MIDTERM INFO

-​ Weeks 1-4
-​ 30 mc (1mark)
-​ 3 short answer from a pool of 6 (5marks)
-​ Approx 1 page
-​ Usually 2 parts - describe or define something, and provide an example, or evaluate concept
described
-​ Out of 45 - 25% of final
-​ Lecture content is priority
-​ Wont be tested on dates → try and know the important ones like constitution revisions big riots/protests

GOVERNING CRIMINAL JUSTICE JAN 5-11

WHAT IS THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

-​ Complex network of independent, but procedurally connected boards

-​ Police, prosectors,courts, correctional agencies, and parole boards
-​ Not coordinated
-​ Complex system of checks and balances
-​ Each agency has its own goals and mandates
-​ Police and prsecution are separate and independent of one another
-​ Competing or conflicting interests
-​ Judges think what are the proportionate offences, how to sentence what to assess etc
-​ Parole board concerned with decisions after sentencing process
-​ Crown and defence(prosecution) council
-​ Trained lawyers but have different objectives in a courtrooms
-​ Crown: prosecute
-​ Defence: protect interest of client

WHAT IS THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

-​ Formal system - are all part of the government (defence council is not)
 -​ Legislators, bureaucracy, police, courts, prosecution/crwon, correctional services
-​ Informal system
-​ Media, victims groups, defence counsel
-​ Police reported crime rates
-​ Crime rates are calculated per 100, 000 of the population
-​ Contains all data reported to the police (individual instances)
-​ Factors of the police reported crime rate
-​ Must come to attenion of police (relates to police)
-​ Difference between police departments (relates to police)
-​ Soical and econmic factors (rates can change based on population size and other factors, age,
group, setting, community) (changes can occur due to technology access)
-​ Definitional changes
-​ Useful to tell public about what police do, not what is currently going on
-​ Crime severity index
-​ Measures changes in crime severity in canada
-​ Crime rates dont account for full picture the CSI does
-​ Determined by a weight applied to each crime
-​ Based on sentences handed out over the years
-​ Heavier weight tell us the severity of the act
-​ Useful data for thinking about policy response
to crime
-​ Not useful to look at CSI for one year, look at trends overtime
-​ Population matters, smaller populations will be more severely represented because of low
numbers
-​ Geography matters, crime is concentrated in cities depending on population
-​ Crime statistics
-​ Not all crimes are reported to police
-​ Communities and people not trusting of police will likely not report
-​ Social and econmic status matters
-​ How we measure crime depends on how we define crime
-​ Crime stats indicates trust in police
 -​ Increased reporting could mean it is happening more, or people are becoming more
trusting of police, therefore reporting more often
-​ Also a political tool
-​ Valuable to make chages in the justice system

THREE RULES OF CRIME STATS

-​ Responsibilites for trends depends on whether those trends are good or bad
-​ Useful political tool, doesnt say much about justuce system
-​ Reaction of justice system critics to crime stats depends on direction in which those stats are headed
-​ We can manipulate how we use crime stats to prove a point
-​ Following major incidents, discussion of negative crime data increases, positive disscussion decreases
-​ Conception of crime rates reflects the major event or events

STUDING CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

-​ Main roles of the government is to provide safety and security for society
-​ If they do not provide this it may be seen as unstable
-​ Strengths of poli-sci for studying criminal justice
-​ Criminal jujstice polocy making is influenced by political process
-​ Policies reflect policy process and politics , interested in understand how they gov works
-​ Understand relationship between citizens and the state
-​ Limits on power
-​ Political science brings different perspective on Theoretical, methodological and normative
perspectives of criminology and law

APPLICATION OF INSTITUTIONALISM

-​ Shape decisions and behaviour of actors, actors shape institutions

-​ Institutions: laws, rules, policy structure
-​ Actors: politicians, bureaucrats, criminal justice actors
-​ Ex, what police cant do is shaped by laws constitutions etc, but their actions have shaped how we
interpret and apply laws and the constitution
-​ We can identify behavior and decisions by what they do
 -​ Executive dominates westminster parliamentary system
-​ Other mps have less inglyence and arent really shaping policy, laws, justice system - our
executive is part of the legislator
-​ In the us the president isnt part of congress
-​ Federalism and constitutional division of powers
-​ If gov wants to enact change, institutions must work together (fed, prov)
-​ Charter of rights and freedsoms - entrenched bill of rights
-​ Fundamentally shape the justice system we have

AUTHORITY POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY

-​ Power, independence, accountability - central concepts to the CJ system

-​ Accountability:
-​ Understand checks and balances to gov power
-​ Independence
-​ Intention with excessive independence
-​ Problems with little independence
-​ Find balance, cant have too much or too little
-​ Example:
-​ Judges have majority of power in courts, but can be appealed
-​ We want them to make correct decisions in light of the law, the decisions may not be
popular but must be enforced depending on rules and laws
-​ Undercover policing
-​ Challenges in holding accountable when undercover

CRIME POLICY PURPOSES

-​ Identify and define things that are criminal (as decieded by society, punishable by law)
-​ Crim law provides formal social controls in society, main goal to prevent crime
-​ Nurture and support social controls to reduce crime in society
-​ Provide framework through fromal apparatus of social control (operations)
-​ Both authorize and constain behaviour of criminal justice officials
-​ Tells actors what they can and cant do
 -​ Can trigger course of action, leading to deprivation of individual liberty

UNIQUE NATURE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY

-​ Unique for two reasons (ON EXAM)

-​ High degree pf fragmentation
-​ Separation between major parts of CJ system (courts police corrections, that have
different mandates roles and often in conflict with one another)
-​ Major compenents fragmented because the fulfill roles separately
-​ Different goals ideology and training across parts of CJ system (ex. Defence crown have
different roles within the courtroom but have same training, success of one means failure
of the other)
-​ CJ policy highly symbolic and value driven
-​ Open to politicalization > concept of right and wrong, we ask the system
-​ Not everyone will agree on policies
-​ Relations emotional and moral concerns of the public

FRAGMENTATION: GOALS AND MANDATES (responsibilities)

-​ Police: often work with the crown,

have different roles
-​ Crown: can give police advice,
cant tell them what to do, have to
represent public interest
-​ Defence: one of the most
important actors in justice system,
have no duties to the public (public interest), dont share same jobs with police
-​ Corrections: carry out sentences in safe manner
-​ Separation between them is to keep indepence between them
STRUCTURE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM JAN 14-16

CONSTITUTION ACT 1867

-​ When talking about CJ system, must discuss both

constitutions
-​ Federalism shapes system
-​ Division of responsibilities within the system
-​ Federal s.91: has responsibilities including amending
and writing the criminal code, but not prosecuting the criminal code, penitentiaries (sentences of 2+
years), operate national parole board (ON and QU operate their own parole boards
-​ Provincial s.92: regulatory (liquor regulations), quasi criminal law (looks like criminal law, but not in
criminal code, only regulatory offences), prosecutes only criminal code (can have different prosecutors
for criminal offences), corrections of only 2 or less year sentences (different for minors)
-​ When talking about prosecutors usually talking about provincial **********

CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 1982

-​ S. 7-14: legal rights

-​ We call this ‘ rights and liberties’
-​ S. 7: individual cannot have life liberty or security limited unless is in line with principles of
fundamental justice - relates to common law rules that protect individuals from the state (can
cover other rights if applied in broad scenario)
-​ S. 8: secure against unreasonable search and seizure - do not have unlimited rights against search
and seizure, only unreasonable ( protects against the reasonable expectation of privacy), exigent
circumstances allow officials to search house without a warrant
-​ S. 9: right against to not be arbitrarily det ained or imprisoned - must have legal reason to
detain someone, ‘qualified right’ > must have a good reason and clear criteria
-​ S. 10: right on arresnt or detention
a.​ Must be informed of the reasons for an arrest
b.​ Have to inform you that you have the right to obtain council - make person aware that
they have right to a lawyer
 c.​ Have validity of detention determined by habeas corpus and be released if detention isnt
lawful
-​ S. 11: any person charged with an offence has right to:
a.​ Be informed without delay of offence
b.​ Tried within reasonable limit - how long it tajes something to go to trial
c.​ Not to be compelled ti be a witness in proceedings against person in respect to offence -
self incrimination, accused cannot be compelled to give testimony
d.​ Presumption of innocence until proven guilty - state must prove someone is guilty
e.​ Right to bail - not be denied reasonable bail without just cause
-​ S. 12: sentencing protections
-​ Sentences cannot be cruel or unusual
-​ S. 13: right against selef incrimination
-​ Anything said in a court cannot be used against them to incriminate themselves, witness
in trials
-​ S. 14: right to an interpreter
-​ S. 24(2): judges can exclude evidence if gathered in a way that violates the charter (bring admin. Into
disrepute)
-​ We call this ‘remedy’ or ‘consequences’ of charter is violated

CHARTER AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

-​ Largest impact of charter is on the criminal law and criminal justice policy
-​ Courts assertive and protective of charter rights
-​ More liekly to protect the law
-​ Natural domain
-​ Volume of criminal cases leaves room for interpretation
-​ More opportunity
-​ Increased procedural leverage for defence
-​ Able to protect charter more than the pre charter era
IMPACT OF THE CHARTER

-​ Changes the definition of criminal aw, investigation,

pretrail, trial, and post trial stages
-​ Pretrial: impacts how long it takes to make to trial
-​ Trial stage: complex how evidence is introduced,
questions asked

SOURCES OF CRIMINAL LAW

-​ Main source is criminal code

-​ For young people the youth criminal justice act
-​ Various statutes: Firearms Act, Canada Evidence Act, Controlled Drugs and Substances Act
-​ Quasi criminal law. Regulatory offences; Provincial Offences

CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA

-​ Statute: not a constitution, can be amended, revised and changed by the federal government alone
-​ Additions and amendments by parliment only: must comply w constitution
-​ Criminal code passed by parliament in 1892
-​ Pre criminal code, we were just using common law (judge made law) from the uk
-​ In 1892 they codified it and wrote it down

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

-​ Offences are classified in 3 ways:

-​ Indictable offences: most serious offences; jury trial avaiable; sentences range from discharge to
life
-​ Ex: murder, robery
-​ Summary offence: less serious crimes that dont have right to jury, have more simplistic trial
process, max sentence is 5 years minus a day
-​ Ex: theft under 5k, disturbance, harassment through calls
 -​ Hybrid offence: can be prosecuted as indictable or summary offence, decided by the crown
judge
-​ Ex: impaired driving, theft under 5k
-​ Must prove beyond a reasonable doubt - standard of criminal law
-​ Knew they were committed the act or they ought to have known
-​ Must prove the actus reus and mens reus

MAJOR AMENDENTS

-​ 1968-1969: got many changes in criminal law to bring it

up to current standards of society and moralities, got
repeal of provisions for homosexuality
-​ 2001: terrorism section added because of 9/11
-​ 2019: minor changes were substantive for the operation
of justice system

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS BILL C-51 (2019)

-​ Repeal of ‘zombie laws’ (dead in practice)

-​ Not wide scale review, took out laws striked down and provisions by courts
-​ Removal of:
-​ Acts intended to alarm Her Majesty, Dueling, Advertising “no questions asked”, Selling
crime comics, Witchcraft 33

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS BILL C-75 (2019)

-​ Minor but substantive changes

-​ Reclassifies number of offences
-​ Restrict preliminary inquiries
-​ Focus on bail
-​ Abolish peremptory challenges - specific challenges that crown and defence could exercise when
selecting a jury
-​ Repeal more zombie laws missed the first time
CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA: TIME FOR REFORM?

-​ Criminal law reflects societes values

-​ Rarely subject to systematic review and revision
-​ Sections added and amended in piecemeal fashion
-​ Risk of charges what is incentive for systematic reform

EXECUTIVE AND FEDERALISM JAN 12-18

EXECUTIVE AND FEDERALISM

-​ Policy environment: contextual factors that influence actors in the system and decision making about the
system (policy makers and deciders)
-​ Structural and demographic factors
-​ Talks about 2 structural factors (executive and federalism)
-​ Also about demographics (age, sex, ethinicity)
-​ Other parts of the policy environment: social attitudes, political ideologies, social movements
-​ Policy responses may occur when the public has outcries
-​ Federalism is the most pervasive constraint on what governments can and cannot do
-​ Shapes pretty much every aspects of criminal justice
-​ Federalism - means we have a system of 2 orders of government that have their own specific
constitutional forms of jurisdiction
-​ Executive is the core source of power (both political executive and the bureaucracy)

EXECUTIVE BRANCH

-​ The executive is comprised of crown (head of state - king of uk), and represented by governor general
and the PM and cabinet
-​ Executive branch is Responsible for admin. Of policy and execution of policy - legislature draft drafts it
-​ Key element is how much power we find in exec. Branch
-​ Ex. nothing coems to house of commons unless the exec. Branch wants it to
-​ Centralization of power is strong
POLITICAL EXECUTIVE: CRIMINAL JUSTICE

-​ Thinking about 3 memebrs of the cabinet

-​ 1. Minister - PM federal, or premier prov.
-​ 2. Attorney general/minisyter of justice
-​ 3. Solicitor general- minister of public safety fed, solicitor general ON
-​ In some provinces there is only 2 generals ti think about

SOLICITORS GENERAL

-​ Primarily responsible for police corrections and community safety, has fed and prov responsibilities
-​ Created out of dept of justice in 1966
-​ Prior the dept of justice also housed the solicitor general
-​ Wasnt a formal member of cabinet until the dept was created
-​ Federal general
-​ Domestic security, rcmp, correctional services, and CSIS (added 1984), office of critical
protection
-​ Emergency response and response to national disasters
-​ In 2003 changes to dept happened in response to 9/11 and SARS (new s. Added to criminal code)
-​ Important turning point for emergency response
-​ Main purposes:
-​ Responsible for creating and developing policy relating to police, corrections, parole and other
agencies.
-​ Create regulations (fine details added later by the minister, doesnt go thru parliamentary
process).
-​ Create policy handbooks.
-​ Ex: should rcmp wear bodycams, how to share info between police depts
-​ Providing cabinet with feedback from dept and agencies.
-​ If theres a problem the minister of public safety would bring it to the table.
-​ Must provide feedback from agencies under their jurisdiction.
-​ Must supervise agencies in the CJ and safety system
PUBLIC SAFETY CANADA

-​ All of these are supervised by solicitor general

-​ Dept of safety
-​ More responsibilities than other depts:
supervising agencies at arms length
-​ CBSA border service agency
-​ Responsible for enforcing laws at order
-​ CSIS service intelligence system
-​ Investigate and report on activities that may pose a threat on security of canada
-​ CSC correction service canada
-​ Administering the federal correction system - servicing required
-​ PBC parole board canada
-​ Responsible for granting, deny, or revoking parole
-​ RCMP royal canadian mounted police
-​ Office of invest
-​ Repsonibility to conduct ivestigations relating to inmate problems, without them we wouldnt
know what goes on inside
-​ RCMP review committee
-​ Labour relations with RCMP

CANADA BORDER SERVICES AGENCY (CBSA)

-​ Created in 2003
-​ Joined citizenship and immigration
-​ Enforce criminal law but arent officers
-​ Admin. Legislation that govern admissibility that govern people plants and animals into and outside of
canada
-​ Operate detention centres
-​ Since 2006 CBSA officers can be armed
-​ Main responsibilities:
-​ Criminal investigation and prosecutions
 -​ Gather Intelligence (like detective or officers)
-​ Border watch (respon. For securing borders)
-​ Responsible for administering more than 90 different types of law
-​ Regulation legislation and international agreements

CANADAIN SECUTRITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (CSIS)

-​ Created 1984 in response to MCDonald commission on RCMP activities

-​ Prior to this the RCMP was responsible > called RCMP security service
-​ In 1970s the october crisis took place
-​ The FLQ (group out of quebec) kidnapped a britsh cabinet member and murdered another
-​ In repsonse to this the RCMP made campaign to infiltrate harass and disrupt all aspects on group
in quebec
-​ RCMP broke into political offices and stole info, stole journalist records burned down
buildings from secret meeting
-​ From this we get the McDonald commission, they find that RCMP committed 400 illegal
break and entering cases targeting politcal forms of dissent, spied on idividuals like
tommy douglas
-​ Lots of activities were done but our national security service
-​ Some problems include:
-​ Had all powers of police but a large degree of independence and autonomy, very removed
from command structure of RCMP
-​ Became clear that out of mcd commission that canada needed a different approach to
national security
-​ CSIS is responsible for intelligence gathering analyzing and reporting threats to national service
-​ Completely civilian agency > works in canada but also internationally (canadian embassy)
-​ Do both undercover and non undercover work
-​ No restrict for information collection
-​ Over 2000 employees, 85 languages spoken
-​ Is Still subject to criticism:
-​ Have excessive secrecy and independence
-​ We dont want them to be without accountability
 -​ National security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians
-​ This group has highest amount of secrecy
-​ Aggressive tactics
-​ Judges of fed court have critized CSIS for not being fourth coming for what warrants will be
used for

MINISTRY OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL ONTARIO

-​ Created in 2002 - merged correctional service and solicitor (were separate depts before 02)
-​ Correctional services:
-​ provincial facilities less than 2yrs
-​ Probation and parole officers
-​ Public safety and security
-​ Fire and emergency services
-​ Scientific investigations
-​ Policing services
-​ All municipal services in ON
-​ ON provincial police
-​ Regulation of private security individuals/ agencies

SOLICITOR GENERAL: ISSUES

-​ Thinking about how much influence the SG should have over police and correctional facilities
-​ We want out SG to have an idea what police are doing to set policies for them
-​ We dont want our Solicitor policing
-​ We dont want ministers deciding where particular inmates are housed
-​ We want professional staff to be making these decisions
-​ Many problems with transparency and reform
-​ Jahn was women living with illnesses was placed in segregation for her entire period of sentence
-​ Makes complaint to on human rights commission - 1 year later agree to settlement
-​ That agreement had to do with how they do with segregation and women who have mental health
illnesses
 -​ In 2018 the human rights commison has to issue a thing to ensure that the commission
implements it
-​ Key issue: the distinction between policy and operations
-​ Dept is repsonible for policy, so where do we draw the line between creating policy and guiding
operations
-​ This matters in a democratic country because we dont want a gov telling police who or what to
investigate
-​ Think about the solicitor general, should they be held responsible for actions of frontline officers
-​ One responsibility of answering questions in dept

ATTORNEY GENERAL AND MINISTER OF JUSTICE

-​ Have two main roles: political member of cabinet and are cheif legal officer
-​ Fed minister: irif
-​ Prov minister: doug downy
-​ What do they do?
-​ Responsible for policies, all matters relating to the administration of justice
-​ Are legal advisors, provide legal advice to gov and agenmcies, conduct litigation on behalf of
gov, legislative services like drafting
-​ Often considered central agencies (a dept
that helps coordinate between departments),
an ex would be the privy council office
-​ John a mcdonald was the first minister of justice
-​ Ministry of justice and attorney general have two
different roles in one person ON MIDTERM
-​ Political role is the admin of justice
-​ Amendments to criminal code
-​ Must represent dept of justice to cabinet
-​ Must communicate directions from cabinet to department
-​ Attorney general role
-​ Provide legal advice to gov, including defending the gov
-​ Admin of justice, federal crowns, and admin of courts
 -​ Justice in a broad sense, can change policies and issue reviews
-​ A professional role not a political role
-​ There can be ministers of justice who are not lawyers
-​ We want concerns of attorney general heard at cabinet

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CANADA

-​ Responsible for many types of law

-​ Had only 7 lawyers until 1939
-​ Between 1939 and 1964 there were only 4 female lawyers
-​ Prior to dept of justice they gov would hire a group to do this
work

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE/ATTORNEY GENERAL

-​ Section 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867: prosecution of the

criminal law is the responsibility of provincial attorneys general
-​ Offences not in the Criminal Code
-​ Controlled Drug and Substances Act, Firearms Act
-​ The Minister of Justice/A.G. Canada does not personally conduct litigation
-​ Director of Public Prosecutions and Public Prosecution Service of Canada (established in 2006)
-​ Section 13 notices
-​ Requires director of public prosecutions to send notice to attorney general of they intend
to prosecute a matter that raises important questions of general interest
-​ Just keep attorney general informed on cases of significance
-​ Allows attorney general to become involved in prosecutions
-​ Most of the time they dont take further action, only formal line of communication
-​ Created to separate some persecution activities from the minster of justice and attorney general
-​ Act as prosecutor for every criminal offence
-​ An agency seperate from minister of justice and appointed for 7 year term and cant be re
appointed
-​ Point is to have independent from political and
-​ Just because they are seperate doesnt mean they arent correlated
 -​ Minister of justice does not personally conduct the litigation - meaning he doesnt actually go to court to
represent the gov
-​ Power is delegated to federal crown attorneys

MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ONTARIO

-​ Same dual roles as federal: legal and political

-​ Provincial work focuses on criminal prosecutions:
-​ S.92 const. Act 1867
-​ Carried out by crown attorney
-​ Each are will have crown attorney
-​ In ON crowns do not lay charges, once police lay on charges AG will do the rest
-​ Process is called screening, at this stage they can decide to withdraw charges, if they will support
person to be released from custody, or make an argument that the person should be reprimanded
to a trial
-​ Admin of justice
-​ Court services
-​ Legal aid (this is a separate board)
-​ Crown can provide police advice, but only police can lay the charges in ON

ARMS-LENGTH ORGANIZATIONS

-​ Legal aid:
-​ Not well funded, not everyone fits into the
requirements to get legal aid but many
cannot afford lawyers
-​ Funding comes from provice
-​ Alcohol:
-​ Part of AG job
-​ Special investigation:
-​ Investigates sexual assult allegations, possession of firearms etc.
IMPORTANCE OF JUSTICE PORTFOLIOS

-​ Minister justice of attorney general is an important role, usually given to a senior of a party that has
experience in cabinet
-​ Canadian pratice of bijuralism (practice of two legal traditions - civil law and common law)
-​ Justice ministers have become prominent members of cabinet when governments undertake large-scale
reform
-​ John Turner during Criminal Code reform in late 1960s
-​ Decriminlization of homosexuality (as discussed last lec.)
-​ He became PM, wasnt long running or successful
-​ Jean Chretien during constitutional negotiations in the early 1980s
-​ Was minister justice general in time period that gave us the charter
-​ Was a longer serving PM
-​ Expansions of role in post charter era
-​ S. 4.1 of dept, justice act
-​ Role to provide legal advice on how strong this legal section could be in court
-​ Where we see legal and political role conflict
-​ Respect for policy b4 policy considerations
-​ minister justices supposed to put constitution before policy considerations
-​ Gov policies are struck down by courts all the time
-​ Department of justice has important role in every piece of legislation
-​ Responsibility of resolving legal or charter based conflicts between departments
-​ If there are legal disputes between depts. they are the ones who have to resolve them

SNC-SCANDAL: WHAT HAPPENDS WHEN ROLES CONFLICT

-​ Eng firm based in quebec that was prosecuted for bribery in libia
-​ Charged with fraud and corruption - criminal charges
-​ 48 million dollars in payments to libya government
-​ If convicted they would be blocked for competing for federal contracts
-​ DPA (Deferred Prosecution Agreement) is available to corporations and spares them a trial and possible
conviction and allows them to just pay a penalty
 -​ Concern is that the organization employs over 9k people across canada
-​ Director of public prosecutions (head of prosecution service separate from AG) determined that SNC
Lavlin was not eligible
-​ The minister of justice got pulled into decision (jody was her name), shouldnt have been involved but bc
the corporation was so big and employed many people in QU she gets pulled into conversations with
justin trudeau and clerk or privy council
-​ Jody goes public and says she experienced inappropriate pressure
-​ This brings to life the shawcross doctrine
-​ Need to know this bc it demonstrates challenges when political role challenges other role

SHAWCROSS DOCTRINE: ATTORNEY GENERAL AND CABINET

-​ Constitutional convention
that tries to sort out
relationship between minister
of justice and the cabinet
-​ Says the AG must be guided
by public interest (is the prosecution in the public good)
-​ Cabinet can provide advice to AG, cant direct the AG with what to do (tell them what to do)
-​ AG has responsibility for decisions about prosecution
-​ Cabinet must not pressure the AG
-​ This doctrine relates to independence over prosecution
-​ Decision to prosecute is of AG alone
-​ This is court issue in SNC because two big individuals were doing more than just providing advice to
jody

SEPARATING JUSTICE FROM AG

-​ Relates to prosecutorial independence

-​ Want decisions to be made of public interest
-​ Quasi judicial role
-​ Shawcross doctrine
-​ One major question is should the minster of justice and the attorney general be two separate people
 -​ Other view is that this was a deliberate choice made by confederation
-​ Have perspective over the whole justice system
-​ Could argue that separatation these two roles will give us independence
-​ Judys story shows that there are consequences to actions

FEDERALISM AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY

FEDERALISM AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

-​ Division of powers: shared sovereignty between a central governing authority and constituent political
units
-​ Inter-state federalism: relations between two equal, autonomous and independent orders of government
-​ But not isolated actors!
-​ The delivery of many programs and services require partnership and cooperation
-​ Even though they are spererate does not mean they are sole actors
-​ Need both parts of ogv involved

DIVISION OF POWERS DISPUTES

-​ Provinces are responsible for funding a large portion of the criminal justice system
-​ Federal government responsible for creating legislation that have large impact on the provinces
-​ Ex: fed gov amends creiminal code, can create new mandatory minimums for incarceration. If
this happens people would switch from federal to provincial courts
-​ Can allow fed gov to seem very tough on crime

FEDERALISM AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

-​ Central area for dispute in criminal justice:

-​ Federal government - criminal law
-​ Can also enact laws for public order and safety
-​ Provincial governments - administration of justice; property and civil rights
-​ Provinces can enact legislation for public order and safety
-​ Impose fines, penalties and imprisonment
 -​ Firearms registry
-​ Difficult to decide what it is dealt with because it can fall under both sections fed and provincial
aspects
-​ Arguments that provinces could be responsible for this

NATIONAL UNIFORMITY VS. LOCAL JUSTICE

-​ Competing ideas at Confederation:

-​ National uniformity in the criminal law
-​ Local justice
-​ Some practices and systems already in place at Confederation
-​ Prosecution
-​ Municipal police
-​ Criminal law seen as a unifying force
-​ Creation of a check in the system
-​ Prior to confederation police were a thing, local prosecution, and private prosecution (individuals
prosecute other private citizens)
-​ Those who create the law are separate from those who enforce it

FEDERALISM AND PROSECUTION

-​ Historically it was a local private matter

-​ People would hire private prosecutors
-​ Not until 1857 that they passed the county attorneys act that tookn prosecution away from
private citizens
-​ Concern: what was going on in the US → each state has own criminal code (theres fed criminal
law that coems from each state), so they were looking at the system and strong state model, but
this wasnt attractive to fathers of confederation
-​ This is bc of the civil war
-​ Idea was that the definition of crime would be uniform across canada, but balanced with local
prosecution
-​ CJP was only area divided by provinces and federal government
PROVINCIAL POWER TO NOT PROSECUTE

-​ What happens when a provincial government does not agree with federal created criminal law?
-​ Wynne government in Ontario disagrees with Bill C-36
-​ Response to Supreme Court decision in Canada v. Bedford (2013)
-​ Became issue w Wynne government because her gov disagreed with the gov approach to dealing
with sex workers
-​ Eliminated much law regarding sex workers, essestinally criminalizing the buyers
-​ The gov in ON disagreed with this change saying it was unconstitutional
-​ Could a government avoid prosecuting a law it did not support?

FEDERALISM AND POLICING

-​ Idea is that allowiong provinces with decisions provide a check and balance on federal power
-​ Provinces do not prosecute federally created criminal law in a mechanical way
-​ Prosecutors have wide discretionary powers
-​ Based on these 3 things provinces dont have to prosecute criminal laws, but this poses a problem
because of these 3 things
-​ Objections?
-​ Increase arbitrariness
-​ Violate the rule of law
-​ Introduces politics
-​ Already considerable variance across provinces
-​ Federal criminal law as a baseline
-​ Shawcross Doctrine
-​ Reasonable likelihood of conviction
-​ Public interest
-​ Powerful example of the checks and balances made possible through the federal division of powers and
criminal law
RCMP CONTRACT PROVINCIAL POLICING

-​ Based on a cost share between province and federal government

-​ Fed gov pays 30% province pays 70%
-​ In ON and QU the provinces are 100% responsible for costs
-​ Benefits
-​ National presence and standards (relates to history of RCMP)
-​ Sovereignty
-​ Drawbacks
-​ Bureaucracy
-​ RCMP is one if the biggest police forces in the world, very slow to adapt to technology,
changes. So slow that there is problem with filling positions.
-​ Lack of local connection
-​ Other problem is that all RCMP officers are trained in one area. This can be a problem
because effective policing has to do with community relations and involvement (local
connection)
-​ Surrey, B.C.
-​ Voted to ge trid of RCMP as its police force in 2018
-​ Took 6 years to create the Surrey police force (active 2024)
-​ Alberta
-​ Also toyed with getting rid of RCMP as its police force, realised too expensive, instead
appointed sheriffs
-​ Grande Prairie successfully became the Grand Praire police (no longer part of RCMP)

FEDERALISM AND POLICING

-​ Provincial jurisdiction
-​ Ontario and Quebec only provinces to exclusively provide policing on a provincial scale
-​ Ontario Provincial Police est. 1909
-​ Sûreté du Québec est. 1870
-​ All other provinces rely on the RCMP to some capacity
-​ National policing functions
 -​ International crimes
-​ Matters that transcend provincial borders
-​ CPIC
-​ Tensions with contract policing
-​ History of RCMP and Indigenous peoples

POLICE POLICY AND GOVERNANCE JAN 19-25

POLICE AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

-​ Police are a symbol of the state we see in everyday lives

-​ Represent the legal order of state and does not change with governance
-​ Monopoly of legitimate force on citizens
-​ Actors that are first able to apply force against citizens
-​ Have legal authority to use lethal force
-​ Role in criminal justice policy
-​ Police organization, budgeting and relationship with other government and non-government
agencies are important questions for public administration
-​ Funded through public money - costs municipalities alot to fund police organizations
-​ Opinions are usually heard, respected
-​ Gov doesnt make enemies w police
-​ Looking at policy problems, police have a say in what policy should be
-​ Dont need to prove their expertise
-​ Role in shaping policy and soltuions to problems

KEY ISSUES TO CONSIDER

-​ Government direction
-​ Think about how gov can direst police, where to draw the line, why its a problem for gov to
control police
-​ Also think about opposites like when the gov doesnt contribute anything to police, or not setting
boundaries
-​ Must have independence, but also have gov and legal reps. Having a role
 -​ Autonomy from government
-​ Why is it desirable to keeppolice accountable?
-​ How are these competingdemands reconciled?

COSTS OF POLICING

-​ Largest budget item for municipal governments

-​ Average of 15% spent on policing
-​ $342.28 per capita spending on average
-​ Municipal gov largest budget
-​ Net increase in gross spending
-​ Half of municipalities increased budget yearly
-​ One of the first things they wanted to see was if the budget had increased, and big changes in
funding
-​ Half of municipalities increase this budget yearly
-​ Relationship between crime and police budgets
-​ Not a straightforward relationship, finds theres no strong relationship between net funding and
net crime rate
-​ Found that more funding Doesnt mean lower crime rates
-​ We dont know how cuts to bugdets influence the police force

IS POLICE TRUST IN JEOPARDY

-​ 2020 Angus Reid Poll

-​ Important to know how public thinks about police, they cannot function without public trust and
legitimacy
-​ Confidence in RCMP down 8% from 2018
-​ 17% of racialized people have ‘no-confidence at all’ in RCMP
-​ RCMP has less support compared to local detachments
-​ Think about what is going on at the same time that can be influencing results
-​ Also involved in 2 indigenous killings during this time period
-​ In Ontario:
-​ 59% have confidence in OPP
 -​ 52% have confidence in RCMP
-​ Public trust is not always eary to have and maintain, but has to be thought about
-​ This is another source of where police get their power

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR POLICING

-​ Charter of rights and freedoms

-​ S.8
-​ Provides protection against unreasonable search and seizure
-​ S.9
-​ The right against arbitary detention, detainment
-​ S.10
-​ In general, provides legal rights upon arrest
-​ Sections are limited by section 24.2
-​ s.24(2)
-​ Exclusion of evidence clause
-​ If police violate section 8, judges can use section 24 to exclude evidence
-​ Who has power to arrest?
-​ Everyone
-​ This means that ↴
-​ s.494(1) of CCC: Any one may arrest without warrant
-​ (a) a person whom he finds committing an indictable offence; or
-​ (b) a person who, on reasonable grounds, he believes
-​ (i) has committed a criminal offence, and
-​ (ii) is escaping from and freshly pursued by persons who have lawful authority to arrest
that person

POWER TO ARREST

-​ S.494(2): Anyone who is the owner or a person in lawful possession of property may arrest without
warrant a person whom he finds committing a criminal offence on or in relation to that property
-​ BUT:
 -​ S.494(3) Anyone other than a peace officer who arrests a person without warrant shall forthwith
deliver the person to a peace officer
-​ Citizens Arrest and Self Defence Act (2012)
-​ Power to make a citizen’s arrest within a ‘reasonable’ amount of time after a crime has
occurred – instead of catching perpetrator ‘red handed’ - no specified time frame, but this
comes from lucky moose case
-​ Lucky Moose Food Market arrest
-​ Customer would regularly steal from the store
-​ Store owner caught the guy stealing again the same day so he tied him up in the
back and called the police
-​ Got charged with assault and forceable confinement
-​ Gov responds by amending some codes to fix the national interest in this case for
charges layed
-​ Only allowed when it is not feasible for the police to make an arrest
-​ s.495 of the CCC:
-​ (1) A peace officer may arrest without warrant
-​ Warrent: is basically a permission slip granted by a judge that gives police permission to
arrest individuals
-​ Police can still arrest if they find:
-​ (a) a person who has committed an indictable offence or who, on reasonable grounds, he believes
has committed or is about to commit an indictable offence;
-​ (b) a person whom he finds committing a criminal offence; or
-​ (c) a person in respect of whom he has reasonable grounds to believe that a warrant of arrest or
committal is in force.
-​ Peace officers: people employed for the preservation and maintenance of the public pease or for the
service or execution of civil process
-​ Includes: CBSA, pilots, correctional officers, the mayor, conservation officers, and justice of the
peace (they hear most bail hearings)

POLICE

-​ Three types of government police organizations in Canada

 -​ Federal: Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
-​ Provincial
-​ Sûreté du Québec
-​ Ontario Provincial Police
-​ Royal Newfoundland Constabulary (selected areas)
-​ RCMP on contract are the provincial police in most provinces other than ON, QU, and
Newfoundland
-​ Municipal
-​ Guelph Police Service
-​ Toronto Police Service
-​ All enforce Criminal Code of Canada, provincial laws and municipal by-laws
-​ They can enforce provincial law, and also municipal by-laws

POLICE INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

-​ Fundamental concern in any country, epically

canada because it is democratic and has a rule
of law
-​ In canada bc we have limits on what police
can do, we need to think about the
relationship between independence and
accountability
-​ Accountability: oversight over the police
-​ Independence: police cannot be a law on to themselves, still have accountability

ABUSE OF POWER

-​ APEC Scandal (meeting of world leaders that happens in canada, some considered dictators)
-​ May be instance where we have too much political interference?
-​ Happend 1987 on UBC campus
-​ RCMP tasked with security and making a fence, keeping leaders and public separate
-​ Students that lived on campus told they cannot have posters up or seen, raises red flag because
we have right to lawful protest
 -​ Individuals found around the area before meeting were arrested
-​ RCMP later admits it was unfal for them to say this
-​ One individual arrested and held for 14 hours without charge, this person is a law student in late
30’s and also an army vet
-​ Community members and protestors pepper sprayed when protesting, because of this there is an
inquiry
-​ APEC Inquiry
-​ RCMP mishandled demonstrations
-​ Becomes clear that they did a bad job
-​ Found that the RCMP did not reach an expectable level of leadership
-​ Government interfered with police operations
-​ This is example of when the gov is front of mind and decisions of policing are falling secondary to them,
too much political influence
-​ G20 protests in toronto
-​ Civil rights violated
-​ Citizens arrested and subjected to unreasonable searches for just walking around the streets
during this time
-​ People boxed in by police, this was ordered by a police officer and not even senior officers had
control
-​ 1100 citizens arrested and were clear of wrongdoing
-​ Mass illegal activity by police
-​ Taught police i8mportant lessons about how to manage their powers
-​ Too much independence?
-​ Historic case in canada: biggest arrest ever taken place
-​ Also controversial because of the ‘kettling’ technique used by police
-​ Big concerns because we have right to peaceful protest

HOW CAN WE SORT OUT THE TENSIONS IN POLICE - GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

-​ Theoretical models
MODEL 1: FULL POLICE INDEPENDENCE

-​ “But in all these things he is not the servant of anyone, save of the law itself. No Minister of the Crown
can tell him that he must, or must not, keep observation on this place or that; or that he must, or must not
prosecute this man or that one. Nor can any police authority tell him so. The responsibility for law
enforcement lies on him. He is answerable to the law and the law alone.”
-​ (ex parte Blackburn 1968)
-​ This meand if police decide they dont want to enforce a certain law, they can, they are only
answerable to the law, not to citizens
-​ Comes from a UK decision where a challenge was made to decision by commissioner of police
-​ No master and servant relationship
-​ Law enforcement decisions
-​ Entirely up to police themselves: when to investigate, who to investigate, when to press charges
etc.
-​ Section 31(4) Police Services Act (Ontario): municipal boards “shall not direct the chief of police with
respect to specific operational decisions.”
-​ Relies on Professionalism and expertise of the police
-​ Know limits, know they are subjected to law, but we are not relying on another part of ogv to
hold them accountable
-​ Limited by the law
-​ Legal consequences still apply like charter rights
-​ EX: Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board [2007] 3 SCR 129
-​ Ex: Tort of negligence
-​ Hill was man investigated by police and arrested and tried, ended up being wrongfully convited
for robberies
-​ He sued police for being negligent in investigation, particularly a person who witnessed it was
asked to pick a line of people knowing the person who committed this was an indigenous person,
he was picked being the only visibly indigenous
-​ He was successful all the way to the supreme court, they said people can sue when police have
been negligent in investigation
-​ Shows us limits on police power under the law
 -​ Governments refer to police being completely independence, but this is not entirely true, this is said
because they do not want to held accountable for police wrongdoings

MODEL 2: CORE POLICE INDEPENDENCE

-​ Where we see some Direction of the responsible minister

-​ Can give some direction to police, but not over their core functions (decsions over law
enforcement, initiating a criminal investigation etc. but can ask for updates on situations)
-​ Immune from direction on core law enforcement functions
-​ Relies on confidence in the professionalism and expertise of the police
-​ Check:
-​ Crown Prosecutors
-​ Courts (when they exclude evidence)

MODEL 3: DEMOCRATIC POLICING (roach)

-​ Upholding principal of Ministerial responsibility

-​ Means minister responsible for police has to answer questions about what they have done in
HOC
-​ Distinction between seeking information and seeking to influence
-​ Dont want elected officials directing or influencing the police, we want them asking for
information about situations
-​ Important oversight mechanism
-​ Holds that ministers and those responsible to the people should determine policy
-​ Can create policies about how police can use their powers
-​ Relies on respect for the integrity of politicians
-​ Have to know when to not use their powers over police and when to stop
-​ They can ask questions but not influence
-​ This provides democratic oversight
-​ There needs to be some say in police policy
MODEL 4: GOVERNMENTAL POLICING

-​ “The Governor in Council may appoint an officer, to be known as the Commissioner of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police to hold office during pleasure, who, under the direction of the Minister, has
the control and management of the Force and all matters connected with the Force.” RCMP Act (1985),
5.(1)
-​ Says the RCMP under commissioner independence is not protected
-​ Independence is not protected
-​ Refuse blatantly illegal orders
-​ Model sees police as no different from any other civil servant
-​ Has limited faith in the expertise and professionalism of the police
-​ Holding that political masters can tell them what to do
-​ Not used in canada because we want separation between political leaders and police

-​ Models on the scale of independence and accountability⤴

REFORM

-​ Codify in legislation police independence for core functions of policing

-​ We dont have a definition of what police idependence is or what it protects
-​ Any ministerial direction to the police much be written and made public
-​ Subject to the discussion and scrutiny of cabinet and/or Parliament
-​ When gov provides direction to police it has to be written and public (trying to safeguard against
elected officials serving in their personal intrest)
 -​ Create police boards for the OPP and RCMP
-​ Important layer of non civilian oversight
-​ Non rcmp members dont have say over what happens

STRUCTURES OF CANADIAN POLICING

RCMP

-​ RCMP: north west mounted police (1873)

-​ March west to provide occupation over the wester territories of canada (this time CA claimed
land but some provinces not yet established)
-​ John a mcdonalds idea, based it off of the irish constabulary
-​ Saw that western territories required police presence bc american was trying to take land
(border not yet established)
-​ Part of his project of creating an east west railroad - must have governance in order to do
this
-​ 1905-1916:
-​ Not well poopulated governments and
didnt have funds to create other police
forces so they used the RCMP
-​ 1920:
-​ Domion police was national police at
the time
-​ 1938:
-​ RCMP Takes over provincial policing
-​ Post world war 2:
-​ RCMP expands again
-​ 1974:
-​ Around this time the october crisis is happening
RCMP: JURISDICTION

-​ Contract policing:
-​ Canadas National force
-​ Enforcing Federal laws
-​ National and border security
-​ Safety of state officials, dignitaries and foreign missions
-​ Forensic laboratories and criminal intelligence, Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC)
-​ Largely maintained by the RCMP
-​ Still have responsibility for VIP security
-​ In the canada we have the RCMP, in the us the FBI is the equivalent
-​ US: not providing state policing
-​ Tension between roles
-​ National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Report
-​ Skills required are different and theres two very different responsibilities
-​ (national mandate of the rcmp)Committee found that RCMP is poorly structured to meet canadas
-​ Bc RCMP has a big mandate its prevented from being effective
-​ Committee suggests that canada should have its one stand alone policing like the FBI
-​ National policing wing: has lost alot of officers because of not replacing people
-​

RCMP: CURRENT ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

-​ “culture encourages or at least tolerates misogynistic, racist and homophobic attitudes ... the problem is
systemic in nature and cannot be corrected solely by punishing a few bad apples” (Bastarache Report)
-​ Represents a large class action of female officers that sued the rcmp for cases of sexual
harrassment
-​ Over 2000 women in this case
-​ Over 3000 claims in case
-​ Largest settlement in canadian history (100 million)
-​ Paramilitary structure is another big problem here - creates problem of insubordinates that think
they can report to the higher rankings
 -​ Bc of settlement supreme court asked for an investigation of the rcmp
-​ Sexual harassment
-​ Big problem that the rcmp is facing recently
-​ Merlo-Davidson Settlement
-​ Bastarache report “Broken Dreams Broken Lives”
-​ Investigation of the rcmp
-​ Bastarache Finds that level of violence and sexual assault recored was shocking and RCMP was
aware of this for decades, syas the problem is systemic in nature and cant be corrected by
punishing a few bad apples, says rcmps structure allows these things to go in
-​ In response to this RCMP commits to creating an environment free of harrasment, creates new
policies, implements new features
-​ RCMP union
-​ Right to collective bargaining
-​ Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (2015 SCC 1)
-​ For the longest time the rcmp did not have a union, had to fight SCC to have its own form of
association, have contracts etc
-​ Recently ratified agreement with association and management which resulted in significant pay
raises
-​ Recruitment challenges (they pay significantly less than
OPP)
-​ Numbers have gotten worse over past years
-​ Each class that graduates out of depo (where theyre
trained) was about half normal amount (normal is
around 32)
-​ Systemic discrimination and racism
-​ Much of this relates to history with indigenous people
-​ Publicly released dash footage of RCMP aggressive arrest, arounf this time the NB RCMP killed
two people - all happening when we see outrage of police brutality in the US
-​ History with Indigenous peoples
-​ RCMP created with idea of asserting sovereignty over land
-​ Played role in colonizing the west, and enforcing parts of the indian act
 -​ Were used to remove indigenous children from homes, used as truancy officers for kids who ran
away from these schools
-​ RCMP has website that acknowledges and says their role in historic events

ONTARIO POLICING

-​ Ontario police governed by Comprehensive Ontario Police Services Act (2019)

-​ Replaced act from 1990
-​ Responsible for 50 municipal police forces
-​ Report to minister of safety and corrections
-​ Toronto police 5000 officers
-​ Guelph 200 members
-​ Municipal police services (approximately 50) and the Ontario Provincial Police
-​ Report to the Minister of Community Safety and Corrections
-​ Total cost: approximately $3 billion
-​ First nations police
-​ Responsible for policing first nations reserves and hold same powers of the force

ONTARIO POLICE SERVICES ACT

-​ COPS Act provides duties of police officers and what they are responsible are for, the code of conduct
for officers (overall structure and framework) empowers police service boards *WILL BE TESTED*
-​ Now: Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019
-​ Duties
-​ Code of conduct
-​ Governance framework
-​ Police boards:
-​ Hire the chief of police
-​ Only really deal with chief of police not other officers
-​ Provide policy priorities and objectives
-​ Confusion with where it begins and ends
-​ Cannot direct the chief with specific operational decisions
-​ Also considered the employer in bargaining issues with the police
POLICE SERVICE BOARDS

-​ Early boards political and ineffective

-​ Not interested in providing oversight, way for mayor of municipality to have control over police
→ changed overtime
-​ Political connections remain
-​ Key governance forum for policing
-​ Chief provides main representative on the board
-​ Legitimacy
-​ Why do we care about them?
-​ Key governance forum for police in ontario, provide buffer between mayor and council
and police offical/police themselves

POLICE BOARDS ACROSS CANADA

-​ Adequacy and effectiveness of policing:

-​ Crime prevention
-​ Victim assistance
-​ Public order maintenance
-​ Emergency response
-​ Administration and infrastructure
-​ What most people think of when you think of police boards
-​ Relates to the budget
-​ Lack of consistency and uniformity
-​ What happens in ON is different from other provinces
-​ Differences in ratio between elected and appointed members
-​ Every board has elected members, but all different in amount of elected members to the city
council
-​ BC only requires 1 member of service board

ONTARIO POLICE BOARDS

-​ Ontario is a combination of elected and appointed members

 -​ Vary on numbers, in ON appointed members must always outnumber the elected
-​ Also restrictions on who can serve on this: judges, lawyers, former officers cannot be on the
board
-​ No term limits in ON
-​ Have to be renewed everytime there is a new election but can stay on board as long as theyd like
-​ Training required
-​ ON requires training for members of the service board (cultural sensitivity, rights etc.)
-​ Problems:
-​ Diversity
-​ Perceived lack of power, e.g. Freedom Convoy
-​ Matters who is on this board because these people decide many things
-​ Police board is the daily oversight board
-​ Important problem: in practice members of the service board arent good at using their powers
-​ Concern with people who serve on these boards not knowing the power they hold
-​ Supposed to be oversight for chief of police

CURRENT ISSUES IN POLICE POLICY: USE OF FORCE

-​ Big issue is police use of force - has risen over past 20 years
-​ Based on reporting, police use of force has had a
substantial increase overtime
-​ Over 75 percent death cased by fire arms
-​ Second highest case of death is police restriant
tactics
-​ Third highest was tasers
-​ 2000-2010: average of 22.7 people died per year
-​ Rate per 100000 was 0.07 now 0.103
-​ 2011-2022: average of 37.8 people died per year

CURRENT ISSUES: DISPROPORTIONATE USE OF FORCE

-​ Disproportionate use of force applied to certain groups

→ black and indigenous people in canda
 -​ Green chart: 100 most recent deaths and pulled information based on race
-​ Blue chart: rate per 100,000 deaths based on race
-​ Racial disparities are reflected in how police use their force
-​ Shooting death: black 8.37, indigenous 18.5
-​ Together they mack less than 10 of the population, but they are over 25 percent od the police
deaths

CURRENT ISSUES IN CANADIAN POLICING

-​ Defund or divert resources to the police

-​ Argument to divert resources from the police → this means less spending on police, more
spending else where
-​ Comes from the fact that police have been given more responsibility in society (homelessness,
mental health, drug addiction), bc of this they have more interaction with troubled people
-​ Stregthen and improve oversight and accountability
-​ Alot of privacy concerns with body cameras
-​ Consequences for body cam footage
-​ Increase diversity
-​ Thinking about who our police are, types of people and the value they bring

POLICE OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY JAN 26 - FEB 1

POLICE OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

-​ Structures of police oversight

-​ Canada and Ontario
-​ Oversight and accountability in practice
-​ What happens when police commit crimes?
-​ The Mr. Big Undercover Technique

WHY IS ACCOUNTABILITY IMPORTANT

-​ Policing is based on consent

 -​ We are democratic with a constitution - this means we agree to some limits on liberties in
exchange for protection provided by law enforcement
-​ “the police are the public and the public are the police”
-​ Originates w sir robert peel - seen as founder of municipal police force
-​ Saying police are part of community and not separate from us and to work in service of
community goals
-​ Also speaks to our constitutional limits to government power - important for rule of law
-​ Rule of law here means those who enforce the law are also subject to the same law
-​ Building on the policing by consent model
-​ For model to work there must be public trust in police and their actions
-​ Important for the rule of law
-​ Legitimacy for the police
-​ When police violate the law they must be held accountable for actions
-​ Accountability helps us to maintain the law
-​ Accountability important for Public confidence in the police and the wider justice system
-​ This can be lost when police abuse this or do not follow the law
-​ Important for accountability and trust within the whole justice system

WHY IS IT CHALLENGING TO PROVIDE ACCOUNTABILITY?

-​ Policing is a low visibility activity

-​ What Police officers do is mostly out of view from their superiors
-​ We say low visibility bc much of what they are doing is not being seen by the public
-​ Evidence is difficult to obtain
-​ Even in era where dash cams and body cams are used, it doesnt make cases easy to prosecute
-​ Officers engaging in conduct usually turn off cam or damages footage
-​ Some officers arent required to be recording 24/7
-​ Police officers are viewed as credible
-​ Complainants may have to earn credibility, but officers already have established credibility
-​ Police are viewed as automatically credible from the CJS - this is challenging when thinking
about people victimized by police
 -​ Police can be investigating or arresting someone, this doesnt mean they have unlimited abilities
to act how they please
-​ Resources
-​ Police oversight bodies are basically police for police
-​ Not funded the same way police are - responsible for all police in ON, but budget is not funded
to same extent as parties they investigate
-​
-​ Police as criminal justice insiders
-​ Officers are criminal justice insiders - experts in evidence, rights, and CJS, they arent the average
person going through the justice system
-​ Complainants may be reluctant to report
-​ For example: SA cases
-​ When perpetrator is an officer, many dont report it
-​ Also challenging in small communities where everyone knows everyone bc they think they may
be treated differently once they report something

HOW CAN WE HOLD POLICE ACCOUNTABLE?

-​ Accountability:
-​ Internal: comes from within organizations themselves, have different mechanisms = ex. Chain of
command, also have internal affair units (investigating fellow officers)
-​ Public does not trust this, most are skeptical, and suspicious
-​ External:
-​ Courts and constitutitons: limits on powers through Charter, civil liability for officers,
-​ Media: reporting what police does, asking questions, uncovers many things the police do
that we dont know about
-​ Political: role of solicitor general, authority over police budgets
-​ Civilian oversight: broad term to
include oversight that is conducted by
non police officers
 -​ Goals to investigate conduct and deter conduct but also to influence public
perceptions of the police

SERIOUS INCIDENT RESPONSE TEAMS (SIRT)

-​ Almost every province has created a SIRT - broad category, on calls it SIU (same thing)
-​ Territories: rely on support from
-​ RCMP: subject to the provinces sert
-​ Also oversight body for the rcmp - they investigate serious injuries and deaths of the
police (criminal conduct commited by officers)
-​ Every province has a body except for PEI
-​ Every province that has a SIRT can investigate such cases
-​ Investigate serious injuries and deaths involving police
-​ Some agencies have jurisdiction over sexual assault, intimate partner violence, firearms
-​ Tallking about both on and off duty conduct
-​ Everytime an officer discharges a firearm on a person the SIU has to come and investigate
(including guns and tasers)
-​ Quebec: with first nations or inuit they must investigate

CREATION OF THE SIU

-​ The ON SIU is the first type of this agency

-​ These agencies come about because of protesting, and community organizing by group called
black action defence committee
-​ 1988: Killings of Lester Donaldson and Michael Wade Lawson
-​ Killed by toronto police after being shot at point blank range
-​ Police were called to investigate call that said he was holding hostages
-​ When police arriuved lester was alone but having a mental health episode
-​ Lester plunged at him, the police then shot him
-​ Officer charged with manslaughter and went to trial with jury- was not convicted
-​ 1989: Task Force on Race Relations
-​ Shot at after driving
 -​ Officers charged and aqquitted by a jury
-​ 1990: Creation of Special Investigations Unit (SIU)

CREATION OF SERIOUS INCIDENT RESPONSE TEAMS

-​ BC Independent Investigations Office (IIO)

-​ Created following the Braidwood Inquiry (2010) into the killing of Robert Dziekanski in
vancouver airport
-​ Customs officers call officers to intervene
-​ He resists arrest so officers taser him 5 times - very high profile at the time
-​ In response we get the Braidwood Inquiry which suggests we need dept like SIU to investigate
-​ Manitoba Independent Investigations Unit
-​ Created after the Taman Inquiry (2008)
-​ Struck to investigate what was percuieved as flawed investigation into officer who was
driving drunk and struck and killed woman
-​ Fellow officers interefered
-​ Given conditional sentence
-​ This inquiry highlights challenges for officers investigating officers
-​ Lack of public confidence in officers investigating themselves
-​ Public doesnt have confidence when police are asked to investigate themselves
-​ Alberta SIRT
-​ The prov gov created this as result of lobbying form chief of police

SERIOUS INCIDENT RESPONSE TEAMS: INDEPENDENCE

-​ Independence from police

-​ All agencies are led by lawyers - hold responsibility of deciding whether an officer should be
charged or not
-​ Some allow active police officers to conduct investigations or to assist investigations
-​ Only three – MB, BC, and ON, have a fully civilian team
-​ But! This includes retired officers
-​ Advantages and disadvantages of using retired officers
 -​ Can the agency charge the police?
-​ Some require prosecutors to charge officers
-​ ON has higher level of independence

SERIOUS INCIDENT RESPONSE TEAMS: LIMITATIONS

-​ Reactive
-​ Investigations are conducted after situations happen - after harm is caused
-​ Dont have miuch power in terms of prevention or deterrence
-​ After-the-fact accountability
-​ Providing accountability after something has happended
-​ Bc of this, their focus is on the individual
-​ Cant address policy, orgainzations culture etc.
-​ They are individual in focus bc they are a civilian body
-​ Lack of cooperation from officers
-​ Sometimes officers leave gap between when something haoopens and when something is
reported
-​ even when reported there is a lack of cooperation from fellow officers to give info to
oversight body this is what we call blue wall silence
-​ Blue wall of silence
-​ Policing is brotherhood, you put your life on the line for the person beside you, you must
be able to know your partners will not turn their back on you in anyway
-​ Research shows female officers are also discouraged from this

POLICE COOPERATION: WOOD V. SCHAEFFER 2013 SCC 71

-​ SIU had to sue officers all the way to the SCC in order to obtain police notes
-​ 2 officers shoot and kill people
-​ SIU had to investigate, they say use of force wasnt excessive
-​ Said they had difficulties with witness officers, they said not to write notes until they spoke to
the union officer
 -​ They found that instead of writing notes right after it happened, they had their notes vetted by the
union rep
-​ Basically saying the investigation was limited bc officers refused to cooperate
-​ Problems of police cooperation with criminal investigations into their conduct
-​ SIU conducts two investigations into use of lethal force by OPP
-​ Problems with investigation
-​ Notes not independent or reliable
-​ Family of deceased seeks declaration from the court
-​ Supreme Court of Canada:
-​ Wood v. schaeffer: Witness and subject officers must not consult with lawyers until they have
completed their notes
-​ Decided that cops must submit notes before speaking with a lawyer bc they dont want lawyers
influences how or what they include in their notes

THE CRIMINAL LAW STANDARD

-​ Criminal law standard is low for officers

-​ Standard of criminal fault
-​ Section 25(1) plus guidance from the Supreme Court
-​ Section 25(1) of the Criminal Code, officers to only use as much force as necessary
-​ Authorizes officers to use as much force as necessary
-​ Officers subject to privileges given to them within the criminal code
-​ R v. Nasogaluak (2010):
-​ “Police actions should not be judged against a standard of perfection ... police engage in
dangerous and demanding work and often have to react quickly ... their actions should be judged
in light of these exigent circumstances”
-​ Exigent: emergency circumstances
-​ Theyre saying that we should give police leeway bc we dont know how hard the job is, its easy
for public to say they should have done this and that, but the supreme court is saying that we
arent looking for a standard of operfection
-​ This means it creates a higher bar to prosecute officers (given leeway and different standard)
then the public is
 -​ Creates a high standard to charge and prosecute a police officer
-​ Should we have higher expectations for police officers?
-​ Doesnt consider if theres better ways for officers to do their job
-​ If officer doesnt get charged, it illigitmizes public strust

POLICE OVERSIGHT IN CANADA

-​ Law enforcement complaints agency (LECA)

-​ Special investigations unit (SIU)
-​ Newest agency- Inspectorate of policing

LAW ENFORCEMENT COMPLAINTS AGENCY (LECA)

-​ Formerly known as the “Office of the Independent Police Review Director” (OIPRD)
-​ They investigate police misconduct, they cannot lay criminal charges
-​ Jurisdiction
-​ Civilian oversight body that has jurisdiction over eniter province of ON, as well as special
constables, first nations police - basically any law enforcement person
-​ Public interest
-​ They can initiate investigations on their own without complaints filed
-​ Can look at entire events, or particular police policy
-​ Some examples of systemic reviews cinducted include:
-​ e.g., G20, written policies on strip searches, Thunder Bay Police, DNA gathering, people in
crisis
-​ Big difference is that LECA DOESNT investigate criminal conduct it DOES investigate conduct of
officers
-​ Conduct of an officer
-​ Policies of police departments
-​ Services of police departments
-​ They can investigate the following listed below:
-​ Discreditable conduct: using assaulting language,
opressing to superior rank, false statement, swearing
 -​ Received over 6000 complaints → 97% of complaints are sent back to force to deal with
-​ 46 complains abt policy, 5000 for conduct

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT

-​ It is a Independent civilian law enforcement agency

-​ Conducts criminal investigations
-​ serious injury, death, allegations of sexual assault or
involve the firing of a firearm
-​ Jurisdiction is entire province of Ontario
-​ Agency of the Ministry of the Attorney General
-​ Agency under AG. meaning they have independence
-​ Investigators civilian and police backgrounds
-​ Looking at trends over 5 years, consistent that the most common incident is custody injuries
-​ This means theyre under police custody when they are injured - ex. Showed into wall, pushed
onto ground, smash face on ground, also includes injuries taking place in the police stattion
-​ Second highest is sexual assault complaints: can be in act of regular policing - inappropriate strip
searchs or making innappropriate comments during search
-​ Third is firearm injuries

INSPECTORATE OF POLICING

-​ Operate at arms length away from SG - Operational independence from Solicitor General
-​ All independent from police forces
-​ Came into force April 2024 with the Compliance with Community Safety and Policing Act
-​ Job to ensure compliance with policing act
-​ They are providing oversight for entire policing system - specifically alot for police oversight boards
-​ Governance
-​ Police depts, but also service boards
-​ The difference is they have jurisdiction ove service boards
FUNCTIONS

-​ Complain investigations: looking at an entire

police force/service, or service board, not looking
at individual investigations of officers
-​ Inspections of police services and boards: they can
launch investigations of not up to par
-​ Data sharing: still new so no data
-​ Advisor: trying to professionalize police service boards and provide resource

INVESTIGATION EXAMPLE

-​ Currently investigating Thunder Bay Police Service and the Thunder Bay Police Service Board
-​ Very comprehensive - on basis of complaints on thunder bay police and service boards
-​ Evaluate how missing persons and death investigations are conducted
-​ They have been subject to several oversight investigations- problem is that thunder bay policed
have been accused of not investigating first nations death or missing person cases
-​ Criticized for how it handles deaths of First Nations people
-​ Accused for systemic racism and stereotyping
-​ Possible consequences?
-​ He can appoint outsider to administer whole police service, can dissolve entire police service

POLICE OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN PRACTICE

-​ What happens when police commit crimes?

-​ RCMP’s Mr.Big undercover technique

SIU STUDY: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN POLICE BREAK THE LAW

*KNOW GENERAL TRENDS NOT EXACT PERCENTAGE AND NUMBERS*

-​ Studied SIU investigations over 15 year period

-​ Serious injury, death, firing of fire arm etc.
 -​ What kind of officers were involved?
-​ Over 97% of charged officers are male
-​ Almost 13 years of service
-​ Not talking about rookies all were older
-​ All held rank of constable or detective
-​ Most incidents took place on duty (on duty conduct= so SIU can investigate)
-​ Tend to be higher ranked (sargent 15+yrs) 30%
-​ 44.5% off duty
-​ Complainant conduct
-​ Call it this bc not all cases are prosecuted
-​ Frequently male 63% and usually young
-​ 34% under age of 40
-​ Over 40% of cases the complaintant was involved in criminal activity = resisting arrest, fleeing
arrest, or being violent
-​ Sexual assault cases are different
-​ Complaintants are female and young (almost 94% are female)
-​ About 74% are under the age of 30
-​ Data on race
-​ People of colour are more likely to experience police violence
-​ Comes as a reaction from police killing to black people
-​ SIU just began to collect data on race
-​ Some research done on toronto SIU cases
-​ Human rights commision study- found that black people are disproportionately the most
of complainant
-​ We see over representation of black people in SIU investigations

WHAT ARE THE CHARGES?

-​ Sometimes SIU gets cases they choose not to investigate

-​ This is bc there isnt enough evidence, over complaints etc.
-​ Fully investigated cases:
-​ Most common is assault
 -​ Assault cases almost always happen on duty
-​ When officer is charged with assault, that means force used wasnt porportionate to the
circumstances
-​ Ex: officer dispatched to drugstore to investigate alleged assault, upon arrival
officer attempts to arrest complainant, footage shows officer shoving person into
the gate
-​ Officer charged with assault bc the force used was unproportionate to the
circumstances
-​ Second is sexual assault
-​ Only 1.6 percent resulted in a conviction sentence
-​ SIU only charge 7 percent of cases
-​ Substantiation rate: means they only lay charges to about 6% of investigations
-​ Shows the quality of complaints they are getting (some people dont have grounds for complaints)
-​ Also speaks to their effectiveness

DEATH INVESTIGATIONS

-​ We must understand what happens in police involved deaths

-​ Includes when police are using lethal force, and cases where police are called in intervene in
suicides
-​ When someone dies in police presence
-​ Look at if police are following policy, using proper training, proper steps to intervene
-​ We find that:
-​ General mental health disability: 10.7%
-​ Suicidal mental health disability: 25.2%
-​ Threaten or assault police/others: 34%
-​ Possess weapon: 49.5% Source: The Conversation
-​ Find that police deaths half of the time involve a firearm

SIU INVESTIGATIONS ARE CHALLENGING

-​ Not normal criminal investigations

 -​ This is bc they arent comparable to normal cases
-​ Criminal justice insiders
-​ Officers are the center of investigations and know how to conduct themselves in an investigation
-​ Also more likely to have defective defnse council
-​ Circumstances and credibility
-​ Officers get more credibility then complainants
-​ Who has credibility and who has to earn it poses a challenge in deciding cases
-​ Blue wall of silence
-​ Officers will not snitch on eachother
-​ This makes cases difficult to investigate

APPLYING METHODS OF POLICE OVERSIGHT TO MR.BID

-​ Various types of police oversight

-​ Were looking at a particular type of oversight through the mr.big
case

THE RCMP’S MR. BIG TECHNIQUE

-​ How do these multiple and overlapping accountability mechanisms function in practice?

-​ Why Mr. Big?
-​ Criminal investigation is a core/routine police function
-​ This is the type of work policeshould be experts in
-​ High profile cases
-​ Almost always homicide cases, sometimes missing person cases
-​ Pressure to produce results
-​ This means police have more pressure in solving these cases
-​ Unique challenges of oversight in undercover investigations
-​ Difficult to d this when people dont know they are dealing with police officers
-​ Undercover cases are difficult because you cant identify officers clearly

HOW DOES IT WORK?

-​ 1. target in mind
 -​ Have an idea who the suspect is but havent gotten to charge them
-​ They study the person to get a sense of who they are, their social status, relationships, economic
status etc.
-​ 2. Make contact with suspect
-​ Enroll in the same school, get the same job
-​ Create fake contests to gain more information
-​ Pick people up from bars if they think romantic interest will be easy to get close
-​ 3. Involve suspect in organization
-​ They show suspect that you want to be friends with them - get them into concerts, meet famous
people, skip lines, have money etc.
-​ Gradually they introduce target to criminal organization
-​ Make it clear that they have connections and get get in contact with them
-​ Will ask them to move packages, pick up packages to portray certain image - its all fake
-​ Make it clear that it is an amazing life style to encourage suspect to join
-​ 4. Introduce to mrbig
-​ They say to be full member of crew we need to know if theres dirt on you so they know what
theyre getting involved with
-​ Also make it clear they can solve these problems for you through dirty cops
-​ They make them tell them everything - police intrest in them, warrants, events of criminal acts
-​ Can take up to 50 officers
-​ Each investigation costs about 155k
-​ This technique raises questions and concerns about accountability

MR BIG

-​ Concerns and questions:

-​ False confessions
-​ Are we getting false confessions?
-​ Many confessions are fake (myth of psychological interrogation)
-​ Ciritques of mr.big believe it is manufacturing false confessions
-​ Wrongful convictions
 -​ Argument is that your more likely to get false confessions through this then normal
investigations
-​ Lower self preservation skills
-​ They think theyre dealing with friends so they get comfortable and dont filter the same way in
which they would with an officer
-​ Self preservations kills not present in undercover investigations
-​ Right to remain silent does not apply
-​ Normally this would apply, but in mr.big they dont know they are talking to officers and
therefore dont need to tell them of their rights
-​ Undercover officers can threaten suspect
-​ They can stage fake assaults to show they arent scared to use violence
-​ They can threaten suspects
-​ Great deal of discretion and little oversight

JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT PRE-HART (2014)

-​ In pre hart era courts have provided little about what officers can do
-​ Right to remain silent
-​ Only applies after detention
-​ Have to be in control of the state
-​ Persons in Authority
-​ If you are confessing to a person of authority they have to be more protections in place
-​ Usually aligned with the state
-​ Abuse of Process/Dirty Tricks

R.V. HART 2014 2 S.C.R. 544

-​ Leading supreme court precednt on mr.big technique

-​ Nelson Hart was suspected of murdering his twin daughters
-​ He has taken daughter to park and one girl falls into the lake, he rushes home to get his wife
leaving the other daughter there
-​ Upon arriving back, both daughter are deas
 -​ He said he didnt know how to swim so his first thought was to get his wife who can
-​ Not enough evidence to charge Hart
-​ No witnesses
-​ Two years after the murder, RCMP initiate a Mr. Big sting
-​ They study him and find poor education, very socially isolated
-​ Undercover officer approaches him asking for help to find his sister
-​ Hart is payed for helping the officer
-​ Hart is recruited into a ‘criminal organization’
-​ Know he is unemployed so the officer offers him a job
-​ Hart takes it
-​ Hart participates in various simulated crime scenarios
-​ Enjoys the financial rewards that come with working for the organization
-​ Tells the officers he considers them as brothers and best friends
-​ Operation continues for two more months
-​ Hart can only participate if he gains Mr. Big’s approval
-​ Background check reveals murder investigation
-​ Syas they have a big job coming up, but he has to tell them what will come up in a background
check on him
-​ Hart confesses again and describes murders
-​ He says his reason was that he thought social services were going to take his daughter away from
him so he killed them
-​ Investigation took four months
-​ Hart was paid $15,720
-​ 63 scenarios
-​ Ends up at the supreme court
-​ Concerned with this →
-​ Case is taken from the SCC
-​ Acknowledge that he didnt have a job so this was alot of money form him
-​ He was socially isolated so this offered him friends
HART TEST FOR MR.BIG CONFESSIONS

-​ The SCC says the following:

1.​ Any confession made by the accused during the Mr. Big scenario should be treated as presumptively
inadmissible.
○​ Unless Crown can establish on the balance of probabilities that the probative value of the
confession out weights the prejudicial effect
2.​ Misconduct by the police that offends the community’s sense of fair play and decency will amount to an
abuse of process and warrant the exclusion of the confession
○​ Police cannot capitalize on the vulnerabilities of the accused
○​ If accused is vulnerable you cant use mr.big

IMPACT OF R. V. HART

-​ Mr.big is still legal, but syas there are still limits on what you can do
-​ Supposed to limit conduct of officers - shouldnt target vulnerable people
-​ Vulnerable people may be more likely to lie and make up stories in order to obtain the
prize offered to them
-​ Test applied to Hart:
-​ All of the defendant’s confessions must be excluded from evidence
-​ Mr. Big post-Hart
-​ Still a legal tactic, Requires officers keep more detailed records
-​ Limits the conduct of police in future investigations

IMPACT OF R. V. HART: IFTENE AND KINNEAR 2020

-​ 2 scholars did analysis of cases where mr.big applied

-​ 61 cases where Hart precedent was applied
-​ In 56% of cases where confession was admitted, the accused had a noted vulnerability
-​ They say that in most cases the suspect has clear vulnerabilities
-​ RCMP did not collect enough information to provide proper accountability
-​ Also find the RCMP is not keeping enough detailed notes on the investigations
 -​ What about the cases where officers did mr.big, but werent prosecuted?
-​ They say there are more cases than that bc of this
-​ Hold back and confirmatory evidence
-​ This means the person confessing has given a specific detail that only the person who committed
the act would know
-​ If confessions contain hold back information (info not included in the media) we are more likely
to have a true confession

IMPACT OF R.V. HART

-​ Hart created a great deal of discretion and flexibility

-​ They see that there are many inconsistencies in the courts application
-​ Courts didnt include it as a law - treated as a common law case
-​ Had it been a sec 9 or 10 case the hart case wouldve had a more significant impact
-​ Negligible impact of Hart
-​ They say confession admitted in 51 cases, excluded in 3 cases bc of hart test
-​ Conclude hart framework hasnt made a difference at all bc its not being properly used
-​ “What makes Mr. Big efficient ... is also what makes it legally and ethically problematic: the
exploitation of individual vulnerability” (Iftene and Kinnear, 2020)

READINGS MAIN POINTS

ANDRESEN

-​ Focuses on crime severity index (CSI)

-​ Weights, increases in crime
-​ We have to be careful how we interpret crime severity index’s
-​ Crime prevention suggestions: invest in social welfare programs and social services

GARDNER

-​ Crime driven by social trends beyond control of public officials, law enforcement, government, etc.
-​ Focuses on ways to predict crime rates and trends:
 -​ 1: Responsibility for crime trends depends on whether trends are good or bad.
-​ 2: The reaction of justice system's critics to crime statistics depends on the direction which those
statistics are headed.
-​ 3: Following a major, violent incident, discussion of negative crime data increases; following a
major, violent incident, discussion of positive crime data ends.

ISMALI

-​ Attempts to bring coherence and visibility to the study of Canadian justice policies.
-​ Goal to provide foundations from which individuals can discuss trends, ideas, and controversies in an
informaed manner
-​ Crime disrupts relationships causing harm to people and property invoking feelings and emotional
responses
-​ Crime is neither easily explained or addressed
-​ Discusses key concepts in the CJS, day to day operations,
-​ Covers influence of media, policy changes, broder challenges, charter, jurisdictions etc.

RIDDELL

-​ Discusses that political scientists pay more attention to criminal justice than what is thought, but theres
room for greater contribution
-​ Political science literature says criminal justice has 3 strengths that can be built by future
research:
-​ 1. Scientists are well positioned to study impact and influences of poly on CJ
-​ 2. Can use their study ti bear on questions re. The limits of public authority in the CJ
context
-​ 3. Contains methodological, theoretical and normative perspectives on CJ compared to
what is produced by scholars in other fields
-​ Outlines reasons for optimism that the discipline may build upon in its existing contributions
-​ This review focuses on core elements including: police, courts, correctionis, justice dept., and public
safety dept. As well as criminal justice polisy issues
 -​ Integration and collaboration with criminologists and sociologists, along with a commitment to
ambitious data collection, could elevate the field.

MCLELLAN

-​ Discusses minister of justice and attorney general, their roles, conflicts with positions
-​ Minister of justice’s position: attorney general of canada
-​ Member of cabinet
-​ Fed. office holder has legal training - important to continue this tradition
-​ Its accurate to say two separate positions are held by one person
-​ Both positions are responsible for promoting and protecting the rule of law
-​ SCC says rule of law is promised to be “a stable, predictable and ordered society” where individuals are
protected from arbitrary state action
-​ Meaning state can only use power according to the law
-​ equires the state to be accountable to the public for how it uses those powers

BAKER

-​ Challenges in Federalism:
-​ Criminal justice federalism combines national law-making and provincial administration, leading
to complexity.
-​ Performance is mixed: pragmatic accommodations overcome doctrinal rigidity but fail to address
specific injustices.
-​ Indigenous Canadians remain disproportionately impacted, reflecting broader systemic
inequities.
-​ Discusses federalism in canada

HEINMILLER

-​ a remarkable number of structural and other contextual factors are at play in the firearms policy-making
environment.
 -​ these are factors that may influence poli-cy-makers, such as how the electoral and party systems
create incen-tives for political leaders to emphasize issues that strengthen their regional appeal,
especially in Quebec.
-​ The activities of advocacy groups and the institutional features that facilitate them, such as
parliamentary committees, are the primary concern of the ad-vocacy coalition framework in
-​ While the policy environment is complex and suggests that many factors influence firearms policy, our
goal in the chapters that follow is to test for such influences in a rigorous manner by applying leading
public policy theories and frame-works, and in the process assess the applicability of such theories to
policy-making in a novel and Canadian context.
-​ Focus of Chapter:
-​ Introduces the "policy environment" for firearms policy.
-​ Contextual factors influencing decision-making.
-​ Examples drawn from Canadian and international gun control studies.
-​ Policy Environment: Refers to external factors, distinct from agent-level factors like personal
preferences.

KENT

-​ Canadian policing requires reform to reduce violence, improve governance, and enhance effectiveness.
-​ Overpolicing of marginalized communities coexists with their underprotection from violence.
-​ Systemic reviews, public scrutiny, and ongoing misconduct highlight the need for change.

Key Issues in Canadian Policing

1.​ Discriminatory Practices

○​ Indigenous, Black, and racialized communities face excessive policing while lacking adequate
protection.
○​ Women and vulnerable populations disproportionately impacted.
2.​ Lack of Effective Oversight
○​ Multiple review mechanisms exist, but they fail to prevent misconduct effectively.
○​ Governance issues arise due to fragmented jurisdiction and lack of accountability.
3.​ Financial and Structural Concerns
 ○​ Police budgets remain high, while alternative public safety investments are lacking.
○​ Calls for reallocating resources to mental health and social services have gained traction.
○​ Greater integration with community-based services is needed.

Conclusion

-​ Structural reform is necessary for Canadian policing to become more equitable and effective.
-​ Governance, funding, and systemic overhauls are crucial for long-term improvements.
-​ Public engagement and democratic oversight are vital to defining policing priorities and accountability.

LAMING AND ERICK

-​ Police governance and oversight come in many forms, such as: independent civilian agencies that
investigate cases where police cause the death or serious injury of a citizen commissions that may
investigate citizen complaints against the police and local boards that govern police services by creating
policies, approving budgets, and hiring police chiefs
-​ Police governance involves civilian governing bodies:
-​ Bodies endure long term and deal with local police issues → best known as civilian governing
authorities
-​ Text argues the current framework of municipal police governance requires review and modernization
by provincial and territorial governments to establish best practices and meaningful standards of civilian
oversight of law enforcement.
-​ Sec. 2 analysis applies field theory and institutional theory to interpret contours of police board
-​ Sec. 3 analysis conducts policy revoew of legislation to compare PSBs in canada
-​ Identifies functions to PSBs found in police legislation to illustrate variations and
shortcomings of local police governance bodies across country
-​ Functions: 1) the ratio of elected and appointed board members; 2) term limits for
PSB members; and 3) training required by PSB members

PUDDISTER+MCNABB

-​ Policing is bound by rules of law

 -​ Concerns heightened for communities with history of distrust due to over-policing and under-protection
(black and indigenous communities)
-​ Accountability benefits officer bc it promotes professional integrity, trust, and better relationships with
the community
-​ Oversight bodies are modelled after Ontario’s Special Investigations Unit (SIU)
-​ Common Charges Against Police Officers
-​ Excessive Use of Force:
-​ Sexual Assault:
-​ Officer-Involved Deaths or Near-Deaths:
-​ Police oversight is a crucial component of justice system accountability.
-​ The current system exhibits significant gaps in transparency, effectiveness, and public engagement.
-​ Research underscores the need for systemic reforms to improve police accountability and enhance
public trust.

PUDDISTER

-​ Overall Assessment: While civilian-led oversight agencies are present in almost all provinces, there is
significant variation in their structure, independence, and transparency. These agencies are essential for
holding police accountable for serious incidents and maintaining public trust in the rule of law.
-​ Challenges to Effectiveness: Barriers such as limited cooperation from police officers, variations
in statutory independence, and difficulty in prosecuting misconduct hinder the full potential of
these agencies.
-​ Policy Recommendations: Greater transparency, consistent annual reporting, and enhanced
cooperation are essential to improving the effectiveness of police oversight agencies, especially
given the rising rates of police-involved deaths and public demand for greater accountability.

R. V. HART 2014

-​ Nelson Lloyd Hart was accused of murdering his twin daughters in 2002.
-​ The police suspected him but lacked evidence to charge him.
-​ In 2004, police initiated a "Mr. Big" undercover operation, involving Hart in a fictitious criminal
organization.
 -​ Over four months, Hart participated in 63 scenarios and was paid over $15,000.
-​ Undercover officers befriended Hart, and he eventually confessed to the murders during an interrogation
by the leader of the organization ("Mr. Big").
-​ Hart was arrested after taking an undercover officer to the scene of the drowning and explaining how he
pushed his daughters into the water.
-​ Decision:
●​ The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal of the Crown and upheld the decision of the
Court of Appeal.
●​ The Mr. Big confessions were excluded due to their lack of reliability and the risk of prejudice.
●​ The case was returned for a new trial, but it was uncertain whether there was enough admissible
evidence for a conviction without the confessions.
-​ Majority Opinion (McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Moldaver, and Wagner JJ.):
●​ They agreed with the need for a new rule governing the admissibility of "Mr. Big" confessions.
●​ Emphasized the importance of preventing wrongful convictions and protecting the accused from
coercive police tactics.
-​ Dissenting Opinion (Cromwell J.):
●​ Agreed with the majority's analysis of the legal framework but suggested that the admissibility of
Hart’s statements should be determined at a new trial under the newly proposed framework.
-​ Additional Opinion (Karakatsanis J.):
●​ Raised concerns about the broader implications of "Mr. Big" operations on human dignity and
the principle against self-incrimination under the Charter.
●​ Argued that the majority's common law rule did not fully account for the broader concerns
regarding state conduct in eliciting confessions.
-​ New Evidence Rule: The Court introduced a new rule, making confessions obtained through these
operations presumptively inadmissible unless the Crown can prove their reliability and that they
outweigh the prejudicial effects.

IFTENE+KINNEAR

-​ Three Dangers of Mr. Big Confessions

-​ Risk of Unreliable Confessions
 -​ Prejudice Against the Accused
-​ Coercive and Abusive Police Practices
-​ 2 pronged test for admissibility:
-​ First Prong: Reliability and Probative Value vs. Prejudicial Effect
-​ Presumption of Inadmissibility: Mr. Big confessions are presumed inadmissible unless
the Crown proves their probative value outweighs their prejudicial effect.
-​ Second Prong: Abuse of Process (Coercion and Oppression)
-​ Burden shifts to the accused to prove police misconduct.
-​ Factors indicating coercion:
-​ Direct or veiled threats of violence.
-​ Exploitation of vulnerabilities (mental health, addictions, youth, socio-economic
disadvantage).

-​ Conclusion
●​ While the Hart framework introduced safeguards, its application has been inconsistent.
●​ Vulnerabilities remain central to Mr. Big operations but are often minimized in judicial rulings.
●​ The framework’s reliance on traditional legal reasoning does not align with modern
psychological research on coercion.
●​ Future research should examine the long-term impact of Hart on wrongful convictions and police
investigative practices.
-​