JUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO, petitioner-appellee, vs.

LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO

FACTS:
Mariano Molo died on January 24, 1941. He was survived by his wife, the herein petitioner
Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz, Gliceria
and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate children of Candido Molo, deceased
brother of the testator. Mariano Molo left two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918 and
another executed on June 20, 1939.

Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, filed a petition of the probate of the 1939 will which was admitted to
probate but subsequently set aside upon petition filed by the herein oppositors, the court rendered
decision denying the probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the
same was executed in accordance with law.

In view of the disallowance of the 1939 will, Juana filed a petition for probate of the 1918 will
that was again opposed by Luz Glicerna and Cornelio Molo upon 3 grounds: the petitioner was
estopped from seeking probate of the 1918 will, the will not executed in the manner required by
law and the will has been subsequently revoked. Oppositors, Luz and Cornelio argued that the
revocatory clause contained in 1939 will of the deceased which was denied probate is still valid
and has the effect of nullifying the prior will of 1918.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1918 will can be admitted to probate despite the revocatory clause contained
in the 1939 will which was denied probate.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The earlier will can still be admitted to probate
under the principle of “dependent relative revocation”. The Doctrine of Dependent relative
Revocation states that where the act of destruction of the will is connected with the making of
another will, so as to fairly raise the inference that the testator meant the revocation of the old to
depend upon the efficacy of the new disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be
conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for any reason, the
new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and the original
remain in full force.

The Court held that even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the
testator could be presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in court, such
destruction cannot have the effect of defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is
founded on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly executed and would be
given due effect. The theory on which this principle is predicated is that the testator did not
intend to die intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest when he executed two wills
on two different occasions and instituted his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no
mistake as to his intention of dying testate.

De Belen v. BPI, L-14474, Oct. 31, 1960;

FACTS:

Decedent Benigno Diaz executed a will and, later, a codicil. In the codicil he gave a trust —-
legacy to Filomena Diaz or her legitimate descendants it states that in case of death of some or
all legatees appointed by Benigno, the beneficiaries will pass the legacies in favor of legitimated
descendants and ancestors .That 10 to 15 years after the testators death all property, movable or
immovable , rights and advantageous can proceed to the sale of all giving preference to legatees.
The remainder would be distributed to the following people who are still alive or to their
LEGITIMATE DESCENDANTS namely Isabel Santiago, Los hijos de Domingo Legards,
Nestor Santiago and Filomena Diaz

After Benigno Diaz dies in November 2, 1944, the will and codicil were admitted to probate and
the estate was put under the administration of BPI as trustee for the benefit of legatees.

Filomena Diaz died on February 8, 1954, leaving two legitimate children: Milagros (married
with 7 children); and Onesima who is single.

Onesima filed a petition , alleging that the amount which pertained to Filomena under the will
and codicil should divided equally only between Milagros and her, to the exclusion of Milagros’
children. Onesima petitioned the court to order BPI to deliver to her "one-half of whatever share
[was due to] Filomena Diaz as legatee in the will and codicil of the deceased testator…”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the share of Filomena be distributed equally among her surviving children and
grandchildren.

RULING:

The court ruled in the affirmative. Article 846 of the Civil Code provides that , “heirs instituted
without designation of shares shall inherit in equal parts .”The meaning of the word descendants,
when used in a will or deed to designate a class to take property passing by the will or deed, has
been frequently considered and decided that it means all persons so descended, even though their
parents are living and that such descendants take per capita.

The court then went on to state that in the absence of other indications of contrary intent, the
proper rule to apply in the instant case is that the testator, by designating a class or group of
legatees, intended all members thereof succeed per capita. So that the original legacy to
Filomena Diaz should be equally divided among her surviving children and grandchildren.