecting-in-action or reflecting-on-
action? But the contribution of Schön is nevertheless important in empha-
sizing that knowing and knowledge are constructed in and out of practice
not only derived from propositional or technical knowledge that is resident
on the page or from the lecture hall.
To summarize to this point, knowing-in-action and reflection-in-action
are integral parts of the task or event. They happen during and in the
event, not after it. Each supports the other. The distinction between the two
is that the former follows accustomed practice, the latter enters when there
is a surprise occasioned by the unaccustomed, a change in the usual cir-
cumstances or an emergent critique of the way of doing something that
gives rise to a modification in the way the action will be undertaken.

Reality and reflection-in-action

It is useful at this point to refer to how Schön fits reflection-in-action into
ways of seeing reality:
Underlying this view of the practitioner's reflection-in-action is a
constructionist view of the reality with which the practitioner deals a
view that leads us to see the practitioner as constructing situations in
practice, not only in the exercise of professional artistry but also in all
other modes of professional competence . . . In the constructionist view,
our perceptions, appreciations, and beliefs are rooted in worlds of our
own making that we come to accept as reality.
(Schön, 1987:36, original italics)
Here Schön is recognizing the subjective construction of reality. This is
close to Belenky et al. (1986) in relation to women's experience of higher
education, where they note that the individual learner comes into her own
when she is able to be in a position of constructed knowledge where knowl-
edge is seen as contextual and created by the person valuing both the
subj ec tive and obj ec tive .
As we have seen in Chapter 3, Belenky et al. (1986) recognize that there
is an earlier stage of coming to know in higher education contexts, that is,
a stage of procedural knowledge where some women apply objective proce-
dures for obtaining and communicating knowledge (separated knowledge).
This stage is akin to SchOn's position about technical rationality which rests:
 76 Learning and Reflection

on an objectivist view of the relation of the knowing practitioner to the

reality he knows. On this view, facts are what they are, and the truth of
beliefs is strictly testable by reference to them. All meaningful disagree-
ments are resolvable, at least in principle, by reference to the facts.
And professional knowledge rests on a foundation of facts.
(Schön, 1987:36, original italics)
An additional category (connected knowing) was more characteristic of the
women's group, leading naturally to constructed knowledge as above. There
are implications here for teachers and students as learners. Belenky et al.
(1986) undertook their research in relation to women's experience of higher
education in the USA and identified constructive learners in their sample.
However, our experience suggests, and we have no reason to doubt, that it
can apply to men as well. The implication we are making is that propositional
knowledge (knowing about) really only comes to have internalized and real
meaning as knowledge when the receiving learner begins to apply that
propositional knowledge to themselves by relating in some way to their
experience, as part of developing a constructivist orientation to learning,
where the learner as actor creates knowledge, in collaboration with others.
By consciously engaging in reflective practice, the learner has created
and in turn creates the conditions for the type of learning that is the
essence of higher education. More specifically, if I as a learner am to bring
the propositional knowledge into a reality for me, then by immersing my-
self in a task that employs that knowledge, I will internalize it and make it
have meaning when I bring it to bear with my existing knowing-in-action
and emerging reflection-in-action.
Having investigated some of the components of reflection-in-action we
now need to complement this with reflection-on-action in order to encour-
age reflective learning that contributes to making learning critical through
critical reflection.

Refiection-on-action
Reflection-on-action is significant in the process of engaging in critical re-
flection. What meaning is within the term reflection-on-action? How can
the conditions be created to enable reflection-on-action to happen?
Working with knowledge, in whatever form, is an important part of the
work of a university in relation to student learning. We will therefore refer
to situations or events where teachers and learners together work with knowl-
edge for the purposes of learning, as actions, albeit of a particular kind. An
example is appropriate here. A philosophy seminar working with objec-
tivity/subjectivity can be seen as an event or action with the potential for
reflection-in-action and reflection-on-action that promotes the learning of
the students. Reflection here can include, inter alia, content, process and
the practice of the teacher and students.
We will take initially Schôn's reference to reflection-on-action. It is criti-
cal to his main thesis of developing the professional practitioner. Schön
 Reflection and Reflective Practice 77

(1987) refers to the frequent tendency for improvisers (in music) having
difficulty conveying a verbal account of their reflections-in-action.
Clearly, it is one thing to be able to reflect-in-action and quite another
to be able to reflect on our reflection-in-action so as to produce a good
description of it; and it is still another thing to be able to reflect on the
resulting description.
(p. 31, original italics)
In this extract is the recognition that there will always be some aspects of
action where explanation after the event in words will not be possible.
Given this, there is much that can be unravelled and described in words
that can then be used for reflection. We will take the situation of a learner.
In our view the capacity of a learner to reflect-on-action is significant in
developing critically reflective learning. But we need to unpack Schön's
statement by treating this as thinking, feeling and doing at a number of
levels and incorporating propositional knowledge and that which occurs in
the action as considered earlier.
Drawing upon Schön we can refer to a hierarchy of levels illustrated in
Figure 5.1, starting at the bottom with the action, at level 1.
Figure 5.1 Hierarchy of reflection
4 reflection on the description of the reflection-in-action
3 description of the reflection-in-action
2 reflection-in-action
1 action

We wish to show the levels as dimensions as in Figure 5.2. Levels imply a

hierarchy and implicitly that which is at the 'lower' level is less important.
Further levels can imply a separateness between levels. As dimensions they
are related and overlapping. Experience in action is just as important as
reflection on reflection. Each and all interrelate just as thinking, feeling
and doing fuse and intermingle.
Figure 5.2 Dimensions of reflection

87
 78 Learning and °Reflection

Strictly speaking dimension 2 happens within dimension 1 but because it is

action that is somehow different from that taken in the past and therefore
modifies the action, we will delineate it as dimension 2. We have here,
following Schön's description, dimensions of thought based in and on
an action (including thinking and feelings about past and current doings).
Within dimension 1, action, we would include any propositional knowledge
brought to the action but now probably embedded; knowledge-in-use brought
from previous experience; and current knowing-in-action as well. These are
all in harness, working together. So Figure 5.1 can now be revised as in
Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3 Four dimensions of reflection

4 reflection on the description of dimension 3

3 description of dimension 2
2 r-in-a
1
action: prop k; k-in-u; k-in-a

Note: (Abbreviations: prop k = propositional knowledge; k-in-u = knowledge-in-use;

k-in-a knowledge-in-action; r-in-a = reflection-in-action)

For the learner to go into reflection-on-action mode on dimension 4,

requires on dimension 3, a description of dimension 2: the reflection-in-
action and the action, as recalled on dimension 1. We would also add that
describing some of dimension 1, in particular, knowing-in-action, will also
be novel at dimension 3, for to describe is sometimes to name that which
may have been previously unnamed. This leads to the common difficulty of
a skilled practitioner, namely, being able to articulate what she does in
action. This ability differentiates the reflective teacher, facilitator, coach or
mentor, as she can describe her action and therefore reflect upon it. We
emphasize the importance of naming the process and the importance, in
dialogue, with someone who has the skill initially (and therefore to be
modelled for the learner), to identify these dimensions of reflection.

89
 Reflection and Reflective Practice 79

We do not wish to skip this point in the last paragraph about the signifi-
cance of engaging in critical dialogue. We do have more to say about the
value of dialogue elsewhere for encouraging critical learning (Chapters 4, 6
and 9). Obviously, reflection-in-action is within the action of the person
engaged in the action and therefore part and parcel of the action. Reflection-
on-action can be undertaken by the person on their own after the action.
This personal reflection-on-action is important in the continuing internal
dialogue about their practice and may influence their future action and
reflections-in-action. However, while this form of reflection is necessary and
desirable it is not necessarily sufficient.
Reflection-on-action with another(s) in dialogue which encourages criti-
cal reflection about the actions a person has undertaken will be more likely
to be effective in promoting critical reflective learning. In Chapters 7 and 8
we outline in more detail the levels of reflection that, for our purposes, a
teacher and student learner can engage in. Critically reflective learning is
that which enables the learner to engage in deep and transformatory learn-
ing (see Chapter 3). Without the interaction brought about by dialogue
critically reflective learning may not happen. Hence our emphasis on con-
ditions we recommend to enhance the quality of that dialogue.
The learner brings to any action all her accumulated propositional knowl-
edge (and we include that which has become tacit), knowledge-in-use as a
result of her prior experience (again now likely, to be tacit), knowing-in-
action and reflection-in-action. At the point of reflection-on-action all the
aforementioned come into potential play.
Thus returning to our question, about reflection-on-action, we have a
reflection, above, say at a meta level on which the learner is able, initially to
describe or name what has happened and then reflect on, that is, work with
that material that is before her. Schön describes the 'levels of action and
reflection on action as the rungs of a ladder. Climbing up the ladder, one
(the learner, teacher or both) makes what has happened at the rung below an
object of reflection' (Schön, 1987:114, italics added). We refer to the notion
of dimensions in order to mirror the idea of permeability across dimen-
sions and to prevent the demotion of experience against reflection.
We will take an example to illustrate reflection-on-action through dia-
logue. A student may have engaged in a project which is in draft report
stage (current action completed, or levels/dimensions 1 and 2). With the
tutor and/or other student colleagues the student is reporting upon her
progress to date following a reading by all parties of the project. The stu-
dent, in reporting upon her progress, describes her journey to date (level/
dimension 3) and the difficulty that she had in writing an early section. She
nevertheless pursued working on that section before moving on with the
next section sequentially. The whole group then go into discussion, that
is, dialogue with her about her experience in writing up the project. (We
distinguish dialogue from discussion in Chapter 4.) At one point another
student asks what was the reason for writing the sections in sequence. She is
surprised by the question and at first replies 'but that is how I have always

83
 80 Learning and Reflection

done it'. Questions follow that pose why such a procedure is necessary.
Gradually, the student in question realizes this is a habit (knowledge-in-use)
she has applied up to now without questioning it. Recognition becomes
apparent to her that she could have adopted alternatives to writing up the
project. She could work on a section where she is not 'blocked' and there is
energy and will, or, she may undertake a section that appears at the mo-
ment 'easier'. Here we have reflection at dimension 4 for her but also for
the group among whom this notion appears novel and potentially useful.
Thus through the dialogue about the reflection-on-action of one student
she has learning about her process, as well as, potentially, for some of the
others in the group. Moreover, we have the possibility that had she re-
flected on her action (after the writing) on her own she may not have
realized that potentiality. Therefore the dialogue, necessarily with others,
enabled her to reflect upon her actions and hence her learning.
If we briefly stand outside the above, the student learner is engaging in
some aspects of reflective practice and is also becoming aware of her prac-
tice of reflective practice. That is, she is also learning about some aspects of
the way she is learning meta learning, described below as dimensions.
Another way of describing the above approach is that of Boud et al.
(1985) who describe the relationship between learning experiences and
reflection which we outline below. Given an experience there are three
elements which are important in the reflective process:
returning to the experience by replaying it by description of some kind,
e.g. describing it to others. This is dimension 3 that we described above.
This description provides data and possible clarification for the learner and
others and may provide insights not recognized during the experience, e.g.
particular feelings of which the person was not conscious.
attending to the feelings associated with the experience
The learner's feelings may have, at the time of the action, affected how she
responded to the events. Negative feeling from getting stuck in the project
may have disabled the response to the event resulting in a less effective or
inflexible response. Returning to the event enables the learner to engage
in reflection on her actions as well as obtaining an 'outside' view of what
happened if she is in dialogue with others.
re-evaluating the experience following attention to description and feelings
This is equivalent to dimension 4 above. Boud et al. (1985) elaborate the
stages through which this re-evaluation is undertaken via four aspects which
are not necessarily stages but elements of a whole:
first, association, that is, relating of new data to that which is already
known; integration, which is seeking relationships among the data; vali-
dation to determine the authenticity of the ideas and feelings which
 Reflection and Reflective Practice 81

have resulted; and appropriation, that is, making knowledge one's

own . . While reflection is itself an experience it is not, of course,
.

an end in itself. It has the objective of making us ready for new

experience . . . a new way of doing something, the clarification of an
issue, the development of a skill or the resolution of a problem. A new
cognitive map may emerge, or a new set of ideas may be identified.
(Boud et al., 1985:30, 34, original italics)
In addition to cognitive outcomes, there may also be outcomes that are
affective as well as a new stance towards action and a sense of agency. Thus
Boud et al. provide a methodology for reflection-on-action to take place in
the context of our four dimensions.

Dimension 5
Returning to the dimensions we can refer to the another, inherent here,
dimension 5 where the group reflects on the reflection-on-action. On this
dimension, learners are working on the significance of reflection itself,
that is, learning about how they learn! Thus in reflective dialogue on this
dimension there may be learning for the individual that derives from the
interaction in the group. In Figure 5.4 below we will refer to dimension 4 as
reflection on action and dimension 5 as reflection on reflection.

Figure 5.4 Five dimensions of reflection

5 reflection on the reflection on action

4 reflection on the description of the reflection-in-action (reflection on action)
3 description of the reflection-in-action
2 reflection-in-action
1 action

In summary we would suggest that reflection of a learner's practice may

take place within actions and following actions. The reflection can be a
 82 Learning and Reflection

conversation with oneself during it and/or with others engaged in it through,

but not necessarily via dialogue. It is possible to communicate by non-verbal
means. It is also possible to engage after the action by oneself and/or with
others. Indeed, the ability to reflect after an action is critical to the potenti-
ality of future actions and events. We are also arguing that reflection-on-
action after the action is important with other(s) in dialogue for the actor
may not be able to see herself without some self-deception, thereby limiting
her range for potential reflection (here reflection is an act as well as the
past action being reflected upon).
The key for us is how best to engage in reflection-on-action, in dialogue
with others, in order to attain critical reflection. This is taken up elsewhere
in the book (Chapters 7 and 8).
Paradigm shift?
It is useful to draw a further potential effect of reflection across the five
dimensions referred to above. We have already referred to the effect of
dimension 5 in learning about learning. We can also consider the idea of
reflection-on-action that takes place within a paradigm and reflection that
enables a move(s) out of an existing paradigm. This is another potential-
ity and links with what we have referred to as single- and double-loop
learning. In single-loop learning I am endeavouring through reflection at
level 4 to understand and take 'corrective' action from the reflection in
order to make future action more effective. My reflection-on-action be-
comes my potential knowledge-in-use. So, for a student learning about a
discipline or domain, it is about enhancing the way I understand and or
do something in relation to my domain and within a particular paradigm.
With double-loop learning through reflection, particularly with others in
dialogue I may:
recognize a paradigm that I have been in without realizing it
recognize/realize that there is another paradigmatic framework other
than the one I am in
shift my paradigm
understand and work across paradigms.
An example of the above would be recognition of the idea of relativity in
relation to the mass of a body, in contrast to earlier ideas of mass as con-
stant. Another example would be recognition of the discrepancy between
my espoused as opposed to my in-use notions of sexism what I espouse
perhaps being very different from my actions and my being made aware of
the incongruity.

Refining the meaning of reflection

This point brings us to the ambiguity in Schön that Eraut (1994) has en-
deavoured to untangle. To help us in our work we, like Eraut went to the
Shorter Oxford Dictionary to find meanings for reflection. There were two
definitions:
 Reflection and Reflective Practice 83

1. The action of turning (back) or fixing the thoughts on some subject;

meditation, deep or serious consideration. Linked to this meaning was
an apposite phrase from Paley: 'Mankind act more from habit than
reflection' which seemed a very useful justification for all this effort!
2. The mode, operation, or faculty by which the mind has knowledge of
itself and its operations, or by which it deals with the ideas received from
sensation and perception.

For us, the first definition refers to the process or means by which we
reflect. And for Eraut it additionally treats reflection as a form of delibera-
tion, where the focus is on 'interpreting and understanding cases or sit-
uations by reflecting on what one knows about them' (op cit.:156). This
reflective process or deliberation may bring previous knowledge to bear as
well as that which is currently unformulated in the person engaged in the
action.
In terms of our writing we are aiming to convey through reflective dia-
logue, and a range of applications, a process by which reflection can occur.
Our aim is to create the conditions for reflection that promote and encour-
age critical learning. This incorporates thinking, emotion, and in-the-world
action that a person undertakes, while recognizing the social and political
context and values within which the person lives.
The second definition is distinct from the first in that the latter may lead
to a reframing or reconceptualizing about actions or situations, the potential
result of which is to be able to move into a different paradigm from that
previously; to engage in metacognition (Eraut, 1994); to engage in transform-
atory learning (Harvey and Knight, 1996); to engage in critical dialogue
(Barnett, 1992a). Schön's contribution is that this meaning of reflection
can happen in action as well as after action.
That the second definition fits the raison d'etre of higher education is
probably (with a great deal of profound disputation) accepted. However, it
is on the first definition, the process, the means, the deliberation by which
the second meaning can emerge that we rest our justification for this book. It
is the process of reflective dialogue, significantly with others, for the second
meaning to be realized. We are not asserting this is the only way, just that it
is time for the process of facilitating reflective learning to be practised.
Finally in this subsection we wish to draw attention again (see Chapter 2)
to the dualism of the Western tradition and the rationalist roots of educa-
tional theory. Reflection as a concept has emerged from this rationalist
tradition in the dualism of the mind/body divide. Definitions of reflection
therefore are prone to privilege the rational and cognitive over the physi-
cal, that is, in such definitions reflection is an activity of the detached mind,
using reason as its tool. Alternative approaches to reflection which avoid
the mind/body split have been described as a reintegration of 'cerebral
ways of knowing with thinking through the body' (Michelson, 1995:22).
We assert a more holistic definition which values the senses, recognizes
emotion and draws in personal experience through dialogue.
 84 Learning and Reflection

We define reflection in two senses, first as a process by which experience

is brought into consideration and secondly, deriving from the first, the
creation of meaning and conceptualization from experience and the capac-
ity to look at things as potentially other than they appear, the latter part
embodying the idea of critical reflection. When experience is brought into
consideration it will include, thought, feeling and action. Moreover some
treatments suggest a static, separated quality, as if reflection on action can
be, after the event, totally separated from the previous experience. The
reality is that the learner will, where the reflection is intentional for pro-
moting learning, bring that action into the dialogue. This point further
explains our circles as dimensions of the totality of experience.
In terms of reflection as part of reflective practice and within this reflec-
tive dialogue the integration of mind and body (affect and action) means
that in the act of reflection we bring to that act our cognitive and affective
experience. For example, a learner grappling with a new concept that may
well disturb existing patterns or mindsets of seeing reality. In mathematics,
the concept of many dimensions in geometry can only be appreciated alge-
braically rather than imagined as three dimensions are, and the struggle
to accept and work with hyperspace may lead to learner frustration. The
affect, a feeling of frustration may, in dialogue, generate the energy to grasp
the concept. Similarly, in the laboratory, the researcher may be excited
about the potential outcomes of experimentation. Dialogue with others,
may, in releasing ideas and creative imaginings, lead to a breakthrough in
the researcher's understanding about the experiment for future action.

Critiques of reflective practice

We now address the recent scepticism about engaging in reflective practice
in higher education. Harvey and Knight (1996), in relation to the potenti-
ality of academic staff engaging in their professional development, convey a
view of the reflective practitioner as a 'fashionable solution' to some of the
problems of professional development. Harvey and Knight refer to the re-
flective practitioner as one:
who consciously engages in a dialogue between the thinking that at-
taches to actions and the thinking that deals in more abstracted
propositional knowledge . . . This practitioner is regularly thoughtful
and continually learning from the interplay between procedural and
propositional knowledge.
(p. 160)
They continue:
However, being a reflective practitioner hence helping staff to be-
come such practitioners is more than a matter of copious injunctions
to reflect on teaching and learning. For example, reflection can easily
be self-confirming.
(p. 160)
 &flection and Reflective Practice 85

They further state:

that 'reflection' is a good intention frequently found to be fallen on hard
times. There is nothing to distinguish it from 'thinking', which is a
quintessential human activity. What is important is the quality of thought.
(p. 161)
We agree with Harvey and Knight that there can be a difference in terms of
quality that makes reflective practice more or less useful. Thus reflective
practice that uses experience to change ideas as opposed to adding infor-
mation to existing ideas is of significant value.
However, we do note that, the reflective practitioner, as described by
Harvey and Knight, appears to be reflecting alone only. Thus in the first
extract above the reflective practitioner appears to be having an internal
dialogue between thinking attaching to actions and the thinking that deals
in more abstracted propositional knowledge. We have identified this as
application 1: personal reflection in Chapter 7 and we would endorse the
danger of such reflection being self-confirming. The exhortation to im-
prove the 'quality of thought' in the third extract above, can do little to
protect against self-confirmation. Clearly, if Harvey and Knight are meaning
an internal dialogue then their fear of the notion of the reflective practi-
tioner being 'an illusionist's charter' would be well founded.
We emphasize that the idea of a reflective practitioner reflecting in the
transformational sense used by Harvey and Knight is one we recognize and
endorse and that it can be taught or be made explicit as a tool for develop-
ment. However, the key notion we are making in our writing is that reflec-
tive practice undertaken through reflective dialogue with an other, or others,
may promote transformational learning.
Where there is reflective dialogue between colleagues or learners there
may also be collusion and this can inhibit them from opening up to experi-
ence changes in ideas and action. However, part of the skill in facilitating
reflective learning through reflective dialogue is to grapple with that ten-
dency for inter-personal collusion. Moreover, facilitation includes the
capacity to give feedback to another person about that which they may be
unaware of themselves. If I do receive feedback about that which I am
unaware, I now have, at least, a choice. I may resist the one I am not
familiar with but I am no longer ignorant of it. We discuss the importance
of giving feedback in Chapter 11.
Let us take an example. Harvey and Knight (1996) refer to the need to
enable teachers to be able to move from transmittive to transformational
conceptions of teaching. If I as a teacher have no notion conceptually that
I am transmittive as opposed to being transformative then I will have diffi-
culty moving to the latter. I could be informed of these two conceptions
and assert that I fall into the latter category, but in fact, in practice, I am
teaching in the former mode. Yet how will I move if I have a belief that it is
invalidated in my behaviour? Reflecting on my own may simply endorse my
position. Feedback from dialogue with another may at least reveal that what
 86 Learning and f?eflection

I am espousing is not happening in practice. I have a choice even though

the recognition of the disparity may be painful, and my choice may be
transforming my practice.
In encouraging reflective dialogue with others is the issue of the sense of
power and powerlessness that can be found and felt in any group (or organ-
izational) setting. The sense of power or powerlessness can be innocent
(Baddeley and James, 1991) in that the person or persons may not be aware
of how they are being but nevertheless live it. Examples would be: where a
group in dialogue is dominated by one person to the exclusion of others;
where a man only addresses the other men in a mixed group; or where a
group attempt to learn about diversity from the person who is 'different'
instead of recognizing that the issue of difference resides with them. Dia-
logue with others is not neutral. Recognition and making explicit what is
happening is important in ensuring that learning is encouraged rather than
discouraged and this is primarily the responsibility of the facilitator.
Harvey and Knight cite the teacher engaged in reflective practice for the
purposes of professional development, but of course our discussion will
equally apply to student learners. Indeed, we noted earlier that the idea of
students being reflective practitioners was taken up by Barnett (1992a)
when he refers to 'We're all Reflective Practitioners Now' as the tide to one
of the chapters. Barnett recommends reflective practice to all student learn-
ers not just those students engaged in courses leading directly to profes-
sional practice. Barnett, in common with Harvey and Knight, takes a similar
solitary conception of reflective practice.
The idea of the learner for Barnett (1992a), as reflective practitioner
involves four concepts:
1. the action': to be able to make knowledge claims and form their own
which can also be stated as being engaged in forms of reasoning
2. 'interpersonal engagement': being engaged in forms of reasoning is a kind
of interpersonal engagement which presupposes a listener, an audience
and a critical one at that. The engagement could be in the form of an
essay, film, computer programme or tape: 'the student has to under-
stand that her views only have substance provided they can withstand the
critical scrutiny by others' (p. 195)
3. 'reflection-in-action': 'some kind of internal dialogue' of which an essay
may be the outcome. 'What is presented on paper is simply the outcome
of current stage of the student's reflection-in-action, the reflection occur-
ring during the action of conducting the internal dialogue' (p. 195)
4. 'Knowledge-in-use': for a student this is essentially all the existing propo-
sitional knowledge that she brings to or is exhibiting in a new situation
with all that is going on around her, for example the differing voices,
that contained in books, journals and other media in contributing to
the problem in hand to work through the solution to a satisfactory con-
clusion be.it an essay, project or studio presentation.
The last concept is less easy to adapt from Schön who applied knowledge-
in-use in professional practice. Barnett neatly applies it to learners in
 Reflection and Reflective Practice 87

universities who are engaged in practice in even 'the purest of subjects'.

The importance for Barnett is that these notions or concepts used by the
reflective practitioner: 'are or should be found in the day-to-day experience
of every undergraduate' (p. 196).
Barnett asks what are the implications for engaging in critically reflective
practice for the development of the student's critical and reflective abilities.
He recognizes that he is only hinting at them in his text (1992a) but argues
that there are implications for the content and organization of the curric-
ulum, its design, implementation and the student experience.
Barnett includes the space to enable self-reflection which implies 'signifi-
cant levels of student autonomy and independence in thought and action'.
This in turn implies student responsibility for their own learning. Didactic
teaching should be minimized in favour of real interaction between teacher
and students and between students themselves (on group exercises).
He concludes by stating:
Higher learning calls for higher order thinking on the part of the
student. Whether engaged in propositional thought or in professional
action, students should be enabled to develop the capacity to keep an
eye on themselves, and to engage in a critical dialogue with themselves
in all they think and do . . . it is a reflexive process in which the student
interrogates her/his thoughts or actions. The learning outcome to be
desired, from every student, is that of the reflective practitioner.
(Barnett, 1992a:198, original italics)
Again, although there is a hint of interaction with teachers and other stu-
dents, the primacy for engaging as a reflective practitioner is the student
reflecting alone, albeit critically, and armed with the conceptual under-
standing of reflective practice. Thus the student 'engages in a critical dia-
logue with themselves', 'interrogates her/his thoughts or actions'. It is an
important but restricted level of reflective practice comparable to Applica-
tion 1: personal reflection, in Chapter 7.
Barnett's (1997) recent thinking moves on to a more fundamental criti-
cism of reflection and the reflective practitioner. He is now critical of Schôn's
ideas on reflective practice, as a socially driven concept which may not
stimulate real critical reflection. Barnett writes of reflection as a code word
masking the hidden agenda of instrumentalism because: 'the student's in-
ner self is constructed more by external agendas . . . than by the student's
own personal aspirations, values and hold on the world'. (1997:100)
Reflection as defined above is unlikely to meet the objectives of higher
education. However, we are offered a new idea, the concept of a critical
being, which we have outlined in Chapter 3, integrating domains of knowl-
edge, self and the world.
The task of higher education is to enable student learners not only to
become critical learners in all three domains but:
calls for nothing less than taking seriously students as persons, as cri-
tical persons in the making . . . the student is challenged continually to
 88 Learning and Reflection

make connections between her knowledge, self-understanding and

actions at the highest levels of criticality.
(Barnett, 1997:114)
On the basis of Barnett's recent critique of reflection, high levels of criticality
in the three domains cannot be achieved by reflection as he defines it, and he
is right. For the reconstruction of self, the reconstruction of world and the
transformatory critique of knowledge he recommends, we need a system of
reflection which enables these forms of criticality.
The question for us is what Barnett writes about, namely, how a student is
to gain high levels of criticality in all three domains, i.e. become a critical
being? He recommends a curriculum which: 'has to be one that exposes
students to criticality in the three domains and at the highest level in each'
(p. 102).
Such a curriculum differs from the current academic model which over-
emphasizes critical thinking, the competence model which is focused on
performance and also from the solitary version of the reflective practitioner
as outlined above. We are proposing an approach which accommodates
such a curriculum with one important difference reflection, which enables
the potential for critical transformation.
Self-reflection as described by Barnett, we believe to be a necessary but
on its own an insufficient form of reflection for high levels of critical thought,
activity and self-transformation. These require dialogue in reflection what
we have termed reflective dialogue in Chapters 4 and 5. The prospect of
refashioning traditions and engaging in a transformatory critique (critical
levels in the three domains) without the benefit of interaction with others is
indeed a faint hope. When we bring dialogue into our definition of reflec-
tion we can see how possible it is to reach high levels of criticality. We note
that the conditions for the balanced curriculum recommended by Barnett,
requiring 'quite different pedagogic relationships' (p. 108) are expressed
through a discourse of dialogue, that is: 'self, being, becoming, action,
interaction, knowing, understanding, risk, exploration, emotion, interpreta-
tion, judging, insight, courage, exposure, daring, authenticity, collaboration
and dialogue' (p. 108, original italics).
Hence our emphasis on dialogue, but more specifically, dialogue that
encourages reflection not only about learning in the domains of knowl-
edge, action and self, but reflection on that learning. In this way students
begin to embrace the notions of transformatory learning, critically reflective
learning, deep learning, that are prescribed in the literature yet which omit
the means to achieve such levels of learning.
In this chapter we have sought to explain reflection and reflective prac-
tice and how the concept of reflective practice can contribute to critically
reflective learning. In Part 2 we relate the requirements for reflection and
the concept of reflective practice to current academic practice, as well as to
the future of teaching and learning in higher education. We will follow
these with the practical means by which reflective dialogue can be engen-
dered for critically reflective learning.