An accident is an unplanned and unforeseen event that can result in harm, injury or damage
to people, property or the environment. Accidents are a common feature of the human
experience and result in injury or permanent disability to large numbers of people worldwide
every year. Accidents can occur anytime or anywhere, including in the home, during
transportation, in hospitals, on the sports field, or in the workplace. With appropriate safety
precautions and awareness of ones’ actions and environment, many accidents can be avoided
or prevented.
In contrast to John Kuder (2021), an accident can involve someone running a stop sign and t-
boning a family’s minivan, sending people to the hospital. It was unplanned because the person
did not intend to get in a serious wreck. It disrupts the activity of everyone involved, everyone
using the roads who will now be delayed and the folks who need to respond to the accident.
However, it affects or involves people because people are hurt in the collision. And it was
caused by the unsafe behaviour of running a stop sign. Many people take a safe working
environment for granted, assured in the knowledge that accidents in their role are incredibly
rare. Moreover, becoming complacent while carrying out everyday tasks can mean that even
workplaces with less obvious hazards can pose risks to employees, no matter what their roles
are.
Whitney DeCamp et al (2015) argues that, the definition of an accident implies two
important points. First, accidents are unavoidable; the chance of one occurring will virtually
always be present. Second, the chance of an accident occurring is a variable that can be
changed. While it is impossible to prevent all accidents, it is possible to decrease their rate of
occurrence.
Furthermore, understanding the cause of such phenomenon is the key to decreasing the rate
at which accidents occur. Determining the true root cause of each accident is the only way to
formulate effective strategies. Presented below are the few of the most common theories used
to explain how accidents occur.
Heinrich’s (1950) theory explains accidents using the analogy of dominos falling over one
another and creating a chain of events. Therefore, when dominos fall over, each tips the next
enough to push it over and continue the process until all the connected dominos have fallen. In
addition, if just a single domino is removed, the entire process ceases. Heinrich explains
accident in the same way.
Social environment and ancestry
Faults of a person
Unsafe acts or condition
accident
injury
As seen from the table above, Heinrich identified five stages of accident causation. The first
stage, the social environment and ancestry, encompasses anything that may lead to producing
undesirable traits in people. It is worth noting that Heinrich’s inclusion of genetics and ancestry
is very much a product of the time it was written. A modernised version of this theory would
likely use the term “inherited behaviour,” similar to how alcoholism and temperaments can be
inherited. This stage of accident causation is quite similar to the social learning theories
discussed in the criminological theories.
The second stage, faults of a person, refers to personal characteristics that are conducive to
accidents. For example, having a bad temper may lead to spontaneous outburst and disregard
for safety. Similarly, general reckless can also be one of the manifestations of poor character.
Ignorance, such as not knowing safety regulations or standard operating procedures is also an
example of this stage.
The third stage, an unsafe act or condition, is often the identifiable beginning of a specific
incident. Unlike the first two stages, which affect the probability of accidents occurring, this
stage is closer to the accident in terms of temporal proximity. This can include a specific act that
is unsafe, such as starting a machine without proper warning or failing to perform appropriate
preventative actions, such as using guardrails or other safety measures. In essence, this stage
entails acts (or failures to act) that occasionally cause accidents.
The next stage, logically, is the accident itself. This, in and of itself, needs little stage, injury, is
simply when something occurs that is undesirable and not intended. The final stage, injury, is
the unfortunate outcome of some accidents. Whether an injury occurs during an accident is
often a matter of chance and not always the outcome. This relationship highlights the
relationships between stages in terms of causality. An accident occurring is not a sufficient
cause for injury, but it is a necessary one. Similarly, the undesirable characteristics in stage two
do not always occur in poor environments, but could occur without such environments.
Unlike Heinrich, who explained accidents with a single chain reaction in vague terms, Ferrell’s
model incorporates multiple causes and is very specific about these causes (Roos et al, 1980).
Additionally, Ferrell defines accidents in terms being the result of an error by an individual. As
such, explains the theory using the assumption that accidents are caused by one person. Ferrell
identifies three general causes of accidents: overload, incompatibility and improper activities.
Each of these are actually broad categories that contain several specific causes. Improper
activities are perhaps the simplest of the concepts, as it encompasses two straight forward
sources of accidents. First, it is possible that the responsible person simply did not know better.
Alternatively, the accident may be known to occur from an action, but deliberately the person
chooses to take that risk. The incompatibility cause is slightly more complex than improper
activities. It encompasses both an incorrect response to a situation by an individual as well as
subtle environment, such as a work station that is incorrectly sized.
Petersen’s model is largely an expansion upon Ferrell’s human factor model. The notion of an
overload, caused by capacity, state or load is very similar to Ferrell’s work. Nevertheless, a few
changes and refinements do exist. First, Petersen conceptualized the environmental aspect of
incompatibility (workstations design and display/controls) as a different part of the model,
calling them ergonomic traps. Further, Petersen also separated a decision to err from the
overload cause. Not only that, Petersen also specified separate reasons to choose err. These
reasons include; a logical decision due to the situation (primarily for financial cost and temporal
deadlines), an unconscious desire to err (psychological failings) and perceived low probability of
an accident occurring. Another noteworthy contribution is Petersen’s recognition that human
error is only part of a larger model. A system failure, the inability of the organization to correct
errors, was added as possible mediator between errors and accidents. These failures have a
range of possible occurrences. The failure of management to detect mistakes and lack of
training are two examples of system failures. Even poor policy itself can lead to a systems
failure that does not prevent an accident from occurring following a human error.
Most of the theories thus far discussed focus on human errors and environmental flaws. A
systems model theory approaches the relationship between persons and their environments
differently. Rather than the environment being full of hazards and a person being error prone, a
system model view sees a harmony between man, machine and environment. Under normal
circumstances, the chances of an accident are very low. Thus, once someone or something
disrupts this harmony by changing one of the components or the relationships between the
three, the probability of an accident occurring increases substantially. Another aspect of the
systems model is what is referred to as risk risk-taking. Whenever someone chooses to do
something, there is an associated risk (Firenze, 1978). Accidents occur within a system due to
the complex interactions and interdependencies between various components of that system.
In a system, there are multiple components e.g. people, equipment or procedures that interact
with each other in a non-linear way. Changes or disturbances in one part of the system can
have ripple effects throughout the entire system, leading to unexpected outcomes such as
accidents.
Behaviour-based safety theory as proposed by Krause (1995), suggests that accidents result
from at-risk behaviours. This theory emphasizes the role of human behaviour in contributing to
accidents and highlights the importance of addressing behavioural factors through training and
education. For example, a worker may fail to wear personal protective equipment (PPE) while
operating heavy machinery (at-risk behaviour), increasing the risk of injury.
Additionally, accidents can occur due to a combination of factors that align in a particular
way to create a hazardous situation. The combination theory of accidents suggests that
accidents are not caused by a single factor, but rather by a series of contributing factors that
interact and lead to a mishap. These contributing factors include human error, equipment
failure, environmental conditions and organizational factors. For example, a worker may be
fatigued and rushing to meet a deadline (human error), using equipment that is not properly
maintained (equipment failure), in a poorly-lit and cluttered work environment (environmental
conditions) and working for a company that prioritizes speed over safety (organizational
factors). Hence, when these factors converge, they increase the likelihood of an accident
occurring. Therefore, in this way, accidents are often the result of a chain of events that are
influenced by multiple factors working together.
In summary, accidents can occur for a wide range of reasons due to a combination of human
error, individual characteristics as well as environmental factors and understanding the various
theories behind accidents can help to identify potential risk factors and prevent future incidents
from happening. By addressing both human error and system failures, organizations can work
towards creating safer environments for everyone.
REFERENCES
1. Firenze, R.J (1978). The Process of Hazard Control. New York: Kendal/Hunt.
2. Heinrich (1950). Industrial Accident Prevention (3rd Ed.) New York: McGraw Hill.
3. John Kuder (2021). Why do Accidents Occur?
4. Krause, T.R. (1995). Employee-Driven Safety: Using Behaviour-Based Safety to Improve Your
Company’s Bottom Line. Van Nostrand Reinhold.
5. Roos et al (1980). Industrial Accident Prevention. New York: McGraw Hill.
6. Whitney DeCamp et al (2015). The Theories of Accident Causation. Western Michigan
University.