APPRENTICESHIP AND LEARNERSHIP

NITTO ENTERPRISES V. NLRC

DOCTRINE: Apprenticeship agreements, including

the main rates of apprentices, shall conform to
the rules issued by the Minister of Labor and
Employment. The period of apprenticeship shall
not exceed six months. Apprenticeship
agreements providing for wage rates below the
legal minimum wage, which in no case shall start
below 75% per cent of the applicable minimum
wage, may be entered into only in accordance
with apprenticeship program duly approved by
the Minister of Labor and Employment. The
Ministry shall develop standard model programs
of apprenticeship.

RECIT- READY SUMMARY:

- Nitto Enterprises (Nitto), a company engaged
in the sale of glass and aluminum products,
hired Roberto Capili in May 1990 as an
apprentice machinist, molder and core
maker, evidenced by an apprenticeship
agreement for 6 months from May 28, 1990
to November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rate
of P66.75 which was 75% of the applicable
minimum wage.
 - On August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was
handling a piece of glass, accidentally hit
and injured the leg of an office secretary who
was treated at a nearby hospital.
- Later that same day, after office hours,
Capili entered a workshop within the office
premises which was not his work station.
- He operated one of the power press
machines without authority and in the
process injured his left thumb. Nitto spent
P1,023.04 to cover the medication of Capili.
- The next day, Nitto asked Capili to resign.
Capili signed a quitclaim for P1,912.79 but 3
days later filed a case for illegal dismissal
before the NLRC Arbitration branch of NCR.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Nitto
saying there was a valid ground for
termination.
- The NLRC reversed.

Issue: Whether Capili is an apprentice – No, he is

considered a regular employee.

- According to Article 61 of the Labor Code,

apprenticeship agreements may be entered
into only in accordance with apprenticeship
programduly approved by the Minister of
Labor and Employment.
 - The apprenticeship agreement in this case
was executed on May 28, 1990. On the same
date, an apprenticeship program was
prepared by Nitto and submitted to the
Department of Labor and Employment.
- However, it was filed only on June 7, 1990.
Notwithstanding the absence of approval by
the Department of Labor and Employment,
the apprenticeship agreement was enforced
the day it was signed.
- (Summary: they already enforced an
apprenticeship agreement even before the
program was approved by the DOLE)
Therefore, because there was no valid
apprenticeship agreement, he should be
considered as a regular employee under
Article 280 of the Labor Code and pursuant
to the constitutional mandate to protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare.

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE V. IAC

DOCTRINE
Rule X of Book III provides guidelines on
the manner by which the powers of the Labor
Secretary shall be exercised; on what records
should be kept; maintained and preserved; on
payroll; and on the exclusion of working
scholars from, and inclusion of resident
physicians in the employment coverage as far
as compliance with the substantive labor
provisions on working conditions, rest periods,
and wages, is concerned.

Rule X is merely a guide to the

enforcement of the substantive law on labor.
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not
the decisive law in a civil suit for damages
instituted by an injured person during a
vehicular accident against a working student
of a school and against the school itself.

An implementing rule on labor cannot be

used by an employer as a shield to avoid
liability under the substantive provisions of
the Civil Code.

RECIT- READY SUMMARY:

- Kapunan, Sr. was hit by a jeepney owned
by Filamer Christian Institute and driven
by its alleged employee, Funtecha.
Kapunan then filed a criminal case against
Funtecha alone, who was convicted for
serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence.
- Thereafter, pursuant to his reservation,
Kapunan instituted a civil case for
damages against Funtecha and Filamer
and its president.
- Filamer contends that it is not civilly liable
because Funtecha was not its employee,
as he was only a working scholar assigned
to clean the school premises for only 2
hours in the morning of each school day.
- Filamer cites Section 14, Rule X of Book III
of the Labor Code, which excludes
working scholars from the employment
coverage as far as substantive labor
provisions on working conditions, rest
periods, and wages is concerned.

Issue- WON Funtecha an employee of Filamer?

YES
- It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working
student, being a part-time janitor and a
scholar of Filamer. He was, in relation to the
school, an employee even if he was assigned
to clean the school premises for only 2 hours
in the morning of each school day.
- Funtecha was driving for the service for
which the jeep was intended by the school.
Thus, the act of Funtecha in taking over the
steering wheel was one done for and in
behalf of his employer for which act the
petitioner-school cannot deny any
responsibility by arguing that it was done
beyond the scope of his janitorial duties.
- Funtecha does not need an official
appointment for a driver's position in order
for Petitioner to be held responsible for his
grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that
the act of driving at the time of the incident
was for the benefit of the petitioner.
- Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules
implementing the Labor Code, on which the
petitioner anchors its defense only for the
purpose of administering and enforcing the
provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of
employment. Rule X of Book III provides
guidelines on the manner by which the
powers of the Labor Secretary shall be
exercised; on what records should be kept;
maintained and preserved; on payroll; and
on the exclusion of working scholars from,
and inclusion of resident physicians in the
employment coverage as far as compliance
with the substantive labor provisions on
working conditions, rest periods, and wages,
is concerned.
- In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to
the enforcement of the substantive law on
labor. The Court, thus, makes the distinction
and so holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III
of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil
suit for damages instituted by an injured
 person during a vehicular accident against a
working student of a school and against the
school itself.
- This case does not deal with a labor dispute
on conditions of employment between an
alleged employee and an alleged employer.
It invokes a claim brought by one for
damages for injury caused by the patently
negligent acts of a person, against both doer-
employee and his employer.
- Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule
on labor to disregard the primary liability of
an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on
labor cannot be used by an employer as a
shield to avoid liability under the substantive
provisions of the Civil Code.

ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC. V. SEBOLINO

DOCTRINE:
An apprenticeship program is similar to
probationary period in a sense that the
employer cannot mandate the
employee/apprentice to undergo a second trial
period. However, it may be possible if the
second trial period was voluntarily agreed upon.

RECIT- READY SUMMARY:

 - Complainants (check full digest for full list)
filed a complaint against Atlanta, a domestic
corporation engaged in the manufacture of
steel pipes, for illegal dismissal,
regularization, underpayment, nonpayment
of wages and other money claims, as well as
claims for moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees.
- Complainants claimed that they had attained
regular status as they were allowed to work
with Atlanta for more than six (6) months
from the start of a purported apprenticeship
agreement between them and the company.
They claimed that they were illegally
dismissed when the apprenticeship
agreement expired.
- Atlanta argued that the workers were not
entitled to regularization and to their money
claims because they were engaged as
apprentices under a government-approved
apprenticeship program. They also claimed
that their names did not appear in the list of
employees (Master List) prior to their
engagement as apprentices.
ISSUE: Whether Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and
Sagun were apprentices or regular employees –
REGULAR EMPLOYEES

- The SC said that after the termination of the

first apprenticeship program, Sebolino, et.
al. already acquired regular status as
 employees of Atlanta. In this case, Sebolino,
et. al. were already rendering service to the
company as employees before they were
made to undergo the 2nd apprenticeship.
They occupied positions such as machine
operator, scaleman, and extruder operator,
all of which are necessary and desirable to
Atlanta’s usual business as a plastic
manufacturer.
- Even if we recognize the company’s need to
train its employees through apprenticeship,
only the first apprenticeship agreement can
be considered. With the expiration of the first
apprenticeship, Atlanta had to recognize the
completion of their training and their
acquisition of a regular employee status. To
foist upon them the second apprenticeship
agreement for a second skill which was not
even mentioned in the agreement itself is a
violation of the Labor Code’s IRR and is
manifestly unfair to the employees.
- As regards the consecutive apprenticeships,
the Court ruled that 2nd apprenticeship is
invalid because they were training for
something beyond the work they were
supposedly training for. Some employees
signed for 5 months for skill 1, then after that
sign another for skill 2.
 - To require employees to take a second skill is
UNFAIR. Attempt of employer to circumvent
security of tenure. An apprenticeship
program is similar to probationary period in
a sense that the employer cannot mandate
the employee/apprentice to undergo a
second trial period. However, it may be
possible if the second trial period was
voluntarily agreed upon.

EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS

GENERAL MILLING CORP V. TORRES, ET AL.

DOCTRINE:
Art. 40 states that: the employment permit
may be issued to a non resident alien or to the
applicant employer after a determination of
the non-availability of a person in the
Philippines who is competent, able and willing
at the time of application to perform the
services for which the alien is desired.

The SOLE has the discretion to determine

whether or not employment of an alien would
redound to the national interest as provided by
 the permissive language of Art 40 and the
objectives set forth in Art 12.

RECIT- READY SUMMARY:

- Earl Cone (US citizen) was issued an Alien
Employment Permit (AEP) as sports
consultant and assistant coach for General
Milling Corp (GMC).
- Later, private respondent Basketball
Coaches Association of the Philippines
(BCAP) appealed the issuance of said AEP
to Secretary of Labor (SOLE), the SOLE
ordered the cancellation of the permit on
the ground that there was no showing that
there is no person in the Philippines who is
competent, able and willing to perform the
services required nor that the hiring of
Cone would redound to the national
interest.

ISSUE: WON the SOLE have the discretion to

determine whether or not employment of an
alien would redound to the national interest?
YES, permissive language Art. 40 and the
objectives set forth in Art. 12

- *insert doctrine* The permissive language

employed in the Labor Code indicates that
the authority granted involves the exercise
of discretion on the part of the issuing
 authority. Furthermore, Art 12 of the Labor
Code sets forth a statement of objectives
that the SOLE should, and indeed must, take
into account in exercising his authority and
jurisdiction granted by the Labor Code. Thus,
GMC cannot argue that hiring a foreigner is
an exercise of management prerogative. The
right to choose who to employ is limited by
the requirement of an AEP.
- RE Equal protection issue: GMC said that
Cone’s case is the same as Norman Black.
SC said that Black is a long time resident of
the country. Art 40 does not apply to him.
Art. 40 only applies to non-resident aliens.

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF

EDUCATORS v. QUISUMBING

DOCTRINE:
Dislocation Factor and Foreign Hires’ limited
tenure cannot serve as valid bases for
distinction in salary rates. While the Court
recognizes the need of the School to attract
foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an
enticement to prejudice local-hires. The
principle of “equal pay for equal work” applies
to the School, its “international character”
notwithstanding. The dislocation factor and
limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are
adequately compensated by certain benefits
accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-
hires, such as housing, transportation,
shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel
allowances.

RECIT- READY SUMMARY:

- Private Respondent International School,
Inc. (ISM) is a domestic education
institution established primarily for
dependents of foreign diplomatic
personnel and other temporary residents.
- The School hires both foreign and local
teachers as members of its faculty,
classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-
hires and (2) local-hires.
- The School grants foreign-hires certain
benefits not accorded local-hires. These
include housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes, and home leave travel
allowance.
- Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate
twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-
hires. The School justifies the difference on
two "significant economic disadvantages"
foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a)
the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited
tenure.
- Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire
 classification employed by the School is
discriminatory to Filipinos and that the
grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires
constitutes racial discrimination. School
alleges that the difference on the salaries
was due to the disadvantages foreign-hires
have to endure (as stated above).
Furthermore, the compensation scheme is
simply the School's adaptive measure to
remain competitive on an international
level in terms of attracting competent
professionals in the field of international
education.
- Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment
upheld the point-of-hire classification for the
distinction in salary rates and ruled in favor
of ISM. It said that there is reasonable
classification based on substantial
distinctions. He said that “equal pay for equal
work” does not find application in the
present case because the international
character of the School requires the hiring of
foreign personnel to deal with different
nationalities and different cultures, among
the student population. He also recognized
the existence of a system of salaries and
benefits accorded to foreign hired personnel
which system is universally recognized.
Issue is Whether the disparity in the salaries of
local hires and foreign hires is discriminatory?
YES

- The Constitution directs the State to promote

"equality of employment opportunities for
all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that
the State shall "ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or
creed." Provisions in the Constitution, Labor
Code and at the same time the ICESCR
established the accepted principle of "equal
pay for equal work” in this jurisdiction.
Persons who work with substantially equal
qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility,
under similar conditions, should be paid
similar salaries. This rule applies to the
School, its "international character"
notwithstanding.
- [DOCTRINE] Dislocation Factor and Foreign
Hires’ limited tenure cannot serve as valid
bases for distinction in salary rates. While the
Court recognizes the need of the School to
attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be
used as an enticement to prejudice local-
hires.
- The principle of “equal pay for equal work”
applies to the School, its “international
character” notwithstanding. The dislocation
 factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-
hires are adequately compensated by certain
benefits accorded them which are not
enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes and
home leave travel allowances.

MCBURNIE V. GANZON, EGI MANUFACTURERS

DOCTRINE:
Any alien seeking admission to the
Philippines for employment purposes and
any domestic or foreign employer who
desires to engage an alien for employment
in the Philippines shall obtain an
employment permit from the Department of
Labor.

RECIT- READY SUMMARY:

McBurnie, an Australian national, instituted a
complaint for illegal dismissal and other
monetary claims against the respondents.
McBurnie claimed that on May 11, 1999, he
signed a five-year employment agreement
with the company EGI as an Executive Vice
President who shall oversee the management
of the company’s hotels and resorts within the
Philippines. He performed work for the
company until sometime in November 1999,
when he figured in an accident that compelled
him to go back to Australia while recuperating
from his injuries. While in Australia, he was
informed by respondent Ganzon that his
services were no longer needed because their
intended project would no longer push
through.

The respondents opposed the complaint,

contending that their agreement with
McBurnie was to jointly invest in and establish
a company for the management of hotels.
They did not intend to create an employer-
employee relationship, and the execution of
the employment contract that was being
invoked by McBurnie was solely for the
purpose of allowing McBurnie to obtain an
alien work permit in the Philippines. At the
time McBurnie left for Australia for his medical
treatment, he had not yet obtained a work
permit.

ISSUE: WON McBurnie, an Australian national

can be considered as an employee of Ganzon
and as such, he was illegally dissmissed? NO

- First, before a case for illegal dismissal can

prosper, an employer-employee relationship
must first be established. Although an
employment agreement forms part of the
 case records, respondent Ganzon signed it
with the notation "per my note."
- The respondents have sufficiently explained
that the note refers to the letter which
embodied certain conditions for the
employment’s effectivity.
- However, the said conditions, particularly on
the successful completion of the project
financing for the hotel project in Baguio City
and McBurnie’s acquisition of an Alien
Employment Permit, failed to materialize.
- Second, McBurnie failed to present any
employment permit which would have
authorized him to obtain employment in the
Philippines. This circumstance negates
McBurnie’s claim that he had been
performing work for the respondents by
virtue of an employer employee relationship.
- The absence of the employment permit
instead bolsters the claim that the supposed
employment of McBurnie was merely
simulated, or did not ensue due to the non-
fulfillment of the conditions that were set
forth in the letter of May 11, 1999.
- Third, besides the employment agreement,
McBurnie failed to present other competent
evidence to prove his claim of an employer-
employee relationship. Given the parties’
 conflicting claims on their true intention in
executing the agreement, it was necessary
to resort to the established criteria for the
determination of an employer-employee
relationship, namely: (1) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (2) the
payment of wages; (3) the power of
dismissal; and (4) the power to control the
employee’s conduct.
- The rule of thumb remains: the onus
probandi falls on the claimant to establish or
substantiate the claim by the requisite
quantum of evidence. Whoever claims
entitlement to the benefits provided by law
should establish his or her right thereto.
- McBurnie failed in this regard. As previously
observed by the NLRC, McBurnie even failed
to show through any document such as
payslips or vouchers that his salaries during
the time that he allegedly worked for the
respondents were paid by the company. In
the absence of an employer-employee
relationship between McBurnie and the
respondents, McBurnie could not
successfully claim that he was dismissed,
much less illegally dismissed, by the latter.
- Even granting that there was such an
employer-employee relationship, the records
 are barren of any document showing that its
termination was by the respondents’
dismissal of McBurnie.

PRINCIPLES AND DEFINITIONS

JMM PROMOTIONS v. NLRC

DOCTRINE:
In addition to the cash and surety bonds and
the escrow money, an appeal bond in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award is
required to perfect an appeal from a decision
of the POEA.

RECIT- READY SUMMARY:

- Prior to the present case, Respondent NLRC
issued an Order dismissing petitioner’s
appeal from a decision of the POEA on the
ground of failure to post the required
appeal bond.
- It cited 2nd par. of Art. 223 of the LC,
providing that in the case of a judgment
involving a monetary award, an appeal by
the employer may be perfected only upon
the posting of a cash or surety bond
issued in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed
from.
- Petitioner contends that NLRC committed
 GAD in applying these rules in POEA’s
decisions, insisting that appeal bond is
unnecessary in case of licensed recruiters
for overseas employment as they are
already required by the POEA rules to pay a
license fee of 30k, cash bond of 100k, and
surety bond of 50k, as well as it having
placed in escrow 200k to primarily answer
for valid and legal claims of recruited
workers as a result of recruitment
violations or money claims.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner is still required to

post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from
a decision of the POEA to the NLRC, despite
having posted the total bond of P150k and
placed in escrow P200k, as required by the
POEA Rules? — YES

- The appeal bond is intended to further

insure the payment of the monetary award
in favor of the employee if it is eventually
affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
- Cash and surety bonds and the money
placed in escrow are supposed to
guarantee the payment of all valid and
legal claims against the employer, but
these claims are not limited to monetary
awards to employees whose contracts of
 employment have been violated.
- The POEA can go against these bonds also
for violations by the recruiter of the
conditions of its license, the provisions of
the Labor Code and its IRR, E.O. 247
(reorganizing POEA) and the POEA Rules,
as well as the settlement of other liabilities
the recruiter may incur. As for the escrow
agreement, it was presumably intended to
provide for a standing fund, as it were, to
be used only as a last resort and not to be
reduced with the enforcement against it of
every claim of recruited workers that may
be adjudged against the employer.
- This amount may not even be enough to
cover such claims and, even if it could
initially, may eventually be exhausted after
satisfying other subsequent claims. As it
happens, the decision sought to be
appealed grants a monetary award of
about P170,000 to the dismissed
employee, the herein private respondent.
- The standby guarantees required by the
POEA Rules would be depleted if this award
were to be enforced not against the appeal
bond but against the bonds and the escrow
money, making them inadequate for the
satisfaction of the other obligations the
 recruiter may incur.
- It is possible for the monetary award in
favor of the employee to exceed the
amount of P350,000, which is the sum of
the bonds and escrow money required of
the recruiter.
- Overseas recruiters are subject to more
stringent requirement because of the
special risks to which our workers abroad
are subjected by their foreign employers,
against whom there is usually no direct or
effective recourse.
- The overseas recruiter is solidarily liable
with a foreign employer. The bonds and
the escrow money are intended to insure
more care on the part of the local agent in
its choice of the foreign principal to whom
our overseas workers are to be sent.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE

EXPORTERS, INC. v. DRILON

DOCTRINE:
"Protection to labor" does not signify the
promotion of employment alone. What
concerns the Constitution more paramountly is
that such an employment be above all, decent,
just, and humane. It is bad enough that the
country has to send its sons and daughters to
strange lands because it cannot satisfy their
employment needs at home. Under these
circumstances, the Government is duty-bound
to insure that our toiling expatriates have
adequate protection, personally and
economically, while away from home.

RECIT- READY SUMMARY:

- The Philippine Association of Service
Exporters, Inc. [PASEI] is a firm engaged
principally in the recruitment of Filipino
Workers, male and female, for overseas
placement.
- It challenges Dept. Order 1, series of 1988,
providing guidelines for the temporary
suspension of deployment of Filipino
domestic and household workers.
Specifically, the measure is assailed for
discrimination against males or females,
that it does not apply to all Filipino workers
but only to domestic helpers and females
with similar skills; that it is violative of the
right to travel; and is an invalid exercise of
the lawmaking power, police power being
legislative and not executive in character.
- PASEI also invokes Sec. 3 Art. XIII of the
Constitution providing for worker
participation in policy and decision-making
 processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law.
- It also invokes the non-impairment clause
and alleges an irreparable injury.

ISSUE: W/N THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF

EMPLOYMENT IS VALID?
YES. It constitutes a valid exercise of police
power, which is an implied limitation on the Bill
of Rights. Police power is limited by the
requirement that it not be exercised arbitrarily
or unreasonably.

- As a general rule, official acts enjoy a

presumed validity. The petitioner has shown
no satisfactory reason why the contested
measure should be nullified. There is no
question that the order applies only to
“female contract workers,” but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination
between the sexes.
- It is well-settled that “equality before the
law” under the Constitution does not import
a perfect identity of rights among all men
and women. It admits of classification,
provided that [1] such classifications rest on
substantial distinctions, [2] they are germane
to the purposes of the law, [3] they are not
confined to existing conditions, and [4] they
 apply equally to all members of the same
class.
- In this case, the Court is well aware of the
unhappy plight that has befallen our female
labor force abroad, especially domestic
servants, amid exploitative working
conditions marked by, in not a few cases,
physical and personal abuse.
- On the other hand, the same cannot be said
of our male workers. There is no evidence
that, except perhaps for isolated instances,
our men abroad have been afflicted with an
identical predicament.
- The court held that it is largely a matter of
evidence [that women domestic workers are
being ill-treated abroad in massive
instances] and not upon some fanciful or
arbitrary yardstick that the Government
acted in this case.
- As to the executive exercise of the law-
making power, the judiciary has great
respect for the determinations of the Chief
Executive, especially when the legislature
itself has specifically given them enough
room on how the law should be effectively
enforced. In this case, the Labor Code itself
grants the DOLE secretary rule-making
powers for its implementation.
 - Petitioner’s reliance on the Constitutional
guaranty of worker participation in “policy
and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits” is not well taken.
- The right granted must submit to the
demands and necessities of the state’s
power of regulation. In section3, Art XIII, the
Constitution provides that the state shall
afford full protection to labor. (see doctrine)

PNB v. CABANSAG

DOCTRINE:
The Court reiterates the basic policy that all
Filipino workers, whether employed locally or
overseas, enjoy the protective mantle of
Philippine labor and social legislations. Our
labor statutes may not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or stipulations agreed upon, in a foreign
country.

RECIT- READY SUMMARY:

- Cabansag was hired as a Brance Credit
Officer in PNB’s Singapore branch and was
accepted by the President due to her
credentials. The VP was the one who
supervised her work and upon submission
of her performance report, she was told
“good work.” However, one night 2 of her
 co-employees holding other positions told
her that her resignation was demanded by
the VP.
- Cabansag was shocked so she confirmed
this with the VP the day after and found
out that a demand for her resignation was
underway. After several refusals on
Cabansag’s part to tender a letter of
resignation, she was formally dismissed
thru a letter.
- The VP cited several reasons for her
resignation such as the selling-off of the
branch office which will inevitable lead to
her resignation anyway and a need for a
chinese-speaking replacement for her
position [and one was actually already
hired to replace her]. The LA, NLRC, and
CA ruled in favor of Cabansag and held
that she was illegally terminated because
her right to due process was respected.

ISSUE/S:
1. W/N labor arbiters have jursdiction—YES
2. W/N the respondent was illegally
dismissed, and therefore, entitled to
recover moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees— YES

On venue: The NLRC Rules of Procedure

provides that in cases of OFW, their
complaints shall be filed before the Regional
Arbitration Branch where the complainant
resides or where the principal office of
respondent/employer is situated, at the option
of the complainant. Under the "Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995"
(RA 8042), a migrant worker "refers to a
person who is to be engaged, is engaged or
has been engaged in a remunerated activity in
a state of which he or she is not a legal
resident; to be used interchangeably with
overseas Filipino worker."

As such, it is her option to choose the venue of

her Complaint against petitioner for illegal
dismissal. The law gives her two choices: (1)
At the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB)
where she resides or (2) At the RAB where the
principal office of her employer is situated.

On illegal dismissal: Cabansag was not notified of

the specific act or omission for which her
dismissal was being sought. Neither was she
given any chance to be heard, as required by
law. At any rate, even if she were given the
opportunity to be heard, she could not have
defended herself effectively, for she knew no
cause to answer to. She was illegally dismissed
and entitled to moral damages because she
suffered and continues to suffer mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock and social
humiliation.