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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

The Peace Palace

The Hague, The Netherlands

The 2024 Philip C. Jessup International Law

Moot Court Competition

THE CASE CONCERNING THE STERREN FORTY

THE REPUBLIC OF ANTRANO

(Applicant)

THE KINGDOM OF REMISIA

(Respondent)

MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. ANTRANO HAS ERGA OMNES PARTES AND ERGA OMNES STANDING TO

BRING THE DISPUTE CONCERNING REMISIA’S DEPRIVATION OF
NATIONALITY OF THE STERREN FORTY BEFORE THE COURT............................... 1
A. Antrano does not need to establish a special interest. ................................................... 1
B. Antrano has erga omnes partes standing to launch this claim. ..................................... 2
1. States parties to the CRS have a common interest in preventing statelessness. .............. 2
2. Article 8 of the CRS is an erga omnes partes obligation. ............................................... 4
3. Article 9 of the CRS is an erga omnes partes obligation. ............................................... 5
C. Antrano has erga omnes standing to launch this claim. ................................................ 5
1. The right to a nationality and the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality are
obligations erga omnes. .......................................................................................................... 6
II. REMISIA VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW BY DEPRIVING THE STERREN
FORTY OF THEIR NATIONALITY AND RENDERING THEM STATELESS. ............... 9
A. Remisia violated its obligations under the CRS. ............................................................ 9
1. Remisia violated Article 8(1) of the CRS. .................................................................... 10
2. Remisia violated Article 9 of the CRS. ......................................................................... 13
B. Remisia violated the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality.................. 14
1. Remisia is bound by the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality. ............... 14
2. Remisia violated the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality. ..................... 14
III. ANTRANO DID NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN IT REFUSED
TO PROVIDE REMISIA CONSULAR ACCESS TO MS. SAKI SHAW DURING HER
TIME AS A PRISONER IN ANTRANO. ................................................................................ 16
A. Remisia was not entitled to exercise consular protection over Shaw. ........................ 16
1. The effective nationality test in Nottebohm applies. ..................................................... 17
2. Shaw was not a Remisian national under international law. ........................................ 18
3. Antrano is not estopped from denying Shaw’s Remisian nationality. .......................... 19
B. Shaw did not exhaust local remedies............................................................................. 21
C. If Remisia was entitled to exercise consular protection over Shaw, Antrano’s actions
complied with international law. ........................................................................................... 21
1. If applicable, Antrano did not violate its obligations under Article 36, subparagraphs
1(A) and (C). ......................................................................................................................... 21
2. If applicable, Antrano did not violate its obligations under Article 36, subparagraphs
1(A) and (C). ......................................................................................................................... 24
IV. REMISIA VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW BY DENYING DR. TULOUS
MALEX ENTRY TO REMISIA AS REQUIRED BY SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 99997. ................................................................................................................ 25
A. Resolution 99997 imposed legal obligations on Remisia to grant entry to Malex..... 25
1. The terms of Resolution 99997 confirm a binding obligation to grant entry. .............. 27
2. Decisions under Article 34 are binding under Article 25. ............................................ 27

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3. The context, object, and purpose of Resolution 99997. ................................................ 28

B. Remisia violated its obligations to grant entry to Malex. ............................................ 29
C. Remisia’s violations cannot be defended as countermeasures.................................... 30
D. This Court cannot review the invocation of Article 34. ............................................... 30
E. This Court cannot review the invocation of Article 34. ............................................... 31

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

UN Documents

A/HRC/13/34 (2009) 7

A/HRC/19/43 (2011) 7

A/HRC/25/28 (2013) 7

A/HRC/31/29 (2015) 7

A/HRC/RES/10/13 (2009) 9

A/HRC/RES/13/2 (2010) 5

A/HRC/RES/20/4 (2012) 12

A/HRC/RES/26/14 (2014) 7

A/HRC/RES/32/5 (2016) 14

A/HRC/RES/7/10 (2008) 14

A/RES/50/152 (1995) 7

A/RES/53/125 (1996) 7

A/RES/59/34 (2004) 7

A/RES/61/136 (2006) 7

A/RES/67/149 (2012) 7

A/RES/68/141 (2013) 7

A/RES/71/1 (2016) 25

CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004) 13

CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994) 22

CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999) 30

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CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011) 24

CCPR/C/GC/37 (2020) 16, 17

CEDAW General Recommendation No. 21 (1994) 7

CERD General Recommendation XXX on Discrimination Against Non- 7

Citizens (2002)

E.CN.4/RES/1997/36 (1997) 7

E.CN.4/RES/1998/48 (1998) 7

E/CN.4/RES/1999/28 (1999) 7

E/CN.4/RES/2005/45 (2005) 7

General Assembly Official Records, 16th session, Supplement no. 1A, 25

A/4800/Add. 1

HRI/MC/2007/5 13

International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with 22

Commentaries (2006)

International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the responsibility of 30

International Organizations (2011)

International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Consular Relations with 24

Commentaries (1961)

International Law Commission, First Report on Diplomatic Protection by 16, 17

the Special Rapporteur, Mr. John R. Dugard (2000)

International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for 2, 5, 32

Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) A/56/49

International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 2, 3, 5

Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries (2001), ILC Yearbook,
Vol.II(2)

International Law Commission, Guide to Practice on Reservations to 10, 11, 12, 13,
Treaties, A/66/10 (2011) 14

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Manley O. Hudson, Special Rapporteur on Nationality Including 18

Statelessness, Rep. on Nationality Including Statelessness (1952) ILC,
A/CN.4/50

Official Records of the United Nations Conference on Consular Relations, 22, 28

Vienna (1963) A/CONF.25/16/Add.1, Vol. II, 24

Position of the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of 8

human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism on
citizenship stripping in North-East Syria (February 2022)

S/PV-167, U.N. Security Council, Second Year, Official Records, No. 65, 28, 32
167th Meeting (1947)

S/PV-168, U.N. Security Council, Second Year, Official Records, No. 65, 28
168th Meeting (1947)

UN Office of Legal Affairs, Facsimile to the Chief of the Special Procedures 29

Centre for Human Rights, United Nations Office in Geneva (1996) UNJYB

UN Security Council Resolution 15 (1946), S/Res/15 32

UN Security Council Resolution 39 (1948), S/Res/39 32

UNGA Res 56/83 (2001) UN Doc A/RES/56/83 32

UNHCR General Conclusion No. 102(LVI) (2005) 7

UNHCR General Conclusion No. 106(LVI) (2006) 7

UNHCR General Conclusion No. 78(XLVI) (1995) 7

UNHCR, Addressing Statelessness through the Rule of Law (2022) 5, 9

UNHCR, Expert Meeting: Interpreting the 1961 Statelessness Convention 8, 10, 11, 13,
and Avoiding Statelessness resulting from Loss and Deprivation of 14, 15
Nationality (2014)

UNHCR, Guidelines on Statelessness No.5, HCR/GS/20/05 (2020) 5, 10, 11, 13,

14, 15

UNHCR, Preventing and Reducing Statelessness: The 1961 Convention on 3

the Reduction of Statelessness (2014)

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UNHCR, The Statelessness Conventions Campaign: Why States Should 29, 31

Accede to the 1954 and 1961 Statelessness Conventions (2010)

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, 217 A (III) 7

Treaties, Conventions

African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1990 7

American Convention on Human Rights, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 7

Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI 27, 28, 29, 30,
31, 32

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 7

Document, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13

Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, 1957, 309 U.N.T.S 65 7

Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S 175 2, 4, 5, 10, 13

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2007 U.N.T.S 3 7

Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S 3 7

European Convention on Nationality, 1997, 2135 U.N.T.S 213 7

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 7

Discrimination, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S 195

International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 7

Workers and Members of their Families, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1996, 999 U.N.T.S 171 7

Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights, 15 September 1994 7

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 16, 22, 24

Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, 1969 U.N.T.S 331 3, 4, 11

International Court of Justice Cases

Application of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 1, 2

Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Canada and the Netherlands/Syrian

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Arab Republic), [2023] ICJ Rep 2

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 5, 6

Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina/Serbia and
Montenegro), [1996] ICJ Rep 595

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Crime of Genocide (The Gambia/Myanmar), [2022] ICJ Rep 477

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 31

Crime of Genocide, [1993] Provisional Measures, ICJ Rep 325

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 5

Congo/Rwanda), [2006] ICJ Rep 6

Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico/United States of America), 22, 23

Judgment, [2004] ICJ Rep 12

Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited 1, 5, 6, 19

(Belgium/Spain), [1970] ICJ Rep 3

Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 8

(United States/Iran), [1980] ICJ Rep 3

Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the 30, 31
Charter), Advisory Opinion, [1962] ICJ Rep 151

Corfu Channel Case (Merits), [1949] ICJ Rep 4 24

East Timor (Portugal/Australia), [1995] ICJ Rep 90 5, 6

Electronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI), Judgment, [1989] ICJ Rep 15 22

Jadhav Case (India/Pakistan), Declaration of Judge Sebutinde, [2019] ICJ 16, 23, 24
Rep 494

Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 25, 26, 30
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, [1971] ICJ Rep 16

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 6

Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, [2004] ICJ Rep 136

Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania/Ukraine), [2009] ICJ Rep 10

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61

North Sea Continental Shelf, [1969] ICJ Rep 3 8

Nottebohm (Liechtenstein/Guatemala), [1995] ICJ Rep 4 8, 16, 17, 18,

19, 20, 23

Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran/United States of America), 24

Judgement, [2003] ICJ Rep 161

Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal 28, 30, 31, 32
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya/United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, [1992], ICJ Rep 3

Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

(Belgium/Senegal), [2012] ICJ Rep 422

South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia/South Africa; Liberia/South Africa), 32

Preliminary Objections, [1962] ICJ Rep 319

Permanent Court of International Justice Cases

Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory Opinion, 32

[1923] PCIJ Rep Ser B, No 4

Other International Cases

Anudo Ochieng Anudo v. United Republic of Tanzania, [2018] African Court 8, 15

on Human and Peoples’ Rights

Belilos v. Switzerland, [1998] European Court of Human Rights Application 12

No. 10328/83

Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, [2014] 8

Inter-American Court of Human Rights

Dickson Car Wheel Company v. United Mexican States, [1931] 4 R.I.A.A. 9

669

El derecho a la informacion sobre la asistencia consular en el marco de las 24

garantlas del debidoproceso legal, [1999] Advisory Opinion, Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, OC/16/99

Eudoro Armando Olguín v. Republic of Paraguay, [2001] ICSID Case No 16, 17

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ARB/98/5

Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, [2001] Inter-American Court of Human 12, 13

Rights

Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America, [1984] IUSCT Case 17

No. A-18, DEC 32-A18-FT

Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, [2010] European Court Reports I- 15

01449

Loizidou v. Turkey, [1995] European Court of Human Rights Application 12, 18

No. 15318/89

Partial Award (Civil Claims - Eritrea’s Claims 15, 16, 23, 37-32), [2004] 8
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission

Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of 8, 18

Costa Rica, [1984] OC-4/84, Inter-American Court of Human Rights

Prosecutor v Duško Tadić aka Dule, Decision on the defence motion on 31

jurisdiction, [1995] IT-94-1-T, ICTY

Responsibilities and obligations of States with respect to activities in the 6

Area, Advisory Opinion, [2011] ITLOS Rep 10

Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, [2010] ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, 18

Award

Weber v. Switzerland, [1990] European Court of Human Rights Application 12

No. 11034/84

Domestic Cases

Pham v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2018] EWCA Civ 8
2064

Trop v. Dulles, 356 US 86 (1958) 8

Books

Bruno Simma et al, eds, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 27, 28, 30, 31,
Volume I, 3rd Edition (2012) 32

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Christian Tomuschat, “Ch. 1. Purposes and Principles, Article 2(3)” 32

Greg Nolte, “Ch.1. Purposes and Principles, Article 2(7)” 32

Anne Peters, “Ch. V. The Security Council Functions and Powers, 27, 28, 30, 31
Article 25”

Theodor Schweisfurth, “Ch VI. Pacific Settlement of Disputes, 27, 27, 31

Article 34”

H.F. Van Panhuys, The Role of Nationality in International Law (1959) 17

Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1958) 8

Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, A Critical Analysis of its 27, 28
Fundamental Problems (1950)

J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th 16, 17, 22

ed (2012)

Jorunn Brandvoll, “Deprivation of nationality” Nationality and Statelessness 15

under International Law (2014)

Kate Parlett, The Individual in the International Legal System: Continuity 9

and Change in International Law (2011)

LM Goodrich and AP Simons, United Nations and the Maintenance of Peace 28

and Security (Brookings Institution 1955)

Mark Manly & Laura Van Waas, “The Value of the Human Security 8
Framework in Addressing Statelessness” Human Security and Non-
Citizens (2010)

Michael Schoiswohl, IV Immunities and Privileges, X Laissez-Passer, 29, 30

Laissez-Passer (2016)

Mirna Adjami, Statelessness and Nationality in Côte D’Ivoire (2016) 9

Paolo Picone, “The Distinction between Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga 6
Omnes” The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention (2011)

Ruth Donner, The Regulation of Nationality in International Law (1994) 17

Sydney D. Bailey, and Sam Daws, 'Voting', The Procedure of the UN 25, 28

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Security Council, 3rd edn (1998)

Secondary Sources

Amal de Chickera, “Statelessness and Identity in the Rohingya Refugee 9

Crisis” (2018)

Anthony Miller, United Nations Experts on Mission and their Privileges and 29
Immunities, (2007) International Organizations Law Review

Dapo Akabe, The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is 30, 31
There Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the
United Nations, (1997) 46:2 Inti & CLQ 309

George Tridimas, “Constitutional monarchy as power sharing”” (2021) 32 11

Constitutional Political Economy

Ian Brownlie, The Relations of Nationality in Public International 16

Law, (1963) 39 Brit YB Int'l L 284

IC MacGibbon, Estoppel in International Law, (1958) 7:3 Inti & CLQ 468 20

Jacques Maury, L'arret Nottebohm et La Condition de Nationalite 22

Effective, (1958) 23 Zeitschrift fur auslandisches und internationales
Privatrecht

John Quigley, Procedural Limitations on Capital Punishment: The Case of 22, 24, 25
Foreign Nationals, (2000) 6 ILSA J. INT'l & COMP. L. 519

Maria Jose Recalde-Vela, Access to Redress for Stateless Persons Under 1, 9

International Law: Challenges and Opportunities, (2019) 24:2 TilburgLRev.

Michael Wood, The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions, (1998) 2 26, 27, 28, 29
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law

Oona Hathaway, Alaa Hachem & Justin Cole, “A New Tool for Enforcing 2, 3
Human Rights: Erga Omnes Partes Standing,” (2024) 61:2
ColumbJTransnat’lL

Pok Yin S. Chow, “On Obligations Erga Omnes Partes,” (2021) 52:2 3, 5
GeoJInt’lL

Robert D. Sloane, Breaking the Genuine Link: The Contemporary 17

International Legal Regulation of Nationality, 2009 50 Harv Intl LJ 1

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Tamás Molnár, “The Prohibition of Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality 8

under International Law and EU Law: New Perspectives,” (2015) Hungarian
YB Int’l & Eur Law

Yoshifumi Tanaka, “The Legal Consequences of Obligations Erga Omnes in 5, 6

International Law,” (2021) 68:1 NethInt’lLRev

Other Documents

117th Congress (2021-2022) No Travel for Traffickers Act of 18

2022, H.R.6911.

European Commission, Investor citizenship scheme: Commission refers 18

MALTA to the Court of Justice (Brussels, 2022)

European Commission, Joint Statement on further restrictive economic 18

measures (2022)

Human Rights Watch, “Bahrain: Hundreds Stripped of Citizenship” (2018) 5

Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Canada imposes a visa 18

requirement on Antigua and Barbuda (2017)

Instituit de Droit International, The National Character of an International 17

Claim Presented by a State for Injury Suffered by an Individual, Warsaw
Session (1965)

Institut de Droit International, Resolution: Obligations Erga Omnes in 2

International Law, Krakow Session (2005)

Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, Principles on Deprivation of 14

Nationality as a National Security Measure (2020)

International Federation for Human Rights, “Nicaragua: Serious human 5

rights impacts caused by arbitrary deprivation of nationality” (2023)

Secretary of State for the Home Department, Statement of Changes in 18

Immigration Rules (2023), UIN HCWS979

Valeria Bello, Is the discussion of ‘Statelessness’ in the UN Security Council 29, 31

a question of human security or international security? (2014), Policy Report
No. 02/02. Barcelona: UNU-GCM

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Republic of Antrano (“Antrano”) and the Kingdom of Remisia (“Remisia”)

(collectively, “the Parties”) appear before the International Court of Justice in accordance with
Article 40(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice through submission of a Special
Agreement for the resolution of the differences between them concerning the “Sterren Forty” and
other matters. The Parties have referred the dispute to the Court, granting it jurisdiction under
Article 36(1) of the Statute. The Parties concluded the Special Agreement in The Hague, the
Netherlands, and jointly notified this Court of their Special Agreement on 14 September 2023.

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Does Antrano have standing to bring the dispute concerning Remisia’s deprivation of nationality
of its citizens before the Court?

II

Did Remisia violate international law by depriving its citizens of their nationality and rendering
them stateless?

III

Did Antrano violate international law when it refused to provide Remisia consular access to Ms.
Saki Shaw during her time in custody in Antrano?

IV

Did Remisia violate international law by denying Antranan national Dr. Tulous Malex entry to
Remisia as required by Security Council Resolution 99997?

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Overview of the Parties

Established in 1951, Antrano is a constitutional republic comprising several islands within

the Mahali Archipelago. Since its inaugural President was elected, Antrano has been committed to
promoting the rights of stateless individuals.

Approximately 11,000 kilometres away from Antrano, Remisia is a constitutional

monarchy on the Isidre Plateau. Under its Constitution of 1923, the monarch is entitled to
reverence. Remisia’s reigning monarch, Queen Khasat, ascended to the throne in 2006.

Disrespect to the Crown Act (“DCA”)

Remisia’s legislature enacted the DCA in 1955, making it an offence punishable by up to

five years imprisonment to defame, insult or threaten the reigning monarch. The DCA authorizes
the deprivation of Remisian citizenship if an individual is found guilty and a court determines their
act or speech showed disloyalty to the Crown.

Antrano and Remisia are both parties to the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
(“CSR”). Antrano was an original party, while Remisia ratified the CRS in 1967 with a declaration
under Article 8(3). Remisia’s declaration seeks to retain the authority to revoke an individual’s
citizenship and render them stateless if convicted under the DCA. Antrano and three other States
objected to Remisia’s declaration as being against the object and purpose of the CRS.

Citizenship for Sale

Following her coronation, Queen Khasat prioritized foreign investment. In 2008, Remisia
enacted the Naturalization by Investment Act, authorizing the government to grant citizenship to
applicants who invest €500,000 or more in Remisia. Remisia subsequently launched the
Naturalization by Investment Program (“NIP”), a global marketing campaign encouraging high
net worth individuals to apply for Remisian citizenship under the NIA, citing various benefits.

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Ms. Shaw Purchases Remisian Citizenship

Ms. Saki Shaw, a Molvanian national, shared a close friendship with Queen Khasat since
1988. Shaw was head of Lithos Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of Shaw Corporation, a
transnational mining conglomerate. Molvanian authorities launched a financial crimes
investigation into ShawCorp in 2014 but were unable to subpoena Shaw, who, since purchasing a
residence in Italy in 2012, had not revisited Molvania.

In November 2014, Shaw contacted Queen Khasat and proposed a joint venture in cobalt
mining between Lithos and the Remisian Ministry of Mines. This developed into the Lythos-
Remisia Cooperative (“LRC”), approved in 2015, with ownership structured as 51% for Remisia
and 49% for Lithos.

Shaw personally contributed €500,000 to Remisia’s National Infrastructure Development

Fund as part of the arrangement. Shaw, who had not visited Remisia since Queen Khasat’s
coronation in 2006, successfully applied for Remisian citizenship under the NIP and became a
naturalized Remisian citizen in June 2016. Remisian law allows for dual citizenship.

Non-Recognition of Purchased Citizenship

Antrano’s statutory non-recognition of purchased citizenship has been in effect since 2017.
Passports issued under such arrangements are not valid in Antrano, with signage at every port of
entry informing travellers of such.

Protests against Cobalt Mining

LRC applied for three mining licenses in July 2016, receiving approval from the Ministry
in August 2017. Their cobalt mining operations caused environmental and health concerns because
their facilities generated dust and emitted metallic minerals into nearby rivers.

In October 2019, LRC sought licenses for five new mines, denying any health risks. By
December 2019, the Isidre League of Student Activists (“ISLA”) called for an end to cobalt mining
because of environmental hazards.

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The Ministry approved four new licenses in January 2020. In response, ILSA organized a
nationwide strike on 3 February with more than 30,000 students. More protests erupted that week,
and police arrested seven students suspected of being coordinators. Protesters subsequently
blocked access to LRC’s mines for three weeks. Thousands of protesters vocalized that Queen
Khasat’s friendship with Shaw meant LRC’s operations were favoured at the risk of public health.

The Sterren Forty

To end the demonstrations, the Remisian police detained over 1,000 protesters on 27
February 2020. At the Sterren Palace gates, forty protesters forming a human chain were arrested.
They gained international media attention and were dubbed “the Sterren Forty.” Queen Khasat
was not in residence at the time.

The Remisian Attorney-General announced all protesters would be charged under the DCA
unless they apologized to the Queen. ILSA clarified that they did not intend to challenge the Queen
and expressed disappointment that free debate was not tolerated. Charges were ultimately filed
against 230 students, including the Sterren Forty.

Trials concluded by March 2021, all resulting in guilty verdicts. While most sentences
ranged from one to three years, the Sterren Forty received five-year sentences with citizenship
revocation. All 40 appealed to the Supreme Court of Remisia, arguing they were convicted of
political offences and would be rendered stateless. Their appeals were rejected. The Sterren Forty
are now serving their sentences within Remisia as stateless individuals. This is the first time
Remisia employed its citizenship-stripping powers under the DCA.

Diplomatic Tensions

In April 2021, Antrano’s President Iyali attempted to speak with Remisian authorities and
resolve their differences regarding the application of the DCA. Remisia declined, citing internal
affairs. In January 2022, Antrano notified the United Nations (“UN”) Security Council (“UNSC”)
that Remisia’s actions created a dispute which could endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security. Antrano sought Council action under Articles 34 and 36 of the Charter of the
United Nations, affirming that Remisia rejected its attempts to amicably resolve the dispute as
required by Article 33. Debate was scheduled for 28 March.

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Extradition Request

On 7 March 2022, Molvanian authorities replaced the 2014 subpoena for Shaw with an
arrest warrant for financial crimes and obstruction of justice. Aware of Shaw’s impending trip to
Antrano, Molvania requested her extradition from Antrano.

On 16 March, Shaw was detained by Antranan police based on the extradition request.
Shaw told her arresting officers that she was a Remisian citizen and sought to speak to the
Remisian consul. Antrano denied her request with a written notice because Antrano does not
recognize purchased citizenship. Antrano arranged for Shaw to speak with the Molvanian consul
instead, which she refused. Antrano also provided Remisia with a copy of Shaw’s notice and
recommended they coordinate with the Molvanian Consulate.

Two weeks later, Shaw died of natural causes while in Antrano’s custody.

UN Inspection Mission to Remisia (“UNIMR”)

Following its scheduled meeting, the UNSC established the UNIMR by adopting
Resolution 99997. Tasked with determining the circumstances underlying Remisia’s application
of the DCA, Antranan national Dr. Tulous Malex was selected to lead the UNIMR. Remisia wrote
to the UN Secretary-General twice, announcing that it would not permit Malex to enter Remisia
without an entry visa, which they would not grant. The Secretary-General stated that denying
Malex entry would violate Resolution 99997 and later condemned Remisia’s lack of cooperation.

On 9 August 2022, Malex was denied entry into Remisia despite his UN Certificate. The
Secretary-General referred Remisia’s refusal to the UNSC, but a resolution calling for additional
measures was vetoed by a permanent member.

Diplomatic Negotiations

On 15 August 2022, Antrano and Remisia began discussions to submit a Special

Agreement for the resolution of the differences between them concerning the Sterren Forty and
other matters to the International Court of Justice. The Parties successfully negotiated and
submitted the terms of the Special Agreement to the Registrar of the Court on 14 September 2023.

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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

OVERVIEW

Antrano has standing to invoke the responsibility of Remisia with a view to ascertaining
its failure to comply with its obligations erga omnes partes under the CRS and obligations erga
omnes to respect the right to a nationality. In depriving the Sterren Forty of their nationality and
rendering them stateless, Remisia violated its treaty obligations under the CRS and the customary
international prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality.
Antrano satisfied its obligations to provide consular access to Remisian nationals under
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (“VCCR”). Remisia was not entitled
to exercise consular protection over Shaw, who purchased Remisian citizenship and lacked an
effective link to the State.
Remisia violated its Charter and treaty obligations to facilitate Dr. Malex’s entry into the
country. Security Council Resolution 99997 was a binding Security Council decision to establish
a UNIMR which would operate in Remisia.

Antrano has standing to invoke the responsibility of Remisia with a view to ascertaining
its failure to comply with its obligations erga omnes partes and erga omnes. Antrano does not
need to establish a special interest to launch this claim.
Antrano has standing because it invokes the responsibility of Remisia for violating its
obligations erga omnes partes under Articles 8 and 9 of the CRS. States parties to the CRS have a
common interest in preventing statelessness and cannot do so effectively without a common
interest in compliance with the rules therein.
Further, Antrano has standing to invoke the responsibility of Remisia for violating its
obligations erga omnes to respect the right to a nationality and prevent the arbitrary deprivation of
nationality. These are customary international law norms concerning the basic rights of the human
person and are thus obligations erga omnes.

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II

In depriving the Sterren Forty of their nationality and rendering them stateless, Remisia
violated its treaty obligations under Articles 8 and 9 of the CRS. Remisia’s declaration under
Article 8(3) does not excuse its violation of Article 8(1) or impact its violation of Article 9.
Further, Remisia violated the customary international prohibition of arbitrary deprivation
of nationality because its actions against the Sterren Forty did not have a clear basis in law, did not
serve a legitimate purpose, and were not proportionate.

III

Antrano satisfied its obligations to provide consular access to Remisian nationals under
Article 36 of the VCCR. Remisia was not entitled to exercise consular protection over Shaw, who
purchased Remisian citizenship and lacked an effective link to the State. Further, Remisia cannot
bring this claim because Shaw did not exhaust local remedies in Antrano, and the direct injury
alleged by Remisia follows from non-recognition of Shaw’s citizenship. In any event, Antrano
complied with the Convention by providing consular notice to Remisia without delay and
exercising its obligation to provide consular access to Remisian nationals in good faith, in
accordance with Antranan law.

IV

Remisia violated its Charter and treaty obligations to facilitate Dr. Toulous Malex’s entry
into the country. Security Council Resolution 99997 was a binding Security Council decision to
establish a UN Inspection Mission which would operate in Remisia. The Resolution must be
presumed to be a valid exercise of the Council’s Article 34 powers of investigation under the
Charter, and obliged Remisia to grant entry to investigators. Remisia violated its obligations under
Article 25 to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council by refusing to grant entry
to the UNIMR lead, Dr. Malex. Further, Remisia violated its obligation under Section 26 of the
CPI by failing to facilitate a speedy issuance of an entry visa for a UN Expert. Remisia cannot
defend its violations as legal countermeasures against the Security Council, or Antrano.

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PLEADINGS

I. ANTRANO HAS ERGA OMNES PARTES AND ERGA OMNES STANDING TO BRING THE DISPUTE
CONCERNING REMISIA’S DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY OF THE STERREN FORTY
BEFORE THE COURT.

1. Antrano has standing as an indirectly injured State because Remisia violated its obligations
erga omnes partes and erga omnes in depriving the Sterren Forty of their nationality and rendering
them stateless. Antrano does not need to establish a special interest to launch this claim [A].
Antrano has standing to invoke the responsibility of Remisia for violating its obligations erga
omnes partes under Articles 8 and 9 of the CRS [B]. Further, Antrano has standing to invoke the
responsibility of Remisia for violating its obligations erga omnes to respect the right to a
nationality and prevent the arbitrary deprivation of nationality [C].

A. ANTRANO DOES NOT NEED TO ESTABLISH A SPECIAL INTEREST.

2. Antrano does not need to establish a special interest or show that the victims are its
nationals to launch this claim. Rather, Antrano is entitled to invoke the responsibility of Remisia
with a view to ascertaining its failure to comply with its obligations erga omnes partes and erga
omnes.1 The raison d’être of the erga omnes (partes) doctrine is that, without it, a State could
evade accountability by breaching fundamental rules in a way that did not directly injure any
particular State.2 Requiring a special interest would prevent any State from making a claim
regarding Remisia’s deprivation of nationality of the Sterren Forty before the Court, an acute
concern here as the victims were solely Remisian nationals and are now stateless.3

1
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium/Senegal), [2012] ICJ
Rep 422, ¶68-69 [Belgium]; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia/Myanmar), [2022] ICJ Rep 477,
¶112 [The Gambia]; Application of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Canada and the Netherlands/Syrian
Arab Republic), [2023] ICJ Rep 2, ¶50 [Canada]; Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Limited (Belgium/Spain), [1970] ICJ Rep 3, ¶33 [Barcelona Traction].
2
Belgium, ¶69; The Gambia, ¶108.
3
Compromis, ¶34; Belgium, ¶69; The Gambia, ¶108; Maria Jose Recalde-Vela, “Access to
Redress for Stateless Persons Under International Law: Challenges and Opportunities”
(2019) 24:2 TilburgLRev, 183 [Recalde-Vela].

1
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B. ANTRANO HAS ERGA OMNES PARTES STANDING TO LAUNCH THIS CLAIM.

3. Antrano has standing because it invokes the responsibility of Remisia for violating its
obligations erga omnes partes under Article 8 of the CRS, which generally prohibits rendering
individuals stateless, and Article 9, which prohibits the discriminatory deprivation of nationality.4

4. This Court has recognized the standing of indirectly injured States to invoke State
responsibility for breaches of obligations erga omnes partes.5 These are certain multilateral treaty
obligations established for the protection of a common interest owed towards a group of States
parties to the same treaty, all of which have a legal interest in respecting the rules therein.6 Antrano
and Remisia are both parties to the CRS, making Antrano part of the relevant omnes.7

5. A treaty obligation is erga omnes partes if: (1) the treaty creates an obligation that States
parties have a common interest in upholding, and (2) the provisions invoked are “relevant” to that
common interest.8 Both elements are satisfied because the CRS establishes an obligation to prevent
and reduce statelessness, a commitment which the States parties have a common interest in
upholding [1]. Remisia’s obligations under Articles 8 [2] and 9 [3] of the CRS are relevant to that
common interest and thus owed erga omnes partes.

1. States parties to the CRS have a common interest in preventing statelessness.

6. Taken together, the text and design of the CRS suggest States parties have a common
interest in preventing statelessness and cannot do so effectively without a common interest in

4
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S 175, Arts.8-9 [CRS].
5
Belgium, ¶68-69; The Gambia, ¶112; Canada, ¶¶50-51. See International Law Commission
(“ILC”), Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, A/56/49
(2001), Art.48(1)(a) [ARSIWA]; ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries (2001), ILC Yearbook, Vol.II(2), 126
[ARSIWA Commentaries]; Institut de Droit International, Resolution: Obligations Erga
Omnes in International Law, Krakow Session (2005), Art.3 [Krakow Resolution].
6
Belgium, ¶¶68-69; The Gambia, ¶107; Canada, ¶50.
7
Compromis, ¶62; ARSIWA Commentaries, 126.
8
Belgium, ¶69; The Gambia, ¶108; Oona Hathaway, Alaa Hachem & Justin Cole, “A New Tool
for Enforcing Human Rights: Erga Omnes Partes Standing” (2024) 61:2
ColumbJTransnat’lL, 30-31 [Hathaway].

2
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compliance with the rules therein.9 Common interests “transcend[] the sphere of bilateral relations
of the States parties” and go “over and above the interests of the States concerned individually.”10
Whether a common interest exists involves analyzing the object and purpose of the relevant treaty,
which can be expressed through the treaty’s text and design.11

7. For instance, in Belgium v. Senegal, this Court analyzed the preamble of the Convention
against Torture (“CAT”) to ascertain that its object and purpose is to “make more effective the
struggle against torture... throughout the world.”12 From this purpose, this Court found that States
parties to the CAT share a common interest in preventing torture and ensuring compliance with
the “relevant obligations” outlined therein, meaning each party to the CAT can bring forth a claim
regarding an alleged violation by another party.13

8. Similarly, in The Gambia v. Myanmar, this Court affirmed that the Genocide Convention
was adopted for the humanitarian purpose of preventing genocide, and as such, States parties to
the Genocide Convention have a common interest in preventing genocide by committing
themselves to the obligations therein.14 Motivated by these high ideals, the relevant obligations
under the Genocide Convention are thus owed by any State party to all other parties.15

9. Antrano’s claims are grounded in the CRS and pursue the common interest of preventing
and reducing statelessness, which is precisely the type of common interest this Court found to form
the basis of erga omnes partes standing in Belgium v. Senegal and The Gambia v. Myanmar. This
is a common interest that transcends bilateral relations, as articulated in the preamble where the

9
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, Art.31-32 [VCLT];
UNHCR, Preventing and Reducing Statelessness: The 1961 Convention on the Reduction
of Statelessness (2014), 2 [UNHCR Brochure].
10
ARSIWA Commentaries, 126.
11
Belgium, ¶68; The Gambia, ¶¶106-107; Hathaway, 32-33; Pok Yin S. Chow, “On Obligations
Erga Omnes Partes” (2021) 52:2 GeoJInt’lL, 496 [Chow]. See also: VCLT, Art.31.
12
Belgium, ¶68.
13
Belgium, ¶68-79.
14
The Gambia, ¶107.
15
The Gambia, ¶107.

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States parties consider it “desirable to reduce statelessness by international agreement.”16 The

obligations in the CRS also go above the interests of the States concerned individually, as the
Introductory Note by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) explains
that “[u]nderlying the [CRS] is the notion that while States maintain the right to elaborate the
content of their nationality laws, they must do so in compliance with… the principle that
statelessness should be avoided.”17 Importantly, the CRS extends beyond individual State interests
because the primary victims of statelessness are nationals of the State responsible for rendering
them stateless, as opposed to nationals of other States.18

10. In line with the high ideals it was inspired by, the CRS sets common rules related to
acquisition, renunciation, loss, and deprivation of nationality intended to prevent and reduce
statelessness. The obligations within the CRS are like those in the CAT or the Genocide
Convention, in which this Court observed that “[i]n such a convention the contracting States do
not have any interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the
accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d’être of the Convention.”19

2. Article 8 of the CRS is an erga omnes partes obligation.

11. Article 8(1) of the CRS prohibits the deprivation of nationality if it would result in
statelessness.20 This provision governs unless one of the narrow exceptions set out in Articles 8(2)
or 8(3) applies.21 Since Article 8 establishes a general prohibition on rendering individuals
stateless, it is relevant to the common interest in preventing and reducing statelessness and is thus
an erga omnes partes obligation.

12. That Article 8(3) permits States to submit a declaration retaining the right to withdraw
nationality in exceptional circumstances does not take away from the high ideals that motivate

16
CRS, Preamble; VCLT, Art.31(2).
17
CRS, Introductory Note; VCLT, Art.31(2).
18
The Gambia, ¶109.
19
Belgium, ¶68; The Gambia, ¶106.
20
CRS, Art.8(1).
21
CRS, Arts.8(2)-(3); UNHCR Guidelines, 14.

4
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Article 8(1). On the contrary, the carefully circumscribed nature of these exceptions should be seen
as supplementary to, not diminishing of, States parties’ interest in each other’s compliance.22
Antrano is entitled to verify whether Remisia’s declaration and the actions purportedly undertaken
under that declaration comply with the strict limits of the CRS and its erga omnes partes
character,23 especially since reservations are prohibited under Article 8.24

3. Article 9 of the CRS is an erga omnes partes obligation.

13. Article 9 of the CRS prohibits deprivation of nationality based on racial, ethnic, religious
or political grounds.25 Although Article 9 applies irrespective of whether statelessness would
result, the UNHCR notes it is highly relevant to situations where a State party relies on individual’s
political beliefs as a basis for deprivation of nationality resulting in statelessness under Article
8(3).26 In addition, the discriminatory deprivation of nationality, including on political grounds, is
one of the root causes of statelessness globally.27 Accordingly, the rule under Article 9 is relevant
to the common interest in preventing statelessness and is thus an erga omnes partes obligation.

C. ANTRANO HAS ERGA OMNES STANDING TO LAUNCH THIS CLAIM.

14. All States have standing to invoke the responsibility of another State for breaches of
obligations erga omnes.28 In Barcelona Traction, this Court distinguished between obligations

22
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), 1-2.
23
Belgium, ¶68-69; The Gambia, ¶112.
24
CRS, Art.17.
25
CRS, Art.9.
26
UNHCR, Guidelines on Statelessness No.5, HCR/GS/20/05 (2020), ¶78 [UNHCR Guidelines].
27
UNHCR, Addressing Statelessness through the Rule of Law (2022), 5-6 [UNHCR Rule of
Law]; International Federation for Human Rights, “Nicaragua: Serious human rights
impacts caused by arbitrary deprivation of nationality” (2023); Human Rights Watch,
“Bahrain: Hundreds Stripped of Citizenship” (2018).
28
Barcelona Traction, ¶33; East Timor (Portugal/Australia), [1995] ICJ Rep 90, ¶29 [East
Timor]; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the
Congo/Rwanda), [2006] ICJ Rep 6, ¶¶64-65; Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina/Serbia
and Montenegro), [1996] ICJ Rep 595, ¶31 [Bosnia]; ARSIWA, Art.48(1)(b); ARSIWA
Commentaries, 126; Krakow Resolution, Art. 3; Yoshifumi Tanaka, “The Legal
5
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owed to particulate States and those owed “towards the international community as a whole.”29
Regarding the latter, this Court stated that “[i]n view of the importance of the rights involved, all
States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.”30

15. Obligations erga omnes generally (1) emerge from customary international law and (2) are
of fundamental importance of the international community.31 According to this Court, obligations
erga omnes include “the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person.”32

16. There is no judicial or scholarly consensus which dictates that obligations erga omnes must
be jus cogens. Rather, the two are distinct categories.33 For example, the obligation to protect the
marine environment is considered erga omnes but not a jus cogens.34

1. The right to a nationality and the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of

nationality are obligations erga omnes.

17. Antrano has standing because it invokes the responsibility of Remisia for violating its
obligations erga omnes to respect the right to a nationality and prevent the prohibition of arbitrary
deprivation of nationality. These are obligations erga omnes because they are customary
international law norms [i] and constitute a basic right of the human person [ii].

Consequences of Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law” (2021) 68:1

NethInt’lLRev, 23 [Tanaka].
29
Barcelona Traction, ¶33.
30
Barcelona Traction, ¶33.
31
Barcelona Traction, ¶34; East Timor, ¶29, Bosnia, ¶31; Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, [2004]
ICJ Rep 136, ¶¶155-157; Tanaka, 3.
32
Barcelona Traction, ¶34.
33
Paolo Picone, “The Distinction between Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes” The Law of
Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention (2011), 414; Tanaka, 9.
34
Responsibilities and obligations of States with respect to activities in the Area, Advisory
Opinion, [2011] ITLOS Rep 10, ¶80; Tanaka, 4-5.

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i. The right to a nationality and the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of

nationality are customary international law norms.

18. The right to a nationality, and its corollary, the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of
nationality, are in customary international law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the
cornerstone source for these norms, with Article 15 guaranteeing the right to a nationality and
prohibiting arbitrary deprivation of nationality.35 These norms have been explicitly or implicitly
incorporated into various United Nations36 (“UN”) and regional37 human rights treaties. In
addition, the fundamental importance of the right to a nationality has been echoed by UN General
Assembly Resolutions,38 resolutions of the Human Rights Council and its predecessor,39 general
comments from treaty bodies,40 UN Secretary-General reports,41 and UNHCR Executive
Committee conclusions.42

35
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, 217 A (III), Art.15.
36
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2007, 2515 U.N.T.S 3, Art.18;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1996, 999 U.N.T.S 171, Art.24(3);
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, Art.7; International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965, 660
U.N.T.S. 195, Art.5(d)(iii); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S 13, Art.9; International Convention
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families,
1990, 2220 U.N.T.S 3, Art. 29; Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, 1957,
309 U.N.T.S 65, Arts.1-3.
37
American Convention on Human Rights, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S 123, Art.20(3); European
Convention on Nationality, 1997, 2135 U.N.T.S 213, Art.4; Revised Arab Charter on
Human Rights, 15 September 1994, Art.29; African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of
the Child, 1990, Art.6.
38
A/RES/50/152 (1995); A/RES/53/125 (1996); A/RES/59/34 (2004); A/RES/61/136 (2006);
A/RES/67/149 (2012); A/RES/68/141 (2013).
39
A/HRC/RES/32/5 (2016); A/HRC/RES/26/14 (2014); A/HRC/RES/20/5 (2012);
A/HRC/RES/20/4 (2012); A/HRC/RES/13/2 (2010); A/HRC/RES/10/13 (2009);
A/HRC/RES/7/10 (2008); E/CN.4/RES/2005/45 (2005); E/CN.4/RES/1999/28 (1999);
E.CN.4/RES/1998/48 (1998); E.CN.4/RES/1997/36 (1997).
40
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 21 (1994); CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999); CERD
General Recommendation XXX on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens (2002).
41
A/HRC/13/34 (2009); A/HRC/19/43 (2011); A/HRC/25/28 (2013); A/HRC/31/29 (2015).
42
UNHCR General Conclusion No. 78(XLVI) (1995); UNHCR General Conclusion No.
102(LVI) (2005); UNHCR General Conclusion No. 106(LVI) (2006).

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19. The convergence of (1) State practice and (2) opinio juris, shown through such widespread
treaty ratification and adoption by consensus of many international resolutions on nationality,
demonstrates the crystallization of the right to a nationality and the prohibition of arbitrary
deprivation of nationality as customary international law norms.43 The customary nature of these
norms is supported by eminent legal scholars,44 Special Rapporteurs,45 and various judicial
decisions,46 including those rendered by this Court.47

ii. The right to a nationality and the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of

nationality are rules concerning the basic rights of the human person.

20. The right to a nationality is a basic right of the human person; it is the “right to have
rights.”48 It serves the legal link between the individual and the State,49 and since traditionally only
States were subjects of international law, nationality also serves as “the link between the individual

43
North Sea Continental Shelf, [1969] ICJ Rep 3, ¶77.
44
Tamás Molnár, “The Prohibition of Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality under International
Law and EU Law: New Perspectives” (2015) Hungarian YB Int’l & Eur Law, 71; Mark
Manly & Laura Van Waas, “The Value of the Human Security Framework in Addressing
Statelessness” Human Security and Non-Citizens (2010), 63; UNHCR, Expert Meeting:
Interpreting the 1961 Statelessness Convention and Avoiding Statelessness resulting from
Loss and Deprivation of Nationality (2014), 2 [Tunis Conclusions].
45
Position of the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism on citizenship stripping in North-East
Syria (February 2022), 6.
46
Partial Award (Civil Claims - Eritrea’s Claims 15, 16, 23, 37-32), Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims
Commission, [2004], ¶¶57-58, 60; Anudo Ochieng Anudo v. United Republic of
Tanzania, [2018] African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ¶76 [Anudo]; Proposed
Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory
Opinion, [1984] Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”), ¶¶33-34 [Proposed
Amendments]; Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, [2014]
IACtHR, ¶253.
47
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States/Iran)
[1980] ICJ Rep 3, ¶91.
48
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1958), 296-297; Trop v. Dulles, 356 US 86
(1958), 102; Pham v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2018] EWCA
Civ 2064, ¶49.
49
Nottebohm (Liechtenstein/Guatemala), [1995] ICJ Rep 4, 23 [Nottebohm].

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and the law of nations.”50 Being without a nationality has long signified falling between the cracks
of the international legal system, making the right to a nationality an indispensable right.51

21. Statelessness is a violation of the right to a nationality, leading to serious impediments in

enjoying a socio-political life, securing employment, accessing healthcare and education, facing
restrictions on freedom of movement, and experiencing a lack of state protection.52 The violation
of the right to a nationality can also threaten the maintenance of international peace and security,
especially in cases of statelessness involving forced displacement or persecution, making it a
fundamental concern to the international community.53

22. Because of the importance of the right to a nationality and the prohibition of arbitrary
deprivation of nationality, Antrano has a legal interest in their protection and has erga omnes
standing to launch this claim.

II. REMISIA VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW BY DEPRIVING THE STERREN FORTY OF

THEIR NATIONALITY AND RENDERING THEM STATELESS.

23. In depriving the Sterren Forty of their nationality and rendering them stateless, Remisia
violated its treaty obligations under the CRS [A] and the customary international prohibition of
arbitrary deprivation of nationality [B].

A. REMISIA VIOLATED ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CRS.

24. Remisia violated Article 8(1) of the CRS [1]. Should Remisia’s declaration be considered
valid, Remisia still violated Article 9 of the CRS [2].

50
Recalde-Vela, 184-185; Kate Parlett, The Individual in the International Legal System:
Continuity and Change in International Law (2011), 28.
51
Dickson Car Wheel Company v. United Mexican States, [1931] 4 R.I.A.A. 669, 678.
52
UNHCR Rule of Law, 6.
53
A/RES/71/1 (2016); Mirna Adjami, Statelessness and Nationality in Côte D’Ivoire (2016), 2;
Amal de Chickera, “Statelessness and Identity in the Rohingya Refugee Crisis” (2018), 7.

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1. Remisia violated Article 8(1) of the CRS.

25. Remisia violated Article 8(1) of the CRS [i]. Remisia’s declaration under Article 8(3) does
not excuse this violation [ii]. Should Remisia’s declaration be considered a reservation, it is
impermissible [ii] and Remisia remains party to the CRS without the reservation [iii].

i. Remisia violated Article 8(1) of the CRS.

26. Article 8(1) of the CRS prohibits depriving individuals of their nationality if doing so
renders them stateless.54 Remisia breached that provision because its deprivation of the Sterren
Forty’s nationality rendered them stateless.55

ii. Remisia’s declaration does not excuse its violation of Article 8(1).

27. Remisia’s declaration does not excuse its violation of Article 8(1) because it does not
modify the legal effect of the CRS.56 Remisia is simply purporting to interpret the CRS through its
declaration; it is asserting its belief that the DCA complies with Article 8(3).57

28. In any event, Remisia’s actions against the Sterren Forty do not comply with Article
8(3)(a)(ii) of the CRS, which allows deprivation of nationality leading to statelessness based on
conduct “seriously prejudicial” to the “vital interests” of the State.58 This exception establishes a
high threshold: (1) there must be clear evidence of intent to act inconsistently with their duty of
loyalty to the State as a whole, not just a specific government or part of the State, and (2) conduct
must threaten the fundamental foundation and organization of the State rather than mere criminal
conduct.59 The conduct of the Sterren Forty did not meet this threshold.

54
CRS, Art.8(1).
55
Compromis, ¶34.
56
ILC, Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, A/66/10 (2011), 1.3 [ILC Guide].
57
Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania/Ukraine), [2009] ICJ Rep 61, ¶42.
58
CRS, Art.8(3)(a)(iii).
59
UNHCR Guidelines, ¶¶56-62; Tunis Conclusions, ¶68.

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29. First, the Sterren Forty’s actions reflected policy disagreements with the government’s
economic and environmental policies, not disloyalty to the State itself.60 To the extent they
peacefully advocated for a change in the form of government, this does not equate to disloyalty to
the State.61 In a constitutional monarchy, which Remisia has been since 1923,62 the monarch is
just one component of the broader State.63

30. Second, the Sterren Forty engaged in peaceful protests as opposed to the narrow spectrum
of crimes – espionage, treason, and certain terrorist acts – which are considered fundamentally
detrimental to the State’s vital interests.64 “Vital interests” is a higher standard than “national
interests” and denotes protecting interests such as external security, not economic development.65

iii. Remisia’s purported reservation to the CRS is impermissible.

31. Should Remisia’s declaration be considered a reservation, it is impermissible because it is

contrary to the object and purpose of the CRS to prevent and reduce statelessness.66 In particular,
Remisia’s purported reservation seeks to limit its obligation to not deprive individuals of their
nationality if doing so would render them stateless to an extent not covered by the narrow
exceptions under Article 8(3), as shown by the analysis above. The provisions in the DCA have a
lower threshold for deprivation of nationality compared to the core obligations in the CRS, and as
such, Remisia’s purported reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the CRS.67
As an impermissible reservation, Remisia’s reservation is null and void.68

60
Compromis, ¶¶23-25, 28-30.
61
Compromis, ¶¶27, 32.
62
Compromis, ¶¶5-6.
63
George Tridimas, “Constitutional monarchy as power sharing” (2021) 32 Constitutional
Political Economy, 431.
64
UNHCR Guidelines, ¶¶62-64; Tunis Conclusions, ¶68.
65
UNHCR Guidelines, ¶62; Tunis Conclusions, ¶68.
66
VCLT, Art.19; ILC Guide, 3.1.4-3.1.5.
67
VCLT, Art.19; ILC Guide, 3.1.4-3.1.5.
68
ILC Guide, 4.5.1.

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iv. Remisia remains bound by the CRS without the benefit of its reservation.

32. In accordance with the severability principle, Remisia is bound by CRS without the benefit
of its impermissible reservation. Endorsed by the Human Rights Committee and regional courts,
this principle dictates that the “normal consequence” of an impermissible reservation is the entry
into force of a treaty for the reserving State without the benefit of the reservation.69 Remisia cannot
incontrovertibly rebut the presumption of severability due to the wording of its reservation, its
subsequent conduct, and the special character of the CRS.

33. First, Remisia’s reservation is worded as a “simple” declaration which must be

distinguished from “conditional” declarations.70 When Remisia ratified the CRS, it did not qualify
its declaration as a condition for its participation in the treaty.71

34. Second, shortly after Remisia ratified the CRS in 1967, four States including Antrano
objected to Remisia’s declaration, contending that it was an impermissible reservation.72 Remisia
has been aware of the potential impermissibility of its declaration for many decades and has
signalled no intention to not be bound by the CRS until now. Antrano’s objection also did not state
an intention to preclude the entry into force of the CRS between Antrano and Remisia.73 As it did
for the reserving State in Loizidou v. Turkey, this awareness suggests a willingness on Remisia’s
part to assume the risk that its declaration could be deemed impermissible without affecting the
entry into force of the treaty.74

69
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994), ¶18; Belilos v. Switzerland, [1998] European Court of
Human Rights (“ECtHR”) Application No. 10328/83, ¶60; Weber v. Switzerland, [1990]
ECtHR Application No. 11034/84, ¶38; Loizidou v. Turkey, [1995] ECtHR Application
No. 15318/89, ¶97 [Loizidou]; Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, [2001] IACtHR, ¶98
[Hilaire].
70
ILC Guide, 1.4.
71
Compromis, ¶62.
72
Clarifications, ¶10.
73
Clarifications, ¶10.
74
Loizidou, ¶95.

12
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35. Third, as is common for courts analyzing the consequences of an impermissible

reservation, this Court should bear in mind the special character of the treaty at issue.75 As
submitted in Section I.C of these pleadings, the States parties to the CRS share a common interest
in preventing statelessness and ensuring compliance with the rules therein.76 If this Court
concluded that Remisia’s impermissible reservation nullifies their instrument of ratification, this
would also exempt Remisia from its erga omnes partes obligations normally unaffected by its
declaration, including those under Article 9. This would elevate the impermissible reservation and
Remisia’s Constitution into the primary reference points for the Court, reducing the CRS into a
subsidiary parameter.77 Such a shift risks fragmenting the international legal order for preventing
statelessness and undermines the erga omnes partes doctrine.

36. Because Remisia cannot incontrovertibly rebut the presumption of severability, the CRS
remains operative between Antrano and Remisia and Remisia’s reservation is invalid.78

2. Remisia violated Article 9 of the CRS.

37. Irrespective of Remisia’s declaration, Remisia breached Article 9 of the CRS which
prohibits deprivation of nationality on political grounds.79 Under this provision, nationality cannot
be revoked to delegitimize political opinions different from those held by the government or in
response to conduct consistent with an individual’s rights to freedom of expression and assembly.80

38. Remisia violated both of these rules. First, Remisia targeted the Sterren Forty for featuring
prominently in the protests and expressing disagreement with the government’s economic and
environmental policies.81 Hundreds of protestors who expressed the same political opinions as the
Sterren Forty had their charges dropped after signing an apology, demonstrating how Remisia

75
Loizidou, ¶93; Hilaire, ¶94.
76
Pleadings, ¶¶6-10.
77
Hilaire, ¶93.
78
ILC Guide, 4.5.3(2); HRI/MC/2007/5, ¶7.
79
CRS, Art.9.
80
UNHCR Guidelines, ¶78; Tunis Conclusions, ¶71.
81
Compromis, ¶30.

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selectively employed the DCA and its citizenship-stripping powers to delegitimize protesters who
refused to change their political opinions.82 Second, the actions of the Sterren Forty were in
exercise of their rights to freedom of expression, constituting a form of political discourse,83 and
freedom of assembly, constituting peaceful protests.84 Remisia deprived the Sterren Forty of their
nationality on political grounds in response to them exercising these rights.85

B. REMISIA VIOLATED THE PROHIBITION OF ARBITRARY DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY.

39. As submitted in Section I.B of these pleadings, the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of
nationality is customary international law.86 Remisia is bound by this norm [1] and violated it in
depriving the Sterren Forty of their nationality [2].

1. Remisia is bound by the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality.

40. Remisia’s declaration to the CRS does not impact its obligations under customary
international law,87 and Remisia is not a persistent objector to the customary international norm
prohibiting arbitrary deprivation of nationality because it has not withdrawn the nationality of its
citizens each time the DCA was invoked over several decades.88

2. Remisia violated the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality.

41. Remisia violated the customary international prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of

nationality because its actions against the Sterren Forty did not have a clear basis in law [i], did
not serve a legitimate purpose [ii], and were not proportionate [iii].89

82
Compromis, ¶31.
83
CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011), ¶11.
84
CCPR/C/GC/37 (2020), ¶¶4-7.
85
Compromis, ¶¶30-31, 33-34.
86
Pleadings, ¶¶18-19.
87
ILC Guide, 4.4.2.
88
Compromis, ¶8.
89
UNHCR Guidelines, ¶91; Tunis Conclusions, ¶¶16-24; A/HRC/13/34 (2009), ¶25;
A/HRC/19/43 (2011); ¶4; A/HRC/25/28 (2013), ¶3; Institute on Statelessness and
14
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Remisia’s actions did not have a clear basis in law.

42. Deprivation of nationality must be established by law and be predictable.90 Although the
DCA authorizes the withdrawal of nationality, it employs wide-ranging terms such as “defame”
and “insult” without defined criteria.91 The DCA is not sufficiently precise to enable citizens to
reasonably foresee the consequences of actions that could lead to withdrawal of nationality.92

i. Remisia’s actions had no legitimate purpose.

43. Remisia’s actions had no legitimate purpose because, as submitted in Section II.A of these
pleadings, it deprived the Sterren Forty of their nationality on political grounds.93 They were not
convicted for blocking infrastructure or economic projects, but to stifle their political opinions.94

ii. Remisia’s actions were not proportionate.

44. Since deprivation of nationality destroys a fundamental right, it is presumptively

disproportionate absent exceptionally strong countervailing State interests.95 The consequences of
any deprivation of nationality must be weighed against the gravity of the offence for which
withdrawing nationality is prescribed.96 In this case, the severity of the punishment imposed on
the Sterren Forty – five-year imprisonment sentences coupled with deprivation of nationality and
expulsion post-custodial term – far exceeds the appropriate sentence for minor offences that
harmed no one.97 Most protesters convicted under the DCA for comparable actions received

Inclusion, Principles on Deprivation of Nationality as a National Security Measure,

Art.7.
90
UNHCR Guidelines, ¶92; Tunis Conclusions, ¶16.
91
Compromis, ¶7.
92
UNHCR Guidelines, ¶92; Tunis Conclusions, ¶16.
93
Pleadings, ¶¶37-38.
94
Compromis, ¶¶33-34; UNHCR Guidelines, ¶78; Tunis Conclusions, ¶71.
95
UNHR Guidelines, ¶95; Tunis Conclusions, ¶23; A/HRC/13/34 (2009), ¶5; A/HRC/25/28
(2013), ¶4.
96
Tunis Conclusions, ¶21; A/HRC/13/34 (2009), ¶28; A/HRC/25/28 (2013), ¶4; Anudo, ¶79;
Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, [2010] European Court Reports I-01449, ¶56.
97
Compromis, ¶34; Jorunn Brandvoll, “Deprivation of nationality” Nationality and Statelessness
under International Law (2014), 210.

15
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sentences ranging from one to three years, demonstrating that Remisia could have achieved its
goals without resorting to the clearly disproportionate step of withdrawing nationality.98

III. ANTRANO DID NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN IT REFUSED TO PROVIDE
REMISIA CONSULAR ACCESS TO MS. SAKI SHAW DURING HER TIME AS A PRISONER IN
ANTRANO.

45. Remisia was not entitled to exercise consular protection of Ms. Saki Shaw because
Remisia’s naturalization of Shaw does not impose binding obligations on Antrano, and Shaw lacks
a genuine connection to Remisia [A]. Further, Remisia’s claim is inadmissible because Shaw failed
to exhaust the local remedies available in Antrano to establish her right to consular protection by
Remisia [B]. Regardless, Antrano met its obligations under Article 36.1(b) ‘without delay’ and did
not violate Article 36.1(a) and (c) of the VCCR [C].

A. REMISIA WAS NOT ENTITLED TO EXERCISE CONSULAR PROTECTION OVER SHAW.

46. Under the VCCR, a state can only provide consular assistance to their own nationals.99 As
the ICJ held in Nottebohm, nationality must be determined under international law as Remisian
legislation cannot unilaterally impose obligations on Antrano.100 The absence of an effective tie of
nationality can authorize Antrano to deny the legitimacy of diplomatic protection.101

47. Remisia was not entitled to exercise consular protection over Shaw in Antrano, as Shaw is
not a national of Remisia under international law.102 Since Shaw’s naturalization was conferred in
‘exceptional circumstances of speed and accommodation,’ the effective nationality test in
Nottebohm applies [1]. Shaw’s connection to Remisia was extremely tenuous. Her NIP application

98
Compromis, ¶34.
99
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963), 596 U.N.T.S 261, Art 36 [VCCR].
100
Nottebohm, 21; Ian Brownlie, "The Relations of Nationality in Public International Law"
(1963) 39 Brit YB Int'l L 284, 290-291.
101
Eudoro Armando Olguín v. Republic of Paraguay, [2001] ICSID Case No ARB/98/5, Award,
¶62 [Olguin]; ILC, First Report on Diplomatic Protection by the Special Rapporteur, Mr.
John R. Dugard (2000), ¶119 [Dugard].
102
Jadhav Case (India/Pakistan) [Jadhav], Declaration of Judge Sebutinde, [2019] ICJ Rep 494,
¶8 citing J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed (2012),
702 [Crawford].

16
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and personal details failed to reveal any authentic ties to Remisia, before and after her
naturalization [2].103 Furthermore, Antrano was not estopped from denying Shaw’s Remisian
citizenship [3].

1. The effective nationality test in Nottebohm applies.

48. This Court in Nottebohm held that naturalization may not establish diplomatic protection
if it is ‘not based on any real prior connection’ and if it did not ‘alter the manner of life of the
person upon whom it was conferred.’104 Courts assess the individual’s habitual residence, the
centre of their interests, family ties and participation in public life in making this determination.105

49. Effective nationality is a binding requirement for countries claiming diplomatic protection
over an individual.106 The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)
noted that the absence of effective nationality would authorize a state to deny the legitimacy of
diplomatic protection.107 The International Institute of Law resolved that nationality conferred in
the absence of “any link of attachment” is prima facie conferred in bad faith and, therefore, may
not be recognized for the purpose of diplomatic protection.108

50. The ICSID maintains that Nottebohm’s effective nationality test may apply to ‘nationalities
of convenience’ conferred in ‘circumstances of exceptional speed and accommodation, such as
Shaw’s, whose citizenship was purchased and motivated by the promise of gaining access to

103
Nottebohm, 23, 26.
104
Nottebohm, 26.
105
Nottebohm, 22; Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America, [1984] IUSCT Case No.
A-18, DEC 32-A18-FT, ¶43 [A/18].
106
Nottebohm, 23; A/18 ¶¶45,50; Robert D. Sloane, Breaking the Genuine Link: The
Contemporary International Legal Regulation of Nationality, in 50 Harv Intl LJ 1 (2009),
25 citing H.F. Van Panhuys, The Role of Nationality in International Law (1959), 158
and Ruth Donner, The Regulation of Nationality in International Law (1994), 62;
Crawford, 516.
107
Olguin, ¶62.
108
Instituit de Droit International, The National Character of an International Claim Presented
by a State for Injury Suffered by an Individual (1965), Warsaw, Art.4(c) cited in Dugard,
¶119.

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international fora.109 The NIP provided Shaw access to visa-free travel and consular assistance in
over a hundred countries shortly after she fled her home state due to legal complications.110
Additionally, Shaw's approval for naturalization was guaranteed once she transferred €500,000 to
the National Infrastructure Development Fund, as agreed with the Remisian government.111

2. Shaw was not a Remisian national under international law.

51. Shaw lacked an effective link and cannot be considered a Remisian national under
international law. Purchased citizenship under the NIP does not indicate an effective link.
Individually, Shaw had no ‘real prior connection’ to Remisia, and her naturalization did not alter
her manner of life.112 Further, the commercial activities of Lithos Limited cannot be attributed to
Shaw personally, nor do they indicate any exceptional connection to Remisia.

52. First, naturalization under the NIP does not meet the effective nationality test. State practice
demonstrates that countries may decline to recognize purchased citizenship. Only thirteen states
operate citizenship-for-purchase programs, while the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, the
United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States have taken steps to restrict other countries' sale
of citizenship.113 Shaw purchased her citizenship for €500,000 and qualified without any
consideration of “real and lasting ties” with Remisia.114

109
Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award (2010), ¶¶77-78;
Casas, 66.
110
Compromis, ¶¶12, 16.
111
Compromis, ¶¶11, 18, 19.
112
Nottebohm, 26.
113
European Commission, Investor citizenship scheme: Commission refers MALTA to the Court
of Justice (Brussels, 2022); European Commission, Joint Statement on further restrictive
economic measures (2022); Secretary of State for the Home Department, Statement of
Changes in Immigration Rules (2023), UIN HCWS979; Immigration, Refugees and
Citizenship Canada, Canada imposes a visa requirement on Antigua and Barbuda
(2017); 117th Congress (2021-2022) No Travel for Traffickers Act of 2022, H.R.6911.
114
Compromis, ¶¶11, 19. Nottebohm, 22-23; Proposed Amendments, ¶¶36-37; Manley O.
Hudson, Special Rapporteur on Nationality Including Statelessness, Rep. on Nationality
Including Statelessness (1952), ILC, A/CN.4/50, 8.

18
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53. Second, Shaw lacked a ‘real prior connection’ to Remisia, and her naturalization did not
alter her manner of life.115 Shaw’s Remisian citizenship was used to avoid legal complications in
her home country of Molvania.116 She had little personal connection to Remisia, lived outside of
the country and was naturalized a decade after her last visit to Remisia.117 After naturalization,
Shaw’s relationship with Remisia remained unchanged. She did not travel to or show any intention
of settling in Remisia.118

54. Third, Lithos business activities do not show a link between Shaw and Remisia. As a
separate legal entity, decisions made by Shaw as the head of Lithos are solely attributable to the
corporation.119 Corporations are determinant legal personalities which override the continuing
autonomy of their shareholders and employees.120 Nor did Lithos hold the power of attorney to
affect Shaw’s legal interests in Remisia.121 Remisia’s evaluation of Shaw’s application confirms
that corporate actions are irrelevant to Shaw’s qualification for the NIP and referenced only her
personal contributions, not those of Lithos.122 Even if Lithos’ national ties can serve as a proxy for
Shaw’s, the corporation lacks any exceptional tie to Remisia. Lithos operates globally, with
various headquarters in other countries.123

3. Antrano is not estopped from denying Shaw’s Remisian nationality.

55. Antrano never recognized Remisia’s title to exercise protection over Shaw. In Nottebohm,
this Court affirmed that validating a passport upon entry is distinct from recognizing that the

115
Nottebohm, 26.
116
Compromis, ¶¶16-19; Barcelona Traction, Separate Opinion of Judge Jessup, ¶46; Casas, 66-
67.
117
Compromis, ¶19.
118
Nottebohm, 25; Compromis, ¶16; Clarifications, ¶5.
119
Barcelona Traction, ¶45.
120
Barcelona Traction, ¶40.
121
Cf Nottebohm, 13.
122
Compromis, ¶¶18,19.
123
Compromis, ¶15.

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citizenship presented conferred any title to the exercise of protection.124 Border officials are not
responsible for determining whether assertions of nationality are valid in international law.125

124
Nottebohm, 18.
125
IC MacGibbon, Estoppel in International Law (1958), 7:3 Inti & CLQ 468, 483-484.

20
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B. SHAW DID NOT EXHAUST LOCAL REMEDIES.

56. Local remedies must be exhausted where the primary injury does not directly impact the
claimant state.126

57. The Avena exception to this rule does not apply because Remisia’s claim is not one of
‘interdependence.’127 It is a ‘mixed’ claim with a direct alleged injury – the denial of Remisia’s
consular access to Shaw – that is dependent on the indirect and preponderant alleged injury – non-
recognition of Shaw’s nationality in Antrano.128 Avena considered the obligation of consular
notice, which may be owed independently to the state and a purported national, prior to
confirmation of the latter’s nationality.129 However, the duty to provide consular access is only
owed to nationals. Remisia’s rights are not interdependent but sequential to the validity of Shaw’s
nationality in Antrano.130 Further, non-recognition cannot be a direct injury to Remisia as Antrano
is under no obligation to recognize the effects of Remisia’s citizenship-for-sale.131 Thus, Remisia’s
claim is barred because Shaw did not exhaust local remedies in Antrano.132

C. IF REMISIA WAS ENTITLED TO EXERCISE CONSULAR PROTECTION OVER SHAW, ANTRANO’S

ACTIONS COMPLIED WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW.

58. If Remisia was entitled to exercise consular protection over Shaw, Antrano met its
obligations under Article 36 of the VCCR. Antrano met any relevant obligations to be fulfilled
‘without delay’ under sub-paragraph 1(b) to inform Shaw of her rights under the VCCR and to
provide consular notice to Remisia [1].133 Antrano did not violate any obligations under Article
36 sub-paragraphs 1(a) and 1(c), respectively, to provide Remisia with freedom of communication
and visitation with its nationals in custody [2].134

1. If applicable, Antrano did not violate its obligations under Article 36,
subparagraphs 1(A) and (C).

59. Antrano met any obligation it assumed to, ‘without delay’ (1) inform Shaw of her rights
under Article 36 and (2) provide consular notice to Remisia of Shaw’s detainment.135 These duties
are relevant prior to confirmation of the nationality of a detainee and are preliminary steps to
facilitate the rights to consular communication and visitation.136

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126
Electronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI), Judgment, [1989] ICJ Rep 15, ¶52; ILC, Draft Articles on
Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries (2006), Art.14 ¶11 [Diplomatic Protection
with Commentaries].
127
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico/United States of America), Judgment, [2004]
ICJ Rep 12, ¶40 [Avena] citing LaGrand, ¶77.
128
Avena, Separate Opinion of Judge Vereshchetin, ¶¶5, 7. Diplomatic Protection with
Commentaries.
129
VCCR, Art.1(b); Avena, ¶¶40, 63.
130
Cf. John Quigley, Procedural Limitations on Capital Punishment: The Case of Foreign
Nationals (2000), 6 ILSA J. INT'l & COMP. L. 519, 522 [Quigley].
131
Jacques Maury, 'L'arret Nottebohm et La Condition de Nationalite Effective' (1958) 23
Zeitschrift fur auslandisches und internationales Privatrecht 515, 517.
132
Crawford, 686.
133
VCCR, Art.36(1)(b); Official Records of the United Nations Conference on Consular
Relations, Vienna (1963) A/CONF.25/16/Add.1, Vol. II, 24 [Official Records].
134
Compromis, ¶47; VCCR, Art.36(1)(a)(c).
135
VCCR, Art.36(1)(b).
136
Lagrand, ¶74; Avena ¶76, 99, 102-104; Jhadav, ¶¶107-108 citing Official Records, 24.

22
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60. Upon her arrest, Antrano fulfilled its duty to inform Shaw of her VCCR rights.137 As this
Court held in Avena, ‘without delay’ is not understood as ‘immediately upon arrest and before
interrogation.’138 Instead, these obligations are only triggered when there are grounds to believe
that the person in custody is probably a foreign national.139 Where the declarations of nationality
by the person in custody are in dispute, diplomatic correspondence may be evidence that the
detained is ‘probably’ a foreign national.140 While in “obvious” cases, 48 hours may constitute
delay,141 in “less obvious” cases, consular notice may be provided five days after arrest.142

61. Antrano complied with both ‘without delay’ standards in providing consular notice to
Remisia. When Shaw entered Antrano, she had no valid documentation connecting her to Remisia,
nor was there any evidence of personal ties to the state, such as a residence or family ties.143 Under
Antranan law, the passports she carried pointed solely to her status as a Molvanian citizen.144
Accordingly, the Molvanian consulate was notified of her custody.145 Shaw’s connection to
Remisia was not obvious until its ambassador claimed the right to exercise consular protection two
days after her arrest.146 At that time, Antrano satisfied its duty to provide consular notice by
informing Remisia that it had “notified the Molvanian Consulate of Ms. Shaw’s arrest” and
forwarding relevant written communication.147 The form of consular notice provided is immaterial
since the communication was sufficient to facilitate the exercise of Remisia’s rights under Article
36.148

137
Clarifications, ¶7.
138
Avena, ¶85.
139
Avena, ¶63.
140
Jadhav, Declaration of Judge Sebutinde, ¶11.
141
Jadhav, ¶114 citing Avena, ¶89.
142
Jadhav, ¶114, citing Avena, ¶97.
143
Nottebohm, ¶22.
144
Compromis, ¶42.
145
Clarification, ¶7; Compromis, ¶43.

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2. If applicable, Antrano did not violate its obligations under Article 36,
subparagraphs 1(A) and (C).

62. Antrano complied with its obligations to allow Remisia free communication and visitation
of its nationals in custody.149 Antranan laws may regulate consular access unless their application
nullifies Remisia’s rights under Article 36.150 This is a high standard, and the burden of proof falls
on Remisia to establish this violation in “well-founded fact and law.”151

63. Remisia was empowered to exercise its consular rights through Molvania.152 International
law permits states to jointly exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a dual national.153 Since
Remisia never attempted to exercise consular access or communication in coordination with
Molvania, it cannot provide conclusive evidence that its rights were nullified.154

64. Even if Antrano’s offer to coordinate through Molvania was insufficient, Remisia cannot
prove Antrano failed to provide consular access in a timely manner. Antrano is obligated to
exercise due diligence by identifying a detainee’s nationality in accordance with its own internal
laws.155 While ascertaining Shaw’s nationality, Antrano provided Remisia with consular notice in

146
Compromis, ¶45.
147
Compromis, ¶45.
148
Jadhav, ¶111.
149
VCCR, Art.36(1)(a)(c).
150
VCCR, Art.36(2); ILC, Draft Articles on Consular Relations with Commentaries (1961),
Art.36, ¶¶5,7.
151
ICJ Statute, Art.53(2); Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran/United States of America),
Judgement [2003] ICJ Rep 161, ¶119.
152
Compromis, ¶45.
153
Diplomatic Protection, Art.6(2).
154
Corfu Channel Case (Merits), [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 16-17.
155
El derecho a la informacion sobre la asistencia consular en el marco de las garantlas del
debido proceso legal, [1999] Advisory Opinion, IACrtHR OC/16/99, ¶94; Quigley, 522-
523.

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good faith compliance with Article 36.156 During Shaw’s detention, Antrano could not confirm her
Remisian nationality and, consequently, could not legally provide Remisia with access.157

IV. REMISIA VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW BY DENYING DR. TULOUS MALEX ENTRY TO
REMISIA AS REQUIRED BY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 99997.

65. Dr. Malex was empowered by Security Council Resolution 99997 to travel to Remisia to
establish the UNIMR.158 Remisia violated international law by denying Malex entry to Remisia.

66. Resolution 99997 imposed legal obligations on Remisia to, inter alia, grant entry to the
civilian experts and necessary support staff of the UNIMR, including Malex [A]. Remisia violated
these obligations by refusing to grant Malex an entry visa [B] and cannot defend its actions as a
legal countermeasure [C].

67. This Court cannot judicially review the UNSC’s invocation of Article 34 [D]. In any event,
Resolution 99997 was validly enacted under Article 34 in line with the UN Charter [E].

A. RESOLUTION 99997 IMPOSED LEGAL OBLIGATIONS ON REMISIA TO GRANT ENTRY TO

MALEX.

68. The UNSC’s decision to establish the UNIMR is a mandatory provision which, per Article
25 of the UN Charter, imposes the obligation on Remisia to grant entry to Malex.159 Article 25
requires UN members to carry out the decisions of the Council, even if those decisions do not
concern enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter.160 Council decisions are
presumptively binding unless they take the clear form of ‘recommendations.’161 In Namibia, this

156
Quigley, 523.
157
Compromis, ¶47.
158
Security Council Resolution 99997 (2022), Art.1 [Resolution].
159
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion,
[1971] ICJ Rep 16, ¶113 [Namibia].
160
Namibia, ¶113.
161
Sydney D. Bailey, and Sam Daws, 'Voting', The Procedure of the UN Security Council, 3rd
edn (1998), 269 citing General Assembly Official Records, 16th session, Supplement no.
1A, A/4800/Add. 1, 4. [Bailey and Daws].

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Court held that Council decisions are interpreted based on text, Charter provisions invoked, and
relevant circumstances.162 The text of Resolution 99997 [1], the invocation of Article 34 [2], and
the circumstances around its adoption [3] clarify that Remisia was under a binding obligation to
grant Malex entry.

162
Namibia, ¶114; Michael Wood, The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions (1998), 2
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 75 [Wood].

26
 661A

1. The terms of Resolution 99997 confirm a binding obligation to grant entry.

69. Article 1 of Resolution 99997 states that the Council “[d]ecides to establish… the UN
Inspection Mission to Remisia.”163 The use of the word ‘decides’ indicates that the provision is
mandatory, and, in accordance with the common sense interpretation of the text ‘to Remisia’
indicates the location where the UNIMR will operate.164

70. Entry into Remisia is a constitutive component of the establishment of the UNIMR, as
described in Article 1. Since it is not considered by subsequent Articles in the resolution, it must
be included in the binding decision to establish the UNIMR for Article 1 to have any effect.165
Article 2, which ‘[c]alls upon’ Remisia to cooperate with the Mission once established, does not
contemplate entry into the country. Neither does Article 3, which refers UN personnel to observe
municipal laws within the countries in which they are operating.166

2. Decisions under Article 34 are binding under Article 25.

71. Remisia is obligated under Article 25 ‘to accept and carry out’ the decision to launch an
Inspection Mission to Remisia under Article 34.167 The reference to this provision supports the
conclusion that Remisia was obligated to permit Malex’s entry.

72. Under Article 34, the UNSC can dispatch a commission of inquiry for on-the-spot
assessments with greater authority than subsequent articles of Chapter VI, which authorize
“recommendation[s]” for state compliance.168 Decisions under Article 34 are also binding per the
Charter principle to ‘give every assistance to the United Nations in any action it takes in

163
Resolution, Art.1.
164
Wood, 82, 86-87.
165
Bruno Simma et al, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Volume I, 3rd Edition
(2012) [Simma] at Anne Peters, “Ch. V. The Security Council Functions and Powers,
Article 25”, 794 [Peters] citing Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, A Critical
Analysis of its Fundamental Problems (1950), 445 [Kelsen]; Simma at Theodor
Schweisfurth, “Ch VI. Pacific Settlement of Disputes, Article 34”, 1103 [Schweisfurth].
166
Resolution, Art.2,3.
167
Schweisfurth, 1103; Resolution, Preamble.
168
Schweisfurth, 1095 and 1103 citing Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI,
Art.33(2), 36, 37(2), 38 [Charter].

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accordance with the present Charter.’169 Further, the decision to investigate must be taken in
accordance with the voting procedure set out in Article 27(3), which applies only to substantive
decisions of the UNSC.170

73. Highly qualified publicists and UNSC practice confirm that Remisia cannot prevent the
execution of the SC’s investigative powers, which are necessary for the Council to discharge its
mandate to maintain international peace and security.171 Article 34 is a preliminary measure which
provides the UNSC with the information necessary to determine its functions as the UN organ
primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.172 The Council has
the right to investigate “regardless of whether or not the State investigated approves or likes it”
since the entry of investigators is an essential precondition for the effective discharge by the UNSC
of its functions.173

74. The Charter establishes that Remisia cannot rely on other treaties to evade UNSC
decisions. Per Article 103, obligations imposed by Article 34 prevail over obligations under any
other international agreement, including the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.174

3. The context, object, and purpose of Resolution 99997.

75. Consideration of the context, object and purpose behind Resolution 99997 evidences that
Article 1 is a binding decision for the UNIMR to enter Remisia.175 As the UNSC President stated,

169
Charter, Art.2(5); Bailey and Daws, 267; Peters, 795.
170
Schweisfurth, 1100-1101.
171
Schweisfurth, 1104.
172
Charter, Art.34; S/PV-168, U.N. Security Council, Second Year, Official Records [Records],
No. 65, 168th Meeting (1947), 1553 [168th Meeting] referenced in LM Goodrich and AP
Simons, United Nations and the Maintenance of Peace and Security (Brookings
Institution 1955) 181 [Goodrich and Simons]; Schweisfurth, 1104.
173
Peters, 794 citing Kelsen, 445; US Delegation, S/PV-167, Records, No. 64, 167th Meeting,
1541 [167th Meeting] cited in Goodrich and Simmons, 181.
174
Charter, Art.103; Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya/United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, [1992], ICJ Rep 3, ¶39 [Lockerbie].
175
Wood (1998), 89-94.
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“denying entry to the UNIMR chief would be in violation” of Resolution 99997.176 Presidential
statements may provide authoritative clarification on the bindingness of UNSC Resolutions.177

76. The UNIMR was established because the spread of statelessness in Remisia gave rise to a
“dispute… which might lead to international friction.”178 Statelessness risks fueling international
disputes, forcible displacement and violence; its spread falls within the UNSC’s primary
responsibility under Article 24 to maintain international peace and security.179 Given the potential
gravity of the proliferation of statelessness, the UNSC would be unlikely to recommend a non-
binding investigation.

B. REMISIA VIOLATED ITS OBLIGATIONS TO GRANT ENTRY TO MALEX.

77. By refusing to grant Malex an entry visa, Remisia is actively interfering with the binding
decision to dispatch the UNIMR to Remisia.180 Remisia violated its obligations to accept and carry
out the decisions of the UNSC under Article 25 of the UN Charter and contravened the general
principle under Article 2(5) to ‘assist the [UN] in any action taken in accordance with the
Charter.’181

78. Remisia also violated its obligations under Section 22 and Section 26 of the Convention on
the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (“CPI”) to grant Malex the necessary facilities
for entry into the State as necessary for the independent exercise of his functions.182 In accordance

176
Compromis, ¶53.
177
Wood at 82-84.
178
Compromis, ¶39.
179
Charter, Art.24; UNHCR, The Statelessness Conventions Campaign: Why States Should
Accede to the 1954 and 1961 Statelessness Conventions (2010), ¶3 [Statelessness];
Valeria Bello. Is the discussion of ‘Statelessness’ in the UN Security Council a question
of human security or international security? (2014), Policy Report No. 02/02. Barcelona:
UNU-GCM, 8-15 [Bello].
180
Compromis, ¶52.
181
Charter, Art.2(5), 25.
182
Michael Schoiswohl, IV Immunities and Privileges, X Laissez-Passer, Laissez-Passer (2016),
459 [Schoiswohl]; UN Office of Legal Affairs, Facsimile to the Chief of the Special
Procedures Centre for Human Rights, United Nations Office in Geneva (1996) UNJYB,
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with Remisia’s obligations under the CPI, issuing an entry visa should have been a formality, not
an impediment to Malex’s ability to enter on UN business.183 Instead, Remisia repeatedly refused
to facilitate the speedy issuance of a visa for Malex.184

C. REMISIA’S VIOLATIONS CANNOT BE DEFENDED AS COUNTERMEASURES.

79. Remisia cannot establish that its actions were legal countermeasures to illegal actions taken
by the UNSC or Antrano. As the UNIMR lead, Malex’s right of entry belongs to the UN.185 ILC
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations states that members of an
organization may not take countermeasures against the organization unless such countermeasures
are provided for by the rules of the organization.186 Remisia also cannot deny Antranan UN
personnel entry because of its dispute with Antrano. This would violate Article 105 of the Charter,
which prohibits denying entry to UN personnel based on their nationality.187

D. THIS COURT CANNOT REVIEW THE INVOCATION OF ARTICLE 34.

80. This Court cannot judicially review UNSC decisions, and there is no procedure in the UN
for determining the validity of a UNSC resolution.188 The Court cannot substitute its discretion for

437 cited by Anthony Miller, United Nations Experts on Mission and their Privileges and
Immunities (2007), International Organizations Law Review, 11.
183
Schoiswohl, 498.
184
Compromis, ¶52, 57, 58.
185
Schoiswohl, 496.
186
ILC Draft Articles on the responsibility of International Organizations (2011), Art.52(2) cited
by Peters, 847.
187
Charter, Art.105; Schoiswohl, 495.
188
Lockerbie, ¶39-43; Namibia, ¶89, quoted by Dapo Akabe, The International Court of Justice
and the Security Council: Is There Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the
Political Organs of the United Nations (1997), 46:2 Inti & CLQ 309, 326. [Akabe];
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter),
Advisory Opinion, [1962] ICJ Rep 151, 168 [Certain Expenses].

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the UNSC's, as it is the primary UN organ responsible for the maintenance of peace and security.189
Remisia, accordingly, cannot challenge the lawfulness of Resolution 99997 before this Court.

81. Discretionary determinations by the UNSC, such as the existence of a threat to the peace,
cannot be reviewed.190 The decision to invoke Article 34 to investigate the situation in Remisia is
also discretionary and beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. Whether the UNIMR is an effective
mechanism for the UNSC to fulfill its responsibilities to maintain international peace and security
is also not reviewable by this Court.191

E. THIS COURT CANNOT REVIEW THE INVOCATION OF ARTICLE 34.

82. Even if UNSC decisions could be judicially reviewed, the standard of review is highly
deferential.192 The UNSC enjoys wide discretion in its evaluation of facts and interpretation of
Charter terms, and its resolutions are presumptively valid.193

83. Here, the procedural and substantive requirements for triggering Article 34 have been met.
There is no evidence of procedural issues in the enactment of Resolution 99997.194 Substantively,
the UNSC may investigate any situation that may give rise to an international dispute, provided it
does not fall within the domaine réservé of the State.195

84. The proliferation of statelessness in Remisia could threaten international peace and security
and falls within the primary of the UNSC under Article 24.196 The presumption by Antrano that a

189
Charter, Art. 24; Akabe, 337 citing Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, [1993] Provisional Measures, ICJ Rep 325,
Separate Opinion Lauterpatch, 439 ¶99.
190
Akabe 337 citing Lockerbie, Dissenting Opinion by Judge Weeramantry, 66 & 176; Charter,
Art.39.
191
Prosecutor v Duško Tadić aka Dule (1995), Decision on the defence motion on jurisdiction,
IT-94-1-T, ICTY, ¶23.
192
Lockerbie, ¶39-43.
193
Certain Expenses, ¶168; Peters, 817, 844-845.
194
Compromis, ¶48; Charter, Art.27(3), 32.
195
Schweisfurth, 1097.
196
Charter, Art.24; Statelessness; Bello.

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dispute emerged with Remisia regarding statelessness was sufficient to empower the UNSC to
invoke Article 34.197 As a party to the CSP and the CRS, Remisia’s refusal to comply with its
obligations under the Conventions as required by Antrano confirms that a dispute arose.198

85. Further, statelessness is not within Remisia’s domaine réservé because it is regulated by
multiple international conventions, including the CSP and CRS.199 Generally, the narrow carve-
out for the domaine réservé of a State under Article 2(7) of the Charter does not effectively limit
the UNSC’s Article 34 authority to investigate situations which might lead to international friction
or give rise to dispute.200

86. The mandate of the UNIMR under Article 1 of Resolution 99997 accords with Article 34’s
purpose to determine if a situation poses a threat to international peace and security.201
Subparagraph 1(a) directs the UNIMR to investigate the underlying cause of the proliferation of
statelessness, and 1(b) investigates the current state of the stateless prisoners.202 This direction is
consistent with past uses of Article 34, which directed broad investigations in 1946 and 1948.203
For example, despite opposition from several of the states affected, Resolution 15 established a
Commission with a broad geographical scope to “elucidate the causes and nature” of disturbances
along the Greek border.204 Thus, Resolution 99997 was validly enacted.

197
Compromis, ¶39; Schweisfurthl, 1097.
198
South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia/South Africa; Liberia/South Africa), Preliminary
Objections, [1962] ICJ Rep 319, 328 cited in Lockerbie, Judgment - Preliminary
Objections, ¶22; Simma at Christian Tomuschat, “Ch. 1. Purposes and Principles, Article
2(3)”, 195 cf ARSIWA, Art. 48, taken note of by UNGA Res 56/83 (2001) UN Doc
A/RES/56/83; Schweisfurth, 1097.
199
Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory Opinion, [1923] PCIJ Rep Ser B,
No 4, 23-24; Simma at Greg Nolte, “Ch.1. Purposes and Principles, Article 2(7)”, 291-
292.
200
Charter, Art.2(7); Schweisfurth, 1098.
201
Schweisfurth, 1098; Charter, Art. 34.
202
Resolution, Art.1.
203
UN Security Council Resolution 15 (1946), S/Res/15 [The Greek Question]; UN Security
Council Resolution 39 (1948), S/Res/39.
204
The Greek Question; 167th Meeting, 1542.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

For the foregoing reasons, the Republic of Antrano respectfully requests this Court find, adjudge,
and declare that:

Antrano has standing to submit the dispute concerning Remisia’s deprivation of nationality of
the Sterren Forty before the Court to determine whether Remisia violated its obligations erga
omnes partes and erga omnes;

II

Remisia’s deprivation of nationality of the Sterren Forty, rendering them stateless, violated its
obligations under Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the
customary international prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality.

III

Remisia did not have the right to exercise consular protection over Ms. Saki Shaw and Antrano
fulfilled its VCCR obligations to provide consular access to Remisian nationals.

IV

Security Council Resolution 99997 was a binding decision by the Security Council to establish
an inspection mission in Remisia. Remisia breached its Charter and Treaty obligations by
refusing to facilitate Dr. Toulous Malex’s entry into the country.

33