TITLE: Biraogo v.

The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

CITATION: G.R. No. 192935, 7 December 2010
FACTS:
This special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo assailing Executive Order No. 1 for being
violative of. the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional
authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.
The genesis of this case can be traced to the campaign slogan of President-elect Benigno Simeon Aquino |II "Kung
walang corrupt, walang mahirap". He had declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption thus, to transform
it into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption
allegedly committed during the previous administration.
The President on July 30, 2010 signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.
Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the
President. Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be empowered by the Constitution, a
statute or an authorization vested in him by law. According to petitioner, such power cannot be presumed since there is
no provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth commission. He adds
that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the President the continuing authority to reorganize his
office, cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission considering the aforesaid provision merely uses verbs
such as "reorganize," "transfer," "consolidate," "merge," and"abolish."
The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation by the President of a fact-finding body
such as a truth commission. Pointing to numerous offices created by past presidents,it argues that the authority of the
President to create public offices, within the Office of the President Proper has long been recognized. According to the
OSG, the Executive, just like the other two branches of government, possesses the inherent authority to create fact
finding committees to assist it in the perfommance of its constitutionally mandated functions and in the exercise of its
administrative functions.This power, as the OSc explains it, is but an adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the
President under Section i and his power of control under Section 17, both of Article VIl of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress
to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions.
RULING:
No, the creation of Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President but the Court did not uphold
the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause
enshrined in Bill of Rights for singling out the "'previous administration" as its sole object.
As to the issue on president's executive power, the creation of Philippine Truth Commission finds justification under Sec.
17, Article VIl of the Constitution imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They
argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book IlI, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.0. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto
inexistent like the "Truth Commission."
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the "Truth Commission" with-quasi-judicial
powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and
the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and
personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President's executive power and power of control
necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in
any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and
settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere
allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a
fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter's
jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable
purposes.
Issue: 1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
Held: The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of
the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated,he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or wil sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Title: Republic of the Philippines v. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno

Facts: Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines by then-President
Benigno S. Aquino III in 2012. Prior to her appointment to the Supreme Court, Sereno served as a faculty member of the
University of the Philippines College of Law and as legal counsel in various government agencies, including serving as
legal counsel for the Republic in international arbitrations.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida, filed a quo warranto petition before the
Supreme Court seeking to declare the appointment of Sereno as Chief Justice void. The basis for the petition was the
alleged failure of Sereno to file her Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs) required for government
positions. These filings were for the period when she was a professor at the UP College of Law and while employed as
legal counsel for the government.
The Solicitor General argued that Sereno’s failure to file and submit her SALNs demonstrated a lack of integrity, making
her ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice. The petition was anchored on the notion that “proven integrity” is an
indispensable requirement for appointment to the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution of the Philippines.
Sereno countered that, as an impeachable officer, she can only be removed through the impeachment process provided
by the Constitution, and that the remedy of quo warranto is inapplicable.
The case that led to the ouster of Sereno from the position of Chief Justice involved a series of legal maneuverings
initiated by the Office of the Solicitor General.
Issues:
1. Whether the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction to hear a quo warranto petition against an impeachable officer such
as the Chief Justice of the Philippines.
2. Whether the remedy of quo warranto is appropriate against Sereno, given the allegations of her failure to satisfy the
requirement of integrity due to non-filing of SALNs.
3. Whether Sereno can only be removed by impeachment and not by any other legal proceedings.
4. Whether the petition is barred by prescription.
5. Whether the supplementation of a ground for tax fraud in the quo warranto petition
Court’s Decision:
1. The Court asserted its jurisdiction to hear the quo warranto petition. It noted that while impeachment is a political
process, quo warranto is a judicial proceeding that addresses the legality of a public official’s appointment.
2. The Court held that the failure to file the required SALNs, along with other grounds, shows a lack of integrity, thus
rendering Sereno ineligible for the position of Chief Justice.
3. The Court ruled that the remedy of quo warranto is not exclusive to impeachment proceedings and that both legal
remedies could coexist.
4. The Court rejected the argument that the petition was barred by prescription, asserting the principle “nullum tempus
occurrit regi,” which implies that the State is not bound by prescription in bringing actions in the public interest.
5. The Court did not find forum shopping in the filing of the quo warranto petition, clarifying that this case and the
impeachment proceedings involve different issues and proceedings.

Contentions:
Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):
OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because what is being sought is to question the validity of her
appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of committing culpable violation of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust while in office, citing Funa v. Chairman Villar, Estrada v. Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De
Vera. OSG maintains that the phrase “may be removed from office” in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution means that
Members of the SC may be removed through modes other than impeachment.
OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under Section 11, Rule 66 since
Sereno’s transgressions only came to light during the impeachment proceedings. Moreover, OSG claims that it has an
imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition under the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi (“no time runs against
the king”) or prescription does not operate against the government. The State has a continuous interest in ensuring that
those who partake of its sovereign powers are qualified. Even assuming that the one-year period is applicable to the
OSG, considering that SALNs are not published, the OSG will have no other means by which to know the disqualification.
Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which created a permanent Committee
on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate complaints involving graft and corruption and ethical violations
against members of the SC and contending that this is not a political question because such issue may be resolved
through the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial Ethics.
OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed to show that she is a person of proven
integrity which is an indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary under Section 7(3), Article VIII of the
Constitution. According to the OSG, because OSG failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her
integrity remains unproven. The failure to submit her SALN, which is a legal obligation, should have disqualified Sereno
from being a candidate; therefore, she has no right to hold the office. Good faith cannot be considered as a defense since
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA No. 6713) are special laws and are thus governed by the concept of malum prohibitum, wherein malice or
criminal intent is completely immaterial.
Sereno (respondent):
Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted through impeachment, citing Section 2 of Article XI of
the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First lndorsement from Hon.
Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment Against SAJ Antonio T. Carpio. Sereno contends that the clear
intention of the framers of the Constitution was to create an exclusive category of public officers who can be removed
only by impeachment and not otherwise. Impeachment was chosen as the method of removing certain high-ranking
government officers to shield them from harassment suits that will prevent them from performing their functions which
are vital to the continued operations of government. Sereno further argues that the word “may” on Section 2 of Article
XI only qualifies the penalty imposable after the impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office. Sereno contends that the
since the mode is wrong, the SC has no jurisdiction.
Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours with the present case because the President and the
Vice President may, in fact, be removed by means other than impeachment on the basis of Section 4, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the qualifications of the
President and the Vice-President. There is no such provision for other impeachable officers. Moreover, on the rest of the
cases cited by the OSG, there is no mention that quo warranto may be allowed.
Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before the RTC, such would result to a conundrum
because a judge of lower court would have effectively exercised disciplinary power and administrative supervision over
an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank and is contrary to Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which
vests upon the SC disciplinary and administrative power over all courts and the personnel thereof.
Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted through quo warranto initiated by the OSG, the
Congress’ “check” on the SC through impeachment would be rendered inutile.
Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a petition for quo
warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the “cause of ouster” and not from the “discovery” of the
disqualification.
Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs because as a public officer,
she enjoys the presumption that her appointment to office was regular. OSG failed to overcome the presumption created
by the certifications from UP HRDO that she had been cleared of all administrative responsibilities and charges. Her
integrity is a political question which can only be decided by the JBC and the President.
Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that SALNs are missing cannot give rise to the inference that
they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs were filed should give an inference to a pattern of filing, not of non-filing.
Intervenors’ arguments:
The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that she possessed the integrity required
by the Constitution; rather, the onus of determining whether or not she qualified for the post fell upon the JBC.
Moreover, submission of SALNs is not a constitutional requirement; what is only required is the imprimatur of the JBC.
The intervenors likewise contend that “qualifications” such as citizenship, age, and experience are enforceable while
“characteristics” such as competence, integrity, probity, and independence are mere subjective considerations.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.
Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING the
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.
The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council is directed to
commence the application and nomination process.
This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.