DRP001 Puc RPT Z 320 001
DRP001 Puc RPT Z 320 001
Package 1
DOC. NUMBER: DRP001-PUC-RPT-Z-320-001 REV. O1 PAGE 2 of 215
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. PURPOSE .......................................................................................................................3
2. SCOPE............................................................................................................................3
This document is property of Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company. Its reproduction without previous
permission in writing is strictly forbidden.
DUQM Refinery Project
Package 1
DOC. NUMBER: DRP001-PUC-RPT-Z-320-001 REV. O1 PAGE 3 of 215
1. PURPOSE
This document presents the report of the Amine Regeneration Unit (320 U) EPC Process
HAZOP study performed for DUQM Refinery Project EPC Package One for Duqm Refinery
(Contract No.: CNT-1100-1000-006), to be located in Oman. The study was undertaken
during the Detail Engineering Phase of the Project.
The study was carried out in four (4) sessions, from February, 11 to February, 14 of 2019.
Specialist from ALTRAN facilitated the study. The HAZOP team consisted of specialists from
CONTRACTOR and COMPANY.
The purpose of the HAZOP Study is to identify hazards, ensure process safety, and minimize
operability problems via a systematic application of Process parameters (e.g. flow, pressure
and temperature) and guide words (e.g. no, more, less) to produce deviations (e.g. no flow,
less pressure) from the design intent or intended operational mode of the plant.
2. SCOPE
The scope of work of the HAZOP analysis was for Amine Regeneration Unit (320 U).
In continuation, please find the ARU Unit 320 HAZOP Study Report developed by third party
consultant, ALTRAN.
This document is property of Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company. Its reproduction without previous
permission in writing is strictly forbidden.
HAZOP STUDY REPORT
UNIT 320 ARU
Revision 1.0
ALTRAN
Parque Empresarial Las Mercedes
C/ Campezo, 1 – Building 1
28022 Madrid
www.altran.es
Tables Index
Table 1: HAZOP Parameters by HAZOP Study Procedure .. 13 Table 8: List of P&IDs .......................................................... 28
Table 2: Severity, Likelihood and Risk Ranking according to Table 9: List of DPTs ........................................................... 30
DRP001-PUC-PRO-Z-000-003 HAZOP Study Procedure ... 17 Table 10: Other documents ................................................. 30
Table 3: Top major scenarios ............................................... 23 Table 11. Parking Lot items list............................................ 37
Table 5: Nodes List .............................................................. 26 Table 12: List of HAZOP Recommendations ....................... 39
Table 6: Company specifications and procedures ................ 28 Table 13. Scenarios affecting Package Equipment ............. 80
Table 7: Industry Codes and Standards ............................... 28 Table 14. Critical Alarm per scenario................................... 82
2.1.2 Rich Amine Pumps, Lean/Rich Amine Exchanger, Lean Amine Cooler and Lean Amine Pumps
Rich amine from the Amine Flash Drum is pumped via the Rich Amine Pumps (320P-001A/B) to one of the two 70%
regeneration columns. There are two identical amine regeneration columns and associated equipment; only one will be
detailed in this process description. The intended operation is for both columns to operate on equal flowrates during
normal operation.
Before entering the Amine Regenerator (320C-101) the rich amine is preheated in the Lean/Rich Exchanger (320E-101)
with hot lean amine from the bottom of 320C-101 as a means of reducing the reboiler steam consumption and lean amine
cooling duty. The rich amine outlet temperature is controlled by providing a by-pass line to the exchanger on the lean
amine (hot) side. The preheated rich amine then passes to 320C-101 under flow control cascaded from the Amine Flash
Drum level.
Cooled lean amine exciting the Lean/Rich Amine Exchanger is pumped using the Lean Amine Pumps (320P-101A/B)
and cooled further, to 60 °C, by the Lean Amine Cooler prior to being returned to the consumers (amine absorbers in the
SGP, DHT and HCU). The lean amine temperature is controlled using a combination of variable speed drive (VSD) fans
and on/off fans in conjunction with a temperature controller on the Lean Amine Cooler discharge.
Under flow control make-up amine solution from the Amine Make-Up Tank (320TK 001) is pumped via the Amine Transfer
Pumps (320P-006A/B) to upstream of 320E-101 and added to the system to make up for operational losses and thus
maintain the correct concentration of lean amine (40 wt% MDEA). The Amine Transfer pumps also send make-up amine
solution to the second regenerator arrangement.
A slip stream, of up to 25% of the total lean amine mass flow, from the discharge of the Lean Amine cooler is sent for
filtering (see Section 2.7.1 for details of the filtration system). From here, the filtered amine is pumped back to the lean
amine header using the Amine Filter Pump (320P-002A/B).
For start-up and shutdown, provision is made to route the lean amine from the discharge of the Lean Amine cooler to the
Amine Make-Up Tank.
No No flow
Chemical reaction
Flow As Well As
Runaway reaction
Other Than
Level No No level
Despite these variables, other variables have been analysed during HAZOP study (e.g. Start-up, Shutdown,
Maintenance, etc.) as considered applicable by the HAZOP Team.
At this point of the review, the team determined whether the Deviation was credible and proceeded to identify the Causes
for every deviation, and determine their Consequences in terms of People, Environment, Asset and Reputation as if no
Safeguards were implemented. Afterwards, any Safeguards already included in the design, which could prevent the
occurrence of the hazard or mitigate its consequences, were discussed and documented. After safeguards were
documented, the HAZOP team ranked the scenarios, in this case considering the safeguards for the likelihood of the
event. Consequences, Likelihoods and Risks were ranked as described in Attachment 2 of the “DRP001-PUC-PRO-Z-
000-003 HAZOP Study Procedure”. A description of this risk ranking is recorded in section 3.1 of this report.
Interlocks considered as valid safeguards for the studied scenarios, or whenever the HAZOP team potentially considered
the implementation of an interlock, have been subject to SIL analysis (further study performed after HAZOP sessions).
All deviations which have been considered by the team to be meaningful have been recorded during the meeting. The
Scribe recorded all relevant information based on consensus reached among the attendees during the review for these
deviations as the review progresses. Records allow questions which may arise following completion of the sessions to
be addressed, diminishing the possibly need to have parts of the study to be redone due to lack of information
documented. It is better to document more than less.
When a potential hazard is identified, remedial action may be required depending on the likelihood of the event and the
severity of its consequence. The need for a solution has to be recorded as a Recommendation / Action to be
implemented. After a later and deeper study, resolution of the action may adopt a different direction than the one initially
intended provided that response includes a detailed justification.
It is important to remark that Consequences severity assessment has not considered existing safeguards and likelihood
assessment takes into account the presence of existing safeguards.
Despite this risk ranking, for those scenarios where an interlock is proposed as a valid safeguard to cover the risk gap,
or whenever the HAZOP team potentially considers the implementation of an interlock, SIL assignment shall be
completed using the Layers Of Protection Analysis (LOPA) methodology in compliance with “DRP001-PUC-PRO-K-000-
003 SIL Review Procedure”.
a) Equipment, piping and valves are adequately designed (including local environmental / site, start-up, all modes
of operation, capacity changes and shutdown conditions), with proper material selected, installed, maintained
and inspected.
b) All plant items would be suitably commissioned, tested and fit for first use.
c) Operator is trained and qualified. Operating and Maintenance procedures are written, up-to-date, understood,
and appropriately followed. Therefore, human error will be only considered as a cause of deviation for operations
with highly manual intervention, and will be decided in a case by case basis.
d) Adequate emergency response procedures and facilities, as well as trained emergency response teams, are
available.
e) When analyzing control loop / control valve failures, it is assumed that any of the elements (e.g. transmitter,
controller or control valve) is failing leading to the consequences of the analyzed deviation. Alarms linked to this
control loop will not be taken into account as valid safeguards. However, in some cases, alarming of valves limit
switches and MCC pumps (discrepancy alarms) can be recorded as valid safeguards because they are
considered as separate elements
f) Control valves failure (open or closed) could be due to many known common failure modes, including but not
limited to:
Mechanical failure
Loss of power / instrument air supply
Failure of control loop
Transmitter failure
g) The failure on demand of a Safeguard is not considered as a cause of process deviation. The spurious action of
one safeguard (when not required to act, on its more credible fail action: safe position) shall on the other hand
be reviewed as part of the HAZOP Study, considering one single final element (e.g. the spurious closure of an
isolation valve).
h) All equipment shall be referenced by their tag number and not by their title.
i) In general, causes of a deviation will be related to the analyzed node. Consequences and Safeguards can
nevertheless be associated to systems out of the node.
j) Double jeopardy will not be considered as cause of an event.
k) Latent failures will not be considered as double jeopardy.
l) Spontaneous pipe / flange / vessel wall rupture is excluded from HAZOP.
m) Relief devices will be considered as IPL if the evaluated scenario is covered by the device. If a relief device is
included in the design to cover a particular scenario the device is considered to be available on demand and
adequate for its purpose.
n) Check valves protection against contamination scenarios shall be analyzed in a case by case basis
o) Hazardous scenarios covered by the design will be analyzed it will be recorded: “Covered by design “. For this
scenarios no risk ranking will be done, neither SIL assignation.
Remarks /
Causes Consequences Safeguards CAT LKH SEV Risk Recommendations Responsible Close Date
Observations
EPC-HZP-320-29.
Provide an
additional LT with
LAH (independent
from 320LIT-8030)
24.2.1.1. Liquid accumulation to allow operator to
in unit 320 flare header manually drain the
24.2.1. Liquid
leading to possible blockage in 1. 320LC-8030 with sour gas flare
carryover during P B 4 High DEC Process Next P&ID issue.
flare system. Unavailability of LAH header leg in case of
fire scenario.
the flare system in case of liquid accumulation.
emergency (relief scenario). Due to volume of
sour gas flare
header leg, operator
will have enough
time to manually
drain the system.
24.2.2. Failure
24.2.2.1. Liquid accumulation
of control
in unit 320 flare header
320LC-8030
leading to possible blockage in :Refer To EPC-HZP-
(valve 320LV- 1. None detected. P B 4 High
flare system. Unavailability of 320-29
8030 not
the flare system in case of
opening when it
emergency (relief scenario).
is required).
Process:
Unit 320 - ARU
File Description:
HAZOP study for Duqm Refinery Project EPC Package One
Date:
February 2019
Process Description:
Chemicals:
Purpose:
Scope:
Objectives:
Project Notes:
GENERAL NOTES:
1.- All findings for train 1 of U-320 ARU is applicable for the train 2.
2.- The following nodes have been reviewed and there are not HAZOP findings:
- #13 - LP steam and LP Condensate distribution
- #14 - MP steam distribution
- #15 - Cooling Water Distribution
- #16 - Service Water Distribution
- #17 - MP Boiler Feed Water Distribution
- #18 - Potable Water Distribution
- #19 - Demineralized Water Distribution
- #20 - Refinery Fuel Gas Distribution
- #21 - Plant Air Distribution
- #22 - Instrument Air Distribution
- #23 - Nitrogen Distribution
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS:
EPC-HZP-320-GR1.- Consider providing condensate connection for 320PK-101 antifoam package for dilution purposes instead of demi water connection in order to avoid O2 presence in the product. (Responsible: DEC Process / Close date: May,
2019)
EPC-HZP-320-GR2.- Node #11 "Fresh Amine Storage Tank 320TK-003" provide isolation valves in lines 4"-320MDA-0001-A2AL7-NI-NT and 4"-320MDA-0002-A2AL7-NI-NT in P&ID DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-017_H1. (Responsible: DEC
Process / Close date: Next P&ID issue)
1.1.5. Failure of 1.1.5.1. Potential loss 1. 320LAL-0027 Yes A B 2 Mod EPC-HZP-320-1. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process / Next P&ID Personnel injuries is
control 320LC-0027 / of level in 320V-001 A/B/C Ensure each 320000-U-PID- DEC issue not considered
320FC-1041 valve leading to pumps transmitter 320LIT- 002-1_H1 Instrumentation because pumps
320FV-1041 320P-001 A/B due to 2. Interlock 320U- Yes 0027 A/B/C has a low 320P-001 A/B have
opening). cavitation. 0100 triggered by and high level alarm. double mechanical
320LALL-0026 A/B/C seal with alarm and
(2oo3) causing the not LOC is expected.
trip of pumps 320P-
001 A/B (1oo1) 320LC-0027 is
redundant (sensors
320LIT-0027 A/B/C)
320LAL-0027 A/B/C
provide enough time
for operator to take
an action (20
minutes).
No / Less 1.2. No / 1.2.1. Less flow of 1.2.1.1. Potential loss 1. 320LC-0027 with No A B 2 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP- Personnel injuries is
Less Flow rich amine from U- of level in 320V-001 LAL 320-1 not considered
105 SGP Unit. leading to pumps because pumps
320P-001 A/B due to 2. Interlock 320U- Yes 320P-001 A/B have
cavitation. 0100 triggered by double mechanical
320LALL-0026 A/B/C seal with alarm and
(2oo3) causing the not LOC is expected.
trip of pumps 320P-
001 A/B (1oo1) 320LC-0027 is
redundant (sensors
320LIT-0027 A/B/C)
1.2.2. Less flow of 1.2.2.1. Potential loss 1. 320LC-0027 with No A B 2 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP- Personnel injuries is
rich amine from U- of level in 320V-001 LAL 320-1 not considered
160 DHT Unit. leading to pumps because pumps
320P-001 A/B due to 2. Interlock 320U- Yes 320P-001 A/B have
cavitation. 0100 triggered by double mechanical
320LALL-0026 A/B/C seal with alarm and
(2oo3) causing the not LOC is expected.
trip of pumps 320P-
001 A/B (1oo1) 320LC-0027 is
redundant (sensors
320LIT-0027 A/B/C)
320LAL-0027 A/B/C
provide enough time
for operator to take
an action (20
minutes).
1.2.3. Less flow of 1.2.3.1. Potential loss 1. 320LC-0027 with No A B 2 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP- Personnel injuries is
rich amine from U- of level in 320V-001 LAL 320-1 not considered
120 HCU Unit. leading to pumps because pumps
320P-001 A/B due to 2. Interlock 320U- Yes 320P-001 A/B have
cavitation. 0100 triggered by double mechanical
320LALL-0026 A/B/C seal with alarm and
(2oo3) causing the not LOC is expected.
trip of pumps 320P-
001 A/B (1oo1) 320LC-0027 is
redundant (sensors
320LIT-0027 A/B/C)
320LAL-0027 A/B/C
provide enough time
for operator to take
an action (20
minutes).
1.2.5. Failure of valve 1.2.5.1. Potential 1. Interlock 320U- Yes A C 2 Mod EPC-HZP-320-2. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process / Next C&E Personnel injuries is
320UV-0021 A/B mechanical damage 0101 A/B triggered by Include not fully open 320000-U-PID- DEC issue not considered
closed. to pumps 320P-001 closed signal in valve signal in valve 320UV- 002-2_H1 Instrumentation because pumps
A/B due to blocked 320UV-0021 A/B 0021 A/B to activate 320P-001 A/B have
suction. (1oo1) causing the interlock 320U-0101 double mechanical
trip of pumps 320P- A/B tripping the seal with alarm and
001 A/B (1oo1) pumps 320P-001 A/B. not LOC is expected.
1.2.8. Failure of 1.2.8.1. Potential off- 1. Amine scrubber Normally flashed gas
control 320FC-0022 spec flashed gas sent 110V-003 (at U-110 is sent to U-110 VDU.
(valve 320FV-0022 to U-110 VDU Unit VDU Unit)
closing). (high H2S content).
Possible problems in 2. Sampling
U-110 VDU Unit. See procedure (320SC-
U-110 VDU Unit L2-0023)
HAZOP Study.
1.2.12. Failure of 1.2.12.1. Potential 1. 320LC-0027 with No A B 2 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP- Personnel injuries is
control 320FC-0001 loss of level in 320V- LAL 320-1 not considered
(valve 320FV-0001 001 leading to pumps because pumps
closing) (when the 320P-001 A/B due to 2. Interlock 320U- Yes 320P-001 A/B have
line is in operation cavitation. 0100 triggered by double mechanical
(start-up or turndown 320LALL-0026 A/B/C seal with alarm and
conditions)). (2oo3) causing the not LOC is expected.
trip of pumps 320P-
001 A/B (1oo1) 320LC-0027 is
redundant (sensors
320LIT-0027 A/B/C)
320LAL-0027 A/B/C
provide enough time
for operator to take
an action (20
minutes).
HAZOP Team
discussed about the
possibility of running
U-320 ARU Unit
when U-160 DHT and
U-120 HCU Unit are
shutdown, by opening
lean amine line from
320AE-001 to 320V-
001. Operator will
have enough time to
open this line
because there is
enough inventory in
regenerator 320C-
101 to feed U-105
SGP Unit during this
scenario until
operator take the
action.
3. Firefighting system
1.9.4. Gas blow-by 1.9.4.1. Potential 1. 320PSV-0021 P A 4 Mod This scenario has
from U-105 SGP Unit mechanical damage A/B/C (designed for been analysed in
(from 105C-006 or to 320V-001 due to this scenario) order to cover the
105V-005). overpressure. LOC. following scenarios:
Toxic release. 7.1.2.1 and 7.5.2.1
from U-105 SGP Unit
HAZOP.
1.13.1.2. Valves
320UV-0021 A/B fail
closed. This is the
safe position.
1.13.1.3. Valve
320FV-0023 fails
open. This is the safe
position.
1.13.1.4. Valve
320FV-0022 fails
closed. This is the
safe position.
1.13.1.6. Valve
320PV-0021B fails
open. This is the safe
position.
1.13.1.7. Valve
320FV-1041 fails
closed. This is the
safe position.
1.13.1.8. Valve
320FV-0001 fails
open. This is the safe
position.
1.13.3. Loss of steam 1.13.3.1. Increase of 1. Slope on top P A 4 Mod EPC-HZP-320-5. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process Issue for
tracing supply. condensation on the flashed gas lines, Study the best 320000-U-PID- design
top flashed gas lines draining liquid and A A 3 Low technical solution to 002-1_H1; P&IDs
leading to corrosion avoiding minimize the DRP001-PUC-
problems. LOC. Toxic accumulation probability of failure of 320000-U-PID-
release. steam tracing system 211_H1; DRP001-
2. Flashed gas top for top flashed gas PUC-320000-U-
lines with no liquid lines. PID-300_H1
pockets to avoid...
3. Maintenance
procedures
Less 2.6. Lower 2.6.1. Human error 2.6.1.1. Potential 1. 320LAL-0262 No A B 1 Low Personnel injuries is
Level starting-up pump mechanical damage not considered
320P-003 when it is to pump 320P-003 2. Process interlock because pump 320P-
not required. due to cavitation. 320I-0120 triggered 003 has double
by 320LALL-0264 mechanical seal with
causing the stop of alarm and not LOC is
pump 320P-003 expected.
3. Maintenance
procedures
Less 3.6. Lower 3.6.1. Human error 3.6.1.1. Potential 1. Process interlock A B 2 Mod Personnel injuries is
Level (operator starts pump mechanical damage 320I-0250 triggered not considered
320P-005 when it is to pump 320P-005 by 320LALL-0221A because pump 320P-
not required). due to cavitation. causing the stop of 005 has double
pump 320P-005 mechanical seal with
alarm and not LOC is
expected.
3. Maintenance
procedures
4.2.5.2. Delay in
make-up operation.
Moderate operational
changes. Non
hazardous
consequences.
Less 4.6.... 4.6.1. Human error... 4.6.1.1. Potential... 1. 320LAL-0242A No A A 2 Low Personnel injuries...
320LAL-0242A
provides enough time
to operator to take an
action.
Less 4.10. Lower 4.10.1. Failure of 4.10.1.1. Potential 1. 320PSV-0241 A A 2 Low :Refer To EPC-HZP-
Pressure control 320PC-0241 vacuum formation in (Vacuum breaker) 320-9
(valve 320PV-0241B 320TK-001 leading to
opening / 320PV- mechanical damage
0241A closing). (collapse).
Economical impact.
4.13.1.2. Valve
320PV-0241B fails
open. This is the safe
position.
4.13.1.3. Valve
320FV-0241 fails
closed. This is the
safe position.
4.13.1.4. Valve
320FV-0242 fails
open. This is the safe
position.
4.13.1.5. Valve
320FV-0243 fails...
3. Maintenance
procedures
Less 5.6. Lower 5.6.1. Human error 5.6.1.1. Potential loss 1. 320LAL-0302A No A A 2 Low Personnel injuries is
Level during tank 320TK- of level in 320TK-002 not considered
002 transfer leading to mechanical 2. Operating because pumps
operation. damage to pump procedures 320P-006 A/B have
320P-004 or 320P- double mechanical
006 A/B due to 3. Process interlock seal with alarm and
cavitation. 320I-0110 triggered not LOC is expected.
by 320LALL-0301
(1oo1) causing the The likelihood of this
stop of pumps 320P- scenario is very low
004 and 320P-006 because it is an
A/B (1oo1) intermittent and
supervised operation.
Less 5.10. Lower 5.10.1. Failure of 5.10.1.1. Potential 1. 320PSV-0301 A A 2 Low :Refer To EPC-HZP-
Pressure control 320PC-0301 vacuum formation in (Vacuum breaker) 320-10
(valve 320PV-0301B 320TK-002 leading to
opening / 320PV- mechanical damage
0301A closing). (collapse).
Economical impact.
5.13.1.2. Valve
320PV-0301B fails
open. This is the safe
position.
4. 320TAH-1105 No
6.1.2.2. Potential 1. 320TC-1101 with No P A 4 Mod EPC-HZP-320-11. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process / Next P&ID SIL Assessment is
overheating in reboiler TAH Implement a new SIF 320001-U-PID- DEC issue required for this new
320E-102 A/B system triggered by PAHH in 004_H1; DRP001- Instrumentation SIF triggered by
leading to 2. 320PC-1062 with No a new PT in 320C-101 PUC-320001-U- PAHH in a new PT in
pressurization of PAH causing the closure of PID-006_H1 320C-101 causing
320C-101. LOC. Toxic 320UV-1101 (cut-off the closure of 320UV-
release. 3. 320PC-1141 with No steam to reboiler 1101 (cut-off steam
PAH (at outlet of 320E-102 A/B) (1oo1). to reboiler 320E-102
320V-101) A/B) (1oo1).
4. 320TAH-1104 A/B No
5. 320TAH-1105 No
6. 320PSV-1061 A/B
(designed for this
scenario)
No / Less 6.2. No / 6.2.1. Failure of 6.2.1.1. Potential 1. 320PAL-1062 No :Refer To EPC-HZP- This scenario has
Less Flow control 320FFC-1102 flooding of 320V-102 320-3 been analysed in
(feed / steam ratio) / A/B leading to loss of 2. 320TAL-1104 A/B No order to cover the
320FC-1103A/B / condensation inside following scenarios:
320LC-1122 A/B reboiler 320E-102 3. 320TAL-1105 No 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2
(valve 320FV-1103 A/B. Loss of duty and 16.11.1.3 from
A/B closing). leading to lower 4. Sampling U-160 DHT Unit
temperature in 320C- procedure (320SC- HAZOP.
101 bottom system. J4-0381) (at outlet of
Off-spec lean amine 320AE-001 A-J)
and process upsets in
U-105 SGP, U-160
DHT and U-120 HCU
Unit. See U-105 SGP,
U-160 DHT and U-120
HCU HAZOP Studies.
6.2.2. Loss of steam 6.2.2.1. Loss of duty 1. 320PAL-1062 No :Refer To EPC-HZP- This scenario has
supply from U-340 leading to lower 320-3 been analysed in
SRU Unit. temperature in 320C- 2. 320TAL-1104 A/B No order to cover the
101 bottom system. following scenarios:
Off-spec lean amine 3. 320TAL-1105 No 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2
and process upsets in and 16.11.1.3 from
U-105 SGP, U-160 4. Sampling U-160 DHT Unit
DHT and U-120 HCU procedure (320SC- HAZOP.
Unit. See U-105 SGP, J4-0381) (at outlet of
U-160 DHT and U-120 320AE-001 A-J)
HCU HAZOP Studies.
6.2.3. Loss of LP 6.2.3.1. Loss of duty 1. 320PAL-1062 No :Refer To EPC-HZP- This scenario has
steam supply. leading to lower 320-3 been analysed in
temperature in 320C- 2. 320TAL-1104 A/B No order to cover the
101 bottom system. following scenarios:
Off-spec lean amine 3. 320TAL-1105 No 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2
and process upsets in and 16.11.1.3 from
U-105 SGP, U-160... 4. Sampling... U-160 DHT Unit...
6.2.4. Failure of valve 6.2.4.1. Loss of duty 1. 320PAL-1062 No :Refer To EPC-HZP- This scenario has
320UV-1101 closed. leading to lower 320-3 been analysed in
temperature in 320C- 2. 320TAL-1104 A/B No order to cover the
101 bottom system. following scenarios:
Off-spec lean amine 3. 320TAL-1105 No 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2
and process upsets in and 16.11.1.3 from
U-105 SGP, U-160 4. Sampling U-160 DHT Unit
DHT and U-120 HCU procedure (320SC- HAZOP.
Unit. See U-105 SGP, J4-0381) (at outlet of
U-160 DHT and U-120 320AE-001 A-J)
HCU HAZOP Studies.
6.2.5. Failure of 6.2.5.1. Loss of duty 1. 320PAL-1062 No :Refer To EPC-HZP- This scenario has
control 320PC-1102 leading to lower 320-3 been analysed in
(valve 320PV-1102 temperature in 320C- 2. 320TAL-1104 A/B No order to cover the
A/B closing). 101 bottom system. following scenarios:
Off-spec lean amine 3. 320TAL-1105 No 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2
and process upsets in and 16.11.1.3 from
U-105 SGP, U-160 4. Sampling U-160 DHT Unit
DHT and U-120 HCU procedure (320SC- HAZOP.
Unit. See U-105 SGP, J4-0381) (at outlet of
U-160 DHT and U-120 320AE-001 A-J)
HCU HAZOP Studies.
4. 320TAH-1105 No
5. 320PSV-1061 A/B
(designed for this
scenario)
4. 320TAH-1105 No
5. 320PSV-1061 A/B
(designed for this
scenario)
6.13.1.2. Valves
320PV-1102 A/B fail
closed. This is the
safe position.
6.13.1.3. Valves
320FV-1103 A/B fail
closed. This is the
safe position.
6.13.1.4. Valve
320UV-1101 fails
closed. This is the
safe position.
4. Process interlock
320I-1150 triggered
by 320LAHH-1062
causing the closure of
320PV-1102 A/B and
closure of 320FV-
1041
7.7.1.3. Possible 1. None detected. A C 2 Mod EPC-HZP-320-15. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process Next P&ID Personnel injuries is
mechanical damage Relocate 320TIT-1046 320001-U-PID- issue not considered
to pumps 320P-101 downstream 320E- 003_H1 because pumps
A/B due to cavitation 101 bypass 320P-101 A/B have
(vaporization). connection (10"- double mechanical
320AML-1004- seal with alarm and
A1LQ5-HC-NT). not LOC is expected.
7.7.3. Failure of 7.7.3.1. High EPC-HZP-320-16. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process Next P&ID
control 320TC-0382 temperature at the Provide a TG in lean 320000-U-PID- issue
(variable speed outlet of 320AE-001 amine line 020-2_H1
320AE-001 A-J fans A-J leading to high downstream 320TIT-
control). temperature lean 0382.
amine to BL (U-160
DHT, U-120 HCU and
U-105 SGP Units).
Moderate operational
changes. Non
hazardous
consequences
because the design
temperature of U-160
DHT, U-120 HCU and
U-105 SGP Units...
7.13.1.2. Valve
320TV-1047 fails
closed. This is the
safe position.
7.13.1.3. Valve
320FV-1081 fails
open. This is the safe
position.
7.13.1.4. Valve
320FV-0202 fails
open. This is the safe
position.
7.13.1.5. Valve
320FV-0001 fails
open. This is the safe
position.
7.13.2.2. Failure of
320AE-001 A-J. See
Higher Temperature
deviation in this node.
No / Less 8.2. No / 8.2.1. Plugging of 8.2.1.1. Potential loss 1. 320PDAH-0181 No EPC-HZP-320-17. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process Next P&ID Confirm with
Less Flow 320PK-001. of quality of lean Provide a sample 320000-U-PID- issue VENDOR during
amine to BL (U-105 connection at outlet of 011_H1 320PK-001 Package
SGP, U-160 DHT and activated carbon filter HAZOP Study if
U-120 HCU Units). 320S-001. 320PK-001 has a
Moderate operational sample connection at
changes. Non inlet and outlet of
hazardous 320PK-001.
consequences.
Review possible
spurious trip or failure
of 320PK-001 and
how to protect pumps
320P-002 A/B in that
case, during 320PK-
001 Package HAZOP
Study with VENDOR
presence.
8.2.6. Failure of 8.2.6.1. Potential 1. None detected. A C 2 Mod EPC-HZP-320-18. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process / Next P&ID Personnel injuries is
control 320FC-0202 mechanical damage Configure a FAL in 320000-U-PID- DEC issue not considered
(valve 320FV-0202 to pumps 320P-002 320FI-0181A (critical 010_H1 Instrumentation because pumps
closing). A/B due blocked alarm). 320P-002 A/B have
discharge. double mechanical
seal with alarm and
not LOC is expected.
8.13.1.2. Valve
320FV-0202 fails
open. This is the safe
position.
9.1.2. Failure of 9.1.2.1. Potential 1. Sampling :Refer To EPC-HZP- This scenario has
control 320FC-1163 amine dilution in long procedure (320SC- 320-3 been analysed in
(valve 320FV-1163 term leading to off- J4-0381) (at outlet of order to cover the
opening). spec lean amine and 320AE-001 A-J) following scenarios:
process upsets in U- 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2
105 SGP, U-160 DHT and 16.11.1.3 from
and U-120 HCU Unit. U-160 DHT Unit
See U-105 SGP, U- HAZOP.
160 DHT and U-120
HCU HAZOP Studies.
9.1.5. Failure of 9.1.5.1. Potential level 1. 320LC-1141 / No P A 4 Mod EPC-HZP-320-19. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process / Next P&ID
control 320FC-1164 increase in 320V-101 320FC-1161 (reflux Configure a LAH in 320001-U-PID- DEC issue
(valve 320FV-1164 and low flow of reflux control) with LAH 320LI-1142 (critical 008_H1 Instrumentation
opening) (minimum to column 320C-101 alarm).
recirculation line). leading to 2. 320PC-1062 with No
overpressure and PAH :Refer To EPC-HZP-
mechanical damage. 320-11
LOC. Toxic release. 3. 320PC-1141 with No
PAH
4. 320TC-1061 with... No
5. 320PSV-1061 A/B
(designed for this
scenario)
9.1.6. Failure of 9.1.6.1. Potential loss 1. Interlock 320U- Yes A C 2 Mod Personnel injuries is
control 320LC-1141 / of level in 320V-101 1200 triggered by not considered
320FC-1161 (valve leading to possible 320LALL-1142 (1oo1) because pumps
320FV-1161 mechanical damage causing the trip of 320P-102 A/B have
opening). to pumps 320P-102 pumps 320P-102 A/B double mechanical
A/B due to cavitation. (1oo1) seal with alarm and
not LOC is expected.
9.1.6.2. Potential off- 1. 320TC-1061 with No A B 2 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP- This scenario has
spec lean amine due TAL 320-3 been analysed in
to low temperature in order to cover the
320C-101. 2. Sampling following scenarios:
Economical impact. procedure (320SC- 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2
J4-0381) (at outlet of and 16.11.1.3 from
320AE-001 A-J) U-160 DHT Unit
HAZOP.
9.1.7. Failure of 9.1.7.1. Potential loss 1. 320LC-1141 / No A C 2 Mod EPC-HZP-320-20. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process / Next P&ID Personnel injuries is
control 320FC-1162 of level in 320V-101 320FC-1161 (reflux Configure a high 320002-U-PID- DEC issue not considered
(valve 320FV-1162 leading to possible control) with LAL deviation from set- 009_H1 Instrumentation because pumps
opening). mechanical damage point alarm in 320FC- 320P-102 A/B have
to pumps 320P-102 2. Interlock 320U- Yes 1162 (not critical double mechanical
A/B due to cavitation. 1200 triggered by alarm). seal with alarm and
320LALL-1142 (1oo1) not LOC is expected.
causing the trip of
pumps 320P-102 A/B 320LAL-1141 does
(1oo1) not provide enough
time to operator to
take an action.
9.2.5. Failure of 9.2.5.1. Potential 1. 320LAH-1141 No P A 4 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP- 320LAH-1141 allows
pumps 320P-102 overfilling of 320V-101 320-19 the operator to take
A/B. leading to flooding of 2. 320PSV-1061 A/B an action (20
the 320C-101 (designed for this minutes).
overhead system. scenario)
Potential overpressure
in 320C-101 due to
blocked outlet
conditions leading to
mechanical damage.
LOC. Toxic release.
4. 320TC-1061 with No
TAH
5. 320PSV-1061 A/B
(designed for this
scenario)
4. 320PSV-1061 A/B
(designed for this
scenario)
9.2.9. Blocked outlet 9.2.9.1. Potential 1. 320PC-1141 with No P A 4 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP-
conditions at U-340 overpressure in 320C- PAH 320-11
SRU Unit. 101 due to blocked
outlet conditions 2. 320PSV-1061 A/B
leading to mechanical (designed for this
damage. LOC. Toxic scenario)
release.
9.7.2.2. See
Temperature
parameter in node #7.
9.7.5. Failure of 9.7.5.1. Potential 1. 320PC-1141 with No P A 4 Mod EPC-HZP-320-21. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process / Next P&ID
control 320TC-1141 overpressure 320C- PAH Configure a TAH in 320002-U-PID- DEC issue
(variable speed 101 due to high 320TI-1142 (critical 008_H1 Instrumentation
320AE-101 A/B fans temperature leading to 2. 320PSV-1061 A/B alarm).
control). mechanical damage. (designed for this
LOC. Toxic release. scenario) :Refer To EPC-HZP-
320-11
9.8.2. Failure of 9.8.2.1. Potential off- 1. 320TC-1061 with No A B 2 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP- This scenario has
control 320TC-1047 spec lean amine due TAL 320-3 been analysed in
(valve 320TV-1047 to low temperature in order to cover the
opening). 320C-101. 2. Sampling following scenarios:
Economical impact. procedure (320SC- 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2
J4-0381) (at outlet of and 16.11.1.3 from
320AE-001 A-J) U-160 DHT Unit
HAZOP.
9.8.2.2. See
Temperature
parameter in node #7.
9.13.1.2. Valve
320PV-1141 fails
open. This is the safe
position.
9.13.1.3. Valve
320PV-1062 fails
closed. This is the
safe position.
9.13.1.4. Valve
320FV-1161 fails
open. This is the safe
position.
9.13.1.5. Valve
320FV-1162 fails
closed. This is the
safe position.
9.13.1.6. Valve
320FV-1163 fails
closed. This is the
safe position.
9.13.1.7. Valve
320FV-1164 fails
open. This is the safe
position.
9.13.1.8. Valve
320TV-1047 fails
closed. This is the
safe position.
9.13.2.2. Failure of
320AE-101 A/B. See
Higher Temperature
deviation in this node.
9.13.3. Loss of steam 9.13.3.1. Increase of 1. Slope on top acid P A 4 Mod EPC-HZP-320-22. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process Issue for
tracing supply. condensation on the gas lines, draining Study the best 320001-U-PID- design
top acid gas lines liquid and avoiding A A 3 Low technical solution to 004_H1; DRP001- P&IDs
leading to corrosion accumulation minimize the PUC-320001-U-
problems. Plugging in probability of failure of PID-008_H1;
line and air cooler 2. Acid gas top lines steam tracing system DRP001-PUC-
320-AE-101 A/B with no liquid pockets for top acid gas lines. 320000-U-PID-
bundles. LOC. Toxic to avoid accumulation 300_H1
release.
3. Corrosion EPC-HZP-320-23. RP001-PUC- DEC Process Next P&ID
monitoring electric Implement a TG at BL 320000-U-PID- issue
resistant probe and in acid gas line 20"- 300_H1
coupon 320SOG-0007-
A4AR4-HC-ST.
4. Operating manuals
for air cooler 320AE-
101 A/B washing
operation
5. Maintenance
procedures
10.1.2. More flow 10.1.2.1. Potential 1. 320LC-0341 with No P B 2 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP-
from U-135 CAR overfilling of 320V-004 LAH 320-24 and EPC-
Unit. leading to carry over HZP-320-25
to atmosphere at safe
location. Possible
personnel injuries due
to thermal burn.
10.2.4. Failure of 10.2.4.1. Potential 1. None detected. P C 2 Mod EPC-HZP-320-25. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process / Next P&ID
control 320LC-0341 overfilling of 320V-004 Configure a LAH in 320000-U-PID- DEC issue
(valve 320LV-0341 leading to carry over 320LI-0342 (not 018_H1 Instrumentation
closing). to atmosphere at safe critical alarm).
location. Possible
personnel injuries due :Refer To EPC-HZP-
to thermal burn. 320-24
10.13.1.2. Valve
320FV-0341 fails
open. This is the safe
position.
10.13.1.3. Valve
320FV-1163 fails
closed. This is the
safe position.
10.13.1.4. Valves
320FV-1103 A/B fail
closed. This is the
safe position.
10.13.2.2. Failure of
320AE-002. See
Higher Temperature
deviation in this node.
Less 11.6. Lower 11.6.1. Human error 11.6.1.1. Potential 1. 320LAL-0322A No A A 2 Low Personnel injuries is
Level during tank 320TK- loss of level in 320TK- not considered
003 transfer 003 leading to 2. Operating because pump 320P-
operation. mechanical damage procedures 007 has double
to pump 320P-007 mechanical seal with
due to cavitation. 3. Interlock 320U- Yes alarm and not LOC is
0130 triggered by expected.
320LALL-0321 (1oo1)
causing the trip of The likelihood of this
pump 320P-007 scenario is very low
(1oo1) because it is an
intermittent and
supervised operation.
Less 11.10. 11.10.1. Failure of 11.10.1.1. Potential 1. 320PSV-0321 A A 2 Low :Refer To EPC-HZP-
Lower control 320PC-0321 vacuum formation in (Vacuum breaker) 320-27
Pressure (valve 320PV-0321B 320TK-003 leading to
opening / 320PV- mechanical damage
0321A closing). (collapse).
Economical impact.
11.13.1.2. Valve
320PV-0341A fails
open. This is the safe
position.
1.13.1.5. Valve
Change the position of Next DRP001-PUC- 1.13.1. Loss of
Amine Flash Drum 320PV-0021A fails
EPC-HZP-320-4 valve 320PV-0021A to DEC Process P&ID 1 320000-U-PID-002- instrument air
320V-001 System open. This is not the
fail closed (FC). issue 1_H1 supply.
safe position.
1. Slope on top
flashed gas lines,
DRP001-PUC- draining liquid and
Study the best technical 1.13.3.1. Increase of
320000-U-PID-002- avoiding
solution to minimize the Issue condensation on the
1_H1; DRP001-PUC- 1.13.3. Loss of accumulation
probability of failure of for Amine Flash Drum top flashed gas lines Mod;
EPC-HZP-320-5 DEC Process 1 320000-U-PID- steam tracing 2. Flashed gas top P; A 4; 3 A; A
steam tracing system design 320V-001 System leading to corrosion Low
211_H1; DRP001- supply. lines with no liquid
for top flashed gas P&IDs problems. LOC.
PUC-320000-U-PID- pockets to avoid
lines. Toxic release.
300_H1 accumulation
3. Maintenance
procedures
Ensure operating
3.5.1.1. Potential
procedure includes
overfilling 320V-002
specific instructions for
leading to flooding
the operator to close
Operati of the system
balance line to 320TK-
ng 3.5.1. More drains (balance line). See note 11 on P&ID:
001 and open balance Amine Drains Drum
EPC-HZP-320-6 DEC Process proced 3 N/A from unit to 320V- Impossibility of 1. 320LAH-0221A DRP001-PUC-320000-U-
line to 320V-003 before 320V-002 System
ure 002. continuous draining PID-012_H1
starting amine draining
delivery operation. Moderate
operation to 320V-002
operational changes.
or oil skimming
Non hazardous
operation from 320TK-
consequences.
001.
Provide a line from
3.11.1.1.
320P-005 discharge
Impossibility to take
back to 320V-002 in Next DRP001-PUC- 3.11.1. Wrong
Amine Drains Drum a proper sample to
EPC-HZP-320-7 order to perform a good DEC Process P&ID 3 320000-U-PID- composition of 1. None detected. A 1 C Low
320V-002 System select destination
mixture and facilitate issue 012_H1 amine.
(320TK-001 / 002).
the sampling operation
Economical impact.
in 320SC-J4-0221.
Operati
ng /
Provide operating / 3.16.1.1. Potential
PDO / DEC mainte DRP001-PUC-
maintenance Amine Drains Drum 3.16.1. Work in personnel injuries
EPC-HZP-320-8 Process / nance 3 320000-U-PID-
procedures to work in 320V-002 System confined spaces. during work confined
Commissioning proced 012_H1
confined spaces safely. spaces.
ures
issue.
- SIL Assessment is
1. 320TC-1101 with
required for this new SIF
TAH
triggered by PAHH in a
2. 320PC-1062 with
new PT in 320C-101
Implement a new SIF 6.1.2.2. Potential PAH
causing the closure of
triggered by PAHH in a DRP001-PUC- overheating in 3. 320PC-1141 with
6.1.2. Failure of 320UV-1101 (cut-off
new PT in 320C-101 DEC Process / Next Amine Regenerator 320001-U-PID- reboiler 320E-102 PAH (at outlet of
control 320PC-1102 steam to reboiler 320E-
EPC-HZP-320-11 causing the closure of DEC P&ID 6 320C-101 / 320C- 004_H1; DRP001- A/B system leading 320V-101) P 4 A Mod
(valve 320PV-1102 102 A/B) (1oo1).
320UV-1101 (cut-off Instrumentation issue 201 Reboiler System PUC-320001-U-PID- to pressurization of 4. 320TAH-1104
A/B opening). - This recommendation
steam to reboiler 320E- 006_H1 320C-101. LOC. A/B
also applies to scenarios
102 A/B) (1oo1). Toxic release. 5. 320TAH-1105
6.2.6.2, 6.2.7.2, 9.1.5.1,
6. 320PSV-1061
9.2.5.2, 9.2.7.3, 9.2.8.1,
A/B (designed for
9.2.9.1, 9.7.4.1 and
this scenario)
9.7.5.1
6.14.1.1. Potential
operational problems
/ overheating of
Provide independent
reboilers 320E-102
small warm-up lines for DRP001-PUC- According to isolation
A/B during start-up
start-up of each steam Next Amine Regenerator 320001-U-PID-006- 6.14.1. Start-up of philosophy, warm-up 1'
due to large size of
EPC-HZP-320-12 line (steam line for U- DEC Process P&ID 6 320C-101 / 320C- Rev H1; DRP001-PUC- reboiler 320E-102 lines are required for
steam line. Operator
340 SRU and steam line issue. 201 Reboiler System 320002-U-PID-006- A/B. steam lines in the
will start one train
for network) in each Rev H1 individual trains and BL.
and, then, the
train.
second one and high
flow conditions could
happen.
1. Interlock 320U-
Include not fully open Personnel injuries is not
DRP001-PUC- 1100 triggered by
signal in valve 320UV- Lean Amine Cooling 7.2.1.1. Potential considered because
DEC Process / Next 320001-U-PID- 7.2.1. Failure of closed signal in
1061 to activate System from 320C- mechanical damage pumps 320P-101 A/B
EPC-HZP-320-14 DEC C&E 7 004_H1; DRP001- valve 320UV-1061 valve 320UV-1061 A 2 C Mod
interlock 320U-1100 101 / 320C-201 to to 320P-101 A/B due have double mechanical
Instrumentation issue PUC-320001-U-PID- closed. (1oo1) causing the
tripping the pumps BL to blocked suction. seal with alarm and not
005_H1 trip of pumps 320P-
320P-101 A/B. LOC is expected.
101 A/B (1oo1)
1. 320LC-1141 /
320FC-1161 (reflux
9.1.5.1. Potential
control) with LAH
level increase in
2. 320PC-1062 with
9.1.5. Failure of 320V-101 and low
Amine Regenerator PAH This recommendation
Configure a LAH in DEC Process / Next DRP001-PUC- control 320FC-1164 flow of reflux to
320C-101 / 320C- 3. 320PC-1141 with also applies to scenarios
EPC-HZP-320-19 320LI-1142 (critical DEC P&ID 9 320001-U-PID- (valve 320FV-1164 column 320C-101 P 4 A Mod
201 Overhead PAH 9.2.5.1, 9.2.5.2, 9.2.7.2,
alarm). Instrumentation issue 008_H1 opening) (minimum leading to
System 4. 320TC-1061 with 9.2.7.3 and 9.2.8.1
recirculation line). overpressure and
TAH
mechanical damage.
5. 320PSV-1061
LOC. Toxic release.
A/B (designed for
this scenario)
9.7.5.1. Potential
9.7.5. Failure of overpressure 320C- 1. 320PC-1141 with
Amine Regenerator
Configure a TAH in DEC Process / Next DRP001-PUC- control 320TC- 101 due to high PAH This recommendation
320C-101 / 320C-
EPC-HZP-320-21 320TI-1142 (critical DEC P&ID 9 320002-U-PID- 1141 (variable temperature leading 2. 320PSV-1061 P 4 A Mod also applies to scenario
201 Overhead
alarm). Instrumentation issue 008_H1 speed 320AE-101 to mechanical A/B (designed for 9.7.4.1
System
A/B fans control). damage. LOC. Toxic this scenario)
release.
10.2.4.1. Potential
overfilling of 320V-
10.2.4. Failure of 004 leading to carry This recommendation
Configure a LAH in DEC Process / Next DRP001-PUC-
Condensate Drum control 320LC-0341 over to atmosphere also applies to scenarios
EPC-HZP-320-25 320LI-0342 (not critical DEC P&ID 10 320000-U-PID- 1. None detected. P 2 C Mod
320V-004 System (valve 320LV-0341 at safe location. 10.1.1.1, 10.1.2.1 and
alarm). Instrumentation issue 018_H1
closing). Possible personnel 10.2.3.1
injuries due to
thermal burn.
Consider installing a
PCV in nitrogen line
(back-up purging gas) to
automatically maintain 24.1.1.1. Loss of
Next DRP001-PUC-
the purging gas flow to Sour Flare Header 24.1.1. Lack of purging gas and
EPC-HZP-320-28 DEC Process P&ID 24 320000-U-PID-211- 1. None detected. A 1 B Low
the system in case of System purging fuel gas. impossibility to
issue. Rev H1
loss of purging fuel gas. detect this scenario.
Review the line
arrangement
accordingly.
DEVIATION: N/A
CAUSE: N/A
ACTION DETAILS:
Consider providing condensate connection for 320PK-101 antifoam package for dilution purposes instead
of demi water connection in order to avoid O2 presence in the product.
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
DEVIATION: N/A
CAUSE: N/A
ACTION DETAILS:
Node #11 "Fresh Amine Storage Tank 320TK-003" provide isolation valves in lines 4"-320MDA-0001-
A2AL7-NI-NT and 4"-320MDA-0002-A2AL7-NI-NT in P&ID DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-017_H1.
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
ACTION DETAILS:
Ensure each transmitter 320LIT-0027 A/B/C has a low and high level alarm.
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
- Personnel injuries is not considered because pumps 320P-001 A/B have double mechanical seal with
alarm and not LOC is expected.
- 320LC-0027 is redundant (sensors 320LIT-0027 A/B/C)
- 320LAL-0027 A/B/C provide enough time for operator to take an action (20 minutes).
- This recommendation also applies to scenarios 1.2.1.1, 1.2.12.1, 1.2.2.1, 1.2.3.1, 1.2.5.2, 1.2.6.1 and
1.2.7.1
ACTION DETAILS:
Include not fully open signal in valve 320UV-0021 A/B to activate interlock 320U-0101 A/B tripping the
pumps 320P-001 A/B.
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
Personnel injuries is not considered because pumps 320P-001 A/B have double mechanical seal with
alarm and not LOC is expected.
ACTION DETAILS:
Implement sampling connections downstream 320E-101 (at train 1) and 320E-201 (at train 2).
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
- This scenario has been analysed in order to cover the following scenarios: 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2 and
16.11.1.3 from U-160 DHT Unit HAZOP.
- This recommendation also applies to scenarios 6.1.1.1, 6.2.1.1, 6.2.2.1, 6.2.3.1, 6.2.4.1, 6.2.5.1, 9.1.2.1,
9.1.6.2 and 9.8.2.1
CONSEQUENCE: 1.13.1.5. Valve 320PV-0021A fails open. This is not the CATEGORY:
safe position.
ACTION DETAILS:
Change the position of valve 320PV-0021A to fail closed (FC).
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
ACTION DETAILS:
Study the best technical solution to minimize the probability of failure of steam tracing system for top
flashed gas lines.
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
ACTION DETAILS:
Ensure operating procedure includes specific instructions for the operator to close balance line to 320TK-
001 and open balance line to 320V-003 before starting amine draining operation to 320V-002 or oil
skimming operation from 320TK-001.
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
See note 11 on P&ID: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1
ACTION DETAILS:
Provide a line from 320P-005 discharge back to 320V-002 in order to perform a good mixture and facilitate
the sampling operation in 320SC-J4-0221.
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
ACTION DETAILS:
Provide operating / maintenance procedures to work in confined spaces safely.
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
CAUSE: 4.9.1. Failure of control 320PC-0241 (valve 320PV-0241A opening / 320PV-0241B closing).
ACTION DETAILS:
Implement a new PI with PAH and PAL in 320TK-001 (not critical alarms).
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
This recommendation also applies to scenarios 4.10.1.1 and 4.10.2.1
CAUSE: 5.9.1. Failure of control 320PC-0301 (valve 320PV-0301A opening / 320PV-0301B closing).
ACTION DETAILS:
Implement a new PI with PAH and PAL in 320TK-002 (not critical alarms).
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
This recommendation also applies to scenarios 5.10.1.1 and 5.10.2.1
ACTION DETAILS:
Implement a new SIF triggered by PAHH in a new PT in 320C-101 causing the closure of 320UV-1101
(cut-off steam to reboiler 320E-102 A/B) (1oo1).
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
ACTION DETAILS:
Provide independent small warm-up lines for start-up of each steam line (steam line for U-340 SRU and
steam line for network) in each train.
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
According to isolation philosophy, warm-up 1' lines are required for steam lines in the individual trains and
BL.
CAUSE: 7.1.1. Two pumps 320P-101 A/B running simultaneously (failure of autostart system 320I-0150).
ACTION DETAILS:
Classify 320PAL-0381 as critical alarm.
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
- Personnel injuries is not considered because pumps 320P-101 A/B have double mechanical seal with
alarm and not LOC is expected.
- 320LAL-1062 does not provide enough time to operator to take an action.
ACTION DETAILS:
Include not fully open signal in valve 320UV-1061 to activate interlock 320U-1100 tripping the pumps
320P-101 A/B.
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
Personnel injuries is not considered because pumps 320P-101 A/B have double mechanical seal with
alarm and not LOC is expected.
ACTION DETAILS:
Relocate 320TIT-1046 downstream 320E-101 bypass connection (10'-320AML-1004-A1LQ5-HC-NT).
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
Personnel injuries is not considered because pumps 320P-101 A/B have double mechanical seal with
alarm and not LOC is expected.
CAUSE: 7.7.3. Failure of control 320TC-0382 (variable speed 320AE-001 A-J fans control).
ACTION DETAILS:
Provide a TG in lean amine line downstream 320TIT-0382.
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
This recommendation also applies to scenario 7.7.2.1
ACTION DETAILS:
Provide a sample connection at outlet of activated carbon filter 320S-001.
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
Confirm with VENDOR during 320PK-001 Package HAZOP Study if 320PK-001 has a sample connection
at inlet and outlet of 320PK-001.
ACTION DETAILS:
Configure a FAL in 320FI-0181A (critical alarm).
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
Personnel injuries is not considered because pumps 320P-002 A/B have double mechanical seal with
alarm and not LOC is expected.
CAUSE: 9.1.5. Failure of control 320FC-1164 (valve 320FV-1164 opening) (minimum recirculation line).
CONSEQUENCE: 9.1.5.1. Potential level increase in 320V-101 and low flow of CATEGORY: P
reflux to column 320C-101 leading to overpressure and mechanical damage.
LOC. Toxic release.
ACTION DETAILS:
Configure a LAH in 320LI-1142 (critical alarm).
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
This recommendation also applies to scenarios 9.2.5.1, 9.2.5.2, 9.2.7.2, 9.2.7.3 and 9.2.8.1
ACTION DETAILS:
Configure a high deviation from set-point alarm in 320FC-1162 (not critical alarm).
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
- Personnel injuries is not considered because pumps 320P-102 A/B have double mechanical seal with
alarm and not LOC is expected.
- 320LAL-1141 does not provide enough time to operator to take an action.
CAUSE: 9.7.5. Failure of control 320TC-1141 (variable speed 320AE-101 A/B fans control).
ACTION DETAILS:
Configure a TAH in 320TI-1142 (critical alarm).
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
This recommendation also applies to scenario 9.7.4.1
CONSEQUENCE: 9.13.3.1. Increase of condensation on the top acid gas lines CATEGORY: P; A
leading to corrosion problems. Plugging in line and air cooler 320-AE-101 A/B
bundles. LOC. Toxic release.
ACTION DETAILS:
Study the best technical solution to minimize the probability of failure of steam tracing system for top acid
gas lines.
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
CONSEQUENCE: 9.13.3.1. Increase of condensation on the top acid gas lines CATEGORY: P; A
leading to corrosion problems. Plugging in line and air cooler 320-AE-101 A/B
bundles. LOC. Toxic release.
ACTION DETAILS:
Implement a TG at BL in acid gas line 20'-320SOG-0007-A4AR4-HC-ST.
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
CAUSE: 10.1.1. Failure of control 320FFC-1102 (feed / steam ratio) / 320FC-1103A/B / 320LC-1122 A/B
(valve 320FV-1103 A/B opening).
ACTION DETAILS:
Ensure drip pan is provided to collect condensate from 320AE-002 vent to be directed to ground level.
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
This recommendation also applies to scenarios 10.1.2.1, 10.2.3.1 and 10.2.4.1
ACTION DETAILS:
Configure a LAH in 320LI-0342 (not critical alarm).
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
This recommendation also applies to scenarios 10.1.1.1, 10.1.2.1 and 10.2.3.1
ACTION DETAILS:
Ensure design of vent line of 320V-004 (4'-320VNT-0007-A2AS-PP-NT) is designed to avoid any
overpressure situation in case of failure of 320AE-002.
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
CAUSE: 11.9.1. Failure of control 320PC-0321 (valve 320PV-0321A opening / 320PV-0321B closing).
ACTION DETAILS:
Implement a new PI with PAH and PAL in 320TK-003 (not critical alarms).
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
This recommendation also applies to scenarios 11.10.1.1 and 11.10.2.1
CONSEQUENCE: 24.1.1.1. Loss of purging gas and impossibility to detect this CATEGORY: A
scenario.
ACTION DETAILS:
Consider installing a PCV in nitrogen line (back-up purging gas) to automatically maintain the purging gas
flow to the system in case of loss of purging fuel gas. Review the line arrangement accordingly.
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
ACTION DETAILS:
Provide an additional LT with LAH (independent from 320LIT-8030) to allow operator to manually drain the
sour gas flare header leg in case of liquid accumulation. Due to volume of sour gas flare header leg,
operator will have enough time to manually drain the system.
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
This recommendation also applies to scenario 24.2.2.1
CONSEQUENCE: 24.4.1.1. Valve 320LV-8030 fails closed. This is not the CATEGORY:
safe position.
ACTION DETAILS:
Change the failing position of valve 320LV-8030 to FO and add position indication at control room (open /
closed) with alarm in case of opening position.
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
CAUSE: 24.5.1. Impossibility to steam out the system before start-up or during commissioning /
maintenance activities.
ACTION DETAILS:
Provide steam out connection for sour gas flare header at the top of the line.
RESPONSE:
ATTACHMENTS:
OBSERVATIONS:
Causes Consequences Safeguards CAT LKH SEV Risk Recommendations P&ID No. Responsible Close Date Remarks / Observations
EPC-HZP-320-17. Confirm with VENDOR during
8.2.1.1. Potential loss of quality of lean amine to
Provide a sample DRP001-PUC- 320PK-001 Package HAZOP
8.2.1. Plugging of BL (U-105 SGP, U-160 DHT and U-120 HCU Next P&ID
1. 320PDAH-0181 connection at outlet of 320000-U-PID- DEC Process Study if 320PK-001 has a
320PK-001. Units). Moderate operational changes. Non issue
activated carbon filter 011_H1 sample connection at inlet
hazardous consequences.
320S-001. and outlet of 320PK-001.
Review possible spurious trip
or failure of 320PK-001 and
how to protect pumps 320P-
8.2.1. Plugging of 8.2.1.2. Potential mechanical damage to pumps
1. 320PDAH-0181 A B 2 Mod 002 A/B in that case, during
320PK-001. 320P-002 A/B due blocked suction.
320PK-001 Package HAZOP
Study with VENDOR
presence.
Causes Consequences Alarms CAT LKH SEV Risk Recommendations P&ID No. Responsible Close Date Remarks / Observations
- Personnel injuries is not considered
because pumps 320P-001 A/B have
double mechanical seal with alarm and
1.1.5. Failure of control DEC Process /
EPC-HZP-320-1. Ensure each DRP001-PUC- not LOC is expected.
320LC-0027 / 320FC- 1.1.5.1. Potential loss of level in 320V-001 leading to pumps 1. 320LAL- DEC
A B 2 Mod transmitter 320LIT-0027 A/B/C 320000-U-PID- Next P&ID issue - 320LC-0027 is redundant (sensors
1041 valve 320FV-1041 320P-001 A/B due to cavitation. 0027 A/B/C Instrumentatio
has a low and high level alarm. 002-1_H1 320LIT-0027 A/B/C)
opening). n
- 320LAL-0027 A/B/C provide enough
time for operator to take an action (20
minutes).
- Personnel injuries is not considered
7.1.1. Two pumps 320P- because pumps 320P-101 A/B have
DEC Process /
101 A/B running DRP001-PUC- double mechanical seal with alarm and
7.1.1.1. Potential loss of level in 320C-101 leading to EPC-HZP-320-13. Classify DEC
simultaneously (failure of A B 2 Mod 320000-U-PID- Next P&ID issue not LOC is expected.
mechanical damage to 320P-101 A/B due to cavitation. 320PAL-0381 as critical alarm. Instrumentatio
autostart system 320I- 020-1_H1 - 320LAL-1062 does not provide
n
0150). enough time to operator to take an
action.
DEC Process / Personnel injuries is not considered
8.2.6. Failure of control EPC-HZP-320-18. Configure a DRP001-PUC-
8.2.6.1. Potential mechanical damage to pumps 320P-002 DEC because pumps 320P-002 A/B have
320FC-0202 (valve A C 2 Mod FAL in 320FI-0181A (critical 320000-U-PID- Next P&ID issue
A/B due blocked discharge. Instrumentatio double mechanical seal with alarm and
320FV-0202 closing). alarm). 010_H1
n not LOC is expected.