Right To Equality
Right To Equality
To equaliTy
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The right to equality and non-discrimination
Section 9 of the constitution
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the
law.
- Everyone includes anyone within the borders of SA
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.
▪ This includes affirmative action is justified given our historical context of racism.
▪ Sometimes to achieve equality unfair discrimination can be used.
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or
more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture,
language and birth. (Vertical Application)
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more
grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or
prohibit unfair discrimination. (Horizontal Application)
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is
established that the discrimination is fair.
The right to equality encapsulates the aspiration of eventually achieving a society in
which all enjoy equal access to the resources and amenities of life, and are able to
develop their full human potential.
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Formal equality
Formal equality focuses on the formal way in which the law treat individuals or
groups.
It explicitly denies the need to take into account the social and economic context or
the differences in power, status and opportunities between individuals or groups of
individuals when judging whether the equality injunction has been breached or not.
Formal equality demands that all people should be treated in the same manner,
regardless of their personal circumstances, their history, their social and economic
status, and whether they have been discriminated against in the past or still face
discrimination in the present.
Formal equality demands neutrality and does not accommodate different treatment of
people who are socially and economically different from one another.
The harm of discrimination is situated in the failure of a government to treat people
as equally fair.
Substantive equality
It focuses on the actual economic, social, and political conditions of groups and
individuals in society.
As such the constitutional court stated that Particularly in a country such as South Africa,
persons belonging to certain categories have suffered considerable unfair discrimination in
the past. It is insufficient for the Constitution merely to ensure, through its Bill of Rights, that
statutory provisions which have caused such unfair discrimination in the past are eliminated.
Past unfair discrimination frequently has ongoing negative consequences, the continuation of
which is not halted immediately when the initial causes thereof are eliminated, and unless
remedied, may continue for a substantial time and even indefinitely. Like justice, equality
delayed is equality denied.
Substantive equality asks what impact differentiating legal rules or other
differentiating treatment will have on groups or individuals, given differences in the
social and economic status of such groups or individuals, and given the way in which
existing ‘neutral’ legal rules privilege the economically and culturally dominant and
powerful in society.
A legal commitment to substantive equality therefore entails attention to the context.
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This context includes the social and economic inequalities in society, the effects of
past and ongoing prejudice and discrimination on the basis of race, sex, gender,
sexual orientation, disability, economic status and other grounds on the life
opportunities of individuals.
The context also includes the manner in which private relationships, such as
marriage and child-rearing duties, continue to be structured in ways that produce or
perpetuate disadvantage and subordination.
NB NB NB ! The focus is on the impact of the treatment instead of the treatment
itself.
Substantive equality is remedial in nature and aims to overcome the effects of past
and ongoing prejudice and discrimination as well as the broader structural reasons
for the disempowerment and economic disadvantage faced by some individuals or
groups in society.
The factors that need to be considered by substantive equality : personal
circumstances, history, social and economic status, effects and impact of legal rules
and lastly remedial in nature (in overcoming the effects of the past ), all of these
factors need to be considered.
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impugned provision as well as the history of the group or groups to which the
complainant belongs.
4. Taking this context into account, the court determines whether the legally relevant
differentiation aims to create or perpetuate patterns of group disadvantage, or
whether it aims to break down these structural inequalities and thus reach for true
or substantive equality.
5. If the latter is the case, the court will be reluctant to declare the measures
unconstitutional or unlawful.
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Differentiation and discrimination
Differentiation is not discriminatory if it aims to redress inequalities of the past or
marginalised groups (race, gender, sexual orientation) as in accordance with s 9(2) of
the constitution.
Values underlying the right to equality: human dignity and equality.
The judges of the Constitutional Court have unanimously embraced the idea that at
its core, the equality guarantee protects individuals’ human dignity.
This court placed human dignity at the heart of its equality enquiry.
The Court accepts that the equality guarantee protects individuals from differentiation
based on one of the specified grounds in section 9(3) or similar forms of
differentiation that have the potential to infringe on a person’s fundamental human
dignity.
The concourt stated that human dignity will be impaired whenever a legally relevant
differentiation treats people as ‘second-class citizens’, ‘demeans them’, ‘treats them
as less capable for no good reason’, otherwise offends ‘fundamental human dignity’
or where it violates an individual’s self-esteem and personal integrity.
This idea of dignity is based on the notion that all human beings have an equal moral
worth – the right to be treated with equal concern and respect –
It has been concluded that equality without dignity is inhuman.
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Section 9(1) applies in cases where the legislative provision differentiates
between people or groups of people, but this differentiation is not based, either
directly or indirectly, on one of the grounds listed in section 9(3) or on an
analogous ground that is similar to the grounds explicitly listed in section 9(3).
▪ This is known as mere differentiation.
Mere differentiation is therefore referring to the many distinctions that the law makes
that have nothing to do with the kind of discrimination based on race, sex, gender or
other grounds listed in or similar to those listed in section 9(3) of the Constitution.
Mere differentiation, when differentiating, the state needs to function in a rational
manner.
They may not distinguish between groups in a way that is irrational.
The state will need to show that the purpose is not arbitrary(subjective) nor irrational
and that it does not distinguish between people or groups of people in a way that is
irrational.
Rationality is part of accountability and justification in a democratic state.
It is important in a rationality enquiry ‘to identify and examine the specific government
object sought to be achieved by the challenged rule of law or provision’ and a court
will not rely on a generic general purpose identified.
However, all the state has to show is that the purpose was neither arbitrary nor
irrational for the differentiation to be in line with s9(1).
It does not have to show that the purpose pursued was a wise one or one with which
the Court agrees.
However, where there is no discernible purpose for the differentiation, the court will
find the legislative provision to be in breach of s 9(1).
▪ The Court declared certain sections of the Post Office Act 66 unconstitutional as they
breached section 9(1) of the Constitution.
▪ This was because the impugned provisions treated divorced spouses of employees of the
Post Office differently from other divorced spouses whose treatment is regulated by other
legislation.
▪ The Constitutional Court found that this differentiation was irrational as it had no basis.
▪ The different treatment was an anomaly that could not be explained in a rational manner.
▪ As the different treatment was not based on a ground like race or sex or gender, but on
whether a person worked for the Post Office or another employer, the Court relied on section
9(1) to invalidate the provisions of the Post Office Act.
▪ However, because the rationality test is applied relatively strictly, the Court does not often
invalidate legislation because it breaches section 9(1) of the Constitution.
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Rules of the pension fund.
▪ The rules of the pension fund stated that Ms. Ngewu would only be able to acquire her share
of the pension interest when Mr. Ngewu terminates his membership with the fund.
▪ NOT at the time of divorce.
▪ The rules of the pension fund are contained in the Post Office Act.
▪ Note: According to the pension fund Act, the pension fund interest is paid upon divorce.
In conclusion:
This section recognises that the achievement of equality requires the state and other
powerful institutions in society to take positive steps to address the deep social and
economic inequalities in society.
In addition, the state and other powerful institutions must also address the structures
and systems in society that help to perpetuate this inequality.
These structures and systems prevent individuals from enjoying equal opportunities
and benefits that will allow them to flourish because opportunities and benefits are
available to some people but not to others in society.
The aim of these is to eradicate a system that perpetuates inequality and to address
social and economic inequality to achieve equality in the long term.
Section 9(2) ‘imposes a positive duty on all organs of state to protect and promote
the achievement of equality – a duty which binds the judiciary too’.
NB!!!! A constitutional challenge to restitutionary measures – even based on
any of the grounds of discrimination listed in section 9(3) – must be tested
against section 9(2).
▪ Once a court has determined that the measures comply with the requirements
of section 9(2), they cannot be presumed to be unfairly discriminatory and
cannot be tested against section 9(3).
▪ This means that if it is shown that measures comply with section 9(2), this is a
complete defence against any charge that the measures unfairly discriminate
against anyone.
▪ Thus, the court uses s9(2) to test legislative provisions that implement affirmative
action measures.
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▪ However when it finds that such measures do not comply with s 9(2), the court can
test their constitutionality against s 9(3).
▪ In the achievement of Equality, the state (and other institutions in society) are
required to take positive steps to address the deep social and economic inequalities
in society
Section 9(2) applies to cases where the legislative provision explicitly aims to
give effect to restitutionary measures.
▪ This enhances the notion of substantive equality.
▪ The substantive notion of equality recognises that there are uneven race, class and
gender levels and forms of social and systemic differentiation.
▪ Constitutional Court stated in Van Heerden, the precedent-setting case on section
9(2), corrective or restitutionary measures are mandated by section 9(2) as part of a
‘credible and abiding process of reparation for past exclusion, dispossession, and
indignity within the discipline of our constitutional framework’
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▪ Nevertheless, not every single person who benefits from a restitutionary programme needs to
have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.
▪ What is required is that an ‘overwhelming majority of members of the favoured class are
persons designated as disadvantaged by unfair exclusion’.
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2. Are the measures designed to protect or advance such persons or categories of
persons?
▪ The second requirement for a valid restitutionary programme is that the measure must be
designed to protect or advance those disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.
▪ The measures ‘must be reasonably capable of attaining the desired outcome’ - (of addressing
the effects of past unfair discrimination).
▪ The outcome could be to eradicate social and economic inequality between groups as well as
to eradicate the structures of advantage and privilege that help to perpetuate such inequality
▪ Measures must not be arbitrary.
▪ It is important to note that the onus here rests on the party trying to convince the court that the
remedial measures are unconstitutional and do not comply with section 9(2).
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▪ In the High Court Mr. Van Heerden complaining that the differentiation in the employer
contributions laid down by Rule 4.2.1 (that provided for more advantageous pension benefits)
were arbitrary, unreasonable and unfairly discriminatory.
▪ High court Ruling : found that it amounted to unfair discrimination because rule 4.2.1 was not
a measure designed to advance a previously disadvantaged group.
Con court
▪ Where appeal took place.
▪ The applicant’s complaint is that the High Court misconceived the true nature of equality
protection recognised by our Constitution.
▪ The applicants further allege that the High Court resorted to a formal rather than substantive
notion of equality.
▪ The constitutional Court upheld the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court which
declared Rule 4.2.1 unconstitutional.
▪ Affirmative action measures
• Thus, these affirmative action measures are not reverse discrimination or positive
discrimination.
• S 9(1) and s 9(2) are complementary; both contribute to the constitutional goal of achieving
equality to ensure full and equal enjoyment of all rights.
• To that end, Differentiation aimed at protecting or advancing persons disadvantaged by unfair
discrimination is warranted provided the measures are shown to conform to the internal test
set by s 9(2).
• This court found that the legislative and other measures properly fall within the requirements
of s9(2) and that they are not presumptively unfair.
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▪ First, the court has to determine whether the differentiation in fact amounts to discrimination.
IF YES, THEN
▪ Second, if it does, the court has to determine whether the discrimination amounts to unfair
discrimination.
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Is the discrimination unfair?
▪ Once it is shown that the differentiation constitutes discrimination - either on a ground
listed in section 9(3) or on an analogous ground and whether direct or indirect - the
enquiry moves to the question of whether the discrimination is fair or unfair.
▪ Note: When discrimination occurs on a listed ground, it is presumed, in accordance
with 9(5), that the discrimination is unfair and hence unconstitutional.
▪ It is however possible to rebut the presumption and establish that the discrimination
is not unfair
▪ As the Court remarked in Harksen, the prohibition on unfair discrimination ‘provides a
bulwark against invasions which impair human dignity or which affect people
adversely in a comparably serious manner’.
▪ This remark seems to imply that any determination of the unfairness of the
discrimination depends on whether the human dignity of the complainant has been
impaired.
▪ The Court therefore stressed that what is important is that the enquiry focus on the
impact of the discrimination on the victim.
▪ To determine whether the discriminatory provision has had an unfair impact on a
complainant, a court must consider various factors. Although there is no closed list of
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factors, the Constitutional Court in the Harksen case highlighted the following factors
to guide this enquiry:
a. The position of the complainants in society, whether they have suffered in
the past from patterns of disadvantage, whether the discrimination in the
case under consideration is on a specified ground or not.
▪ The examination is often backward looking establishing the historical factors that led
to patterns of group disadvantage and harm.
▪ They can belong to a group that is economically marginalised and/or suffers from
stigmatisation, marginalisation or prejudice, for instance because of racism, sexism,
homophobia or HIV stigmatisation, and/or political minority status.
c. To what extent the discrimination has affected the rights or interests of the
complainants and whether it has led to an impairment of their fundamental
human dignity or constitutes an impairment of a comparably serious
nature.
▪ The more invasive the nature of the discrimination is, the more likely the
discrimination will be held to be unfair.
▪ Eg. National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home
Affairs and Others - here the court found that the discrimination against gays and
lesbians was ‘severe’ since ‘no concern, let alone anything approaching equal
concern’ was shown towards the group.
▪ A court must ask whether, given the factors above, it would be fair to discriminate
against a group.
▪ It will not be fair if the discrimination fundamentally affects the human dignity of the
group of complainants.
▪ This contextual test is aimed at protecting all individuals in society without hampering
the achievement of substantive equality which provides that individuals belonging to
different groups may have to be treated differently in certain circumstances.
▪ The determination must take into account South Africa’s particular history as well as
the structural inequality in our society which promotes and perpetuates the
subordination of certain individuals and groups.
▪ Both the social and economic effects of past discrimination as well as the continuing
prejudice and stigmatisation of people belonging to disfavoured groups frame this
contextual enquiry into the fairness or unfairness of the discrimination.
Summary of section 9
▪ 9(1) = rationality test (Ngewu)
▪ 9(2) = the 3 questions (see above a,b,c)
▪ 9(3) = the test for unfair discrimination (see Harksen v Lane)
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▪ Note: a court should first consider s9 and then s36!!!
The ground
▪ The treatment of solvent spouses because of their close relationship to the insolvent
spouse or because they are spouses in the first place.
▪ Can it constitute discrimination?
▪ The court noted that : The differentiation does arise from the complainants
attributes or characteristics as solvent spouses, namely their close relationship with
the insolvent spouse. According to the court, these attributes have the potential to
demean persons in their human dignity.
▪ Thus this discrimination is analogous and does fall within s9(3).
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▪ The test for unfair discrimination is as follows:
a. The position of the complainants in society, whether they have suffered in the
past from patterns of disadvantage, whether the discrimination in the case under
consideration is on a specified ground or not.
b. The nature of the provision or power and the purpose sought to be achieved by it.
c. To what extent the discrimination has affected the rights or interests of the
complainants and whether it has led to an impairment of their fundamental
human dignity or constitutes an impairment of a comparably serious nature.
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