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CrPC Case Laws
APPEAL
Section 372 – MOST IMP
Case Law: Satyapal Singh vs State of MP
SC held that the father of the deceased, has locus standi to prefer an appeal before the High
Court under proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. as he falls within the definition of victim as
defined under Section 2(wa) of Cr.P.C. to question the correctness of the judgment and
order of acquittal passed by the trial court.
Section 374
Case Law: Bakshi Ram Case
A trial was held by an Assistant Sessions Judge; after he had recorded the evidence in the Court
and heard the arguments, but before writing and delivering his judgment, he was invested with
the powers of an Additional Sessions Judge. It was held that an appeal from the conviction lay
to the Sessions Judge and not to the High Court, as the accused had been convicted "on a trial
held by" an Assistant Sessions Judge within the meaning of this section; the fact that he was
an Additional Sessions Judge when he wrote and delivered judgment did not affect the
question.
Section 377 – MOST IMP
Case Law: Assistant Collector of Central Excise vs Krishna Murthy
Only the Public Prosecutor can file an appeal against inadequacy of sentence. The complainant
has no locus standi for the purpose.
Case Law: State of UP vs Dharmendra Singh
Sub-section (3) applies when an appeal is filed before the High Court by the State on the ground
of inadequacy of sentence. It does not apply when such appeal is filed before the Supreme
Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Section 378 – MOST IMP
Murlidhar v State of Karnataka
SC gave imp. principles relating to appeals from an acquittal order:
(i) There is presumption of innocence in favor of an accused person and such
presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favor by the trial
Court.
(ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with
the merit of the appeal against acquittal.
(iii) Though, the power of the appellate Court in considering the appeals against
acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the
appellate Court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of facts recorded by the
trial Court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor
of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case,
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interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified.
Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on
erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely
to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in
interfering with such conclusions is fully justified, and
(iv) Merely because the appellate Court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the
evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of
acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial Court is a possible view. The
evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in interference by the
Appellate Court in the judgment of the trial Court.
State (Delhi Administration) vs. Dharampal
State Government cannot maintain an appeal under section 378(1) and (2) where special leave
to appeal has been refused by the High Court to a complainant.
Surajpal Singh case
Section 379 – No case
Section 386 – MOST IMP
Sudha Renukiah vs State of AP
In exercise of appellate power under section 386 the High Court has full power to reverse an
order of acquittal and if the accused are found guilty they can be sentenced according to law.
P Karumbaiah vs State
There is no provision in the Code to permit withdrawal of an appeal once admitted for hearing.
Amratbhai Lilabhai vs State of Gujarat
In case of non-appearance of the accused or his counsel, the appellate Court should dismiss the
criminal appeal, but cannot dispose it of on merits without hearing the accused or his advocate
Article 136
Pritam Singh vs State of Punjab
Article 136 of Constitution of India is very general and is not confined merely to criminal cases,
as is evident from the words “appeal from any judgment, decree, sentence or order” which
obviously covers wide discretion with which Supreme Court is invested under it is to be
exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases.
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Thus, unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and
grave injustice has been done and that the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity
to warrant a review of the decision appealed against, Special leave will not be granted.
SENTENCE ON OFFENDER ALREADY SENTENCED FOR ANOTHER OFFENCE
[Section 427]
Case Law: VK Bansal v State of Haryana
Held: It is manifest from Section 427(1) that the Court has the power and the discretion to issue
a direction but in the very nature of the power so conferred upon the Court the discretionary
power shall have to be exercised along the judicial lines and not in a mechanical, wooden or
pedantic manner. It is difficult to lay down any straightjacket approach in the matter and that a
direction that the subsequent sentence would run concurrently or not would essentially depend
on the nature of the offence or offences and the overall fact situation.
Case Law: Benson v State of Kerala
Held: SC having regard to the duration of his incarceration and the remission earned by the
accused directed that the sentences awarded to him in those cases would run concurrently. It
was noticeably recorded that the offences in the cases under scrutiny had been committed on
the same day
PERIOD OF DETENTION UNDERGONE BY THE ACCUSED TO BE SET-OFF
AGAINST THE SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT [Section 428]
Case Law: Boucher Pierre Andre v Superintendent Central Jail
Held: SC has laid down as follows:
1. The section applies to a fact situation described by the clause "where an accused person has,
on conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for a term". The clause does not, either
expressly or by necessary implication, suggest that the conviction and sentence must be after
the coming into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. The fact situation necessary for attracting the applicability of the section would be equally
satisfied whether an accused person has been convicted and sentenced before or after the
coming into force of the new Code.
3. Even though the conviction might have been under the old Code but if the sentence is still
running, the provisions of the section will be attracted.
4. If the term has already run out, no question of set-off can arise.
Case Law: State of Maharashtra v Najakat Ali Mubarak Ali
Held: Where the accused was arrested in two criminal cases and remained in jail as an under-
trial in both the cases and was also convicted in both the cases, he would be entitled to set off
the period during which he remained in custody in both the cases, while calculating the total
period of sentence, for which he was required to remain in judicial custody
SUSPENSION OR REMISSION OF SENTENCE [Section 432]
Case Law: UOI v Sriharan
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The Supreme Court held that as the only surviving sentence in the instant case was under
TADA Act, a law pertaining to Union Government, only Central Government was empowered
to consider remission of sentence.
Case Law: Ramdeo Chauhan v State of Assam
Even where the sentence of death imposed upon an accused person is confirmed by the
Supreme Court, he is not remediless. He can still seek benefit under sections 432, 433 and
433A.
The Court said: The power to commute a sentence of death is independent of section 433A. The
restriction under section 433-A of the Code comes into operation only after power under
section 433 is exercised. Section 433-A is applicable to two categories of convicts: (a) those
who could have been punished with sentence of death, and (b) those whose sentence has been
converted into imprisonment for life under section 433.
Case Law: K.M. Nanavati v State of Bombay
COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE [Section 433]
Case Law: State of Rajasthan v Jamil Khan
The Supreme Court was seized of a question that whether there is any restriction on the exercise
of power under sections 432 for remission and 433 for commutation in cases of minimum
sentence.
Held: Neither section 432 nor section 433 contained a non obstante provision. Therefore, the
minimum sentence provided for any offence cannot be and shall not be remitted or commuted
by the Government in exercise of their power under section 432 or 433 CrPC. Wherever the
Penal Code or such penal statutes have provided for a minimum sentence for any offence, to
that extent, the power of remission or commutation has to be read as restricted; otherwise, the
whole purpose of punishment will be deflated and it will be a mockery on sentencing.
Case Law: Shatrugan Chauhan v UOI
A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has held that undue, inordinate and unreasonable
delay in execution of death sentence does certainly attribute to torture which indeed is in
violation of Article 21 and thereby entails as the ground for commutation of sentence.
However, the nature of delay, i.e., whether it is undue or unreasonable, must be appreciated
based on the facts of individual cases, and no exhaustive guidelines can be framed in this
regard.
