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DRP001 Puc RPT Z 320 001

The document outlines the HAZOP study conducted for the Amine Regeneration Unit (320 U) of the DUQM Refinery Project in Oman, focusing on identifying hazards and operability issues. The study, facilitated by ALTRAN, took place over four sessions in February 2019 and resulted in thirty-three recommendations for improving safety and operability. Key findings include significant risks associated with the flare system's unavailability during emergencies, and a comprehensive report detailing the study's methodology, findings, and recommendations is provided in the attached documentation.

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Fayaz Khan
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100% found this document useful (1 vote)
368 views215 pages

DRP001 Puc RPT Z 320 001

The document outlines the HAZOP study conducted for the Amine Regeneration Unit (320 U) of the DUQM Refinery Project in Oman, focusing on identifying hazards and operability issues. The study, facilitated by ALTRAN, took place over four sessions in February 2019 and resulted in thirty-three recommendations for improving safety and operability. Key findings include significant risks associated with the flare system's unavailability during emergencies, and a comprehensive report detailing the study's methodology, findings, and recommendations is provided in the attached documentation.

Uploaded by

Fayaz Khan
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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You are on page 1/ 215

DUQM Refinery Project

Package 1
DOC. NUMBER: DRP001-PUC-RPT-Z-320-001 REV. O1 PAGE 2 of 215

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. PURPOSE .......................................................................................................................3
2. SCOPE............................................................................................................................3

This document is property of Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company. Its reproduction without previous
permission in writing is strictly forbidden.
DUQM Refinery Project
Package 1
DOC. NUMBER: DRP001-PUC-RPT-Z-320-001 REV. O1 PAGE 3 of 215

1. PURPOSE

This document presents the report of the Amine Regeneration Unit (320 U) EPC Process
HAZOP study performed for DUQM Refinery Project EPC Package One for Duqm Refinery
(Contract No.: CNT-1100-1000-006), to be located in Oman. The study was undertaken
during the Detail Engineering Phase of the Project.

The study was carried out in four (4) sessions, from February, 11 to February, 14 of 2019.
Specialist from ALTRAN facilitated the study. The HAZOP team consisted of specialists from
CONTRACTOR and COMPANY.

The purpose of the HAZOP Study is to identify hazards, ensure process safety, and minimize
operability problems via a systematic application of Process parameters (e.g. flow, pressure
and temperature) and guide words (e.g. no, more, less) to produce deviations (e.g. no flow,
less pressure) from the design intent or intended operational mode of the plant.

2. SCOPE

The scope of work of the HAZOP analysis was for Amine Regeneration Unit (320 U).

In continuation, please find the ARU Unit 320 HAZOP Study Report developed by third party
consultant, ALTRAN.

This document is property of Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company. Its reproduction without previous
permission in writing is strictly forbidden.
HAZOP STUDY REPORT
UNIT 320 ARU
Revision 1.0

ALTRAN
Parque Empresarial Las Mercedes
C/ Campezo, 1 – Building 1
28022 Madrid
www.altran.es

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 2 of 83


CHARACTERISTICS
TÉCNICAS REUNIDAS
CIRCULATION LEVEL:
DAEWOO LLC - DUQM
External, ALTRAN, TÉCNICAS REUNIDAS DAEWOO LLC - DUQM REFINERY, Business Unit
REFINERY
CONFIDENCIALITY: Confidential (TÉCNICAS
Confidential TÉCNICAS REUNIDAS DAEWOO LLC - DUQM REFINERY, Confidential ALTRAN, REUNIDAS DAEWOO
Confidential (TÉCNICAS REUNIDAS DAEWOO LLC - DUQM REFINERY & ALTRAN), No LLC - DUQM REFINERY
Confidential & ALTRAN)
REPRODUCTION OF THE DOCUMENT:
Controlled
Prohibited, Controlled, Authorized

DEVELOPMENT & EVOLUTION OF THE DOCUMENT

REVISION DATE PREPARED BY REVIEWED BY APPROVED BY

1.0 22/02/2019 Tania Castelo Jesús Ruiz Bienvenido Villazán

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 3 of 83


Content

Abbreviations ........................................................... 5 6.2 Worksheets Introduction .......................... 24


6.3 Summary of HAZOP Study Findings ....... 25
1 Executive Summary........................................... 7
6.4 Items for later review ............................... 25
2 Introduction and Scope of Work ...................... 8 6.5 Scenarios affecting other units /
2.1 Unit 320 - ARU description ........................ 8 Contractors .............................................. 25
6.6 Open actions from FEED HAZOP
2.1.1 Rich Amine Reception and Oil Review ..................................................... 25
Removal ......................................................... 8
2.1.2 Rich Amine Pumps, Lean/Rich Amine 7 List of Study Nodes ......................................... 26
Exchanger, Lean Amine Cooler and Lean 8 List of Reference Documents ......................... 28
Amine Pumps ................................................. 9
2.1.3 Amine Regeneration .......................... 9 Attachments ........................................................... 31
2.1.4 Amine Solvent Preparation and Attachment 01. Attendance List .......................... 32
Storage ......................................................... 10
2.1.5 Amine Wash Water System ............. 11 Attachment 02. HAZOP Worksheets ................... 33
2.1.6 Fresh Amine Storage ....................... 11 Attachment 03. Marked-up DPTs ......................... 34
2.1.7 Solvent Conditioning ........................ 11
Attachment 04. HAZOP Master P&IDs ................. 35
2.1.8 Amine Closed Drain System ............ 12
2.1.9 Oil Skimming Facilities..................... 12 Attachment 05. Parking Lot items list ................. 36
3 Methodology .................................................... 13 Attachment 06. List of HAZOP
Recommendations ................................................. 38
3.1 Risk Ranking ........................................... 16
Attachment 07. HAZOP Individual Action
4 Criteria and Assumptions ............................... 18
Sheets ...................................................... 45
5 Organization ..................................................... 21
Attachment 08. Scenarios affecting Package
5.1 Study Period ............................................ 21 Equipment ...................................................... 79
5.2 Study Team ............................................. 21
Attachment 09. Critical Alarms List ..................... 81
6 Study Results ................................................... 22
6.1 Major and Priority findings ....................... 22

Tables Index
Table 1: HAZOP Parameters by HAZOP Study Procedure .. 13 Table 8: List of P&IDs .......................................................... 28
Table 2: Severity, Likelihood and Risk Ranking according to Table 9: List of DPTs ........................................................... 30
DRP001-PUC-PRO-Z-000-003 HAZOP Study Procedure ... 17 Table 10: Other documents ................................................. 30
Table 3: Top major scenarios ............................................... 23 Table 11. Parking Lot items list............................................ 37
Table 5: Nodes List .............................................................. 26 Table 12: List of HAZOP Recommendations ....................... 39
Table 6: Company specifications and procedures ................ 28 Table 13. Scenarios affecting Package Equipment ............. 80
Table 7: Industry Codes and Standards ............................... 28 Table 14. Critical Alarm per scenario................................... 82

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 4 of 83


Abbreviations
ANSI American National Standards Institute
ARU Amine Regeneration Unit
BFW Boiled Feed Water
BL Battery Limit
BWM Medium Pressure Boiler Feed Water
C&E Cause and Effect Matrix
CAR Coker Amine Regeneration Unit
CW Cooling Water
DCS Distributed Control System
DEC Daewoo Engineering and Constructor
DHT Disel Hydrodesulphurization Unit
DP Design Pressure
DPT Design Pressure and Temperature Diagram
DT Design Temperature
EPC Engineering, Procurement and Construction
ESD Emergency Shutdown
FC Fail Closed
FEED Front End Engineering Design
FO Fail Open
HAZOP HAZard and OPerability
HC Hydrocarbons
HCU Hydrocracker Unit
HP High Pressure
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IPL Independent Protection layer
ISA Instrumentation, Systems and Automation Society
KO Know-Out
LOC Loss Of Containment
LOPA Layer of Protection Analysis
LP Low Pressure
LPG Liquid Petroleum Gas
LSO Light Slop Oil
MDEA Methyl di-Ethanolamine
MP Medium Pressure
NPSH Net Positive Suction Head
OP Operating Pressure

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 5 of 83


OT Operating Temperature
P&ID Piping & Instrumentation Diagram
PDO Petroleum Development Oman
PG Pressure Gauge
SCL Low Pressure Steam Condensate
SFL Sour Gas Flare
SGP Saturated Gas Plant
SIF Safety Instrumented Function
SIL Safety Integrity Level
SOS Slop Oil System
SRU Sulphur Recovery Unit
SWS Sour Water Stripper
VDU Vaccum Distillation Unit
VSD Variable Speed Drive

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 6 of 83


1 Executive Summary
As part of the activities for the DUQM Refinery Project EPC Package One for Duqm Refinery in Oman, a HAZOP study
has been conducted. This report contains the findings of this study for Unit 320 - ARU (Amine Regeneration Unit), and a
brief description of the unit is recorded in Section 2.1
The HAZOP Study was conducted over four (4) sessions at Técnicas Reunidas offices in Madrid, from February, 11 to
February, 14 of 2019.
HAZOP sessions were focused on the identification of potential hazardous and operability issues within Unit 320 - ARU
(Amine Regeneration Unit).
Unit 320 - ARU (Amine Regeneration Unit) has been split in a total of twenty-four (24) nodes. These nodes were marked
on DPTs in Attachment 03 and on P&IDs in Attachment 04. A list of these nodes is presented in Section 7. Documentation
used for this study is listed also on section 7 of this report.
Top major scenarios, with respect to highest risk generated from study, are associated to significant damage to people
due unavailability of the flare system in case of emergency (relief scenario). These scenarios are registered in section
6.1.
A total of thirty-three (33) recommendations were recorded as result of this HAZOP (including two (2) general
recommendations). A list of recommendations is presented in Attachment 06.
The findings of HAZOP study are recorded in Attachment 02.
Individual HAZOP action sheets are created in order to optimize the following up and closing out activities. These
individual action sheets are included in Attachment 07.
HAZOP Study purpose is not to revisit the design of the systems; other project activities are performed following this
objective. Design issues detected during the sessions have been recorded as part of a “Parking Lot List” which will be
afterwards discussed and closed by both Project Teams but not subject to the same HAZOP Recommendations approval
process. A total of eight (8) parking lot items have been registered. These parking lots have been listed in Attachment
05.
Finally, critical alarms per scenario have been recorded in the HAZOP worksheets and a complete list is shown in
Attachment 09.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 7 of 83


2 Introduction and Scope of Work
The purpose of the HAZOP Study is to identify potential hazards and operability problems, review the adequacy of the
protective measures and either propose solutions or identify areas for further evaluation. The review covers the study of
the system under normal operation and aims at assessing deviations from the design intention.
The HAZOP & SIL Determination Study is to review the safety and operability of the current configuration, it shall not be
used as a mean by which modify or optimize the design, but as a tool to identify actual problems regarding hazardous
situations.
The purpose of a HAZOP Study is to identify all possible deviations from the design intention of the process and
determine the potential hazards associated to them. It provides a systematic review of the P&IDs in order to:
 Check the design and consider whether any of the deviations which may occur from a malfunction could pose a
hazard to people working on the installation, to the general public or damage to plant and equipment or to the
environment in general.
 Check whether the safeguards already incorporated in the design are sufficient to reduce the risk to an
acceptable level.
 Consider any safety / operability interfaces, which exist with other installations.
 Ensure the process plants, general facilities, storage and handling, utilities, other services and off-sites can be
started up, operated, maintained and shut down safely.
A HAZOP Study followed by a consequent SIL Determination Study (LOPA methodology) provides such a methodology
to guide users to the safe, cost effective and consistent design, implementation and maintenance of SIFs.
This report contains the findings of HAZOP Study for Unit 320 - ARU (Amine Regeneration Unit). A brief description of
the unit is recorded in the following section.

2.1 Unit 320 - ARU description


The objective of Amine Regeneration Unit (ARU) is to regenerate the rich amine streams by removing the acid gas and
recirculating lean amine back to the users.
The ARU has a design capacity of 593 ton/h of rich amine and is configured with 2 x 70% capacity regeneration columns
(based on the heavy crude design case) with associated preheat, overhead and reboiler systems. There shall be a
common flash drum, drains drum, tankage, lean amine cooling system and lean amine filtration system. This arrangement
allows a single column and associated equipment to be taken offline whilst continuing to operate the refinery.
The ARU receives rich amine from the Saturated Gas Pant (SGP), Hydrocracker Unit (HCU) and Diesel
Hydrodesulphurization Unit (DHT), regenerates the amine and then returns the lean amine back to the SGP, HCU and
DHT. The ARU also produces effluent streams of flash gas which is sent to the Vacuum Distillation Unit (VDU), acid gas
which is sent to the Sulphur Recovery Unit (SRU) and sour water which is sent to the Sour Water Stripper (SWS).

2.1.1 Rich Amine Reception and Oil Removal


Rich amine flows into the Amine Flash Drum (320V-001) from the various amine scrubbers in the SGP, DHT and HCU.
In the Amine Flash Drum most of the dissolved light hydrocarbons and any excess H2S are flashed out of the feed amine
solution. The flashed gas is sweetened in a small scrubbing column mounted on the flash drum which removes most of
the H2S using a steady flow of lean amine from downstream of the Lean Amine Cooler (320AE-001). The sweetened
flash gas is then routed to the VDU where it is combusted in the Vacuum Charge Heater (110F-001). Pressure is
maintained in 320V-001 via pressure control on the flash gas line to the VDU.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 8 of 83


The liquid entering 320V-001 can contain dissolved or entrained heavy hydrocarbons which are separated out into a
hydrocarbon layer; this is collected in an oil compartment in 320V-001 and intermittently routed to the Oil Skim Drum
(320V-003).
During turndown, a reduced flow from the amine scrubbers around the refinery is expected. Provisions are made to avoid
issues within the unit by providing a recycle line that connects downstream of the Lean Amine Cooler to the Amine Flash
Drum. This line can be opened when the feeds from the SGP, DHT and HCU are reduced to ensure that the minimum
required amine is circulated around the ARU.

2.1.2 Rich Amine Pumps, Lean/Rich Amine Exchanger, Lean Amine Cooler and Lean Amine Pumps
Rich amine from the Amine Flash Drum is pumped via the Rich Amine Pumps (320P-001A/B) to one of the two 70%
regeneration columns. There are two identical amine regeneration columns and associated equipment; only one will be
detailed in this process description. The intended operation is for both columns to operate on equal flowrates during
normal operation.
Before entering the Amine Regenerator (320C-101) the rich amine is preheated in the Lean/Rich Exchanger (320E-101)
with hot lean amine from the bottom of 320C-101 as a means of reducing the reboiler steam consumption and lean amine
cooling duty. The rich amine outlet temperature is controlled by providing a by-pass line to the exchanger on the lean
amine (hot) side. The preheated rich amine then passes to 320C-101 under flow control cascaded from the Amine Flash
Drum level.
Cooled lean amine exciting the Lean/Rich Amine Exchanger is pumped using the Lean Amine Pumps (320P-101A/B)
and cooled further, to 60 °C, by the Lean Amine Cooler prior to being returned to the consumers (amine absorbers in the
SGP, DHT and HCU). The lean amine temperature is controlled using a combination of variable speed drive (VSD) fans
and on/off fans in conjunction with a temperature controller on the Lean Amine Cooler discharge.
Under flow control make-up amine solution from the Amine Make-Up Tank (320TK 001) is pumped via the Amine Transfer
Pumps (320P-006A/B) to upstream of 320E-101 and added to the system to make up for operational losses and thus
maintain the correct concentration of lean amine (40 wt% MDEA). The Amine Transfer pumps also send make-up amine
solution to the second regenerator arrangement.
A slip stream, of up to 25% of the total lean amine mass flow, from the discharge of the Lean Amine cooler is sent for
filtering (see Section 2.7.1 for details of the filtration system). From here, the filtered amine is pumped back to the lean
amine header using the Amine Filter Pump (320P-002A/B).
For start-up and shutdown, provision is made to route the lean amine from the discharge of the Lean Amine cooler to the
Amine Make-Up Tank.

2.1.3 Amine Regeneration


In the Amine Regenerator, the rich amine is stripped of H2S to produce a lean amine bottoms product. The Amine
Regenerator overhead section consists of a Regenerator Overheads Condenser (320AE-101), a Regenerator Reflux
Drum (320V-101) and the Regenerator Reflux Pumps (320P-102A/B).
The Amine Regenerator has two kettle reboilers, Regenerator Reboiler (320E 102A/B), configured as 2 x 50% of the
total required duty for the regenerator. The reboiler duty is provided by de-superheated low pressure (LP) steam. Under
pressure control the LP steam comes direct from the SRU with provisions to import LP steam from the LP steam header
if the SRU LP steam pressure drops. The LP steam is desuperheated by the addition of medium pressure boiler feed
water (BWM) in the LP Steam Desuperheater (320DS-101).
The flow of steam to the reboilers is set based on the flow of rich amine to the Amine Regenerator and the column top
temperature. Desuperheated LP steam is utilised so that the bulk amine temperature does not exceed 131 °C above
which the amine degradation is increased.
The LP steam condensate leaving the reboilers is collected in the Reboiler Condensate Drum (320V-102A/B) which is
balanced with the LP steam. Under level control the LP steam condensate is combined with the LP steam condensate
from the other regeneration column and the LP steam condensate from the Coker Amine Regeneration Unit (CAR) before

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 9 of 83


flowing into the common Condensate Drum (320V-004). The Condensate Drum is fitted with a Condensate Drum
Condenser (320AE-002) and a vent to atmosphere which has a LP steam connection to prevent air ingress during normal
operation. A connection for BWM is provided to ensure means of charging the system with some initial inventory prior to
start-up is available. The Condensate Pumps (320P-008A/B) distribute the LP steam condensate throughout the ARU
and CAR. The condensate will be used for flushing of equipment before maintenance and will also be injected into the
Regenerator (320C-101) to maintain the water balance. In the discharge of the pumps a level controlled connection to
the low pressure steam condensate (SCL) system is provided to prevent the Condensate Drum from over filling.
The Regenerator Overhead Condenser is used to condense the majority of the water vapour in the overhead vapours,
thus producing a H2S rich vapour stream suitable for conversion into elemental sulphur in the SRU. The condenser outlet
temperature is controlled at 60°C using a combination of VSD and on/off fans, in conjunction with a temperature controller
on the condenser discharge.
A nitrogen connection has been provided to the line downstream of 320AE-101, for purging and to minimise negative
pressure fluctuations during start-up. The pressure in the column overheads is controlled via a pressure controller
upstream of the condenser and a control valve in the acid gas discharge line to the SRU.
The liquid and vapour in the condenser outlet stream are separated in the Regenerator Reflux Drum. The condensed
water, containing H2S, is refluxed back to the top of the Amine Regenerator using 320P-102A/B and flow control reset
by level control on 320V-101, while the residual acid gas is diverted to the SRU. In the event of a high pressure in this
line, the overhead acid gas is diverted to the Sour Gas Flare (SFL) under pressure control.
Downstream of the control valve regulating the overheads pressure the acid gas from both of the regeneration columns
is combined before being sent to the SRU.
A purge of liquid is provided from the Regenerator Reflux Pump discharge to prevent ammonium salt build up in the
overheads. Under flow control, both of the purge streams from the regenerating columns are combined before being
routed to the SWS.
Via the Wash Water Injection Pump (320P-004) amine wash water from the Amine Wash Water Tank (320TK-002) is
added to the reflux line returning to the Amine Regenerator. This is the case when amine wash water is available.
Alternatively, condensate pumped via the Condensate Pumps (320P-008A/B) may be used instead of amine wash water
to make up water lost in the purge and the overhead vapour product stream to the SRU. Wash water or condensate is
added back into the Amine Regenerator under flow control. Pumps 320P-004 and 320P-008A/B provide amine wash
water and condensate, respectively, to the other regenerating column as well.
As the ARU may experience hydrocarbons in the reflux drum, a weir at one end of 320V-101 has been provided to form
a skimmed oil compartment. During the normal operation, the normal liquid level will be below the level of the weir. If the
operators suspect that there may be hydrocarbons in the reflux drum they can allow the level in the reflux drum to rise
by changing the level control set point until they get liquid overflowing to the skim compartment. Then physical
observation is carried out to check whether the oil is present or not. If the oil is present, the skimmed liquid is then routed
to the Oil Skim Drum. In the absence of oil, the amine solution can be drained instead to the Amine Drain Drum (320V-
002).

2.1.4 Amine Solvent Preparation and Storage


The Amine Make-Up Tank is provided for the preparation of 40 wt% amine solution. Amine wash water from the Amine
Wash Water Tank and fresh amine from the Fresh Amine Storage Tank (320TK-003) are mixed under ratio control via
batch meters to make up the dilute amine solution before being routed into 320TK-001 via a jet mixer. Provision is also
made to use condensate from the Condensate Drum via the Condensate Transfer Pumps if amine wash water is
unavailable.
The Amine Make-Up Tank provides capacity for the drain down of the complete amine system inventory (lean) from the
entire regeneration unit (including connected absorber systems) to allow for maintenance activities. An additional volume
is allowed for maintaining a solution inventory for normal operation equivalent to one month make up. Piping connections
are provided to enable lean solvent inventory to be pumped back directly from the discharge of the Lean Amine Cooler
to the Amine Make Up Tank during a shutdown. Residual amine quantities from the Amine Make-Up Tank are drained

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 10 of 83


into the Amine Drains Drum and pumped from there back to Amine Make-Up Tank using the Amine Drains Drum Pump
(320P-005) if they are lean and if they are rich they are routed back to the Amine Flash Drum.
The Amine Make-Up Tank is nitrogen blanketed to minimise amine degradation due to contact with oxygen and provided
with a floating oil skimmer for removal of any oil present on top of the amine solvent layer. The skimmed liquid is sent by
gravity to the Oil Skim Drum.

2.1.5 Amine Wash Water System


The Amine Wash Water Tank is provided to store water used to wash the amine unit during decommissioning.
The Amine Wash Water Tank is sized to store amine wash water from the associated amine system for two wash cycle
equivalent to one inventory. The tank is nitrogen blanketed to minimize amine degradation due to contact with oxygen.
The Wash Water Injection Pump is used to recycle wash water back to the amine regenerators overheads reflux lines
as water make-up. Alternatively, the wash water can be used for the preparation of dilute amine solution in the Amine
Make-Up Tank via the Amine Transfer Pump.

2.1.6 Fresh Amine Storage


Fresh amine for the system is to be provided from road tankers or iso-containers. A Fresh Amine Pump (320P-007),
common to both the ARU and CAR, is provided for the purpose of pumping fresh amine to the required Amine Make-Up
Tank. The Fresh Amine Storage Tank, also common to both units, is provided to act as a buffer in the case of late arrival
of fresh amine supply, and to contain the amine required for make-up during normal operations. The Fresh Amine Pump
is configured to allow filling of the Fresh Amine Storage Tank or Amine Make-Up Tanks directly from the road tankers or
iso containers or to allow pumping of fresh amine from the Fresh Amine Storage Tank to the required Amine Make-Up
Tank.
The Fresh Amine Storage Tank will be located in the ARU. Prior to shutdown and maintenance of the ARU, it will be
necessary to ensure an adequate volume of solvent has been prepared in the CAR Amine Make-Up Tank (135TK-001)
to last the duration of the ARU shutdown.
The Fresh Amine Storage Tank is blanketed using nitrogen to minimize amine degradation due to contact with oxygen.
A SCL connection is provided to enable dilution of MDEA to reduce viscosity and aid pumping operation.

2.1.7 Solvent Conditioning


The following solvent conditioning methods are followed to maintain the amine system efficiency.
Lean Amine Filtration
A lean amine slip-stream, of 25 wt% of the total flow from the discharge of the Lean Amine Cooler, is treated in the
filtration section to remove hydrocarbons and mild scales from the lean amine stream. This reduction in hydrocarbons
and mild scales reduces the foaming tendency and corrosivity of the amines respectively.
Filtration is done on a continuous basis. The filtration section comprises three stages of filtration. The first stage is the
Amine Precoat Filter Package (320PK-001) which will process 100% of slip stream to remove suspended solids down to
a size of 5 microns and larger. The second stage is an Activated Carbon Filter (320S-001) which will continuously process
50% of the slip stream to remove dissolved organic contaminants. The balance 50% of the stream will bypass the second
stage filter and re-join the stream from the second stage prior to entering the third stage. The third, and final, filtration
stage is an Amine Guard Filter (320S-002) which catches any carbon fines carried over from the Activated Carbon Filter.
The filtered lean amine is then pumped back into the main lean amine header, using the Amine Filter Pumps, where it
re-joins the rest of the lean amine before being sent for further distribution to the users.
Connections are provided on the suction and discharge of the Amine Filter Pumps for the future installation of an ion
exchange type heat stable salt removal skid.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 11 of 83


Anti-Foam Injection
Each of the regeneration columns has an Anti-Foam Injection Package (320PK-101 & 320PK-201) to provide continuous
or intermittent injection of anti-foam agent into the suction of the Regenerator Reflux Pumps. A connection to dose anti-
foam into the regenerator feed streams is also provided.

2.1.8 Amine Closed Drain System


An amine closed drain collection system and Amine Drains Drum is provided servicing the entire ARU. This drum collects
maintenance drains from instruments, piping and equipment during the normal operation of the plant. During shutdown
the drum also accommodates batches of lean amine solution drained from equipment, which cannot otherwise be
pumped out directly back to the Amine Make-Up Tank. The Amine Drains Drum Pump is used to transfer lean amine
collected in the drum via the Recovered Amine Filter (320S-003), to the Amine Make-Up Tank. A provision has been
made to route the drained rich amine to the Amine Flash Drum during the normal operation of the plant.
The Amine Drains Drum is located adjacent to and is pressure balanced to the Amine Make-Up Tank.
Pump out of the Amine Drains Drum should not be initiated when the contents are above 65°C in order to avoid NPSH
problems in the Amine Drains Drum Pump.

2.1.9 Oil Skimming Facilities


An Oil Skim Drum is provided to receive skim oil from the Amine Make-Up Tank, the Amine Flash Drum, the bottom of
the regenerators and the regenerator reflux drums. The Oil Skim Drum is an above ground separator which has its
pressure balanced to the SFL header.
Facilities to manual isolate the Oil Skim Drum from the SFL and pressure balance it to the Amine Make-Up Tank are
provided when oil skimming from the Amine Make-Up Tank is required. The Oil Skim Drum’s function is to allow a long
settling time to minimise the loss of amine to the Light Slop Oil (LSO) system. The drum is provided with an overflow weir
and a low pressure steam heating coil to facilitate the separation of oil from amine when an emulsion forms prior to
pumping. The recovered oil is routed to the LSO via the Oil Skim Drum Pump (320P-003). The recovered amine is
drained to the Amine Drains Drum by gravity.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 12 of 83


3 Methodology
Methodology followed during this HAZOP study is on full accordance with document “DRP001-PUC-PRO-Z-000-003
HAZOP Study Procedure”, which defines and details the process hazard analyses to be conducted during project
development.
Before HAZOP sessions, as a preliminary task, HAZOP Chairman divided each P&ID into a number of discrete systems
(nodes) for review (subject to approval by the HAZOP team). A node typically consists of a line or piece of equipment.
Each P&ID may have divided into several nodes for convenience and to ensure a thorough examination. A preliminary
list of nodes was provided for CONTRACTOR review and agreement prior to starting with the HAZOP sessions.
Prior to the start of the study of a node during the sessions, the Chairman identified and described the node, whose limits
were agreed by the HAZOP Team. These limits were marked up over the P&IDs to be displayed during the sessions.
The study has been conducted taking into account a number of assumptions, which were agreed with COMPANY prior
to the start of the sessions. The Assumptions list is presented in section 4 of this report.
At the beginning of the study, the Chairman presented a description of the HAZOP methodology and the goals of the
review.
For each specific unit, at the start of the session, CONTRACTOR's Process Engineer or LICENSOR described the overall
process function briefly to the HAZOP Team and indicated the nature of the process and material hazards. Thereafter,
for each system to be reviewed, Process Engineer or LICENSOR described the specific system being reviewed, and the
node description / intention was defined.
The Chairman leaded the review by applying a set of guidewords to relevant process parameters (variables) in order to
develop meaningful deviations (see Attachment 1 in the Project HAZOP Study Procedure DRP001-PUC-PRO-Z-000-
003). This table is recorded in this report on Table 1:

Table 1: HAZOP Parameters by HAZOP Study Procedure

SPECIFIC PARAMETER GUIDEWORD DEVIATION

No No flow

More Higher flow rate

Less Lower flow rate

Chemical reaction
Flow As Well As
Runaway reaction

Reverse Reverse flow

Other Than

Misdirected Misdirected flow

Level No No level

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 13 of 83


SPECIFIC PARAMETER GUIDEWORD DEVIATION

More Higher level

Less Lower level

More Higher temperature


Temperature
Less Lower temperature

More Higher pressure


Pressure
Less Lower pressure

Part Of Missing component


Composition
Change Of Change of composition

More Increase in number of phases

Phase Less Decrease in number of phases

Reverse Reverse phase/ Change in Phase

Loss of Services (Steam, Cooling


Services / Utilities Loss of
Water, Nitrogen, Instrument Air…)
General Start-up / Shutdown /
Start-up / Shutdown / Maintenance General
Maintenance

Despite these variables, other variables have been analysed during HAZOP study (e.g. Start-up, Shutdown,
Maintenance, etc.) as considered applicable by the HAZOP Team.
At this point of the review, the team determined whether the Deviation was credible and proceeded to identify the Causes
for every deviation, and determine their Consequences in terms of People, Environment, Asset and Reputation as if no
Safeguards were implemented. Afterwards, any Safeguards already included in the design, which could prevent the
occurrence of the hazard or mitigate its consequences, were discussed and documented. After safeguards were
documented, the HAZOP team ranked the scenarios, in this case considering the safeguards for the likelihood of the
event. Consequences, Likelihoods and Risks were ranked as described in Attachment 2 of the “DRP001-PUC-PRO-Z-
000-003 HAZOP Study Procedure”. A description of this risk ranking is recorded in section 3.1 of this report.
Interlocks considered as valid safeguards for the studied scenarios, or whenever the HAZOP team potentially considered
the implementation of an interlock, have been subject to SIL analysis (further study performed after HAZOP sessions).
All deviations which have been considered by the team to be meaningful have been recorded during the meeting. The
Scribe recorded all relevant information based on consensus reached among the attendees during the review for these
deviations as the review progresses. Records allow questions which may arise following completion of the sessions to
be addressed, diminishing the possibly need to have parts of the study to be redone due to lack of information
documented. It is better to document more than less.
When a potential hazard is identified, remedial action may be required depending on the likelihood of the event and the
severity of its consequence. The need for a solution has to be recorded as a Recommendation / Action to be
implemented. After a later and deeper study, resolution of the action may adopt a different direction than the one initially
intended provided that response includes a detailed justification.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 14 of 83


HAZOP team assigned responsibilities for resolution of action items during the review sessions.
Every recommendation was recorded using a clear and unequivocal statement. Redundant actions have been avoided;
cross references have been used instead. Actions claiming for an activity which is already scheduled have been avoided.
When the possibilities of the first combination of guidewords / process parameter have been exhausted, the second
deviation was applied. The same process has been repeated until all relevant deviations were analysed in all process
nodes.

Image 1. HAZOP Sequence scheme from “DRP001-PUC-PRO-Z-000-003 HAZOP Study Procedure”

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 15 of 83


The following fields have been recorded as part of the HAZOP Worksheets:
 Node
 Referenced drawings
 Sessions
 Node intention
 Guideword
 Deviation.
 Causes.
 Consequences.
 Safeguards (with Critical Alarms identification)
 SIL Assessment Required?
 Risk ranking after Safeguards
o These Risk ranking were developed for following Consequence Categories (when applicable):
o People
o Environment
o Asset
o Reputation
 Recommendations.
 P&ID Number
 Responsible
 Close Date
 Remarks
If a Safety Critical Task is identified, it will be included in the “remarks” column.
Worksheets were made visible to the team using an overhead projector as the Study progresses to allow the team to
validate the records. These Worksheets have been available to the team members for review between sessions. All
decisions and conclusions taken during the sessions and reflected on the Worksheets must remain unchanged. Fields
of HAZOP study worksheet were recorded using PHAWorks software.
Worksheets for HAZOP are included in Attachment 02.

3.1 Risk Ranking


This section explains the procedure followed for the execution of the Risk Assessment during the HAZOP Study.
The risk ranking classification as per “DRP001-PUC-PRO-Z-000-003 HAZOP Study Procedure”, Attachment 2 Duqm
Risk Ranking Matrix and PRO-1400-0000-001, was performed and the results are indicated on the HAZOP worksheet.
The risk ranking was developed for any consequence and with regard to the four categories “People”, “Environment”,
“Asset” and “Reputation” and as considered applicable by the HAZOP team.
For each of them, consequences were rated according to the following levels and indices:

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 16 of 83


Table 2: Severity, Likelihood and Risk Ranking according to DRP001-PUC-PRO-Z-000-003 HAZOP Study Procedure

It is important to remark that Consequences severity assessment has not considered existing safeguards and likelihood
assessment takes into account the presence of existing safeguards.
Despite this risk ranking, for those scenarios where an interlock is proposed as a valid safeguard to cover the risk gap,
or whenever the HAZOP team potentially considers the implementation of an interlock, SIL assignment shall be
completed using the Layers Of Protection Analysis (LOPA) methodology in compliance with “DRP001-PUC-PRO-K-000-
003 SIL Review Procedure”.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 17 of 83


4 Criteria and Assumptions
In order to perform HAZOP study, following assumptions were addressed and approved before HAZOP sessions
(Attachment 3 from document “DRP001-PUC-PRO-Z-000-003 HAZOP Study Procedure”).

a) Equipment, piping and valves are adequately designed (including local environmental / site, start-up, all modes
of operation, capacity changes and shutdown conditions), with proper material selected, installed, maintained
and inspected.
b) All plant items would be suitably commissioned, tested and fit for first use.
c) Operator is trained and qualified. Operating and Maintenance procedures are written, up-to-date, understood,
and appropriately followed. Therefore, human error will be only considered as a cause of deviation for operations
with highly manual intervention, and will be decided in a case by case basis.
d) Adequate emergency response procedures and facilities, as well as trained emergency response teams, are
available.
e) When analyzing control loop / control valve failures, it is assumed that any of the elements (e.g. transmitter,
controller or control valve) is failing leading to the consequences of the analyzed deviation. Alarms linked to this
control loop will not be taken into account as valid safeguards. However, in some cases, alarming of valves limit
switches and MCC pumps (discrepancy alarms) can be recorded as valid safeguards because they are
considered as separate elements
f) Control valves failure (open or closed) could be due to many known common failure modes, including but not
limited to:
 Mechanical failure
 Loss of power / instrument air supply
 Failure of control loop
 Transmitter failure
g) The failure on demand of a Safeguard is not considered as a cause of process deviation. The spurious action of
one safeguard (when not required to act, on its more credible fail action: safe position) shall on the other hand
be reviewed as part of the HAZOP Study, considering one single final element (e.g. the spurious closure of an
isolation valve).
h) All equipment shall be referenced by their tag number and not by their title.
i) In general, causes of a deviation will be related to the analyzed node. Consequences and Safeguards can
nevertheless be associated to systems out of the node.
j) Double jeopardy will not be considered as cause of an event.
k) Latent failures will not be considered as double jeopardy.
l) Spontaneous pipe / flange / vessel wall rupture is excluded from HAZOP.
m) Relief devices will be considered as IPL if the evaluated scenario is covered by the device. If a relief device is
included in the design to cover a particular scenario the device is considered to be available on demand and
adequate for its purpose.
n) Check valves protection against contamination scenarios shall be analyzed in a case by case basis
o) Hazardous scenarios covered by the design will be analyzed it will be recorded: “Covered by design “. For this
scenarios no risk ranking will be done, neither SIL assignation.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 18 of 83


p) Once all the deviations in a node have been analyzed for the normal operation, the team will be required to raise
any other particular deviation which could be generated during start-up, shutdown or maintenance activities,
different from those analyzed during normal operation, which leads to an unsafe situation in order to cover them.
q) HAZOP Study purpose is not to revisit the design of the systems. Recommendations raised will only address
those risks coming from deviations in the existent design at that phase. In case any design issue is detected
during the HAZOP sessions, it will be recorded as part of a “Parking Lot List” which will be afterwards discussed
and closed by both Project Teams but not subject to HAZOP follow up and signed approval.
r) If no consequences are found out for a scenario, it will be explicitly indicated “no hazardous consequences” and
the analysis will be stopped. In case the extent of the consequence is unknown or cannot be predicted, an action
will be raised to validate the scenario.
s) Identical equipment inside the unit or different trains will be analyzed only once and the analysis will be applicable
to the rest of similar equipment
t) Utility systems in different units (such as closed drain systems, KO drums, steams systems, etc..) will be analyzed
by the same team and all together in order to ensure homogenized criteria, however particularities of each unit
shall be considered.
u) In Process HAZOP, only process nodes (including utilities supply) will be studied. Packages Nodes will
correspond to nodes inside package battery limits and they will be studied on their package P&IDs. Interfaces
with related Process nodes will be reviewed at the end of each package.
v) Alarms with operator intervention should only be considered as a valid safeguard if the operator is awarded of
the process deviation, has a simple obvious possible response, and has sufficient time to react before the
subsequent ESD trip or hazard would occur. Operator response time will be 10 min in case that the action is
taken from the control room and 20 min in case that the action is taken in field. (Ref: Lees’ Loss Prevention in
the Process Industries – Hazard Identification Assessment and Control, Table 34.6, Volume 2, Third Edition,
2004.)
w) Check valves can be considered as an effective safeguard depending on the scenario as well as the type /
number of valves. Two different type check valves in series which are tested or internally inspected and
maintained are considered sufficient to eliminate the backflow scenario, for both liquid or gases systems.
For overpressure scenarios, two check valves of different type could be considered as a protection for
overpressure mitigation (Refer to API 521, 4.4.9.3.2.2 Severe Check Valve Leakage). A case by case analysis
to be done during the HAZOP Study.
x) External fire causing high pressure situations over equipment is considered possible only for equipment with an
elevation less than 25 ft. (7.6 m) from any potential area of potential accumulation of flammable liquid, i.e: ground,
solid structures, etc.
y) Spectacle blinds, removal spool pieces and lock open, or closed valves, are considered in the correct position
and cannot be moved spuriously.
z) Normally credit will be given to operating procedures covering or preventing a particular event and associated to
a valid alarm. If credit is not given, specific reasons shall be identified during HAZOP sessions and recorded in
the “remarks” column.
aa) Equipment connected to an emergency power generator or to any other energy source which is maintained
during a general power failure event will be considered available during this scenario (essential loads).

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 135 CAR – Rev. 1.0 Page 19 of 77


Besides these assumptions, following General Notes were recorded during HAZOP study:
1. All findings for train 1 of U-320 ARU is applicable for the train 2.
2. The following nodes have been reviewed and there are not HAZOP findings:
- #13 - LP steam and LP Condensate distribution
- #14 - MP steam distribution
- #15 - Cooling Water Distribution
- #16 - Service Water Distribution
- #17 - MP Boiler Feed Water Distribution
- #18 - Potable Water Distribution
- #19 - Demineralized Water Distribution
- #20 - Refinery Fuel Gas Distribution
- #21 - Plant Air Distribution
- #22 - Instrument Air Distribution
- #23 - Nitrogen Distribution

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 20 of 83


5 Organization
5.1 Study Period
The HAZOP Study sessions were conducted over four (4) sessions at Técnicas Reunidas offices in Madrid from
February, 11 to February, 14 of 2019.

5.2 Study Team


The independent HAZOP Study Leader for the Sessions was Bienvenido Villazán (ALTRAN) and the Technical Assistant
was Tania Castelo (ALTRAN).
A record of the attendees was done at the beginning of each session and supplemented as a new team member attended.
HAZOP sessions scanned signed up HAZOP Attendance Log Sheets are attached in Attachment 01.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 21 of 83


6 Study Results
HAZOP Study was followed by a consequent SIL Determination Study (LOPA methodology) in order to provide such a
methodology to guide users to the safe, cost effective and consistent design, implementation and maintenance of SIFs.
All recommendations generated during this study need to be tracked. Follow–up procedure is explained on “DRP001-
PUC-PRO-Z-000-003 HAZOP Study Procedure”.
This report contains the findings of the HAZOP Study for the Unit 320 - ARU (Amine Regeneration Unit) within the Duqm
Refinery Project EPC Package One.
The list of Recommendations can be found on Attachment 06 and the individual Action Sheets on Attachment 07.
The list of Critical Alarms identified in the HAZOP study is recorded in Attachment 09.

6.1 Major and Priority findings


Following list shows top scenarios with respect to highest risk generated from the study in order to coordinate the
expediting of these issues:

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 22 of 83


Table 3: Top major scenarios

Remarks /
Causes Consequences Safeguards CAT LKH SEV Risk Recommendations Responsible Close Date
Observations
EPC-HZP-320-29.
Provide an
additional LT with
LAH (independent
from 320LIT-8030)
24.2.1.1. Liquid accumulation to allow operator to
in unit 320 flare header manually drain the
24.2.1. Liquid
leading to possible blockage in 1. 320LC-8030 with sour gas flare
carryover during P B 4 High DEC Process Next P&ID issue.
flare system. Unavailability of LAH header leg in case of
fire scenario.
the flare system in case of liquid accumulation.
emergency (relief scenario). Due to volume of
sour gas flare
header leg, operator
will have enough
time to manually
drain the system.
24.2.2. Failure
24.2.2.1. Liquid accumulation
of control
in unit 320 flare header
320LC-8030
leading to possible blockage in :Refer To EPC-HZP-
(valve 320LV- 1. None detected. P B 4 High
flare system. Unavailability of 320-29
8030 not
the flare system in case of
opening when it
emergency (relief scenario).
is required).

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 23 of 83


6.2 Worksheets Introduction
Worksheets from PHAWorks software are included in Attachment 02. A worksheet for each node parameter is registered.
These worksheets record all the findings from HAZOP sessions despite parking lot items.
Worksheets have following fields:
 Session: Number of HAZOP session of the unit and date.
 Node: Number and name of the analysed node
 Drawings: Code and revision of P&IDs involved in the analysed node.
 Parameter: Analysed parameter.
 Intention: Node description and design conditions.

Columns from these worksheets are:


 GW: guideword applied for deviation generation.
 Deviation: Deviation used to look for credible causes.
 Causes: Situations that can generate analysed deviation.
 Consequences: Scenario development written at the end in safety, environmental and economic losses
terms.
 Safeguards: Devices or procedures that can mitigate or prevent the undesired consequences. They are
listed in appearance order.
 Critical alarm: this column is fulfilled with Yes/No to identify principal / critical alarm per scenario, with the
intention of prepare, consolidate and submit a complete list of critical alarms.
 SIL Assessment Required: When a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) is identified a valid safeguard, this
shall be identified in order to be included in the SIL assessment. With that purpose, this column has been
added to be fulfilled by the HAZOP team with Yes / No.
 CAT: Risk categorization. It could be “P” for People, “E” for Environment, “A” for Asset and “R” for Reputation.
Risk is assessed for each applied risk recipient.
 Lkh: Likelihood of the Scenario (Safeguards have been considered during likelihood assessment).
 Sev: Severity of the Consequences (Safeguards have not been considered during severity assessment).
 Risk: Risk for each risk recipient from Risk Matrix. If the risk is Low, risk is acceptable, Moderate risks are
on ALARP area (it means that a reduction measurement is not mandatory, it is needed to check if the risk
can be reduced reasonably practicable) and if risk is High or Extreme, risk is not acceptable and a reduction
measurement is mandatory.
 Recommendation: Additional safeguards to be included in the design are registered in this column.
 P&ID No.: Code number of P&ID where the Recommendation is applicable.
 Responsible: Responsible for recommendation implementation is assigned during HAZOP meeting.
 Close Date: Expected date when the recommendation is implemented.
 Remarks: Any additional comment to HAZOP analysis is registered.
Despite these columns, in HAZOP worksheets cover page, General Notes for the analysis and General
Recommendations have been addressed.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 24 of 83


6.3 Summary of HAZOP Study Findings
During HAZOP sessions, a total of twenty-four (24) nodes were analysed. These nodes are listed on section 7 of this
report. P&IDs marked with these nodes are attached in Attachment 04.
HAZOP sessions findings have been recorded in HAZOP worksheets attached in Attachment 02 and in parking lot items
list in Attachment 05.
A total of eight (8) parking lot items have been recorded and a total of thirty-three (33) HAZOP recommendations
(including two (2) general recommendations) have been registered in this report.
These HAZOP recommendations have been listed in Attachment 06 and, to help developing a proper follow – up and
close out activities of the HAZOP recommendations, individual actions sheets are attached in Attachment 07.

6.4 Items for later review


Some items have not been analysed due to actual information status. The following package needs to be analysed when
detailed information becomes available:
- Amine Precoat Filter Package 320-PK-001

Specific scenarios for later review are listed on Attachment 08.

6.5 Scenarios affecting other units / Contractors


No scenarios affecting to other Units or CONTRACTORS have been identified in this HAZOP study.

6.6 Open actions from FEED HAZOP Review


Actions raised during the FEED HAZOP were reviewed during the EPC HAZOP sessions in order to verify the status of
all actions and if they apply in this HAZOP review. All these FEED HAZOP actions will have to be tracked and closed
accordingly to the information presented in the Individual Action Sheets.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 25 of 83


7 List of Study Nodes
For HAZOP analysis, Unit 320 - ARU (Amine Regeneration Unit) has been split into 24 nodes. Nodes are listed including
P&IDs where the node has been marked-up. In Attachment 03 and Attachment 04, nodes are represented on DPTs and
P&IDs respectively.
Table 4: Nodes List

Number Name P&IDs Comments


DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-2_H1
1 Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1
2 Oil Skim Drum 320V-003 System DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-014_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1
3 Amine Drains Drum 320V-002 System
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-212_H1
Amine Make-up Tank 320TK-001
4 DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1
System
Amine Wash Water Tank 320TK-002 DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1
5
System DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-016_H1
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-006_H1
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1
Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-
6 DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1
201 Reboiler System
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-006_H1
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-005_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1
Lean Amine Cooling System from
7 DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1
320C-101 / 320C-201 to BL
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-1_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-2_H1
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-005_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Lean Amine Filtration System 320PK- DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1
8
001, 320S-001 and 320S-002 DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 26 of 83


Number Name P&IDs Comments
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-008_H1
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1
Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-
9 DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1
201 Overhead System
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-008_H1
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-018_H1
10 Condensate Drum 320-V004 System
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
11 Fresh Amine Storage Tank 320TK-003 DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-017_H1
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1
Anti-foam Injection Package 320PK- DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-015_H1
12
101 / 320PK-201 DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-015_H1
LP steam and LP Condensate DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-200_H1
13
distribution DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-201_H1
14 MP steam distribution
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-202_H1
15 Cooling Water Distribution
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-203_H1
16 Service Water Distribution
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-204_H1
17 MP Boiler Feed Water Distribution
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-205_H1
18 Potable Water Distribution
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-206_H1
19 Demineralized Water Distribution
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-207_H1
20 Refinery Fuel Gas Distribution
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-208_H1
21 Plant Air Distribution
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-209_H1
22 Instrument Air Distribution
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-210_H1
23 Nitrogen Distribution
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-211_H1
24 Sour Flare Header System
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 27 of 83


8 List of Reference Documents
In this section all documents used to perform HAZOP Study including their revision are recorded.

Table 5: Company specifications and procedures

Doc. Number Title Revision

DRP001-PUC-PRO-Z-000-003 HAZOP Study Procedure S2

DRP001-PUC-PRO-K-000-003 SIL Review Procedure S1

Table 6: Industry Codes and Standards

Doc. Number Title Revision

Functional Safety – Safety Instrumented Systems for the


ANSI/ISA 84.00.01 2004
Process Industry Sector
Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable
IEC 61508 2010
Electronic Safety-Related System
Functional Safety – Safety Instrumented Systems for the
IEC 61511 2016
Process Industry Sector
ISA TR84.00.02 Safety Instrumented Functions – Evaluation Techniques 2002

Table 7: List of P&IDs

Doc. Number Title Revision


UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. RICH
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001 H1
AMINE FLASH DRUM INLET MANIFOLD
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. RICH
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1 H1
AMINE FLASH DRUM-1
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. RICH
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-2 H1
AMINE FLASH DRUM-2
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. LEAN/RICH
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003 H1
AMINE EXCHANGER
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. AMINE
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004 H1
REGENERATOR
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. LEAN
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-005 H1
AMINE PUMPS
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. AMINE
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-006 H1
REGENERATOR REBOILER
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. REBOILER
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007 H1
CONDENSATE DRUM
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID.
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-008 H1
REGENERATOR OVHD CONDENSER AND REFLUX DRUM
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID.
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009 H1
REGENERATOR REFLUX PUMPS

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 28 of 83


Doc. Number Title Revision
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. AMINE
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010 H1
PRECOAT FILTER PACKAGE
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. AMINE
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011 H1
ACTIVATED CARBON & GUARDS FILTERS
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. AMINE
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012 H1
DRAIN COLLECTION SYSTEM
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. AMINE
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013 H1
SOLVENT STORAGE AND PREPARATION
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. OIL SKIM
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-014 H1
DRUM
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. ANTIFOAM
DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-015 H1
INJECTION PACKAGE
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. AMINE
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-016 H1
WASH WATER TANK
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. FRESH
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-017 H1
AMINE STORAGE TANK
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID.
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-018 H1
CONDENSATE RECOVERY
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. LEAN
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-1 H1
AMINE COOLER-1
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. LEAN
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-2 H1
AMINE COOLER-2
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. LEAN/RICH
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003 H1
AMINE EXCHANGER
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. AMINE
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004 H1
REGENERATOR
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. LEAN
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-005 H1
AMINE PUMPS
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. AMINE
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-006 H1
REGENERATOR REBOILER
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. REBOILER
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007 H1
CONDENSATE DRUM
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID.
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-008 H1
REGENERATOR OVHD CONDENSER AND REFLUX DRUM
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID.
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009 H1
REGENERATOR REFLUX PUMPS
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. ANTIFOAM
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-015 H1
INJECTION PACKAGE
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. LP STEAM
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-200 H1
AND LP CONDENSATE DISTRIBUTION
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. MP STEAM
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-201 H1
DISTRIBUTION
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. COOLING
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-202 H1
WATER DISTRIBUTION
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. SERVICE
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-203 H1
WATER DISTRIBUTION
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. MP BOILER
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-204 H1
FEED WATER DISTRIBUTION
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. POTABLE
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-205 H1
WATER DISTRIBUTION
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID.
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-206 H1
DEMINERALIZED WATER DISTRIBUTION
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. REFINERY
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-207 H1
FUEL GAS DISTRIBUTION

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 29 of 83


Doc. Number Title Revision
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. PLANT AIR
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-208 H1
DISTRIBUTION
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID.
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-209 H1
INSTRUMENT AIR DISTRIBUTION
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. NITROGEN
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-210 H1
DISTRIBUTION
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. SOUR
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-211 H1
FLARE HEADER
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. AMINE
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-212 H1
DRAIN HEADER
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. PROCESS
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300 H1
BATTERY LIMITS
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. UTILITY
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301 H1
BATTERY LIMITS
UNIT 320 - AMINE REGENERATION UNIT - P&ID. SAMPLE
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-400 H1
CONNECTION

Table 8: List of DPTs

Doc. Number Title Revision


DRP001-PUC-320000-T-DPT-001 ARU - PREFLASH AND FILTRATION B1
DRP001-PUC-320000-T-DPT-002 ARU - REGENERATION SECTION B1
DRP001-PUC-320000-T-DPT-003 ARU - AMINE SYSTEM ANCILLARIES B1
DRP001-PUC-320000-T-DPT-004 ARU - FRESH AMINE STORAGE B1

Table 9: Other documents

Doc. Number Title Revision


CAUSE & EFFECT DIAGRAM - UNIT 320 - AMINE
DRP001-PUC-CED-T-320-001 C1
REGENERATION UNIT
DRP001-PUC-SDE-T-320-001 ARU - PROCESS DESCRIPTION B1
DRP001-PUC-SPE-T-320-001 ARU - PROCESS BASIS OF DESIGN B1
DRP001-PUC-HMB-T-320-001 ARU - HEAT & MATERIAL BALANCE O1
DRP001-PUC-320000-P-PP-001-1 ARU - GENERAL PLOT PLANT 02
DRP001-PUC-320000-P-PP-001-2 ARU - GENERAL PLOT PLANT 02

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 30 of 83


Attachments

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 31 of 83


Attachment 01. Attendance List

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 32 of 83


Attachment 02. HAZOP Worksheets

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 33 of 83


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C.
Location: Oman
Facility: Duqm Refinery
PHA Method: HAZOP
PHA Type: Initial

Process:
Unit 320 - ARU

File Description:
HAZOP study for Duqm Refinery Project EPC Package One

Date:
February 2019

Process Description:

Chemicals:

Purpose:

Scope:

Objectives:

Project Notes:
GENERAL NOTES:

1.- All findings for train 1 of U-320 ARU is applicable for the train 2.

2.- The following nodes have been reviewed and there are not HAZOP findings:
- #13 - LP steam and LP Condensate distribution
- #14 - MP steam distribution
- #15 - Cooling Water Distribution
- #16 - Service Water Distribution
- #17 - MP Boiler Feed Water Distribution
- #18 - Potable Water Distribution
- #19 - Demineralized Water Distribution
- #20 - Refinery Fuel Gas Distribution
- #21 - Plant Air Distribution
- #22 - Instrument Air Distribution
- #23 - Nitrogen Distribution

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS:

EPC-HZP-320-GR1.- Consider providing condensate connection for 320PK-101 antifoam package for dilution purposes instead of demi water connection in order to avoid O2 presence in the product. (Responsible: DEC Process / Close date: May,
2019)

EPC-HZP-320-GR2.- Node #11 "Fresh Amine Storage Tank 320TK-003" provide isolation valves in lines 4"-320MDA-0001-A2AL7-NI-NT and 4"-320MDA-0002-A2AL7-NI-NT in P&ID DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-017_H1. (Responsible: DEC
Process / Close date: Next P&ID issue)

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 1 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (1) Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System
Intention: Recover and flash any possible HC content in rich amine from BL and pump rich amine to amine regenerator 320C-101. Conditions in 320V-001: OP: 0,65 kg/cm2g (DP: 4.0 kg/cm2g); OT: 66 ºC (DT: 95 C).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 1.1. More 1.1.1. More flow of 1.1.1.1. Moderate
Flow rich amine from U- operational changes.
105 SGP Unit. Non hazardous
consequences
because from/to U-
320 ARU Unit is part
of a closed loop.

1.1.2. More flow of 1.1.2.1. Moderate


rich amine from U- operational changes.
160 DHT Unit. Non hazardous
consequences
because from/to U-
320 ARU Unit is part
of a closed loop.

1.1.3. More flow of 1.1.3.1. Moderate


rich amine from U- operational changes.
120 HCU Unit. Non hazardous
consequences
because from/to U-
320 ARU Unit is part
of a closed loop.

1.1.4. Failure of 1.1.4.1. Potential gas


control 320LC-0024 blow by to 320V-003.
(valve 320LV-0024 Non hazardous
opening). consequences
because 320V-003
has a 6" open line to
flare.

1.1.5. Failure of 1.1.5.1. Potential loss 1. 320LAL-0027 Yes A B 2 Mod EPC-HZP-320-1. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process / Next P&ID Personnel injuries is
control 320LC-0027 / of level in 320V-001 A/B/C Ensure each 320000-U-PID- DEC issue not considered
320FC-1041 valve leading to pumps transmitter 320LIT- 002-1_H1 Instrumentation because pumps
320FV-1041 320P-001 A/B due to 2. Interlock 320U- Yes 0027 A/B/C has a low 320P-001 A/B have
opening). cavitation. 0100 triggered by and high level alarm. double mechanical
320LALL-0026 A/B/C seal with alarm and
(2oo3) causing the not LOC is expected.
trip of pumps 320P-
001 A/B (1oo1) 320LC-0027 is
redundant (sensors
320LIT-0027 A/B/C)

320LAL-0027 A/B/C
provide enough time
for operator to take
an action (20
minutes).

1.1.5.2. See More


Flow deviation in node
#9.

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 2 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (1) Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System
Intention: Recover and flash any possible HC content in rich amine from BL and pump rich amine to amine regenerator 320C-101. Conditions in 320V-001: OP: 0,65 kg/cm2g (DP: 4.0 kg/cm2g); OT: 66 ºC (DT: 95 C).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
1.1.6. Failure of 1.1.6.1. Potential 1. 320LC-0027 with No
control 320FC-0022 increase of level in LAH and LAHH
(valve 320FV-0022 320V-001 leading to
opening). overfilling. Possible
liquid carry over to
flashed gas to U-110
VDU Unit and
possible problems in
VDU furnaces. See U-
110 VDU Unit
HAZOP Study.

1.1.7. Failure of 1.1.7.1. Moderate


control 320PC-0021 operational changes.
(valve 320PV-0021A Non hazardous
opening). consequences.

1.1.8. Failure of 1.1.8.1. Flashed gas


control 320PC-0021 sending to flare.
(valve 320PV-0021B Moderate operational
opening). changes. Non
hazardous
consequences.

1.1.9. Failure of 1.1.9.1. Moderate


control 320FC-0023 operational changes.
(valve 320FV-0023 Non hazardous
opening) (minimum consequences.
recirculation line).
1.1.9.2. Possible less
flow to 320C-101. See
No / Less Flow in
node #9.

1.1.10. Failure of 1.1.10.1. Moderate


control 320FC-0001 operational changes.
(valve 320FV-0001 Non hazardous
opening) (when the consequences in this
line is in operation node.
(start-up or turndown
conditions)). 1.1.10.2. See Flow
parameter in node #7.

No / Less 1.2. No / 1.2.1. Less flow of 1.2.1.1. Potential loss 1. 320LC-0027 with No A B 2 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP- Personnel injuries is
Less Flow rich amine from U- of level in 320V-001 LAL 320-1 not considered
105 SGP Unit. leading to pumps because pumps
320P-001 A/B due to 2. Interlock 320U- Yes 320P-001 A/B have
cavitation. 0100 triggered by double mechanical
320LALL-0026 A/B/C seal with alarm and
(2oo3) causing the not LOC is expected.
trip of pumps 320P-
001 A/B (1oo1) 320LC-0027 is
redundant (sensors
320LIT-0027 A/B/C)

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 3 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (1) Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System
Intention: Recover and flash any possible HC content in rich amine from BL and pump rich amine to amine regenerator 320C-101. Conditions in 320V-001: OP: 0,65 kg/cm2g (DP: 4.0 kg/cm2g); OT: 66 ºC (DT: 95 C).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
320LAL-0027 A/B/C
provide enough time
for operator to take
an action (20
minutes).

Operator has the


opportunity to open
the lean amine line
from 320AE-001 to
320V-001.

1.2.2. Less flow of 1.2.2.1. Potential loss 1. 320LC-0027 with No A B 2 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP- Personnel injuries is
rich amine from U- of level in 320V-001 LAL 320-1 not considered
160 DHT Unit. leading to pumps because pumps
320P-001 A/B due to 2. Interlock 320U- Yes 320P-001 A/B have
cavitation. 0100 triggered by double mechanical
320LALL-0026 A/B/C seal with alarm and
(2oo3) causing the not LOC is expected.
trip of pumps 320P-
001 A/B (1oo1) 320LC-0027 is
redundant (sensors
320LIT-0027 A/B/C)

320LAL-0027 A/B/C
provide enough time
for operator to take
an action (20
minutes).

Operator has the


opportunity to open
the lean amine line
from 320AE-001 to
320V-001.

1.2.3. Less flow of 1.2.3.1. Potential loss 1. 320LC-0027 with No A B 2 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP- Personnel injuries is
rich amine from U- of level in 320V-001 LAL 320-1 not considered
120 HCU Unit. leading to pumps because pumps
320P-001 A/B due to 2. Interlock 320U- Yes 320P-001 A/B have
cavitation. 0100 triggered by double mechanical
320LALL-0026 A/B/C seal with alarm and
(2oo3) causing the not LOC is expected.
trip of pumps 320P-
001 A/B (1oo1) 320LC-0027 is
redundant (sensors
320LIT-0027 A/B/C)

320LAL-0027 A/B/C
provide enough time
for operator to take
an action (20
minutes).

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 4 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (1) Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System
Intention: Recover and flash any possible HC content in rich amine from BL and pump rich amine to amine regenerator 320C-101. Conditions in 320V-001: OP: 0,65 kg/cm2g (DP: 4.0 kg/cm2g); OT: 66 ºC (DT: 95 C).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Operator has the
opportunity to open
the lean amine line
from 320AE-001 to
320V-001.

1.2.4. Failure of 1.2.4.1. Potential oil 1. Sampling A B 2 Mod


control 320LC-0024 accumulation and procedure (320SC-
(valve 320LV-0024 carry over to amine K4-0021)
closing). sent to regenerator
320C-101 leading to 2. 320LAH-0021 No
foaming and
operational upsets.
Economical impact.

1.2.5. Failure of valve 1.2.5.1. Potential 1. Interlock 320U- Yes A C 2 Mod EPC-HZP-320-2. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process / Next C&E Personnel injuries is
320UV-0021 A/B mechanical damage 0101 A/B triggered by Include not fully open 320000-U-PID- DEC issue not considered
closed. to pumps 320P-001 closed signal in valve signal in valve 320UV- 002-2_H1 Instrumentation because pumps
A/B due to blocked 320UV-0021 A/B 0021 A/B to activate 320P-001 A/B have
suction. (1oo1) causing the interlock 320U-0101 double mechanical
trip of pumps 320P- A/B tripping the seal with alarm and
001 A/B (1oo1) pumps 320P-001 A/B. not LOC is expected.

1.2.5.2. Potential 1. 320LAH-0027 No :Refer To EPC-HZP-


increase of level in A/B/C / 320LAHH- 320-1
320V-001 leading to 0027 A/B/C
overfilling. Possible
liquid carry over to
flashed gas to U-110
VDU Unit and
possible problems in
VDU furnaces. See U-
110 VDU Unit
HAZOP Study.

1.2.5.3. See No / Less


Flow deviation in node
#9.

1.2.6. Failure of 1.2.6.1. Potential 1. 320LAH-0027 No :Refer To EPC-HZP-


pumps 320P-001 increase of level in A/B/C / 320LAHH- 320-1
A/B. 320V-001 leading to 0027 A/B/C
overfilling. Possible
liquid carry over to
flashed gas to U-110
VDU Unit and
possible problems in
VDU furnaces. See U-
110 VDU Unit
HAZOP Study.

1.2.6.2. See No / Less


Flow deviation in node
#9.

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 5 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (1) Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System
Intention: Recover and flash any possible HC content in rich amine from BL and pump rich amine to amine regenerator 320C-101. Conditions in 320V-001: OP: 0,65 kg/cm2g (DP: 4.0 kg/cm2g); OT: 66 ºC (DT: 95 C).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
1.2.7. Failure of 1.2.7.1. Potential 1. 320LAH-0027 No :Refer To EPC-HZP- 320LC-0027 is
control 320LC-0027 / increase of level in A/B/C / 320LAHH- 320-1 redundant (sensors
320FC-1041 valve 320V-001 leading to 0027 A/B/C 320LIT-0027 A/B/C)
320FV-1041 closing). overfilling. Possible
liquid carry over to
flashed gas to U-110
VDU Unit and
possible problems in
VDU furnaces. See U-
110 VDU Unit
HAZOP Study.

1.2.7.2. See No / Less


Flow deviation in node
#9.

1.2.7.3. Potential 1. Minimum No A B 2 Mod Personnel injuries is


mechanical damage recirculation line not considered
to pumps 320P-001 (320FC-0023 with because pumps
A/B due to blocked FAL) 320P-001 A/B have
discharge. double mechanical
seal with alarm and
not LOC is expected.

1.2.8. Failure of 1.2.8.1. Potential off- 1. Amine scrubber Normally flashed gas
control 320FC-0022 spec flashed gas sent 110V-003 (at U-110 is sent to U-110 VDU.
(valve 320FV-0022 to U-110 VDU Unit VDU Unit)
closing). (high H2S content).
Possible problems in 2. Sampling
U-110 VDU Unit. See procedure (320SC-
U-110 VDU Unit L2-0023)
HAZOP Study.

1.2.8.2. See Flow


parameter in node #7.

1.2.9. Failure of 1.2.9.1. Potential 1. 320PAH-0023 No P A 4 Mod


control 320PC-0021 overpressure leading
(valve 320PV-0021 A to mechanical 2. 320PSV-0021
/ B closing). damage to 320V-001 A/B/C (designed for
system. LOC. Toxic this scenario)
release.

1.2.10. Blocked outlet 1.2.10.1. Potential 1. 320PC-0021 with No P A 4 Mod


conditions at U-110 overpressure leading PAH
VDU Unit. to mechanical
damage to 320V-001 2. 320PAH-0023 No
system. LOC. Toxic
release. 3. 320PSV-0021
A/B/C (designed for
this scenario)

1.2.11. Failure of 1.2.11.1. Valve


control 320FC-0023... 320FV-0023 is...

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 6 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (1) Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System
Intention: Recover and flash any possible HC content in rich amine from BL and pump rich amine to amine regenerator 320C-101. Conditions in 320V-001: OP: 0,65 kg/cm2g (DP: 4.0 kg/cm2g); OT: 66 ºC (DT: 95 C).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...(valve 320FV-0023 ...closed in normal
closing) (minimum operation.
recirculation line).

1.2.12. Failure of 1.2.12.1. Potential 1. 320LC-0027 with No A B 2 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP- Personnel injuries is
control 320FC-0001 loss of level in 320V- LAL 320-1 not considered
(valve 320FV-0001 001 leading to pumps because pumps
closing) (when the 320P-001 A/B due to 2. Interlock 320U- Yes 320P-001 A/B have
line is in operation cavitation. 0100 triggered by double mechanical
(start-up or turndown 320LALL-0026 A/B/C seal with alarm and
conditions)). (2oo3) causing the not LOC is expected.
trip of pumps 320P-
001 A/B (1oo1) 320LC-0027 is
redundant (sensors
320LIT-0027 A/B/C)

320LAL-0027 A/B/C
provide enough time
for operator to take
an action (20
minutes).

HAZOP Team
discussed about the
possibility of running
U-320 ARU Unit
when U-160 DHT and
U-120 HCU Unit are
shutdown, by opening
lean amine line from
320AE-001 to 320V-
001. Operator will
have enough time to
open this line
because there is
enough inventory in
regenerator 320C-
101 to feed U-105
SGP Unit during this
scenario until
operator take the
action.

1.2.12.2. See Flow


parameter in node #7.

Reverse 1.3. 1.3.1. Non credible


Reverse causes.
Flow

Misdirected 1.4. 1.4.1. Non additional


Misdirected causes.
Flow

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 7 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (1) Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System
Intention: Recover and flash any possible HC content in rich amine from BL and pump rich amine to amine regenerator 320C-101. Conditions in 320V-001: OP: 0,65 kg/cm2g (DP: 4.0 kg/cm2g); OT: 66 ºC (DT: 95 C).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Level
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 1.5. Higher 1.5.1. See Flow
Level parameter in this
node.

Less 1.6. Lower 1.6.1. See Flow


Level parameter in this
node.

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (1) Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System
Intention: Recover and flash any possible HC content in rich amine from BL and pump rich amine to amine regenerator 320C-101. Conditions in 320V-001: OP: 0,65 kg/cm2g (DP: 4.0 kg/cm2g); OT: 66 ºC (DT: 95 C).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Temperature
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 1.7. Higher 1.7.1. Non credible
Temperatur causes.
e

Less 1.8. Lower 1.8.1. Non credible


Temperatur causes.
e

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (1) Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System
Intention: Recover and flash any possible HC content in rich amine from BL and pump rich amine to amine regenerator 320C-101. Conditions in 320V-001: OP: 0,65 kg/cm2g (DP: 4.0 kg/cm2g); OT: 66 ºC (DT: 95 C).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Pressure
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 1.9. Higher 1.9.1. See Flow
Pressure parameter in this
node.

1.9.2. External fire. 1.9.2.1. Non expected


consequences for
320V-001 because
the elevation is higher
than 7.6 m.

1.9.2.2. Potential 1. 320PSV-1043 A A 2 Low


mechanical damage (designed for this
to 320E-101 leading scenario) (tube side)
to fire escalation /
asset loss. 2. 320PSV-1042
(designed for this
scenario) (shell side)

3. Firefighting system

1.9.3. Gas blow-by 1.9.3.1. Potential This scenario has


from U-120 HCU Unit increase of pressure been analysed in
(from 120V-014). in 320V-001. Non order to cover the
hazardous following scenarios:
consequences 14.1.1.2 and 14.2.6.1
because design... from U-120 HCU...
PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.
HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 8 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (1) Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System
Intention: Recover and flash any possible HC content in rich amine from BL and pump rich amine to amine regenerator 320C-101. Conditions in 320V-001: OP: 0,65 kg/cm2g (DP: 4.0 kg/cm2g); OT: 66 ºC (DT: 95 C).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Pressure
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...pressure will not be ...Unit HAZOP.
exceeded.

1.9.4. Gas blow-by 1.9.4.1. Potential 1. 320PSV-0021 P A 4 Mod This scenario has
from U-105 SGP Unit mechanical damage A/B/C (designed for been analysed in
(from 105C-006 or to 320V-001 due to this scenario) order to cover the
105V-005). overpressure. LOC. following scenarios:
Toxic release. 7.1.2.1 and 7.5.2.1
from U-105 SGP Unit
HAZOP.

1.9.5. LPG 1.9.5.1. Potential 1. 320PSV-0021 P A 4 Mod This scenario has


breakthrough from U- mechanical damage A/B/C (designed for been analysed in
105 SGP Unit. to 320V-001 due to this scenario) order to cover the
overpressure. LOC. following scenarios:
Toxic release. 11.1.3.1, 11.1.5.1 and
11.2.2.3 from U-105
SGP Unit HAZOP.

Less 1.10. Lower 1.10.1. See Flow


Pressure parameter in this
node.

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (1) Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System
Intention: Recover and flash any possible HC content in rich amine from BL and pump rich amine to amine regenerator 320C-101. Conditions in 320V-001: OP: 0,65 kg/cm2g (DP: 4.0 kg/cm2g); OT: 66 ºC (DT: 95 C).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Composition
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Change of 1.11. 1.11.1. Different 1.11.1.1. Possible 1. Oil skimming No A B 2 Mod This scenario has
Change of composition of rich foam formation facilities in 320V-001 been analysed in
Compositio amine (HC presence) leading to process (320LC-0024 with order to cover the
n from U-160 DHT Unit. upsets in U-320 ARU LAH) following scenario:
Unit. Economical 34.11.1.1 from U-160
impact. DHT Unit HAZOP.

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (1) Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System
Intention: Recover and flash any possible HC content in rich amine from BL and pump rich amine to amine regenerator 320C-101. Conditions in 320V-001: OP: 0,65 kg/cm2g (DP: 4.0 kg/cm2g); OT: 66 ºC (DT: 95 C).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Contamination
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Part of 1.12. Part of 1.12.1. Tube leak in 1.12.1.1. Potential rich 1. Sampling EPC-HZP-320-3. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process Next P&ID This scenario has
Contaminati 320E-101. amine entrance to procedure (320SC- Implement sampling 320001-U-PID- issue been analysed in
on lean amine leading to J4-0381) (at outlet of connections 003_H1; DRP001- order to cover the
off-spec lean amine 320AE-001 A-J) downstream 320E- PUC-320002-U- following scenarios:
and process upsets in 101 (at train 1) and PID-003_H1 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2
U-105 SGP, U-160 320E-201 (at train 2). and 16.11.1.3 from
DHT and U-120 HCU U-160 DHT Unit
Unit. See U-105 SGP, HAZOP.
U-160 DHT and U-120
HCU HAZOP Studies.

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 9 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (1) Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System
Intention: Recover and flash any possible HC content in rich amine from BL and pump rich amine to amine regenerator 320C-101. Conditions in 320V-001: OP: 0,65 kg/cm2g (DP: 4.0 kg/cm2g); OT: 66 ºC (DT: 95 C).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Services / Utilities
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Loss of 1.13. Loss 1.13.1. Loss of 1.13.1.1. Valve
of Services instrument air supply. 320LV-0024 fails
/ Utilities closed. This is the
safe position.

1.13.1.2. Valves
320UV-0021 A/B fail
closed. This is the
safe position.

1.13.1.3. Valve
320FV-0023 fails
open. This is the safe
position.

1.13.1.4. Valve
320FV-0022 fails
closed. This is the
safe position.

1.13.1.5. Valve EPC-HZP-320-4. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process Next P&ID


320PV-0021A fails Change the position of 320000-U-PID- issue
open. This is not the valve 320PV-0021A to 002-1_H1
safe position. fail closed (FC).

1.13.1.6. Valve
320PV-0021B fails
open. This is the safe
position.

1.13.1.7. Valve
320FV-1041 fails
closed. This is the
safe position.

1.13.1.8. Valve
320FV-0001 fails
open. This is the safe
position.

1.13.2. Loss of power 1.13.2.1. Failure of


supply. pumps 320P-001 A/B.
See No / Less Flow
deviation in this node.

1.13.3. Loss of steam 1.13.3.1. Increase of 1. Slope on top P A 4 Mod EPC-HZP-320-5. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process Issue for
tracing supply. condensation on the flashed gas lines, Study the best 320000-U-PID- design
top flashed gas lines draining liquid and A A 3 Low technical solution to 002-1_H1; P&IDs
leading to corrosion avoiding minimize the DRP001-PUC-
problems. LOC. Toxic accumulation probability of failure of 320000-U-PID-
release. steam tracing system 211_H1; DRP001-
2. Flashed gas top for top flashed gas PUC-320000-U-
lines with no liquid lines. PID-300_H1
pockets to avoid...

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HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 10 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (1) Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System
Intention: Recover and flash any possible HC content in rich amine from BL and pump rich amine to amine regenerator 320C-101. Conditions in 320V-001: OP: 0,65 kg/cm2g (DP: 4.0 kg/cm2g); OT: 66 ºC (DT: 95 C).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Services / Utilities
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...accumulation

3. Maintenance
procedures

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (1) Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System
Intention: Recover and flash any possible HC content in rich amine from BL and pump rich amine to amine regenerator 320C-101. Conditions in 320V-001: OP: 0,65 kg/cm2g (DP: 4.0 kg/cm2g); OT: 66 ºC (DT: 95 C).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Start-up
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 1.14. 1.14.1. Non additional
General causes.
Start-up

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (1) Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System
Intention: Recover and flash any possible HC content in rich amine from BL and pump rich amine to amine regenerator 320C-101. Conditions in 320V-001: OP: 0,65 kg/cm2g (DP: 4.0 kg/cm2g); OT: 66 ºC (DT: 95 C).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Shutdown
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 1.15. 1.15.1. Non additional
General causes.
Shutdown

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (1) Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System
Intention: Recover and flash any possible HC content in rich amine from BL and pump rich amine to amine regenerator 320C-101. Conditions in 320V-001: OP: 0,65 kg/cm2g (DP: 4.0 kg/cm2g); OT: 66 ºC (DT: 95 C).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Maintenance
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 1.16. 1.16.1. Non additional
General causes.
Maintenanc
e

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HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 11 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (2) Oil Skim Drum 320V-003 System
Intention: Collect oil recovered from 320V-001, 320TK-001 or other process equipment and pump it to BL (U-550 SOS). Conditions in 320V-003: OP: 0.1 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-014_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 2.1. More 2.1.1. See Level
Flow parameter in this
node.

No / Less 2.2. No / 2.2.1. See Level


Less Flow parameter in this
node.

Reverse 2.3. 2.3.1. Non credible


Reverse causes.
Flow

Misdirected 2.4. 2.4.1. Non additional


Misdirected causes.
Flow

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (2) Oil Skim Drum 320V-003 System
Intention: Collect oil recovered from 320V-001, 320TK-001 or other process equipment and pump it to BL (U-550 SOS). Conditions in 320V-003: OP: 0.1 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-014_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Level
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 2.5. Higher 2.5.1. More flow of oil 2.5.1.1. Potential 1. 320LAH-0262 No
Level from upstream overfilling of 320V-003
(including failure of leading to liquid carry
control 320LC-0024 over to flare.
(valve 320LV-0024 Moderate operational
opening)). changes at sour gas
flare system. Non
hazardous
consequences
because there is flare
K.O. Drum.

2.5.2. Failure of pump 2.5.2.1. Potential 1. 320LAH-0262 No


320P-003 when it is overfilling of 320V-003
required. leading to liquid carry
over to flare.
Moderate operational
changes at sour gas
flare system. Non
hazardous
consequences
because there is flare
K.O. Drum.

Less 2.6. Lower 2.6.1. Human error 2.6.1.1. Potential 1. 320LAL-0262 No A B 1 Low Personnel injuries is
Level starting-up pump mechanical damage not considered
320P-003 when it is to pump 320P-003 2. Process interlock because pump 320P-
not required. due to cavitation. 320I-0120 triggered 003 has double
by 320LALL-0264 mechanical seal with
causing the stop of alarm and not LOC is
pump 320P-003 expected.

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 12 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (2) Oil Skim Drum 320V-003 System
Intention: Collect oil recovered from 320V-001, 320TK-001 or other process equipment and pump it to BL (U-550 SOS). Conditions in 320V-003: OP: 0.1 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-014_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Temperature
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 2.7. Higher 2.7.1. Steam coil left 2.7.1.1. Moderate
Temperatur open by mistake. operational changes.
e Non hazardous
consequences.

Less 2.8. Lower 2.8.1. Loss of LP 2.8.1.1. Moderate


Temperatur Steam supply when it operational changes.
e is required. Non hazardous
consequences.

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (2) Oil Skim Drum 320V-003 System
Intention: Collect oil recovered from 320V-001, 320TK-001 or other process equipment and pump it to BL (U-550 SOS). Conditions in 320V-003: OP: 0.1 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-014_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Pressure
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 2.9. Higher 2.9.1. See Level
Pressure parameter in this
node.

Less 2.10. Lower 2.10.1. See Level


Pressure parameter in this
node.

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (2) Oil Skim Drum 320V-003 System
Intention: Collect oil recovered from 320V-001, 320TK-001 or other process equipment and pump it to BL (U-550 SOS). Conditions in 320V-003: OP: 0.1 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-014_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Composition
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Change of 2.11. 2.11.1. Non additional
Change of causes.
Compositio
n

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (2) Oil Skim Drum 320V-003 System
Intention: Collect oil recovered from 320V-001, 320TK-001 or other process equipment and pump it to BL (U-550 SOS). Conditions in 320V-003: OP: 0.1 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-014_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Contamination
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Part of 2.12. Part of 2.12.1. Steam coil 2.12.1.1. Potential
Contaminati leak. steam entrance to
on 320V-003 leading to
moderate operational
changes. Non
hazardous
consequences.

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HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 13 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (2) Oil Skim Drum 320V-003 System
Intention: Collect oil recovered from 320V-001, 320TK-001 or other process equipment and pump it to BL (U-550 SOS). Conditions in 320V-003: OP: 0.1 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-014_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Services / Utilities
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Loss of 2.13. Loss 2.13.1. Loss of 2.13.1.1. Valve
of Services instrument air supply. 320LV-0024 fails
/ Utilities closed. This is the
safe position.

2.13.2. Loss of power 2.13.2.1. Failure of


supply. pump 320P-003. See
Higher Level deviation
in this node.

2.13.3. Loss of LP 2.13.3.1. See Lower


Steam supply. Temperature deviation
in this node.

2.13.4. Loss of 2.13.4.1. See General


nitrogen supply. Start-up deviation in
this node.

2.13.5. Loss of steam 2.13.5.1. Increase of 1. Slope on top acid P A 4 Mod


tracing. condensation on the gas lines, draining
top acid gas lines liquid and avoiding A A 3 Low
leading to corrosion accumulation
problems in a long
term. LOC. Toxic 2. Acid gas top lines
release. with no liquid pockets
to avoid accumulation

3. Maintenance
procedures

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (2) Oil Skim Drum 320V-003 System
Intention: Collect oil recovered from 320V-001, 320TK-001 or other process equipment and pump it to BL (U-550 SOS). Conditions in 320V-003: OP: 0.1 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-014_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Start-up
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 2.14. 2.14.1. Loss of 2.14.1.1. Delay in
General nitrogen supply when purging operation.
Start-up the line is in operation Non hazardous
(purging). consequences.

2.14.2. Failure of 2.14.2.1. Delay in 1. 320RO-0261


valve 320PCV-0261 purging operation.
closing when the line Non hazardous
is in operation consequences.
(purging).

2.14.3. Failure of 2.14.3.1. Possible


valve 320PCV-0261 high pressure in
opening when the line 320V-003 during
is in operation purging operation.
(purging). Non hazardous
consequences
because 320V-003...

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HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 14 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (2) Oil Skim Drum 320V-003 System
Intention: Collect oil recovered from 320V-001, 320TK-001 or other process equipment and pump it to BL (U-550 SOS). Conditions in 320V-003: OP: 0.1 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-014_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Start-up
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...is open to flare.

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (2) Oil Skim Drum 320V-003 System
Intention: Collect oil recovered from 320V-001, 320TK-001 or other process equipment and pump it to BL (U-550 SOS). Conditions in 320V-003: OP: 0.1 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-014_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Shutdown
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 2.15. 2.15.1. Non additional
General causes.
Shutdown

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (2) Oil Skim Drum 320V-003 System
Intention: Collect oil recovered from 320V-001, 320TK-001 or other process equipment and pump it to BL (U-550 SOS). Conditions in 320V-003: OP: 0.1 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-014_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Maintenance
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 2.16. 2.16.1. Non additional
General causes.
Maintenanc
e

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HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 15 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (3) Amine Drains Drum 320V-002 System
Intention: Collect amine drains from U-320 ARU unit and pump it to 320TK-001 / 002. Conditions in 320V-002: OP: 0.01 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: AMB/80 ºC (DT:155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-212_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 3.1. More 3.1.1. See Level
Flow parameter in this
node.

No / Less 3.2. No / 3.2.1. See Level


Less Flow parameter in this
node.

3.2.2. Plugging of 3.2.2.1. Potential 1. 320PDG-0224 A B 2 Mod Personnel injuries is


320S-003. mechanical damage (starting pump is a not considered
to pump 320P-005 supervise operation) because pump 320P-
due to blocked 005 has double
discharge. mechanical seal with
alarm and not LOC is
expected.

Reverse 3.3. 3.3.1. Non credible


Reverse causes.
Flow

Misdirected 3.4. 3.4.1. Non additional


Misdirected causes.
Flow

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (3) Amine Drains Drum 320V-002 System
Intention: Collect amine drains from U-320 ARU unit and pump it to 320TK-001 / 002. Conditions in 320V-002: OP: 0.01 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: AMB/80 ºC (DT:155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-212_H1
Parameter: Level
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 3.5. Higher 3.5.1. More drains 3.5.1.1. Potential 1. 320LAH-0221A No EPC-HZP-320-6. N/A DEC Process Operating See note 11 on P&ID:
Level from unit to 320V- overfilling 320V-002 Ensure operating procedure DRP001-PUC-
002. leading to flooding of procedure includes delivery 320000-U-PID-
the system (balance specific instructions 012_H1
line). Impossibility of for the operator to
continuous draining close balance line to
operation. Moderate 320TK-001 and open
operational changes. balance line to 320V-
Non hazardous 003 before starting
consequences. amine draining
operation to 320V-002
or oil skimming
operation from
320TK-001.

3.5.2. Human error 3.5.2.1. Potential 1. 320LAH-0221A No


(operator does not overfilling 320V-002
start pump 320P-005 leading to flooding of
when it is required). the system (balance
line). Impossibility of
continuous draining
operation. Moderate
operational changes.
Non hazardous...

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 16 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (3) Amine Drains Drum 320V-002 System
Intention: Collect amine drains from U-320 ARU unit and pump it to 320TK-001 / 002. Conditions in 320V-002: OP: 0.01 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: AMB/80 ºC (DT:155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-212_H1
Parameter: Level
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...consequences.

3.5.3. Failure of pump 3.5.3.1. Potential 1. 320LAH-0221A No


320P-005. overfilling 320V-002
leading to flooding of
the system (balance
line). Impossibility of
continuous draining
operation. Moderate
operational changes.
Non hazardous
consequences.

Less 3.6. Lower 3.6.1. Human error 3.6.1.1. Potential 1. Process interlock A B 2 Mod Personnel injuries is
Level (operator starts pump mechanical damage 320I-0250 triggered not considered
320P-005 when it is to pump 320P-005 by 320LALL-0221A because pump 320P-
not required). due to cavitation. causing the stop of 005 has double
pump 320P-005 mechanical seal with
alarm and not LOC is
expected.

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (3) Amine Drains Drum 320V-002 System
Intention: Collect amine drains from U-320 ARU unit and pump it to 320TK-001 / 002. Conditions in 320V-002: OP: 0.01 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: AMB/80 ºC (DT:155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-212_H1
Parameter: Temperature
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 3.7. Higher 3.7.1. Hot drains from 3.7.1.1. Potential hot 1. Permissive to start A A 2 Low The amount of
Temperatur upstream. material sent to pump 320P-005 in potential hot material
e 320TK-001 / 002 case of 320TAH- to tanks 320TK-001 /
leading to mechanical 0221 (process 002 is very low
damage to tanks. interlock 320I-0250) compare with the
Economical impact. volume of those
2. Operating tanks.
procedures (line for
cold circulation
available for main
source of amine drain
(320C-101)

Less 3.8. Lower 3.8.1. Non credible


Temperatur causes.
e

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (3) Amine Drains Drum 320V-002 System
Intention: Collect amine drains from U-320 ARU unit and pump it to 320TK-001 / 002. Conditions in 320V-002: OP: 0.01 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: AMB/80 ºC (DT:155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-212_H1
Parameter: Pressure
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 3.9. Higher 3.9.1. See Level
Pressure parameter in this
node.

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 17 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (3) Amine Drains Drum 320V-002 System
Intention: Collect amine drains from U-320 ARU unit and pump it to 320TK-001 / 002. Conditions in 320V-002: OP: 0.01 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: AMB/80 ºC (DT:155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-212_H1
Parameter: Pressure
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
3.9.2. External fire. 3.9.2.1. Potential 1. 320PSV-0221 A A 1 Low
mechanical damage (designed for this
to 320S-003 leading scenario)
to fire escalation /
asset loss. 2. Firefighting system

3.9.2.2. Potential 1. 320PSV-0241 A A 2 Low


mechanical damage (designed for this
to 320V-002 leading scenario) (at 320TK-
to fire escalation / 001)
asset loss.
2. Firefighting system

Less 3.10. Lower 3.10.1. See Level


Pressure parameter in this
node.

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (3) Amine Drains Drum 320V-002 System
Intention: Collect amine drains from U-320 ARU unit and pump it to 320TK-001 / 002. Conditions in 320V-002: OP: 0.01 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: AMB/80 ºC (DT:155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-212_H1
Parameter: Composition
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Change of 3.11. 3.11.1. Wrong 3.11.1.1. Impossibility 1. None detected. A C 1 Low EPC-HZP-320-7. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process Next P&ID
Change of composition of to take a proper Provide a line from 320000-U-PID- issue
Compositio amine. sample to select 320P-005 discharge 012_H1
n destination (320TK- back to 320V-002 in
001 / 002). order to perform a
Economical impact. good mixture and
facilitate the sampling
operation in 320SC-
J4-0221.

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (3) Amine Drains Drum 320V-002 System
Intention: Collect amine drains from U-320 ARU unit and pump it to 320TK-001 / 002. Conditions in 320V-002: OP: 0.01 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: AMB/80 ºC (DT:155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-212_H1
Parameter: Contamination
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Part of 3.12. Part of 3.12.1. Non additional
Contaminati causes.
on

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (3) Amine Drains Drum 320V-002 System
Intention: Collect amine drains from U-320 ARU unit and pump it to 320TK-001 / 002. Conditions in 320V-002: OP: 0.01 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: AMB/80 ºC (DT:155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-212_H1
Parameter: Services / Utilities
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Loss of 3.13. Loss 3.13.1. Loss of power 3.13.1.1. Failure of
of Services supply. pump 320P-005. See
/ Utilities No / Less Flow
deviation in this node.

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 18 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (3) Amine Drains Drum 320V-002 System
Intention: Collect amine drains from U-320 ARU unit and pump it to 320TK-001 / 002. Conditions in 320V-002: OP: 0.01 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: AMB/80 ºC (DT:155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-212_H1
Parameter: Services / Utilities
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
3.13.2. Loss of 3.13.2.1. See General
nitrogen supply. Start-up deviation in
this node.

3.13.3. Loss of steam 3.13.3.1. Increase of 1. Slope on top acid P A 4 Mod


tracing. condensation on the gas lines, draining
top acid gas lines liquid and avoiding A A 3 Low
leading to corrosion accumulation
problems in a long
term. LOC. Toxic 2. Acid gas top lines
release. with no liquid pockets
to avoid accumulation

3. Maintenance
procedures

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (3) Amine Drains Drum 320V-002 System
Intention: Collect amine drains from U-320 ARU unit and pump it to 320TK-001 / 002. Conditions in 320V-002: OP: 0.01 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: AMB/80 ºC (DT:155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-212_H1
Parameter: Start-up
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 3.14. 3.14.1. Loss of 3.14.1.1. Delay in
General nitrogen supply when purging operation.
Start-up the line is in operation Non hazardous
(purging). consequences.

3.14.2. Failure of 3.14.2.1. Delay in 1. 320RO-0221


valve 320PCV-0221 purging operation.
closing when the line Non hazardous
is in operation consequences.
(purging).

3.14.3. Failure of 3.14.3.1. Possible


valve 320PCV-0221 high pressure in
opening when the line 320V-002 during
is in operation purging operation.
(purging). Non hazardous
consequences
because 320V-002 is
open to flare through
balance line to 320V-
003.

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (3) Amine Drains Drum 320V-002 System
Intention: Collect amine drains from U-320 ARU unit and pump it to 320TK-001 / 002. Conditions in 320V-002: OP: 0.01 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: AMB/80 ºC (DT:155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-212_H1
Parameter: Shutdown
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 3.15. 3.15.1. Non additional
General issues.
Shutdown

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HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 19 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (3) 13/02/2019


Node: (3) Amine Drains Drum 320V-002 System
Intention: Collect amine drains from U-320 ARU unit and pump it to 320TK-001 / 002. Conditions in 320V-002: OP: 0.01 kg/cm2g (DP: 3.5 kg/cm2g); OT: AMB/80 ºC (DT:155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-212_H1
Parameter: Maintenance
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 3.16. 3.16.1. Work in 3.16.1.1. Potential EPC-HZP-320-8. DRP001-PUC- PDO / DEC Operating /
General confined spaces. personnel injuries Provide operating / 320000-U-PID- Process / maintenanc
Maintenanc during work confined maintenance 012_H1 Commissioning e
e spaces. procedures to work in procedures
confined spaces issue.
safely.

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HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 20 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (4) Amine Make-up Tank 320TK-001 System
Intention: Store amine for make-up purposes and provide facilities to transfer it to the unit. Conditions in 320TK-001: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 4.1. More 4.1.1. See Level
Flow parameter in this
node.

4.1.2. Failure of 4.1.2.1. Different This scenario has


control 320FFC-0244 composition of make- been analysed in
/ 320FC-0243 (valve up amine leading to order to cover the
320FV-0243 opening) process changes. following scenarios:
(during 320TK-001 Potential off-spec 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2
preparation). amine to BL (U-160 and 16.11.1.3 from
DHT, U-120 HCU and U-160 DHT Unit
U-105 SGP Units). HAZOP.
See U-160 DHT, U-
120 HCU and U-105
SGP HAZOP Studies.

4.1.3. Failure of 4.1.3.1. Moderate


control 320FC-0242 operational changes.
(valve 320FV-0242 Non hazardous
opening) (minimum consequences.
recirculation line).

4.1.4. Failure of 4.1.4.1. Moderate


control 320FC-0241 operational changes.
(valve 320FV-0241 Non hazardous
opening) (during consequences.
amine make-up
operation).

No / Less 4.2. No / 4.2.1. See Level


Less Flow parameter in this
node.

4.2.2. Failure of 4.2.2.1. Higher This scenario has


control 320FFC-0244 concentration in been analysed in
/ 320FC-0243 (valve make-up amine order to cover the
320FV-0243 closing) leading to process following scenarios:
(during 320TK-001 changes. Potential off- 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2
preparation). spec amine to BL (U- and 16.11.1.3 from
160 DHT, U-120 HCU U-160 DHT Unit
and U-105 SGP HAZOP.
Units). See U-160
DHT, U-120 HCU and
U-105 SGP HAZOP
Studies.

4.2.3. Failure of 4.2.3.1. Delay in


pumps 320P-006 320TK-001
A/B. preparation or amine
make-up operations.
Moderate operational
changes. Non
hazardous
consequences.

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HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 21 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (4) Amine Make-up Tank 320TK-001 System
Intention: Store amine for make-up purposes and provide facilities to transfer it to the unit. Conditions in 320TK-001: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
4.2.4. Failure of 4.2.4.1. Valve 320FV-
control 320FC-0242 0242 is closed during
(valve 320FV-0242 normal operation.
closing) (minimum
recirculation line).

4.2.5. Failure of 4.2.5.1. Potential loss 1. Minimum A A 2 Low Personnel injuries is


control 320FC-0241 of level in 320TK-001 recirculation line not considered
(valve 320FV-0241 leading to mechanical (320FC-0242) because pumps
closing) (during damage to pumps 320P-006 A/B have
amine make-up 320P-006 A/B due to double mechanical
operation). blocked discharge. seal with alarm and
not LOC is expected.

The likelihood of this


scenario is very low
because it is an
intermittent and
supervised operation.

4.2.5.2. Delay in
make-up operation.
Moderate operational
changes. Non
hazardous
consequences.

Reverse 4.3. 4.3.1. Non credible


Reverse causes.
Flow

Misdirected 4.4. 4.4.1. Non additional


Misdirected causes.
Flow

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (4) Amine Make-up Tank 320TK-001 System
Intention: Store amine for make-up purposes and provide facilities to transfer it to the unit. Conditions in 320TK-001: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1
Parameter: Level
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 4.5. Higher 4.5.1. Human error 4.5.1.1. Potential 1. 320LAH-0242A No A A 2 Low The likelihood of this
Level during tank 320TK- overfilling of 320TK- scenario is very low
001 loading 001 leading to 2. Operating because it is an
operation. mechanical damage procedures intermittent and
due to overpressure supervised operation.
and, finally, spillage in 3. Interlock 320U- Yes
the tank area. 0300 triggered by 320LAH-0242A
Economical impact. 320LAHH-0241 provides enough time
(1oo1) causing the to operator to take an
trip of pump 320P- action.
007 (1oo1)

Less 4.6.... 4.6.1. Human error... 4.6.1.1. Potential... 1. 320LAL-0242A No A A 2 Low Personnel injuries...

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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (4) Amine Make-up Tank 320TK-001 System
Intention: Store amine for make-up purposes and provide facilities to transfer it to the unit. Conditions in 320TK-001: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1
Parameter: Level
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...Lower ...during tank 320TK- ...loss of level in ...is not considered
Level 001 transfer 320TK-001 leading to 2. Operating because pumps
operation. mechanical damage procedures 320P-006 A/B have
to pumps 320P-006 double mechanical
A/B due to cavitation. 3. Interlock 320U- Yes seal with alarm and
0300 triggered by not LOC is expected.
320LALL-0241 (1oo1)
causing the trip of The likelihood of this
pumps 320P-006 A/B scenario is very low
(1oo1) because it is an
intermittent and
supervised operation.

320LAL-0242A
provides enough time
to operator to take an
action.

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (4) Amine Make-up Tank 320TK-001 System
Intention: Store amine for make-up purposes and provide facilities to transfer it to the unit. Conditions in 320TK-001: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1
Parameter: Temperature
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 4.7. Higher 4.7.1. Non credible
Temperatur causes.
e

Less 4.8. Lower 4.8.1. Non credible


Temperatur causes.
e

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (4) Amine Make-up Tank 320TK-001 System
Intention: Store amine for make-up purposes and provide facilities to transfer it to the unit. Conditions in 320TK-001: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1
Parameter: Pressure
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 4.9. Higher 4.9.1. Failure of 4.9.1.1. Potential 1. 320PSV-0241 A A 2 Low EPC-HZP-320-9. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process / Next P&ID
Pressure control 320PC-0241 mechanical damage (designed for this Implement a new PI 320000-U-PID- DEC issue
(valve 320PV-0241A to 320TK-001 due to scenario) with PAH and PAL in 013_H1 Instrumentation
opening / 320PV- overpressure. 320TK-001 (not
0241B closing). Economical impact. critical alarms).

Less 4.10. Lower 4.10.1. Failure of 4.10.1.1. Potential 1. 320PSV-0241 A A 2 Low :Refer To EPC-HZP-
Pressure control 320PC-0241 vacuum formation in (Vacuum breaker) 320-9
(valve 320PV-0241B 320TK-001 leading to
opening / 320PV- mechanical damage
0241A closing). (collapse).
Economical impact.

4.10.2. Loss of 4.10.2.1. Potential 1. 320PAL-0241 No A A 2 Low :Refer To EPC-HZP-


nitrogen supply. vacuum formation in 320-9
320TK-001 leading... 2. 320PSV-0241...
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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (4) Amine Make-up Tank 320TK-001 System
Intention: Store amine for make-up purposes and provide facilities to transfer it to the unit. Conditions in 320TK-001: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1
Parameter: Pressure
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...to mechanical ...(Vacuum breaker)
damage (collapse).
Economical impact.

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (4) Amine Make-up Tank 320TK-001 System
Intention: Store amine for make-up purposes and provide facilities to transfer it to the unit. Conditions in 320TK-001: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1
Parameter: Composition
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Change of 4.11. 4.11.1. See Flow
Change of parameter in this
Compositio node.
n

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (4) Amine Make-up Tank 320TK-001 System
Intention: Store amine for make-up purposes and provide facilities to transfer it to the unit. Conditions in 320TK-001: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1
Parameter: Contamination
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Part of 4.12. Part of 4.12.1. Non additional
Contaminati causes.
on

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (4) Amine Make-up Tank 320TK-001 System
Intention: Store amine for make-up purposes and provide facilities to transfer it to the unit. Conditions in 320TK-001: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1
Parameter: Services / Utilities
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Loss of 4.13. Loss 4.13.1. Loss of 4.13.1.1. Valve
of Services instrument air supply. 320PV-0241A fails
/ Utilities closed. This is the
safe position.

4.13.1.2. Valve
320PV-0241B fails
open. This is the safe
position.

4.13.1.3. Valve
320FV-0241 fails
closed. This is the
safe position.

4.13.1.4. Valve
320FV-0242 fails
open. This is the safe
position.

4.13.1.5. Valve
320FV-0243 fails...

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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (4) Amine Make-up Tank 320TK-001 System
Intention: Store amine for make-up purposes and provide facilities to transfer it to the unit. Conditions in 320TK-001: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1
Parameter: Services / Utilities
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...closed. This is the
safe position.

4.13.2. Loss of power 4.13.2.1. Failure of


supply. pumps 320P-006 A/B.
See No / Less Flow
deviation in this node.

4.13.3. Loss of 4.13.3.1. See Lower


nitrogen supply. Pressure deviation in
this node.

4.13.4. Loss of steam 4.13.4.1. Increase of 1. Slope on top acid P A 4 Mod


tracing. condensation on the gas lines, draining
top acid gas lines liquid and avoiding A A 3 Low
leading to corrosion accumulation
problems in a long
term. LOC. Toxic 2. Acid gas top lines
release. with no liquid pockets
to avoid accumulation

3. Maintenance
procedures

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (4) Amine Make-up Tank 320TK-001 System
Intention: Store amine for make-up purposes and provide facilities to transfer it to the unit. Conditions in 320TK-001: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1
Parameter: Start-up
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 4.14. 4.14.1. Non additional
General causes.
Start-up

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (4) Amine Make-up Tank 320TK-001 System
Intention: Store amine for make-up purposes and provide facilities to transfer it to the unit. Conditions in 320TK-001: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1
Parameter: Shutdown
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 4.15. 4.15.1. Non additional
General causes.
Shutdown

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (4) Amine Make-up Tank 320TK-001 System
Intention: Store amine for make-up purposes and provide facilities to transfer it to the unit. Conditions in 320TK-001: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1
Parameter: Maintenance
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 4.16. 4.16.1. Non additional
General causes.
Maintena...

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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (4) Amine Make-up Tank 320TK-001 System
Intention: Store amine for make-up purposes and provide facilities to transfer it to the unit. Conditions in 320TK-001: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1
Parameter: Maintenance
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...nce

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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (5) Amine Wash Water Tank 320TK-002 System
Intention: Store amine wash water and provide facilities to supply to tank 320TK-001. Conditions in 320TK-002: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 85 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-016_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 5.1. More 5.1.1. See Level
Flow parameter in this
node.

No / Less 5.2. No / 5.2.1. See Level


Less Flow parameter in this
node.

5.2.2. Failure of pump 5.2.2.1. Delay in


320P-004. make-up amine
preparation operation.
Moderate operational
changes. Non
hazardous
consequences.

Reverse 5.3. 5.3.1. Non credible


Reverse causes.
Flow

Misdirected 5.4. 5.4.1. Non additional


Misdirected causes.
Flow

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (5) Amine Wash Water Tank 320TK-002 System
Intention: Store amine wash water and provide facilities to supply to tank 320TK-001. Conditions in 320TK-002: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 85 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-016_H1
Parameter: Level
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 5.5. Higher 5.5.1. Human error 5.5.1.1. Potential 1. 320LAH-0302A No A A 2 Low The likelihood of this
Level during tank 320TK- overfilling of 320TK- scenario is very low
002 loading 002 leading to 2. 320LAHH-0301 No because it is an
operation. mechanical damage intermittent and
due to overpressure 3. Operating supervised operation.
and, finally, spillage in procedures
the tank area.
Economical impact.

Less 5.6. Lower 5.6.1. Human error 5.6.1.1. Potential loss 1. 320LAL-0302A No A A 2 Low Personnel injuries is
Level during tank 320TK- of level in 320TK-002 not considered
002 transfer leading to mechanical 2. Operating because pumps
operation. damage to pump procedures 320P-006 A/B have
320P-004 or 320P- double mechanical
006 A/B due to 3. Process interlock seal with alarm and
cavitation. 320I-0110 triggered not LOC is expected.
by 320LALL-0301
(1oo1) causing the The likelihood of this
stop of pumps 320P- scenario is very low
004 and 320P-006 because it is an
A/B (1oo1) intermittent and
supervised operation.

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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (5) Amine Wash Water Tank 320TK-002 System
Intention: Store amine wash water and provide facilities to supply to tank 320TK-001. Conditions in 320TK-002: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 85 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-016_H1
Parameter: Temperature
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 5.7. Higher 5.7.1. Non credible
Temperatur causes.
e

Less 5.8. Lower 5.8.1. Non credible


Temperatur causes.
e

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (5) Amine Wash Water Tank 320TK-002 System
Intention: Store amine wash water and provide facilities to supply to tank 320TK-001. Conditions in 320TK-002: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 85 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-016_H1
Parameter: Pressure
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 5.9. Higher 5.9.1. Failure of 5.9.1.1. Potential 1. 320PSV-0301 A A 2 Low EPC-HZP-320-10. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process / Next P&ID
Pressure control 320PC-0301 mechanical damage (designed for this Implement a new PI 320000-U-PID- DEC issue
(valve 320PV-0301A to 320TK-002 due to scenario) with PAH and PAL in 016_H1 Instrumentation
opening / 320PV- overpressure. 320TK-002 (not
0301B closing). Economical impact. critical alarms).

Less 5.10. Lower 5.10.1. Failure of 5.10.1.1. Potential 1. 320PSV-0301 A A 2 Low :Refer To EPC-HZP-
Pressure control 320PC-0301 vacuum formation in (Vacuum breaker) 320-10
(valve 320PV-0301B 320TK-002 leading to
opening / 320PV- mechanical damage
0301A closing). (collapse).
Economical impact.

5.10.2. Loss of 5.10.2.1. Potential 1. 320PAL-0301 No A A 2 Low :Refer To EPC-HZP-


nitrogen supply. vacuum formation in 320-10
320TK-002 leading to 2. 320PSV-0301
mechanical damage (Vacuum breaker)
(collapse).
Economical impact.

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (5) Amine Wash Water Tank 320TK-002 System
Intention: Store amine wash water and provide facilities to supply to tank 320TK-001. Conditions in 320TK-002: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 85 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-016_H1
Parameter: Composition
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Change of 5.11. 5.11.1. Non additional
Change of causes.
Compositio
n

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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (5) Amine Wash Water Tank 320TK-002 System
Intention: Store amine wash water and provide facilities to supply to tank 320TK-001. Conditions in 320TK-002: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 85 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-016_H1
Parameter: Contamination
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Part of 5.12. Part of 5.12.1. Non additional
Contaminati causes.
on

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (5) Amine Wash Water Tank 320TK-002 System
Intention: Store amine wash water and provide facilities to supply to tank 320TK-001. Conditions in 320TK-002: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 85 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-016_H1
Parameter: Services / Utilities
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Loss of 5.13. Loss 5.13.1. Loss of 5.13.1.1. Valve
of Services instrument air supply. 320PV-0301A fails
/ Utilities closed. This is the
safe position.

5.13.1.2. Valve
320PV-0301B fails
open. This is the safe
position.

5.13.2. Loss of power 5.13.2.1. Failure of


supply. pump 320P-004. See
No / Less Flow
deviation in this node.

5.13.3. Loss of 5.13.3.1. See Lower


nitrogen supply. Pressure deviation in
this node.

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (5) Amine Wash Water Tank 320TK-002 System
Intention: Store amine wash water and provide facilities to supply to tank 320TK-001. Conditions in 320TK-002: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 85 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-016_H1
Parameter: Start-up
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 5.14. 5.14.1. Non additional
General causes.
Start-up

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (5) Amine Wash Water Tank 320TK-002 System
Intention: Store amine wash water and provide facilities to supply to tank 320TK-001. Conditions in 320TK-002: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 85 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-016_H1
Parameter: Shutdown
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 5.15. 5.15.1. Non additional
General causes.
Shutdown

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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (5) Amine Wash Water Tank 320TK-002 System
Intention: Store amine wash water and provide facilities to supply to tank 320TK-001. Conditions in 320TK-002: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 85 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-016_H1
Parameter: Maintenance
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 5.16. 5.16.1. Non additional
General causes.
Maintenanc
e

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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (6) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Reboiler System
Intention: Provide enough heat to regenerator column 320C-101 to perform regeneration. Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 6.1. More 6.1.1. Failure of 6.1.1.1. Possible loss 1. 320PAL-1062 No :Refer To EPC-HZP- This scenario has
Flow control 320FFC-1102 of level in 320V-102 320-3 been analysed in
(feed / steam ratio) / A/B leading to loss of 2. 320TAL-1104 A/B No order to cover the
320FC-1103A/B / condensation inside following scenarios:
320LC-1122 A/B reboiler 320E-102 3. 320TAL-1105 No 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2
(valve 320FV-1103 A/B. Loss of duty and 16.11.1.3 from
A/B opening). leading to lower 4. Sampling U-160 DHT Unit
temperature in 320C- procedure (320SC- HAZOP.
101 bottom system. J4-0381) (at outlet of
Off-spec lean amine 320AE-001 A-J)
and process upsets in
U-105 SGP, U-160
DHT and U-120 HCU
Unit. See U-105 SGP,
U-160 DHT and U-120
HCU HAZOP Studies.

6.1.1.2. See Flow


parameter in node
#10.

6.1.2. Failure of 6.1.2.1. Potential 1. 320TC-1101 with No A B 2 Mod


control 320PC-1102 overheating in reboiler TAH
(valve 320PV-1102 320E-102 A/B system
A/B opening). leading to amine 2. 320PAH-1062 No
degradation.
Economical impact. 3. 320TAH-1104 A/B No

4. 320TAH-1105 No

6.1.2.2. Potential 1. 320TC-1101 with No P A 4 Mod EPC-HZP-320-11. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process / Next P&ID SIL Assessment is
overheating in reboiler TAH Implement a new SIF 320001-U-PID- DEC issue required for this new
320E-102 A/B system triggered by PAHH in 004_H1; DRP001- Instrumentation SIF triggered by
leading to 2. 320PC-1062 with No a new PT in 320C-101 PUC-320001-U- PAHH in a new PT in
pressurization of PAH causing the closure of PID-006_H1 320C-101 causing
320C-101. LOC. Toxic 320UV-1101 (cut-off the closure of 320UV-
release. 3. 320PC-1141 with No steam to reboiler 1101 (cut-off steam
PAH (at outlet of 320E-102 A/B) (1oo1). to reboiler 320E-102
320V-101) A/B) (1oo1).

4. 320TAH-1104 A/B No

5. 320TAH-1105 No

6. 320PSV-1061 A/B
(designed for this
scenario)

6.1.3. Failure of 6.1.3.1. Moderate


control 320TC-1101 operational changes
(valve 320TV-1101 regarding
opening). temperature. Non
hazardous...

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Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (6) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Reboiler System
Intention: Provide enough heat to regenerator column 320C-101 to perform regeneration. Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...consequences
because the design
temperature in 320E-
102 A/B will not be
exceeded.

6.1.3.2. Potential 1. 320PSV-1121 A/B P A 4 Mod


mechanical damage / 320PSV-1122 A/B
to 320E-102 A/B (designed for this
system due to scenario)
overpressure. LOC.
Toxic release.

No / Less 6.2. No / 6.2.1. Failure of 6.2.1.1. Potential 1. 320PAL-1062 No :Refer To EPC-HZP- This scenario has
Less Flow control 320FFC-1102 flooding of 320V-102 320-3 been analysed in
(feed / steam ratio) / A/B leading to loss of 2. 320TAL-1104 A/B No order to cover the
320FC-1103A/B / condensation inside following scenarios:
320LC-1122 A/B reboiler 320E-102 3. 320TAL-1105 No 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2
(valve 320FV-1103 A/B. Loss of duty and 16.11.1.3 from
A/B closing). leading to lower 4. Sampling U-160 DHT Unit
temperature in 320C- procedure (320SC- HAZOP.
101 bottom system. J4-0381) (at outlet of
Off-spec lean amine 320AE-001 A-J)
and process upsets in
U-105 SGP, U-160
DHT and U-120 HCU
Unit. See U-105 SGP,
U-160 DHT and U-120
HCU HAZOP Studies.

6.2.1.2. See Flow


parameter in node
#10.

6.2.2. Loss of steam 6.2.2.1. Loss of duty 1. 320PAL-1062 No :Refer To EPC-HZP- This scenario has
supply from U-340 leading to lower 320-3 been analysed in
SRU Unit. temperature in 320C- 2. 320TAL-1104 A/B No order to cover the
101 bottom system. following scenarios:
Off-spec lean amine 3. 320TAL-1105 No 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2
and process upsets in and 16.11.1.3 from
U-105 SGP, U-160 4. Sampling U-160 DHT Unit
DHT and U-120 HCU procedure (320SC- HAZOP.
Unit. See U-105 SGP, J4-0381) (at outlet of
U-160 DHT and U-120 320AE-001 A-J)
HCU HAZOP Studies.

6.2.3. Loss of LP 6.2.3.1. Loss of duty 1. 320PAL-1062 No :Refer To EPC-HZP- This scenario has
steam supply. leading to lower 320-3 been analysed in
temperature in 320C- 2. 320TAL-1104 A/B No order to cover the
101 bottom system. following scenarios:
Off-spec lean amine 3. 320TAL-1105 No 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2
and process upsets in and 16.11.1.3 from
U-105 SGP, U-160... 4. Sampling... U-160 DHT Unit...

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Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (6) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Reboiler System
Intention: Provide enough heat to regenerator column 320C-101 to perform regeneration. Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...DHT and U-120 ...procedure (320SC- ...HAZOP.
HCU Unit. See U-105 J4-0381) (at outlet of
SGP, U-160 DHT and 320AE-001 A-J)
U-120 HCU HAZOP
Studies.

6.2.4. Failure of valve 6.2.4.1. Loss of duty 1. 320PAL-1062 No :Refer To EPC-HZP- This scenario has
320UV-1101 closed. leading to lower 320-3 been analysed in
temperature in 320C- 2. 320TAL-1104 A/B No order to cover the
101 bottom system. following scenarios:
Off-spec lean amine 3. 320TAL-1105 No 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2
and process upsets in and 16.11.1.3 from
U-105 SGP, U-160 4. Sampling U-160 DHT Unit
DHT and U-120 HCU procedure (320SC- HAZOP.
Unit. See U-105 SGP, J4-0381) (at outlet of
U-160 DHT and U-120 320AE-001 A-J)
HCU HAZOP Studies.

6.2.5. Failure of 6.2.5.1. Loss of duty 1. 320PAL-1062 No :Refer To EPC-HZP- This scenario has
control 320PC-1102 leading to lower 320-3 been analysed in
(valve 320PV-1102 temperature in 320C- 2. 320TAL-1104 A/B No order to cover the
A/B closing). 101 bottom system. following scenarios:
Off-spec lean amine 3. 320TAL-1105 No 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2
and process upsets in and 16.11.1.3 from
U-105 SGP, U-160 4. Sampling U-160 DHT Unit
DHT and U-120 HCU procedure (320SC- HAZOP.
Unit. See U-105 SGP, J4-0381) (at outlet of
U-160 DHT and U-120 320AE-001 A-J)
HCU HAZOP Studies.

6.2.6. Failure of 6.2.6.1. Potential 1. 320PAH-1062 No A B 2 Mod


control 320TC-1101 overheating in reboiler
(valve 320TV-1101 320E-102 A/B system 2. 320TAH-1104 A/B No
closing). leading to amine
degradation. 3. 320TAH-1105 No
Economical impact.

6.2.6.2. Potential 1. 320PC-1062 with No P A 4 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP-


overheating in reboiler PAH 320-11
320E-102 A/B system
leading to 2. 320PC-1141 with No
pressurization of PAH (at outlet of
320C-101. LOC. Toxic 320V-101)
release.
3. 320TAH-1104 A/B No

4. 320TAH-1105 No

5. 320PSV-1061 A/B
(designed for this
scenario)

6.2.7. Loss of BFW... 6.2.7.1. Potential... 1. 320PAH-1062 No A B 2 Mod

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Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (6) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Reboiler System
Intention: Provide enough heat to regenerator column 320C-101 to perform regeneration. Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...supply. ...overheating in
reboiler 320E-102 A/B 2. 320TAH-1104 A/B No
system leading to
amine degradation. 3. 320TAH-1105 No
Economical impact.

6.2.7.2. Potential 1. 320PC-1062 with No P A 4 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP-


overheating in reboiler PAH 320-11
320E-102 A/B system
leading to 2. 320PC-1141 with No
pressurization of PAH (at outlet of
320C-101. LOC. Toxic 320V-101)
release.
3. 320TAH-1104 A/B No

4. 320TAH-1105 No

5. 320PSV-1061 A/B
(designed for this
scenario)

Reverse 6.3. 6.3.1. Non credible


Reverse causes.
Flow

Misdirected 6.4. 6.4.1. Non additional


Misdirected causes.
Flow

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (6) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Reboiler System
Intention: Provide enough heat to regenerator column 320C-101 to perform regeneration. Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Level
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 6.5. Higher 6.5.1. See Flow
Level parameter in this
node.

Less 6.6. Lower 6.6.1. See Flow


Level parameter in this
node.

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Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (6) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Reboiler System
Intention: Provide enough heat to regenerator column 320C-101 to perform regeneration. Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Temperature
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 6.7. Higher 6.7.1. See Flow
Temperatur parameter in this
e node.

Less 6.8. Lower 6.8.1. See Flow


Temperatur parameter in this
e node.

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (6) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Reboiler System
Intention: Provide enough heat to regenerator column 320C-101 to perform regeneration. Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Pressure
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 6.9. Higher 6.9.1. See Flow
Pressure parameter in this
node.

6.9.2. External fire. 6.9.2.1. Non expected


consequences for
320E-102 A/B
because the elevation
is higher than 7.6 m.

6.9.2.2. Non expected


consequences for
320V-102 A/B
because the elevation
is higher than 7.6 m.

6.9.2.3. Potential 1. 320PSV-1061 A/B A A 3 Low


mechanical damage (designed for this
to 320C-101 leading scenario)
to fire escalation /
asset loss. 2. Firefighting system

Less 6.10. Lower 6.10.1. See Flow


Pressure parameter in this
node.

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (6) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Reboiler System
Intention: Provide enough heat to regenerator column 320C-101 to perform regeneration. Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Composition
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Change of 6.11. 6.11.1. Non additional
Change of causes.
Compositio
n

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Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (6) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Reboiler System
Intention: Provide enough heat to regenerator column 320C-101 to perform regeneration. Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Contamination
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Part of 6.12. Part of 6.12.1. Tube leak in 6.12.1.1. Potential
Contaminati 320E-102 A/B. steam entrance to
on amine leading to
dilution. Moderate
operational changes.
Non hazardous
consequences.

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (6) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Reboiler System
Intention: Provide enough heat to regenerator column 320C-101 to perform regeneration. Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Services / Utilities
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Loss of 6.13. Loss 6.13.1. Loss of 6.13.1.1. Valve
of Services instrument air supply. 320TV-1101 fails
/ Utilities closed. This is the
safe position.

6.13.1.2. Valves
320PV-1102 A/B fail
closed. This is the
safe position.

6.13.1.3. Valves
320FV-1103 A/B fail
closed. This is the
safe position.

6.13.1.4. Valve
320UV-1101 fails
closed. This is the
safe position.

6.13.2. Loss of LP 6.13.2.1. See No /


Steam supply. Less Flow deviation in
this node.

6.13.3. Loss of BFW 6.13.3.1. See No /


supply. Less Flow deviation in
this node.

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (6) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Reboiler System
Intention: Provide enough heat to regenerator column 320C-101 to perform regeneration. Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Start-up
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 6.14. 6.14.1. Start-up of 6.14.1.1. Potential EPC-HZP-320-12. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process Next P&ID According to isolation
General reboiler 320E-102 operational problems / Provide independent 320001-U-PID- issue. philosophy, warm-up
Start-up A/B. overheating of... small warm-up lines... 006-Rev H1;... 1" lines are required...

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Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (6) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Reboiler System
Intention: Provide enough heat to regenerator column 320C-101 to perform regeneration. Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Start-up
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...reboilers 320E-102 ...for start-up of each ...DRP001-PUC- ...for steam lines in
A/B during start-up steam line (steam line 320002-U-PID- the individual trains
due to large size of for U-340 SRU and 006-Rev H1 and BL.
steam line. Operator steam line for
will start one train and, network) in each train.
then, the second one
and high flow
conditions could
happen.

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (6) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Reboiler System
Intention: Provide enough heat to regenerator column 320C-101 to perform regeneration. Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Shutdown
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 6.15. 6.15.1. Non additional
General causes.
Shutdown

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (6) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Reboiler System
Intention: Provide enough heat to regenerator column 320C-101 to perform regeneration. Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-006_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Maintenance
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 6.16. 6.16.1. Non additional
General causes.
Maintenanc
e

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Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (7) Lean Amine Cooling System from 320C-101 / 320C-201 to BL
Intention: Lean amine cooling down and filtration before going to BL (U-105 SGP Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-160 DHT Unit). Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC). Conditions at BL: OP: 13,1
kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT: 115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-005_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-005_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 7.1. More 7.1.1. Two pumps 7.1.1.1. Potential loss 1. 320LAL-1062 No A B 2 Mod EPC-HZP-320-13. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process / Next P&ID Personnel injuries is
Flow 320P-101 A/B of level in 320C-101 Classify 320PAL-0381 320000-U-PID- DEC issue not considered
running leading to mechanical 2. Interlock 320U- Yes as critical alarm. 020-1_H1 Instrumentation because pumps
simultaneously damage to 320P-101 1100 triggered by 320P-101 A/B have
(failure of autostart A/B due to cavitation. 320LALL-1061 (1oo1) double mechanical
system 320I-0150). causing the trip of seal with alarm and
pumps 320P-101 A/B not LOC is expected.
(1oo1)
320LAL-1062 does
not provide enough
time to operator to
take an action.

7.1.2. Failure of 7.1.2.1. Potential low


control 320FC-1081 flow conditions to BL
(valve 320FV-1081 (U-105 SGP, U-160
opening) (minimum DHT and U-120 HCU
recirculation line). Units). See U-105
SGP, U-160 DHT and
U-120 HCU HAZOP
Studies.

7.1.3. Failure of 7.1.3.1. See Flow


control 320FC-0022 parameter in node #1.
(valve 320FV-0022
opening). 7.1.3.2. Moderate
operational changes.
Non hazardous
consequences in this
node.

7.1.4. Failure of 7.1.4.1. More 1. 320FC-0201


control 320FC-0202 circulation to filter
(valve 320FV-0202 320PK-001, 320S-001
opening). / 002. Moderate
operational changes.
Non hazardous
consequences in this
node.

7.1.4.2. See Flow


parameter in node #8.

7.1.5. Failure of 7.1.5.1. See Flow


control 320FC-0001 parameter in node #1.
(valve 320FV-0001
opening) (when the 7.1.5.2. Moderate
line is in operation operational changes.
(start-up or turndown Non hazardous
conditions)). consequences in this
node.

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 38 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (7) Lean Amine Cooling System from 320C-101 / 320C-201 to BL
Intention: Lean amine cooling down and filtration before going to BL (U-105 SGP Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-160 DHT Unit). Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC). Conditions at BL: OP: 13,1
kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT: 115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-005_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-005_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
No / Less 7.2. No / 7.2.1. Failure of valve 7.2.1.1. Potential 1. Interlock 320U- Yes A C 2 Mod EPC-HZP-320-14. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process / Next C&E Personnel injuries is
Less Flow 320UV-1061 closed. mechanical damage 1100 triggered by Include not fully open 320001-U-PID- DEC issue not considered
to 320P-101 A/B due closed signal in valve signal in valve 320UV- 004_H1; DRP001- Instrumentation because pumps
to blocked suction. 320UV-1061 (1oo1) 1061 to activate PUC-320001-U- 320P-101 A/B have
causing the trip of interlock 320U-1100 PID-005_H1 double mechanical
pumps 320P-101 A/B tripping the pumps seal with alarm and
(1oo1) 320P-101 A/B. not LOC is expected.

7.2.1.2. Potential 1. 320LAH-1062 No A B 2 Mod


overfilling of 320C-101
leading to possible 2. 320PDAH-1066 / No
internal damage to 1067
320C-101.
Economical impact. 3. Process interlock
320I-1150 triggered
by 320LAHH-1062
causing the closure of
320PV-1102 A/B and
closure of 320FV-
1041

7.2.2. Failure of 7.2.2.1. Potential 1. Autostart of stand- A A 2 Low


pumps 320P-101 overfilling of 320C-101 by pump 320P-101
A/B. leading to possible A/B (320I-0150)
internal damage to
320C-101. 2. 320LAH-1062 No
Economical impact.
3. 320PDAH-1066 / No
1067

4. Process interlock
320I-1150 triggered
by 320LAHH-1062
causing the closure of
320PV-1102 A/B and
closure of 320FV-
1041

7.2.2.2. Potential low 1. Autostart of stand-


flow conditions to BL by pump 320P-101
(U-105 SGP, U-160 A/B (320I-0150)
DHT and U-120 HCU
Units). See U-105
SGP, U-160 DHT and
U-120 HCU HAZOP
Studies.

7.2.3. Failure of 7.2.3.1. Valve 320FV-


control 320FC-1081 1081 is closed in
(valve 320FV-1081 normal operation.
closing) (minimum...

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 39 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (7) Lean Amine Cooling System from 320C-101 / 320C-201 to BL
Intention: Lean amine cooling down and filtration before going to BL (U-105 SGP Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-160 DHT Unit). Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC). Conditions at BL: OP: 13,1
kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT: 115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-005_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-005_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...recirculation line).

7.2.4. Failure of 7.2.4.1. See Flow


control 320FC-0022 parameter in node #1.
(valve 320FV-0022
closing). 7.2.4.2. Moderate
operational changes.
Non hazardous
consequences in this
node.

7.2.5. Failure of 7.2.5.1. See Flow


control 320FC-0202 parameter in node #8.
(valve 320FV-0202
closing). 7.2.5.2. Lean amine This scenario has
loss of quality on a been analysed in
long term. Possible order to cover the
off-spec lean amine to following scenarios:
BL (U-105 SGP, U- 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2
160 DHT and U-120 and 16.11.1.3 from
HCU Units). See U- U-160 DHT Unit
105 SGP, U-160 DHT HAZOP.
and U-120 HCU
HAZOP Studies.

7.2.6. Failure of 7.2.6.1. See Flow


control 320FC-0001 parameter in node #1.
(valve 320FV-0001
closing) (when the 7.2.6.2. Potential loss 1. Minimum A B 2 Mod Personnel injuries is
line is in operation of level in 320C-101 recirculation line not considered
(start-up or turndown leading to mechanical (320FC-1081) because pumps
conditions)). damage to 320P-101 320P-101 A/B have
A/B due to cavitation. 2. 320LAL-1062 No double mechanical
seal with alarm and
3. Interlock 320U- Yes not LOC is expected.
1100 triggered by
320LALL-1061 (1oo1) 320LAL-1062 does
causing the trip of not provide enough
pumps 320P-101 A/B time to operator to
(1oo1) take an action.

7.2.7. Blocked outlet 7.2.7.1. Moderate


conditions in BL (U- operational changes.
160 DHT). Non hazardous
consequences.

7.2.8. Blocked outlet 7.2.8.1. Moderate


conditions in BL (U- operational changes.
105 SGP). Non hazardous
consequences.

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 40 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (7) Lean Amine Cooling System from 320C-101 / 320C-201 to BL
Intention: Lean amine cooling down and filtration before going to BL (U-105 SGP Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-160 DHT Unit). Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC). Conditions at BL: OP: 13,1
kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT: 115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-005_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-005_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
7.2.9. Blocked outlet 7.2.9.1. Moderate
conditions in BL (U- operational changes.
120 HCU). Non hazardous
consequences.

Reverse 7.3. 7.3.1. Non credible


Reverse causes.
Flow

Misdirected 7.4. 7.4.1. Non additional


Misdirected causes.
Flow

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (7) Lean Amine Cooling System from 320C-101 / 320C-201 to BL
Intention: Lean amine cooling down and filtration before going to BL (U-105 SGP Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-160 DHT Unit). Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC). Conditions at BL: OP: 13,1
kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT: 115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-005_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-005_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Level
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 7.5. Higher 7.5.1. See Flow
Level parameter in this
node.

Less 7.6. Lower 7.6.1. See Flow


Level parameter in this
node.

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (7) Lean Amine Cooling System from 320C-101 / 320C-201 to BL
Intention: Lean amine cooling down and filtration before going to BL (U-105 SGP Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-160 DHT Unit). Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC). Conditions at BL: OP: 13,1
kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT: 115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-005_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-005_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Temperature
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 7.7. Higher 7.7.1. Failure of 7.7.1.1. See
Temperatur control 320TC-1047 Temperature
e (valve 320TV-1047 parameter in node #9.
opening).
7.7.1.2. High
temperature of lean
amine at the outlet of
320E-101 leading to
moderate operational
changes. Non
hazardous
consequences...

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 41 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (7) Lean Amine Cooling System from 320C-101 / 320C-201 to BL
Intention: Lean amine cooling down and filtration before going to BL (U-105 SGP Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-160 DHT Unit). Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC). Conditions at BL: OP: 13,1
kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT: 115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-005_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-005_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Temperature
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...because the design
temperature of
320AE-001 A-J and
320P-101 A/B will not
be exceeded.

7.7.1.3. Possible 1. None detected. A C 2 Mod EPC-HZP-320-15. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process Next P&ID Personnel injuries is
mechanical damage Relocate 320TIT-1046 320001-U-PID- issue not considered
to pumps 320P-101 downstream 320E- 003_H1 because pumps
A/B due to cavitation 101 bypass 320P-101 A/B have
(vaporization). connection (10"- double mechanical
320AML-1004- seal with alarm and
A1LQ5-HC-NT). not LOC is expected.

7.7.2. Failure of 7.7.2.1. High 1. 320TC-0382 with No :Refer To EPC-HZP-


320AE-001 A-J. temperature at the TAH 320-16
outlet of 320AE-001
A-J leading to high
temperature lean
amine to BL (U-160
DHT, U-120 HCU and
U-105 SGP Units).
Moderate operational
changes. Non
hazardous
consequences
because the design
temperature of U-160
DHT, U-120 HCU and
U-105 SGP Units
equipment (160V-022,
120V-012 and 105V-
012) will not be
exceeded.

7.7.3. Failure of 7.7.3.1. High EPC-HZP-320-16. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process Next P&ID
control 320TC-0382 temperature at the Provide a TG in lean 320000-U-PID- issue
(variable speed outlet of 320AE-001 amine line 020-2_H1
320AE-001 A-J fans A-J leading to high downstream 320TIT-
control). temperature lean 0382.
amine to BL (U-160
DHT, U-120 HCU and
U-105 SGP Units).
Moderate operational
changes. Non
hazardous
consequences
because the design
temperature of U-160
DHT, U-120 HCU and
U-105 SGP Units...

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 42 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (7) Lean Amine Cooling System from 320C-101 / 320C-201 to BL
Intention: Lean amine cooling down and filtration before going to BL (U-105 SGP Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-160 DHT Unit). Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC). Conditions at BL: OP: 13,1
kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT: 115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-005_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-005_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Temperature
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...equipment (160V-
022, 120V-012 and
105V-012) will not be
exceeded.

Less 7.8. Lower 7.8.1. Failure of 7.8.1.1. See


Temperatur control 320TC-1047 Temperature
e (valve 320TV-1047 parameter in node #9.
closing).
7.8.1.2. Moderate
operational changes.
Non hazardous
consequences in this
node.

7.8.2. Failure of 7.8.2.1. Moderate


control 320TC-0382 operational changes.
(variable speed Non hazardous
320AE-001 A-J fans consequences.
control).

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (7) Lean Amine Cooling System from 320C-101 / 320C-201 to BL
Intention: Lean amine cooling down and filtration before going to BL (U-105 SGP Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-160 DHT Unit). Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC). Conditions at BL: OP: 13,1
kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT: 115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-005_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-005_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Pressure
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 7.9. Higher 7.9.1. See Flow
Pressure parameter in this
node.

7.9.2. External fire. 7.9.2.1. See Higher


Pressure deviation in
nodes #1 and #6.

Less 7.10. Lower 7.10.1. See Flow


Pressure parameter in this
node.

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 43 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (7) Lean Amine Cooling System from 320C-101 / 320C-201 to BL
Intention: Lean amine cooling down and filtration before going to BL (U-105 SGP Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-160 DHT Unit). Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC). Conditions at BL: OP: 13,1
kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT: 115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-005_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-005_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Composition
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Change of 7.11. 7.11.1. Non additional
Change of causes.
Compositio
n

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (7) Lean Amine Cooling System from 320C-101 / 320C-201 to BL
Intention: Lean amine cooling down and filtration before going to BL (U-105 SGP Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-160 DHT Unit). Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC). Conditions at BL: OP: 13,1
kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT: 115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-005_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-005_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Contamination
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Part of 7.12. Part of 7.12.1. Tube leak in 7.12.1.1. See Part of
Contaminati 320E-101. Contamination
on deviation in node #1.

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (7) Lean Amine Cooling System from 320C-101 / 320C-201 to BL
Intention: Lean amine cooling down and filtration before going to BL (U-105 SGP Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-160 DHT Unit). Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC). Conditions at BL: OP: 13,1
kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT: 115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-005_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-005_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Services / Utilities
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Loss of 7.13. Loss 7.13.1. Loss of 7.13.1.1. Valve
of Services instrument air supply. 320UV-1061 fails
/ Utilities closed. This is the
safe position.

7.13.1.2. Valve
320TV-1047 fails
closed. This is the
safe position.

7.13.1.3. Valve
320FV-1081 fails
open. This is the safe
position.

7.13.1.4. Valve
320FV-0202 fails
open. This is the safe
position.

7.13.1.5. Valve
320FV-0001 fails
open. This is the safe
position.

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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (7) Lean Amine Cooling System from 320C-101 / 320C-201 to BL
Intention: Lean amine cooling down and filtration before going to BL (U-105 SGP Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-160 DHT Unit). Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC). Conditions at BL: OP: 13,1
kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT: 115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-005_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-005_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Services / Utilities
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
7.13.1.6. Valve
320FV-0022 fails
closed. This is the
safe position.

7.13.2. Loss of power 7.13.2.1. Failure of


supply. pumps 320P-101 A/B.
See No / Less Flow
deviation in this node.

7.13.2.2. Failure of
320AE-001 A-J. See
Higher Temperature
deviation in this node.

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (7) Lean Amine Cooling System from 320C-101 / 320C-201 to BL
Intention: Lean amine cooling down and filtration before going to BL (U-105 SGP Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-160 DHT Unit). Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC). Conditions at BL: OP: 13,1
kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT: 115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-005_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-005_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Start-up
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 7.14. 7.14.1. Non additional
General causes.
Start-up

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (7) Lean Amine Cooling System from 320C-101 / 320C-201 to BL
Intention: Lean amine cooling down and filtration before going to BL (U-105 SGP Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-160 DHT Unit). Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC). Conditions at BL: OP: 13,1
kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT: 115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-005_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-005_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Shutdown
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 7.15. 7.15.1. Non additional
General causes.
Shutdown

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Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (7) Lean Amine Cooling System from 320C-101 / 320C-201 to BL
Intention: Lean amine cooling down and filtration before going to BL (U-105 SGP Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-160 DHT Unit). Conditions in 320C-101 bottom: OP: 1,56 kg/cm2g (DP: 4,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 131 ºC (DT: 155 ºC). Conditions at BL: OP: 13,1
kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT: 115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-001_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-005_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-2_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-005_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Maintenance
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 7.16. 7.16.1. Non additional
General causes.
Maintenanc
e

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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (8) Lean Amine Filtration System 320PK-001, 320S-001 and 320S-002
Intention: Lean amine filtration before sending it to BL (U-160 DHT Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-105 SPG Unit). Conditions at outlet filtration system: OP: 10,3 kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT:115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 8.1. More 8.1.1. Failure of 8.1.1.1. Moderate
Flow control 320FC-0201 operational changes.
(valve 320FV-0201 Non hazardous
opening). consequences.

8.1.2. Failure of 8.1.2.1. Moderate


control 320FC-0202 operational changes.
(valve 320FV-0202 Non hazardous
opening). consequences.

No / Less 8.2. No / 8.2.1. Plugging of 8.2.1.1. Potential loss 1. 320PDAH-0181 No EPC-HZP-320-17. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process Next P&ID Confirm with
Less Flow 320PK-001. of quality of lean Provide a sample 320000-U-PID- issue VENDOR during
amine to BL (U-105 connection at outlet of 011_H1 320PK-001 Package
SGP, U-160 DHT and activated carbon filter HAZOP Study if
U-120 HCU Units). 320S-001. 320PK-001 has a
Moderate operational sample connection at
changes. Non inlet and outlet of
hazardous 320PK-001.
consequences.

8.2.1.2. Potential 1. 320PDAH-0181 No A B 2 Mod Personnel injuries is


mechanical damage not considered
to pumps 320P-002 because pumps
A/B due blocked 320P-002 A/B have
suction. double mechanical
seal with alarm and
not LOC is expected.

Review possible
spurious trip or failure
of 320PK-001 and
how to protect pumps
320P-002 A/B in that
case, during 320PK-
001 Package HAZOP
Study with VENDOR
presence.

8.2.2. Failure of 8.2.2.1. Potential loss 1. 320FAL-0202 No 320P-002 A/B


control 320FC-0201 of quality of lean damage due to
(valve 320FV-0201 amine to BL (U-105 cavitation is not
closing). SGP, U-160 DHT and considered because
U-120 HCU Units). in normal operation
Moderate operational 50% of flow is
changes. Non bypassing 320S-001.
hazardous
consequences.

8.2.3. Plugging of 8.2.3.1. Potential loss 1. 320PDAH-0201 No 320P-002 A/B


320S-001. of quality of lean damage due to
amine to BL (U-105 cavitation is not
SGP, U-160 DHT and considered because
U-120 HCU Units). in normal operation
Moderate... 50% of flow is...

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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (8) Lean Amine Filtration System 320PK-001, 320S-001 and 320S-002
Intention: Lean amine filtration before sending it to BL (U-160 DHT Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-105 SPG Unit). Conditions at outlet filtration system: OP: 10,3 kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT:115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...operational ...bypassing 320S-
changes. Non 001.
hazardous
consequences.

8.2.4. Plugging of 8.2.4.1. Potential loss 1. 320PDAH-0202 No


320S-002. of quality of lean
amine to BL (U-105
SGP, U-160 DHT and
U-120 HCU Units).
Moderate operational
changes. Non
hazardous
consequences.

8.2.4.2. Potential 1. 320PDAH-0202 No A B 2 Mod Personnel injuries is


mechanical damage not considered
to pumps 320P-002 because pumps
A/B due blocked 320P-002 A/B have
suction. double mechanical
seal with alarm and
not LOC is expected.

8.2.5. Failure of 8.2.5.1. Potential loss 1. 320FAL-0202 No


pumps 320P-002 of quality of lean
A/B. amine to BL (U-105
SGP, U-160 DHT and
U-120 HCU Units).
Moderate operational
changes. Non
hazardous
consequences.

8.2.6. Failure of 8.2.6.1. Potential 1. None detected. A C 2 Mod EPC-HZP-320-18. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process / Next P&ID Personnel injuries is
control 320FC-0202 mechanical damage Configure a FAL in 320000-U-PID- DEC issue not considered
(valve 320FV-0202 to pumps 320P-002 320FI-0181A (critical 010_H1 Instrumentation because pumps
closing). A/B due blocked alarm). 320P-002 A/B have
discharge. double mechanical
seal with alarm and
not LOC is expected.

Reverse 8.3. 8.3.1. Non credible


Reverse causes.
Flow

Misdirected 8.4. 8.4.1. Non additional


Misdirected causes.
Flow

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Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (8) Lean Amine Filtration System 320PK-001, 320S-001 and 320S-002
Intention: Lean amine filtration before sending it to BL (U-160 DHT Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-105 SPG Unit). Conditions at outlet filtration system: OP: 10,3 kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT:115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1
Parameter: Level
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 8.5. Higher 8.5.1. Non credible
Level causes.

Less 8.6. Lower 8.6.1. Non credible


Level causes.

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (8) Lean Amine Filtration System 320PK-001, 320S-001 and 320S-002
Intention: Lean amine filtration before sending it to BL (U-160 DHT Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-105 SPG Unit). Conditions at outlet filtration system: OP: 10,3 kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT:115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1
Parameter: Temperature
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 8.7. Higher 8.7.1. Non credible
Temperatur causes.
e

Less 8.8. Lower 8.8.1. Non credible


Temperatur causes.
e

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (8) Lean Amine Filtration System 320PK-001, 320S-001 and 320S-002
Intention: Lean amine filtration before sending it to BL (U-160 DHT Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-105 SPG Unit). Conditions at outlet filtration system: OP: 10,3 kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT:115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1
Parameter: Pressure
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 8.9. Higher 8.9.1. See Flow
Pressure parameter in this
node.

8.9.2. External fire. 8.9.2.1. Potential 1. 320PSV-0181 A A 2 Low


mechanical damage (designed for this
to 320PK-001 leading scenario)
to asset loss.
2. Firefighting system

8.9.2.2. Potential 1. 320PSV-0203 A A 2 Low


mechanical damage (designed for this
to 320S-001 leading scenario)
to asset loss.
2. Firefighting system

8.9.2.3. Potential 1. 320PSV-0202 A A 2 Low


mechanical damage (designed for this
to 320S-002 leading scenario)
to asset loss.
2. Firefighting system

Less 8.10. Lower 8.10.1. See Flow


Pressure parameter in this
node.

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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (8) Lean Amine Filtration System 320PK-001, 320S-001 and 320S-002
Intention: Lean amine filtration before sending it to BL (U-160 DHT Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-105 SPG Unit). Conditions at outlet filtration system: OP: 10,3 kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT:115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1
Parameter: Composition
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Change of 8.11. 8.11.1. Non additional
Change of causes.
Compositio
n

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (8) Lean Amine Filtration System 320PK-001, 320S-001 and 320S-002
Intention: Lean amine filtration before sending it to BL (U-160 DHT Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-105 SPG Unit). Conditions at outlet filtration system: OP: 10,3 kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT:115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1
Parameter: Contamination
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Part of 8.12. Part of 8.12.1. Non additional
Contaminati causes.
on

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (8) Lean Amine Filtration System 320PK-001, 320S-001 and 320S-002
Intention: Lean amine filtration before sending it to BL (U-160 DHT Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-105 SPG Unit). Conditions at outlet filtration system: OP: 10,3 kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT:115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1
Parameter: Services / Utilities
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Loss of 8.13. Loss 8.13.1. Loss of 8.13.1.1. Valve
of Services instrument air supply. 320FV-0201 fails
/ Utilities closed. This is the
safe position.

8.13.1.2. Valve
320FV-0202 fails
open. This is the safe
position.

8.13.2. Loss of power 8.13.2.1. Failure of


supply. pumps 320P-002 A/B.
See No / Less Flow
deviation in this node.

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (8) Lean Amine Filtration System 320PK-001, 320S-001 and 320S-002
Intention: Lean amine filtration before sending it to BL (U-160 DHT Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-105 SPG Unit). Conditions at outlet filtration system: OP: 10,3 kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT:115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1
Parameter: Start-up
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 8.14. 8.14.1. Non additional
General causes.
Start-up

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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (8) Lean Amine Filtration System 320PK-001, 320S-001 and 320S-002
Intention: Lean amine filtration before sending it to BL (U-160 DHT Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-105 SPG Unit). Conditions at outlet filtration system: OP: 10,3 kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT:115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1
Parameter: Shutdown
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 8.15. 8.15.1. Non additional
General causes.
Shutdown

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (8) Lean Amine Filtration System 320PK-001, 320S-001 and 320S-002
Intention: Lean amine filtration before sending it to BL (U-160 DHT Unit, U-120 HCU Unit and U-105 SPG Unit). Conditions at outlet filtration system: OP: 10,3 kg/cm2g (DP: 23,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 60 ºC (DT:115 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1
Parameter: Maintenance
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 8.16. 8.16.1. Non additional
General causes.
Maintenanc
e

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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (9) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Overhead System
Intention: Condense overhead vapours from 320C-101, collect them in 320V-101 and provide reflux to column 320C-101. Acid gas is sent to BL (U-340 SRU Unit) on pressure control. Conditions in 320C-101 overhead: OP: 1,28 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5
kg/cm2g); OT: 108 ºC (DT: 140 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 9.1. More 9.1.1. Failure of 9.1.1.1. See Flow
Flow control 320LC-0027 / parameter in node #1.
320FC-1041 (valve
320FV-1041 9.1.1.2. Potential 1. 320LAH-1062 No A B 2 Mod
opening). overfilling of 320C-101
leading to possible 2. 320PDAH-1066 / No
internal damage to 1067
320C-101.
Economical impact. 3. Process interlock
320I-1150 triggered
by 320LAHH-1062
causing the closure of
320PV-1102 A/B and
closure of 320FV-
1041

9.1.2. Failure of 9.1.2.1. Potential 1. Sampling :Refer To EPC-HZP- This scenario has
control 320FC-1163 amine dilution in long procedure (320SC- 320-3 been analysed in
(valve 320FV-1163 term leading to off- J4-0381) (at outlet of order to cover the
opening). spec lean amine and 320AE-001 A-J) following scenarios:
process upsets in U- 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2
105 SGP, U-160 DHT and 16.11.1.3 from
and U-120 HCU Unit. U-160 DHT Unit
See U-105 SGP, U- HAZOP.
160 DHT and U-120
HCU HAZOP Studies.

9.1.2.2. See Flow


parameter in node
#10.

9.1.3. Failure of 9.1.3.1. Moderate


control 320PC-1062 operational changes.
(valve 320PV-1062 Non hazardous
opening). consequences.

9.1.4. Failure of 9.1.4.1. Moderate 1. 320PAL-1062 No


control 320PC-1141 operational changes.
(valve 320PV-1141 Non hazardous 2. 320FAL-1141 No
opening). consequences.

9.1.5. Failure of 9.1.5.1. Potential level 1. 320LC-1141 / No P A 4 Mod EPC-HZP-320-19. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process / Next P&ID
control 320FC-1164 increase in 320V-101 320FC-1161 (reflux Configure a LAH in 320001-U-PID- DEC issue
(valve 320FV-1164 and low flow of reflux control) with LAH 320LI-1142 (critical 008_H1 Instrumentation
opening) (minimum to column 320C-101 alarm).
recirculation line). leading to 2. 320PC-1062 with No
overpressure and PAH :Refer To EPC-HZP-
mechanical damage. 320-11
LOC. Toxic release. 3. 320PC-1141 with No
PAH

4. 320TC-1061 with... No

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Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (9) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Overhead System
Intention: Condense overhead vapours from 320C-101, collect them in 320V-101 and provide reflux to column 320C-101. Acid gas is sent to BL (U-340 SRU Unit) on pressure control. Conditions in 320C-101 overhead: OP: 1,28 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5
kg/cm2g); OT: 108 ºC (DT: 140 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...TAH

5. 320PSV-1061 A/B
(designed for this
scenario)

9.1.6. Failure of 9.1.6.1. Potential loss 1. Interlock 320U- Yes A C 2 Mod Personnel injuries is
control 320LC-1141 / of level in 320V-101 1200 triggered by not considered
320FC-1161 (valve leading to possible 320LALL-1142 (1oo1) because pumps
320FV-1161 mechanical damage causing the trip of 320P-102 A/B have
opening). to pumps 320P-102 pumps 320P-102 A/B double mechanical
A/B due to cavitation. (1oo1) seal with alarm and
not LOC is expected.

9.1.6.2. Potential off- 1. 320TC-1061 with No A B 2 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP- This scenario has
spec lean amine due TAL 320-3 been analysed in
to low temperature in order to cover the
320C-101. 2. Sampling following scenarios:
Economical impact. procedure (320SC- 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2
J4-0381) (at outlet of and 16.11.1.3 from
320AE-001 A-J) U-160 DHT Unit
HAZOP.

9.1.7. Failure of 9.1.7.1. Potential loss 1. 320LC-1141 / No A C 2 Mod EPC-HZP-320-20. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process / Next P&ID Personnel injuries is
control 320FC-1162 of level in 320V-101 320FC-1161 (reflux Configure a high 320002-U-PID- DEC issue not considered
(valve 320FV-1162 leading to possible control) with LAL deviation from set- 009_H1 Instrumentation because pumps
opening). mechanical damage point alarm in 320FC- 320P-102 A/B have
to pumps 320P-102 2. Interlock 320U- Yes 1162 (not critical double mechanical
A/B due to cavitation. 1200 triggered by alarm). seal with alarm and
320LALL-1142 (1oo1) not LOC is expected.
causing the trip of
pumps 320P-102 A/B 320LAL-1141 does
(1oo1) not provide enough
time to operator to
take an action.

No / Less 9.2. No / 9.2.1. Less flow of 9.2.1.1. See Flow


Less Flow rich amine from parameter in node #1.
320V-001 (Failure of
control 320LC-0027 / 9.2.1.2. Potential loss 1. 320LAL-1062 No A C 2 Mod Personnel injuries is
320FC-1041 (valve of level in 320C-101 not considered
320FV-1041 closing) bottom leading to 2. Interlock 320U- Yes because pumps
or Failure of control mechanical damage 1100 triggered by 320P-101 A/B have
320FC-0023 (valve to pumps 320P-101 320LALL-1061 (1oo1) double mechanical
320FV-0023 opening) A/B due to cavitation. causing the trip of seal with alarm and
(minimum pumps 320P-101 A/B not LOC is expected.
recirculation line) or (1oo1)
Failure of valve 320LAL-1062 does
320UV-0021 A/B not provide enough
closed or Failure of time to operator to
pumps 320P-001 take an action.
A/B).

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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (9) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Overhead System
Intention: Condense overhead vapours from 320C-101, collect them in 320V-101 and provide reflux to column 320C-101. Acid gas is sent to BL (U-340 SRU Unit) on pressure control. Conditions in 320C-101 overhead: OP: 1,28 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5
kg/cm2g); OT: 108 ºC (DT: 140 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
9.2.2. Failure of 9.2.2.1. Potential 1. Sampling A B 2 Mod
control 320FC-1163 increase of ammonia procedure (320SC-
(valve 320FV-1163 and salt deposition J4-1142) (at bottom
closing). leading to air cooler of 320V-101)
320AE-101 A/B
fouling. Possible 2. Operating
plugging and process procedures
upsets. Economical
impact.

9.2.2.2. See Flow


parameter in node
#10.

9.2.3. Failure of 9.2.3.1. Potential 1. 320PC-1141 with No P A 4 Mod


control 320PC-1062 overpressure in 320C- PAH
(valve 320PV-1062 101 leading to
closing). mechanical damage. 2. 320PSV-1061 A/B
LOC. Toxic release. (designed for this
scenario)

9.2.4. Failure of 9.2.4.1. Valve 320PV-


control 320PC-1141 1141 is closed in
(valve 320PV-1141 normal operation.
closing).

9.2.5. Failure of 9.2.5.1. Potential 1. 320LAH-1141 No P A 4 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP- 320LAH-1141 allows
pumps 320P-102 overfilling of 320V-101 320-19 the operator to take
A/B. leading to flooding of 2. 320PSV-1061 A/B an action (20
the 320C-101 (designed for this minutes).
overhead system. scenario)
Potential overpressure
in 320C-101 due to
blocked outlet
conditions leading to
mechanical damage.
LOC. Toxic release.

9.2.5.2. Potential loss 1. 320LAH-1141 No P A 4 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP-


of reflux to column 320-11 and EPC-
320C-101 leading to 2. 320PC-1062 with No HZP-320-19
overpressure and PAH
mechanical damage.
LOC. Toxic release. 3. 320PC-1141 with No
PAH

4. 320TC-1061 with No
TAH

5. 320PSV-1061 A/B
(designed for this
scenario)

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Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (9) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Overhead System
Intention: Condense overhead vapours from 320C-101, collect them in 320V-101 and provide reflux to column 320C-101. Acid gas is sent to BL (U-340 SRU Unit) on pressure control. Conditions in 320C-101 overhead: OP: 1,28 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5
kg/cm2g); OT: 108 ºC (DT: 140 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
9.2.5.3. Possible liquid
carry over to U-340
SRU Unit. See U-340
SRU Unit HAZOP
Study.

9.2.6. Failure of 9.2.6.1. Valve 320FV-


control 320FC-1164 1164 is closed in
(valve 320FV-1164 normal operation.
closing) (minimum
recirculation line).

9.2.7. Failure of 9.2.7.1. Possible 1. Minimum A B 2 Mod Personnel injuries is


control 320LC-1141 / mechanical damage recirculation line not considered
320FC-1161 (valve to pumps 320P-102 (320FC-1164) because pumps
320FV-1161 closing). A/B due to blocked 320P-102 A/B have
discharge. double mechanical
seal with alarm and
not LOC is expected.

9.2.7.2. Potential 1. 320PSV-1061 A/B P A 4 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP-


overfilling of 320V-101 (designed for this 320-19
leading to flooding of scenario)
the 320C-101
overhead system.
Potential overpressure
in 320C-101 due to
blocked outlet
conditions leading to
mechanical damage.
LOC. Toxic release.

9.2.7.3. Potential loss 1. 320PC-1062 with No P A 4 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP-


of reflux to column PAH 320-11 and EPC-
320C-101 leading to HZP-320-19
overpressure and 2. 320PC-1141 with No
mechanical damage. PAH
LOC. Toxic release.
3. 320TC-1061 with No
TAH

4. 320PSV-1061 A/B
(designed for this
scenario)

9.2.8. Failure of 9.2.8.1. Potential 1. 320LC-1141 / No P A 4 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP-


control 320FC-1162 overfilling of 320V-101 320FC-1161 (reflux 320-11 and EPC-
(valve 320FV-1162 leading to flooding of control) with LAH HZP-320-19
closing). the 320C-101
overhead system. 2. 320PSV-1061 A/B
Potential overpressure (designed for this
in 320C-101 due to... scenario)

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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (9) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Overhead System
Intention: Condense overhead vapours from 320C-101, collect them in 320V-101 and provide reflux to column 320C-101. Acid gas is sent to BL (U-340 SRU Unit) on pressure control. Conditions in 320C-101 overhead: OP: 1,28 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5
kg/cm2g); OT: 108 ºC (DT: 140 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...blocked outlet
conditions leading to
mechanical damage.
LOC. Toxic release.

9.2.9. Blocked outlet 9.2.9.1. Potential 1. 320PC-1141 with No P A 4 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP-
conditions at U-340 overpressure in 320C- PAH 320-11
SRU Unit. 101 due to blocked
outlet conditions 2. 320PSV-1061 A/B
leading to mechanical (designed for this
damage. LOC. Toxic scenario)
release.

Reverse 9.3. 9.3.1. Non credible


Reverse causes.
Flow

Misdirected 9.4. 9.4.1. Non additional


Misdirected causes.
Flow

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (9) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Overhead System
Intention: Condense overhead vapours from 320C-101, collect them in 320V-101 and provide reflux to column 320C-101. Acid gas is sent to BL (U-340 SRU Unit) on pressure control. Conditions in 320C-101 overhead: OP: 1,28 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5
kg/cm2g); OT: 108 ºC (DT: 140 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Level
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 9.5. Higher 9.5.1. See Flow
Level parameter in this
node.

Less 9.6. Lower 9.6.1. See Flow


Level parameter in this
node.

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (9) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Overhead System
Intention: Condense overhead vapours from 320C-101, collect them in 320V-101 and provide reflux to column 320C-101. Acid gas is sent to BL (U-340 SRU Unit) on pressure control. Conditions in 320C-101 overhead: OP: 1,28 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5
kg/cm2g); OT: 108 ºC (DT: 140 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Temperature
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 9.7. Higher 9.7.1. See Flow
Temperatur parameter in this
e node.

9.7.2. Failure of 9.7.2.1. Moderate


control 320TC-1047 operational changes.
(valve 320TV-1047... Non hazardous...

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Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (9) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Overhead System
Intention: Condense overhead vapours from 320C-101, collect them in 320V-101 and provide reflux to column 320C-101. Acid gas is sent to BL (U-340 SRU Unit) on pressure control. Conditions in 320C-101 overhead: OP: 1,28 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5
kg/cm2g); OT: 108 ºC (DT: 140 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Temperature
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...closing). ...consequences.

9.7.2.2. See
Temperature
parameter in node #7.

9.7.3. Failure of 9.7.3.1. See Flow


control 320TC-1061 parameter in node #6.
(reboiler 320E-102
A/B control).

9.7.4. Failure of 9.7.4.1. Potential 1. 320PC-1141 with No P A 4 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP-


320AE-101 A/B. overpressure 320C- PAH 320-11 and EPC-
101 due to high HZP-320-21
temperature leading to 2. 320TC-1141 with No
mechanical damage. TAH
LOC. Toxic release.
3. 320PSV-1061 A/B
(designed for this
scenario)

9.7.5. Failure of 9.7.5.1. Potential 1. 320PC-1141 with No P A 4 Mod EPC-HZP-320-21. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process / Next P&ID
control 320TC-1141 overpressure 320C- PAH Configure a TAH in 320002-U-PID- DEC issue
(variable speed 101 due to high 320TI-1142 (critical 008_H1 Instrumentation
320AE-101 A/B fans temperature leading to 2. 320PSV-1061 A/B alarm).
control). mechanical damage. (designed for this
LOC. Toxic release. scenario) :Refer To EPC-HZP-
320-11

Less 9.8. Lower 9.8.1. See Flow


Temperatur parameter in this
e node.

9.8.2. Failure of 9.8.2.1. Potential off- 1. 320TC-1061 with No A B 2 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP- This scenario has
control 320TC-1047 spec lean amine due TAL 320-3 been analysed in
(valve 320TV-1047 to low temperature in order to cover the
opening). 320C-101. 2. Sampling following scenarios:
Economical impact. procedure (320SC- 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2
J4-0381) (at outlet of and 16.11.1.3 from
320AE-001 A-J) U-160 DHT Unit
HAZOP.

9.8.2.2. See
Temperature
parameter in node #7.

9.8.3. Failure of 9.8.3.1. See Flow


control 320TC-1061 parameter in node #6.
(reboiler 320E-102
A/B control).

9.8.4. Failure of... 9.8.4.1. Moderate...

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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (9) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Overhead System
Intention: Condense overhead vapours from 320C-101, collect them in 320V-101 and provide reflux to column 320C-101. Acid gas is sent to BL (U-340 SRU Unit) on pressure control. Conditions in 320C-101 overhead: OP: 1,28 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5
kg/cm2g); OT: 108 ºC (DT: 140 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Temperature
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...control 320TC-1141 ...operational
(variable speed changes. Non
320AE-101 A/B fans hazardous
control). consequences.

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (9) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Overhead System
Intention: Condense overhead vapours from 320C-101, collect them in 320V-101 and provide reflux to column 320C-101. Acid gas is sent to BL (U-340 SRU Unit) on pressure control. Conditions in 320C-101 overhead: OP: 1,28 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5
kg/cm2g); OT: 108 ºC (DT: 140 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Pressure
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 9.9. Higher 9.9.1. See Flow
Pressure parameter in this
node.

9.9.2. External fire. 9.9.2.1. Non expected


consequences for
320V-101 because
the elevation is higher
than 7.6 m.

9.9.2.2. See Higher


Pressure deviation in
node #6.

Less 9.10. Lower 9.10.1. See Flow


Pressure parameter in this
node.

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (9) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Overhead System
Intention: Condense overhead vapours from 320C-101, collect them in 320V-101 and provide reflux to column 320C-101. Acid gas is sent to BL (U-340 SRU Unit) on pressure control. Conditions in 320C-101 overhead: OP: 1,28 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5
kg/cm2g); OT: 108 ºC (DT: 140 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Composition
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Change of 9.11. 9.11.1. More flow of 9.11.1.1. Potential 1. Operating A A 2 Low This scenario is
Change of antifoam injection increase of foaming procedures unlikely because it is
Compositio from 320PK-001. leading to process an intermittent
n upsets. Economical system.
impact.

9.11.2. Less flow of 9.11.2.1. Potential 1. Operating A A 2 Low This scenario is


antifoam injection increase of foaming procedures unlikely because it is
from 320PK-001. leading to process an intermittent
upsets. Economical system.
impact.

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HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 58 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (9) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Overhead System
Intention: Condense overhead vapours from 320C-101, collect them in 320V-101 and provide reflux to column 320C-101. Acid gas is sent to BL (U-340 SRU Unit) on pressure control. Conditions in 320C-101 overhead: OP: 1,28 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5
kg/cm2g); OT: 108 ºC (DT: 140 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Contamination
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Part of 9.12. Part of 9.12.1. Non additional
Contaminati causes.
on

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (9) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Overhead System
Intention: Condense overhead vapours from 320C-101, collect them in 320V-101 and provide reflux to column 320C-101. Acid gas is sent to BL (U-340 SRU Unit) on pressure control. Conditions in 320C-101 overhead: OP: 1,28 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5
kg/cm2g); OT: 108 ºC (DT: 140 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Services / Utilities
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Loss of 9.13. Loss 9.13.1. Loss of 9.13.1.1. Valve
of Services instrument air supply. 320FV-1041 fails
/ Utilities closed. This is the
safe position.

9.13.1.2. Valve
320PV-1141 fails
open. This is the safe
position.

9.13.1.3. Valve
320PV-1062 fails
closed. This is the
safe position.

9.13.1.4. Valve
320FV-1161 fails
open. This is the safe
position.

9.13.1.5. Valve
320FV-1162 fails
closed. This is the
safe position.

9.13.1.6. Valve
320FV-1163 fails
closed. This is the
safe position.

9.13.1.7. Valve
320FV-1164 fails
open. This is the safe
position.

9.13.1.8. Valve
320TV-1047 fails
closed. This is the
safe position.

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HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (9) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Overhead System
Intention: Condense overhead vapours from 320C-101, collect them in 320V-101 and provide reflux to column 320C-101. Acid gas is sent to BL (U-340 SRU Unit) on pressure control. Conditions in 320C-101 overhead: OP: 1,28 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5
kg/cm2g); OT: 108 ºC (DT: 140 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Services / Utilities
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
9.13.2. Loss of power 9.13.2.1. Failure of
supply. pumps 320P-102 A/B.
See No / Less Flow
deviation in this node.

9.13.2.2. Failure of
320AE-101 A/B. See
Higher Temperature
deviation in this node.

9.13.3. Loss of steam 9.13.3.1. Increase of 1. Slope on top acid P A 4 Mod EPC-HZP-320-22. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process Issue for
tracing supply. condensation on the gas lines, draining Study the best 320001-U-PID- design
top acid gas lines liquid and avoiding A A 3 Low technical solution to 004_H1; DRP001- P&IDs
leading to corrosion accumulation minimize the PUC-320001-U-
problems. Plugging in probability of failure of PID-008_H1;
line and air cooler 2. Acid gas top lines steam tracing system DRP001-PUC-
320-AE-101 A/B with no liquid pockets for top acid gas lines. 320000-U-PID-
bundles. LOC. Toxic to avoid accumulation 300_H1
release.
3. Corrosion EPC-HZP-320-23. RP001-PUC- DEC Process Next P&ID
monitoring electric Implement a TG at BL 320000-U-PID- issue
resistant probe and in acid gas line 20"- 300_H1
coupon 320SOG-0007-
A4AR4-HC-ST.
4. Operating manuals
for air cooler 320AE-
101 A/B washing
operation

5. Maintenance
procedures

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (9) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Overhead System
Intention: Condense overhead vapours from 320C-101, collect them in 320V-101 and provide reflux to column 320C-101. Acid gas is sent to BL (U-340 SRU Unit) on pressure control. Conditions in 320C-101 overhead: OP: 1,28 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5
kg/cm2g); OT: 108 ºC (DT: 140 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Start-up
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 9.14. 9.14.1. Non additional
General causes.
Start-up

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HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (9) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Overhead System
Intention: Condense overhead vapours from 320C-101, collect them in 320V-101 and provide reflux to column 320C-101. Acid gas is sent to BL (U-340 SRU Unit) on pressure control. Conditions in 320C-101 overhead: OP: 1,28 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5
kg/cm2g); OT: 108 ºC (DT: 140 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Shutdown
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 9.15. 9.15.1. Non additional
General causes.
Shutdown

Session: (1) 11/02/2019


Node: (9) Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Overhead System
Intention: Condense overhead vapours from 320C-101, collect them in 320V-101 and provide reflux to column 320C-101. Acid gas is sent to BL (U-340 SRU Unit) on pressure control. Conditions in 320C-101 overhead: OP: 1,28 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5
kg/cm2g); OT: 108 ºC (DT: 140 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1;
DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1
Parameter: Maintenance
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 9.16. 9.16.1. Non additional
General causes.
Maintenanc
e

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Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 61 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (10) Condensate Drum 320V-004 System
Intention: Collect condensate from U-320 ARU Unit and U-135 CAR Unit and send it to condensate system on level control and to 320AE-101 A/B / 320AE-201 A/B. Conditions in 320V-004: OP: 0 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 100 ºC (DT: 150 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-018_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 10.1. More 10.1.1. Failure of 10.1.1.1. Potential 1. 320LC-0341 with No P B 2 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP-
Flow control 320FFC-1102 overfilling of 320V-004 LAH 320-25
(feed / steam ratio) / leading to carry over
320FC-1103A/B / to atmosphere at safe EPC-HZP-320-24. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process Next P&ID
320LC-1122 A/B location. Possible Ensure drip pan is 320000-U-PID- issue
(valve 320FV-1103 personnel injuries due provided to collect 018_H1
A/B opening). to thermal burn. condensate from
320AE-002 vent to be
directed to ground
level.

10.1.1.2. See Flow


parameter in node #6.

10.1.2. More flow 10.1.2.1. Potential 1. 320LC-0341 with No P B 2 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP-
from U-135 CAR overfilling of 320V-004 LAH 320-24 and EPC-
Unit. leading to carry over HZP-320-25
to atmosphere at safe
location. Possible
personnel injuries due
to thermal burn.

10.1.3. Failure of 10.1.3.1. Loss of level 1. Interlock 32U-0140 Yes P C 2 Mod


control 320LC-0341 in 320V-004 leading to triggered by
(valve 320LV-0341 mechanical damage 320LALL-0342 (1oo1) A C 2 Mod
opening). to pumps 320P-008 causing the trip of
A/B due to cavitation. pumps 320P-008 A/B
Economical impact (1oo1)
and possible
personnel injuries due
to thermal burn.

10.1.4. Failure of 10.1.4.1. Moderate


control 320FC-0341 operational changes.
(valve 320FV-0341 Non hazardous
opening) (minimum consequences.
recirculation line).

10.1.5. Failure of 10.1.5.1. See Flow


control 320FC-1163 parameter in node #9.
(valve 320FV-1163
opening). 10.1.5.2. Moderate
operational changes.
Non hazardous
consequences in this
node.

No / Less 10.2. No / 10.2.1. Failure of 10.2.1.1. See Flow


Less Flow control 320FFC-1102 parameter in node #6.
(feed / steam ratio) /
320FC-1103A/B / 10.2.1.2. Loss of level 1. 320LC-0341 with No P C 2 Mod
320LC-1122 A/B in 320V-004 leading to LAL
(valve 320FV-1103 mechanical damage A C 2 Mod
A/B closing). to pumps 320P-008... 2. Interlock 320U-... Yes

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HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (10) Condensate Drum 320V-004 System
Intention: Collect condensate from U-320 ARU Unit and U-135 CAR Unit and send it to condensate system on level control and to 320AE-101 A/B / 320AE-201 A/B. Conditions in 320V-004: OP: 0 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 100 ºC (DT: 150 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-018_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...A/B due to ...0140 triggered by
cavitation. Economical 320LALL-0342 (1oo1)
impact and possible causing the trip of
personnel injuries due pumps 320P-008 A/B
to thermal burn. (1oo1)

10.2.2. Less flow 10.2.2.1. Moderate


from U-135 CAR operational changes.
Unit. Non hazardous
consequences.

10.2.3. Failure of 10.2.3.1. Potential 1. 320LAH-0341 No P B 2 Mod :Refer To EPC-HZP-


pumps 320P-008 overfilling of 320V-004 320-24 and EPC-
A/B. leading to carry over HZP-320-25
to atmosphere at safe
location. Possible
personnel injuries due
to thermal burn.

10.2.4. Failure of 10.2.4.1. Potential 1. None detected. P C 2 Mod EPC-HZP-320-25. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process / Next P&ID
control 320LC-0341 overfilling of 320V-004 Configure a LAH in 320000-U-PID- DEC issue
(valve 320LV-0341 leading to carry over 320LI-0342 (not 018_H1 Instrumentation
closing). to atmosphere at safe critical alarm).
location. Possible
personnel injuries due :Refer To EPC-HZP-
to thermal burn. 320-24

10.2.4.2. Potential 1. Minimum P B 2 Mod


mechanical damage recirculation line
to pumps 320P-008 (320FC-0341) A B 2 Mod
A/B due to blocked
discharge.
Economical impact
and possible
personnel injuries due
to thermal burn.

10.2.5. Failure of 10.2.5.1. Valve


control 320FC-0341 320FV-0341 is closed
(valve 320FV-0341 in normal operation.
closing) (minimum
recirculation line).

10.2.6. Failure of 10.2.6.1. See Flow


control 320FC-1163 parameter in node #9.
(valve 320FV-1163
closing). 10.2.6.2. Moderate
operational changes.
Non hazardous
consequences in this
node.

Reverse 10.3. 10.3.1. Non credible


Reverse... causes.

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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (10) Condensate Drum 320V-004 System
Intention: Collect condensate from U-320 ARU Unit and U-135 CAR Unit and send it to condensate system on level control and to 320AE-101 A/B / 320AE-201 A/B. Conditions in 320V-004: OP: 0 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 100 ºC (DT: 150 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-018_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
...Flow

Misdirected 10.4. 10.4.1. Non additional


Misdirected causes.
Flow

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (10) Condensate Drum 320V-004 System
Intention: Collect condensate from U-320 ARU Unit and U-135 CAR Unit and send it to condensate system on level control and to 320AE-101 A/B / 320AE-201 A/B. Conditions in 320V-004: OP: 0 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 100 ºC (DT: 150 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-018_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
Parameter: Level
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 10.5. Higher 10.5.1. See Flow
Level parameter in this
node.

Less 10.6. Lower 10.6.1. See Flow


Level parameter in this
node.

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (10) Condensate Drum 320V-004 System
Intention: Collect condensate from U-320 ARU Unit and U-135 CAR Unit and send it to condensate system on level control and to 320AE-101 A/B / 320AE-201 A/B. Conditions in 320V-004: OP: 0 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 100 ºC (DT: 150 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-018_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
Parameter: Temperature
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 10.7. Higher 10.7.1. Failure of 10.7.1.1. Loss of EPC-HZP-320-26. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process Next P&ID
Temperatur 320AE-002. steam to atmosphere Ensure design of vent 320000-U-PID- issue
e at safe location. Non line of 320V-004 (4"- 018_H1
hazardous 320VNT-0007-A2AS-
consequences. PP-NT) is designed to
avoid any
overpressure situation
in case of failure of
320AE-002.

Less 10.8. Lower 10.8.1. Non credible


Temperatur causes.
e

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (10) Condensate Drum 320V-004 System
Intention: Collect condensate from U-320 ARU Unit and U-135 CAR Unit and send it to condensate system on level control and to 320AE-101 A/B / 320AE-201 A/B. Conditions in 320V-004: OP: 0 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 100 ºC (DT: 150 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-018_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
Parameter: Pressure
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 10.9. Higher 10.9.1. See Flow
Pressure parameter in this
node.

Less 10.10. 10.10.1. See Flow


Lower parameter in this
Pressure node.

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Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (10) Condensate Drum 320V-004 System
Intention: Collect condensate from U-320 ARU Unit and U-135 CAR Unit and send it to condensate system on level control and to 320AE-101 A/B / 320AE-201 A/B. Conditions in 320V-004: OP: 0 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 100 ºC (DT: 150 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-018_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
Parameter: Composition
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Change of 10.11. 10.11.1. Non
Change of additional causes.
Compositio
n

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (10) Condensate Drum 320V-004 System
Intention: Collect condensate from U-320 ARU Unit and U-135 CAR Unit and send it to condensate system on level control and to 320AE-101 A/B / 320AE-201 A/B. Conditions in 320V-004: OP: 0 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 100 ºC (DT: 150 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-018_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
Parameter: Contamination
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Part of 10.12. Part 10.12.1. Non
of additional causes.
Contaminati
on

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (10) Condensate Drum 320V-004 System
Intention: Collect condensate from U-320 ARU Unit and U-135 CAR Unit and send it to condensate system on level control and to 320AE-101 A/B / 320AE-201 A/B. Conditions in 320V-004: OP: 0 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 100 ºC (DT: 150 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-018_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
Parameter: Services / Utilities
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Loss of 10.13. Loss 10.13.1. Loss of 10.13.1.1. Valve
of Services instrument air supply. 320LV-0341 fails
/ Utilities closed. This is the
safe position.

10.13.1.2. Valve
320FV-0341 fails
open. This is the safe
position.

10.13.1.3. Valve
320FV-1163 fails
closed. This is the
safe position.

10.13.1.4. Valves
320FV-1103 A/B fail
closed. This is the
safe position.

10.13.2. Loss of 10.13.2.1. Failure of


power supply. pumps 320P-008 A/B.
See No / Less Flow
deviation in this node.

10.13.2.2. Failure of
320AE-002. See
Higher Temperature
deviation in this node.

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 65 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (10) Condensate Drum 320V-004 System
Intention: Collect condensate from U-320 ARU Unit and U-135 CAR Unit and send it to condensate system on level control and to 320AE-101 A/B / 320AE-201 A/B. Conditions in 320V-004: OP: 0 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 100 ºC (DT: 150 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-018_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
Parameter: Start-up
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 10.14. 10.14.1. Non
General additional causes.
Start-up

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (10) Condensate Drum 320V-004 System
Intention: Collect condensate from U-320 ARU Unit and U-135 CAR Unit and send it to condensate system on level control and to 320AE-101 A/B / 320AE-201 A/B. Conditions in 320V-004: OP: 0 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 100 ºC (DT: 150 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-018_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
Parameter: Shutdown
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 10.15. 10.15.1. Non
General additional causes.
Shutdown

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (10) Condensate Drum 320V-004 System
Intention: Collect condensate from U-320 ARU Unit and U-135 CAR Unit and send it to condensate system on level control and to 320AE-101 A/B / 320AE-201 A/B. Conditions in 320V-004: OP: 0 kg/cm2g (DP: 3,5 kg/cm2g); OT: 100 ºC (DT: 150 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-018_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-007_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
Parameter: Maintenance
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 10.16. 10.16.1. Non
General additional causes.
Maintenanc
e

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 66 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (11) Fresh Amine Storage Tank 320TK-003
Intention: Store fresh amine and provide facilities to transfer it to 320TK-001 and 135TK-001 (U-135 CAR Unit). Conditions in 320TK-003: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-017_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 11.1. More 11.1.1. See Level
Flow parameter in this
node.

No / Less 11.2. No / 11.2.1. See Level


Less Flow parameter in this
node.

11.2.2. Failure of 11.2.2.1. Delay in


pump 320P-007. loading / transfer
operations. Moderate
operational changes.
Non hazardous
consequences.

Reverse 11.3. 11.3.1. Non credible


Reverse causes.
Flow

Misdirected 11.4. 11.4.1. Non additional


Misdirected causes.
Flow

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (11) Fresh Amine Storage Tank 320TK-003
Intention: Store fresh amine and provide facilities to transfer it to 320TK-001 and 135TK-001 (U-135 CAR Unit). Conditions in 320TK-003: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-017_H1
Parameter: Level
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 11.5. Higher 11.5.1. Human error 11.5.1.1. Potential 1. 320LAH-0322A No A A 2 Low The likelihood of this
Level during tank 320TK- overfilling of 320TK- scenario is very low
003 loading 003 leading to 2. Operating because it is an
operation. mechanical damage procedures intermittent and
due to overpressure supervised operation.
and, finally, spillage in 3. Interlock 320U- Yes
the tank area. 0130 triggered by 320LAH-0322A
Economical impact. 320LAHH-0321 provides enough time
(1oo1) causing the to operator to take an
trip of pump 320P- action.
007 (1oo1)

Less 11.6. Lower 11.6.1. Human error 11.6.1.1. Potential 1. 320LAL-0322A No A A 2 Low Personnel injuries is
Level during tank 320TK- loss of level in 320TK- not considered
003 transfer 003 leading to 2. Operating because pump 320P-
operation. mechanical damage procedures 007 has double
to pump 320P-007 mechanical seal with
due to cavitation. 3. Interlock 320U- Yes alarm and not LOC is
0130 triggered by expected.
320LALL-0321 (1oo1)
causing the trip of The likelihood of this
pump 320P-007 scenario is very low
(1oo1) because it is an
intermittent and
supervised operation.

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 67 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (11) Fresh Amine Storage Tank 320TK-003
Intention: Store fresh amine and provide facilities to transfer it to 320TK-001 and 135TK-001 (U-135 CAR Unit). Conditions in 320TK-003: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-017_H1
Parameter: Level
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
320LAL-0322A
provides enough time
to operator to take an
action.

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (11) Fresh Amine Storage Tank 320TK-003
Intention: Store fresh amine and provide facilities to transfer it to 320TK-001 and 135TK-001 (U-135 CAR Unit). Conditions in 320TK-003: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-017_H1
Parameter: Temperature
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 11.7. Higher 11.7.1. Non credible
Temperatur causes.
e

Less 11.8. Lower 11.8.1. Non credible


Temperatur causes.
e

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (11) Fresh Amine Storage Tank 320TK-003
Intention: Store fresh amine and provide facilities to transfer it to 320TK-001 and 135TK-001 (U-135 CAR Unit). Conditions in 320TK-003: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-017_H1
Parameter: Pressure
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 11.9. Higher 11.9.1. Failure of 11.9.1.1. Potential 1. 320PSV-0321 A A 2 Low EPC-HZP-320-27. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process / Next P&ID
Pressure control 320PC-0321 mechanical damage (designed for this Implement a new PI 320000-U-PID- DEC issue
(valve 320PV-0321A to 320TK-003 due to scenario) with PAH and PAL in 017_H1 Instrumentation
opening / 320PV- overpressure. 320TK-003 (not
0321B closing). Economical impact. critical alarms).

Less 11.10. 11.10.1. Failure of 11.10.1.1. Potential 1. 320PSV-0321 A A 2 Low :Refer To EPC-HZP-
Lower control 320PC-0321 vacuum formation in (Vacuum breaker) 320-27
Pressure (valve 320PV-0321B 320TK-003 leading to
opening / 320PV- mechanical damage
0321A closing). (collapse).
Economical impact.

11.10.2. Loss of 11.10.2.1. Potential 1. 320PAL-0321 No A A 2 Low :Refer To EPC-HZP-


nitrogen supply. vacuum formation in 320-27
320TK-003 leading to 2. 320PSV-0321
mechanical damage (Vacuum breaker)
(collapse).
Economical impact.

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 68 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (11) Fresh Amine Storage Tank 320TK-003
Intention: Store fresh amine and provide facilities to transfer it to 320TK-001 and 135TK-001 (U-135 CAR Unit). Conditions in 320TK-003: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-017_H1
Parameter: Composition
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Change of 11.11. 11.11.1. Non
Change of additional causes.
Compositio
n

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (11) Fresh Amine Storage Tank 320TK-003
Intention: Store fresh amine and provide facilities to transfer it to 320TK-001 and 135TK-001 (U-135 CAR Unit). Conditions in 320TK-003: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-017_H1
Parameter: Contamination
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Part of 11.12. Part 11.12.1. Non
of additional causes.
Contaminati
on

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (11) Fresh Amine Storage Tank 320TK-003
Intention: Store fresh amine and provide facilities to transfer it to 320TK-001 and 135TK-001 (U-135 CAR Unit). Conditions in 320TK-003: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-017_H1
Parameter: Services / Utilities
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Loss of 11.13. Loss 11.13.1. Loss of 11.13.1.1. Valve
of Services instrument air supply. 320PV-0341B fails
/ Utilities closed. This is the
safe position.

11.13.1.2. Valve
320PV-0341A fails
open. This is the safe
position.

11.13.2. Loss of 11.13.2.1. Failure of


power supply. pump 320P-007. See
No / Less Flow
deviation in this node.

11.13.3. Loss of 11.13.3.1. See Lower


nitrogen supply. Pressure deviation in
this node.

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (11) Fresh Amine Storage Tank 320TK-003
Intention: Store fresh amine and provide facilities to transfer it to 320TK-001 and 135TK-001 (U-135 CAR Unit). Conditions in 320TK-003: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-017_H1
Parameter: Start-up
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 11.14. 11.14.1. Non
General additional causes.
Start-up

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 69 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (11) Fresh Amine Storage Tank 320TK-003
Intention: Store fresh amine and provide facilities to transfer it to 320TK-001 and 135TK-001 (U-135 CAR Unit). Conditions in 320TK-003: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-017_H1
Parameter: Shutdown
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 11.15. 11.15.1. Non
General additional causes.
Shutdown

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (11) Fresh Amine Storage Tank 320TK-003
Intention: Store fresh amine and provide facilities to transfer it to 320TK-001 and 135TK-001 (U-135 CAR Unit). Conditions in 320TK-003: OP: 0,006 kg/cm2g (DP: 0,02 kg/cm2g); OT: 25 ºC (DT: 95 ºC).
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-017_H1
Parameter: Maintenance
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 11.16. 11.16.1. Non
General additional causes.
Maintenanc
e

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 70 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (2) 12/02/2019


Node: (12) Anti-foam Injection Package 320PK-101 / 320PK-201 Intention: Anti-foam injection.
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-015_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-015_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 12.1. More 12.1.1. See Change
Flow of Composition
deviation in node #9.

No / Less 12.2. No / 12.2.1. See Change


Less Flow of Composition
deviation in node #9.

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 71 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (4) 14/02/2019


Node: (24) Sour Flare Header System Intention: Distribution of sour gas to flare header.
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-211_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
No / Less 24.1. No / 24.1.1. Lack of 24.1.1.1. Loss of 1. None detected. A B 1 Low EPC-HZP-320-28. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process Next P&ID
Less Flow purging fuel gas. purging gas and Consider installing a 320000-U-PID- issue.
impossibility to detect PCV in nitrogen line 211-Rev H1
this scenario. (back-up purging gas)
to automatically
maintain the purging
gas flow to the system
in case of loss of
purging fuel gas.
Review the line
arrangement
accordingly.

Session: (4) 14/02/2019


Node: (24) Sour Flare Header System Intention: Distribution of sour gas to flare header.
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-211_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
Parameter: Level
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
More 24.2. Higher 24.2.1. Liquid 24.2.1.1. Liquid 1. 320LC-8030 with No P B 4 High EPC-HZP-320-29. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process Next P&ID
Level carryover during fire accumulation in unit LAH Provide an additional 320000-U-PID- issue.
scenario. 320 flare header LT with LAH 301-Rev H1
leading to possible (independent from
blockage in flare 320LIT-8030) to allow
system. Unavailability operator to manually
of the flare system in drain the sour gas
case of emergency flare header leg in
(relief scenario). case of liquid
accumulation. Due to
volume of sour gas
flare header leg,
operator will have
enough time to
manually drain the
system.

24.2.2. Failure of 24.2.2.1. Liquid 1. None detected. P B 4 High :Refer To EPC-HZP-


control 320LC-8030 accumulation in unit 320-29
(valve 320LV-8030 320 flare header
not opening when it is leading to possible
required). blockage in flare
system. Unavailability
of the flare system in
case of emergency
(relief scenario).

Less 24.3. Lower 24.3.1. Failure of 24.3.1.1. Loss of sour


Level control 320LC-8030 gas flare to sour water
(valve 320LV-8030 drain system (open to
opening when it is not flare). Non hazardous
required). consequences.

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


HAZOP WORKSHEETS: U320 - ARU
Company: TR - Duqm Refinery and Petrochemical Industries Company L.L.C. Page: 72 of 72
Facility: Duqm Refinery

Session: (4) 14/02/2019


Node: (24) Sour Flare Header System Intention: Distribution of sour gas to flare header.
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-211_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
Parameter: Services / Utilities
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
Loss of 24.4. Loss 24.4.1. Loss of 24.4.1.1. Valve EPC-HZP-320-30. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process Next P&ID
of Services instrument air supply. 320LV-8030 fails Change the failing 320000-U-PID- issue.
/ Utilities closed. This is not the position of valve 301-Rev H1
safe position. 320LV-8030 to FO
and add position
indication at control
room (open / closed)
with alarm in case of
opening position.

Session: (4) 14/02/2019


Node: (24) Sour Flare Header System Intention: Distribution of sour gas to flare header.
Drawings: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-211_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301_H1
Parameter: Start-up
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS Critical Alarm SIL Assessment Required CAT LKH SEV RISK RECOMMENDATIONS P&ID No. RESPONSIBLE CLOSE DATE REMARKS
General 24.5. 24.5.1. Impossibility 24.5.1.1. Lack of EPC-HZP-320-31. DRP001-PUC- DEC Process Next P&ID
General to steam out the steam out. Provide steam out 320000-U-PID- issue.
Start-up system before start- connection for sour 211-Rev H1
up or during gas flare header at the
commissioning / top of the line.
maintenance
activities.

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc. ALTRAN INNOVACIÓN, S.L.


Attachment 03. Marked-up DPTs

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 34 of 83


Attachment 04. HAZOP Master P&IDs

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 35 of 83


Attachment 05. Parking Lot items list

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 36 of 83


Table 10. Parking Lot items list

Number Description Document Number Responsible Close date


Review the possibility to change the design of
condensate drum 320V-004 system to avoid open
vent (and LP steam connection) at safe location DRP001-PUC-320000- PDO / DEC Issue for design
1
downstream 320AE-002. Instead, consider providing U-PID-018_H1 Process P&IDs
a safety valve for system protection (harmonization
design with U-100 CDU Unit).
Review the possibility to implement any feasible
solution to minimize the loss of nitrogen in case of loss
of instrument air to 320PV-0321B (blanketing control DRP001-PUC-320000- COMPANY / Issue for design
2
valve) in 320TK-003. This recommendation is U-PID-017_H1 CONTRACTOR P&IDs
applicable to other blanketing control valves in tanks
of EPC 2.
Relocate 320SC-J2-0241 to be in parallel of 320FV-
DRP001-PUC-320000- Next P&ID
3 0242 instead of current location (around 320FV-0241) DEC Process
U-PID-013_H1 issue
in order to facilitate lean amine sampling operation.
Review the possibility to implement any feasible
solution to minimize the loss of nitrogen in case of loss
of instrument air to 320PV-0241B (blanketing control DRP001-PUC-320000- COMPANY / Issue for design
4
valve) in 320TK-001. This recommendation is U-PID-013_H1 CONTRACTOR P&IDs
applicable to other blanketing control valves in tanks
of EPC 2.
Review the possibility to implement any feasible
solution to minimize the loss of nitrogen in case of loss
of instrument air to 320PV-0301B (blanketing control DRP001-PUC-320000- COMPANY / Issue for design
5
valve) in 320TK-002. This recommendation is U-PID-016_H1 CONTRACTOR P&IDs
applicable to other blanketing control valves in tanks
of EPC 2.
Consider changing 320LIT-1141 / 1142 in 320V-101 DRP001-PUC-320001- DEC Next P&ID
6
to interface measurement type. U-PID-008_H1 Instrumentation issue
Consider changing the line for emptying out 320V-002
DRP001-PUC-320000- Next P&ID
7 from bottom to dip top side of the vessel. Ensure DEC Process
U-PID-012_H1 issue
similar drums in EPC 1 have the same arrangement.
Relocate fresh amine make-up line downstream DRP001-PUC-320001- Next P&ID
8 DEC Process
320E-101. U-PID-003_H1 issue

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 37 of 83


Attachment 06. List of HAZOP
Recommendations

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 38 of 83


Table 11: List of HAZOP Recommendations

Close Node Risk


Rec. Num. Recommendation Responsible Node Title P&ID Cause Consequences Safeguards Severity Likelihood Risk Remarks / Observations
Date Num. Category
Consider providing
condensate connection
for 320PK-101 antifoam
package for dilution May, GENERAL
EPC-HZP-320-GR1 DEC Process - All P&IDs N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
purposes instead of 2019 RECOMMENDATION
demi water connection
in order to avoid O2
presence in the product.

Node #11 "Fresh Amine


Storage Tank 320TK-
003" provide isolation
valves in lines 4"- Next
GENERAL
EPC-HZP-320-GR2 320MDA-0001-A2AL7- DEC Process P&ID - All P&IDs N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
RECOMMENDATION
NI-NT and 4"-320MDA- issue
0002-A2AL7-NI-NT in
P&ID DRP001-PUC-
320000-U-PID-017_H1.

- Personnel injuries is not


considered because
pumps 320P-001 A/B
have double mechanical
seal with alarm and not
1. 320LAL-0027
LOC is expected.
A/B/C
- 320LC-0027 is
1.1.5. Failure of 1.1.5.1. Potential 2. Interlock 320U-
Ensure each transmitter redundant (sensors
DEC Process / Next DRP001-PUC- control 320LC-0027 loss of level in 320V- 0100 triggered by
320LIT-0027 A/B/C has Amine Flash Drum 320LIT-0027 A/B/C)
EPC-HZP-320-1 DEC P&ID 1 320000-U-PID-002- / 320FC-1041 valve 001 leading to 320LALL-0026 A 2 B Mod
a low and high level 320V-001 System - 320LAL-0027 A/B/C
Instrumentation issue 1_H1 320FV-1041 pumps 320P-001 A/B A/B/C (2oo3)
alarm. provide enough time for
opening). due to cavitation. causing the trip of
operator to take an action
pumps 320P-001
(20 minutes).
A/B (1oo1)
- This recommendation
also applies to scenarios
1.2.1.1, 1.2.12.1, 1.2.2.1,
1.2.3.1, 1.2.5.2, 1.2.6.1
and 1.2.7.1
1. Interlock 320U-
Include not fully open 0101 A/B triggered Personnel injuries is not
1.2.5.1. Potential
signal in valve 320UV- by closed signal in considered because
DEC Process / Next DRP001-PUC- 1.2.5. Failure of mechanical damage
0021 A/B to activate Amine Flash Drum valve 320UV-0021 pumps 320P-001 A/B
EPC-HZP-320-2 DEC C&E 1 320000-U-PID-002- valve 320UV-0021 to pumps 320P-001 A 2 C Mod
interlock 320U-0101 320V-001 System A/B (1oo1) causing have double mechanical
Instrumentation issue 2_H1 A/B closed. A/B due to blocked
A/B tripping the pumps the trip of pumps seal with alarm and not
suction.
320P-001 A/B. 320P-001 A/B LOC is expected.
(1oo1)

- This scenario has been


1.12.1.1. Potential
analysed in order to cover
rich amine entrance
the following scenarios:
to lean amine leading
16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2 and
Implement sampling DRP001-PUC- to off-spec lean
1. Sampling 16.11.1.3 from U-160
connections Next 320001-U-PID- amine and process
Amine Flash Drum 1.12.1. Tube leak in procedure (320SC- DHT Unit HAZOP.
EPC-HZP-320-3 downstream 320E-101 DEC Process P&ID 1 003_H1; DRP001- upsets in U-105 SGP,
320V-001 System 320E-101. J4-0381) (at outlet - This recommendation
(at train 1) and 320E- issue PUC-320002-U-PID- U-160 DHT and U-
of 320AE-001 A-J) also applies to scenarios
201 (at train 2). 003_H1 120 HCU Unit. See U-
6.1.1.1, 6.2.1.1, 6.2.2.1,
105 SGP, U-160 DHT
6.2.3.1, 6.2.4.1, 6.2.5.1,
and U-120 HCU
9.1.2.1, 9.1.6.2 and
HAZOP Studies.
9.8.2.1

1.13.1.5. Valve
Change the position of Next DRP001-PUC- 1.13.1. Loss of
Amine Flash Drum 320PV-0021A fails
EPC-HZP-320-4 valve 320PV-0021A to DEC Process P&ID 1 320000-U-PID-002- instrument air
320V-001 System open. This is not the
fail closed (FC). issue 1_H1 supply.
safe position.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 39 of 83


Close Node Risk
Rec. Num. Recommendation Responsible Node Title P&ID Cause Consequences Safeguards Severity Likelihood Risk Remarks / Observations
Date Num. Category

1. Slope on top
flashed gas lines,
DRP001-PUC- draining liquid and
Study the best technical 1.13.3.1. Increase of
320000-U-PID-002- avoiding
solution to minimize the Issue condensation on the
1_H1; DRP001-PUC- 1.13.3. Loss of accumulation
probability of failure of for Amine Flash Drum top flashed gas lines Mod;
EPC-HZP-320-5 DEC Process 1 320000-U-PID- steam tracing 2. Flashed gas top P; A 4; 3 A; A
steam tracing system design 320V-001 System leading to corrosion Low
211_H1; DRP001- supply. lines with no liquid
for top flashed gas P&IDs problems. LOC.
PUC-320000-U-PID- pockets to avoid
lines. Toxic release.
300_H1 accumulation
3. Maintenance
procedures

Ensure operating
3.5.1.1. Potential
procedure includes
overfilling 320V-002
specific instructions for
leading to flooding
the operator to close
Operati of the system
balance line to 320TK-
ng 3.5.1. More drains (balance line). See note 11 on P&ID:
001 and open balance Amine Drains Drum
EPC-HZP-320-6 DEC Process proced 3 N/A from unit to 320V- Impossibility of 1. 320LAH-0221A DRP001-PUC-320000-U-
line to 320V-003 before 320V-002 System
ure 002. continuous draining PID-012_H1
starting amine draining
delivery operation. Moderate
operation to 320V-002
operational changes.
or oil skimming
Non hazardous
operation from 320TK-
consequences.
001.
Provide a line from
3.11.1.1.
320P-005 discharge
Impossibility to take
back to 320V-002 in Next DRP001-PUC- 3.11.1. Wrong
Amine Drains Drum a proper sample to
EPC-HZP-320-7 order to perform a good DEC Process P&ID 3 320000-U-PID- composition of 1. None detected. A 1 C Low
320V-002 System select destination
mixture and facilitate issue 012_H1 amine.
(320TK-001 / 002).
the sampling operation
Economical impact.
in 320SC-J4-0221.
Operati
ng /
Provide operating / 3.16.1.1. Potential
PDO / DEC mainte DRP001-PUC-
maintenance Amine Drains Drum 3.16.1. Work in personnel injuries
EPC-HZP-320-8 Process / nance 3 320000-U-PID-
procedures to work in 320V-002 System confined spaces. during work confined
Commissioning proced 012_H1
confined spaces safely. spaces.
ures
issue.

4.9.1. Failure of 4.9.1.1. Potential


Implement a new PI with DEC Process / Next DRP001-PUC- control 320PC-0241 mechanical damage 1. 320PSV-0241 This recommendation
Amine Make-up Tank
EPC-HZP-320-9 PAH and PAL in 320TK- DEC P&ID 4 320000-U-PID- (valve 320PV-0241A to 320TK-001 due to (designed for this A 2 A Low also applies to scenarios
320TK-001 System
001 (not critical alarms). Instrumentation issue 013_H1 opening / 320PV- overpressure. scenario) 4.10.1.1 and 4.10.2.1
0241B closing). Economical impact.

5.9.1. Failure of 5.9.1.1. Potential


Implement a new PI with DEC Process / Next Amine Wash Water DRP001-PUC- control 320PC-0301 mechanical damage 1. 320PSV-0301 This recommendation
EPC-HZP-320-10 PAH and PAL in 320TK- DEC P&ID 5 Tank 320TK-002 320000-U-PID- (valve 320PV-0301A to 320TK-002 due to (designed for this A 2 A Low also applies to scenarios
002 (not critical alarms). Instrumentation issue System 016_H1 opening / 320PV- overpressure. scenario) 5.10.1.1 and 5.10.2.1
0301B closing). Economical impact.

- SIL Assessment is
1. 320TC-1101 with
required for this new SIF
TAH
triggered by PAHH in a
2. 320PC-1062 with
new PT in 320C-101
Implement a new SIF 6.1.2.2. Potential PAH
causing the closure of
triggered by PAHH in a DRP001-PUC- overheating in 3. 320PC-1141 with
6.1.2. Failure of 320UV-1101 (cut-off
new PT in 320C-101 DEC Process / Next Amine Regenerator 320001-U-PID- reboiler 320E-102 PAH (at outlet of
control 320PC-1102 steam to reboiler 320E-
EPC-HZP-320-11 causing the closure of DEC P&ID 6 320C-101 / 320C- 004_H1; DRP001- A/B system leading 320V-101) P 4 A Mod
(valve 320PV-1102 102 A/B) (1oo1).
320UV-1101 (cut-off Instrumentation issue 201 Reboiler System PUC-320001-U-PID- to pressurization of 4. 320TAH-1104
A/B opening). - This recommendation
steam to reboiler 320E- 006_H1 320C-101. LOC. A/B
also applies to scenarios
102 A/B) (1oo1). Toxic release. 5. 320TAH-1105
6.2.6.2, 6.2.7.2, 9.1.5.1,
6. 320PSV-1061
9.2.5.2, 9.2.7.3, 9.2.8.1,
A/B (designed for
9.2.9.1, 9.7.4.1 and
this scenario)
9.7.5.1

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 40 of 83


Close Node Risk
Rec. Num. Recommendation Responsible Node Title P&ID Cause Consequences Safeguards Severity Likelihood Risk Remarks / Observations
Date Num. Category

6.14.1.1. Potential
operational problems
/ overheating of
Provide independent
reboilers 320E-102
small warm-up lines for DRP001-PUC- According to isolation
A/B during start-up
start-up of each steam Next Amine Regenerator 320001-U-PID-006- 6.14.1. Start-up of philosophy, warm-up 1'
due to large size of
EPC-HZP-320-12 line (steam line for U- DEC Process P&ID 6 320C-101 / 320C- Rev H1; DRP001-PUC- reboiler 320E-102 lines are required for
steam line. Operator
340 SRU and steam line issue. 201 Reboiler System 320002-U-PID-006- A/B. steam lines in the
will start one train
for network) in each Rev H1 individual trains and BL.
and, then, the
train.
second one and high
flow conditions could
happen.

- Personnel injuries is not


considered because
1. 320LAL-1062
7.1.1. Two pumps 7.1.1.1. Potential pumps 320P-101 A/B
2. Interlock 320U-
Lean Amine Cooling 320P-101 A/B loss of level in 320C- have double mechanical
DEC Process / Next DRP001-PUC- 1100 triggered by
Classify 320PAL-0381 System from 320C- running 101 leading to seal with alarm and not
EPC-HZP-320-13 DEC P&ID 7 320000-U-PID-020- 320LALL-1061 A 2 B Mod
as critical alarm. 101 / 320C-201 to simultaneously mechanical damage LOC is expected.
Instrumentation issue 1_H1 (1oo1) causing the
BL (failure of autostart to 320P-101 A/B due - 320LAL-1062 does not
trip of pumps 320P-
system 320I-0150). to cavitation. provide enough time to
101 A/B (1oo1)
operator to take an
action.

1. Interlock 320U-
Include not fully open Personnel injuries is not
DRP001-PUC- 1100 triggered by
signal in valve 320UV- Lean Amine Cooling 7.2.1.1. Potential considered because
DEC Process / Next 320001-U-PID- 7.2.1. Failure of closed signal in
1061 to activate System from 320C- mechanical damage pumps 320P-101 A/B
EPC-HZP-320-14 DEC C&E 7 004_H1; DRP001- valve 320UV-1061 valve 320UV-1061 A 2 C Mod
interlock 320U-1100 101 / 320C-201 to to 320P-101 A/B due have double mechanical
Instrumentation issue PUC-320001-U-PID- closed. (1oo1) causing the
tripping the pumps BL to blocked suction. seal with alarm and not
005_H1 trip of pumps 320P-
320P-101 A/B. LOC is expected.
101 A/B (1oo1)

Personnel injuries is not


Relocate 320TIT-1046 7.7.1.3. Possible
Lean Amine Cooling 7.7.1. Failure of considered because
downstream 320E-101 Next DRP001-PUC- mechanical damage
System from 320C- control 320TC- pumps 320P-101 A/B
EPC-HZP-320-15 bypass connection (10'- DEC Process P&ID 7 320001-U-PID- to pumps 320P-101 1. None detected. A 2 C Mod
101 / 320C-201 to 1047 (valve 320TV- have double mechanical
320AML-1004-A1LQ5- issue 003_H1 A/B due to cavitation
BL 1047 opening). seal with alarm and not
HC-NT). (vaporization).
LOC is expected.
7.7.3.1. High
temperature at the
outlet of 320AE-001
A-J leading to high
temperature lean
amine to BL (U-160
DHT, U-120 HCU and
U-105 SGP Units).
7.7.3. Failure of
Lean Amine Cooling Moderate operational
Provide a TG in lean Next DRP001-PUC- control 320TC- This recommendation
System from 320C- changes. Non
EPC-HZP-320-16 amine line downstream DEC Process P&ID 7 320000-U-PID-020- 0382 (variable also applies to scenario
101 / 320C-201 to hazardous
320TIT-0382. issue 2_H1 speed 320AE-001 7.7.2.1
BL consequences
A-J fans control).
because the design
temperature of U-
160 DHT, U-120 HCU
and U-105 SGP Units
equipment (160V-
022, 120V-012 and
105V-012) will not be
exceeded.
8.2.1.1. Potential
loss of quality of lean
Confirm with VENDOR
amine to BL (U-105
Provide a sample Lean Amine Filtration during 320PK-001
Next DRP001-PUC- SGP, U-160 DHT and
connection at outlet of System 320PK-001, 8.2.1. Plugging of Package HAZOP Study if
EPC-HZP-320-17 DEC Process P&ID 8 320000-U-PID- U-120 HCU Units). 1. 320PDAH-0181
activated carbon filter 320S-001 and 320S- 320PK-001. 320PK-001 has a sample
issue 011_H1 Moderate operational
320S-001. 002 connection at inlet and
changes. Non
outlet of 320PK-001.
hazardous
consequences.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 41 of 83


Close Node Risk
Rec. Num. Recommendation Responsible Node Title P&ID Cause Consequences Safeguards Severity Likelihood Risk Remarks / Observations
Date Num. Category
Personnel injuries is not
8.2.6.1. Potential
Lean Amine Filtration 8.2.6. Failure of considered because
Configure a FAL in DEC Process / Next DRP001-PUC- mechanical damage
System 320PK-001, control 320FC-0202 pumps 320P-002 A/B
EPC-HZP-320-18 320FI-0181A (critical DEC P&ID 8 320000-U-PID- to pumps 320P-002 1. None detected. A 2 C Mod
320S-001 and 320S- (valve 320FV-0202 have double mechanical
alarm). Instrumentation issue 010_H1 A/B due blocked
002 closing). seal with alarm and not
discharge.
LOC is expected.

1. 320LC-1141 /
320FC-1161 (reflux
9.1.5.1. Potential
control) with LAH
level increase in
2. 320PC-1062 with
9.1.5. Failure of 320V-101 and low
Amine Regenerator PAH This recommendation
Configure a LAH in DEC Process / Next DRP001-PUC- control 320FC-1164 flow of reflux to
320C-101 / 320C- 3. 320PC-1141 with also applies to scenarios
EPC-HZP-320-19 320LI-1142 (critical DEC P&ID 9 320001-U-PID- (valve 320FV-1164 column 320C-101 P 4 A Mod
201 Overhead PAH 9.2.5.1, 9.2.5.2, 9.2.7.2,
alarm). Instrumentation issue 008_H1 opening) (minimum leading to
System 4. 320TC-1061 with 9.2.7.3 and 9.2.8.1
recirculation line). overpressure and
TAH
mechanical damage.
5. 320PSV-1061
LOC. Toxic release.
A/B (designed for
this scenario)

- Personnel injuries is not


1. 320LC-1141 /
considered because
9.1.7.1. Potential 320FC-1161 (reflux
pumps 320P-102 A/B
loss of level in 320V- control) with LAL
Configure a high Amine Regenerator 9.1.7. Failure of have double mechanical
DEC Process / Next DRP001-PUC- 101 leading to 2. Interlock 320U-
deviation from set-point 320C-101 / 320C- control 320FC-1162 seal with alarm and not
EPC-HZP-320-20 DEC P&ID 9 320002-U-PID- possible mechanical 1200 triggered by A 2 C Mod
alarm in 320FC-1162 201 Overhead (valve 320FV-1162 LOC is expected.
Instrumentation issue 009_H1 damage to pumps 320LALL-1142
(not critical alarm). System opening). - 320LAL-1141 does not
320P-102 A/B due to (1oo1) causing the
provide enough time to
cavitation. trip of pumps 320P-
operator to take an
102 A/B (1oo1)
action.

9.7.5.1. Potential
9.7.5. Failure of overpressure 320C- 1. 320PC-1141 with
Amine Regenerator
Configure a TAH in DEC Process / Next DRP001-PUC- control 320TC- 101 due to high PAH This recommendation
320C-101 / 320C-
EPC-HZP-320-21 320TI-1142 (critical DEC P&ID 9 320002-U-PID- 1141 (variable temperature leading 2. 320PSV-1061 P 4 A Mod also applies to scenario
201 Overhead
alarm). Instrumentation issue 008_H1 speed 320AE-101 to mechanical A/B (designed for 9.7.4.1
System
A/B fans control). damage. LOC. Toxic this scenario)
release.

1. Slope on top acid


gas lines, draining
liquid and avoiding
accumulation
2. Acid gas top
9.13.3.1. Increase of lines with no liquid
DRP001-PUC- condensation on the pockets to avoid
Study the best technical 320001-U-PID- top acid gas lines accumulation
Issue Amine Regenerator
solution to minimize the 004_H1; DRP001- 9.13.3. Loss of leading to corrosion 3. Corrosion
for 320C-101 / 320C- Mod;
EPC-HZP-320-22 probability of failure of DEC Process 9 PUC-320001-U-PID- steam tracing problems. Plugging monitoring electric P; A 4; 3 A; A
design 201 Overhead Low
steam tracing system 008_H1; DRP001- supply. in line and air cooler resistant probe and
P&IDs System
for top acid gas lines. PUC-320000-U-PID- 320-AE-101 A/B coupon
300_H1 bundles. LOC. Toxic 4. Operating
release. manuals for air
cooler 320AE-101
A/B washing
operation
5. Maintenance
procedures

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 42 of 83


Close Node Risk
Rec. Num. Recommendation Responsible Node Title P&ID Cause Consequences Safeguards Severity Likelihood Risk Remarks / Observations
Date Num. Category

1. Slope on top acid


gas lines, draining
liquid and avoiding
accumulation
2. Acid gas top
9.13.3.1. Increase of lines with no liquid
condensation on the pockets to avoid
top acid gas lines accumulation
Implement a TG at BL in Amine Regenerator
Next 9.13.3. Loss of leading to corrosion 3. Corrosion
acid gas line 20'- 320C-101 / 320C- RP001-PUC-320000- Mod;
EPC-HZP-320-23 DEC Process P&ID 9 steam tracing problems. Plugging monitoring electric P; A 4; 3 A; A
320SOG-0007-A4AR4- 201 Overhead U-PID-300_H1 Low
issue supply. in line and air cooler resistant probe and
HC-ST. System
320-AE-101 A/B coupon
bundles. LOC. Toxic 4. Operating
release. manuals for air
cooler 320AE-101
A/B washing
operation
5. Maintenance
procedures

10.1.1. Failure of 10.1.1.1. Potential


control 320FFC- overfilling of 320V-
Ensure drip pan is
1102 (feed / steam 004 leading to carry This recommendation
provided to collect Next DRP001-PUC-
Condensate Drum ratio) / 320FC- over to atmosphere 1. 320LC-0341 with also applies to scenarios
EPC-HZP-320-24 condensate from DEC Process P&ID 10 320000-U-PID- P 2 B Mod
320V-004 System 1103A/B / 320LC- at safe location. LAH 10.1.2.1, 10.2.3.1 and
320AE-002 vent to be issue 018_H1
1122 A/B (valve Possible personnel 10.2.4.1
directed to ground level.
320FV-1103 A/B injuries due to
opening). thermal burn.

10.2.4.1. Potential
overfilling of 320V-
10.2.4. Failure of 004 leading to carry This recommendation
Configure a LAH in DEC Process / Next DRP001-PUC-
Condensate Drum control 320LC-0341 over to atmosphere also applies to scenarios
EPC-HZP-320-25 320LI-0342 (not critical DEC P&ID 10 320000-U-PID- 1. None detected. P 2 C Mod
320V-004 System (valve 320LV-0341 at safe location. 10.1.1.1, 10.1.2.1 and
alarm). Instrumentation issue 018_H1
closing). Possible personnel 10.2.3.1
injuries due to
thermal burn.

Ensure design of vent


line of 320V-004 (4'- 10.7.1.1. Loss of
320VNT-0007-A2AS-PP- Next DRP001-PUC- steam to atmosphere
Condensate Drum 10.7.1. Failure of
EPC-HZP-320-26 NT) is designed to avoid DEC Process P&ID 10 320000-U-PID- at safe location. Non
320V-004 System 320AE-002.
any overpressure issue 018_H1 hazardous
situation in case of consequences.
failure of 320AE-002.

11.9.1. Failure of 11.9.1.1. Potential


Implement a new PI with DEC Process / Next DRP001-PUC- control 320PC-0321 mechanical damage 1. 320PSV-0321 This recommendation
Fresh Amine Storage
EPC-HZP-320-27 PAH and PAL in 320TK- DEC P&ID 11 320000-U-PID- (valve 320PV-0321A to 320TK-003 due to (designed for this A 2 A Low also applies to scenarios
Tank 320TK-003
003 (not critical alarms). Instrumentation issue 017_H1 opening / 320PV- overpressure. scenario) 11.10.1.1 and 11.10.2.1
0321B closing). Economical impact.

Consider installing a
PCV in nitrogen line
(back-up purging gas) to
automatically maintain 24.1.1.1. Loss of
Next DRP001-PUC-
the purging gas flow to Sour Flare Header 24.1.1. Lack of purging gas and
EPC-HZP-320-28 DEC Process P&ID 24 320000-U-PID-211- 1. None detected. A 1 B Low
the system in case of System purging fuel gas. impossibility to
issue. Rev H1
loss of purging fuel gas. detect this scenario.
Review the line
arrangement
accordingly.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 43 of 83


Close Node Risk
Rec. Num. Recommendation Responsible Node Title P&ID Cause Consequences Safeguards Severity Likelihood Risk Remarks / Observations
Date Num. Category
Provide an additional LT
with LAH (independent
24.2.1.1. Liquid
from 320LIT-8030) to
accumulation in unit
allow operator to
320 flare header
manually drain the sour
leading to possible
gas flare header leg in Next DRP001-PUC- 24.2.1. Liquid This recommendation
Sour Flare Header blockage in flare 1. 320LC-8030 with
EPC-HZP-320-29 case of liquid DEC Process P&ID 24 320000-U-PID-301- carryover during P 4 B High also applies to scenario
System system. LAH
accumulation. Due to issue. Rev H1 fire scenario. 24.2.2.1
Unavailability of the
volume of sour gas flare
flare system in case
header leg, operator will
of emergency (relief
have enough time to
scenario).
manually drain the
system.
Change the failing
position of valve 320LV-
8030 to FO and add 24.4.1.1. Valve
Next DRP001-PUC- 24.4.1. Loss of
position indication at Sour Flare Header 320LV-8030 fails
EPC-HZP-320-30 DEC Process P&ID 24 320000-U-PID-301- instrument air
control room (open / System closed. This is not
issue. Rev H1 supply.
closed) with alarm in the safe position.
case of opening
position.
24.5.1.
Impossibility to
Provide steam out steam out the
Next DRP001-PUC-
connection for sour gas Sour Flare Header system before start- 24.5.1.1. Lack of
EPC-HZP-320-31 DEC Process P&ID 24 320000-U-PID-211-
flare header at the top System up or during steam out.
issue. Rev H1
of the line. commissioning /
maintenance
activities.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 44 of 83


Attachment 07. HAZOP Individual Action
Sheets

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 45 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process ACTION DUE DATE: May, 2019

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-GR1 MEETING DATES: 14/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): All P&IDs

NODE: -. GENERAL RECOMMENDATION

DEVIATION: N/A

CAUSE: N/A

CONSEQUENCE: N/A CATEGORY: N/A

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty N/A Freq N/A Risk N/A

ACTION DETAILS:
Consider providing condensate connection for 320PK-101 antifoam package for dilution purposes instead
of demi water connection in order to avoid O2 presence in the product.

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 46 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-GR2 MEETING DATES: 14/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): All P&IDs

NODE: -. GENERAL RECOMMENDATION

DEVIATION: N/A

CAUSE: N/A

CONSEQUENCE: N/A CATEGORY: N/A

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty N/A Freq N/A Risk N/A

ACTION DETAILS:
Node #11 "Fresh Amine Storage Tank 320TK-003" provide isolation valves in lines 4"-320MDA-0001-
A2AL7-NI-NT and 4"-320MDA-0002-A2AL7-NI-NT in P&ID DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-017_H1.

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 47 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process / DEC Instrumentation ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-1 MEETING DATES: 11/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1

NODE: 1. Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System

DEVIATION: 1.1. More Flow

CAUSE: 1.1.5. Failure of control 320LC-0027 / 320FC-1041 valve 320FV-1041 opening).

CONSEQUENCE: 1.1.5.1. Potential loss of level in 320V-001 leading to CATEGORY: A


pumps 320P-001 A/B due to cavitation.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. 320LAL-0027 A/B/C
2. Interlock 320U-0100 triggered by 320LALL-0026 A/B/C (2oo3) causing the trip of pumps 320P-001 A/B
(1oo1)

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty 2 Freq B Risk Mod

ACTION DETAILS:
Ensure each transmitter 320LIT-0027 A/B/C has a low and high level alarm.

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:
- Personnel injuries is not considered because pumps 320P-001 A/B have double mechanical seal with
alarm and not LOC is expected.
- 320LC-0027 is redundant (sensors 320LIT-0027 A/B/C)
- 320LAL-0027 A/B/C provide enough time for operator to take an action (20 minutes).
- This recommendation also applies to scenarios 1.2.1.1, 1.2.12.1, 1.2.2.1, 1.2.3.1, 1.2.5.2, 1.2.6.1 and
1.2.7.1

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 48 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process / DEC Instrumentation ACTION DUE DATE: Next C&E issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-2 MEETING DATES: 11/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-2_H1

NODE: 1. Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System

DEVIATION: 1.2. No / Less Flow

CAUSE: 1.2.5. Failure of valve 320UV-0021 A/B closed.

CONSEQUENCE: 1.2.5.1. Potential mechanical damage to pumps 320P-001 CATEGORY: A


A/B due to blocked suction.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. Interlock 320U-0101 A/B triggered by closed signal in valve 320UV-0021 A/B (1oo1) causing the trip of
pumps 320P-001 A/B (1oo1)

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty 2 Freq C Risk Mod

ACTION DETAILS:
Include not fully open signal in valve 320UV-0021 A/B to activate interlock 320U-0101 A/B tripping the
pumps 320P-001 A/B.

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:
Personnel injuries is not considered because pumps 320P-001 A/B have double mechanical seal with
alarm and not LOC is expected.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 49 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-3 MEETING DATES: 11/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-


003_H1

NODE: 1. Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System

DEVIATION: 1.12. Part of Contamination

CAUSE: 1.12.1. Tube leak in 320E-101.

CONSEQUENCE: 1.12.1.1. Potential rich amine entrance to lean amine CATEGORY:


leading to off-spec lean amine and process upsets in U-105 SGP, U-160 DHT
and U-120 HCU Unit. See U-105 SGP, U-160 DHT and U-120 HCU HAZOP
Studies.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. Sampling procedure (320SC-J4-0381) (at outlet of 320AE-001 A-J)

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty Freq Risk

ACTION DETAILS:
Implement sampling connections downstream 320E-101 (at train 1) and 320E-201 (at train 2).

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:
- This scenario has been analysed in order to cover the following scenarios: 16.11.1.1, 16.11.1.2 and
16.11.1.3 from U-160 DHT Unit HAZOP.
- This recommendation also applies to scenarios 6.1.1.1, 6.2.1.1, 6.2.2.1, 6.2.3.1, 6.2.4.1, 6.2.5.1, 9.1.2.1,
9.1.6.2 and 9.8.2.1

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 50 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-4 MEETING DATES: 11/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1

NODE: 1. Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System

DEVIATION: 1.13. Loss of Services / Utilities

CAUSE: 1.13.1. Loss of instrument air supply.

CONSEQUENCE: 1.13.1.5. Valve 320PV-0021A fails open. This is not the CATEGORY:
safe position.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty Freq Risk

ACTION DETAILS:
Change the position of valve 320PV-0021A to fail closed (FC).

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 51 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process ACTION DUE DATE: Issue for design P&IDs

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-5 MEETING DATES: 11/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-002-1_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-


211_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1

NODE: 1. Amine Flash Drum 320V-001 System

DEVIATION: 1.13. Loss of Services / Utilities

CAUSE: 1.13.3. Loss of steam tracing supply.

CONSEQUENCE: 1.13.3.1. Increase of condensation on the top flashed gas CATEGORY: P; A


lines leading to corrosion problems. LOC. Toxic release.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. Slope on top flashed gas lines, draining liquid and avoiding accumulation
2. Flashed gas top lines with no liquid pockets to avoid accumulation
3. Maintenance procedures

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty 4; 3 Freq A; A Risk Mod; Low

ACTION DETAILS:
Study the best technical solution to minimize the probability of failure of steam tracing system for top
flashed gas lines.

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 52 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process ACTION DUE DATE: Operating procedure delivery

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-6 MEETING DATES: 13/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): N/A

NODE: 3. Amine Drains Drum 320V-002 System

DEVIATION: 3.5. Higher Level

CAUSE: 3.5.1. More drains from unit to 320V-002.

CONSEQUENCE: 3.5.1.1. Potential overfilling 320V-002 leading to flooding of CATEGORY:


the system (balance line). Impossibility of continuous draining operation.
Moderate operational changes. Non hazardous consequences.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. 320LAH-0221A

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty Freq Risk

ACTION DETAILS:
Ensure operating procedure includes specific instructions for the operator to close balance line to 320TK-
001 and open balance line to 320V-003 before starting amine draining operation to 320V-002 or oil
skimming operation from 320TK-001.

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:
See note 11 on P&ID: DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 53 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-7 MEETING DATES: 13/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1

NODE: 3. Amine Drains Drum 320V-002 System

DEVIATION: 3.11. Change of Composition

CAUSE: 3.11.1. Wrong composition of amine.

CONSEQUENCE: 3.11.1.1. Impossibility to take a proper sample to select CATEGORY: A


destination (320TK-001 / 002). Economical impact.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. None detected.

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty 1 Freq C Risk Low

ACTION DETAILS:
Provide a line from 320P-005 discharge back to 320V-002 in order to perform a good mixture and facilitate
the sampling operation in 320SC-J4-0221.

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 54 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION DUE DATE: Operating / maintenance
ACTION BY: PDO / DEC Process / Commissioning
procedures issue.

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-8 MEETING DATES: 13/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-012_H1

NODE: 3. Amine Drains Drum 320V-002 System

DEVIATION: 3.16. General Maintenance

CAUSE: 3.16.1. Work in confined spaces.

CONSEQUENCE: 3.16.1.1. Potential personnel injuries during work confined CATEGORY:


spaces.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty Freq Risk

ACTION DETAILS:
Provide operating / maintenance procedures to work in confined spaces safely.

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 55 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process / DEC Instrumentation ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-9 MEETING DATES: 12/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-013_H1

NODE: 4. Amine Make-up Tank 320TK-001 System

DEVIATION: 4.9. Higher Pressure

CAUSE: 4.9.1. Failure of control 320PC-0241 (valve 320PV-0241A opening / 320PV-0241B closing).

CONSEQUENCE: 4.9.1.1. Potential mechanical damage to 320TK-001 due to CATEGORY: A


overpressure. Economical impact.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. 320PSV-0241 (designed for this scenario)

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty 2 Freq A Risk Low

ACTION DETAILS:
Implement a new PI with PAH and PAL in 320TK-001 (not critical alarms).

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:
This recommendation also applies to scenarios 4.10.1.1 and 4.10.2.1

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 56 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process / DEC Instrumentation ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-10 MEETING DATES: 12/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-016_H1

NODE: 5. Amine Wash Water Tank 320TK-002 System

DEVIATION: 5.9. Higher Pressure

CAUSE: 5.9.1. Failure of control 320PC-0301 (valve 320PV-0301A opening / 320PV-0301B closing).

CONSEQUENCE: 5.9.1.1. Potential mechanical damage to 320TK-002 due to CATEGORY: A


overpressure. Economical impact.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. 320PSV-0301 (designed for this scenario)

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty 2 Freq A Risk Low

ACTION DETAILS:
Implement a new PI with PAH and PAL in 320TK-002 (not critical alarms).

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:
This recommendation also applies to scenarios 5.10.1.1 and 5.10.2.1

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 57 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process / DEC Instrumentation ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-11 MEETING DATES: 11/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-


006_H1

NODE: 6. Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Reboiler System

DEVIATION: 6.1. More Flow

CAUSE: 6.1.2. Failure of control 320PC-1102 (valve 320PV-1102 A/B opening).

CONSEQUENCE: 6.1.2.2. Potential overheating in reboiler 320E-102 A/B CATEGORY: P


system leading to pressurization of 320C-101. LOC. Toxic release.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. 320TC-1101 with TAH
2. 320PC-1062 with PAH
3. 320PC-1141 with PAH (at outlet of 320V-101)
4. 320TAH-1104 A/B
5. 320TAH-1105
6. 320PSV-1061 A/B (designed for this scenario)
RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty 4 Freq A Risk Mod

ACTION DETAILS:
Implement a new SIF triggered by PAHH in a new PT in 320C-101 causing the closure of 320UV-1101
(cut-off steam to reboiler 320E-102 A/B) (1oo1).
RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:


OBSERVATIONS:
- SIL Assessment is required for this new SIF triggered by PAHH in a new PT in 320C-101 causing the
closure of 320UV-1101 (cut-off steam to reboiler 320E-102 A/B) (1oo1).
- This recommendation also applies to scenarios 6.2.6.2, 6.2.7.2, 9.1.5.1, 9.2.5.2, 9.2.7.3, 9.2.8.1, 9.2.9.1,
9.7.4.1 and 9.7.5.1

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 58 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue.

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-12 MEETING DATES: 11/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-006-Rev H1; DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-


006-Rev H1

NODE: 6. Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Reboiler System

DEVIATION: 6.14. General Start-up

CAUSE: 6.14.1. Start-up of reboiler 320E-102 A/B.

CONSEQUENCE: 6.14.1.1. Potential operational problems / overheating of CATEGORY:


reboilers 320E-102 A/B during start-up due to large size of steam line.
Operator will start one train and, then, the second one and high flow conditions
could happen.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty Freq Risk

ACTION DETAILS:
Provide independent small warm-up lines for start-up of each steam line (steam line for U-340 SRU and
steam line for network) in each train.

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:
According to isolation philosophy, warm-up 1' lines are required for steam lines in the individual trains and
BL.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 59 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process / DEC Instrumentation ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-13 MEETING DATES: 12/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-1_H1

NODE: 7. Lean Amine Cooling System from 320C-101 / 320C-201 to BL

DEVIATION: 7.1. More Flow

CAUSE: 7.1.1. Two pumps 320P-101 A/B running simultaneously (failure of autostart system 320I-0150).

CONSEQUENCE: 7.1.1.1. Potential loss of level in 320C-101 leading to CATEGORY: A


mechanical damage to 320P-101 A/B due to cavitation.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. 320LAL-1062
2. Interlock 320U-1100 triggered by 320LALL-1061 (1oo1) causing the trip of pumps 320P-101 A/B (1oo1)

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty 2 Freq B Risk Mod

ACTION DETAILS:
Classify 320PAL-0381 as critical alarm.

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:
- Personnel injuries is not considered because pumps 320P-101 A/B have double mechanical seal with
alarm and not LOC is expected.
- 320LAL-1062 does not provide enough time to operator to take an action.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 60 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process / DEC Instrumentation ACTION DUE DATE: Next C&E issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-14 MEETING DATES: 12/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-


005_H1

NODE: 7. Lean Amine Cooling System from 320C-101 / 320C-201 to BL

DEVIATION: 7.2. No / Less Flow

CAUSE: 7.2.1. Failure of valve 320UV-1061 closed.

CONSEQUENCE: 7.2.1.1. Potential mechanical damage to 320P-101 A/B due CATEGORY: A


to blocked suction.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. Interlock 320U-1100 triggered by closed signal in valve 320UV-1061 (1oo1) causing the trip of pumps
320P-101 A/B (1oo1)

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty 2 Freq C Risk Mod

ACTION DETAILS:
Include not fully open signal in valve 320UV-1061 to activate interlock 320U-1100 tripping the pumps
320P-101 A/B.

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:
Personnel injuries is not considered because pumps 320P-101 A/B have double mechanical seal with
alarm and not LOC is expected.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 61 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-15 MEETING DATES: 12/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-003_H1

NODE: 7. Lean Amine Cooling System from 320C-101 / 320C-201 to BL

DEVIATION: 7.7. Higher Temperature

CAUSE: 7.7.1. Failure of control 320TC-1047 (valve 320TV-1047 opening).

CONSEQUENCE: 7.7.1.3. Possible mechanical damage to pumps 320P-101 CATEGORY: A


A/B due to cavitation (vaporization).

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. None detected.

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty 2 Freq C Risk Mod

ACTION DETAILS:
Relocate 320TIT-1046 downstream 320E-101 bypass connection (10'-320AML-1004-A1LQ5-HC-NT).

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:
Personnel injuries is not considered because pumps 320P-101 A/B have double mechanical seal with
alarm and not LOC is expected.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 62 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-16 MEETING DATES: 12/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-020-2_H1

NODE: 7. Lean Amine Cooling System from 320C-101 / 320C-201 to BL

DEVIATION: 7.7. Higher Temperature

CAUSE: 7.7.3. Failure of control 320TC-0382 (variable speed 320AE-001 A-J fans control).

CONSEQUENCE: 7.7.3.1. High temperature at the outlet of 320AE-001 A-J CATEGORY:


leading to high temperature lean amine to BL (U-160 DHT, U-120 HCU and U-
105 SGP Units). Moderate operational changes. Non hazardous
consequences because the design temperature of U-160 DHT, U-120 HCU
and U-105 SGP Units equipment (160V-022, 120V-012 and 105V-012) will not
be exceeded.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty Freq Risk

ACTION DETAILS:
Provide a TG in lean amine line downstream 320TIT-0382.

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:
This recommendation also applies to scenario 7.7.2.1

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 63 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-17 MEETING DATES: 12/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-011_H1

NODE: 8. Lean Amine Filtration System 320PK-001, 320S-001 and 320S-002

DEVIATION: 8.2. No / Less Flow

CAUSE: 8.2.1. Plugging of 320PK-001.

CONSEQUENCE: 8.2.1.1. Potential loss of quality of lean amine to BL (U-105 CATEGORY:


SGP, U-160 DHT and U-120 HCU Units). Moderate operational changes. Non
hazardous consequences.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. 320PDAH-0181

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty Freq Risk

ACTION DETAILS:
Provide a sample connection at outlet of activated carbon filter 320S-001.

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:
Confirm with VENDOR during 320PK-001 Package HAZOP Study if 320PK-001 has a sample connection
at inlet and outlet of 320PK-001.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 64 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process / DEC Instrumentation ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-18 MEETING DATES: 12/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-010_H1

NODE: 8. Lean Amine Filtration System 320PK-001, 320S-001 and 320S-002

DEVIATION: 8.2. No / Less Flow

CAUSE: 8.2.6. Failure of control 320FC-0202 (valve 320FV-0202 closing).

CONSEQUENCE: 8.2.6.1. Potential mechanical damage to pumps 320P-002 CATEGORY: A


A/B due blocked discharge.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. None detected.

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty 2 Freq C Risk Mod

ACTION DETAILS:
Configure a FAL in 320FI-0181A (critical alarm).

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:
Personnel injuries is not considered because pumps 320P-002 A/B have double mechanical seal with
alarm and not LOC is expected.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 65 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process / DEC Instrumentation ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-19 MEETING DATES: 11/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-008_H1

NODE: 9. Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Overhead System

DEVIATION: 9.1. More Flow

CAUSE: 9.1.5. Failure of control 320FC-1164 (valve 320FV-1164 opening) (minimum recirculation line).

CONSEQUENCE: 9.1.5.1. Potential level increase in 320V-101 and low flow of CATEGORY: P
reflux to column 320C-101 leading to overpressure and mechanical damage.
LOC. Toxic release.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. 320LC-1141 / 320FC-1161 (reflux control) with LAH
2. 320PC-1062 with PAH
3. 320PC-1141 with PAH
4. 320TC-1061 with TAH
5. 320PSV-1061 A/B (designed for this scenario)

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty 4 Freq A Risk Mod

ACTION DETAILS:
Configure a LAH in 320LI-1142 (critical alarm).

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:
This recommendation also applies to scenarios 9.2.5.1, 9.2.5.2, 9.2.7.2, 9.2.7.3 and 9.2.8.1

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 66 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process / DEC Instrumentation ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-20 MEETING DATES: 11/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-009_H1

NODE: 9. Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Overhead System

DEVIATION: 9.1. More Flow

CAUSE: 9.1.7. Failure of control 320FC-1162 (valve 320FV-1162 opening).

CONSEQUENCE: 9.1.7.1. Potential loss of level in 320V-101 leading to CATEGORY: A


possible mechanical damage to pumps 320P-102 A/B due to cavitation.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. 320LC-1141 / 320FC-1161 (reflux control) with LAL
2. Interlock 320U-1200 triggered by 320LALL-1142 (1oo1) causing the trip of pumps 320P-102 A/B (1oo1)

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty 2 Freq C Risk Mod

ACTION DETAILS:
Configure a high deviation from set-point alarm in 320FC-1162 (not critical alarm).

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:
- Personnel injuries is not considered because pumps 320P-102 A/B have double mechanical seal with
alarm and not LOC is expected.
- 320LAL-1141 does not provide enough time to operator to take an action.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 67 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process / DEC Instrumentation ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-21 MEETING DATES: 11/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320002-U-PID-008_H1

NODE: 9. Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Overhead System

DEVIATION: 9.7. Higher Temperature

CAUSE: 9.7.5. Failure of control 320TC-1141 (variable speed 320AE-101 A/B fans control).

CONSEQUENCE: 9.7.5.1. Potential overpressure 320C-101 due to high CATEGORY: P


temperature leading to mechanical damage. LOC. Toxic release.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. 320PC-1141 with PAH
2. 320PSV-1061 A/B (designed for this scenario)

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty 4 Freq A Risk Mod

ACTION DETAILS:
Configure a TAH in 320TI-1142 (critical alarm).

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:
This recommendation also applies to scenario 9.7.4.1

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 68 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process ACTION DUE DATE: Issue for design P&IDs

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-22 MEETING DATES: 11/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-004_H1; DRP001-PUC-320001-U-PID-


008_H1; DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1

NODE: 9. Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Overhead System

DEVIATION: 9.13. Loss of Services / Utilities

CAUSE: 9.13.3. Loss of steam tracing supply.

CONSEQUENCE: 9.13.3.1. Increase of condensation on the top acid gas lines CATEGORY: P; A
leading to corrosion problems. Plugging in line and air cooler 320-AE-101 A/B
bundles. LOC. Toxic release.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. Slope on top acid gas lines, draining liquid and avoiding accumulation
2. Acid gas top lines with no liquid pockets to avoid accumulation
3. Corrosion monitoring electric resistant probe and coupon
4. Operating manuals for air cooler 320AE-101 A/B washing operation
5. Maintenance procedures

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty 4; 3 Freq A; A Risk Mod; Low

ACTION DETAILS:
Study the best technical solution to minimize the probability of failure of steam tracing system for top acid
gas lines.

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 69 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-23 MEETING DATES: 11/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): RP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-300_H1

NODE: 9. Amine Regenerator 320C-101 / 320C-201 Overhead System

DEVIATION: 9.13. Loss of Services / Utilities

CAUSE: 9.13.3. Loss of steam tracing supply.

CONSEQUENCE: 9.13.3.1. Increase of condensation on the top acid gas lines CATEGORY: P; A
leading to corrosion problems. Plugging in line and air cooler 320-AE-101 A/B
bundles. LOC. Toxic release.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. Slope on top acid gas lines, draining liquid and avoiding accumulation
2. Acid gas top lines with no liquid pockets to avoid accumulation
3. Corrosion monitoring electric resistant probe and coupon
4. Operating manuals for air cooler 320AE-101 A/B washing operation
5. Maintenance procedures

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty 4; 3 Freq A; A Risk Mod; Low

ACTION DETAILS:
Implement a TG at BL in acid gas line 20'-320SOG-0007-A4AR4-HC-ST.

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 70 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-24 MEETING DATES: 12/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-018_H1

NODE: 10. Condensate Drum 320V-004 System

DEVIATION: 10.1. More Flow

CAUSE: 10.1.1. Failure of control 320FFC-1102 (feed / steam ratio) / 320FC-1103A/B / 320LC-1122 A/B
(valve 320FV-1103 A/B opening).

CONSEQUENCE: 10.1.1.1. Potential overfilling of 320V-004 leading to carry CATEGORY: P


over to atmosphere at safe location. Possible personnel injuries due to thermal
burn.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. 320LC-0341 with LAH

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty 2 Freq B Risk Mod

ACTION DETAILS:
Ensure drip pan is provided to collect condensate from 320AE-002 vent to be directed to ground level.

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:
This recommendation also applies to scenarios 10.1.2.1, 10.2.3.1 and 10.2.4.1

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 71 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process / DEC Instrumentation ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-25 MEETING DATES: 12/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-018_H1

NODE: 10. Condensate Drum 320V-004 System

DEVIATION: 10.2. No / Less Flow

CAUSE: 10.2.4. Failure of control 320LC-0341 (valve 320LV-0341 closing).

CONSEQUENCE: 10.2.4.1. Potential overfilling of 320V-004 leading to carry CATEGORY: P


over to atmosphere at safe location. Possible personnel injuries due to thermal
burn.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. None detected.

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty 2 Freq C Risk Mod

ACTION DETAILS:
Configure a LAH in 320LI-0342 (not critical alarm).

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:
This recommendation also applies to scenarios 10.1.1.1, 10.1.2.1 and 10.2.3.1

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 72 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-26 MEETING DATES: 12/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-018_H1

NODE: 10. Condensate Drum 320V-004 System

DEVIATION: 10.7. Higher Temperature

CAUSE: 10.7.1. Failure of 320AE-002.

CONSEQUENCE: 10.7.1.1. Loss of steam to atmosphere at safe location. Non CATEGORY:


hazardous consequences.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty Freq Risk

ACTION DETAILS:
Ensure design of vent line of 320V-004 (4'-320VNT-0007-A2AS-PP-NT) is designed to avoid any
overpressure situation in case of failure of 320AE-002.

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 73 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process / DEC Instrumentation ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-27 MEETING DATES: 12/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-017_H1

NODE: 11. Fresh Amine Storage Tank 320TK-003

DEVIATION: 11.9. Higher Pressure

CAUSE: 11.9.1. Failure of control 320PC-0321 (valve 320PV-0321A opening / 320PV-0321B closing).

CONSEQUENCE: 11.9.1.1. Potential mechanical damage to 320TK-003 due CATEGORY: A


to overpressure. Economical impact.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. 320PSV-0321 (designed for this scenario)

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty 2 Freq A Risk Low

ACTION DETAILS:
Implement a new PI with PAH and PAL in 320TK-003 (not critical alarms).

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:
This recommendation also applies to scenarios 11.10.1.1 and 11.10.2.1

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 74 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue.

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-28 MEETING DATES: 14/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-211-Rev H1

NODE: 24. Sour Flare Header System

DEVIATION: 24.1. No / Less Flow

CAUSE: 24.1.1. Lack of purging fuel gas.

CONSEQUENCE: 24.1.1.1. Loss of purging gas and impossibility to detect this CATEGORY: A
scenario.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. None detected.

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty 1 Freq B Risk Low

ACTION DETAILS:
Consider installing a PCV in nitrogen line (back-up purging gas) to automatically maintain the purging gas
flow to the system in case of loss of purging fuel gas. Review the line arrangement accordingly.

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 75 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue.

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-29 MEETING DATES: 14/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301-Rev H1

NODE: 24. Sour Flare Header System

DEVIATION: 24.2. Higher Level

CAUSE: 24.2.1. Liquid carryover during fire scenario.

CONSEQUENCE: 24.2.1.1. Liquid accumulation in unit 320 flare header CATEGORY: P


leading to possible blockage in flare system. Unavailability of the flare system
in case of emergency (relief scenario).

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):


1. 320LC-8030 with LAH

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty 4 Freq B Risk High

ACTION DETAILS:
Provide an additional LT with LAH (independent from 320LIT-8030) to allow operator to manually drain the
sour gas flare header leg in case of liquid accumulation. Due to volume of sour gas flare header leg,
operator will have enough time to manually drain the system.

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:
This recommendation also applies to scenario 24.2.2.1

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 76 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue.

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-30 MEETING DATES: 14/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-301-Rev H1

NODE: 24. Sour Flare Header System

DEVIATION: 24.4. Loss of Services / Utilities

CAUSE: 24.4.1. Loss of instrument air supply.

CONSEQUENCE: 24.4.1.1. Valve 320LV-8030 fails closed. This is not the CATEGORY:
safe position.

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty Freq Risk

ACTION DETAILS:
Change the failing position of valve 320LV-8030 to FO and add position indication at control room (open /
closed) with alarm in case of opening position.

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 77 of 83


HAZOP ACTION RESPONSE SHEET
PROJECT: DUQM Refinery
OPERATING CENTER: UNIT: U320 – ARU
Project EPC Package One
ACTION BY: DEC Process ACTION DUE DATE: Next P&ID issue.

ACTION TRACKING NUMBER: EPC-HZP-320-31 MEETING DATES: 14/02/2019

REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S): DRP001-PUC-320000-U-PID-211-Rev H1

NODE: 24. Sour Flare Header System

DEVIATION: 24.5. General Start-up

CAUSE: 24.5.1. Impossibility to steam out the system before start-up or during commissioning /
maintenance activities.

CONSEQUENCE: 24.5.1.1. Lack of steam out. CATEGORY:

EXISTING CONTROL (SAFEGUARDS):

RISK ASSESSMENT Svrty Freq Risk

ACTION DETAILS:
Provide steam out connection for sour gas flare header at the top of the line.

RESPONSE:

ATTACHMENTS:

PREPARED BY (NAME / POSITION): SIGNATURE: DATE:

REVIEWED BY (PROJECT ENGINEER): SIGNATURE: DATE:

HSE VERIFICATION BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY PROCESS SAFETY APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

COMPANY DISCIPLINE LEAD APPROVAL BY: SIGNATURE: DATE:

OBSERVATIONS:

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 78 of 83


Attachment 08. Scenarios affecting
Package Equipment

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 79 of 83


Table 12. Scenarios affecting Package Equipment

Causes Consequences Safeguards CAT LKH SEV Risk Recommendations P&ID No. Responsible Close Date Remarks / Observations
EPC-HZP-320-17. Confirm with VENDOR during
8.2.1.1. Potential loss of quality of lean amine to
Provide a sample DRP001-PUC- 320PK-001 Package HAZOP
8.2.1. Plugging of BL (U-105 SGP, U-160 DHT and U-120 HCU Next P&ID
1. 320PDAH-0181 connection at outlet of 320000-U-PID- DEC Process Study if 320PK-001 has a
320PK-001. Units). Moderate operational changes. Non issue
activated carbon filter 011_H1 sample connection at inlet
hazardous consequences.
320S-001. and outlet of 320PK-001.
Review possible spurious trip
or failure of 320PK-001 and
how to protect pumps 320P-
8.2.1. Plugging of 8.2.1.2. Potential mechanical damage to pumps
1. 320PDAH-0181 A B 2 Mod 002 A/B in that case, during
320PK-001. 320P-002 A/B due blocked suction.
320PK-001 Package HAZOP
Study with VENDOR
presence.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 80 of 83


Attachment 09. Critical Alarms List

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 81 of 83


Table 13. Critical Alarm per scenario

Causes Consequences Alarms CAT LKH SEV Risk Recommendations P&ID No. Responsible Close Date Remarks / Observations
- Personnel injuries is not considered
because pumps 320P-001 A/B have
double mechanical seal with alarm and
1.1.5. Failure of control DEC Process /
EPC-HZP-320-1. Ensure each DRP001-PUC- not LOC is expected.
320LC-0027 / 320FC- 1.1.5.1. Potential loss of level in 320V-001 leading to pumps 1. 320LAL- DEC
A B 2 Mod transmitter 320LIT-0027 A/B/C 320000-U-PID- Next P&ID issue - 320LC-0027 is redundant (sensors
1041 valve 320FV-1041 320P-001 A/B due to cavitation. 0027 A/B/C Instrumentatio
has a low and high level alarm. 002-1_H1 320LIT-0027 A/B/C)
opening). n
- 320LAL-0027 A/B/C provide enough
time for operator to take an action (20
minutes).
- Personnel injuries is not considered
7.1.1. Two pumps 320P- because pumps 320P-101 A/B have
DEC Process /
101 A/B running DRP001-PUC- double mechanical seal with alarm and
7.1.1.1. Potential loss of level in 320C-101 leading to EPC-HZP-320-13. Classify DEC
simultaneously (failure of A B 2 Mod 320000-U-PID- Next P&ID issue not LOC is expected.
mechanical damage to 320P-101 A/B due to cavitation. 320PAL-0381 as critical alarm. Instrumentatio
autostart system 320I- 020-1_H1 - 320LAL-1062 does not provide
n
0150). enough time to operator to take an
action.
DEC Process / Personnel injuries is not considered
8.2.6. Failure of control EPC-HZP-320-18. Configure a DRP001-PUC-
8.2.6.1. Potential mechanical damage to pumps 320P-002 DEC because pumps 320P-002 A/B have
320FC-0202 (valve A C 2 Mod FAL in 320FI-0181A (critical 320000-U-PID- Next P&ID issue
A/B due blocked discharge. Instrumentatio double mechanical seal with alarm and
320FV-0202 closing). alarm). 010_H1
n not LOC is expected.

9.1.5. Failure of control


DEC Process /
320FC-1164 (valve 9.1.5.1. Potential level increase in 320V-101 and low flow of EPC-HZP-320-19. Configure a DRP001-PUC-
DEC
320FV-1164 opening) reflux to column 320C-101 leading to overpressure and P A 4 Mod LAH in 320LI-1142 (critical 320001-U-PID- Next P&ID issue
Instrumentatio
(minimum recirculation mechanical damage. LOC. Toxic release. alarm). 008_H1
n
line).

9.7.5. Failure of control DEC Process /


9.7.5.1. Potential overpressure 320C-101 due to high EPC-HZP-320-21. Configure a DRP001-PUC-
320TC-1141 (variable DEC
temperature leading to mechanical damage. LOC. Toxic P A 4 Mod TAH in 320TI-1142 (critical 320002-U-PID- Next P&ID issue
speed 320AE-101 A/B Instrumentatio
release. alarm). 008_H1
fans control). n

HAZOP STUDY REPORT - UNIT 320 ARU – Rev. 1.0 Page 82 of 83

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