Thanks to visit codestin.com
Credit goes to www.scribd.com

0% found this document useful (0 votes)
12 views5 pages

CASES

Uploaded by

pgokalingapao
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
12 views5 pages

CASES

Uploaded by

pgokalingapao
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 5

Bara Lidasan vs Commission on Elections

G.R. No. L-28089 – 21 SCRA 496 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative
Department – Legislative Powers; Lawmaking Power – Effect if Title Does Not Completely
Express the Subject

Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled “An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” was passed. Lidasan
however discovered that certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao
Del Sur, pursuant to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor
of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter
registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to have RA 4790 be
nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not clearly indicate in its title
that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in its territory several barrios from Cotabato.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790 is constitutional.

HELD: No. It is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to
perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it
did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of
Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and
added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns
and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted
for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province.

The rule is “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill”. The title should inform the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. Here, the title — “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton,
in the Province of Lanao del Sur” — projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao
del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that
communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur
town.

G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of


Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as complainant all private
prosecutor, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol
Branch II, ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO
CAJES and MODESTO S SUELLO, respondents.

The legal issue in this case is whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes
squatting and similar acts, applies to agricultural lands. The decree (which took effect
on August 20, 1975) provides:

SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat,
or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner,
succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his
will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished
by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not
less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at the
discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
(2nd paragraph is omitted.)

The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower
court separate information against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as
penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The information against Mario Aparici which
is similar to the other fifteen informations, reads:

That sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the present at


barangay Magsaysay, municipality of Talibon, province of Bohol,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate
a portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by
Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as successor to the pasture applicant
Celestino de la Serna of Pasture Lease Application No. 8919, accused's
entrance into the area has been and is still against the win of the offended
party; did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and
cultivate a portion of the said grazing land; said cultivating has rendered a
nuisance to and has deprived the pasture applicant from the full use
thereof for which the land applied for has been intended, that is preventing
applicant's cattle from grazing the whole area, thereby causing damage
and prejudice to the said applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de
la Serna, Jr. (sic)

Five of the information, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto
Cajes and Modesto Suello were the accused, were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves,
Jr. of Branch II (Criminal Cases Nos. 1824, 1828, 1832, 1833 and 1839, respectively).

Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an
omnibus order dated December 9, 1977 dismissing the five informations on the grounds
(1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy",
whereas under the decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force,
intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to
the cultivation of a grazing land.

Because of that order, the fiscal amended the information by using in lieu of "stealth and
strategy" the expression "with threat, and taking advantage of the absence of the
ranchowner and/or tolerance of the said ranchowner". The fiscal asked that the
dismissal order be reconsidered and that the amended information be admitted.

The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase "and for other purposes" in
the decree does not include agricultural purposes because its preamble does not
mention the Secretary of Agriculture and makes reference to the affluent class.

From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No.
5440. The appeal is devoid of merit.

We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture
lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban
communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-
to-do individuals. The squatting complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.

The preamble of the decree is quoted below:

WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter


of Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of
National Defense, Public Work. 9 and communications, Social Welfare
and the Director of Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the
Presidential Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors,
City and Municipal Mayors, and City and District Engineers, "to remove an
illegal construction including buildings on and along esteros and river
banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without permits on
public and private property." squatting is still a major problem in urban
communities all over the country;

WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully


occupying public and private lands belong to the affluent class;

WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive


against this illegal and nefarious practice.

It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers to illegal constructions on


public and private property. It is complemented by Letter of Instruction No. 19-A which
provides for the relocation of squatters in the interest of public health, safety and peace
and order.

On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the
grazing lands involved in this case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947 which makes it
unlawful for any person, corporation or association to forcibly enter or occupy public
agricultural lands. That law provides:

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person corporation or association


to enter or occupy, through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth,
any public agriculture land including such public lands as are granted to
private individuals under the provision of the Public Land Act or any other
laws providing for the of public agriculture lands in the Philippines and are
duly covered by the corresponding applications for the notwithstanding
standing the fact that title thereto still remains in the Government or for
any person, natural or judicial to investigate induce or force another to
commit such acts.

Violations of the law are punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand or
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both such fine and imprisonment in the
discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (See People
vs. Lapasaran 100 Phil. 40.)

The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court
does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended
to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of
ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the
legislative intent is uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104
Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50).

WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,


vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.

Vicente Sotto for petitioner.


Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.

LAUREL, J.:

The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the
issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and
selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of
postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international
Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he
considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the
matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent
publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps for printing as
follows:

"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue, green,
brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36
and 50 centavos." The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to this
day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein.

In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question
under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:

No. 4052. — AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING
THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE
APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH
NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature


assembled and by the authority of the same:

SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately available out
of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the costs of plates and printing of
postage stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident thereto.

SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is
hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion of the amount herein appropriated in the manner
indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.

SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the Treasury.

SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, February 21, 1933.

It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates and printing
of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of
Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount
appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government".
The printing and issuance of the postage stamps in question appears to have been approved by authority
of the President of the Philippines in a letter dated September 1, 1936, made part of the respondent's
memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent alleges that the Government of the Philippines would suffer
losses if the writ prayed for is granted. He estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale of the postage
stamps in question at P1,618,17.10 and states that there still remain to be sold stamps worth
P1,402,279.02.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to
the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the
violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or
property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the
issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for
the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to
that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated
on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to
advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took
advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its
people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to the President of the
Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the stamps as actually
designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned,
contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat
XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic
Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that
while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of
a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the
aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be
embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the
purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main
purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide
Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)

We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the
complete separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional
inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and prescription, care should
be taken that at this stage of our political development nothing is done by the Government or its officials
that may lead to the belief that the Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or
institution. But, upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending
circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the case
at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed
advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor
judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to
take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap
exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a
constitutional inhibition.

The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

You might also like