A comparative study of structural differences between the American

and European sports models and an introduction to European Football

clubs’ main sources of revenue

Introduction

The European football industry has become increasingly commercialized over the past 20 years
as the amount of money in sports has increased significantly following the rise of wealthy,
private, foreign and domestic investors and the increased value of broadcasting rights.
Consequently, over the past years transfer fees have skyrocketed and player salaries have
inflated (Deloitte, 2017). European clubs living beyond their means has caused increased debt
levels and an increase in the number of clubs going through insolvency proceedings despite the
fact that the game is now more popular than ever with record high revenues reported by top-

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flight clubs (Sloane, 2015; Szymanski, 2014). Thus, an interesting topic for broader research
is to examine how sustainable this type of behaviour is, and identify different risks and reasons
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why European football clubs could fail in the future.

This paper discusses what are the structural differences between American and European sports
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models as well as introduce the main revenue sources in European club football. Eventually,
the findings of this paper will be used as a base for the broader research topic in the future.
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The current hypothesis of the author is that there are major risks presently involved in football
finance caused by the ownership incentives due to the structure of European football leagues.
Thus, the expectation is that introducing a hybrid model, a mix of American and European
sports models, would help to avoid a possible financial failure in the future.

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American Model

Amateurs and the Role of Schools and Colleges

In the traditional American Sports Model, there is a clear distinction between amateur and
professional athletes (Pijetlovic, 2015; Nafziger, 2008). Amateur sports in the US involves
athletes taking part in different competitions without getting paid. These contests are governed
by various authorities such as community leagues, state and national regulatory boards,
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and other supervisory organisations
involved at nonprofessional level (Nafziger, 2008). Even though the athletes at amateur level
sports do not receive a salary, that does not mean that money is not involved in amateur sports.
In 2010, NCAA signed a 14-year deal worth $10.8 billion with CBS Sports and Turner
Broadcasting for the rights to broadcast men's college basketball tournament (Eder, 2010).

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However, due to strict rules regarding amateur sports, the athletes will not get anything but the
scholarship to pay their education. The fairness of this is also a widely debated topic among
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academics (E.g. Mitchell and Edelman, 2013; Hamzaee et al., 2015; Smith, 2011; Cooper,
2011).
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However, the role of the schools and colleges in developing athletes is significantly different
than in the European model, as most sports operate as part of the school's physical education
instead of clubs (Nafziger, 2008).
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Commercialised as Franchises
This paper focuses only on the academic findings from the four major professional leagues;
National Football League (NFL), National Hockey League (NHL), National Basketball
Association (NBA), and the Major League Baseball (MLB) because these four create the
general ‘American Model' of professional sports. Many academics have researched the model
applied in the American sports (e.g. Vrooman, 2000; Fort and Quirk, 1992, 1995; Dietl et al.,
2011a; Andreff, 2011). The academic literature suggests that these four major leagues have a
clear motive for profit maximisation and, thus, sports is seen more like a business (e.g. Sloane,
2015; Andreff, 2011; Szymanski, 2003). Furthermore, the teams adopt a similar structure to
normal business corporations where each league commercially operates as associations of
franchises, but also as joint ventures among the constituent teams (Pijetlovic, 2015).
Additionally, the franchises elect the league's commissioner in charge of interpretation and

5
enforcement of the rules within the league. Thus, American leagues do not belong to
international governing bodies the same way as European football clubs do. Therefore, teams
do not face any international competition and the majority of players in these leagues do not
participate in World Cup competitions to represent their country (Pijetlovic, 2015). For
instance, NHL (2017a) announced that it won’t allow its players to participate in the 2018
Winter Olympics because majority of clubs were against it. Instead, NHL occasionally
organizes the World Cup of Hockey – previously in 2016 – and have all the power to set the
rules and decide which countries can take part (NHL, 2016).

Closed Leagues

The structure of all the four major leagues involves a closed system of competition where a
fixed number of 30-32 teams compete against each other without facing any external

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competition. (Nafziger, 2008; Pijetlovic, 2015; Andreff, 2011). Thus, the worst performing
teams do not risk relegation, and the minor league teams cannot be promoted to the major
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league. Different economists have identified both strengths and weaknesses of having closed
leagues (Dietl et al., 2011b; Andreff, 2011; Buzzacchi et al., 2010).
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The entry barriers are very high for new teams entering a closed league as it is only possible
by purchasing an expensive expansion of the franchise, if there is one for sale (Andreff, 2011).
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The new team is added to the association of franchises only if the super-majority of the existing
clubs and the league commission vote for it (Pijetlovic, 2015). Also, the commissioner of the
league will examine the profitability of the entering team's market and location (Andreff, 2011).
In December 2017, NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman announced that Seattle can begin NHL
expansion process, but it comes with a hefty $650 million expansion fee (NHL, 2017b).
Another entry barrier is that the teams do not float in the stock market because it is forbidden
by the league (Dietl et al., 2011a). This is because the owners do not want to risk their teams
being acquired by an outsider (Andreff, 2011). If Porter's five forces framework is applied the
threat of new entry is very low for the existing teams (Porter, 1979). However, it could be
argued that the model implicates unfair competition as it is challenging to create a new
franchise. Therefore, many economists identify the leagues as cartels (Biner, 2014; Vrooman,
2000, 2015).

In a closed league system, a team enjoys benefits of having a monopoly as it is usually the only
team in an urban area allowed to organise major league's games (Andreff, 2011). However, in

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case the market is not profitable enough the owners can, with the league's agreement, move the
franchise to another city or even another country (Pijetlovic, 2015; Dietl et al., 2011a). In 2011,
Atlanta Thrashers (NHL) was sold to Winnipeg, Canada, due to decreased attendance (NHL,
2011). Thus, the fans may lose the club they love strictly due to business. Additionally, the
owners have used their power over the public by threating relocation unless they can allocate
public finance into new stadium project, which has caused a lot of debate (Rappaport and
Wilkerson, 2001).

Some of the benefits of having this type of profit-maximising closed league is that it can
regulate the talent distribution and the salaries better to avoid inflated transfer fees and
explosive growth in wages (Kesenne, 2000). Furthermore, through revenue sharing, the league
can control the financial stability of the teams. By having these regulations, the competitive
balance is argued to remain higher (Buzzacchi, et al., 2010).

Salary Caps

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Most major leagues in the United States have introduced salary caps to regulate both talent
distribution and players' salaries. Salary caps are an integral part of the system of labour
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relations in the U.S major leagues and the amount of league revenue, which should be directed
to players' salaries, is negotiated between the team owners and players' unions in Collective
Bargaining Agreements (Dietl et al., 2011b). This has also been the centre of discussion in
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academic literature. First, Staudohar's work (1998) describes the history of the development of
salary caps in the four major leagues in North America. Fort and Quirk (1995) argue that salary
cap is the only effective way to improve the competitive balance and financial stability in
sporting leagues. Also, Kesenne (2000) supports the arguments with his two-team model and
finds that the NBA's salary cap model improves both competitive balance and the distribution
of the players' salaries within the league. In contrast, Dietl et al. (2009) analyse the possible
impact of the externally controlled salary cap on social welfare in a league where clubs intend
to maximise profits, and argue that the restrictions may worsen the quality of teams and the
league at players expense. Moreover, Vrooman (2000) argues that his findings show that the
salary cap system, in fact, worsens the competitive balance than improves it. Thus, it is essential
to address more research into examining the strengths and weaknesses of the salary cap system
in particular league.

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As an exception, MLB claims not to have a salary cap, but a luxury tax mechanism instead.
The tax mechanism divides the league into two halves, in which teams above certain tax
threshold pay higher taxes to the league, and the league then redistributes the money to less
wealthy teams in the lower half (Dietl et al., 2011b). Consequently, the system does not restrict
spending in the league but it aims to make sure that the gap between wealthy and poor teams
does not increase, balancing the league’s competitiveness. Additional theoretical analyses of
luxury taxes can be found from the literature of Marburger (1997) and Dietl et al. (2010).

Draft System and the Player Mobility

In North American closed leagues, the league can regulate the recruitment rules and player
mobility because of its monopsony power in the labour market for talent (Andreff, 2011;
Szymanski 2003). Since the 1970s veteran players have had a right for free agent status after

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playing in the league for a defined number of years as the restrictions on prohibiting a player's
move to another club without the owner's agreement resulted in several strikes and lockouts
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(Andreff, 2011). However, the new young prospects and young foreign players enter the league
in a reverse-order-of-finish draft, meaning that the last finished team, will be able to draft the
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best rookie with the first overall pick in the rookie draft, which takes place during the offseason
(Kahane, 2006). Thus, professional sports leagues are the only businesses in North America
where firms (clubs) face restrictions on whom they decide to hire (Andreff, 2011). Also, trading
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players for cash is either restricted or forbidden and the trade happens through player and draft
pick barters instead (Szymanski, 2003). Moreover, Fort and Quirk (1995) argue that because
the American sports clubs are considered as profit maximisers in the current closed league
system, the clubs only invest in talent if it increases revenue more than total costs. Additionally,
the authors argue that small-market teams lack of incentives to build competitive teams that
would maximise the league’s revenue because big-market teams subsidise them through
revenue sharing and finishing last gives them an opportunity to draft the most talented prospect.

Revenue Sharing

The revenue from national television rights is divided equally, but the clubs are allowed to sell
local broadcasting rights individually within their home market (Peeters, 2012; Szymanski,
2003). According to Buzzacchi et al. (2010), some North American leagues have adapted gate
revenue sharing, where the home team pays a certain percentage of ticket revenue to the away

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team, for instance, in the NFL gate sharing is as high as 40%. The impact of revenue sharing
system has also been discussed with many economists. Feess and Stahler (2009) argue that
revenue sharing enhances competitive balance within a league as money is transferred from
financially strong teams to weaker ones. Thus, narrowing the gap between big market teams
and the small market teams. Additionally, Vrooman (2015) suggests that a cooperative profit-
max cartel maximises league revenues and fan welfare, but it comes at the expense of
minimised salaries and a reduced amount of the overall talent in the league. In contrast, the
findings of Szymanski and Kesenne (2004) state that gate revenue sharing will reduce
investment in talent and decrease the competitive balance within the league. Due to these
findings, it is challenging to state the right and wrong because the topic is very subjective.

European Model

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Even though there are some similarities in European and American sports models, it could be
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argued that the European model is everything the American model is not. Various scholars
have identified different strengths and weaknesses among the models (e.g. Sloane, 1971, 2015;
Andreff, 2011; Szymanski, 2010); however, it is difficult to state which model overcomes the
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other.
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Win/Utility Maximization
While the findings of the North American model are based on the four major leagues, the
European model is strictly based on European football (Pijetlovic, 2015; Dietl et al., 2011a;
Szymanski, 2003). In his influential paper, Sloane (1971), first finds that the owners of
European football clubs can be best thought of as ‘utility maximisers', with an incentive to
maximise performance on the pitch. Furthermore, academics make the distinction between the
two by arguing that the club owners' main objective in European football is to maximise wins
rather than profits (Leach and Szymanski, 2015; Feess and Muehlheusser, 2003; Vrooman,
2015).

"The goal is to win. It's not about making money" – Roman

Abramovich, owner Chelsea FC

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Vrooman (2015) suggests that the owners in Sportsman Leagues are win-maximizers who
spend the money on talent at the owners' expense. Players in Sportsman Leagues enjoy higher
salaries, but the leagues are often dominated by large-market clubs and, thus, there is a more
significant gap in competition between the rich and poor clubs (Vrooman, 2015). In contrast,
after examining 16 English football clubs listed in the stock market, Leach and Szymanski
(2015) argue that football clubs in England could be considered as profit maximisers because
stock floating companies always pursue to raise value for investors. However, they found that
the stock price quickly declined as the proceedings were invested in a team. Thus, the
hypothesis of listing resulting in increased profits and declining performance on the pitch was
rejected. According to Rohde and Breuer (2016a, 2016b), the ownership models in European
football leagues include foreign/domestic private investors, club member associations, and
distributed ownership. In addition, the clubs are allowed to list themselves at stock exchange,
which differs from the American model.

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During the past decade, different economists have studied the impact of different owners on
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competitive balance and financial performance (e.g. Rohde and Breuer, 2016a, 2016b; Sass,
2014; Franck and Lang, 2014) and found both risks and benefits. The biggest influencer has
been foreign private investors or i.e. ‘sugar daddies’ whose involvement has increased club’s
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spending power, but can also be associated with agency problems and financial dependence
(Rohde and Breuer, 2016b).
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Following the increased spending habits of clubs’ private investors, The Union of European
Football Associations (UEFA) introduced new Financial Fair Play Regulations (FFP) to slow
down the spending habits and aim for more sustainable growth (Rohde and Breuer, 2016a;
Franck and Lang, 2014). The FFP system is the only restriction in the European model and
under the rules, clubs must break-even over a three-year period (Sass, 2014). Even though this
model is rather new, economists (Sass, 2014; Freestone and Manoli, 2017; Schubert and
Könecke, 2014) have already argued both for and against it. This topic will also be further
addressed in the next paper.

Open Leagues
Another distinctive difference between the models is that European leagues are open to external
competition through a system of promotion and relegation (Sloane, 2015). Sloane also notes
that the club's geographical movement in Europe is somewhat restricted and, thus, the mobility

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of clubs is more upward/downward within divisions. This means that the best performing teams
in the second division are promoted to the first division while the last-ranked teams in first
division face relegation to the second division (Andreff, 2011). In theory, teams can climb up
the latter by starting from the lowest division and end up to the first division due to its sports
success; however, this demands a lot of resources (Ross and Szymanski, 2002). According to
Szymanski and Zimbalist (2005), the open league model faces more competition than a closed
league due to absence of entry barriers. The authors argue that the higher amount of competition
can explain the leagues’ low profitability. Moreover, Ross and Szymanski (2002) argue that
the system of promotion and relegation raises fan welfare because it increases the effectiveness
of competition within a league as clubs invest more into talent while trying to 1) win the league,
2) avoid relegation, or 3) pursue a promotion. Consequently, Szymanski and Valletti (2003)
argue that because both ends of the league table remain interesting to follow until the end of
the season, broadcast income will remain higher than in the closed leagues. However, this can

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lead to a riskier financial behaviour through wealthy sugar daddies' money injections as
suggested by Franck and Lang (2014).
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Sports teams cannot be run as traditional businesses trying to overcome the competition until
the point where competition does not exist (Szymanski and Valletti, 2003). This is because at
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least two, preferably equal, teams are needed to create quality product that meets with the
customers’ (fans) demand. Both closed and open leagues are concerned with the competitive
balance in the league because the more uncertain the outcome is, the more it creates interest
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among fans (Szymanski, 2003). Consequently, increased interest will result in higher match
day and broadcasting revenues. Promotion/regulation system itself balances the
competitiveness within a league as the weaker clubs get replaced with possibly better clubs
from the top of the lower division (Andreff, 2011). However, Andreff also argues that open
league system decreases competitive balance, as it leads to more profound economic and
financial disparities across the league due to lost broadcasting and ticket revenue following
relegation.

No Additional Player Restrictions

In 1995, the European Court of Justice ruled that the transfer system and restrictions
considering the maximum number of foreign players allowed per team were illegal and, thus,
violated the Treaty of Rome that guarantees free worker mobility to all European Union
citizens (Andreff and Staudohar, 2000). After the so-called Bosman case in 1995, the player

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labour market was opened and has become increasingly more international (Sloane, 2015). For
instance, the Football Observatory's 2016 monthly report indicates that 61.8% of the players in
the English Premier League are foreign (Poli et al., 2016). Despite the fact that salaries and
transfer fees saw explosive growth after the Bosman case, the leagues have not adapted similar
restrictions to American model (Dietl et al., 2011b). Thus, player drafts, roster limits, and salary
caps are absent, and most transfers occur through cash transfers or player loans (Sloane, 2015;
Andreff, 2011).

The Main Sources of Revenue in Football Clubs

Over the past 20 years the European club football industry has become more commercialized
and, thus, more and more economists have studied the economics and business models of
different football leagues. Andreff and Staudohar (2000) were among the first to propose an

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"MCMMG" (Medias – Corporations – Merchandising – Markets – Global) model to illustrate
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the financial structure of modern sports by demonstrating the five main sources of revenue. As
a sequel, Bourg and Gouguet (2012) updated the MCMMG pattern with their "SATI (Sponsors
– Actionnaires – Television – International) model" which is more focused on professional
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football rather than sports in general (Cited in Dima, 2015). Furthermore, Bastien (2013) adapt
these two in his "SATEMMI model (Spectators – Actionnaires – Television – Enterprise –
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Marches – Merchandising – International" (cited in Dima, 2015).

Through these findings, Dima (2015) sums the European Football Industry's business model to
three most critical revenue-generating factors (MCM):

1. Media Rights
2. Commercial Income
3. Matchday Revenue

All of the models mentioned above can be used to study how European football clubs generate
revenue. Dima's MCM model provides a broad and clear overview and, thus, it is the most
suitable model for this paper. The MCM, model is also used in the Deloitte's Annual Review
of Football Finance (2017).

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Media Rights
The growth in the number of broadcasters and the rise of commercial broadcasting explains the
explosive growth of the value of media rights sales in professional sports (Noll, 2007). Noll
argues that the rise of commercialised TV broadcasting shifted the sports broadcasting from
free public TV to commercial paid channels.

From the late 1990s till today, TV broadcasting has been the most significant revenue stream
in European football leagues (Dima, 2015; Dietl et al., 2011; Deloitte, 2017; Andreff and
Staudohar, 2000). The total broadcast revenue includes broadcasts distributed from taking part
in regular domestic leagues, League Cup competition, and European club competition
(Bosshardt et al., 2015).

According to Deloitte (2017a), the financial performance in ‘the big five' (England, France,
Germany, Italy, Spain) leagues has been heavily impacted by the increasing growth of

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centralised broadcast revenues. Increased broadcasting revenue has fuelled the investment in
talent as the clubs pursue sporting success, which would not only generate more broadcast
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income but also accelerate growth in ticket sales and merchandise sales (Szymanski, 2017).
However, as the clubs' primary income comes from TV rights sales, it can be argued that the
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bargaining power of the media companies is high and thus, it can be seen as a risk among clubs.
For instance, Szymanski (2017) points out how within a year 12 clubs faced insolvency
proceedings after the unexpected collapse of the ITV digital broadcast contract, in 2002.
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Figure 1: ‘Big Five' European League clubs' revenues – 2015/16 (€m)

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*As illustrated in figure 1, TV broadcasting is the most significant revenue channel in each of
the big five leagues, followed by sponsorship/commercial revenue and lastly matchday revenue
(Deloitte, 2017).
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Figure 2: Revenue Sharing in European ‘Big Five’

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*Figure 2 The differences in broadcast revenue sharing in the European ‘big five’ leagues. As
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mentioned above, this is a different system to the American model (KPMG, 2017). Furthermore, in
European football leagues, gate revenue sharing only occurs in some external Cup competitions, e.g.
FA CUP, which are different from the actual league (Peeters, 2012)
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Commercial Income

The commercial income in Dima's MCM model (2015) involves the revenue generated through
sponsorship sales, merchandising, and other business operations (Bosshardt et al., 2015). As
illustrated in figure 1 above, the commercial income used in MCM model can be seen as
commercial/sponsorship revenue, which is the second highest source of revenue in each of the
‘big five' league. As most of the European clubs' income statements are not available for the
public, this paper illustrates how the revenues are created by studying English Premier League
club, Manchester United.

With a record-breaking total revenue of £581,204,000, in 2017, Manchester United has

regained the top spot in the Money League (Manchester United PLC, 2017; Deloitte, 2017b).
According to Deloitte's annual report, Football Money League (2017b), United was able to
regain the top spot in spite of declining on-pitch performance due to phenomenal growth in

15
commercial revenue. In 2017, United created £275,471,000 in commercial revenue, which
equals to 47,3% of the total revenue (Manchester United PLC, 2017). The breakdown of
commercial income can be seen in table 1 below.

Table 1. Manchester United PLC, 2017 Annual Report, Income Statement Breakdown:

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According to the annual report (2017), United signed a 10-year deal with Adidas, in August
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2015, and is worth a guaranteed £750m, equalling to a total of £75m a year. However, this
amount varies based on on-pitch performance. Thus, the maximum possible increase is £4
million per year if the team wins any titles. On the other hand, in case the team fails to qualify
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for Champions League for two or more consecutive seasons, the maximum reduction is 30%
of that year's payment.
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Another noteworthy sponsorship deal was made with the United's current shirt sponsor General
Motors (Chevrolet) and is worth a total of $559 million. According to the annual report, the
agreement started in the 2014/15 season and is to end at the end of the 2020/21 season.
Moreover, the club received $37,2 million in pre-sponsorship payments and is due to get the
remaining $521.8m over the seven-year deal. The amount received in 2017 equalled to 10.2%
of the total revenue.

The merchandising business in United includes all the sales of different sportswear, clothing,
fan shirts, and other licensed products such as coffee mugs and bedspread that feature the
Manchester United brand. The total merchandise sales reached close to £104m in 2017, which
is almost as much as the average total income of Premier League clubs who did not face
relegation or qualify to European League competitions, in 2015/16 (see figure 3 below). Thus,
it is an excellent example of the financial disparities within the English Premier League.

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Figure 3: Premier League and Championship clubs' average revenues – 2015/16 (£m)

(Deloitte, 2017)

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Matchday Income
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The match day income is the final part of the MCM model, and it involves all the revenue
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generated through ticket and corporate hospitality sales (including season ticket sales) and the
supporters' expenses inside the stadiums during home games (Bosshardt et al., 2015). As the
match day revenue has the same main factors with every club, Manchester United can be used
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again as an example. The match day revenue includes the revenue generated through ticket and
hospitality sales only in the games played at the club's home stadium. In United's case, the
revenue is based on 19 EPL matches played at the Old Trafford (home stadium) and any
additional games resulting from the success in FA Cup, EFL Cup, and international UEFA
competitions (Manchester United PLC, 2017). In 2017 (fiscal year ended 20 June 2017),
United's total match day revenue was £111.6 million (Manchester United PLC, 2017).

As the match day revenue can only be created in matches played at the home stadium,
qualifying for external domestic or international competitions can make a big difference in a
club's financial performance each year. Furthermore, the matchday revenue is also dependent
on the stadium capacity as clubs with bigger stadiums can create more income than those with
relatively small stadium capacity. Consequently, these clubs can gain a competitive advantage
over other clubs, therefore more clubs are investing in new stadiums, e.g. Tottenham Hotspur
is currently building a new arena for the season 2018/19 (Szymanski, 2017; Deloitte 2017a).

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Conclusion

In conclusion, both American and European models have their own strengths and weaknesses.
The American closed, cartel type model has its own problems to show evidence of fair
competition in terms of standard economics as the entry barriers are high. Furthermore, because
the teams do not face relegation, the customers may lose interest in the product in mid-season
as the teams at the lower end of standings have nothing at stake if they have missed the chance
to qualify to the playoffs. Moreover, the profit maximising owners do not have an incentive to
invest in talent before the beginning of the next season, because finishing last is ‘rewarded’
with the opportunity to pick the best prospect in the upcoming draft. However, in the closed
leagues, the owners can focus on maximising profits through various restrictions in salaries
and talent distribution, and having the ability to relocate the franchise geographically. Thus,
the American model shows evidence of being more financially sustainable.

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In contrast, in the European open league model, the owners have stronger incentives to
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maximise wins, because they face more competition due to the promotion/relegation system.
In these leagues, poorly performed teams are punished through relegation to a lower division,
which also results in vast financial losses. On the other hand, good performance will be
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rewarded, as teams qualify to external international competitions. Also, in some occasions,
teams receive a bigger share of broadcasting revenue in case the league shares revenues based
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on performance. One of the benefits of this system is that the league remains interesting in both
ends as teams are either trying to win the championship, qualify to European leagues, or avoid
relegation.

However, this has resulted in overinvestment in talent and will not be as sustainable as the
American model. Furthermore, European football clubs are strongly dependent on the
broadcasting revenue. Consequently, unexpected changes in broadcast sales would be an
adverse shock to most of the clubs. Thus, it can be argued that the current European model
does not seem to be financially sustainable and there are risks of failure involved, even though
the UEFA has introduced the Financial Fair Play Regulations. However, these risks will be
further addressed in the next paper.

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Appendix

Research Log

Database Time Spent Search Terms Results Evaluation of

material
Ebsco Host 4h Football 72 Studied material
economy, or, and took notes
football
stakeholders, or
problems in
football finance,
not, American
football
Ebsco Host 3h Football 11/72 saved to Studied material
economy, not, folder and wrote down
nfl, or, problems notes
in football

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finance, not,
American
football
Ebsco Host 6h
pl
Economy & 1000 Picked few of the
Premier league & first articles and
finance & saved them
management &
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football, or,
soccer
Ebsco host 4 Macroeconomic 54 Selected few
impact of articles and
Sa

European club highlighted text

football

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This article was first found through Mendeley search engine:
- Sass, M. (2014). Glory Hunters, Sugar Daddies, and Long-Term Competitive
Balance Under UEFA Financial Fair Play. Journal of Sports Economics, 17(2),
pp.148-158.
o Then the software started recommending articles and saving and highlighting
articles on pdfs helped in my research

Screenshots from Mendeley are attached below:

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Mind Map

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