Nigerian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 3 No.

2, 2021 (ISSN: 2734-3146)

HAPPINESS AS THE END OF HUMAN ACTION IN THOMAS

AQUINAS MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Dr. Chidiebere Obi

Department of Philosophy,
Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka
Email: [email protected]
&
Andrew Mozia
Department of Philosophy,
Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka
Email: [email protected]

Abstract
It is being increasingly recognized that virtue ethics is central to Aquinas’s moral thought and to his
consideration of the characteristic capacities and achievements of human nature. Aquinas sees ethics as
having two principal topics: first, the ultimate goal of human existence, and second, how that goal is to
be won, or lost. Aquinas maintains that happiness doesn’t lie in riches, honors, fame and glory, power,
bodily endowment, pleasures any endowment of soul, and any created good. For him, however, the
essential respect in which God constitutes our blessedness is in direct vision of the divine nature. Happy
is he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss. Happiness is the attainment of the last
end. The essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect; happiness is joy in truth. Aquinas
maintains that the ultimate end of human beings, their perfected happiness, cannot be any finite or
created good, since no finite or created good could finally and completely satisfy human desire. Only
God could be that good, the God whose existence and goodness can be known through philosophical
inquiry. Thus, this work through the method of hermeneutics reads Aquinas’ Summa Theologica and
unveils man’s capacity for self-determination by free choices as the springboard through which
Aquinas’ doctrine of happiness is anchored and concludes that happiness lies in the service to humanity,
that is, the internal tranquility one gets through the services rendered to alleviates mankind.
Keywords: Human Action, Happiness, Ultimate end, and Aquinas’ Cardinal Virtues; Prudence,
Courage, Justice, and Temperance

Introduction
There are two ways in which we can speak about the ultimate end: in terms of what it means for
something to be an ultimate end, and in terms of the thing that meets that description. In terms of what
it means for something to be an ultimate end, all human beings agree in desiring the ultimate end
because they all desire to attain their own perfection, and that is what is meant by “ultimate end,”.But
in terms of the thing that meets that description, human beings do not all agree in their ultimate end:
some desire wealth as their full and complete good, whereas others desire pleasure and others desire
something else, just as what is sweet is pleasant to everyone’s taste, but some people prefer the
sweetness of wine, others the sweetness of honey or some other sweet thing.1 The unqualifiedly best
sweet thing must be the one that someone with the best possible sense of taste finds most pleasant, and
similarly the most complete good must be the one that someone with well-disposed affections desires
as ultimate end. The human good consists in holding on to happiness rather than in letting it go.

The moral philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas involves a merger of at least two apparently disparate
traditions: Aristotelian eudaimonism and Christian theology. On the one hand, Aquinas follows
Aristotle in thinking that an act is good or bad depending on whether it contributes to or deters us from
our proper human end or final goal at which all human actions aim. That telos is eudaimonia, or
happiness, where “happiness” is understood in terms of completion, perfection, or well-being.
Achieving happiness, however, requires a range of intellectual and moral virtues that enable us to
understand the nature of happiness and motivate us to seek it in a reliable and consistent way.

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On the other hand, Aquinas believes that we can never achieve complete or final happiness in this life.
For him, final happiness consists in beatitude, or supernatural union with God. Such an end lies far
beyond what we through our natural human capacities can attain. For this reason, we not only need the
virtues, we also need God to transform our nature to perfect or “deify” it so that we might be suited to
participate in divine beatitude. Moreover, Aquinas believes that we inherited a propensity to sin from
our first parent, Adam. While our nature is not wholly corrupted by sin, it is nevertheless diminished by
sin’s stain, as evidenced by the fact that our wills are at enmity with God’s. Thus we need God’s help
in order to restore the good of our nature and bring us into conformity with his will. To this end, God
imbues us with his grace which comes in the form of divinely instantiated virtues and gifts.

This paper first considers Aquinas’s meta-ethical views. Those views provide a good context for
understanding his unique synthesis of Christian teaching and Aristotelian philosophy. Also, his meta-
ethical views provide an ideal background for understanding other features of his moral philosophy
such as the nature of human action, virtue, natural law, and the ultimate end of human beings. While
contemporary moral philosophers tend to address these subjects as discrete topics of study, Aquinas’s
treatment of them yields a bracing, comprehensive view of the moral life. This article presents these
subjects in a way that illuminates their interconnected roles.

Conceptualizing Human Action in Aquinas’ Perspectives

According to Aquinas’s ethics, human goodness depends on performing acts that are in accord with our
human nature. But what sort of acts are those? In other words, what feature or features serve to
distinguish human acts from acts of a different kind? Here we must go beyond the simple claim that an
action is human just insofar as it is rational. For while this claim is no doubt true, the nature of rationality
itself needs explanation. This section seeks to explore more fully just what rationality or reason consists
in according to Aquinas. Only then can we understand the nature of human action and the end at which
such action aims.

Aquinas provides the most comprehensive treatment of this subject in the second part of the Summa
theologiae. There, he explains that reason is comprised of two powers: one cognitive, the other
appetitive. The cognitive power is the “intellect”, which enables us to know and understand. The
intellect also enables us to apprehend the goodness a thing has. The appetitive power of reason is called
the “will”. Aquinas describes the will as a native desire for the understood good. That is, it is an appetite
that is responsive to the intellect’s estimations of what is good or choice worthy. On this view, all acts
of will are dependent on antecedent acts of intellect; the intellect must supply the will with the object
to which the latter inclines. In turn, that object moves the will as a final cause “because the good
understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end”.2

From the abbreviated account of intellect and will provided thus far, it may appear that the intellect
necessitates the will’s acts by its own evaluative portrayals of goodness. Yet Aquinas insists that no
single account of the good can necessitate the will’s movement. Most goods do not have a necessary
connection to happiness. That is, we do not need them in order to be happy; thus the will does not incline
to them of necessity. But what of those goods that do have a necessary connection to happiness? What
about the goodness of God or those virtues that leads us to God “in whom alone true happiness
consists”? According to Aquinas, the will does not incline necessarily to these goods, either. For in this
life we cannot see God in all his goodness, and thus the connection between God, virtue, final happiness
will always appear opaque. Aquinas writes: “until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the
necessity of such connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God of necessity, nor to those things
which are of God”.3 In this life, then, our intellectual limitations prevent us from apprehending what is
good. Instead, we are presented with competing goods between which we must choose. Some goods
provide immediate gratification but no long-term fulfillment. Other goods may precipitate hardship but
eventually make us better people. Indeed, sometimes we must exercise considerable effort in ignoring
superficial or petty pleasures while attending to more difficult yet enduring goods. To employ Aquinas’s
parlance, the will must exercise efficient causality on the intellect by instructing it to consider some
goods rather than others. This happens whenever we, through our own determination, direct our
attention away from certain desirable objects and toward those we think are more choice worthy. Of

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course, our character will often govern the goods we desire and ultimately choose. Even so, Aquinas
does not think that our character wholly determines our choices, as evidenced by the fact that we
sometimes make decisions that are contrary to our established habits. This is actually fortunate for us,
for it suggests that even people disposed toward evil can manage to make good choices and perhaps
begin to correct their more hardened and inordinate inclinations.

Consequently, we are prepared to answer the question posed at the beginning of this section: what
actions are those we can designate as human? The answer is this: human actions are those over which
one has voluntary control. Unlike non-rational animals, human beings choose their actions according
to a reasoned account of what they think are good. Seen this way, human actions are not products of
deterministic causal forces. They are products of our own free judgment, the exercise of which is a
function of both intellect and will. When discussing what it is that makes an action “human,” then,
Aquinas has in mind those capacities whereby one judges and chooses what is good. For it is through
one’s ability to deliberate and judge in this way that one exercises mastery over one’s actions.

Thus, we have established that human actions are actions that are governed by a reasoned consideration
of what is good. Aquinas also thinks that the good in question functions as an end, the object for the
sake of which the agent acts. “For the object of the will is the end and the good”.4 There are two worries
that emerge here, both of which can be resolved rather quickly. First, it seems we do not always act for
the sake of an end. Many actions we perform are not products of our own deliberation and voluntary
judgment. Yet Aquinas points out that acts of this sort are not properly human acts since they do not
proceed from the deliberation of the reason. In order for an act to count as a “human act”, it must be a
product of the agent’s reasoned consideration about what is good. Second, it appears that Aquinas is
mistaken when he says that the ends for the sake of which we act are good. Clearly, many things we
pursue in life are not good. Aquinas does not deny this. He agrees that cognitive errors and excessive
passion can distort our moral views and, in turn, incline us to choose the wrong things. Aquinas’s point,
however, is that our actions are done for the sake of what we believe (rightly or wrongly) to be good.

Whether the ends we pursue are in fact good is a separate question one to which we will return below.
He (Aquinas) does not simply wish to defend the claim that human acts are for the sake of some good.
Following Augustine, he insists that our actions are for the sake of a finalgood, a last end which we
desire for its own sake and for the sake of which everything else is chosen. If there was no such end,
we would have a hard time explaining why anyone chooses to do anything at all. The reason for this is
as follows. Aquinas argues that for every action or series of actions there must be something that is first
in “order of intention”. In other words, there must be some end or good that is intrinsically desirable
and serves the will’s final cause. According to this view, such a good is a catalyst for desire and is
therefore necessary in order for us to act for the sake of what we desire. MacDonald writes, “one can
explain a given action only by appealing to some end or good that is itself capable of moving the will
that is; by appealing to an end that is viewed desirable in itself”.5Were you to remove the intrinsically
desirable end, then you would remove the very principle that motivates us to act in the first place. This
account also helps explain why we cannot postulate an “indefinite series of ends” when explaining
human actions.6 For the existence of an indefinite series of ends would mean that there is no intrinsically
desirable good for the sake of which we act. In the absence of any such good, we would not desire
anything and thus never have the necessary motivation to act. So there must be a last end or final good
that we desire for its own sake.

However, this last claim still does not capture what Aquinas ultimately wishes to show, namely, that
there is a single end for the sake of which all of us act. To put the matter as starkly as possible, Aquinas
wants to argue that every human act of every human being is for the sake of a single end that is the same
for everyone. The previous argument did not require us to think that the final end for which we act is
the same for everyone. Nor did it show that the end at which every human being aims consists in a
specific, solitary good (as opposed to a constellation of goods). What, exactly, is this last end at which
we aim? We do so by performing actions we think will directly or indirectly contribute to or facilitate
a life that is more complete or fulfilling than it would be otherwise. In other words, the last end the end
or good that we desire for its own sake is happiness, whereby “happiness” Aquinas means the sort of

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perfection or fulfillment just described. Admittedly, this claim is fairly abstract and uncontroversial.
After all, Aquinas does not say what happiness consists in the thing in which it is realized. He simply
wishes to show that there is something everyone desires and pursues, namely, ultimate fulfillment. He
says, “everyone desires the fulfillment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfillment in which
the last end consists”.7 So construed, the idea of the last end is, as MacDonald explains, a “formal
concept…of the complete and perfect good, that which completely satisfies desire”.8 But while
everyone acts for the sake of such an end abstractly conceived, Aquinas recognizes that there is
considerable disagreement over what it is in which happiness consists. So there is a difference between
the idea of the last end (an idea for the sake of which everyone acts) and the specific object in which
the last end is thought to consist. Some people think that the last end consists in the acquisition of
external goods, like riches, power, or fame. Others think it consists in goods of the body, like comeliness
or physical pleasure. And still others think that happiness consists in acquiring goods of the soul such
as knowledge, virtue, and friendship. But as laudable as some of these good are (particularly those of
the latter category), they are all beset with unique deficiencies that preclude them from providing the
kind of complete fulfillment characteristic of final happiness.

What is it, then, in which our last end really consists or is realized? For Aquinas, the last end of
happiness can only consist in that which is perfectly good, which is God. Because God is perfect
goodness, he is the only one capable of fulfilling our heart’s deepest longing and facilitating the
perfection at which we aim. Thus he says that human beings attain their last end by knowing and loving
God. Aquinas refers to this last end the state in which perfect happiness consists as the beatific vision.
The beatific vision is a supernatural union with God, the enjoyment of which surpasses the satisfaction
afforded by those goods people sometimes associate with the last end. But if perfect happiness consists
in the beatific vision, then why do people fail to seek it? As we have already noted, all of us desire our
own perfection, which is synonymous with final happiness. Unfortunately, many of our actions are
informed by mistaken views of what happiness really consists in. These views may be the result of some
intellectual or cognitive error (say if one’s views are the result of ignorance or ill-informed deliberation).

Situating Happiness in Aquinas’ Perspectives

There is no better way to begin to critique Thomas Aquinas’s account of happiness than through a
careful study of The Treatise on Happiness in his Summa Theologiae. From that Treatise, we can get a
sense of the story that Aquinas tells about happiness, as Aquinas tells it, in the order he tells it, and
using the terminology in which he asserts it. And so we begin by treatment of Aquinas’s account of
happiness with a thorough, largely uncontroversial and hopefully insightful summary of that Treatise.
This treatment will serve as the foundation of the study moving forward. Without it, we cannot hope to
address or, indeed, even recognize the most important questions that a systematic interpretation of
Aquinas’s account of happiness must answer. The Treatise on Happiness is a mature and comprehensive
treatment of Aquinas’s basic account of happiness. It is broken into five questions: one on the ultimate
end and four on happiness. To even understand why the question about the ultimate end is asked in this
context, it is important to know that Aquinas’s views are situated in a broadly teleological framework,
according to which human beings have apart from their choosing an orientation towards an ultimate
end, or ultimate goal or purpose. Aquinas connects happiness with that unchosen human ultimate end.
It is because of this connection that, in Question 1 at the beginning of the Treatise, Aquinas examines
the ultimate end in general. He then by successive stages treats happiness itself. Aquinas first considers
what happiness consists in, or in other words what thing (or collection of things), fundamentally, is
capable of making a person happy, when attained (Question 2). For example, under this heading, he
considers whether, fundamentally, wealth is capable of making a person happy. Now, it turns out that
Aquinas thinks that happiness just is a particular sort of attainment of the thing out there in the world
capable of making a person happy. So, in Question 3, he examines under the heading, ‘what happiness
is,’ the nature of the attainment of the thing in which happiness consists. In other words, in this question,
Aquinas elaborates on what happiness is by detailing what the relevant sort of attainment of the
happiness-conducing thing(s) is like. Questions 4 and 5 concern how we can attain happiness. In
particular, Question 4 details those things that are required for happiness, and Question 5 concerns
aspects of the very attainment of happiness.

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It is with good reason that Aquinas calls this an examination of the last end in general. Aquinas accepts
a teleological view of all natural things, according to which all things necessarily act for the sake of an
end. In other words, all things act to achieve goals or aims, even things like rocks and plants. Each thing
in its own characteristic way pursues various ends either through some non-cognitive processes
implanted in it by God (as in the case of rocks and plants) or through some cognitive processes (as in
the case of animals). But not only do all things act for the sake of ends, all things act for the sake of
ultimate ends. This is so because all things, in their own characteristic way, are oriented towards their
own characteristic perfection (e.g. acorns are oriented towards becoming flourishing oaks) and, since
being entirely perfected is the ratio or nature. Humans are just a variation on this underlying theme. But
we are able to do so in a special way that Aquinas thinks that non-human animals are incapable of, to
say nothing of rocks or plants. In particular, unlike other creatures, human beings very frequently “move
themselves to an end because they have control (dominium) of their own acts through free will. Unlike
other animals, we direct ourselves to ends that we conceive of as ends and so we act deliberately in a
way that non-human animals do not. Furthermore, like everything else, we too have an ultimate end.
We must have some ultimate end as we act, according to Aquinas, because a desire for some ultimate
end fundamentally explains why we do anything at all; that ultimate end or aim gets all other desires
moving. Indeed, according to Aquinas, ultimately, whatever we desire, we desire on account of the
ultimate end. And it turns out that it is the ultimate end (singular) on any particular occasion that gets
desire moving because Aquinas also thinks that it’s impossible for a person to be oriented towards
several ultimate ends at once. One reason he gives for thinking this is that a desire for an ultimate end
is, by its very nature, a desire for a good that is complete. But one cannot desire two distinct goods as
complete.

Aquinas distinguishes between two kinds of lives and two kinds of happiness that require different
amounts of external goods; the distinction is also put to use moving forward. On the one hand, there is
the contemplative life, which is centered on the pursuit of truth, with its associated contemplative
happiness. That sort of life requires only a small set of bare essential external goods; think, for example,
of the philosopher on sabbatical. On the other hand, there is the active life, which is centered on securing
various goods for one’s self and others through all manner of activities; here we might think of
elementary school teachers, doctors, and landscapers. That kind of life too has an associated happiness,
namely, active happiness. But in comparison to lives characterized principally by the exercise of
contemplative virtues, lives centered around “the works of active virtue,” at least in general, require
“very many more” external goods. The doctor, for example, often needs medicine or various implements
in order to help others, whereas the philosopher can, at least in principle, get by with very little. That
said, there is something beyond the most basic of necessities that even a contemplative needs in order
to be imperfectly happy, according to Aquinas: friends. Aquinas says, “A human being needs the help
of friends in order to do activities well as much in the activities of the active life as in the activities of
the contemplative life. So an imperfectly happy person is reasonably healthy, has sufficient external
goods to live and work, and she spends her time doing good and enjoyable activities, often in the
company of friends. This portrait makes it quite clear that imperfect happiness, as Aquinas thinks of it,
is not foreign to our way of thinking about what makes for a good and appealing life.

Aquinas is uncompromising in his view that our true happiness can only be found in knowledge of God.
No other worldly good or pleasure can truly provide us with the ultimate good we seek. As he argues
in the Summa Theologica:
It is impossible for any created good to constitute man’s happiness. For happiness
is that perfect good which entirely satisfies one’s desire; otherwise it would not
be the ultimate end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of
the will, i.e., of man’s desire, is what is universally good; just as the object of the
intellect is what is universally true. Hence it is evident that nothing can satisfy
man’s will, except what is universally good. This is to be found, not in any
creature, but in God alone, because every creature has only participated
goodness. Therefore, God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the
words of the Psalms (102:5): “Who alone satisfies your desire with good things.”
Therefore, God alone constitutes man’s happiness.9

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Thus for Aquinas we must make a sharp distinction between enjoyment and happiness. Enjoyment
pertains to worldly goods and physical pleasures: but these tend to be very short-lived. And even if all
of our worldly desires were satisfied, even if we were to experience every possible enjoyment, we would
remain unhappy, since we would still have a nagging feeling that something is missing. Today Aquinas
would point to the experience of many rich people and celebrities as evidence for this truth. Despite
having every worldly good, fine foods, cars, houses, vacations, friends, family many of them remain
deeply unhappy, even spiraling into the misery of drugs and suicide. Aquinas would explain this as
follows: when every enjoyment is felt, the soul begins to crave for something more than mere
enjoyment. But if one has no knowledge of this “something more” or doesn’t know how to go about
finding it, the enjoyment turns to pain and suffering. This also explains why we see a lot of billionaires
suddenly change towards the middle or end of their lives: that nagging feeling that there is something
more results in charitable work or an orientation to a higher purpose in life. One might, however,
question Aquinas’ insistence that perfect happiness is only possible in the afterlife. Is it possible to
purify the soul in this lifetime, so that one can possess a direct experience of Ultimate Reality? The
Buddhists and Hindus certainly think so: they can point to certain individuals such as the Buddha who
have obtained absolute enlightenment. And there is a mystical side to monotheistic religions like
Christianity, Islam, and Judaism as well, according to which the ultimate goal is Oneness with God,
which has been attained by various saints or prophets throughout history. Aquinas’ own mystical
experience at the end of his life might be just such an example: perhaps he actually achieved a beatific
vision of God, a vision so strong that it rendered all of his words obsolete. But more than likely, our
mistaken views will be the result of certain appetitive excesses that corrupt our understanding of what
is really good. For this reason, good actions require excellences or virtues of both mind and appetite.
Further, we seek to explain in sharp focus what those virtues are and why we need them.

The Cardinal Virtues

A cursory glance at the second part of the Summa Theologiae would reveal a host of virtues that are
indicative of human goodness. But there are essentially four virtues from which Aquinas’s more
extensive list flows. These virtues are prudence, justice, temperance, and courage. Aquinas refers to
these virtues as the “cardinal” virtues. They are the principle habits on which the rest of the virtues
hinged. Any virtue the point of which is to promote discretion with respect to action will be considered
a part of prudence. Similarly, temperance concerns the moderation of passion, and thus will include any
virtue that seeks to restrain those desires of a more or less insatiable sort. Moreover, Aquinas thinks the
cardinal virtues provide general templates for the most salient forms of moral activity: commanding
action (prudence); giving to those what is due (justice); curbing the passions (temperance); and
strengthening the passions against fear (courage). A more detailed sketch of these virtues follows.

Prudence
In order to act well, we need to make good judgments about how we should behave. This is precisely
the sort of habit associated with prudence, which Aquinas defines as “wisdom concerning human
affairs. or “right reason with respect to action”.10 In order to make good moral judgments, a twofold
knowledge is required: one must know (1) the general moral principles that guide actions and (2) the
particular circumstances in which a decision is required. For “actions are about singular matters: and so
it is necessary for the prudent man to know both the universal principles of reason, and the singulars
about which actions are concerned”. This passage may appear to suggest that prudence involves a fairly
simple and straightforward process of applying moral rules to specific situations. But this is somewhat
misleading since the activity of prudence involves a fairly developed ability to evaluate situations
themselves. As Thomas Hibbs explains: “prudence involves not simply the subordination of particulars
to appropriate universals, but the appraisal of concrete, contingent circumstances”. 11 From this
perspective, good decisions will always be responsive to what our situation requires. Thus we cannot
simply consult a list of moral prescriptions in determining what we should do. We must also “grasp
what is pertinent and to assess what ought to be done in complex circumstances”.12 As a cardinal virtue,
prudence functions as a principal virtue on which a variety of other excellences hinge. Those
excellences include: memory, intelligence, docility, shrewdness, reason, foresight, circumspection, and
caution. Without these excellences, we may commit a number of cognitive errors that may prevent us
from acting in a morally appropriate way. For example, we may reject the guidance of good counsel;

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make decisions precipitously; or act thoughtlessly by failing “to judge rightly through contempt or
neglect of those things on which a right judgment depends”. We may also act for the sake of goods that
are contrary to our nature. This invariably happens when the passions cloud our judgment and make
deficient objects of satisfaction look more choice worthy than they really are. In order to make reliable
judgments about what is really good; our passions need some measure of restraint so that they do not
corrupt good judgment. In short, prudence depends on virtues of the appetite, and it is to these virtues
we now turn.

Temperance
Temperance has a twofold meaning. In a general sense, the term denotes a kind of moderation common
to every moral virtue. In its more restricted sense, temperance concerns the moderation of physical
pleasures, especially those associated with eating, drinking, and sex. We display a common propensity
to sacrifice our well-being for the sake of these transient goods. Thus we need some virtue that serves
to restrain what Aquinas calls ‘concupiscible passion’, the appetite whereby we desire what is pleasing
and avoid what is harmful. Temperance is that virtue, as it denotes a restrained desire for physical
gratification. Like prudence, temperance is a cardinal virtue. There are a host of subsidiary virtues that
fall under temperance because they serve to modify the most insatiable human passions. Yet there are
other virtues associated with temperance that may strike the reader as surprising. For example, Aquinas
argues that humility is a part of temperance. Humility aims to restrain the immoderate desire for what
one cannot achieve. While humility is not concerned with tempering the appetites associated with touch,
it nevertheless consists in a kind of restraint and thus bears a formal resemblance to temperance. He
says: “whatever virtues restrain or suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity of the
passions, are considered parts of temperance.”13 Thus Aquinas also thinks meekness, clemency,
and studiousness are parts of temperance. They, too, restrain certain appetitive drives: specifically
anger, the desire to punish, and the desire to pursue vain curiosities, respectively.

Courage
Temperance and its subsidiary virtues restrain the strong appetite, such as the sexual appetite. But
courage and its subsidiary virtues modify what Aquinas calls the irascible appetite. By “irascible
appetite” Aquinas means the desire for that which is difficult to attain or avoid. Occasionally, the
difficulty in achieving or avoiding certain objects can give rise to various degrees of fear and, in turn,
discourage us from adhering to reason’s instruction. In these cases we may refuse to endure the pain or
discomfort required for achieving our proper human good. Like prudence and temperance, courage is a
cardinal virtue. Those with courage will also have a considerable degree of endurance. Lack of
endurance will no doubt undermine one’s ability to bear life’s travails. The courageous person must
also be confident (which is closely aligned with magnanimity). For he will not only have to endure pain
and suffering, he must aggressively confront the obstacles that stand in the way of achieving his proper
good. His success in confronting those obstacles requires that he exercise a “strength of hope” which
arises from a confidence in his own strength, the strength of others, or the promises of God. Such hope
enables him to confront threats and challenges without reservation. The courageous person will also
display magnificence, that is, a sense of nobility with respect to the importance of his endeavors.
Aquinas underscores the value of what the courageous person seeks to attain by executing his actions
with a “greatness of purpose”.14 finally, the courageous person will have patience and perseverance.
That is, he will not be broken by stress or sorrow, nor will he be wearied or discouraged due to the
exigencies of his endeavors. And finally, Justice! The virtues we have considered thus far concern
our own state. The virtue of justice, however, governs our relationships with others. Specifically, it
denotes a sustained or constant willingness to extend to each person what he or she deserves. Beyond
this, Aquinas’s account of justice exhibits considerable breadth, complexity, and admits of various
distinctions. Constraints of space, however, would compel me to mention only two sets of distinctions:
(1) legal (or general) and particular justice, and (2) commutative and distributive justice.

The purpose of legal justice is to govern our actions according to the common good. Construed this
way, justice is a general virtue which concerns not individual benefits but community welfare.
According to Aquinas, everyone who is a member of a community stands to that community as a part
to a whole. Whatever affects the part also affects the whole. And so whatever is good (or harmful) for

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oneself will also be good (or harmful) for the community of which one is a part. For this reason, we
should expect the good community to enact laws that will govern its members in ways that are beneficial
to everyone. A clarification is in order. Aquinas acknowledges that legal justice does not appear to be
altogether different from the virtues we previously considered. After all, courage, temperance, and
prudence are just as likely to contribute to others’ welfare as legal justice. Yet these virtues
differ logically from legal justice because they have specific objects of their own. Whereas legal justice
concerns the common good, prudence concerns commanding action, temperance concerns curbing
concupiscent passion, and courage concerns strengthening irascible passion against fear. Failure to
moderate our baser appetites not only forestalls the development of personal virtue but leads to acts
which are contrary to others’ well-being. For example, restraining impetuous sexual appetite is the
province of temperance. But as Thomas Williams insightfully points out, “sexuality [also] has
implications for the common good.” For “there are precepts of justice that regulate our sex lives:
fornication and adultery are violations not only of chastity but also of justice” 15 Thus Aquinas insists
that temperance can do more than just modify our sexual drives. So long as it is shaped or informed by
legal justice, temperance can direct us to preserve the common good in our actions. While distributive
justice concerns the way in which collective goods and responsibilities “are fairly apportioned among
people who stand in a social community” Yet with respect to distributive justice, what a person receives
is not a matter of equal quantity but “due proportion”.

This brief account of justice may seem like a stale precursor to more modern accounts of justice,
particularly those that depict justice in terms of equality and economic fairness. Yet a brief survey of
the virtues that hinge on justice reveals an account that is richer than the foregoing paragraphs may
suggest. For Aquinas, justice is principally about our relations to others, and so he thinks that all the
virtues that are directed to another person may by reason of this common aspect be annexed to justice
The virtues Aquinas has in mind here are not simply those that regulate our relationships with other
human beings, but with God. Thus he insists that religion is a virtue that falls under justice, since it
involves offering God his due honor. The same can be said for piety and observance, since they seek to
render to God service and deference, respectively. Other virtues annexed to justice include truthfulness,
since the just person will always present himself to others without pretext or falsehood; gratitude, which
involves an appreciation for others’ kindness; and revenge, whereby we respond to or defend ourselves
against others’ injurious actions.

Using Philosophical Tool of Evaluation

Aquinas’ character seems to have been one of imperturbability, and there is no doubting his sharpness
of intellect. After his death the teaching of Aquinas and Thomism formed the official doctrine of the
Dominicans, and this was adopted by some other Orders, but it was in general relatively neglected by
the Catholic Church. However, No other area in contemporary philosophy is connected with its past in
the way that ethics is. When it comes to the study of mind, language, or metaphysics, most scholars feel
little obligation to look back more than 100 years or so. In ethics, matters are quite different. Aristotle,
Hobbes, Kant, and Mill are not just a part of the curriculum-in many ways; these authors constitute the
core curriculum. The study of ethics, in large part, just is the study of the history of ethics, and many
leading contemporary ethicists are also experts on the history of their subject. In this light, the case of
Thomas Aquinas is puzzling. Though it would be an exaggeration to say that his ethics has been
neglected, it certainly has not received the same kind of attention that other areas of his thought receive,
such as his metaphysics, theory of soul, or philosophical theology. Moreover, his ethical writings have
had very little influence on mainstream contemporary ethics. Although everyone knows of his theory
of natural law and his adoption of Aristotle’s virtue theory to the development of his ethics.

However, though Aquinas’ thought owes a great deal to Aristotle, and he attempts to reconcile the
central tenets of Aristotelian philosophy with Christian dogma; these attempts deal with issues like the
nature of God, our means to salvation, and our understanding of the nature of creation. Aquinas’ thought
begins with the presupposition that the universe is, at least partly, intelligible to finite human intellects:
the structures and laws of the universe can be understood. Aquinas hatches a compromise between the
conclusions derived from our natural cognitive faculties (the senses and reason of secular philosophy),
and conclusions derived from divine revelation (the faith of divine theology). One could dismiss one or

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the other as worthless, or say that each one ultimately depends on the other, as Augustine does; Aquinas
however maintains the distinction, and says that they are two generally autonomous ways of looking at
the same object, namely God. Whereas our natural cognition works “from below” to know God through
His effects as the creator of the world, divine revelation-supernatural cognition-works “from above” to
know God as cause. Thus faith and scientific knowledge are sharply distinguished not by object, but by
method. Both are cognitive processes involving the assent of the intellect to truths; but whereas faith
requires the addition of the will in order to believe truths with certainty, scientific knowledge requires
no such application of will since the intellect either intuitively “sees” truths immediately, or argues
validly to establish truths from intuitively known premises.

Furthermore, Aristotle considers man as a rational animal, whose involvement in the virtuous activity
(function) is rewarded by happiness; while for Aquinas, man is a being searching for his ultimate
happiness (where this ultimate happiness is, God). Aquinas makes a distinction between ‘enjoyment’
and happiness and this distinction is beyond Aristotle. The reason for this abounds in Aquinas’
explanation that enjoyment has to do with temporary goods and physical pleasures, which, according
to him, are “short-lived”, imperfect and unsatisfactory, irrespective of the amount and duration of it. In
other words, Aquinas believes there is no amount of enjoyment that can satisfy unsearchable human
desires and wants, or rather, cravings for a lasting, permanent and perfect kind of happiness. The claim
from Aquinas is consistent with what he adapts from Aristotle’s ethics. There will always be a persistent
vacuum of unhappiness (quasi happiness) created in the human mind, whenever enjoyment or these
temporary goods are accepted in place of the perfect happiness. In other words, from Aquinas, we learn
that nothing can satisfy these never-ending desires for true and perfect happiness. As a result of this,
the more enjoyment that one feels, the more one’s soul longs for more enjoyment, but because this chain
of desire cannot go on to infinity, one must at a certain point, stop and desire something more than mere
enjoyment, which is perfect happiness.

Aquinas’ moral philosophy (ethics) has its foundation in Aristotle’s teleological view of creation, the
view that everything which exists in nature acts purposefully for an end or a goal, yet Aquinas takes
this view to its supernatural conclusion. For Aquinas, since life in itself is goal-oriented or goal-directed,
that would mean that to understand the nature of anything would depend on whether the natural goal or
purpose of that thing is properly understood. Aquinas, then reasons that the human final cause or the
ultimate end is the beatific vision, perfect happiness). This is an indication on how Aquinas understands
or views a human being and his/her nature. As result, Aquinas considers a human being as an agent,
whose action must always direct him/her to a higher and final end, the Final Cause, God. For Aquinas,
wherever we find movement, that movement must be directed towards some good and that good must
act according to the natural law imprinted into its being. Aquinas, concludes that an action of an agent
is good in so far as “it tends to the perfection or full actuality” of the nature of that being. Hence, for
Aquinas, everything acts for its natural good, whether consciously or unconsciously, and this good is
the perfection of the agent.

Thus, Aquinas’ definition of the human being in terms of his metaphysical composition of body and
soul, as opposed to Aristotle’s definition of the human being in terms of his/her function (ergon) aids
Aquinas in his conclusion that man is a spiritual being. This is an expansion of Aristotle’s thought about
the human body and soul. Aristotle’s concept of soul as a form of living organism (“life force”), both
for human and non-human beings, would have had negative implications on Aquinas’ definition and
understanding of the human being as a spiritual being. Aquinas considers the soul as the form and first
principle of life possessed by a human person because of his participation in the “divine nature” through
his/her rationality. So, for one to have argued that Aquinas adopts some of ethical concepts of Aristotle
in his moral philosophy is correct, but one needs to admit also that Aquinas transcends or transforms
Aristotle’s understanding of the soul in his moral philosophy. This proves that Joseph Owens and
Stephen Wang are correct in their claims that Aquinas, in some of his ethical thought, transcends and
transforms Aristotle’s ethical concepts even though they (Aquinas and Aristotle) both use similar or at
times, the same vocabularies. This is consistent with the position of this thesis because Aquinas’
treatment of the human being is more balanced than that of Aristotle, who places much emphasis on the
human mind (rationality), as if rationality is the only thing that constitutes a human being. Aquinas sees

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the human being as a knower, a being composed of body (matter) and soul (form), without either of
them stifling or dominating the other. Man is a spiritual being as well as a rational being: a claim, which
is at the heart of Aquinas’ moral philosophy. Consequently, Aquinas’ view of God tends to be different
from that of Aristotle, who believes God to be a substance, or rather, a cosmic movement, who is at one
time, one God and another, many Gods. However, Aquinas agrees with Aristotle’s notion of the first
unmoved mover but Aquinas also believes that God is one and is the Absolute Being, the Final Cause,
First Act; whose existence is knowable, though, not completely. This difference between Aristotle’s
and Aquinas’ concepts of the soul, the human being and God, has great implications on how Aquinas
understands human beings, their soul, their purpose and goal in life, their Maker and above all, their
ultimate end, happiness.

Since happiness is the ultimate end, it is not desired for the sake of anything else; rather, other things
are desired for the sake of happiness. And this is true of delight most of all: “for it is ridiculous to ask
someone why he wants delight,” as is said in Ethics. Therefore, happiness consists most of all in
pleasure and delight. Since desire is for what is good, it seems that what all things desire is the best
thing of all. Now all things desire delight: the wise, the unwise, even things that lack reason. Therefore,
delight is the best thing of all; and so happiness, which is the supreme good, consists in pleasure.

Ultimate and perfect happiness cannot consist in anything other than a vision of the divine essence. In
order to make this evident, we need to consider two things. First, human beings are not perfectly happy
as long as something is left for them to desire and seek. Second, the perfection of each capacity is
determined by the nature of its object. Now the object of the intellect is what something is, that is, the
essence of a thing. Hence, the intellect attains perfection to the extent that it knows the essence of
something. If, then, an intellect knows the essence of some effect through which the essence of the
cause cannot be known (in other words, through which the intellect cannot know what the cause is), the
intellect is not said to reach the cause in an unqualified sense, even though it can know through the
effect that the cause is. And so when human beings know an effect, and know that it has a cause, there
remains a natural desire in them to know what the cause is. That desire is a kind of wonder, and it causes
inquiry, as is said at the beginning of the Metaphysics. For example, if someone sees a solar eclipse, he
reflects that it has some cause. And because he does not know what that cause is, he wonders about it,
and out of his wondering he proceeds to inquire. And this inquiry does not come to an end until he
arrives at knowledge of the essence of the cause. So if the human intellect, through knowing the essence
of some created effect, knows of God merely that he is, the perfection of that intellect has not yet reached
the First Cause in an unqualified sense; instead, there remains in it a natural desire to seek the cause.
Hence, it is not yet perfectly happy. So perfect happiness requires the intellect to reach the very essence
of the First Cause. And in this way it will have its perfection by being united with God as its object; and
human happiness consists in this alone.

The will follows the apprehension of intellect or reason. Now it can happen that reason can consider
one and the same thing in various ways, and accordingly it can happen that one and the same thing is
desired in one way but not desired in some other way. Thus, happiness can be considered under the
description “final and complete good,” which is the abstract notion of happiness; and the will naturally
and necessarily tends toward happiness considered in this way, as we have said. Happiness can also be
considered under various particular descriptions, involving the activity itself or the active power or its
object; and the will does not necessarily tend toward happiness considered in that way.

This definition of happiness that some have put forward, “they are happy who have everything they
want” (or, alternatively, “who have obtained everything they longed for”) is good and sufficient if you
understand it in a certain way; in another way, however, it is incomplete. For if one understands it
simply in terms of all the things that human beings desire through their natural appetite, it turns out to
be true that those who have everything they want are happy, because the only thing that satisfies natural
human appetite is a perfect good, which is happiness. But if one understands that definition in terms of
the things that human beings will according to the apprehension of reason, then having everything one
wants is not characteristic of happiness, but rather of misery, since having such things can stand in the
way of having everything one wills naturally, in much the same way that reason sometimes takes certain

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things to be true that in fact stand in the way of knowing the truth. It is because he understands the
definition in this way that Augustine adds “and wants nothing bad” to complete the definition, although
the first part “they are happy who have everything they want” would be sufficient if interpreted
correctly.

Conclusion
Perfect happiness (beatitudo) is not possible in this lifetime, but only in the afterlife for those who
achieve a direct perception of God.16 There can be an imperfect happiness (felicitas) attainable in this
lifetime, in proportion to the exercise of reason (contemplation of truth) and the exercise of virtue.
However, many neuroscientists would tell you that all happiness is a chemical and electrical process in
the brain: motivation, followed by reward. While others would argue that true happiness entails material
possession like money, lands, gaining political powers, and ability to woe different types of women for
sexual stratifications. Ironically, true happiness does not lie in any of the above, as instances abounds
where very rich and wealthy people end up taking their lives as a result of depression arising from
perhaps, their inability to meet up with whatever demand of their lives. Rather, we would argue that
true happiness greatly comes from service than acquisition of wealth. As St. Augustine would say, my
heart is restless until it rests in Lord, meaning that it is simply in the pursuit of God’s divine knowledge,
made possible through great works and services to humanity, which it reward is hitherto life after death.

References
1. Thomas Aquinas, St. Summa theologiae, Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province.
Westminster: Christian Classics, 1981
2. Thomas Aquinas, St. Summa contra gentiles (SCG), vol. I. Trans. Anton Pegis. Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1975
3. Thomas Aquinas, St. Questiones de vertitate (QDV). Trans. Robert W. Mulligan, S.J. Henry
Regnery Company, 1954
4. Loc.Cit
5. MacDonald, Scott and Eleonore Stump, eds. 1998. Aquinas’ Moral Theory: Essays in Honor of
Norman Kretzmann, eds. Scott MacDonald and Eleonore Stump. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1998 P.44
6. Aquinas, Summa Theogiae
7. MacDonald, Scott. “Ultimate Ends and Practical Reasoning: Aquinas’s Aristotelian Moral
Psychology and Anscombe’s Fallacy,” The Philosophical Review, 1991, P.87
8. Aquinas, Op.Cit
9. MacDonald, Op.Cit., P.61
10. Aquinas, Op.Cit
11. Hibbs, Thomas. 2001. Virtue’s Splendor: Wisdom, Prudence, and the Human Good. New York:
Fordham University Press, 2001, P.92
12. Ibid., P.98
13. Aquinas, Op.Cit
14. Loc.Cit
15. Williams, Thomas “Introduction,” in Disputed Questions on the Virtues. Trans. E.M. Atkins. Eds.
E.M. Atkins and Thomas Williams, 2005, Pp. ix-xxx.
16. Aquinas, Op.Cit

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