IP

THE INSTITUTE
OF PETROLEUM

Liquefied Petroleum Gas

Volume 1 : Large Bulk Pressure
Storage & Refrigerated LPG

MODEL CODE OF SAFE PRACTICE

PART 9

ISBN 0 471 91612 9

First'printed 1987
Reprinted October 1997

This Code is based on accepted good practice and the appropriate standards
for use in the industry . It should be regarded as complementary to the
statutory requirements pertaining to the petroleum industry in different countries .
It is hoped that the adoption of this Code will help reduce the risk of accidents .

Published by
THE INSTITUTE OF PETROLEUM, LONDON
A charitable company limited by guarantee

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Issued under licence to BG Group employees only
IMPORTANT: This file is subject to a licence agreement issued by the Energy Institute, London, UK. All rights reserved. It may only be used in accordance with
the licence terms and conditions. It must not be forwarded to, or stored or accessed by, any unauthorised user. Enquiries: e: [email protected] t: +44 (0)207 467 7100
 INSTITUTE OF PETROLEUM

Liquefied Petroleum Gas

Volume 1

LARGE BULK PRESSURE STORAGE AND REFRIGERATED LPG

Being the first of a two volume revision of Part 9 of the

Institute of Petroleum
Model Code of Safe Practice in the
Petroleum Industry

February
1987

A Code jointly prepared by The Institute of Petroleum,

The Institution of Gas Engineers and
The Liquefied Petroleum Gas Industry Technical Association (UK)

Published on behalf of
THE INSTITUTE OF PETROLEUM, LONDON
John Wiley & Sons
Chichester • New York • Brisbane • Toronto • Singapore

Issued under licence to BG Group employees only

IMPORTANT: This file is subject to a licence agreement issued by the Energy Institute, London, UK. All rights reserved. It may only be used in accordance with
the licence terms and conditions. It must not be forwarded to, or stored or accessed by, any unauthorised user. Enquiries: e: [email protected] t: +44 (0)207 467 7100
 Copyright ©1987 by The Institute of Petroleum, London

All rights reserved .

No part of this book may be reproduced by any means, or

transmitted, or translated into a machine language
without the written permission of the copyright holder .

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data :

Institute of Petroleum
Liquefied Petroleum gas : a code .-
2nd ed .-(Model code of safe practice
in the petroleum industry . Pt . 9) .
Vol . 1
1 . Liquefied petroleum gas-Storage-
Standards
I . Title II . Institution of Gas Engineers
III . Liquefied Petroleum Gas Industry
Technical Association III . Series
665 .7'42 TP756
ISBN 0 47191612 9

Printed andbound in Great Britain By

Galliard (Printers) Ltd ., Great Yarmouth,
Norfolk .

Issued under licence to BG Group employees only

IMPORTANT: This file is subject to a licence agreement issued by the Energy Institute, London, UK. All rights reserved. It may only be used in accordance with
the licence terms and conditions. It must not be forwarded to, or stored or accessed by, any unauthorised user. Enquiries: e: [email protected] t: +44 (0)207 467 7100
 CONTENTS

Foreword

1 Properties of Liquefied Petroleum Gas

1 .1 Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) 1
1 .2 Properties and Characteristics 1
1 .3 Hazards 1
1 .4 Odorization . . . 2
1 .5 Prevention of Water Deposition . . . 3

2 Pressure Storage at Refineries, Bulk Distribution Plants and Large Industrial Consumer Premises
2 .1 Scope 4
2 .1 .1 Inclusions 4
2 .1 .2 Exclusions 4
2 .1 .3 Object 4

2 .2 Requirements for the Layout Location and Spacing of LPG Pressure Storage Installations . . . 4
2 .2 .1 General layout principles . . . 4
2 .2 .2 Location and spacing 4
2 .2 .3 Bunds and separation kerbs 5
2 .2 .4 Ground conditions 6
2 .2 .5 Pits and depressions in the storage, area 6
2 .2 .6 Other hazardous storage . 6
2 .2 .7 Layout of storage . . . . . 6
2 .2 .8 Protection of facilities . 6

2 .3 Pressure Storage . .
2 .3 .1 Design code
2 .3 .2 Design criteria
2 .3 .3 Fittings
2 .3 .4 Connections . .
2 .3 .5 Level gauging equipment
2 .3 .6 Pressure relief . .
2 .3 .7 Shut-off valves . . .
2 .3 .8 Emergency shut-off valves
2 .3 .9 Excess flow valves
2 .3 .10 Drain systems .
2 .3 .11 Filling capacity
2 .3 .12 Insulation .

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 CONTENTS

23 .l3Icing ofvalves ~ . ~ ~ ~ 8
2 .3 .14 .~ ^8
2 .3 .15 Marking g
2 .3 .l6Identification 0
2 .3 .17 Examination 0

2 .4 Piping, Valves and Fittings

Fittings 9
2 .4 .1 Design code g
2 .4 .2 Materials 0
2 .4 .3 Pipe thickness 9
2 .4 .4 Pipe joints 0
2.4 .5 Welding . . . .' ' .' 0
2 .4 .6 Valves 10
2.4 .7 Flanges and fittings 10
2 .4 .8 Bolting 10
2 .4 .9 Installation and flexibility 10
2 .4 .10 Thermal pressure relief 10
2 .4 .11 Insulation 10
2 .4 .12Articulated pipe connections 11
2 .4 .13 Inspection and testing 11
2 .4 .14 Hoses 11
2 .4 .15 Emergency shutdown 11

2 .5 Foundations and Supports for Vessels and Piping 11

2.5 .1 Codes and specifications 11
2 .5 .2 Ground conditions 11
2 .5 .3 Materials 11
2 .5 .4 Loadings 11
155 Settlement 12
2 .5 .6 Support systems I . 12
2 .5 .7 Pipe supports 12
2 .5 .8 Fireproofing 12

2 .6 Pumps, andMetrsComp 12
2 .6 .1 Pumps 12
2 .6 .2 Compressors 12
2 .6 .3 Meters ~ ~ . . ~ . . . 12
2 .6 .4 Protection of pumps, compressors and meters 12
2 .6 .5 Transfer systems 12

2 .7 Road and Rail Loading

Loading and Unloading Facilities 13
2 .7 .1 Location and layout 13
2 .7 .2 Ground conditions 13
2 .7 .3 Loading and unloading equipment 13
2 .1 .4 Stray currents, earthing and bonding 14

2.8 Electrical, Electricity, Lightning Protection 14

2.8 .1 Electrical earthing and bonding 14
2 .8 .2 Lightning protection 14

2 .9 Requirements for Fire Protection 14

2 .9 .1 Fire plan ' 14
2 .9 .2 Control of fires ' 14
2 .9 .3 Protection systems ' 14
2 .9 .4 Access ' . . ' 14
2 .9 .5 14
2 .9 .6- Cooling water 14
2 .9 .7 Care and maintenance of fire-fighting egogpnueot 15

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 CONTENTS

2 .9 .8 Drainage 15
2.9 .9 Removal of combustible materials 15
2 .9 .10 Warning signs 15

2 .10 Operations . . . . 15
2 .10 .1 Housekeeping : 15
2 .10 .2 Training 15
2 .10 .3 Emergency procedures/plans 15
2 .10 .4 Emergency action 15
2 .10 .5 Purging and filling of systems 16
2 .10 .6 Draining water in service 16
2 .10 .7 Transfer operations 16
2 .10 .8 Access to storage and operating areas 17
2 .10 .9 Lighting of storage and operating areas 17

2 .11 Inspection of Pressure Storage 17

2 .11 .1 Permit to work systems . 17
2 .11 .2 Preparation 17
2 .11 .3 External inspection-above-ground vessels 17
2 .11 .4 Internal inspection-above-ground vessels 18
2 .11 .5 Buried/mounded vessels 18
2 .11 .6 Cracks . . 18
2 .11 .7 Pressure relief valves 18

3 Refrigerated Liquefied Petroleum Gas Storage

3 .1 Scope 19
3 .1 .1 Inclusions 19
3 .1 .2 Exclusions 19
3 .1 .3 Object 19

3 .2 General Philosophy 19
3 .2 .1 Definitions 19
3 .2 .2 Level of safety 20
3 .2 .3 Prudent provisions for spillage 20
3 .2 .4 Leakage 20
3 .2 .5 Vapour formation and fire 20

3 .3 Requirements for Location and Spacing of Refrigerated LPG Tanks 20

3 .3 .1 Limits for thermal radiation flux levels 20
3 .3 .2 Rate of leakage 21
3 .3 .3 Vapour travel 21

3 .4 Requirements for Bunds and Impounding Basins 21

3 .4 .1 Individual tank bunding 21
3 .4 .2 Bund capacity 21
3 .4 .3 Bund design 21
3 .4 .4 Bund safety 22

3 .5 Requirements for Low Pressure Refrigerated Storage Tanks . 22

3 .5 .1 Design . . . 22
3 .5 .2 Tank fittings 23
3 .5 .3 Tank connections and appurtenances 23
3 .5 .4 Pressure/vacuum control and relief systems 23
3 .5 .5 Insulation of tanks 24
3 .5 .6 Corrosion protection of tanks 25
3 .5 .7 Marking of tanks 25

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 CONTENTS

3 .6 Requirements for Piping, Valves and Fittings 25

3 .6 .1 Piping code 25
3 .6 .2 Materials . . . . 25
3 .6 .3 Installation 25
3 .6 .4 Thermal pressure relief . . . . 25

3 .7 Requirements for Foundations for Tanks 25

3.7 .1 Foundation design 25
3 .7 .2 Uplift 25

3 .8 Requirements for Fire Protection/Loss Control Systems 26

3 .8 .1 Fire plan 26
3 .8 .2 Control of fires 26
3 .8 .3 Protection systems 26

3 .9 Inspection of Refrigerated Storage Tanks 26

3 .9 .1 Permit to work systems 26
3 .9 .2 General philosophy 26
3 .9 .3 The possibility of internal corrosion 26
3 .9 .4 Problems associated with internal inspection 27
3 .9 .5 Requirements for internal inspection 27
3 .9 .6 Requirements for external inspection 27
3 .9 .7 Competent person/records 28

3 .10 Requirements for the Initial Filling of Storage Tank or Re-commissioning After Inspection 28
3 .10 .1 General 28
3 .10 .2 Ice/hydrate formation 28
3 .10 .3 Permit to work systems . 28
3 .10.4 Removal of air-drying out 28
3 .10 .5 Displacement of inerts by LPG vapour 28
3 .10 .6 Cooling down and commissioning 28

3 .11 Requirements for Taking Tank out of Service 29

3 .11 .1 Permit to work systems 29
3 .11 .2 Removal of liquid 29
3 .11 .3 Purging 29
3 .11 .4 Sources of inert gas 29
3 .11 .5 Purging procedure 29
3 .11 .6 Preparation for entry 30
3 .11 .7 Entry into tanks 30

3 .12 Operational Requirements 30

3 .12 .1 Training 30
3 .12 .2 Emergency procedures/plans 30
3 .12 .3 Commissioning, gas freeing and entry into tanks 31
3 .12 .4 Transfer operations 31

Appendices
1 Thermal Radiation Flux Levels 32
2 Calculation of Thermal Radiation Flux Levels 34
3 Leak Sources and Typical Leak Rates from LPG Storage Systems . . . 65
4 Vapour Dispersion . . . . . . 69
5 Cooling Water Requirements for the Protection of Refrigerated LPG Storage Tank
Systems Exposed to Thermal Radiation 70

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 CONTENTS

6 Safe End Limits When Purging with Nitrogen vol . per cent 72
7 Glossary of Terms . . . . 73
8 Guidance on Work Permit Procedures 75
9 Some Codes of Practice, Specifications, Standards, etc ., Relevant to the LPG Industry . . . 84
10 List of Abbreviations 87

Index 88

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 FOREWORD

1. This Code is Part 9 of The Institute of Petroleum Chapter 3-Refrigerated LPG .

Model Code of Safe Practice in the Petroleum This subject was previously
Industry . It supersedes the edition published in dealt with in Clause 2 .4 of Chapter
1967, the technical recommendations of which 2 of the 1967 Code under the title
have both been amplified and brought up to date . Low Pressure Refrigerated Stor-
Its purpose is to provide a general guide to safe age . However, because of the
practice in storing, handling and transport of evolution of new techniques for
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), and it gives, for handling refrigerated products,
the most part, recommendations for safe practice the increase in quantities being
rather than a set of rigid rules . It is the intention stored and handled and the result-
that this approach should more easily allow the ing need for special safety con-
use of new methods, techniques, materials, etc ., siderations with respect to these
which may be developed in the future and which large quantities, it has been
meet the requirements for safe practice given in decided to consider refrigerated
this Code . storage separately .
It must be stressed that in determining any Relevant Appendices
required safe procedure the effect of any unusual
Volume 2
circumstances, on which it is impossible to
Chapter 1-Pressure storage at industrial,
generalize, must receive due consideration and,
commercial and domestic prem-
further, that design, construction and operation
ises (originally Chapter 3 of the
of plant and equipment must be carried out only
1967 Code) .
by suitably trained personnel .
Chapter 2-Plant for the filling, handling and
Attention is drawn to the Institute's Area
storage of cylinders (originally
Classification Code which should also be con-
Chapter 4 of the 1967 Code) .
sidered during the design of LPG facilities .
Chapter 3-Transport by road and rail (orig-
2. Attention is also drawn to the fact that in many
inally Chapter 5 of the 1967
countries there exist statutory requirements,
Code) .
both local and national, relating to LPG, and this
For marine transport reference
Code should be regarded as being complemen-
should be made to the Inter-
tary to such requirements .
national Safety Guide for Oil Tan-
3. This Code is arranged as two volumes containing
kers and Terminals (ISGOTT),
six separate chapters supported by a number of
and for pipeline transport to the
Appendices .
IP Code of Practice for Petroleum
The volumes and chapters are as follows :
Pipelines .
Volume 1 Relevant Appendices .
Chapter 1-General information applicable to
LPG . 4. The Liquefied Petroleum Gas Sub-Committee,
Chapter 2-Pressure storage at refineries, which prepared this Code, is a Sub-Committee of
bulk distribution plants and also the Engineering Committee of the Institute . It
industrial consumer premises, comprises representatives of The Institute of Pet-
where such storage is large . roleum, The Institution of Gas Engineers and

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 FOREWORD

The Liquefied Petroleum Gas Industry Technical the risk of accident, The Institute of Petroleum,
Association (UK) . The Institution of Gas Engineers and The
5. For the purpose of this Code certain interpret- Liquefied Petroleum Gas Industry Technical
ations which are given in Appendix 7 apply irres- Association (UK) cannot accept any responsi-
pective of any other meaning the words may have bility, of whatever kind, for damage or alleged
in other connections . Where used in the Code damage arising or otherwise occurring in or about
such defined terms are printed in italics . premises, areas or vehicles to which this Code has
6. Although it is believed that adoption of the been applied .
recommendations of the Code will help to reduce

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 1
PROPERTIES OF LIQUEFIED
PETROLEUM GAS

1 .1 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS 1.2 PROPERTIES AND

(LPG) CHARACTERISTICS

1 .1 .1 1 .2 .1
The term Liquefied Petroleum Gas or LPG includes Commercial butane is a hydrocarbon mixture consist-
commercial propane, commercial butane and mix- ing predominantly of a mixture of normal and
tures thereof . isobutane and/or butylene, i .e . C4s .

1 .1 .2 1 .2 .2
LPG at ambient temperature and normal atmos- Commercial propane is a hydrocarbon mixture con-
pheric pressure is usually a gas but is readily liquefied sisting predominantly of propane and/or propylene,
by either additional pressure, or refrigeration, or a i .e . C3s .
combination of both .
It is stored and handled : 1 .2 .3
Physical properties of these two commercial grades
(a) as a liquid under pressure at ambient tempera-
are given in Table 1 .
tures,
(b) as a fully refrigerated liquid kept at sufficiently
low temperature to produce a pressure substan-
tially atmospheric,
(c) as a semi-refrigerated liquid kept at a higher 1.3 HAZARDS
temperature than (b) to produce an intermediate
pressure . 1 .3 .1
LPG is usually stored and transported as a liquid .
1 .1 .3 Leakage of liquid results in the formation of large
volumes of vapour as 1 volume of liquid produces
LPG is supplied against product specifications, e .g .
approximately 250 volumes of vapour at atmospheric
BS 4250, Gas Processors Association of the USA
(GPA) . pressure .

1 .1 .4 1 .3 .2
Even small quantities of LPG vapour in air may form
The two grades of LPG most commonly handled are
a flammable mixture . The limits of flammability of
referred to as commercial butane and commercial
propane respectively . Mixtures of commercial butane LPG are approximately 2% to 10% volume of gas in
and commercial propane are also handled . air and this results in LPG leakage forming large
volumes of flammable gas-air mixtures .
1 .1 .5 1 volume of vapour can form 10 to 50 volumes of
LPG_ may be produced as an odourless product . For flammable gas-air mixture .
general usage it is odorized as necessary to permit 1 volume of liquid can form 2,500 to 12,500 volumes
detection of leakage by smell (see 1 .4) . offlammable gas-air mixture .

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 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS

Table 1 The cooling which occurs on evaporation of liquid

Typical properties of commercial LPG grades . LPG causes frost burns to the skin anddamage to eyes
if protection, e .g . gloves and goggles, is not used
Commercial Commercial
when contact with LPG is a possibility .
Property butane propane
Refrigerated LPG causes severe frost burns and eye
Density at atmospheric damage even if little or no evaporation occurs .
boiling point, kg/litre 0 .60 0 .57
Density at 15 °C, kg/litre 0 .57 0 .51 1 .3 .7
m3/tonne at 15 °C 1 .72 1 .96
LPG whether in liquid or vapour form is only slightly
Density of vapour com-
pared with air at 15 °C toxic . The vapour is an asphyxiant in high concen-
and 1 bars 2 .00 1 .50 trations and is anaesthetic . Thus precautions must be
Ratio of vapour volume to taken in entering confined spaces such as tanks
liquid volume at 15 °C because of these properties of the LPG (and also
and 1 bara 230 270 because of its flammability and the risk of reduced
Boiling point at
atmospheric pressure 0 °C -44 0 C oxygen levels) .
Vapour pressure bara,
-400 0C 3- 1 .4 1 .3 .8
8 .0 Liquid LPG has a high coefficient of expansion .
45 °C 5 18 Adequate ullage must therefore always be provided
Latent heat of vaporiz-
ation, kJ/kg at 15 °C 372 358 in storage vessels (static and transport) to prevent
Specific heat of liquid at them becoming hydraulically full as a result of tem-
15 °C, kJ/(kg °C) 2 .4 2.5 perature rise . Pipelines and equipment which are
Limits of flammability normally liquid full must be protected, by operating
vol% in gas-air mixture procedures and/or safety equipment, against the high
at atmospheric pressure 1 .8-9 .0 2 .1-10
pressure which would result from the liquid's expan-
sion with temperature rise .

1 .3.3 1 .3 .9
LPG at ambient temperature and normal atmos- A container which has held LPG and is nominally
pheric pressures is normally a gas which is heavier empty is still potentially dangerous . In this state the
than air . Commercial butane vapour and commercial internal pressure is approximately atmospheric and
propane vapour are approximately 2 .0 and 1 .5 times should the valve be open or leaking a flammable
as heavy as air, respectively . LPG vapours will there- mixture may result due to air diffusing into the con-
fore sink to the lowest levels of the surroundings and tainer when temperatures fall or vapour issuing from
flow along the ground or through drains or such-like the container when temperatures rise .
passages . Under still air conditions the natural dissi-
pation of accumulated vapour may be slow . 1 .3 .10
The density of liquid LPG is approximately half that
1 .3 .4 of water, and when leakage occurs in low ambient
A small release of LPG into the atmosphere will temperatures the product could be carried away by
result in a flammable mixture which may be ignited water .
some distance from the point of leakage .
1 .3 .11
1 .3 .5 If water is used for hydraulic testing of storage etc .
LPG has a low viscosity ; hence it has little or no then its weight and not that of the LPG contents is
lubricating properties and it is more likely to find a relevant for foundation design .
leakage path than water or most other petroleum
products . These facts are significant with respect to 1 .3 .12
the design of plant and have particular relevance to The presence of water in LPG systems presents a
the glands and seals of pumps, compressors and hazard from icing under certain conditions (see 1 .5) .
valves.

1 .3 .6 1.4 ODORIZATION
Whilst LPG is colourless both in the liquid and vapour
phases the cooling which takes place when the liquid Odorization is not required if harmful in the use or
evaporates results, in cases of leakage, in water con- further processing of the LPG or if it will serve no
densation and even freezing of water vapour con- useful purpose as a warning agent in .such use . In
tained in the air ; this appears as a white mist or cloud . other circumstances the odour should be distinctive,

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 PROPERTIES OF LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS

unpleasant . and non-persistent and should indicate 1 .5 PREVENTION OF WATER

the presence of gas in the air at a level in excess of 20%
DEPOSITION
of the lower limit of flammability .
The odorization requirement can be met by the
Methanol or propylene glycol may be added to LPG
addition of controlled quantities of suitable odorizing
to prevent water deposition and hydrate formation .
agents, e .g . ethyl mercaptan, dimethyl sulphide . Care
For refrigerated product water and other trace compo-
is necessary in handling those odorants which are
nents must be removed prior to refrigeration .
toxic in concentrated form .
s

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 2

PRESSURE STORAGE AT
REFINERIES, BULK
DISTRIBUTION PLANTS AND
LARGE INDUSTRIAL
CONSUMER PREMISES

2 .1 SCOPE 2 .2 REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

LAYOUT, LOCATION AND SPACING
2 .1 .1 Inclusions
OF LPG PRESSURE STORAGE
This chapter covers LPG pressure storage instal-
lations, above ground, mounded or below ground, at INSTALLATIONS
refineries and bulk distribution plants as well as at
2.2 .1 General Layout Principles
large industrial consumer plants where storage
The layout of LPG Storage Installations shall ensure
involves vessels of individual capacity greater than
135 m 3 or group storage greater than 450 m3 . that in the event of ignition of leakage of product the
effect on other parts of the installation or on people or
property located outside the installation is minimized .
2 .1 .2 Exclusions The principles to be followed in the location and
spacing of Pressure storage vessels and ancillaries are
2.1 .2 .1 This code does not cover storage in frozen set out in 2 .2 .2 . These are based on the consideration
earth pits or underground caverns . of the possible effects of leakage of LPG .
Measures aimed at preventing leaks are set out in
2 .1 .2.2 This chapter is not intended to cover either 2 .3 to 2 .10 . Additional measures to minimize the
refrigerated storage, which is covered in Chapter 3, or effects of leakage to ensure that the facilities are
storage of LPG at the smaller industrial consumer adequately protected are set out in 2 .2 .3 to 2 .2 .7 .
premises, which is covered in Volume 2 .
2 .2.2 Location and Spacing

2 .2.2 .1 LPG pressure storage vessels, pump bays and

2.1 .3 Object
loading and discharge facilities shall be located and
2 .1 .3.1 The object of this chapter is to recommend spaced to ensure :
basic safety requirements and practice for the design, (a) That they are sufficiently distanced from fixed
construction and use of LPG pressure storage, par- sources of ignition .
tially refrigerated storage and ancillary facilities . (b) In the event of a fire as described in 2 .2 .2 .3 the
heat radiation flux levels resulting will not exceed
2.1 .3.2 It is not intended to preclude the use of the relevant maximum levels given in Table I of
alternative designs, materials and methods where Appendix 1 .
these provide equivalent standards of safety . (c) Accessibility for fire fighting .

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 PRESSURE STORAGE

(d) That spillage from one vessel or work area does 2 .2 .2.6 The permitted radiation level on thermally
not flow under any other vessel or directly to any protected adjacent LPG storage vessels is based on the
other important facility/work area . protection of the adjacent vessel, e.g . by the appli-
cation of cooling water at the rate specified in 2 .9 .6 .4 .
2 .2 .2 .2 LPG pressure storage vessels, pump bays and Where cooling water is the method of protection
loading/discharge facilities shall be located to ensure then its provision and application must be reliable .
the following minimum distances to fixed sources of Equivalent protective systems are acceptable pro-
ignition irrespective of the requirements of 2 .2 .2 .1 : vided their efficiency can be demonstrated at the
specified radiation level and over the expected dur-
22 .5 m For storage vessels not exceeding 337 m 3
ation of the fire .
30 m For storage vessels exceeding 337 m3
25 m For pump bays and loading/unloading
2.2 .2 .7 The minimum cooling water application rate
facilities
of 7 litres/(minute m2 ) specified in 2.9 .6 .4 is based on
Deflection walls may be used to extend the vapour protection of a pressure storage vessel against flame
travel path from leakage as identified in 2 .2.2 .4 to engulfment, rather than by thermal radiation, and is
meet these safety distances . therefore higher than would be calculated when using
Such walls should be so located as to minimize the the method given in Appendix 5 .
risk of flame engulfment of storage vessels, in the The required cooling water application rate for
event of ignition of escaped product and also so as to other equipment referred to in Appendix 1 may be
ensure free ventilation of the storage area from at calculated by the method in Appendix 5 . .
least three directions, taking account of prevailing
winds . 2 .2 .2 .8 In the case of below-ground/mounded LPG
pressure storage, in addition to meeting the require-
2 .2 .2 .3 The radiation flux levels laid down in Table I ments of Appendix 1 for a relief valve and spill fire,
of Appendix I shall be based on the ignition of there shall also be a minimum spacing of 3 metres
product discharging from the vessel's relief valves as between the vessel shell and the site boundary .
well as spillage from the vessel, its appurtenances and
other identified leak sources (see Appendix 3), and 2 .2 .2 .9 In the event that the requirements of Table I
possibly forming a pool of a size dictated by the of Appendix 1 dictate lesser distances then there shall
spillage rate, evaporation rate and duration (see be a minimum spacing between adjacent above-
2 .2 .2 .4) and the local topography/location of a bund ground LPG pressure vessels of 1 .5 metres or 0 .25
or impounding basin . times the sum of the adjacent vessel diameters,
The atmospheric conditions relevant to the site whichever is the greater . For below-ground mounded
shall be applied in determining the flux levels . storage the spacing between adjacent vessels shall be
Calculation methods are described in Appendix 2 . determined by the site conditions and the require-
ments for safe installation/removal of such vessels as
2 .2 .2 .4 The rate of spillage and its duration used in well as their inspection, testing and maintenance .
2 .2 .2 .3 shall be based on identified potential leak
sources in the system . The identification and quanti- 2 .2 .2.10 The maximum number of vessels in any
tative assessment of such leak sources require a sys- Group shall be 6 . Any one group shall be separated
tematic evaluation of the design and operating pro- from any other group by 15 m .
cedures, taking into account failure modes and the
likelihood of their occurring . 2 .2 .2 .11 In any group vessels shall be in a single line,
Examples of potential leak sources and indications i .e . shell to shell and not end to shell or end to end .
of leakage rates from them under specific conditions
and using a simplified typical equation are given in
Appendix 3 .
2 .2 .3 Bunds and Separation Kerbs
2 .2 .2 .5 Provision should be made to minimize the
probability of a flammable cloud resulting from a spill 2 .2 .3 .1 The provision of bunds around above-ground
as defined in 2 .2 .2 .3 from reaching the site boundary . LPG pressure storage designed and constructed in
Typical provisions may include such measures as accordance with the requirements of this code is not
spacing, limitation of spill pool area, screening and normally required .
vapour dispersion equipment .
Appendix 3 provides examples of potential leak 2.2 .3 .2 Separation kerbs, low to avoid gas traps, with
sources and typical leak rates and Appendix 4, refer- a maximum height of 0 .6 m may be required to direct
ences to mathematical models for calculating hazard spillage to suitable places away from storage vessels
distances arising from such releases . and other vulnerable equipment .

5
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 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS

2.2 .4 Ground Conditions 2.2.8 .4 Below-ground and mounded storage vessels

Ground beneath above-ground pressure storage and should have a minimum cover of 500 mm .
vessels in unfilled below-ground chambers should be
either concreted or compacted and graded to levels to
ensure that any spillage has a preferential flow away 2 .3 PRESSURE STORAGE
from the vessel and its connections .
2 .3 .1 Design Code
2.2 .5 Pits and Depressions in the Storage Area
To prevent the formation of gas pockets, pits and 2 .3 .1 .1 Vessels should be designed, fabricated,
depressions, other than those which are provided as inspected and tested in accordance with a recognized
catchment areas, should be avoided in and close to pressure vessel code as appropriate, e .g . BS 5500,
the storage area . ASME Section VIII .

2 .2 .6 Other Hazardous Storage 2 .3 .1 .2 Careful consideration should be given to the

No pressure vessel for LPG should be located within material used for construction, bearing in mind the
the bunded enclosure of: minimum temperature that the material of the vessel
could reach in service or an emergency . Such a
(a) a tank containing any flammable liquid, minimum temperature may well be below the
(b) a tank containinig liquid oxygen or other hazard- minimum ambient temperature in emergency situ-
ous or cryogenic substance,
ations and may also be so for vessels with high offtake
(c) a tank containing refrigerated LPG or liquefied rates in normal service .
natural gas (LNG),
(d) a heated storage tank, e .g . residual fuel oil or 2.3 .1 .3 Vessels for a partially refrigerated product
bitumen . should be designed in accordance with the low tem-
perature requirements of the code referred to in
2.2 .7 Layout of Storage
2 .3 .1 .1 .
The layout and grouping of above-ground vessels, as
distinct from spacing, should receive careful consider-
ation to ensure accessibility for fire-fighting and to 2 .3 .2 Design Criteria
avoid spillage from one vessel flowing under any other
or to any vulnerable equipment .
2 .3 .2 .1 The design pressure of the container should
be not less than the vapour pressure of the actual LPG
2 .2.8 Protection of Facilities to be stored in it, at the highest temperature that such
contents will reach in service and should also take into
2.2 .8.1 To prevent unauthorized access, the area account any additional pressures developed in oper-
which includes vessels, pumping equipment and load- ation .
ing/unloading facilities should be enclosed by an The vapour pressure is dependent on the surface
industrial type fence at least 2 m high unless it is temperature of the contents and not the bulk mean
otherwise adequately protected, e .g . the area comes temperature .
within a greater fenced plant area or is otherwise
isolated from the public . 2.3.2 .2 For partially refrigerated pressure storage the
capacity of the refrigeration plant and/or the insu-
2.2 .8.2 When damage to LPG systems from vehicu- lation system should be such that the LPG is main-
lar traffic is a possibility, precautions to guard against tained at a temperature at which its vapour pressure is
such damage must be taken . below the set to discharge pressure of the relief valve .

2.2 .8.3 Below-ground and mounded storage should 2.3.2 .3 The design of the buried/mounded vessel
be protected from above-ground loadings due to should allow for any differential settlement/move-
vehicular traffic or other cause, either by fencing off ment (including frost heave) as well as for the weight
the area under which the storage is buried or by the of superimposed loads .
use of reinforced concrete slab or other cover
adequate to prevent the weight imposing concen- 2 .3.2 .4 Vacuum conditions
trated direct loads on the vessel. If operating conditions may be expected to lower
If the storage area is not fenced off, the vessel product- temperatures to the extent that the vapour
manhole cover and other fittings should be protected pressure of the stored product falls below atmospheric
against damage and tampering . pressure, e .g . butane under very cold conditions,
The perimeter of the area under which storage is then either the vessel should be designed for the
buried should be permanently marked . necessary degree of vacuum or the system should

6
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 PRESSURE STORAGE

incorporate positive means for preventing vacuum 2 .3 .6.3 Pressure setting of relief valves
formation . The pressure at which relief valves start to discharge
and reach full flow should be in accordance with the
2.3 .3 Fittings vessel's design code, e .g . BS 5500, ASME Section
Each vessel should be provided with at least one of VIII .
each of the following fittings, all of which should be
suitable for use with LPG over the vessel's design 2 .3 .6.4 Capacity of relief valves
range of pressure and temperature : The full vapour flow capacity for relief valves should
be determined for a vessel exposed to fire conditions
(a) pressure relief system connected directly to the
in accordance with API RP520 or equivalent . How-
vapour space,
ever, the relief valves must also provide protection
(b) manhole,
against any overpressure resulting from overfilling,
(c) drain system,
when relief valve discharge would be flashing liquid .
(d) means of determining the liquid level (see 2 .3 .5),
For above-ground vessels no credit should be taken
(e) pressure indicator connected to the vapour space,
for the effect of any insulation on limiting heat absorp-
(f) temperature indicator for contents,
tion unless the insulating material has adequate fire
(g) maximum level device, e .g . high level alarm,
resistant properties .
fixed ullage gauge .
In sizing relief valve capacity for mounded/buried
storage credit may be taken for the inherent insulation
2 .3.4 Connections provided by the covering material, as specified in the
relevant code .
2.3 .4 .1 Connections should be minimized, particu-
larly those below the maximum liquid level . 2 .3 .6.5 Relief valve marking
Every relief valve should incorporate permanent
2 .3 .4 .2 Connections should be designed and attached markings as follows :
to the vessel in accordance with its design code, e .g .
BS 5500, ASME Section VIII . Connections should (a) manufacturer's identification, including
preferably be welded and flanged but screwed connec- -manufacturer's name or symbol,
tions smaller than 50 mm to BS 3799 or equivalent -catalogue or type number,
may be used . (b) nominal inlet and outlet sizes,
(c) start to discharge pressure,
2 .3 .4 .3 The manhole should be not less than 0 .55 m (d) certified capacity in defined terms .
internal diameter .
2 .3 .6 .6 Relief valve installation
2 .3 .4 .4 For below-ground and mounded vessels the (a) Where provision is made to isolate any relief
manholes and connections should be extended to suit valve for periodic servicing or testing, the relief
the depth of cover, i .e . to facilitate access to valves, valve or valves which remain connected to the
etc . vessel should provide the full capacity required
by 2 .3 .6 .4 . Relief valve connections to vessels
2 .3 .5 Level Gauging Equipment should be as short as possible and should not
Consideration should be given to providing two inde- throttle relief valve discharge .
pendent level gauges in addition to the maximum (b) In discharge lines the formation of liquid traps
level device . Column type gauge glasses for determin- and the creation of back pressures, which might
ing liquid level are not acceptable . prevent the proper functioning of the relief valve,
should be avoided . Particular attention should be
2.3 .6 Pressure Relief paid to this aspect when discharge lines are long,
e .g . discharge into flare lines .
2 .3 .6.1 Code requirements (c) Relief valves, discharging directly to atmosphere,
The requirements for pressure relief as specified in should be fitted with vent pipes, be adequately
the vessels design code, e .g . BS 5500, ASME Section supported and have outlets at least 2 m above the
VIII, must be complied with . top of the vessel and any access platform to which
they are fitted and at least 3 m above ground level .
2.3.6 .2 Pressure relief valves (d) Vent pipes should be corrosion resistant and be
(a) Relief valves should be spring loaded ; weight designed to allow the escape of moisture and
loaded relief valves should not be used . condensate . They should ensure that, in the event
(b) Relief valves should be constructed so that the of ignition of discharging vapour, flame impinge-
breakage of any part will not obstruct the free ment on the vessel or any adjacent vessel, piping,
discharge of vapour under pressure . equipment or structure is avoided .

7
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 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS

2 .3 .7 Shut-off Valves 2 .3 .10.2 Drain connections

The length of piping between_ . the valves required by
2 .3 .7.1 All liquid and vapour connections on vessels 2 .3 .10.1 should be such that the risk of simultaneous
with the exception of those for relief valves, plugged obstruction of both valves is minimized . A sufficient
openings and those where the connection through the length of piping should be provided downstream of
tank shell is not greater than 1 .4 mm diameter should the second valve, to ensure that discharge will not
have shut-off valves and should preferably be of the take place beneath the vessel. The second valve and
fire-safe type (see BS 5146, BS 6683) . the piping should be adequately supported and
secured to prevent breakage by jet forces . Both valves
2 .3 .7.2 The shut-off valve required by 2 .3 .7 .1 should on the drain system should have a means of actuation
be located as close to the vessel connection as prac- which cannot be readily removed or moved from the
ticable, except that where there are no mechanical closed position except by intentional operation .
joints between the shut-off valve and the vessel and
the intervening piping is designed, constructed and 2 .3 .10.3 Dewatering pots
tested in accordance with the vessel's design code, As an alternative to the systems described in 2 .3 .10.1
e .g . BS 5500, ASME Section VIII, the shut-off valve and 2 .3 .10 .2 each vessel may be equipped with its own
may be located at the downstream end of that length dewatering pot whereby water can be drained to a
of piping . predetermined level indicated by suitable gauges .
Such dewatering pots should be equipped with a
2 .3 .8 Emergency Shut-off Valves double valve system on the discharge .
It is recommended that all liquid and vapour connec-
tions, other than for relief valves, level gauges and 2 .3 .11 Filling Capacity
drainage connections which are larger than 3 mm for The maximum quantity of LPG which should be filled
liquids and 8 mm for vapour, should have an into any vessel should be such that the vessel will not
emergency shut-off valve, e .g . an excess flow valve, become liquid full due to expansion of its contents
an automatically operated valve or a remotely con- with rise of temperature, i .e . the highest level which
trolled valve . The emergency shut-off valve should be the contents will reach in operational service, due to
in addition to the shut-off valve of 2 .3 .7 .1 unless that whatever cause, must never fill the vessel .
shut-off valve is remotely controlled, can be operated
from a safe area and is of a fail-safe type . 2.3 .12 Insulation
Insulation when provided on vessels should :
2 .3 .9 Excess Flow Valves (a) withstand, together with its cladding, direct
impingement from hose streams,
2 .3.9.1 Where the emergency shut-off valve of 2 .3 .8 (b) be impervious, either by a cellular construction
is of the excess flow type, its closing rate of flow or the provision of an efficient vapour barrier, to
should be below that likely to result from failure of the ingress of water vapour,
the line it is protecting under any ambient tempera- (c) be sufficiently robust to ensure that minor
ture conditions likely to be experienced . Excess flow mechanical damage will not destroy its vapour
valves should have a rated closing capacity sufficiently barrier .
above the flow requirements to prevent closure in
normal operation . 2.3.13 Icing of Valves
Insulation, steam heating or other means should be
2 .3 .9.2 Pressure surges resulting from the closure of used to prevent icing of valves or other fittings, e .g .
excess flow valves (and other emergency valves) vessel drain systems, if product quality, operating
should be considered at the design stage . procedures and/or ambient temperatures are favour-
able to ice/hydrate formation (see 1 .5) .
2 .3 .10 Drain Systems
2.3 .14 Protection-Painting
2.3.10.1 Double valving
Drain connections should be provided with a shut-off 2.3.14.1 Vessels and their supports should be treated
valve in accordance with 2 .3 .7 .1 and should prefer- externally to prevent corrosion .
ably be limited to 50 mm nominal size . This shut-off
valve should be provided with a length of piping 2 .3.14 .2 .Below ground or mounded vessels need
terminating with a second shut-off valve, preferably special consideration for external protection (e .g .
limited to 25 mm nominal size . The first valve should coating, cathodic protection, etc .) . Such protection
preferably be a quick shut-off type ; the second valve must be adequate to resist corrosion from the sur-
should be a throttling type . rounding material .

8
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the licence terms and conditions. It must not be forwarded to, or stored or accessed by, any unauthorised user. Enquiries: e: [email protected] t: +44 (0)207 467 7100
 PRESSURE STORAGE

2 .3.14 .3 The backfill or covering material which will 2 .4.2.3 Seamless steel, seamless copper or brass pipe
be in contact with below-ground or mounded vessels or tubing may be used for sizes up to and including
should be clean and free from rocks'or similar abras- 12 .5 mm . It is recommended, however, that non-
ive material . The backfill/covering material should be ferrous pipe or tubing should be confined to instru-
carefully consolidated and the covering of mounded ment piping, piping for control equipment or vapour
vessels prevented from migration . The minimum lines and should be as short as practicable .
cover provided should be 500 mm .
2.4 .2 .4 All pipes larger than 12 .5 mm, up to and
2.3 .14.4 For above-ground vessels finish painting in a including 400 mm, should be seamless (API 5L Grade
light colour increases reflection and minimizes tem- B max 0 .23% carbon) . Pipes larger than 400 mm may
perature rise of the contents from solar heat gain . be submerged arc welded (API 5L Grade B max
0 .23% carbon or equivalent) .
2 .3 .15 Marking For temperature service down to -38 °C carbon
Each pressure vessel should be conspicuously and steel seamless pipe should be used for all sizes (API
permanently marked to include the following : 5L Grade B max 0 .23% carbon or equivalent) .
For temperature service down to -50 °C sizes
(a) the pressure vessel code to which it is designed
larger than 12 .5 mm, up to and including 400 mm,
and constructed,
should be seamless fine grained steel (A/333 Grade 6
(b) the manufacturer's name and serial number,
max 0 .23% carbon) . Sizes larger than 400 mm may be
(c) the capacity in defined units,
electric fusion welded to ASTM A671 Grade CC 65
(d) the maximum and minimum safe working press-
Class 32 max 0 .23% carbon (base material A 516
ure,
Grade 65 or equivalent) .
(e) the minimum safe working temperature,
(f) the date of the original test, test pressure and the
symbol of the inspecting authority and space for 2 .4 .3 Pipe Thickness
subsequent inspection/test markings . Irrespective of the design code used, minimum pipe
thickness shall be as follows :
Markings should be on a corrosion resistant metal
plate attached to the vessel located so as to remain Nominal pipe size Minimum thickness
visible .
Under 150 mm
2.3 .16 Identification Except for screwed connections Schedule 40
Pipe with screwed connections Schedule 80
Vessels should carry a number or other suitable mark- (see Clause 2 .4 .4)
ing, plainly visible for easy identification . 150 mm 6.4 mm
200 to 300 mm inclusive Schedule 20
2 .3 .17 Examination 350 mm and larger Schedule 10
Each pressure vessel should be inspected/tested at
intervals by a competent person and the date of the The schedule thicknesses referred to are those
last inspection/test marked permanently and clearly specified in BS 1600 and ANSI B 36 .10 .
on its data plate (see 2 .11 regarding inspection) .
2 .4 .4 Pipe Joints

2.4 PIPING, VALVES AND FITTINGS 2 .4 .4.1 Joints on piping runs should preferably be
welded joints .
2 .4 .1 Design Code
Piping systems should conform to the provisions of a 2.4 .4.2 Pipe joints of 50 mm nominal size and larger
recognized piping code as appropriate, e .g . BS 3351 should be welded or flanged . Joints smaller than
or ANSI B 31 .3 . 50 mm nominal size may be welded, flanged or
screwed .
2 .4 .2 Materials
2 .4 .4.3 Screwed joints should not be used in buried
2 .4.2 .1 All materials, including non-metallic parts piping or for low temperature service except for small
for valves, seals, gaskets and diaphragms should be diameter lines such as instrument lines and pressure
resistant to LPG under the service conditions to gauge connections .
which they are subjected .
2 .4 .5 Welding
2 .4.2 .2 With the exception of the permissive use of
valves of nodular iron as noted in 2 .4.6 .4 cast iron 2.4 .5 .1 Qualifications for welding procedures and
materials should not be used . welders should be in accordance with the require-

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the licence terms and conditions. It must not be forwarded to, or stored or accessed by, any unauthorised user. Enquiries: e: [email protected] t: +44 (0)207 467 7100
 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS

ments of BS 4871, BS 2633, ANSI B 31 .3 or their 2 .4.9 Installation and Flexibility

equivalents .
2 .4.9 .1 All pipelines should have adequate flexibility
to accommodate settling of vessels or other equip-
2 .4 .6 Valves ment, thermal expansion and contraction or any other
stresses which may occur in the pipework system .
2 .4.6.1 The primary shutoff valves for vessels should
be of the fire-safe type and of steel or nodular iron to 2 .4.9 .2 Flexibility should preferably be provided by
BS 2789 or equivalent . the use of bends or loops . Where lack of space
prohibits the use of these methods of obtaining flexi-
2 .4.6 .2 Liquid line valves should preferably be of the bility, suitable expansion joints of the bellows type,
fire-safe type and of steel or nodular iron to BS 2789 properly anchored and guided, may be used . Bellows
or equivalent . should be protected from torsional loads .

2 .4.6.3 Forged brass valves with bronze trim may be 2 .4.9 .3 Piping should preferably be laid above
used for line valves but the lower melting point of ground and be protected against both physical dam-
these materials in the event of a fire should be taken age and corrosion . When piping- must extend through
into consideration . a wall or be buried, it should be protected against
physical damage, from superimposed loads and cor-
2 .4 .6.4 With the exception of the use of valves of rosion .
nodular iron made to an appropriate standard, e .g .
BS 2789, cast iron valves should not be used . 2 .4 .9 .4 The need for bracing/protection of small bore
connections should be considered, particularly those
located near to rotating or other equipment or where
2 .4 .7 Flanges and Fittings accidental impact is possible .

2.4 .7.1 Steel flanges and flanged fittings should be to

BS 1560, ANSI B 16 .5 or equivalent standards . 2 .4 .10 Thermal Pressure Relief

2 .4 .7.2 Slip-on or weld neck raised face flanges are 2.4.10.1 Any equipment or section of pipeline in
preferred ; screwed flanges may be used for sizes which liquid may be trapped, e .g . between shut-off
smaller than 50 mm except in piping for low tempera- valves, should be protected by the use of operating
ture service . procedures or suitable equipment against excessive
pressure caused by thermal expansion of the contents .
2 .4 .7.3 Steel butt welding fittings, other than flanges,
should be to BS 1640, ANSI B 16 .9 or equivalent 2 .4.10.2 To meet the requirements of 2 .4 .10 .1 the
standard and be at least of the same schedule thick- minimum setting of relief valves should not be less
ness as the pipe . For pipe to BS 3601 and BS 3602 butt than the maximum pressure under normal operating
welding fittings to BS 1965 should be used . conditions of the section of pipeline which they are
protecting, and the maximum setting should be not
2 .4 .7.4 Steel socket welding and screwed fittings and . more than the design pressure .
screwed couplings should be to BS 3799, ANSI B
16 .11 or equivalent standard . 2 .4.10 .3 If pressure relieving devices discharge to
atmosphere, the discharge should be arranged in a
2.4 .7.5 Steel unions should be to BS 3799 or equiv- safe manner .
alent standard . They should have ground metal-to-
metal seats ; gasket type unions should not be used .
2 .4.11 Insulation
2.4.7.6 Plugs should be solid steel plugs or similar to
BS 3799 or equivalent standard . Cast iron or brass 2 .4.11 .1 Pipeline insulation should be in accordance
plugs should not be used . with the requirements of BS 3351, ANSI B 31 .3 or
their equivalents .
2.4.7.7 Spirally wound gaskets are recommended for
LPG service (see BS 3381) . 2 .4.11 .2 Insulation, steam heating or other means
should be used to prevent icing of valves or other
fittings if product quality, operating procedures and/
2 .4 .8 Bolting or ambient temperatures are favourable to ice/hyd-
Bolting should be to BS 4882 or equivalent standard . rate formation .

10
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 PRESSURE STORAGE

2 .4 .12 Articulated Pipe Connections 2.5 FOUNDATIONS AND SUPPORTS

FOR VESSELS AND PIPING
2 .4 .12 .1 Materials used for articulated pipe connec-
tions should be suitable for use with LPG at the 2.5.1 Codes and Specifications
service conditions applicable . The materials, principles, methods and details of
design and construction of foundations and supports
should comply with approved codes and specifi-
2.4.12 .2 Articulated pipe connections should be
designed to be capable of withstanding a test pressure cations, e .g .
of at least 14 times the maximum pressure they will Foundations . . BS CP 2004
carry in service . Site Foundations . . BS 5930
Earthworks . . BS 6031
Loadings . . BS CP 3
2 .4 .13 Inspection and Testing
Reference should be made to the sections on inspec- and BS 6399
tion and testing in the piping code referred to, e .g . BS Mass and reinforced concrete . . . BS CP 114
Brickwork and masonry . . BS 5628
3351, ANSI B 31 .3 or their equivalents .
Structural steel . . BS 449
Structural concrete . . BS CP 110

2 .4 .14 Hoses
2 .5 .2 Ground Conditions
2 .4 .14 .1 Materials
A thorough knowledge of the ground conditions
Hose materials should be suitable for use with the
should be obtained with particular reference to estab-
grade of LPG and the service conditions applicable . If
lishing the allowable bearing pressure, total and dif-
wire braid is used for the reinforcement of hoses it
ferential settlement expected, including any effects of
should be of corrosion resistant material such as
earth tremors, risk of flotation and any possibility of
stainless steel .
change of original conditions .

2 .4 .14.2 Design pressure

Hoses should be designed to withstand a minimum 2.5 .3 Materials
bursting pressure of 4 times the maximum pressure The choice of materials for foundations and supports
they will carry in service . will be influenced by ground conditions, loadings and
detailed design considerations . Materials may be :

2 .4.14.3 Inspection (a) brickwork or masonry,

Hoses should be examined visually every day if used (b) mass or reinforced concrete,
continuously, and at each time of use if used intermit- (c) steel plate, steel pipe or structural steel,
tently . They should be replaced when they show (d) sand, etc. (for below-ground or mounded
visible signs of deterioration . storage) .

2 .4 .14.4 Testing 2 .5 .4 Loadings

Hoses should be tested periodically to their maximum The greatest combined effect of dead and imposed
working pressure and for electrical continuity, the loadings should be used for the design as incurred by
frequency of test depending on the amount of use . the following factors ; it is recommended that the
Records of these tests should be kept . relevant authority be approached for local infor-
mation on appropriate meteorological records :
2.4.14 .5 Protection (a) dead loading: weight of vessel, supports and con-
Hoses when not in use should be protected from tents,
deterioration . (b) test loading : weight of test fluid,
(c) wind loading : shape factor, height, exposure and
2 .4 .15 Emergency Shutdown suction effect on leeward side,
Emergency valves, e .g . breakaway couplings, excess (d) snow loading,
flow valves, automatically operated valves or (e) earthquake loading,
remotely controlled valves, should be installed in (f ) superimposed loading (in the case of below-
pipelines to which hoses and articulated pipe connec- ground or mounded vessels),
tions are linked to limit discharge of LPG in the event (g) operational loading : vibration, thermal (natural
of their failure . and operational), cyclic .

11

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 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS

2 .5 .5 Settlement 2.6 PUMPS, COMPRESSORS

The possibility of settlement, in particular differential
settlement, must be taken into account in the design
AND METERS
of the support system in order to limit stresses in the
2 .6 .1 Pumps
vessel shell and pipework .
2 .6 .1 .1 The design, materials and construction of
pumps should be suitable for LPG under the foreseen
2 .5.6 Support Systems
operating conditions .

2 .5 .6.1 The design of support systems should follow

2 .6.1 .2 Mechanical seals are preferable to packed
the requirement of the code to which the vessel is
glands .
designed and constructed .
2 .6.1 .3 Positive displacement pumps should have a
2 .5 .6.2 If field welding on the vessel is required, it
bypass valve or other suitable protection against over-
should be carried out in accordance with the code to
pressure .
which the vessel is designed, constructed and tested .
2 .6.1 .4 Pumps should be protected by strainers at
2.5 .6.3 The spacing of individual supports should
least during commissioning.
depend on vessel shell stressing and foundation load-
ings should be related to ground conditions .
2.6 .1 .5 When pumps operate in parallel, each pump
suction and discharge line should contain a block
2.5 .6.4 The design of support systems should allow
valve designed for at least the maximum pressure the
for movement of the vessel as a result of pressure and
pump can deliver .
thermal effects .

2 .5.6 .5 To avoid flotation the storage vessel should as 2 .6 .2 Compressors

appropriate, be securely anchored, weighted or have
adequate pier height . 2.6 .2 .1 The design, materials and construction of
compressors should be suitable for LPG vapour under
2 .5.6 .6 If, in order to meet the requirements of the foreseen operating conditions .
2 .5 .6 .4 and 2 .5 .6.5, the vessel is secured at one end
the other being left free to move axially then piping 2 .6 .2 .2 Positive displacement compressors should be
connections should be sited at the fixed end . equipped with pressure relieving devices on the dis-
charge side .
2 .5.6 .7 Vessel skirts should be provided with both
inspection openings and vents to prevent accumu- 2 .6.2 .3 Suitably sized liquid traps should be installed
lation of vapour . upstream of compressors . They should preferably be
equipped with a high-level shutdown device, a level
2.5 .6 .8 Vessel support systems should be designed to indicator and a drain . It is also recommended that an
prevent or to drain any accumulation of water . oil trap is located downstream of any compressor in
which LPG and lubricating oil are in contact .
2.5 .6.9 To avoid corrosion of the vessel shell any
saddles or steel corrosion plates as appropriate should 2 .6.3 Meters
be continuously welded to the vessel in accordance
with its design code . 2.6 .3.1 The design, materials and construction of
meters and their ancillaries should be suitable for
LPG under the foreseen operating conditions .
2 .5 .7 Pipe Supports
Pipe supports should be designed and spaced to suit 2 .6.3 .2 Meters should be protected by filters .
the pipework configuration and the anchorage and
friction forces involved . 2 .6.4 Protection of Pumps, Compressors and Meters
Pumps, compressors and meters should be protected
against accidental damage by suitable positioning
2.5 .8 Fireproofing and/or physical protection .
Supports for above ground storage and piping local to
any vessel should be fireproofed . Fireproofing should 2 .6 .5 Transfer Systems
provide the supporting structure 2 hours of protection
(see BS 476) and should be waterproofed . 2.6.5.1 Transfer systems should be designed to

12
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 PRESSURE STORAGE

minimize the risk of operator errors, e .g . propane in 2 .7 .3 Loading and Unloading Equipment
butane equipment .
Equipment should be clearly marked, particularly 2 .7.3 .1 Flexible connections between the fixed load-
at crossover points, to show the grade of LPG it is ing/unloading facilities and the road/rail vehicle may
designed to handle . be by articulated pipe connections (see 2 .4 .12) or
hoses (see 2 .4 .14) . They should enable connection to
2 .6.5.2 There should be a means of rapid shut-off but be made with correctly positioned vehicles without
resultant surges must be considered at the design incurring undue strains on fixed facilities or transport
stage . unit connections . Emergency valves in accordance
with 2 .6 .5 .4 should be installed .
2 .6.5.3 If automatic alarm devices are used to indi-
cate approach to maximum permissible filling level or 2 .7.3 .2 Readily accessible means should be provided
automatic shut-off valves to prevent overfilling, then to enable the operator to shut off the flow of LPG in
they should be independent of, and not operated by, an emergency .
the primary level gauge(s) on the vessel .
2.7.3.3 Safety systems should be provided which will
2.6 .5 .4 To prevent uncontrolled discharge of LPG in prevent road/rail vehicle movement, either accidental
the event of hose or articulated pipe connection or driveaway, before hoses or articulated arms are
failure, emergency shut-off valves, e .g . excess flow disconnected .
valves, automatic or remotely controlled valves,
should be installed in pipelines adjacent to the con- 2 .7.3 .4 Safety systems should be provided which will
nection . minimize product leakage in the event of road/rail
vehicle movement before hoses or articulated arms
are disconnected .

2 .7.3.5 Safety systems should be provided which will

2.7 ROAD AND RAIL LOADING
prevent access by locomotives to the sidings whilst
AND UNLOADING FACILITIES rail tank wagons are still connected to the loading or
unloading facilities .
2.7 .1 Location and Layout
2.7.3.6 Platforms
2.7.1 .1 Road Platforms, which may be provided to give access to
The location and layout of road loading/unloading loading or unloading equipment above ground level,
facilities should be separate from other traffic, should or between loading equipment and the top of the road
permit ease of vehicle access and exit, preferably or rail vehicles, should be designed so that they are at
without need for reversing, and have spacing between the optimum height for the operations involved .
connection points sufficient for the largest vehicles
anticipated . Kerbs or other suitable barriers should 2 .7.3.7 Non-slip materials should be used for the
be provided to protect product handling facilities . walkway surfaces of platforms and the treads of access
The location of the facilities should also meet the stairways . The platforms should be of adequate width
requirements of 2 .2.2 and of Table 1 of Appendix 1 . to give free passage around any loading equipment
above the surface level of the platform .
2 .7.1 .2 Rail Handrails or other means of protection against
Rail tank wagon loadinglunloading facilities should falling should be provided on road loading gantries
be separate from those for other products and where for personnel using vehicle walkways during loading
practicable served by separate tracks . or unloading operations .
Rail sidings should be constructed with the appro-
priate structure gauge clearances . Whenever possible 2 .7.3 .8 Where a platform provides access to a multi-
entry to rail sidings should be laid to a falling gradient plicity of connections, there should be an emergency
from the main line ; a suitable gradient is 1 in 400 . exit remote from the normal access stairway .
The location of the facilities should also meet the
requirements of 2 .2.2 and of Table 1 of Appendix 1 . 2 .7.3 .9 If access is required between the fixed plat-
forms and the tops of the vehicles, hinged gangways
2 .7 .2 Ground Conditions may be necessary to bridge the gaps .
Ground beneath loading/unloading facilities should
be either concreted or compacted and graded to 2.7.3 .10 Construction materials
levels to ensure that any spillage has a preferential Materials used in the construction of loading or
flow away from the road or rail tanker(s) . unloading structures should be non-combustible .

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 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS

2.7 .4 Stray Currents, Earthing and Bonding 2.9 .3.3 The possibility of a major fire outbreak, and
one leading to direct flame impingement on a storage
2.7.4 .1 General vessel, can be minimized by sound engineering in
Road and rail loading/unloading facilities should be plant design and layout . Sound operating practice
electrically continuous with the rest of the product and adequate instruction of personnel with respect to
system (see 2 .8 .1 and 2 .10 .7 .6(d) ) . normal and emergency operating procedures are also
minimizing factors .
2.7.4.2 Rail sidings
Rail sidings for loadinglunloading of rail tank wagons 2 .9 .3 .4 The cover provided for below-ground or
should be insulated from the main line to prevent mounded storage (see 2 .2 .8 .4) will afford protection
stray currents from electrified lines or signalling track against direct flame impingement and will minimize
circuits (see 2 .8 .1) . heat absorption from nearby fires .

2 .9.4 Access
2.8 ELECTRICAL, STATIC Suitable access for fire-fighting equipment and fire
ELECTRICITY, LIGHTNING authority apparatus should be provided, and should
PROTECTION be kept clear at all times .

2.8.1 Electrical Apparatus, Earthing and Bonding 2 .9 .5 Communications/Alarm

Electrical apparatus and installations, earthing and An adequate communications/alarm system for sum-
bonding, telecommunications and instrumentation moning the emergency services and warning person-
should comply with the recommendations of the IP nel should be provided . This system should be tested
Electrical Safety Code . at regular intervals .

2 .8 .2 Lightning Protection 2.9 .6 Cooling Water

LPG pressure storage vessels do not require lightning
protection . 2 .9 .6 .1 When cooling water is the protective medium
then 2 .9 .6 .2 to 2 .9 .6 .10 must be complied with .

2.9 REQUIREMENTS FOR FIRE 2 .9.6 .2 Provision must be made for an adequate
PROTECTION supply of water for fire protection and a minimum of
2 hours of supply is recommended to meet the
2 .9 .1 Fire Plan requirements of 2 .9 .1 .
A fire plan must be prepared for the protection of the
system and be based on a systematic evaluation of the 2.9.6 .3 The application of water to storage vessels
design and operating procedures, taking into account may be by any one of, or a combination of, hydrants,
failure modes, the likelihood of their occurring and hoses, mobile equipment and fixed monitors as well
available resources . as by fixed spray systems required by 2 .9 .6 .5 .

2.9 .2 Control of Fires 2 .9.6.4 Mobile equipment, fixed monitors, etc ., and
fixed spray systems or combinations of them should
As small LPG fires can be extinguished using suitable be designed to permit the application of water at a
first-aid fire extinguishers, e .g . dry powder, units of rate equivalent to at least 7 litres/(minute m 2 ) of
adequate size should be available adjacent to all above-ground vessel surface area .
loading/unloading points and other work sites, e .g .
pump areas . 2 .9.6 .5 All above-ground storage should be provided
with fixed spray systems designed to ensure that a film
2.9 .3 Protection Systems of cooling water is applied to the whole surface of the
vessel to ensure that all surfaces including product
2 .9.3.1 Each LPG storage vessel and each bulk load- pipelines in the immediate vicinity exposed to thermal
ing/discharge facility shall be provided with a fire radiation are protected .
protection system which will ensure its structural Provided sufficient back-up facilities are available
integrity under fire conditions, e .g . intensity, dur- the rate of water application from the fixed sprays
ation, as covered by the fire plan (see 2 .9 .1) . need not-be the total required by 2 .9.6 .4 above .

2 .9.3.2 Fire protection may be achieved by the use of 2 .9 .6.6 Hydrants where provided should be readily
spacing, location, insulation or similar systems and/or accessible at all times and so spaced as to provide for
by the use of cooling water . the protection of all the facilities .

14
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 PRESSURE STORAGE

2 .9.6.7 Sufficient lengths of fire hose should be pro- 2 .10 OPERATIONS

vided and be readily available . It is desirable to equip
the outlet of each line with a combination jet and fog 2 .10 .1 Housekeeping
nozzle .
2 .10.1 .1 All parts of an LPG installation, particularly
2.9.6.8 Control of the water supply to fixed spray storage areas and filling/discharge points, should be
systems, hydrants, etc ., must be possible from outside kept clean, tidy and free from extraneous material .
the danger area and spray systems on vessels should
be individually controllable . Consideration should 2.10.1 .2 Following the completion of any construc-
always be given to the need for more than one control tion or maintenance work all surplus materials and
point, e .g. on opposite sides of the installation . debris should be immediately removed .

2 .9.6 .9 Measures to prevent the freezing of cooling 2.10.1 .3 Ladders, stairways, walkways and access
water supplies and frost damage to supply lines, spray platforms should be maintained in a safe condition .
systems, etc ., must be provided .
2.10 .2 Training
2.9 .6 .10 The application of cooling water on bulk
road vehicles and rail tank wagons whilst being filled 2.10 .2.1 All involved with the handling of LPG
or discharged must be possible from fixed spray sys- should understand the characteristics of the product
tems and/or immediately available mobile equip- and be familiar with the sections of this code relevant
ment . to their spheres of responsibility.

2 .10 .2.2 Plant personnel should be instructed in the

2 .9 .7 Care and Maintenance of Fire-fighting fundamentals of fire-fighting and fire-control with
Equipment particular reference to fires involving LPG . They
Fire-fighting equipment should be regularly should also be instructed in the correct handling of
inspected, tested and maintained . Particular atten- any fire-fighting and fire-control equipment provided
tion should be paid to the spray water systems to and should be exercised in this respect at intervals .
ensure the water film is achieved, e .g . nozzles not The location of all vapour and liquid piping and valves
blocked . Firemains, hydrants, standpipes, hoses and should be known and .their use understood .
other equipment should be protected from frost and
mechanical damage . Portable first-aid fire extin- 2 .10 .3 Emergency Procedures/Plans
guishers should be suitably mounted to protect them
from deterioration . 2 .10.3 .1 Procedures and plans must be developed to
handle emergencies arising from leakage, fire or any
other circumstance which could give rise to such
2.9 .8 Drainage emergencies. Such plans should include all necessary
Suitable traps/separators should be incorporated in liaison with the local authorities, neighbouring indus-
drainage systems to prevent LPG (liquid/vapour) try or the general public.
migrating to areas where it could create a hazard, e .g .
any closed or piped drainage system . 2.10.3 .2 Plant personnel should receive regular
instruction in their roles in the emergency plan as well
as in the practical handling of emergency situations .
2.9.9 Removal of Combustible Materials
Readily ignitable material should not be allowed to 2.10.3 .3 To ensure the adequacy of the emergency
remain within 6 m of any above-ground pressure procedures and personnel awareness of them, exer-
storage vessel or between it and any spillage or deflec- cises based on simulated incidents should be carried
tion or separation wall . Such material should also be out periodically with the participation of the public
removed from the vicinity of below-ground or emergency services which are available in the area .
mounded storage .
If weed killers are used, chemicals which are a 2.10 .4 Emergency Action
potential source of fire danger should not be selected The following aspects should be featured in any estab-
for this purpose . lished emergency procedures plan and training
associated with it :
2.9 .10 Warning Signs (a) In any emergency situation it is of paramount
In areas where smoking and naked lights are pro- importance to avoid endangering human life .
hibited, prominent notices to this effect should be (b) In any emergency situation summon help, e .g .
posted, particularly at access points . local fire-fighting services .
15

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 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS

(c) In any emergency situation attempt to isolate the the completeness of the air removal and the
part of the plant affected . flammability of the issuing gas . The oxygen con-
(d) In any emergency situation account for all per- tent in the system should be reduced to a level
sonnel and evacuate all those not directly con- insufficient to support combustion .
cerned with handling the emergency . (e) A slight positive pressure must be maintained in
(e) In the case of major leakage, large areas may be the LPG system during air displacement and
affected by the vapour cloud and the evacuation subsequent filling .
of personnel and removal of sources of ignition in
areas ahead of the cloud should be carried out . 2 .10 .5.4 Prevention of excessive chilling
(f) Fires and LPG leaks must always be approached In filling the storage vessel and system care should be
in the same direction as the wind . taken to prevent excessive chilling of the LPG
(g) LPG fires should normally be controlled but not pumped into it .
extinguished until the source of release can be
shut off . 2 .10 .6 Draining Water in Service
(h) It must always be recognized that because of the
risk of weakening the shell in the vapour area, 2 .10 .6.1 Particular care should be exercised when
direct impingement of flame on a pressure vessel draining storage vessels in service in order to minimize
is particularly hazardous . Thus, in any fire situ- the escape of LPG . Of the two drain valves required
ation, where circumstances prevent successful by 2 .3 .10.1, that nearer to the vessel should be fully
protection of a vessel from the possibility of opened first and draining then controlled by gradually
failure, evacuation of all personnel from the pos- opening the second valve .
sibly affected area must be considered and, if If, on opening the second valve, no flow occurs,
necessary, carried out in accordance with the both valves should be closed immediately to allow
emergency plan . subsequent investigation .
On completion of the draining operation, the valve
2 .10.5 Purging and Filling of Systems further from the storage vessel should be closed first,
then the other valve .
2 .10.5 .1 Permit to work systems
Permit to work systems should be operated when 2.10.6 .2 When draining vessels equipped with de-
purging and filling storage vessels and systems involv- watering pots, the valve upstream of the dewatering
ing venting and draining . pot should always be closed before opening the drain
system downstream of the dewatering pot . The oper-
2.10.5.2 Oxygen content ation of the two valves downstream of the dewatering
When storage vessels and systems which contain air pot should be as described in 2 .10 .6 .1 .
are to be filled with LPG the oxygen content should
first be reduced to a safe level (see Appendix 6) . 2 .10 .7 Transfer Operations

2 .10 .7.1 Product transfers

2 .10 .5.3 Air displacement
(a) Air may be replaced by an inert gas, water or Before LPG is transferred from one container to
LPG vapour (the latter is not the preferred another and whilst the transfer is in progress, whether
method) . If inert gas is used and its source is it involves storage vessels, bulk road vehicles, rail
cryogenic, care should be exercised to ensure full tank wagons or portable containers, the procedure
vaporization before entry into the LPG system to detailed in 2.10 .7 .2 to 2 .10 .7 .8 should be followed .
avoid sub-cooling of any part of the system .
2.10.7.2 Receiving vessels should always be checked
(b) When water is used for air displacement the use
of freezing point depressants such as methanol that they are suitable to handle the grade of LPG to be
may subsequently be necessary to avoid ice and transferred and that sufficient ullage exists to receive
hydrate formation in valves, pressure reducing the quantity involved .
equipment, etc .
2.10.7.3 The interconnecting liquid and vapour pip-
(c) If LPG vapour is used to replace the air, then the
vessel and system will, for a period of time, ing system and manifold should be checked to ensure
that it is in safe working condition and that only valves
contain a flammable mixture and a flammable
required for the transfer operation, and any operation
mixture will be vented ; adequate precautions to
proceeding simultaneously, are open . A check should
prevent its uncontrolled ignition are essential .
also be made to ensure that :
(d) In the case of air displacement by means of an
inert gas or LPG vapour, sampling and testing of (a) Grades of LPG cannot be charged into vessels,
the vessel's contents and the mixture discharged pipelines or equipment not designed to handle
from the vents should be carried out to determine them .

16
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 PRESSURE STORAGE

(b) Unacceptable product contamination cannot 2 .10.7.8 Emergency stoppage of operations

occur . The person in charge of the transfer should ensure
that it is stopped in the event of :
2.10 .7.4 During product transfer (a) a potentially hazardous leak occurring,
The receiving vessel should be checked to ensure that
(b) an emergency occurring in the vicinity,
it is not being filled above its safe working level .
(c) the transfer having to become unattended for any
reason .
2 .10.7.5 On completion of product transfer
The receiving vessel should be checked to ensure that 2.10 .8 Access to Storage and Operating Areas
it is not filled above its safe working level . Stairways, ladders, walkways and platforms provided
to give safe access to tanks, valves and operating
2 .10.7.6 Filling or discharging equipment should be used .
When filling or discharging bulk transport the follow-
ing additional procedures should also be carried out :
2.10 .9 Lighting of Storage and Operating Areas
(a) In addition to the required use of a driveaway Operations should only be carried out when adequate
prevention system (see 2.7 .3 .3) the accidental daylight or artificial light is available .
movement of the vehicle during the transfer oper-
ation should be prevented . The parking brake of
a bulk road vehicle or the handbrake of a rail tank
wagon should be on and, where necessary, wheel
chocks should be used . 2.11 INSPECTION OF PRESSURE
(b) When filling/discharging rail tank wagons safety STORAGE
systems preventing/prohibiting access of loco-
motives and other rolling stock to the sidings 2 .11 .1 Permit to Work Systems
must be operational . Permit to work systems should be operated in connec-
(c) Any driving units or electrical equipment on bulk tion with all procedures covered in 2 .11 .
road vehicles not required and not specifically
designed for the transfer operation should be 2 .11 .2 Preparation
stopped and/or isolated . Before any inspection of a pressure vessel is under-
(d) A bulk road vehicle should be earthed or electri- taken, there should be adequate briefing with respect
cally bonded to the LPG fixed installation before to :
the LPG connection is made . No special earthing (a) the scope and relevant sections of the applicable
arrangements are normally required for rail tank vessel design code,
wagons as they are earthed via the track . (b) the materials of construction and their predicted
(e) Before the vehicle is moved the liquid and vapour performance under normal operating conditions,
connections should be disconnected, care being (c) the history of the system concerned .
exercised to avoid spillage . In the absence of
leakage/spillage the electrical bonding connec- This should be supported by discussions with plant
tion, where appropriate, may then be broken . operating personnel, particularly in respect of any
Where wheel chocks have been used they should unscheduled departure from normal operating
be removed . The vehicle should be checked to conditions or possible plant upsets which may have
ensure that it is in safe working order and the occurred since the vessel was last inspected . Such
surrounding area checked to ensure than any information could be significant and would serve to
LPG that has leaked or has been vented has highlight where particularly precise observation
safely dispersed . might be needed .

2 .10.7.7 Attendance during operations 2 .11 .3 External Inspection-Above-ground Vessels

(a) Any transfer operation must be fully supervised External inspection may be largely carried out whilst
throughout by a competent person . The departure the vessel is in service .
of this competent person requires the stopping of External inspection constitutes a survey of the
the operation . vessel, its supports, the foundations or supporting
(b) No drain valve, bleed valve, pipeline, etc ., in the structures, the associated platforms and access lad-
LPG system which communicates directly to the ders and the external insulation, where applicable .
outside air should be left open without an The predominant application of on-stream inspec-
operator in attendance unless positive measures tion is the measurement of wall thickness at key
have been taken to prevent the escape of product . points on the shell of-a pressure vessel, particularly
(c) Unattended vehicles should not be left connected where past inspection records indicate that there is
to filling/discharge systems . some corrosion occurring in service .

17
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 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS

Further points for attention include : periodic inspection is additional to and separate from
routine monitoring, e .g . checking induced currents . -
(a) signs of general or local deterioration of foun-
At periods not exceeding 5 years the vessel should
dations/support structures due to flooding, etc .,
be internally inspected and wall thickness measure-
(b) condition and proper engagement of vessel sup- ments made at key points on the shell, particularly
port anchor bolts, nuts and washers, those for which past records indicate the possibility of
(c) examination of support/skirt to vessel weld con- any changes occurring .
nections for cracking, etc ., Checks should be made for any soil settlement
(d) checking whether any settlement of the foun-
which could affect the structural integrity of the
dations has occurred since last inspected,
vessel.
(e) random checking of metal surfaces underneath
All accessible nozzles/connections should be
external insulation and fireproofing to determine
periodically inspected for signs of corrosion, damage,
the extent or otherwise of water/moisture pen-
etc .
etration, ascertaining the cause of any possible
penetration and assessing whether further more
extensive external inspection should be pro- 2 .11 .6 Cracks
grammed . The possibility exists that cracks may be found during
inspections . Once located the depth of the crack
2 .11 .4 Internal Inspection-Above-ground Vessels should be established by non-destructive methods .
For internal inspections of above-ground LPG press- This will normally give the information needed for
ure storage vessels a visual examination is generally all later assessment but in some borderline cases more
that is needed . Such a visual examination should be vigorous testing may be required .
supported by wall thickness measurements if past
records or the incident examination indicate that 2.11 .7 Pressure Relief Valves
corrosion may have occurred . The pressure relief valves and other associated con-
nections are of paramount importance and must be
2 .11 .5 Buried/Mounded Vessels regularly and thoroughly inspected for corrosion,
Any cathodic protection system installed should be blockage, etc ., and the valves themselves tested and
thoroughly inspected at least once per year . This maintained at intervals not exceeding 5 years .

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 3

REFRIGERATED LIQUEFIED
PETROLEUM GAS STORAGE

3 .1 SCOPE three following definitions, which are additional to

the design and construction requirements of recog-
3 .1 .1 Inclusions nized standard codes for refrigerated storage tanks .
This chapter covers refrigerated LPG tanks, above These standard codes are presently written for the
ground, fully in-ground and partly in ground, and design and construction of metal tanks, but this code
their associated systems and includes guidance on does not preclude the use of alternative materials,
piping, valves and fittings, fire protection, as well as e .g . concrete, for tank construction provided that the
commissioning and inspection . This chapter must be storage system integrity is at least equivalent to that of
read in conjunction with Chapter 2 which covers large a conventional tank and the additional requirements
LPG pressure storage installations, as repetition has of this code are also complied with .
been avoided .
3 .2 .1 .2 Single containment storage system
3 .1 .2 Exclusions A single containment storage system is one having
either a single or double wall tank, but so designed
3 .1 .2.1 This code does not cover storage in frozen and constructed that only the inner containing el-
earth pits or underground caverns . ement in contact with the refrigerated product meets
the low temperature ductility requirements for
3 .1 .2 .2 This chapter does not cover partially refriger- storage of that product .
ated storage which is classified as pressure storage and The material of the inner containing wall shall have
is included in Chapter 2 . properties at the storage temperature such that a
sudden rupture of this wall can be considered as a
3 .1 .3 Object 'non-credible' mode of failure .
The outer wall (if any) of a single containment
3 .1 .3 .1 The object of this chapter is to recommend
storage system is primarily for the retention and
basic safety requirements and practice for the design,
protection of insulation and is not designed to contain
construction and operation of refrigerated LPG
facilities and to indicate the basic philosophy on liquid in the event of leakage from the inner container .
Such leakage, should it occur, would be contained by
which these requirements are based .
a low height bund wall surrounding the tank .
3 .1 .3 .2 It is not intended to preclude the use of
3.2 .1 .3 Double containment storage system
alternative designs, materials and methods where
these provide equivalent standards of safety . A double containment storage system is one having a
double wall tank designed and constructed so that
both inner and outer elements meet the low tempera-
3.2 GENERAL PHILOSOPHY ture requirements for storage of the refrigerated pro-
duct . The refrigerated product is normally stored
3 .2.1 Definitions within the inner wall, but the outer wall shall be
capable of containing any leakage of refrigerated
3.2 .1 .1 For the --purpose of this code refrigerated product from the inner_tank .
storage, whether above-ground, fully in-ground or At least one of the walls of a double containment
partly in-ground, is considered as covered by the storage system shall be of a material with properties at

19
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 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS

the storage temperature such that a sudden failure of 3 .2 .5 Vapour Formation and Fire
this wall can be considered a 'non-credible' mode of
failure . This will normally be the inner wall, but if 3.2.5 .1 The size of the vapour cloud resulting from
sudden rupture of the inner wall cannot be ruled out liquid leakage can be minimized by :
as a credible mode of failure then the outer wall must
(a) Limitation of the liquid pool area . Bunding close
be designed to contain the liquid released by this
to a tank if of sufficient height and strength to
failure mode .
A double containment storage system is not hold the foreseen leakage (see 3 .3 .2) and thus
conforming to the requirements of a double con-
required to contain product vapour in the event of
tainment system (see 3 .2 .1 .3) will result in a
liquid leakage from the inner tank .
lower rate of vapour formation than would be the
case for wider spaced bunds of the single contain-
3.2.1 .4 Full containment storage system
A full containment storage system is one meeting all ment system (see 3 .2 .1 .2) . However, the full
the requirements of a double containment storage containment system (see 3 .2 .1 .4) would provide
the greatest security against such vapour release .
system (see 3 .2 .1 .3) plus the additional requirement
(b) Limitation of the heat transfer rate to the liquid
that it shall avoid the uncontrolled release of product
pool . The surfacing of bunded areas with
vapour in the event of liquid leakage from the inner
materials which will limit the rate of heat transfer
tank. (In this context the release of vapour through
pressure relief valves is considered a controlled to a liquid pool will minimize vapour formation .
release .)
3 .2.5 .2 If spillage is ignited the flame size, and con-
sequently the area affected by such a fire, will be
3 .2 .2 Level of Safety minimized by limitation of the liquid pool area .
Refrigerated storage tanks and groups of such tanks
when designed, constructed, located, spaced, pro- 3 .2.5 .3 If product leaking from a tank, and/or its
tected, operated and maintained within their design associated pipelines, into a bund results in a major
limits and in accordance with the requirements of this accumulation which is subsequently ignited it is pos-
code provide an acceptable level of safety for both sible that the resulting fire would not be extinguished
plant operators and the public . but be left to burn itself out . Therefore :
(a) Bund height need not be limited in order to
facilitate access to a tank1bund fire .
3.2 .3 Prudent Provisions for Spillage (b) Tanks, working areas, process facilities, site
Whilst the integrity of a tank as per 3 .2 .2 above is boundary, etc ., must be located or protected to
accepted, the complete absence of leakage/spillage limit the thermal radiation flux levels to which
must be regarded as an ideal and therefore it is they would be subjected as a result of such a fire .
prudent to provide sensible measures for the contain- Protection may be afforded by the use of suitable
ing and handling of such leakage/spillage and for spacing, insulation, screening, water application,
dealing with the possible consequences of its occur- etc., or by a combination of such measures .
rence .

3.2.4 Leakage 3.3 REQUIREMENTS FOR LOCATION

The probability of leakage can be minimized by : AND SPACING OF REFRIGERATED
(a) limiting both the number and size of all connec- LPG TANKS
tions on the tank, particularly those below the
maximum liquid level, e .g . by the use of sub- 3 .3.1 Limits for Thermal Radiation Flux Levels
merged pumps for liquid discharge and top filling,
(b) the use of emergency remote control and/or 3 .3 .1 .1 Refrigerated LPG storage tanks and their con-
automatic fail safe shut-off valves on liquid con- tainment systems shall be located and spaced so that
nections on the tank and other important lo- the minimum distance to any fixed source of ignition
cations, is 30 m, irrespective of radiation flux levels .
(c) the double valving of all liquid connections on the
tank below the maximum liquid level, the first 3 .3 .1 .2 Containment systems, i .e . tanks and their
being as near to the tank shell as practicable, associated bunds and impounding basins, shall be
(d) the use of welded connections upstream of the located and spaced so that in the event of a fire, e .g .
first shut-off valve on each connection below the tank fire or fire resulting from the ignition of spillage
maximum liquid level . of flammable products, thermal radiation flux levels

20
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 REFRIGERATED LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS STORAGE

shall not exceed the relevant maximum levels given in 3 .4.1 .2 Each refrigerated storage tank shall be com-
Table 2 of Appendix 1 . pletely surrounded by a bund unless the topography
of the area is such, either naturally or by construction,
3 .3 .1 .3 The thermal radiation flux levels of 3 .3 .1 .2 that spills (as defined in 3 .3 .2) will be directed safely
shall be based on the ignition of flammable product by gravity drainage and diversion walls, if required,
either in a tank or from spillage . In the case of spillage away from adjacent tanks, equipment and sensitive
the pool formed will be dictated by the spillage rate, areas to an impounding basin suitably located within
evaporation rate and duration (covered by 3 .3 .2) and the site boundary .
the topography/location of the site and facilities
associated with it . 3.4.1 .3 Full and double containment systems (see
Reference should be made to Appendix 2 for guid- 3 .2 .1) by definition meet the requirement of 3 .4 .1 .2,
ance on calculation of thermal radiation levels with but low bunds may be required around tank main
respect to the LPG facilities . connections to contain leaks from external piping,
valves and fittings as dictated by the systematic evalu-
3 .3 .1 .4 The calculation of radiation flux levels for the ation requirements of 3 .3 .2 .
purpose of complying with 3 .3 .1 .2 shall be based on
the size of fire resulting from the conditions laid down
in 3 .3 .1 .3 and 3 .3 .2 and assuming the atmospheric 3 .4.2 Bund Capacity
conditions relevant to the site .
3 .4.2 .1 For storage systems which do not conform to
the requirements of full or double containment sys-
3 .3 .2 Rate of Leakage tems (refer to 3 .2 .1) the bundlimpounding basin shall
The rate of leakage of flammable product and its be capable of retaining the total content above ground
duration, used in 3 .3 .1 .3, shall be based on identified level or of the largest tank connected to any shared
potential leak sources in the facilities which need to impounding basin .
be considered . The identification and quantitative
assessment of leak sources should be based on a 3 .4 .2 .2 Where low bunds are provided around tank
systematic evaluation of the design and operating connections (see 3 .4 .1 .3) they should be of sufficient
procedures of such facilities, taking into account fail- capacity to contain the quantity of spillage likely to be
ure modes and the likelihood of their occurring . leaked into them (see 3 .3 .2) .
Examples of potential leak sources from LPG
facilities and indications of leakage rates from them
under specific conditions are quoted in Appendix 3 . 3 .4 .3 Bund Design

3 .4.3 .1 Bunds and impounding basins shall be

3 .3 .3 Vapour Travel designed to contain both water and the applicable
Provision shall be made to minimize the possibility of refrigerated LPG . They shall be constructed so their
a flammable vapour cloud of LPG resulting from a integrity is not threatened under the conditions laid
spill as defined in 3 .3 .2 from reaching the site bound- down in 3 .3 .1 .3 (see 3 .8 .1) .
ary . Such provision may include such measures as
spacing, limitations of spill pool area, insulation of 3.4.3 .2 Foundation design for bunds and/or outer
bund/impounding areas, screening and vapour dis- walls of double and full containment systems (refer to
persion equipment . 3 .2 .1) must take into account, but not necessarily be
Reference should be made to Appendix 3 for limited to, possible frost heave of underlying soils,
examples of potential LPG leak sources and rates of earthquakes and settlement limitations . Where there
leakage and to Appendix 4 for information relating to is the possibility of interaction between bund and tank
mathematical models for calculating hazard distances foundations then the total design should obviate as
arising out of spillages of LPG and the resultant far as is practicable a common failure mode which
vapour cloud formation . could cause loss of integrity of the system .

3.4 .3.3 The area within a bund should be graded to

3 .4 REQUIREMENTS FOR BUNDS levels which ensure that spillage has a preferential
AND IMPOUNDING BASINS flow away from a tank and its connections and is
conducted to any impounding basin provided by suit-
3 .4 .1 Individual Tank Bunding ably designed open runways . The effect of grading on
evaporation rates should be considered:
3.4.1 .1 No refrigerated LPG storage tank shall be
located within a bund enclosing any other tank . 3.4.3.4 To minimize pool size consideration should

21
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 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS

be given to sectionalization within a bund and/or level in it shall always be kept above that in the outer
impounding basin (see 3 .2 .5 .1) . tank .
Outer shells constructed of prestressed concrete,
3.4.3 .5 Bunds and impounding basins shall be pro- or reinforced concrete with an external earthen
vided with water removal systems designed to prevent embankment, do not require water testing unless
LPG spillages escaping into any system outside the specified by the user or approving authorities . Refer-
area of the bund/impounding basin . ence should also be made to the EEMUA document
on RLG storage tanks .
3.4.3.6 The capacity and reliability of water removal
systems for rain water and fire water where applicable 3 .5.1 .4 All welds (both vertical and horizontal) shall
shall be sufficient to prevent the accumulation of such be 100% radiographed.
quantities of water as would cause damage to the tank
foundations, bund wall, or lead to tank flotation . 3 .5.1 .5 Where applicable (see 3 .2 .1) metallic
materials should be selected with regard to their
3 .4 .3.7 Consideration should be given to the design toughness characteristics at the design temperature .
of bunds and the installation of the necessary facilities The toughness requirements shall meet at least the
to allow for the safe recirculation of water because of requirements as specified in the standards referred to
the quantities which may be required in an in 3 .5 .1 .1 or the code or standard to which the tank is
emergency . designed, constructed and tested .

3.5 .1 .6 Double containment and full containment

3 .4 .4 Bund Safety storage systems shall be provided with means for
Consideration should be given to the monitoring of detecting and removing liquid leakage into the annu-
bunded areas for LPG leakage . Attention should also lar space.
be given to double containment systems, and the Full containment storage systems shall also be pro-
areas surrounding in-ground tanks and the entry of vided with means for detecting and removing the
personnel into such areas shall be strictly controlled build-up of condensation in the annular space .
(see 3 .5 .1 .6) .
3 .5.1 .7 Liquid levels
In selecting the maximum filling level account shall be
3 .5 REQUIREMENTS FOR LOW taken of the following :
PRESSURE REFRIGERATED (a) expansion of the product due to temperature rise
STORAGE TANKS to the equilibrium temperature of the product for
the pressure at which the relief valves are set to
3 .5 .1 Design operate,
(b) the time required to shut off the flow of LPG into
3.5.1 .1 A single containment system or the inner the tank in the event of failure of the protective
metal container of a double or full containment system device,
must be designed, constructed and tested to comply (c) unevenness in the level of tank settlement,
with a recognized standard, e .g . for metal containers (d) earthquakes (if applicable) .
BS 4741, API 620 Appendix R, EEMUA Recommen-
dations for the Design and Construction of Refriger- 3.5.1 .8 Each tank shall be provided with at least two
ated Liquefied Gas Storage Tanks . independent means of determining the liquid level .
There are no equivalent standards for the design, Additionally each tank shall be provided with a
construction and testing of concrete containers, and high level alarm and a high level trip system which
until such documents become available it is recom- shall be designed to stop all liquid flows into the tank
mended that the guidelines published by FIP-Feder- to prevent over-filling .
ation Internationale de la Precontrainte (Ref . No . 3/6 The high level trip system shall be independent of
September 1982) should be followed . both high level alarm and of the liquid level gauges .

3.5.1 .2 All inner (primary) containers shall be tested 3.5.1 .9 Normally, means, such as the recirculation of
to the maximum filling level with water . product, should be provided to avoid roll-over caused
by stratification in the tank .
3 .5 .1 .3 Where the outer shell of double or full con-
tainment systems is of metal this outer tank shall be 3 .5.1 .10 Tanks shall be designed to avoid flotation,
tested as per 3 .5 .1 .2. However, in order to prevent e .g . in the event of blockage of bund drainage sys-
damage to the inner tank during this testing the water tems .

22
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 REFRIGERATED LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS STORAGE

3 .5 .2 Tank Fittings atmosphere during normal operatinglatmospheric

conditions .
3.5 .2 .1 Tank fittings such as drains, sampling valves, Vapours are generated by :
pressure gauges, temperature gauges, block valves,
(a) liquid entering the tank,
their attachment and bolting must be made of
(b) system heat inleak, i .e . through walls etc .,
materials which comply with the requirements of BS
(c) energy input from pumps etc .,
1510, the low temperature provisions of BS 3351 or
(d) maximum rate of decrease in atmospheric press-
ANSI B . 31 .2, or equivalent .
ure .

3 .5.4.4 Additional protection systems should be pro-

3.5 .3 Tank Connections and Appurtenances vided to control pressure increases/decreases to
within the design range when this is beyond the
3.5.3 .1 Tank connections, fittings and appurtenances capacity of the boil-off compressor or its equivalent
shall not be positioned below the maximum liquid system .
level, unless required for exceptional reasons of
design, construction or operation . 3 .5 .4.5 High pressures outside the scope of the boil-
off compressor or equivalent system should be limited
3.5 .3 .2 All tank connections below the maximum to the design pressure, e .g . by the following systems :
liquid level and all liquid pipeline connections shall be (a) Pressure controlled release of vapour to a safely
provided with emergency shut-off valve which shall located flare or vent system .
be remotely operable and fitted as close to the tank Such a system is normally designed to cope
shell as is practicable . The connection between this with at least such operational upsets as tripping of
valve and the tank should preferably be welded, the boil-off compressor (or equivalent) system,
unless an internal valve is also incorporated in the hot product run-down into the tank .
tank connection . If the connection between the first The controlled release of pressure by such a
external shut-off valve and the tank is not welded then system is normally by way of a pressure control
it must be flange connected with all bolts being ten- valve in the suction line to the boil-off com-
sioned under controlled conditions . pressor, but provision of relief valves opening to
a safely located flare/vent system is an alternative
3 .5 .3.3 All pipe connections below the maximum solution . In any case the controlled release to a
liquid level shall be double valved ; where filling and/ safely located vent/flare system should be at a
or suction lines have to be below liquid level the pressure level which prevents the emergency
second valve shall be outside but close to the outer relief valves connected to atmosphere from
wall or bund . operating .
(b) Closure of the tank liquid inlet valve and where
3.5.3 .4 Any connection above the liquid level shall applicable tripping of tank circulation pumps .
be provided with positive means of isolation . (c) Final protection by emergency relief valves open-
ing to atmosphere .

3 .5 .4 Pressure/Vacuum Control and Relief Systems

3.5 .4.6 Low pressures outside the scope of the boil-
off compressor (or equivalent) system should be
3 .5.4.1 All tanks should be provided with a pressure/
limited to the design range, e .g . by the use of the
vacuum control and relief system to prevent the
following systems :
design pressure range of the tank being exceeded in
all the conditions of 3 .5 .4 .9 and 3 .5 .4 .10 . (a) The supply of hot gas or liquid product or inert
gas into the tank ; such provision is normally
3.5.4.2 The purpose of the control system as covered referred to as the vacuum protection system .
in 3 .5 .4 .1 is to prevent uncontrolled release of hydro- (b) Tripping the boil-off compressor system and the
carbon vapour to the atmosphere and to prevent air tank product transfer pumps .
entering into the tank under specified operational and (c) Final protection by vacuum valves opening and
atmospheric conditions . allowing air to enter the tank .
The relief system should cope with all other con- There shall, however, be at least two independent
ditions, including failure of the control system . means of vacuum protection before air is allowed to
enter the tank .
3 .5.4.3 The tank operating pressure is normally kept The mixing of air with flammable LPG vapour in
within its specified range by performance control of a the tank is obviously undesirable and is only accept-
boil-off compressor system which reliquefies the able when the alternative (implosion leading to poten-
vapours generated, thus preventing their loss to tial tank failure) would constitute a greater hazard .

23

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 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS

3 .5.4.7 The opening of vacuum valves must be carried on without opening the tank to atmosphere
minimized by the provision of sufficiently reliable and without reducing relief capacity below design
vacuum protection systems . Such protection may requirements .
employ the systems indicated in 3 .5 .4 .6 .
3 .5.4 .12 Emergency relief valves should discharge
3 .5.4 .8 Pressure and vacuum relief valves should be directly to atmosphere .
fitted and sized in accordance with the standards to They shall be designed and installed so that :
which the tank is designed (see 3 .5 .1 .1), API Standard (a) Attached vent pipes are adequately supported
2000 or equivalent and with 3 .5 .4 .9 and 3 .5 .4 .10 . and have outlets at least 2 m above the top of the
Pressure relief valves should be adequate to relieve tank to which they are fitted and at least 3 m
the worst case emergency flow, assuming all other above ground level .
outlets from the tank, including that to the flare, are (b) In case of ignition of the discharge, flame im-
closed . pingement on the tank and its associated equip-
ment is impossible .
3.5 .4 .9 The following factors require consideration (c) In case of ignition of the discharge the radiation
in sizing pressure relief valves : levels of Table 2 of Appendix 1 are not exceeded .
(a) Liquid entering the tank at maximum rate . This requirement may necessitate the installation
(b) Maximum possible boil-off, assuming failure of of protective measures, e .g . water sprays .
the normal possible control system .
(c) Maximum rate of decrease of atmospheric press- 3.5.4 .13 Precautions must be taken to counter the
ure as determined from relevant meteorological effect of icing on relief valves . Special attention
records . (If not available, assume 5 mbar/h .) should be given to prevent the possibility of freezing-
(d) Emergency venting requirement as per API STD up of the vent/flare system .
2000 . No credit should be taken for the effect of
insulation on limiting heat absorption unless the 3.5 .4 .14 Vent pipes if fitted to relief valves must be
material has proven fire resistant properties . designed to allow the escape of moisture and conden-
Flame height should not be limited to the 30 ft as sate, and both they and any loose fitting rain caps
indicated in API Standard 2000 but be in accord- provided must not interfere with the safe operation of
ance with the calculated value (see 3 .3 .1 and the relief valves .
Appendix 2) .
(e) Effect of radiation from an adjacent (tank) fire 3.5 .4 .15 Care must be taken to prevent blockages
(see 3 .3 .1) . due to liquid in vent/flare lines, relief valve headers,
(f ) Effect of possible hot product run down into the etc . Therefore such lines should be free of pockets
tank . and slope towards a knock-out drum .
(g) Flow of hot liquid/vapour into tank, assuming
failure of the vacuum protection system .
(h) Effect of possible contamination when different
products are handled .
3.5 .5 Insulation of Tanks
3.5 .4.10 The following factors shall be considered in
sizing vacuum relief valves : 3.5 .5 .1 A tank's external insulation and cladding
shall :
(a) Maximum possible liquid withdrawal rate .
(b) Maximum possible vapour withdrawal rate (as- (a) Be weatherproof and capable of withstanding
suming boil-off compressor system fails to trip) . direct impingement of the cooling water from any
(c) Maximum increase in atmospheric pressure as fixed deluge system .
determined from relevant meteorological (b) Be impervious to the ingress of water vapour,
records . (If not available, assume 5 mbar/h .) e .g . by the provision of an effective vapour bar-
(d) Vacuum conditions as a result of ambient tem- rier .
perature lower than the atmospheric boiling (c) Be sufficiently robust to ensure that minor
point of the product handled . mechanical damage will not destroy its vapour
(e) Cool-down of roof by spray-water after adjacent barrier.
(tank) fire (see 3 .3 .1) . (d) Withstand a temperature of 100°C without failure
of its insulating or mechanical properties : it
3 .5 .4.11 Relief valve line-up should also be fire retardant and preferably fire
Pressure and vacuum relief valves must be lined up resistant. (See also EEMUA Recommendations
with block valves with spare positions and interlocks for the Design and Construction of-Refrigerated
as necessary so that inspection/maintenance can be Liquefied Gas Storage Tanks .)

24
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 REFRIGERATED LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS STORAGE

3 .5 .6 Corrosion Protection of Tanks 3 .6.3 .2 Piping systems and their supports shall be
suitably insulated/protected within those parts of the
3.5 .6.1 The provision of an internal corrosion allow- installation in which fire exposure conditions or
ance is generally unnecessary . severe radiation from fires may be foreseen (see 3 .8 .2
and 3 .8 .3) .
3 .5.6 .2 The tank shell and roof should be protected
against external corrosion . 3 .6 .4 Thermal Pressure Relief

3 .5.7 Marking of Tanks 3 .6.4 .1 Any equipment or sections of pipeline in

Each refrigerated storage system should be identified which liquid LPG may be trapped, e .g . between
by the attachment of name plates readily visible and shut-off valves, must be protected against excessive
accessible which should give the following infor- pressure caused by thermal expansion of the liquid
mation : contents either by the use of operating procedures or
suitable equipment .
(a) manufacturer's name and serial number,
(b) design standard, 3 .6 .4 .2 The minimum setting of thermal pressure
(c) maximum LPG filling level, relief valves shall be not less than the maximum
(d) liquid volume of the tank when filled with LPG to working pressure of the section of pipeline or equip-
the maximum safe level, ment which they are protecting and the maximum
(e) maximum and minimum design pressure in setting should not be more than the design pressure .
defined units,
(f) maximum and minimum design temperature in 3 .6 .4 .3 If thermal relief valves discharge to atmos-
defined units, phere the discharge must be arranged in a safe
(g) density of the LPG for which the tank is designed manner .
in defined units,
(h) year of construction and test .

3 .7 REQUIREMENTS FOR
FOUNDATIONS FOR TANKS

3 .6 REQUIREMENTS FOR PIPING, 3 .7 .1 Foundation Design

VALVES AND FITTINGS
3 .7.1 .1 Reference should be made to the relevant
3 .6 .1 Piping Code parts of 2 .5 to 3 .4 and to the EEMUA Recommen-
Piping for refrigerated product must conform to the dations for the Design and Construction of Refriger-
low temperature requirements of BS 3351, ANSI B ated Liquefied Gas Storage Tanks .
31 .3 or equivalent .
3 .7.1 .2 The design of tank foundations should
3 .6 .2 Materials include adequate protection against damage due to
frost heave of underlying soils . Commonly used
3 .6.2 .1 All materials, including non-metallic parts of methods of protection are the provision of an external
valves, seals, gaskets, etc ., shall be resistant to LPG heating system under the tank or the elevation of the
under the service conditions of pressure and tempera- base slab above ground level to allow circulation of air
ture to which they may be subjected . below the tank .
If an external heating system is incorporated in the
3.6.2 .2 Cast iron must not be used for piping systems design, adequate facilities should be provided to
handling refrigerated LPG. monitor, control and check the foundation tempera-
tures . Moreover, maintenance of the heating system,
3.6.2 .3 Except for the instrument lines downstream inclusive of replacement of heating coils, should be
of an isolating valve, screwed joints and compression possible when the tank is in operation .
fittings should not be used in piping for low tempera- In the case of fully or partly in-ground tanks, the
ture service . tank walls and base and those of the containment pit
shall be similarly protected against frost heave of
3 .6 .3 Installation adjacent soil .

3 .6 .3 .1 All construction piping welds shall be 100% 3 .7 .2 Uplift

radiographed on construction and radiographs When the tank is designed for a positive pressure with
retained for future reference . holding-down bolts or deadweight anchors to

25
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the licence terms and conditions. It must not be forwarded to, or stored or accessed by, any unauthorised user. Enquiries: e: [email protected] t: +44 (0)207 467 7100
 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS

counteract uplift, the foundations shall be designed to 3 .8.3 .4 When cooling water is the protective medium
resist the uplift at the design pressure but with the then each tank shall be equipped with a fixed deluge
tank empty . system capable of applying water at a rate sufficient to
ensure that as a result of a fire (see 3 .8 .1), e .g. such as
in an adjacent tank/bund/impounding basin, all sur-
3.8 REQUIREMENTS FOR FIRE faces including piping and structures exposed to ther-
PROTECTION/LOSS CONTROL mal radiation are prevented from exceeding 100 °C .
SYSTEMS
3 .8.3.5 It is recommended particularly when water
3.8 .1 Fire Plan supplies are restricted that the fixed deluge system
The concept of a loss control system should be based should be sectionalized to enable the water appli-
on the philosophy that a local mishap resulting in a cation rate to be varied on different parts of the
release of LPG into the atmosphere should not esca- system .
late to the extent that the facilities are endangered
and the public at large is subjected to an unacceptable 3.8 .3 .6 Remote control of the fixed water deluge
risk . system shall be possible from areas not exposed to
Such a concept should be based on a systematic excessive thermal radiation .
evaluation of the design and operational procedures
taking into account failure modes and consequences 3 .8.3.7 Special consideration must be given to the
as outlined in 3 .3 .1, 3 .3 .2 and 3 .3 .3 as well as available quantities of water required for fire protection, and
resources . provisions such as recycling may have to be employed .
Because of the nature of the product an LPG Measures should be taken to ensure separation of the
release will always form a vapour cloud with the recycled water from flammable products .
possibility of ignition . The emphasis of the loss con-
trol system therefore should be focused on control of 3.8 .3 .8 Measures to prevent the freezing of cooling
fires and protection against heat radiation as covered water supplies and frost damage to supply lines, spray
below . systems, etc ., must be provided .

3 .8 .2 Control of Fires
3 .9 INSPECTION OF REFRIGERATED
3.8.2.1 As small LPG fires can be extinguished using STORAGE TANKS
dry powder such extinguishers should be available .
3 .9 .1 Permit to Work Systems
3 .8.2 .2 Certain high/medium expansion foams can Permit to work systems should be operated in connec-
be used for controlling refrigerated LPG pool fires tion with all procedures covered in 3 .9 .
and thereby reducing radiation levels ; normal foams
have been shown to be ineffective for such purposes . 3 .9 .2 General Philosophy
When the fire plan (see 3 .8 .1) calls for the use of The routine internal inspection of non-refrigerated
foam, or similar media, for the control of pool fires tanks and pressure vessels at fixed time intervals is
then applicators in sufficient number must be pro- carried out to monitor the extent of internal corrosion
vided to enable blanketing of the designated area, and/or corrosion not detectable by external inspec-
e .g . bund . tion . However, LPGs themselves are not corrosive .
Additionally because of the temperatures involved
3 .8 .3 Protection Systems the primary liquid containment system of refrigerated
LPG storage is not subject to corrosion under service
3.8 .3.1 Fire protection may be achieved by the use of conditions .
spacing/location, insulating or similar systems and/or Thus if corrosive contaminants can be excluded
by the use of cooling water . from the system and if corrosion can be eliminated
during the construction and commissioning stages
3 .8.3 .2 The fire protection system must be designed then the need for a routine inspection can be consider-
to cater for the likelihood that large refrigerated LPG ably reduced or even obviated .
fires may have to be allowed to burn themselves out . Advantage should be taken of any out of service
period for operational reasons to carry out an internal
3.8 .3 .3 Each refrigerated LPG storage tank shall be inspection .
provided with a fire protection system which will
ensure its structural integrity under fire conditions, 3.9 .3 The Possibility of Internal Corrosion
e .g . intensity, duration covered by the fire plan (see Internal corrosion can develop in a refrigerated LPG
3 .8 .1) . storage tank for such reasons as :

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 REFRIGERATED LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS STORAGE
i
(a) water used f / r hydrostatic testing not being of Where a number of tanks in similar service have been
sufficient purity, e .g . chloride or sulphate content constructed of similar materials and to a common
too high, design the results of the internal inspection of one
(b) purging materials not dry and/or truly inert, e .g . may be taken as a guide to the necessity for inspecting
products of combustion containing carbon others .
dioxide, which dissolves in water, adhering to the
tank walls, leading to stress corrosion,
(c) contaminated product in the system, e .g . 3 .9.6 Requirements for External Inspection
ammonia as a result of unsatisfactory cleaning of
a non-dedicated tanker, 3 .9.6.1 Pressure and vacuum relief valves
(d) contaminated vapour introduced into the system Tank pressure and vacuum relief valves and other
to prevent vacuum conditions . associated connections are of paramount importance
and must be regularly and thoroughly inspected for
3 .9 .4 Problems Associated with Internal Inspection corrosion, blockage, etc ., and the valves themselves
During the considerable time involved in the total tested and maintained yearly .
procedure of taking out of service, purging, emptying,
inspecting and returning to service of a refrigerated 3 .9.6.2 Bottom heating facilities
LPG storage tank, the following problems may arise The importance of preventing frost heave requires
which outweigh any benefits likely to be obtained that bottom heating system operations are checked
from routine internal inspections (see 3 .9 .2) : regularly and a weekly frequency is recommended . In
addition the heating system itself shall be checked
(a) The opening up of a sealed/corrosion-free system yearly .
entails the probability of introducing corrosion .
(b) The increased risk of damage to and deterioration 3 .9.6.3 Tank settlement
of the system during the lengthy non-routine Tank base levels and settlements shall be checked at
procedures involved . frequent intervals during a water test (i .e . at various
(c) Internal inspection of a refrigerated storage tank heights of water fill and during draining) . After com-
requires the whole structure to be subjected to missioning, tank levels and settlements shall be
temperature cycling ; until more experience is checked at yearly intervals for the first 3 years, follow-
available to indicate the absence of risk in this ing which the inspection period may be extended to
process it must be considered a potential problem 3-yearly periods if no problems have been encoun-
area . tered .
(d) The procedures for taking out of service and
re-commissioning can lead to changes in the insu- 3.9.6 .4 Tanks with suspended roofs
lation system, e .g . compression and decom- Outer roofs shall be checked for external corrosion at
pression during warming up and cooling down intervals not exceeding 1 year .
which can result in a loss of its flexibility, and/or
ingress of water into the insulation because of a
3.9.6 .5 Inspection as a part of normal operations
vapour seal leak (not possible whilst the tank is As a part of the normal operation of the facility there
still in cold service) . should be an ongoing check for leakage and/or mal-
(e) Purging entails the disposal of gases which can
operation . Tanks and pipelines should be inspected
form flammable mixtures when mixed with air for cold spots, the zone between tanks and close/high
and when large tanks are involved both the quan- bund walls should be monitored for LPG vapours, the
tities of product and the duration of the pro-
space between the walls of full or double containment
cedures add substantially to the risks involved .
storage systems should be checked for liquid LPG
and the condition of external insulation (and its
3 .9 .5 Requirements for Internal Inspection
vapour barrier) controlled as a check on external
Internal inspection need only take place when : corrosion of the tank .
(a) External inspection gives rise to concern such
that an internal inspection is considered necess- 3 .9.6 .6 Anchorage
ary, e .g . settlement, frost heave, foundation Holding down bolts and anchor straps should be
problems . checked for deterioration and tightness at intervals
(b) Doubt exists regarding the quality of the stored not exceeding one year .
product, vacuum breaker gas or the previously
used test or purge medium such that a possibility 3.9.6 .7 Piping
of internal corrosion is suspected . The filling and offtake piping including bellows and
(c) The tank has been taken out of service for another spring supports should be checked annually for move-
specific purpose . ment .

27
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 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS

3 .9 .7 Competent Person/Records tive densities of the purging medium and air to

All inspectiorractivities should be carried out under minimize mixing ;te . when the inert gas is lighter than
the supervision of competent personnel and should be air it should be introduced at the top of the tank
fully recorded . displacing the air downwards to a vent at the bottom
and, vice versa, where the purge gas is of the same
3 .10 REQUIREMENTS FOR THE density as the air to be replaced it should preferably
be admitted at a point opposite to the discharge vent .
INITIAL FILLING OF STORAGE TANK
OR RE-COMMISSIONING AFTER
INSPECTION 3 .10 .5 Displacement of Inerts by LPG Vapour

3.10 .1 General 3 .10.5 .1 Displacement of inerts is preferably done by

It is assumed that instructions in respect to examina- introducing cold LPG vapours into the bottom of the
tion of the tank to ensure its installation/inspection in tank and venting the inerts from the top . This method
accordance with specification and readiness for use uses the so-called piston effect whereby the mixing of
will be made as for any other important piece of plant the LPG and inerts and therefore the product loss is
or equipment . This section therefore confines itself to minimized .
the special aspects of LPG filling . Where LPG vapours are not available inerts may
Attention is drawn to the necessity for ensuring be removed by the introduction of liquid LPG sprayed
that the tank and its ancillary fittings are not taken from the top of the tank . In applying this method
outside their design limits, e .g. pressure and tempera- extreme care should be taken to avoid sub-cooling of
ture, during the procedures of commissioning and tank materials to below the design temperature . This
re-commissioning . can happen as a result of the low LPG partial press-
ures which occur in the tank particularly in the initial
3 .10 .2 Ice/Hydrate Formation stage of the operation . At low partial pressure the
Particularly during initial commissioning ice/hydrates boiling point temperature of the LPG will be' below
may be formed as a result of residual water in the the atmospheric boiling point .
system . Appropriate methanol injection points
should be provided and emergency shut-down valve Note : To obviate local cold spots liquid LPG should
operation should be frequently checked during this never be introduced at the bottom of the tank .
period .
3 .10.5 .2 All gas discharged to atmosphere during the
3 .10.3 Permit to Work Systems operation must be vented in a safe manner .
Permit to work systems should be operated in connec-
tion with all procedures covered in 3 .10 . 3 .10 .6 Cooling Down and Commissioning

3 .10.4 Removal of Air-Drying Out 3 .10 .6 .1 Cooling down will normally be achieved by
allowing LPG liquid to flash in the tank .
3.10.4.1 To avoid the risk of a flammable mixture The liquid is normally injected into the top of the
forming, air shall be removed from the tank and all tank via a spray nozzle system protected by strainers .
lines connected to it, prior to the introduction of LPG In the early stages of the cool-down operation it is
extremely important to avoid liquid LPG falling on
3.10 .4.2 Air is best removed by purging with an inert the bottom tank plates or impinging on the walls
gas such as nitrogen . The purge gas must be dry, i .e . causing local cold spots outside the minimum design
have a dew point lower than the temperature of the temperature which could give rise to cracks in the
tank when in service . tank's plates or welds due to uneven temperature
distribution .
3.10.4.3 Because products of combustion contain The liquid injection rate will normally be steadily
carbon dioxide and this can lead to stress corrosion of increased until the tank reaches its working tempera-
wet tank walls, the use of inert gas generators (con- ture and a level of about six inches of liquid has
trolled combustion) should be avoided . accumulated on the bottom . At this point the cool-
down is considered to be completed and the normal
3.10 .4.4 Purging shall be continued until the oxygen filling rate can be resorted to .
content is reduced at least to the level indicated in
Appendix 6 . For operational reasons purging is also 3 .10.6 .2 The rate of cooling down which is controlled
normally continued if necessary until the tank is dry . by the rate of liquid injection must be within the
design specification as given by the tank manufac-
3 .10.4 .5 Consideration should be given to the rela- turer .

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 REFRIGERATED LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS STORAGE

3.10 .6.3 During the cool-down procedure pre- 3.11 .3 .4 Purging shall be continued at least until the
cautions must be taken to prevent vacuum conditions safe level indicated in Appendix 6 is reached .
occurring, e .g . ensuring availability of make-up gas .
3.11 .4 Sources of Inert Gas
3.10.6 .4 During cool-down the pressure and tem-
perature of the tank and related piping and pipe 3 .11 .4 .1 Dry nitrogen is preferable as a purging
supports shall constantly be monitored . Furthermore, medium to the product of an inert gas generator
whilst the above procedure is being followed frequent which contains both water and carbon dioxide, factors
checks for leakage s -be made of all tank connec- promoting stress corrosion .
tions, drains, sa e points, etc ., with special atten-
tion being give to any joint hitherto untested . 3 .11 .4.2 Inert gas from an inert gas generator should
be continuously checked to ensure that its contents of
3.10.6 .5 During cool-down the vapour generated in both oxygen and carbon monoxide each remain below
the tank should either be recovered by the boil-off I% .
recovery system or safely vented/flared .
3 .11 .5 Purging Procedure
3.10.6 .6 On completion of cool-down the functioning
of all instruments which indicate, record and control 3.11 .5 .1 The injection of the purging material should
levels, temperature and pressure shall be checked . be carried out in such a way that mixing of inert and
flammable gases is minimized . The presence of
unpurged dead pockets must be avoided as far as is
practicable .
3 .11 REQUIREMENTS FOR TAKING
TANK OUT OF SERVICE 3.11 .5 .2 If the purge medium used is heavier than
LPG it should be introduced at the lowest point
3 .11 .1 Permit to Work Systems available and the flammable gas removed by upward
Permit to work systems should be operated in connec- displacement to a vent situated as near the top as
tion with all procedures covered in 3 .11 . possible ; if the inert gas is lighter than LPG the
reverse procedure should be applied .
3 .11 .2 Removal of Liquid
3 .11 .5.3 The connection used for admission of the
3 .11 .2.1 Liquid should be pumped out of the tank to purging media should be of such a size as to ensure an
the lowest practical level . The tank shall then be adequate rate whilst minimizing mixing. The outlet
positively isolated from all sources of liquid LPG . vent should be larger than the inlet connection and
should be valved to enable control of the venting rate .
3 .11 .2 .2 The remaining liquid should be disposed of
by controlled vaporization . Heated LPG vapour or 3 .11 .5 .4 Throughout the purging operation a small,
inert gas may be introduced to speed this process . but definite, positive pressure must be maintained in
the tank . The design pressure must not be exceeded .
3.11 .2 .3 LPG vapour, inert gas or mixtures removed
from the tank must be disposed of safely . 3 .11 .5 .5 Sampling points should be fitted to the
vents, adjacent to the control valves, to facilitate
3 .11 .3 Purging sampling of the vented gas .

3.11 .3 .1 Inert gas should be introduced into the tank 3 .11 .5.6 Once purging is commenced it should be
to sweep out any flammable gases which remain, the continued to completion without interruption . How-
purged material being disposed of safely . ever, should it be necessary to suspend the operation
definite steps, e .g . a back-up system, must be taken to
3.11 .3 .2 The time required for purging is dependent ensure a positive pressure is maintained and the
on the tank volume, its internal structure and the rate creation of vacuum conditions prevented .
at which inert gas is introduced . A suitable instrument
shall be used to measure the gas concentration in the 3 .11 .5 .7 Purging will normally cease when tests on
issuing purge until a safe level is reached (see Appen- the vented purge gas indicate LPG contents lower
dix 6) . than the limits quoted in Appendix 6 .
Where practicable, sampling of tank contents
3.11 .3 .3 Positive isolation from the LPG vapour and should_ be carried _out to identify any unpurged
any other flammable vapour system shall be made as pockets of LPG . Dependent upon subsequent oper-
soon as recovery of LPG vapour ceases . ations further purging may be required .

29
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 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS

3.11 .5 .8 On completion of purging a positive press- (a) The oxygen content of the atmosphere within the
ure shall be maintained to prevent vacuum conditions tank/confined space is not less than 20% by vol-
being created by changes of ambient conditions . ume .
(b) There is no hazard arising from dangerous sub-
3.11 .5 .9 Throughout and on completion of purging a stances in the atmosphere .
tank will not be safe for entry without breathing
apparatus and notices to this effect must be promi- 3.11 .7.4 Certificates issued in connection with
nently displayed at all entry points . 3 .11 .7 .2 and 3 .11 .7 .3 above must indicate clearly the
period for which they are applicable, when and what
3 .11 .6 Preparation for Entry further testing will be required and any other special
conditions relating to the entry, e .g . ventilation,
3 .11 .6.1 On completion of purging the tank contents arrangements for continuous communication with
will not support combustion, will not support respir- people inside and for rescue .
ation and may even contain toxic gases derived from
the original flammable gas and/or the inert gas .

3.11 .6.2 Consideration should be given to keeping 3 .12 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

the tank fully inerted during inspection/repairs to the
extent that this is practicable . This will obviate the 3 .12.1 Training
hazards which could arise due to the presence of
unpurged pockets of LPG vapour as well as minimiz- 3 .12.1 .1 All involved with the handling of refriger-
ing the problems reviewed in 3 .9 . This will require the ated LPG should understand the characteristics of the
use of special breathing apparatus and stringent pre- product and be familiar with the relevant sections of
cautions (see 3 .1'1 .7) . the code .

3.11 .6 .3 If the inerts are to be replaced by air, the 3.12 .1 .2 Personnel shall be formally instructed with
possible presence of unpurged pockets of LPG vapour respect to the processes and facilities with which they
must be recognized and all sources of ignition are involved before they have an active role in the
excluded from the area . operation of the plant . This instruction shall include
details of operating procedures and location, function
3 .11 .6.4 Air blowers used to assist in ventilation shall and limitation of instrumentation and equipment
be bonded to the tank to avoid the hazard of static both for normal operation and emergency situations .
electricity .
3 .12 .1 .3 Plant personnel should be instructed in the
3.11 .6.5 Ventilation of tanks should be continued fundamentals of fire fighting and fire control with
until the requirements of 3 .11 .7 .3 are met . particular reference to refrigerated LPG and the cor-
rect handling of the equipment provided for this
3.11 .6.6 Oxygen shall not be used to ventilate tanks. purpose .

3.11 .7 Entry into Tanks 3 .12.2 Emergency Procedures/Plans

3.11 .7.1 Before entry a check shall be made that the 3.12 .2.1 Procedures and plans should be developed
tank has been positively isolated from every source of to handle emergencies arising from leakage, fire or
hazardous gas, liquid or vapour, e .g. by blanking off any other circumstance which could give rise to such
or physical disconnection . emergencies . Such plans should include all necessary
liaison with the local authorities, neighbouring indus-
3 .11 .7.2 Before any entry is made into a tank it is try or the general public .
essential for a competent person to establish that a
dangerous atmosphere does not exist . A certificate to 3 .12.2 .2 Plant personnel should receive regular
that effect must be issued authorizing entry and stat- instruction in their roles in the emergency plan as well
ing clearly any conditions applicable, e .g . necessity as in the practical handling of emergency situations .
for breathing apparatus .
3.12 .2.3 To ensure the adequacy of the emergency
3 .11 .7.3 Before any entry is made into a tank without procedures and personnel awareness of them, exer-
suitable breathing apparatus it is essential for an cises based on simulated incidents should be carried
authorized person to make further tests and to estab- out periodically with the participation of the public
lish that: emergency services which are available in the area .

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 REFRIGERATED LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS STORAGE

3 .12 .3 Commissioning, Gas Freeing and Entry into (a) Vapour produced during the transfer operation
Tanks will be safely handled .
Reference should be made to 3 .10 and 3 .11 . (b) Each grade of LPG can only be discharged into
tanks, pipelines or equipment designed to handle
3 .12.4 Transfer Operations it .
(c) Unacceptable product contamination cannot
3 .12 .4.1 Receiving tanks should always be checked occur .
that they are suitable to handle the grade of LPG to be
transferred and sufficient ullage exists to receive the 3 .12.4.3 The receiving tank should be monitored to
quantity involved . ensure that it is not being filled above its safe working
level .
3 .12.4.2 The interconnecting piping system and
manifold should be checked to ensure that it is in safe 3 .12.4 .4 Any transfer operation must be fully super-
working conditio , e .g . cooled, and that only valves vised throughout by a competent person to enable
required for the tr sfer operation and any other immediate action in case of emergency . The depar-
operation proceeding multaneously are open . ture of this competent person requires the stopping of
A check should be m de to ensure that : the operation in a safe condition .

31,
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 Appendix 1
THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

Chapters 2 and 3 of the code require that the design layout and location of storage and other facilities shall reflect
the thermal radiation flux limits defined in Tables 1 and 2 for pressure and refrigerated storage respectively .
This approach may appear to ignore the time element which is significant in determining the hazard posed
by a particular thermal radiation flux level whereas in fact exposure has been taken into account in defining the
laid-down limits .
The decision by the IP not to include clearly stated exposure times in the design limits reflects their view that
currently there is insufficient agreed data available to enable such numbers to be quoted with the required level
of confidence .

Table 1

Pressure storage

Maximum radiation flux levels

Site kW/m2 BTU(h ft2 )
Equipment
The outer surfaces of adjacent
pressure storage vessels (1)
Thermally protected (2) 44 13,750
Unprotected (3) 8 2,500

The outer surfaces of adjacent

storage tanks containingflammable
products (4) and process facilities
Thermally protected (2) 32 10,000
Unprotected (3) 8 2,500

Filling/discharge points 8 2,500

Personnel inside boundary

Process area (5) 8 2,500
Protected work area (6) 8 2,500
Work area (7) 5 1,500
Critical area (8) 1 .5 500

Plant boundary
Remote area (9) 13 4,000
Urban area (10) 5 1,500
Critical area (8) 1 .5 500

32
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 THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

Table 2

Refrigerated storage

Maximum thermal radiation flux levels

Site kW/m2 BTU(h ft2 )

Equipment
The outer surfaces of adjacent
refrigerated storage tanks
Thermally protected (2) 32 10,000
Unprotected (3) 8 2,500

The outer surfaces of adjacent storage

tanks containing flammable products (4)
Thermally protected (2) 32 10,000
Unprotected (3) 8 2,500

The outer surfaces of adjacent LPG

pressure storage vessels and process
facilities (11) 8 2,500

Personnel inside boundary

Process area (5) 8 2,500
Protected work area (6) 8 2,500
Work area (7) 5 1,500
Critical area (8) 1 .5 500

Plant boundary
Remote area (9) 13 4,000
Urban area (10) 5 1,500
Critical area (8) 1 .5 500

Notes
(1) The distance from an LPG pressure storage vessel to a refrigerated storage tank is determined by the
requirement of Chapter 3 (see 3 .3 .1) and Table 2 of this appendix .
(2) Such facilities/areas are protected by means of water sprays, insulation, radiation screens or similar systems .
(3) Protection is provided by spacing alone .
(4) Special consideration should be given to the location of floating roof tanks containing high vapour pressure
products since effective water cooling of their roof structures is impracticable .
(5) A normally unoccupied area occasionally manned by trained and suitably clothed persons familiar both with
escape routes and opportunities for temporary shelter afforded by the process plant .
(6) A permanent building where personnel inside are shielded and/or have shielded means of escape .
(7) An open area or small (e .g . temporary) building without shielded means of escape .
(8) This is either an unshielded area of critical importance where people without protective clothing may be
required at all times including during emergencies or a place difficult or dangerous to evacuate at short
notice (e .g . a sports stadium).
(9) An area only infrequently occupied by small numbers of persons, e .g . moorland, farmland, desert .
(10) An area which is neither a remote area nor a critical area .
(11) The allowable thermal radiation flux level is restricted for these facilities in view of the potentially longer
duration of exposure resulting from a refrigerated tank/bund fire .

33
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 Appendix 2

CALCULATION OF THERMAL
RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

1 Introduction
2 Discussion
2 .1 Fire characteristics
2 .2 Flame surface flux
2 .3 Geometry of flame/target
2 .4 Additional factors
3 Calculation Methods
3 .1 General equations
3 .2 Liquid pool fires
3 .3 Jet flames
References
Addendum-Calculation of Gas Velocity and Temperature (Jet Flames)
4 Figures
Figures 1 to 4 Geometry for view factor calculations
Figures 5 View factors for vertical cylinders
6 View factors for tilted (15°) cylinders
7 View factors for tilted (3(°) cylinders
8 View factors for tilted (45°) cylinders
9 View factors for tilted (60° ) cylinders
10 View factors for tilted (-15°) cylinders
11 View factors for tilted (-30°) cylinders
12 View factors for tilted (-45°) cylinders
13 View factors for tilted (-60° ) cylinders
14 Attenuation due to atmospheric transmittance
5 Example Problems for Calculation of Thermal Radiation Flux Levels for Pool Fires
5 .1 Standard data
5 .2 Example 1 . Propane pool fire
Figures 15 and 16
5 .3 Example 2 . Fire from roof of refrigerated propane storage tank
Figures 17 and 18
5 .4 Example 3 . Fire from roof of refrigerated propane storage tank burning down to pool fire at ground level
Figures 19 and 20

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34
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 CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this appendix is to describe briefly the main factors which affect thermal radiation from fires and
to provide typical simple methods for estimating flux levels . The description is not intended to be exhaustive but
to give an indication of the relative importance of the various factors which are taken into account in the
calculation . The methods described are relatively easy to use and should be applicable to most types of fire where
the burning characteristics are known or can be estimated . When used with a proper appreciation of the variables
involved they should provide a reasonable estimate of thermal radiation flux levels . Other, more sophisticated,
calculation methods have been developed and may be more suitable for particular applications . However, it
should be recognized that the level of accuracy in any thermal radiation flux estimation will depend more on the
accuracy of the basic data (fraction of heat radiated, environmental conditions, burning rate, etc .) than on
differences in calculation methods .
The subject of thermal radiation from fires has received a great deal of attention in recent years and there is
a large bibliography of published information . In addition experimental work is currently in progress to extend
the data base on which the calculation methods depend . In this appendix reference is made only to published
information which is used in the calculation methods described .

2 DISCUSSION

In the context of this code of practice two types of LPG fire are of particular relevance . A `pool fire' is caused by
the ignition of an LPG liquid pool normally in some identifiable containment such as a bund, impounding basin
or storage tank with damaged roof . The second type is that resulting from ignition of a gas jet, e .g . from a relief
valve . While these two types of fire have very different characteristics the basic elements of the calculation are
common to both .
For the purposes of this discussion the parameters involved in the calculation are divided into three area .- :

characteristics of the fire,

flame surface flux,
geometry of flame/target .
Each of these is important in determining incident radiant flux on a target .

2 .1 Fire Characteristics
The important factors are the length, shape and orientation of the flame . For a pool fire the length and shape of
the flame are determined by the dimensions of the liquid pool, and the orientation primarily by the wind velocity .
The presence of obstacles (equipment, structures) can have an effect on flame orientation but no easily applicable
correlations exist to account for these deviations .
The flame length from a relief valve fire is mainly dependent on the gas release rate and exit velocity, and is
analogous to a conventional flare . In general, therefore, calculation methods used for flare design, e .g . API
RP521 (1), should be applicable to the ignited relief valve situation . While these methods are considered
adequate for `distant' targets when a `point source' calculation may be used (see 2 .3 below), more sophisticated
methods may be required for `close' targets .
The main purpose of using more sophisticated techniques is to take account of the flame shape (length,
diameter, radiating surface area) which becomes increasingly important for targets close to the flame . Such
techniques should also account for the differences in flame characteristics between ignited relief valve vents and
flarestacks described briefly below .
Exit velocities from pressurized LPG system relief valve vent pipes generally approach the velocity of sound
(sonic), and correlations intended for determining flame lengths for flare design are not strictly applicable . Sonic
releases entrain air more rapidly and may burn more efficiently resulting in shorter flames . It is also characteristic
that the flame is `lifted off' from the point of release, i .e . burning starts at an elevation above the end of the
discharge pipe .
Flame deviation due to wind can be readily estimated and there should be no obstacles in the path of a relief
valve discharge to complicate this part of the calculation .

2.2 Flame Surface Flux

The estimation of flame surface flux is one of the most difficult parts of the calculation . It is also critical since target
flux levels are directly proportional to the emitted radiation from the flame surface . (It should be noted that the

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 APPENDIX 2

estimation of flame surface flux is analogous to determining the fraction of heat radiated-`F' factor-in the API
RP521 (1) `point source' calculation method .)
Until recently little experimental work was available on flame surface flux from LPG pool fires, and
American Gas Association (AGA) data based on LNG tests (2) was often used for LPG . However, recent LPG
test data indicate a considerably lower flame surface flux for LPG fires . The difference is generally attributed to
obscuration of the LPG flame by black soot so that a significant-fraction of the surface will not be emitting thermal
radiation at any particular moment .
As noted earlier flame surface flux is analogous to `fraction of heat radiated', the F factor used in `point
source' calculation methods . For relief valve fires the F factors may differ considerably from traditional flare
design figures due to the different flame characteristics noted in 2 .1 above .

2 .3 Geometry of Flame/Target
The proportion of emitted radiation incident on a target is mainly dependent on the distance of that target from
the point or area of emission (i .e . the flame surface) . In cases where the distance between flame and target is large
in comparison with the dimensions of the flame the radiating surface may be considered as a'point source' which
simplifies the calculation considerably . However, significant errors can result if the method is used for targets
close to the flame . As a general guide for relief valve fires the point source method should only be used for targets
beyond one flame length from the `point source' of radiation (usually taken as the centre of the flame) . For targets
relatively close to the radiating surface for which an `area source' calculation method should be used, the
orientation of the flame relative to the target will significantly affect the incident radiation level . This is termed
the `view factor' or configuration factor and is taken into account in the calculation method described .
The orientation of the receiving surface is also a factor, and can become important where the target is close
to the flame . This effect becomes less marked for distant targets and is generally disregarded for calculations
where the receiving surface is not well defined, e .g . for thermal radiation levels at a plant boundary .

2.4 Additional Factors

2.4 .1 Atmospheric transmittance

The attenuation of thermal radiation due to absorption and scattering by water vapour, carbon dioxide, dust, etc .,
in the atmosphere can have a significant effect on levels reaching a target . Correlations for attenuation due to
water vapour (the major factor in most instances) have been developed and are included in the calculation
methods .

2 .4.2 Flame spillover (blowsing)

Observation of large pool fires indicates that the base of the flame tends to be carried over the edge of the liquid
pool in the direction of the wind . The phenomenon has been described as 'blowsing' . Data on the magnitude of
this effect in relation to pool size and wind velocity are limited, but at worst the flame could be moved by about
half the pool diameter .
The result would be that downwind targets, relatively closer to the flame surface, would receive a
significantly higher radiation level than estimated on the basis of a flame emanating from the edge of the defined
liquid pool . A correlation is included in the calculation methods .

3 CALCULATION METHODS

3 .1 General Equations
The general equation for calculating thermal radiation on a target outside a flame may be taken as :
I = Io . 0 . r equation (1)
where
I = maximum radiation on target (kW/m2 )
Io = radiation from flame surface (kW/m2 )
0 = configuration or view factor
r = atmospheric transmittance
Each of these terms is discussed in more detail in the following sections for the particular types of LPG fire which
are of interest .
The above equation may be applied to all types of fire, but for calculations where the distance to the target

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 CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

is large compared with the dimensions of the flame a simpler method can be used . This considers the flame as a
`point source' of radiation, and the maximum incident radiation on a distant target is then given by :
I = (Q . F . r)/(4 . .r . d2 ) equation (2)
where
Q = total heat release (kW)
F = fraction of heat radiated
r = atmospheric transmittance
d = distance from point source to target (m)
A detailed description of this calculation method is given in API RP521 (1) .

3.1 .1 Configuration (view) factor (o)

The configuration or view factor takes into account the size and shape of the flame as well as the distance between
the flame surface and the target . For the purposes of this code the flame shape most commonly encountered can
be represented by a circular cylinder, e .g . in the case of a tank or pool fire . Methods for calculating view factors
for this particular flame shape are described below .
(One other type of fire which may occur, e .g . in a channel conducting a liquid spillage to an impounding
basin, would result in a plane flame surface . View factors for this type of flame can be obtained from McGuire (3) ) .
The simplest form of cylindrical flame occurs in low or zero wind conditions when the axis of the flame may
be assumed vertical . The geometry for calculating view factors for this situation is shown in Figure 1 and the
method of Raj (4) has been used to generate the view factor curves shown in Figure 5 .
The view factor calculation becomes more complex when the flame is distorted by wind action to become a
skewed, inclined circular cylinder as shown in Figure 2 . The integral defining the view factor is difficult to solve
analytically but may be evaluated numerically using a computer program similar to that described by Rein,
Sliepcevich and Welker (5) . View factors, calculated in this way are shown in Figures 6 to 13 .
It should be recognized that the view factors given in Figures 5 to 13 are maximum values which assume that
the target is at the optimum angle to receive radiation from the flame .
The view factors presented in Figures 5 to 13 were calculated assuming that the base of the cylindrical flame
and the target are both on the same horizontal plane . However, these data may be used to calculate view factors
for two other cases which commonly arise .
The case of a target located at some elevation between the plane of the flame base and the top of the flame
is illustrated in Figure 3 and would be applicable to many items of plant which could be affected by a ground level
pool fire .
The other case of a target which is below the base of the cylindrical flame is described in Figure 4 and would
apply to ground level targets in the event of a tank roof fire .

3 .1 .2 Atmosphere transmittance (r)

The radiation from the flame to surrounding objects will be- partially attenuated by absorption and scattering
along the intervening path by water vapour, carbon dioxide, dust and aerosol particles . On a clear, humid day,
the major component of attenuation will be that due to water vapour .
This attenuation of thermal radiation by absorption in the atmosphere is taken into account by multiplying
the calculated radiation by a factor z, the atmospheric transmittance . The atmospheric transmittance is the
fraction of heat transmitted by the atmosphere .
Figure 14 gives r as a function of distance and relative humidity .

3 .1 .3 Radiation from flame surface (l o )

A discussion of methods for estimating flame surface flux for LPG pool fires is included in 3 .2 .7 .
For jet flames an estimate of the fraction of heat radiated from the flame is required for the point source
method of calculation as described in 3 .3 .1 . If an area source method is to be used for a jet flame calculation the
flame surface could be assessed from the fraction of heat radiated from the flame and an estimate of the flame
surface area .

The application of the general equations described in this section is detailed in the following two sections which
cover calculation methods for LPG liquid pool fires in 3 .2 and for LPG jet flames in 3 .3 .

3 .2 Liquid Pool Fires

This section describes a method for determining the radiant heat flux levels which may result from liquid pool fires
using equation (1) . The method is based on readily available correlations as referenced in the description . Since

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 APPENDIX 2

experimental data on tank fires is currently not available it is proposed that this method should also be used for
tank fire calculations.
The approach involves the determination of a number of factors specific to the fire .
-Size of the liquid pool
-Linear burning rate
-Length of the flame
-Deviation of the flame from the vertical
-Flame spillover from the edge of the pool
All these factors are required to calculate :
-Radiation view factor (0)
-Radiation from flame surface (I s )
-Atmospheric transmittance (r)
These factors are then combined to give :
-Incident radiant flux on the target (I)

3.2.1 Liquid Pool Size (D)

Liquid pool size will be a function of leak/spill rate and duration, liquid composition, the topographical features
of the spill area and the liquid burning rate .
Pool size is a particularly important factor in determining the characteristics of a fire, as will be seen from the
following sections . All correlations quoted include pool diameter (D) as a parameter, and are based on circular
pool fires . For non-circular pools an equivalent pool diameter may be calculated as follows :
D = 4 . (SA)/(PP) equation (3)
where
(SA) = surface area of pool (m 2 )
(PP) = perimeter of pool (m)
This expression is not applicable to long thin pools, for which reference (3) should be applied .

3 .2 .2 Liquid burning rate (V)

In general the burning rate (linear regression rate of liquid surface) increases with pool diameter as the surface to
volume ratio of the flame decreases and more heat is available to evaporate liquid from the surface of the pool .
The correlation recommended is taken from a paper by Brown, Wesson and Welker (6) . The general
equation is given below and is based on work carried out by the AGA (2) :
V = V,, . [1 - exp (-,8D) I equation (4)
where
• = maximum burning rate (m/s)
f = burning rate size coefficient
• = pool diameter (m)
For large LPG pool fires the following figures may be taken :
• = 2 .17 x 10 -4 (m/s) (reference 7)
fi = 0 .67 (reference 6)
An alternative empirical method for burning rate estimation has been suggested by Burgess and Zabetakis
(8), Stark (9) and others .
It should be noted that burning rate will be increased if water (e .g. from cooling sprays) enters the liquid pool
and increases the vaporization rate .

3.2.3 Length offlame (L)

The flame length from a pool fire is related to the burning rate, pool size and ambient air density . These factors
have been correlated by Thomas (10) in the equation
42 . M 0 .61
• = equation (5)
• (ea . N/g_
.D )

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 CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

where
• = flame length (m)
• = pool diameter (m)
M = mass burning rate (kg/m2 s)
Boa = ambient air density (kg/m 3 )
g = gravitational acceleration (m/s')
and M is defined by
M = V .P 1
where
• = linear burning rate (m/s)
e i = liquid density (kg/m3 )

This correlation was derived from observations on the burning of wood piled in rectangular cribs, but Brown (6)
has confirmed its applicability to LNG fires, and indeed it is generally accepted as being universally applicable
and sufficiently accurate for LPG fires .

3.2 .4 Flame deviation (0)

A correlation of wind tilting of pool flames has been derived from experimental observation of LNG pool fires by
Raj (4) . The correlation is similar to that of Thomas (10) and is given by
cos0=1 foru*---- 1
equation (6)
cos 0 = 1I( u *) for u * > 1
where
8 = angle of flame tilt (°)
u * = dimensionless wind velocity
and u * is defined by

equation (7)
u* = [(MIi ) gD]1/3

where
u =wind speed (m/s)
M = mass burning rate (kg/m2 s)
P, = vapour density (kg/m 3 )
• = gravitational acceleration (m/s2 )
• = pool diameter (m)
e„ is measured at saturated conditions and normal boiling point .
Additional complications are to be expected in modelling pool fires, because of the presence of tanks and
other structures. It is difficult to take into account the effect on flame size due to the presence of structures, and
the fire characteristics in the presence of a strong wind are difficult to model . The wake flow behind tanks and the
wind flow over dike walls may influence the pool burning significantly .

3 .2 .5 Flame spillover (flame drag or blowsing)

The extent to which the flame spills over the edge of the pool in the direction of the wind is primarily a function
of pool diameter and wind speed . The following correlation was derived by Moorhouse (11) based on data from
rectangular, ground level pool fire tests :
069
D*ID W = 1 .5 (Fr) ° ' equation (8)

where
D * = elongated flame base dimension (m)
D W = maximum pool dimension in wind direction (m)
Fr = Froude number
and Fr is defined by
Fr = u 2/(gD) equation (9)

39
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 APPENDIX 2

where
u = wind speed-(m/s)
g = gravitational acceleration (m/s2)
D = pool diameter (m)
This correlation may be used for circular ground level pools but is not ideal . In the case of a tank roof fire flame
spillover may be lower but no correlation is currently available .
For the purpose of thermal radiation calculations it is assumed that the liquid pool is displaced by (D * - D)
metres in the direction of the wind .

3.2 .6 Radiation view factor (0)

The flame characteristics calculated in 3 .2.1 to 3 .2 .5 may be used to calculate the radiation view factor by the
methods described in Figures 1 to 4 .

3 .2 .7 Flame surface flux (Ia)

The estimation of flame surface flux is probably the most difficult of any radiation calculation . The burning
process is an extremely complex phenomenon and very difficult to model theoretically . It is therefore preferable
to use measured values of flame surface flux wherever possible .
The AGA tests (2) provide the most widely accepted data for surface flux levels from LNG fires, and, in the
absence of similar data on LPG fires, an LNG value has often been used as a basis for LPG thermal radiation
calculations . However, more recent tests reported by Mizner and Eyre (7) and BG (12) indicate lower figures are
appropriate for large diameter LPG pool fires .
It is anticipated that further experimental work will lead to general acceptance of surface flux levels for LPG
in the future, but for the present the following is recommended for pools above 20 m diameter :
Flame surface flux for LPG pool fire = 50 kW/m2 (see Note below)
This is an average figure for the whole of the flame surface . It has been noted that the area of the flame nearest to
the liquid pool generally emits a higher flux than the upper surface . This phenomenon may become important for
targets close to the flame base, but insufficient data are available to include a correlation at this stage .
Note: This figure should only be used in the context of the calculation method described in this appendix .

3.2.8 Atmospheric transmittance (r)

The attenuation of thermal radiation due to atmospheric transmittance may be estimated from Figure 14 which
gives r as a function of distance and relative humidity .

3 .2 .9 Incident radiation on target (I)

The thermal radiation level on a target may be calculated as the product of flame surface flux, radiation view factor
and atmospheric transmittance as shown in equation (1) .

3.3 Jet Flames

The term `jet' flame has been used to describe the type of flame produced in the following situations :

(a) a flare,
(b) ignited vapour or vapour/liquid released from a relief valve,
(c) ignited leakages from high pressure pipework or process vessels .
In other words, situations in which the flame shape is influenced by the initial momentum of the release .
The most widely used method for this type of calculation has been that recommended in API RP521 (1) . This
uses a `point source' of heat approach as shown in equation (2) and has proved to be entirely satisfactory for its
main application in sizing and locating elevated flare stacks . This type of calculation generally involves gas exit
velocities in the range 0 .2 to 0 .5 Mach and `targets' of interest relatively distant from the `point source' of heat .
For the present applications it may be necessary to calculate thermal radiation flux levels for ignited relief
valve discharges (where the exit velocity from the discharge pipe approaches 1 .0 Mach) on targets which are
closer to the flame . For these types of application a modification of the API RP521 point source method is
appropriate for the reasons described below .
A high velocity gas release will entrain air more rapidly into the gas jet resulting in a shorter flammable jet
length . If the release is ignited the flame length will be correspondingly shorter than for a low velocity (flare design

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 CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

basis) release . In addition the flame will tend to `lift off from the point of release, thereby moving the source of
radiation to a higher elevation .
A second characteristic of high velocity jet flames is a cleaner, less radiative flame due to the more efficient
gas/air mixing. Estimates of the extent of this effect are included in the calculation methods .
The use of a simple point source of radiation at the flame centre can lead to increasing errors in thermal
radiation calculations as the distance between flame and target decreases . For `close' targets the distribution of
radiative heat over the length of the flame becomes increasingly important, as does the flame shape in determining
the distance between the radiating source (flame surface) and the target .
With this background the following methods are proposed for the various types of jet flame calculation which
may be required .

3 .3 .1 Point Source Method

The use of the API RP521 (1) method using the Brzustowski and Sommer (13) approach as described in API
RP521 appendix A example 2 (Sept . 1982 edition) (1) is recommended subject to the following conditions :
(a) The `target' receiving radiation should be at least one flame length away from the `point source' of heat . (For
the purpose of this calculation the `point source' of heat is assumed to be the flame centre and the flame length
is twice the distance from the point of discharge to the flame centre .)
(b) For LPG vapour releases the fraction of heat radiated from the flame is taken as 0 .38 for gas exit velocities
up to 0 .5 Mach and 0 .22 for exit velocities above 0 .9 Mach . Interpolation between these figures may be used
for intermediate gas exit velocities .
(c) Allowance should be made in the calculation for attenuation of thermal radiation due to atmospheric
transmittance as described in 3 .1 .2 of this appendix .
(d) The calculation of gas exit velocity and gas temperature (when the former exceeds 0 .5 Mach) should be by
the method shown in Addendum .

3 .3.2 Area source method

Where the target is less than one flame length from the point source of heat (see 3 .3 .1 (a)) an estimate should be
made of the shape and dimensions of the flame . A publication by Chamberlain et al . (14) illustrates this type of
approach, although there are other methods often developed by individual companies for in-house use and from
in-house data . Until a generally accepted method becomes available such methods will continue to be used for
plant design and layout . Individual justification for the use of any particular method maybe required for planning
approval purposes.

REFERENCES
API . Guide for Pressure Relief and Depressurising Systems. API RP521(Sept . 1982) .
AGA Project IS-3-1 . LNG Safety Programme-Interim Report on Phase !! Work. Battelle (July 1974) .
McGuire, J . H . Heat Transfer by Radiation . Fire Research Report No . 2 (1953) .
Raj, P. P . K . Calculations of Thermal Radiation from LNG Fire-A Review of the State-of-the-Art. Paper No . 77-T-33,
AGA Transmission conference, Missouri (1977) .
Rein, R . G ., Sliepcevich, C . M ., and Welker, J . R . J. Fire and Flammability, 1(1970) .
Brown, Wesson, H . R ., and Welker, J . R. Predict LNG fire radiation . Hydrocarbon Processing (May 1974) .
Mizner, G . A ., and Eyre, J. A . `Large scale LNG and LPG pool fires .' I . Chem . E . The Assessment of Major Hazards,
Manchester (April 1962) .
Burgess, D ., and Zabetakis, M . G . Fire and Explosion Hazards Associated with LNG . USBM Report 6099 (1962) .
Stark, G . W . V . Liquid Spillage Fires. I . Chem . E . Symposium Series No . 47 .
Thomas, P . H . The size of flames from natural fires . 9th International Conference on Combustion (1963) .
Moorhouse, J . Scaling criteria for pool fires derived from large scale experiments . The Assessment of Major Hazards, I .
Chem . E . (NW Branch), Manchester, April 1982 .
British Gas plc (Publication pending) .
Brzustowski, T. A ., and Sommer, E . C . Predicting radiant heating from flares . API Division of Refining-Proceedings,
Vol . 53 (1973) .
Chamberlain, G . A ., et al. Developments in design methods for predicting thermal radiation from flares . L Chem . E .,
Chemical Engineering Research and Design, 65, No . 4 (July 1987) .

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 i

APPENDIX 2

ADDENDUM-CALCULATION OF GAS VELOCITY AND TEMPERATURE

(JET FLAMES)

(For use in the Brzustowski and Sommer Method for calculating Thermal Radiation from Jet Flames when the
Exit Velocity exceeds 0 .5 Mach .)
The process engineer will usually have the following information available :
(a) gas composition,
(b) . maximum pressure for fire relief (usually 120% of set pressure), Pmu in psia, and the corresponding
stagnation temperature, T,,,,,., in K,
(c) PRV orifice area A and discharge coefficient Cd (if Cd is unknown assume a value of 0 .9),
(d) number of PRVs operating during depressurization N,
(e) vent orifice diameter do in m .
1. Assume each PRV issues into its own vent pipe, and the vents are sufficiently close together that a single
effective diameter d eg can be used ; i .e .

den = do JT m

2. Calculate total mass flow m :

in = NACdPmu
,/
"
RT u -(I
2 y) 2 ~)
where
y = ratio of specific heats --1 .1 for propane and butane
R gas constant = 8 .314 J/(mol . K)
=
Wg = gas molecular weight, kilogram basis
0 .044 for propane and 0 .058 for butane
Thus

m = NACdPmu ,1T • max

1 .502 x 10 3 kg/s

3. Check for choked flow at effective vent orifice . The mass flow rate at which flow becomes choked is given by
__ nd~lg WP. yRTT
4 RTE Wg

= 27,600 deg T

where
T = 2Tmu
` 1+y

Thus

me = 29,662 dc2g
Tmu
kg/s

(a) If m < m< the flow is unchoked, and the gas velocity
4mRTs 1 .045 x 10 -4tTmu
uj _ ,~rd~-
P,0 = d.2g

For propane or butane

_4
1 .045 x 10 tTmax
uj _ z m/s
de g

Also d; = dCg and Ti -- .T

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 CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

(b) If m > rn, the flow is choked and a useful intermediate parameter is P, , the static pressure in the vent pipe,

4rn
P~ _ J
--f -

T`
= 3 .67 -g- N/m2
doff VWg
For propane and butane,

Pc = 3 .416 rr-1
IT.. N/m 2
dig Wg

Then the jet Mach number Mj is given by

((Y + 1)(PP/P,)r-1 - 2 12
Mj =
y-1

For propane and butane,

°-°9°9 - 2\ 12
2 .1(10-5 PP )
Mi =
0 .1

The jet static temperature

_ 2T. . .,
Tj K
2 + (y - 1)MI

The gas velocity

u j = Mj - / yW m/s
Y 9
For propane and butane,

uj = 3 .024 Mj m/s
~Wt

The jet diameter

1)M ; Y+tyatr - 1)
di = defMj os( 2 + (Y-
y+1 l(
For propane and butane,
o5(2
+ 0 .1M ; )5.2s
m
dj`nM' 2 .1

Use uj , dd and Tj in the expressions for lower-explosive-limit-concentration parameter and the jet-thrust-and-
wind-thrust parameter in the Brzustowski and Sommer correlations .

~k V i S ~~ o JE'M -~ R 15`~ A

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 APPENDIX 2

4 FIGURES

Figure 1
Geometry for calculating view factors for a vertical flame .
• = flame length (m)
R = flame radius (m)
X = horizontal distance from flame centre to target (m)
View factors for a range of values of L, R and X are shown
in Figure 5 .

Figure 2
Geometry for calculating view factors for a tilted flame .
L = flame length (m)
R = flame radius (m)
X = horizontal distance from flame centre to target (m)
0 = angle of flame tilt (°)
View factors for a range of values of L, R, X and 0 are
shown in Figures 6 to 13 .

Figure 3
Geometry for calculating view factors if the target is above
the base of the flame.
L+ = flame length above the plane of the target (m)
Y1 L - = flame length below the plane of the target (m)
X
R = flame radius (m)
• = horizontal distance from flame centre to target (m)
0 = angle of flame tilt (°)
Two view factors are calculated :
~+ represents the view factor for that part of the flame
above the target and is calculated from L+, R, X and
0 using Figures 6 to 9 .
~- represents the view factor for that part of the flame
below the target and is calculated from L -, R, X and
-9 using Figures 10 to 13 .
The overall view factor (0) is the sum of ¢+ and 4 - .

Figure 4
Geometry for calculating view factors if the target is below
the base of the flame.
The flame is extended until it reaches the horizontal plane
of the target .
L T` = total length of (extended) flame (m)
L HYP = length of hypothetical flame added by extension
(m)
R = flame radius (m)
• = horizontal distance from centre of hypothetical
flame base to target (m)
0 = angle of flame tilt (°)
Two view factors are calculated from Figures 6 to 9 :
0" using LTOt , R, X and 0 .
0HYP
using L HYP, R, X and 0 .
The overall view factor (¢) is obtained by subtracting OY HYP
from 0T°`

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 CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

L = flame length (m)

:R= flame radius (m)
-X = distance from
flame centre to
target (m)

1 I I 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 3 4 5 678910
XIR
Figure 5
Maximum view factors for vertical cylinders .

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 APPENDIX 2

1 .0

0 .5
y
View
factor
(4)

L = flame length (m)

R = flame radius (m)

X = distance from
flame centre to
target (m)

Figure 6
Maximum view factors for tilted cylinders 0 = I5 °.

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 CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

1 .0

0 .5

View
factor
(4)

L = flame length (m)

R= flame radius (m)

X= distance from
flame centre
to target. (m)

Figure 7
Maximum view factors for tilted cylinders 0 = 30° .

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 APPENDIX 2

1 .0

0 .5
View
factor
(¢)

0 .2

0 .1

0 .05

X= distance from
flame centre
to target (m)

0 .002

4 5 6 7 8 910 20
X/R
Figure 8
Maximum view factors for tilted cylinders 0 = 45° .

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 CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

Y 1 .0

0 .5
View
factor
(0)

L = flame length (m)

R= flame radius (m)
X= distance from
flame centre
to target (m)

5 6 7 8 910 20 50
XI R
Figure 9
Maximum view factors for tilted cylinders 0 = 60° .

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 APPENDIX 2

1 .0

0 .5
View
factor

0 .2

• 0 .1

r • 0 .05

0 .02

• 0 .01

=L= flame length (m)

=R= flame radius (m)
=X= distance from
flame centre
to target (m)

0 .002

I I 1 I I I I I

1 2 3 4 5 6 78910
X/R

Figure 10
Maximum view factors for tilted cylinders 0 = -I5° .

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 CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

1 .0

0 .5
View
factor

0.2

0.1

0.05

0.02

0.01

L = flame length (m)

R = flame radius (m) 0.005
X=distance from
flame centre
to'target (m)

1 3 4 5 678910 50
XIR
Figure I1
Maximum view factors for tilted cylinders 0 = -30° .

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 APPENDIX 2

1 .0

0 .5
View
factor
(Sp)

0 .2

0 .1

0 .05

0 .02

-L =flame length (m)

- R =flame radius (m)
0 .005
X =distance from
= flame centre
to target (m) '- - A

I I I IIIIII

3 4 5 678910 20
X/ R
Figure 12
Maximum view factors for tilted cylinders 0 = -45°.

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 CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

1 .0

- 0 .5

View
factor
(4)

0 .2

0.1

0 .05

0 .02

0.01

L = flame length (m)

Ic-
= R= flame radius (m)
0 .005
X= distance from
flame centre v- -;13 %ON
to target (m)

I I I I I 1111
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
X /R
Figure 13
Maximum view factors for tilted cylinders 0 = W .

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 APPENDIX 2

A = 10%
B = 30%
C = 50%
D = 70%
E = 100%

0.1 0 .2 0 .3 0 .4 0 .5 0 .6 0 .7 0 .8 0 .9 1 .0

Atmospheric transmittance (T)

Figure 14
Atmospheric transmittance .

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 CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

5 EXAMPLE PROBLEMS FOR CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION

FLUX LEVELS FOR POOL FIRES

5 .1 Standard Data
The following standard data are used in all example problems :
Propane property data
Liquid density at atmospheric pressure = 579 kg/m 3
Vapour density at normal boiling point = 2 .30 kg/m3
Vapour density at ambient temperature= 1 .86 kg/m 3
Molecular weight = 44
Specific heat ratio = 1 .1
Lower flammability limit in air = 2.1% vol
Ambient conditions
Airdensity = 1 .22 kg/m3
Air molecular weight = 29
Air temperature = 15°C
Gravitational acceleration = 9 .81 m/s2

5 .2 Example 1 . Propane Pool Fire

Calculate the thermal radiation flux levels in the vicinity of a 20 metre diameter pool of burning propane (e .g . due
to ignition of a spillage in a rundown area/impounding basin) .
Ambient conditions are assumed to be :
Wind speed = 5 m/s'
Relative humidity = 30%
`Targets' of interest are at the following elevations :
Ground level (as base of fire)
10 metres above ground level
Thermal radiation flux levels (relative to distance from the fire) over the range 1 .5 to 44 kW/m 2 (see Appendix 1)
are required .

Calculation
This is a liquid pool fire and the method described in 3 .2 is followed .
From 3 .2 .1 :
Pool diameter (D) is 20 metres (circular pool-diameter given) .
From 3 .2 .2 :
Calculate the liquid burning rate (V) (from equation (4))
V = V„[1 - exp (-jD)j
V = V„[1 - exp (=0 .67 x 20)]
V = 2 .17 x 10 -4 metres/sec (for large pool)
From 3 .2 .3 :
Calculate the flame length (L) from equation (5) .
L = 42D{M/[Qa (gD)os]} 0 .61
M = VO, = 2 .17 x 10 -4 x 579
M = 0 .1256 kg/sec
L = 42 x 20(0 .1256/[1 .22(9 .81 x 20)0-']) 0-61
L = 42 metres
From 3 .2 .4 :
Calculate flame deviation (0) from equations (6) and (7) .
0 = cos - ' (u *) -os
u * = u/(MgD1Lo .)
u * = 5/(0 .1256 x 9 .81 x 20/2.30) 13
u * = 2 .27

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 APPENDIX 2

0 = cos t (0 .664)
0 =48 .4°
For calculation purposes take 0 = 45° .

From 3 .2 .5 :
Calculate flame spillover (D *) from equation (8) .
D* = D x 1 .5 (Fr) 0-°69
Fr = (u) 2/(gD)
Fr = (5) 2/(9 .81 x 20)
Fr = 0 .1274
D * = 20 x 1 .5(0 .1274) 0-069
D * = 26 .0 metres
Flame spillover is therefore 6 metres .
For the purpose of view factor calculation the flame spillover is accounted for by assuming that the liquid pool is
displaced 6 metres in the direction of the wind, i .e . 6 metres nearer to the targets .
From the above calculations the sketch shown in Figure 15 can be constructed in order to simplify the
calculation of view factors .

Calculations for ground level targets

The geometry for calculating view factors for this case is covered in Figure 2 .
View factors (0) are taken from Figure 8 for a 45° flame deviation .
Atmospheric transmittance (r) is taken from Figure 14 for each target distance .
Flame surface flux (10 ) is taken as 50 kW/m 2 from 3 .2 .7 .
The characteristic length/radius ratio for the flame is given by
L = 42 metres R = D/2 = 10 metres LIR = 4 .2
Thermal radiation flux levels at targets from 5 metres to 100 metres distance from the edge of the (displaced)
flame (point C in Figure 15) will be calculated to cover the required range of incident radiation on targets .
Calculation of thermal radiation flux levels :
X* X'IR 0 r 1 X

5 1 .5 0 .71 0 .92 32 .7 11
10 2.0 0 .57 0 .88 25 .1 16
20 3 .0 0 .38 0 .83 15 .8 26
40 5 .0 0 .17 0 .78 6 .6 46
60 7.0 0 .08 0 .75 3 .0 66
80 9 .0 0 .045 0 .73 1 .63 86
100 11 .0 0 .027 0 .71 0 .96 106

X* (m) is measured from the edge of the displaced flame to the target .
X' (m) is measured from the centre of the displaced flame to the target .
X (m) is the distance of the target from the edge of the original pool .
X = X * + 6(1)
(1) Flame spillover (B-C in Figure 15) = 6 metres
The results are shown on Figure 16 .

Figure 15
Sketch of Example I Fire.
A-B = liquid pool dimension (D = 20 m)
A-C = elongated flame dimension (D * = 26 m)
X-Y = axis of `original' flame (L = 42 m)
0 = angle of flame tilt (48 .4°)
For targets at 10 metres elevation
E-F = target vertical elevation (10 m)
C-F = flame length below target (L - = 15 m)
F-G = flame length above target (L' = 27 m)
C-E = distance correction to elevated target (11 m)
Notes : L - = (E-F)/sin (90 - 0) = 15 .1 metres
L' = L - L - = 42 - 15 .1 = 26 .9 metres
C-E = [(E-F)/sin (90 - 0)] sin 0 = 11 .3 metres

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 CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

Thermal radiation Distance to target from edge of pool (m)

flux level (kW/m2) Ground level 10 metres elevation
(maximum)
1 .5 90 90
5.0 53 59
8.0 42 50
13 31 41
32 12 26
44 6 21
Ref. Appendix 3 .1 50

40

10 metres Thermal radiation

elevation flux level (kW/m 2)

30

20

10

I 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 I 1 1 I I 1 I I I I I 0
0 20 40 60 80 100

Distance to target from edge of pool (m)

Figure 16
Example 1 radiation levels .

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 APPENDIX 2

Calculations for targets at 10 metres elevation

The geometry for calculating view factors for this case is covered in Figure 3 .
View factors (0 + ) are taken from-Figure 8 and (¢-) from Figure 12 .
Atmospheric transmittance (z) and flame surface flux (10 ) are taken as for the ground level target .
The lengths of the flame below (L - ) and above (L + ) the target elevation (10 m) are calculated in Figure 15 .
L+/R = 27/10 = 2 .7 L -IR = 15/10 = 1 .5
Thermal radiation flux levels will be calculated at targets from 5 metres to 100 metres distance from the edge
of the (displaced) flame at 10 metres elevation (Point F in Figure 15) . Calculation of thermal radiation flux levels :
0+
X* X'IR 0- 0 T I X

5 1 .5 0 .71 0 .17 0 .88 0 .92 40 .5 22

10 2.0 0 .55 0 .11 0 .66 0 .88 29 .0 27
20 3 .0 0 .32 0 .056 0 .376 0 .83 15 .6 37
40 5 .0 0 .12 0 .023 0 .143 0 .78 5 .6 57
60 7 .0 0 .05 0 .012 0 .062 0 .75 2 .33 77
80 9 .0 0 .028 0 .008 0 .036 0 .73 1 .31 97
100 11 .0 0 .017 0 .005 0 .022 0 .71 0 .78 117

X* (m) is measured from the edge of the displaced flame (at 10 m elevation) to the target .
X' (m) is measured from the centre of the displaced flame (at 10 m elevation) to the target .
X (m) is the horizontal distance of the target from the edge of the original pool .
X = X* + 6(1) + 10(2)
(1) Flame spillover (B-C in Figure 15) = 6 metres
(2) Correction to ground level (C-E in Figure 15) = 11 m
The results are shown in Figure 16 .

5 .3 Example 2. Fire from Roof of Refrigerated Propane Storage Tank

Calculate the thermal radiation flux levels in the vicinity of a refrigerated propane storage tank burning from the
roof . Assume the worst case condition in which the whole area of the roof has been destroyed (i .e . maximum fire
diameter) .
Ambient conditions are assumed to be :
Wind speed = 4 m/si
Relative humidity = 30%
Tank dimensions are taken as :
Shell height = 25 m
Diameter = 36 m
`Targets' of interest are :
(a) Adjacent identical storage tanks (protected by water sprays) on which a maximum thermal radiation flux
level of 32 kW/m2 is permitted . The minimum spacing between tanks and representative radiation levels on
the shell and roof (for water spray rate estimates) are to be calculated .
(b) The (remote area) plant boundary at which a thermal radiation level of 13 kW/m 2 (at ground level) is
allowable . The minimum distance from tank to boundary is required .
The storage tank is assumed to be of a type which will not `burn down', i .e . the base of the visible flame will remain
at an elevation of 25 metres above grade .

Calculation
This is a liquid pool fire and the method used in Example 1 is followed .
For this case the calculations are summarized except where the method differs from Example 1 .
Equivalent pool diameter (D) = 36 metres
Liquid burning rate (V) = 2 .17 x 10 -4 metres/s
Flame length (L) = 63 metres
Flame deviation (0) = 35°
Flame spillover (calculated) = 8 metres

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 CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

P S Figure 17
Sketch of Example 2 Fire .
A-B = liquid pool dimension (D = 36 m)
A-C = elongated flame dimension (D * = 44 m)
X-Y = axis of `original' flame (L = 63 m)
0 = angle of flame tilt (35*)
For targets at ground level
33 metres elevation B-H = vertical distance below flame base (25 m)
A
----------
_ - Y-Z = `hypothetical' flame length (L HYP = 30 .5 m)
N 25 mees -- X-Z = `total' flame length (L T0t = 93 .5 m)
elevation J-K = distance correction to ground level target (17 .5 m)
For targets at 33 metres elevation
M-N = target vertical elevation (8 m)
C-M = flame length below target (L - = 9 .8 m)
M-S = flame length above target (L + = 53 .2 m)
C-N = distance correction to elevated target (5 .6 m)

The sketch in Figure 17 illustrates the conditions . The flame is `extended' to ground level for the purpose of
calculating view factors for ground level targets .
The flame spillover effect is shown as calculated above, but a lower spillover would be expected for this type
of elevated fire .
For this calculation the maximum height of the domed roof on the adjacent tank is taken as 33 metres .

Calculations for targets at 25 metres elevation

For the purpose of tank spacing thermal radiation flux levels are required for targets at the same elevation as the
base of the flame .
The procedure for calculating view factors is similar to that used for ground level targets in Example 1
(Figure 2) .
View factors (0) are taken from Figure 7 for a 30' flame angle .
Atmospheric transmittance (r) is taken from Figure 14 .
Flame surface flux (1) is taken as 50 kW/m 2 from 3 .2 .7 .
Flame LIR = 63/18 = 3 .5
Thermal radiation flux levels will be calculated at targets from 5 metres to 45 metres from the edge of the
flame base (Point C in Figure 17) :

X* X'IR 0 r I X

5 1 .3 0 .67 0 .92 30 .8 13
9 1 .5 0 .59 0 .89 26 .3 17
18 2 .0 0 .45 0 .84 18 .9 26
27 2 .5 0 .35 0 .81 14 .2 35
36 3 .0 0 .27 0 .79 10 .7 44
45 3 .5 0 .22 0 .77 8 .5 53

X* (m) is measured from the edge of the displaced flame to the target (both at 25 m elevation) .
X' (m) is measured from the centre of the displaced flame to the target (both at 25 m elevation) .
X (m) is the horizontal distance of the target from the edge of the tank
X = X` + 8(1)
(1) Flame spillover (B-C in Figure 17) = 8 metres
These results are plotted on Figure 18 .

Calculations for targets at 33 metres elevation

These figures will be used to specify thermal radiation flux levels on the adjacent tank roof. The assumption made
is that the tank roof is exposed to radiation only from that area of the flame which is above roof elevation, i .e . in
this case above 33 metres .
View factors, atmospheric transmittance_and flame surface flux are calculated as above .
Flame LIR = 53 .2/18 = 3 .0

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 APPENDIX 2

Thermal radiation Distance to target . from tank shell (m)

flux level (kW/m 2 ) Ground level . 25 metres elevation . 33 metres elevation
(maximum) Tank shell Tank roof
1 .5 124
5.0 46
8.0 55 58
13 38 43
32 12 18

50
Ref . Appendix 3 .1

40

Thermal radiation
flux level (kW/m2 )

30

20

10

I I t I i s I I I I I 0
0 20 40 80 100

Distance to target from tank shell (m)

Figure 18
Example 2 radiation levels .

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 CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

Thermal radiation flux levels are calculated as for the 25 metre elevation case, for targets between 5 metres
and 45 metres from the edge of the displaced flame at 33 metres elevation (Point M in Figure 17) :

X * X'IR ¢ r I X

5 1 .3 0 .67 0 .92 30 .8 19
9 1 .5 0 .59 0 .89 26 .3 23
18 2 .0 0 .44 0 .84 18 .5 32
27 2 .5 0 .34 0 .81 13 .8 41
36 3 .0 0 .255 0 .79 10 .1 50
45 3 .5 0 .20 0.77 7 .7 59

X* (m) is measured from the edge of the displaced flame (at 33 m elevation) to the target .
X' (m) is measured from the centre of the displaced flame (at 33 m elevation) to the target .
X (m) is the horizontal distance of the target from the edge of the tank .
X = X* + 8(1) + 6(2)
(1) Flame spillover (B-C in Figure 17) = 8 metres
(2) Correction for elevation (C-H in Figure 17) . = 6 metres
These results are plotted on Figure 18 .

Calculations for targets at ground level

The geometry for calculating view factors for this case is covered in Figure 4 .
View factors (0) are taken from Figure 7 .
Atmospheric transmittance and flame surface flux are taken as for previous examples .
LT°`IR = 93 .5/18 = 5 .2
LHYP/R = 30 .5/18 = 1 .7
Thermal radiation flux levels are calculated for targets between 15 metres and 150 metres from the edge of
the extended flame base :
X' X'/R 0 Hyp ¢ r I

15 1 .8 0 .51 0 .43 0 .08 0.85 3 .4 6

18 2 .0 0 .465 0 .36 0 .105 0 .84 4 .4 9
27 2 .5 0 .375 0 .23 0 .145 0 .81 5 .9 18
36 3 .0 0 .31 0 .153 0 .157 0 .79 6 .2 27
54 4 .0 0 .213 0 .078 0 .135 0 .76 5 .1 45
72 5 .0 0 .155 0 .048 0 .107 0 .74 4 .0 63
90 6 .0 0 .112 0 .031 0.081 0 .72 2 .92 81
108 7 .0 0 .084 0 .022 0.062 0 .71 2 .20 99
126 8 .0 0 .064 0 .016 0 .048 0 .70 1 .68 117
144 9 .0 0 .05 0 .012 0 .038 0 .69 1 .31 135

X* (m) is measured from the edge of the displaced flame (extended to ground level) to the target .
X' (m) is measured from the centre of the displaced flame (extended to ground level) to the target .
X (m) is the horizontal-distance of the target from the edge of the tank.
X = X * + 8(1) - 17(2)
(1) Flame spillover (B-C in Figure 17) = 8 metres
(2) Correction for `extended' flame (J-K in Figure 17) = 17 metres
These results are plotted on Figure 18 .

5.4 Example 3 . Fire from Roof of Refrigerated Propane Storage Tank Burning Down to Pool Fire at Ground Level
In this example all conditions are the same as in Example 2 except that the storage tank is assumed to be of a type
which will `burn down', i .e . the fire will start at a visible flame elevation of 25 metres and will finish as a 36 metre
diameter LPG pool fire at ground level .
The initial thermal radiation levels will be as calculated for Example 2 . Data for the same `targets' and
conditions are required for the latter stages of the fire at ground level .

Calculation
All initial calculations are as for Example 2 . A sketch illustrating the latter stages of the fire with the tank burned
down to ground level is shown in Figure 19 .

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 APPENDIX 2

P S Figure 19
Sketch of Example 3 Fire.
A-B = liquid pool dimension (D = 36 m)
A-C = elongated flame dimension (D* = 44 m)
X-Y = axis of `original' flame (L = 63 m)
0 = angle of flame tilt (35°)
For targets at 25 metres elevation
M-N = target vertical elevation (25 m)
C-M = flame length below target (L- = 30 .5 m)
B C NH M-S = flame length above target (L+ = 32 .5 m)
C-N = distance correction to elevated target (17 .5 m)
For targets at 33 metres elevation
F-H = target vertical elevation (33 m)
C-F = flame length below target (L- = 40 .2 m)
F-S = flame length above target (L+ = 22 .8 m)
C-H = distance correction to elevated target (23 .1 m)

Calculations for targets at 25 metres elevation

This elevation represents the top of the shell of an adjacent tank and is treated as in Figure 3 .
View factors (0) for that part of the flame above the target are taken from Figure 3 and for the flame below
the target from Figure 4 .
Atmospheric transmittance (r) and flame surface flux are as for Example 2 .
L+/R = 32 .5/18 = 1 .80 L-/R = 30 .5/18 = 1 .69
Thermal radiation flux levels will be calculated at targets from 5 metres to 45 metres from the edge of the flame
at 25 metres elevation (point M in Figure 19) . Calculation of thermal radiation flux levels :

X' X'IR 0+ 0- 0 r I X
5 1 .3 0 .67 0 .30 0 .97 0 .92 44 .6 30
9 1 .5 0 .59 0 .235 0 .825 0 .89 36 .7 34
18 2 .0 0 .41 0 .155 0 .565 0 .84 23 .7 43
27 2 .5 0 .28 0 .11 0.39 0.81 15 .8 52
36 3 .0 0 .20 0 .08 0 .28 0 .79 11 .1 61
45 3 .5 0 .14 0 .06 0 .20 0 .77 7 .7 70

X* (m) is measured from the edge of the displaced flame (at 25 m elevation) to the target .
X' (m) is measured from the centre of the displaced flame (at 25 m elevation) to the target .
X (m) is the horizontal distance of the target from the edge of the tank .
X = X* + 8(1) + 17(2)
(1) Flame spillover (E -F in Figure 19) = 8 m
(2) Correction for elevation (D-E in Figure 19) = 17 m
These results are shown on Figure 20 .
The 25 metre elevation level also represents the edge of an adjacent tank roof. The thermal radiation flux
levels differ from those calculated above for the tank shell because the roof will receive only minimal radiation
from that part of the flame below 25 metres elevation . This is partly due to the shielding of parts of the roof by the
tank shell, but also because those areas of the roof which are `visible' to the flame are at a very unfavourable angle
to receive and absorb thermal radiation . Therefore, for the roof (25 m elevation) only the view factor for the flame
length above the target is applied .
The calculation for the roof at 25 metres elevation is shown below and also plotted on Figure 20 :

X* X'/R 0 r I X
5 1 .3 0.67 0 .92 30.8 30
9 1 .5 0 .59 0 .89 26 .3 34
18 2 .0 0 .41 0 .84 17 .2 43
27 2 .5 0 .28 0 .81 11 .3 52
36 3 .0 0 .20 0 .79 7 .9 61
45 3 .5 0 .14 0 .77 5 .4 70

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 CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

Thermal radiation Distance to target from tank shell (m)

flux level (kW/m2 ) Ground level 25 metres elevation 33 metres elevation
(maxim um ) Tank shell Tank roof Tank roof
1 .5 140
5 .0 76
8 .0 56 69 61 60
13 39 57 49 52
32 13 37 29 35

Ref. Appendix 3.1

25 metres
elevation
40

Thermal radiation
33 metres flux level (kW/m2 )
elevation
(Tank roof)
30

20

10

I 1 I I 1 I I I I 0
0 20 40 60 80 100

Distance to target from tank shell (m)

Figure 20
Example 3 radiation levels .

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 APPENDIX 2

Calculations for targets at 33 metres elevation

This is also a tank roof calculation and, again, the roof is assumed to receive minimal radiation from that area of
the flame below 33 metres elevation .
The calculation is similar to that for a 25 metre elevation target shown above .
Flame L'IR = .22 .8/18 = 1 .27
Thermal radiation flux levels are calculated for targets from 5 metres to 45 metres from the edge of the
(displaced) flame at 33 metres elevation (Point F in Figure 19) . Calculation of thermal radiation flux levels :
0+
X* X'/R r I X

5 1 .3 0 .66 0 .92 30 .4 36
9 1 .5 0 .57 0 .89 25 .4 40
18 2 .0 0.36 0 .84 15 .1 49
27 2 .5 0 .22 0 .81 8.9 58
36 3 .0 0 .15 0 .79 5 .9 67
45 3 .5 0.105 0 .77 4 .0 76

X* (m) is measured from the edge of the displaced flame (at 33 m elevation) to the target .
X' (m) is measured from the centre of the displaced flame (at 33 m elevation) to the target .
X (m) is the horizontal distance of the target from the edge of the tank .
X = X* + 8(1) + 23(2)

(1) Flame spillover (B-C in Figure 19) = 8 metres

(2) Correction for elevation (C-H in Figure 19) = 23 metres
These results are plotted on Figure 20 .

Calculations for targets at ground level

The calculation is exactly the same as that for a target at 25 metres elevation in Example 2, i .e . flame base and
target at the same elevation .
The figures are plotted on Figure 20, together with the additional data generated below to extend the range
of results :
X* X'IR 95 r I X

54 4 .0 0 .175 0 .76 6.7 63

72 5 .0 0.12 0 .74 4 .5 81
90 6 .0 0.08 0 .72 2 .88 99
108 7 .0 0.06 0 .71 2 .13 117
126 8 .0 0.045 0 .70 1 .58 135
144 9 .0 0.037 0 .69 1 .28 153

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 Appendix 3

LEAK SOURCES AND TYPICAL LEAK

RATES FROM LPG STORAGE
SYSTEMS

Leak sources from LPG storage systems should for design purposes be confined to certain well-defined situations
provided :
(a) the finished design and operating procedures employed are based on the results of systematic analysis of the
system taking into account failure modes and the likelihood of their occurring and
(b) the system is designed, constructed and maintained in conformity with an acceptable code .
In the case of pressure storage such situations are considered to be limited to possible leakage from vessel
flange and piping gaskets, pump seals and to the failure of small bore connections .
In the case of refrigerated systems leaks are similarly limited to flange gaskets and small bore connections
but, additionally, experience has indicated the possibility of limited cracks occurring in plate material .
Tables are given below which, based on simple flow formulae, illustrate the order of magnitude of LPG
releases to be expected from typical credible release sources under the postulated storage conditions . These
formulae are typical of a number of equations which could be used depending on choice, flow regime, release
conditions anticipated at the orifice, storage conditions, etc . Release rates are given for both butane and propane
and the calculations assume the physical properties of the pure materials rather than those of the various
commercial grades manufactured .
This appendix-does not in any way attempt to indicate the risk of credible failures happening, which is an
important part of the systematic evaluation of the design and operating procedures for the plant, but confines
itself to indicating the type of leak source and the leakage rate considered to be typical for that source .
For simplicity no account has been taken in the examples given of the installation of emergency valves, e .g .
excess flow valves, for limiting leakage rates and duration .

1 PRESSURE STORAGE

The typical simple equation used for pressure storage (results shown in Tables 1 and 2) is for small `hole' sizes and
assumes a homogeneous equilibrium two-phase flashing liquid release from the orifice . This contrasts with a
single-phase spray release which may occur under certain circumstances . It also contrasts with the formula used
for refrigerated LPG releases (see 2) in which non-flashing 100% liquid release is assumed .
Thus Tables 1 and 2 are based on the formula
W = ACd [2 dm (Pi - Pc )1 0.5

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 APPENDIX 3

where
W = release rate (kg/s)
A = area of release hole (m 2 )
Cd = coefficient of discharge, assumed here to be 1 .0*
Pi = initial pressure (N/m 2 , Pascals)
Pc = critical pressure (N/m 2 ) ( assumed here to be 0 .55 Pi )
• = mean density of vapour/liquid mixture (kg/m 3 )
1
M,./d„ + (1 - M,,)/dd

where
d„ = density of vapour (kg/M 3 )
dp = density of liquid (kg/m3 )

M,.= (Ti-T`) C
L

where
Ti =initial temperature (K)
• = equilibrium temperature corresponding to Pc (K)
• = latent heat of vaporization (kJ/kg)
C = heat capacity of liquid (kJ/kg per degree centigrade)

Table I
Release resulting from pipe flange gasket failure .
Gasket 1 .5 mm (1/16 in) thick
Failure between adjacent bolt holes
Flange sizes based on ANSI 300 lb flange rating
Butane stored at 1 .5 barg (2 .5 x 105 Pascals)
Propane stored at 7 barg (8 x 10 5 Pascals)

Pipe diameter Area of release hole Butane release rate Propane release rate
(mm (in)) (m2 x 10-6) (kg/s, 1 .5 barg) (kg/s, 7 barg)

50(2) 75 0.23 0.53

100(4) 118 0 .35 0 .81
150(6) 106 0.35 0.70
200(8) 129 0 .39 0 .89
300(12) 133 0.40 0.93

Table 2
Release resulting from small bore connection failure .
Butane stored at 1 .5 barg (2 .5 x 105 Pascals)
Propane stored at 7 barg (8 x 10 5 Pascals)

Pipe diameter Area of release hole Butane release rate Propane release rate
(mm (in)) (m2 x 10"6 ) (kg/s,1 .5 barg) (kg/s, 7barg)

20(3/4) 285 0 .88 1 .88

50(2) 2028 6 .25 13 .75

Note (a) : The effect of friction (e .g . in long pipes) which can considerably reduce release rates
is not taken into account.
Note (b) : Full bore flow is assumed, i .e . no account is taken of emergency valve operation, or
other flow limiters.

A coefficient of discharge of 1 .0 has been used but other lower values, in some cases as low as 0.6, may be appropriate depending upon the
flow regime and the orifice configuration, etc .

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 LEAK SOURCES AND TYPICAL LEAK RATES FROM LPG STORAGE SYSTEMS

2 REFRIGERATED STORAGE

The typical simple equation for deriving Tables 3, 4 and 5 is intended for the flow of an incompressible liquid
through an orifice and assumes no flashing takes place across the release gap .
This is not strictly correct as, initially at least, some flashing will occur, but use of this equation gives the
greater release rate as compared with, for example, the equation for steady flashing flow conditions used for
pressure storage. Thus Tables 3, 4 and 5 are based on the formula :

W = ACd[2e(Pi - P2)] °-5 kg/s

where
A = area of release gap (m 2 )
Pt = upstream absolute pressure (N/m 2 )
P2 = downstream (atmospheric) pressure (N/m 2 )
e = density of liquid at storage temperature (kg/m 3 )
Cd = coefficient of discharge`

Note 1 : All the release rates quoted in Tables 3, 4 and 5 have been determined for a static system .
Note 2 : The densities of refrigerated butane and propane are so close that the release rates will be substantially
the same for both, and also for mixtures of them .

Table 3
Release resulting from pipe flange gasket failure .
Gasket 1 .5 mm (1/16 in) thick
Failure between adjacent bolt holes
Flange sizes based on ANSI 300 1b flange rating

Propane -40°C/butane -9°C

Head Area of release rates of liquid LPG
Pipe diameter in tank release hole
(mm (in)) (m) (m 2 x 10-6 ) kg/s ft 3/s m3/s

300(12) 20 133 1 .2 0 .07 0 .002

400(16) 20 134 1 .2 0 .07 0 .002
500(20) 20 134 1 .2 0 .07 0 .002
600(24) 20 160 1 .5 0 .09 0 .0025
300(12) 30 133 1 .5 0 .09 0 .0025
400(16) 30 134 1 .5 0 .09 0 .0025
500(20) 30 134 1 .5 0.09 0 .0025
600(24) 30 160 1 .8 0.11 0 .003

Note (c) : The height of product chosen, i .e . 20 m and 30 m, are typical of a large tank
approximately two-thirds full and full respectively .

Table 4
Release resulting from tank small bore connection failure.

Propane -40°C/butane -9°C

Head Area of release rates of liquid LPG
Pipe diameter in tank release hole
(mm (in)) (m) (m2 x 10 -6 ) kg/s ft3/s m3/s

20(3/4) 20 285 2 .6 0 .16 0 .005

25(l) 20 507 4 .7 0 .28 0 .008
50(2) 20 2028 18 .7 1 .12 0 .032
20(3/4) 30 285 3 .2 0 .19 0 .006
25(l) 30 507 5 .7 0 .34 0 .010
50(2) 30 2028 22 .7 1 .36 0 .039

Refer to Note (c) .

* For the cases considered a coefficient of discharge of 0 .8 has been used. In practice coefficients of discharge as low as 0 .3 may be appropriate
depending upon the flow regime and the orifice configuration, etc .

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 APPENDIX 3

Table 5
Release from tank material failure-split 20 cm in length .

Propane -40°C/butane -9°C

Area of release rates of liquid LPG
Width of split Head release hole
(mm(in)) (m) (m2 x 10-6 ) kg/s ft3/s m3/s

1 .5 (1/16) 20 290 2 .57 0 .16 0 .005

3 .0(1/8) 20 580 5 .34 0 .32 0.01
1 .5(1/16) 30 290 3 .25 0 .20 0 .06
3 .0(1/8) 30 580 6 .50 0 .39 0 .01

Refer to Note (c) .

Note (d) : A split limited to 20 cm can be considered if the plate has properties at the storage
temperature such that a sudden rupture of the whole tank wall is a non-credible
mode of failure .

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 Appendix 4

VAPOUR DISPERSION

A number of theoretical mathematical models have been derived for predicting vapour dispersion from LPG
spillages . Work on these models and the empirical correlations which take account of various physical processes
which influence vapour dispersion is known to be continuing .
To date no single model is universally acceptable and many companies have their own in-house approaches
which they use on a worldwide basis .
A paper published in the Journal of Hazardous Materials, 6 (1982), entitled `Heavy gas dispersion models',
by D . R . Blackmore, M . N . Herman and J . L . Woodward, contains a review of the following models :
Ground level releases Jet release
Zephyr Astleford etal .
Transloc Bloom
Sigmet-N Cox et al .
Mariah Ooms etal .
Disco
Hegadas 11
Cox and Carpenter
Eidvik
Fay
Flothman and Nikodem
Denz
Germeles and Drake
Picknett
Van Buijtenan
Van Ulden

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 Appendix 5

COOLING WATER REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE PROTECTION OF
REFRIGERATED LPG STORAGE
TANK SYSTEMS EXPOSED TO
THERMAL RADIATION

Appendix 2 describes and illustrates with examples a method by which radiation levels incident on targets as a
result of fire situations may be calculated . The application of water to the target is one way of reducing the effects
of thermal radiation as, in evaporating, water carries away the incident energy . Additionally if a layer of water is
maintained on the target surface then its temperature will not rise above the 100'C limit stipulated in 3 .8 .3 .4 of
the Code .
Cooling water is normally applied by a fixed spray system using open-ended nozzles with a diameter of not
less than 8 mm in order to minimize the risk of blockage . Fixed water monitors should not be used alone as with
them it is not practicable to cover the total exposed area with an even water distribution . Such an even distribution
with a water layer over the surface to be cooled is essential as interruption of the water layer could lead to the
development of local hot spots which could result in rapid loss of mechanical integrity of the structure .
The water application rate is dependent upon the form of the spray system, e .g . open-ended nozzles, the
cooling requirement, e .g . limiting surface temperature to 100'C, and the heat flux received .
Normally the maximum level of heat flux received is used as the basis for the calculation for relatively small
units . However, for large structures such as tank roofs it can result in considerable overstating of the requirement
unless sectionalization of the spray system is carried out . For example, the maximum heat flux in the case of an
adjacent tank fire would occur at the adjacent tank rim and the main part of the roof structure would be at a lower
flux level .
Whether the cooling water is recirculated or not has a bearing on the rate at which it is to be applied . If the
water is not recirculated then the sensible heat absorbed in raising it from ambient temperature to 100'C may be
taken into account as well as the heat of vaporization .

EXAMPLE

Assume the maximum heat flux received = 32 kW/m2

The spray water system does not involve water recirculation .
Ambient water temperature max = 20'C
Required maximum target surface temperature = 100 ° C
As a factor of safety assume that only 25% of the latent heat of evaporation is taken into account .
It is required to determine the necessary water application rate .

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 COOLING WATER REQUIREMENTS FOR REFRIGERATED STORAGE TANKS

Solution
1 kg of water absorbs as sensible heat (20'C to 100'C) = 336 kJ
1 kg of water absorbs in evaporating 2,257 kJ
2,257
Therefore for calculation purposes assume = 564 kJ is used .
Thus heat absorbed by 1 kg of water = 336 +564
= 900 kJ
Radiant heat flux to be absorbed = 32 kW/m2
= 32 kJ/(s/m2 )
Therefore required water application rate =
900
32
= 0 .036 kg/(s/m2 )
This is equivalent to 2 .16 l/(min/m2 ) of surface area to be protected .
Similar calculations can be carried out for other portions of the tank receiving lower flux levels .

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 Appendix 6

SAFE END LIMITS WHEN PURGING

WITH NITROGEN VOL . PER CENT

Safe end point for inert purging

Gas freeing Recommissioning

gas max % 0 2 max

A B

Butane 4 9 .0
Propane 5 9 .0

In the above Columns A and B recommend practical limits to cater for variations in gas composition, etc .
Column A-represents the maximum allowable concentration of flammable gas in the gas/inert mixture to enable
safe subsequent introduction of replacement air .
Column B-represents the maximum allowable concentration of oxygen in the air/inert mixture to enable safe
introduction/replacement by flammable gas .
Note : The above figures do not represent safe levels at which entry is permissible.

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 Appendix 7

GLOSSARY OF TERMS-

For the purpose of this Code the following interpretations apply irrespective of any other meaning the words may
have in other connections . Where used in the Code, these terms are printed in italics .
Above-ground storage : Storage of which no part, other than foundations, is below ground level or covered by
earth or similar materials .
Below-ground/buried storage : Storage of which no part, other than connections, is above ground level .
Blank flange : A solid flange which can be bolted to a flanged connection on pipes or equipment to block off flow
from it . The flanges should be of the same rating .
Bleed valve : A small vent valve, usually immediately downstream of a block valve, which can be opened to
ascertain whether there is pressure on the down side of the block valve when closed .
Blind : (See Blank flange and Slip blind, terms which are preferable as they are unambiguous .)
Block valve : A valve which controls the passage of a liquid through a pipe with the intention that it permits either
full flow or no flow .
Bonding : Provision of a low resistance electrical conductor between sections of plant, equipment or structures .
Breathing apparatus : A device which ensures that the wearer has a continuously available supply of uncontami-
nated air through a face mask, helmet or mouthpiece .
Bund, bunding, bunded area, bunded enclosure : An enclosure bounded by a wall or by natural or constructed
ground contours and designed to confine a spillage of product .
Bund wall: A wall of appropriate height and size, constructed of suitable material and designed to confine a
spillage of product .
Capacity: The interval volume of the container .
Container: A general term used to denote a vessel or tank for holding LPG whether for bulk storage, transport or
portable use .
Competent person : A person who has the necessary ability in the particular process, trade, plant or equipment to
which the text refers to render him capable of the work involved and who has been duly authorized to
undertake the work .
Cryogenic : Relating to low temperatures, e .g . below -100°C .
Earthing: The provision of a safe path of electrical current to ground, in order to protect structures, plant and
equipment from the effects of stray electrical currents and electrostatic discharge .
Fire safe : A term used to denote a defined standard of resistance to fire exposure, e .g . to standards laid down in
BS 5146 .
Fireproofed: Provided with a defined standard of protection against fire exposure, e .g. BS 476 Part 8 .
Fire resistant : The ability to control the surface spread of flame to a specified rate under laid down conditions,
e .g . BS 476 .
Flammable (synonymous with Inflammable) : Refers to any substance, solid, liquid, gas or vapour, which is easily
ignited . The addition of the prefix `non' indicates that-the substance is not readily ignited but does not
necessarily indicate that it is non-combustible .
Fully in-ground : Totally below ground level .

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 APPENDIX 7

Fully refrigerated : Cooled to a temperature at which its vapour pressure is at or below atmospheric pressure .
Gas-free : A tank, vessel, container, pipeline or area is considered to be gasfree when the concentration of
flammable gases is within the safe prescribed limits .-The term gas free does not imply absence of toxic gases
or sufficiency of oxygen for tank or vessel entry .
Hazardous area : An area in which there exists or may exist an atmosphere containing flammable gas or vapour in
a concentration capable of ignition . (The term refers exclusively to hazards arising from ignition .)
Hot work : This includes welding or the use of any flame or electric arc or the use of any equipment likely to cause
heat, flame or spark . It also includes caulking, chipping, drilling, riveting and any other heat producing
operation, unless it is carried out in such a way as to keep the temperature of the tools and work below 100 ° C .
Impounding basin : (As for bund, bunding, bunded area, bunded enclosure .)
Mounded storage/vessel : Storage above or partly in the ground which, excluding connections, is completely
covered by earth, sand or other suitable material .
Naked lights/naked flames : Include all unconfined flames, fires, exposed incandescent material, lamps of an
unapproved pattern, electric welding arcs and portable hand or power operated equipment liable to cause
incendiary sparks .
Non-credible : Having such a low frequency of occurrence as to justify its exclusion from consideration for all
practical purposes .
Partially refrigerated : Cooled to a temperature between ambient and the materials' boiling point such that its
vapour pressure is reduced below that related to its level at ambient temperatures .
Partly in-ground : Refers to storage which is partly below ground and partly above ground .
Permit: See Work permit .
Permit to work system : A formal system for controlling work which is potentially hazardous which specifies
precise conditions for the work, including its limitation and duration and which can only be authorized by
specified levels of authority .
Pressure storage: Storage of or for LPG at its vapour pressure at ambient temperatures .
Pressure vessel: A container designed for the storage or transport of LPG at ambient temperatures, built to a
recognized Code such as BS 5500 or ASME Section VIII .
Refrigerated LPG : LPG which is cooled to a temperature at which its vapour pressure is substantially at
atmospheric pressure .
Refrigerated product : (As for refrigerated LPG .)
Refrigerated storage : Storage for product which is at such a temperature that its vapour pressure is substantially
at atmospheric pressure .
Semi-refrigerated : (As for Partially refrigerated .)
Slip blind : A circular flat plate with a handle which can be bolted between two flanges to block off flow . The handle
should extend outside the flanges . The plate should be thick enough to withstand the anticipated pressure
which need not be the flange rating pressure .
Source of ignition : Naked lights, fires, certain electrical equipment, hot surfaces above ignition temperature or a
spark or flame produced by any other means .
Spectacle blind: A solid circular plate connected to a circular plate with a hole in it by a straight handle . The plates
are designed to be bolted between flanges on piping and equipment . The first will block off flow and the
second will pass normal flow . The plate should be thick enough to withstand the anticipated pressure which
need not be the flange rating pressure . The advantage of this device is that no additional mechanical stress is
applied to the equipment when it is changed between the open and closed position .
Storage vessel: A container for the bulk storage of LPG at ambient temperatures .
Tank: A container for the bulk storage or transport of liquid and specifically for refrigerated LPG as distinct from
the pressurized product .
Thermally protected : Provided with cooling water facilities or other effective means, e .g . insulation, designed to
limit the effect of radiation from fire .
Vessel : A container for the bulk storage or transport of LPG at ambient temperatures .
Work permit: A document issued by an authorized person to permit work to be carried out safely in a defined
area under specific conditions .

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 Appendix 8

GUIDANCE ON WORK PERMIT

PROCEDURES

The following is intended to assist those responsible in producing their own local work permit procedures, which
are essential to the safe management of an LPG plant . It must be stressed that the details will depend on the size,
layout and scope of operations in the plant as well as its internal organization, and they must therefore be carefully
worked out at a local level .

(A) GENERAL

No construction, repair, maintenance work, dismantling or modification to facilities should be carried out
anywhere inside an LPG plant without the authority of the manager or his authorized representative .
In all cases except for work of a routine and non-hazardous nature, this permission should be given in the
written form of a work permit .

(1) Work Permit

The work permit should clearly specify
(a) the particular item of plant equipment to be worked upon,
(b) the work to be permitted and
(c) all the conditions that are to be observed to enable the work to be carried out without hazard ; these conditions
should include all the special precautions to be taken, such as isolation, gas testing, protective clothing and
appliances, breathing apparatus, safety, fire-fighting equipment .
To enable this to be done effectively, the layout of the work permit form should include a comprehensive
checklist section, giving the issuer a methodical procedure by which to consider and stipulate all the necessary
conditions to be followed, and the user of the permit a similar check-off opportunity . (The dual nature of this
check-off procedure by both the parties involved is particularly emphasized .)
An integral part of the work permit system of control is that it is used in conjunction with gas test and other
certificates that are additionally required to cover specific precautions listed on the work permit.

(2) Gas Test Certificates

The authorizations of hot work involving a source ofignition or of entry into a confined space such as a refrigerated
storage tank or pressure vessel are examples requiring a check for gas free conditions to be made . For this purpose
the work permit will indicate the necessity for gas test certificates to be issued . Such a gas test certificate can be an
integral part of the work permit form or can be a separate document .
It must be kept in mind that a gasfree test- result is indicative of conditions only at the actual time of testing .
Repeat gas test checks are often stipulated under the conditions of issue of a work permit .

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 APPENDIX 8

Gas testing should only be permitted to be carried out by authorized persons who have received training in
the use and care of gas detectors and who are knowledgeable as to their limitations .

(3) Other Required Certificates

Other specific certificates in addition to gas test certificates may be required in conjunction with the work permit,
e .g . certificates to cover excavation, electrical equipment and prime mover isolations, or use of radiation sources .

(4) Administration of Work Permit Forms

The use of standard printed work permit forms and gas test and other certificates should be made a requirement
and the use of any other individually made out forms should be prohibited .
It is an essential part of control that all work permit and gas test and other certificate forms be made in
duplicate (i .e . original and carbon copy) and all such pairs of forms should have an identifying serial number . All
gas test and other certificates should include the identifying serial number of the work permit to which they relate .

(B) SCOPE OF WORK PERMITS

(1) Where it is considered that work is of a routine and non-hazardous nature and no work permit is required,
effective and appropriate supervision should still be provided to ensure safe conduct of the work .
It is of help to have written standing instructions which define such routine duties and these should be
reviewed and kept up to date .
(2) Certain open areas or certain buildings (e .g . offices, workshops, laboratories) within the plant may be
designated as areas within which normal work, including hot work or use of sources of ignition, may be carried
out without a work permit or under a blanket work permit renewable at intervals (e .g . annually) . The extent
of such a designated area should be clearly defined on the ground (and/or by notices, fencing, etc .), and
chosen so that unrestricted hot work or other sources of ignition do not endanger the plant operations or
facilities .
(3) At all other locations a work permit is required for any work which may create a hazard ; examples of such
work are :

entry into any confined space such as a tank or vessel for cleaning out or any other purpose ;
work which involves hot work, naked lights or other sources of ignition, or requires the use of mobile
internal combustion engines, air compressors or portable electric lights with trailing leads ;
work in the open or in buildings, in or near a hazardous area, which have not been designated as in (2)
above ;
work in, near, or on tanks, vessels, pipelines, equipment or other facilities or in pits, culverts, drains,
etc . ;
excavations ;
work on electrical feeders, distributors or equipment .

(C) PROCEDURE PRIOR TO THE ISSUE OF A WORK PERMIT ;

CONDITIONS OF ISSUE

(1) Before issuing a permit, the person signing it should inspect the site and satisfy himself that conditions and
precautions covered by the permit will render the operation safe .
(2) The safety considerations to be stipulated on the work permit should be arrived at by full consideration of all
the factors relating to both the work to be carried out and its location . Firstly consider the equipment to be
worked on to determine whether LPG or other hazardous liquid or vapour may escape during the work .
Secondly consider the method of doing the job to assess whether this will introduce any potential hazards
(e .g . sources of ignition) .
Thirdly consider the location in relation to other equipment (e .g . manifolds, vents, drains) to assess the
likelihood of a hazard affecting the job . The consideration of these factors can be aided by the use of a
systematic checklist on the work permit form, but should include any additional factors that may be necessary
to ensure full safety during the job . Gas free or other testing requirements should be stipulated at this stage .
The factors to be considered should include the following ; it is necessary to assess these conditions not
just at the time of issuing the permit but on a continuing basis to cover the full period of the work-to be carried
out (see (F) below) .

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 GUIDANCE ON WORK PERMIT PROCEDURES

(a) Emptying the liquid LPG, depressurizing and disconnecting equipment, pipelines, pressure vessels,
tanks, etc ., as necessary .

(b) Isolation
Isolation may be by locking isolation valves of the double block and bleed type, by fitting blank flanges
or blinds, or by swinging spectacle blinds to the closed position . The use of single valves or cocks alone,
as a means of isolation for allowing work on equipment, is acceptable only for short periods during which
blank flanges or blinds are being fitted or spectacle blinds are being swung . Increased security may be
achieved by locking these single isolation valves . Double block and bleed systems are preferred to single
valves wherever practicable .
For entry into confined spaces, all possible sources of harmful gases and liquids must be isolated by
the use of slip blinds, spectacle blinds or blank flanges . A register of isolation fitting and removal should
be maintained so as to prevent any of these items being overlooked .

(c) Isolation of electrical supplies

This should be carried out by a competent person who has been given clear instructions on the method
to be used . A different method of isolation may be stipulated if the work does not involve exposure of
the electrical equipment but is confined to the driven item (e .g . locking out of the contactors may be
sufficient for adjustment of a pump seal but withdrawal of fuses and earthing down may be required for
disconnection of the motor) . An attempt to restart an isolated drive should be made to check the
effectiveness of the isolation . A warning notice should be fixed to all isolated equipment to prevent
inadvertent reconnection whilst repairs are in progress .

(d) Mechanically driven equipment

The source of fuel or power must be positively isolated .
(e) Freeing of the equipment from LPG vapours remaining after emptying under (a) above .
(f) Sealing off of all sewers, drains, ducts or gutters within 15 m of any intended hot work (to prevent danger
of hazardous vapours arising) .
(g) Checking for gas free conditions necessary for the class of work to be carried out (see (A) (2), (B) (3) ) .
The need for a gas test to be carried out should always be borne in mind in regard to any work in an
LPG plant regardless of its location .
(h) Atmospheric air contains 21% oxygen and it is not desirable for persons to have to breathe air in which
the oxygen content is less than 20% .
It is stressed that adequate instructions should be given in the use of breathing apparatus of the
appropriate type to all personnel required to wear it in the course of their duties .
(i) Need to wear protective clothing and/or breathing apparatus and stipulation of the type to be worn .
(j) Clearing away of combustible materials, removing or wetting down of decks, platforms, scaffolds, etc .
(k) Safe disposition of welding or other equipment to be used in carrying out the work .
(1) Earthing of electrical or welding equipment, or steam, air or water hose nozzles to be used in the work .
(m) Display of suitable warning notices about the site .
(n) Location of overhead or buried electric power lines or product lines, particularly if digging, using cranes
or other mechanical equipment .
(o) Provision of fire=fighting facilities and standby fire personnel if necessary .
The above guidelines cannot cover all special conditions that may arise . Where other circumstances require
further special conditions these should also be entered upon the work permit in the extra space provided .

(D) ISSUE OF WORK PERMIT

No permit should be signed or issued until the plant manager or his authorized representative has ensured that all
the relevant factors have been checked, the conditions entered on the permit and authorization given for the
work . All work permits should be made out and signed in duplicate and the person in charge of carrying out the
work should also sign the permit (both copies) to signify that only the work permitted will be done and that the
special conditions on the permit will be strictly observed .
A copy of the jointly signed permit will be held by the issuer (the manager or his authorized representative)
and the other by the person in charge of carrying out the work . A permit has no validity without the two signatures
which indicate the responsibility assumed by both parties . It is recommended that the user's copy of the permit be
displayed at the work area so as to enable all workers to see it .

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 APPENDIX 8

(E) VALIDITY OF WORK PERMITS

(1) Work permits should state clearly the work to be -done (see (A) (1)) and define the period for which they are
valid . Permits should not be signed ahead of the time of starting the work or without full inspection of the site
and all conditions ; the date and time of signing should then be entered on them . (If subsequent delay occurs,
permits should be revalidated by further inspection and again signed with the new time or date before the
work commences .)
For extended work periods the permit should be revalidated at specified intervals as necessary . The
frequency at which gas tests should be carried out and gas test certificates issued (see (A) (2)) should be stated
on the work permit.
Such frequency will depend upon the specific circumstances and location of the work to be carried out in
respect of surrounding activities etc . and general rules cannot be laid down . Under some circumstances
repeat gas tests at two-hourly intervals and again at the start of each day or separate work period will be
adequate ; in other cases circumstances may require more frequent checks for flammable vapours and an
automatic continuous monitoring gas detector should be considered (e .g . tank cleaning) .
(2) Permits may be valid for the duration of the work when its nature does not create a hazard, or when the special
conditions associated with the issue of the permit ensure that all hazards will be removed during the period of
work .

(F) CANCELLATION OF PERMIT/CERTIFICATE AND STOPPAGE OF WORK

(1) All work should be stopped, the persons withdrawn and the permit surrendered for cancellation immediately
if it is apparent that any of the stipulated conditions of the permit is not being or cannot be met ; or in the case
of a gas test if a reading is obtained which exceeds that permitted for the work being carried out . Full
re-examination of all conditions should then be made and the necessary remedial steps laid down before
re-issue of the permit .
(2) A work permit is to be withdrawn (or surrendered) immediately if the conditions under which it was issued
change . It should also be withdrawn when a contractor or other person carrying out work ignores the warning
that he is in breach of safety regulations or any conditions of the permit .
(3) On completion of the work the work permit should have the time and date of completion entered on it to
indicate that the equipment is available for reuse and should be signed by the person responsible for carrying
out the work . The issuing authority should sign the permit to indicate its cancellation and should enter the
time and date of this cancellation when it differs from the time of completion of the job . From this time no
further work is permitted .

(G) REMOVAL OF EQUIPMENT TO WORKSHOPS OR OUTSIDE THE PLANT

If equipment has to be removed to a workshop, contractors' premises or other location for repair or replacement,
a permit should specify the cleaning orgas freeing to be done before transport, storage or starting work so that no
hazard will arise in subsequent handling . When equipment is so removed, the supervisor responsible for moving
or despatching it should ensure that it is cleaned and gas freed in accordance with the permit and is safe to handle
in transit . He should attach instructions to it indicating any further precautions necessary to ensure that no
flammability hazard will arise when hot work is carried out . The workshop or other premises receiving the
equipment should not accept it without such instructions, which should bear the signature of the despatching
supervisor and the date of despatch .

(H) TYPICAL FORMS

The following forms are typical of those required to assist safe working practices in an LPG plant .
It must be stressed that any forms used must be designed to suit local geographical and organizational
circumstances, and should be backed up by formal written procedures . These examples should therefore be used
for guidance but should not be regarded as standard .
Specimen form 1 Hot Work Permit
Specimen form 2 Entry Permit
Specimen form 3 Permit to Work on or near Electrical Equipment
Specimen form 4 General Work Permit
Specimen form 5 Permit for Line Disconnecting and Vessel Opening

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 SPECIMEN FORM 1
HOT WORK PERMIT

Starting Time : Date :

Finishing Time : Date :
'Maintenance/( :ontractor Personnel :

Location-specify precisely :
Description of Work :

Note : N/A = Not Applicable

Initial both items completed :

DESCRIPTION YES N/A

I Test . gas free-area, sewers, etc .

2 Surrounding area made safe

Signatures : Gas Tester : Head Operator :

Maintenance/Contractor Personnel :

Initial all items completed :

DESCRIPTION YES NO N/A

I Test . gas free-area . sewers, etc .

2 Has equipment been purged-

: Has equipment been blanked -

4 Race you inspected the equipment=

Is it free of pressure and liquid?-

6 Are surrounding areas safe :-

(e .g . sewers, open vessels)

7 Is the equipment isolated electrically%

1; Is fire protection available=

9 Has safety observer been instructed .

Special Conditions :

Signatures : Checked by Head Operator : Date :

( :as Tester : Operations Supervisor :

Maintenance/Contractor Personnel :

RENEWAL : Permit renewed : Time : Date :

Authorizing Signatory

Ensure complete understanding of Hot Work Permit Procedure .

TYPE 1 PERMIT : Applies to all hazardous work, not involving naked flame or continuous
spark production .
1 . Entry to or use of low voltage electrical equipment . i .e . 50 V or less .
2 . Vehicle entry to units, but on access roads only .
3 . Use of air driven rotary drills .
TYPE 2 PERMIT : For all Hot Work involving open flame or continuous spark production .
In addition vehicle entry to process areas off access roads or lifting over live
equipment .

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 SPECIMEN FORM 2
ENTRY PERMIT

Serial No . :

To he used when entry to confined spaces is required . Confined spaces include

pressure vessels, LPG tanks, ducts, sewers, pipelines and any excavation or pit
overfive feet deep . THIS PERMIT DOES NOT ALLOW HOT WORK .
This permit is valid on the day of issue and up to 08 .00 the following day .

Request
Permit required (date) (time)

Location of work, specify precisely,

Description of work

Signed : Maintenance/Contractor Personnel .

Safety Check

Yes No If No-Why?

l . Is the equipment free of pressure?

2 . Is the equipment free of oil, gas,

steam and water?

3 . Is the equipment free of inerts?

4 . Are all lines spaded or disconnected?

5 . Is all electrical equipment locked

out of service?

6 . Does equipment test free of gas

and toxic vapours?

7 . Does oxygen content exceed 20%?

8 . Is a stand-by man required?

Details of Any Other Safety Requirements :

Specify protective equipment to be worn

Signatures : Gas Tester (Area Operator) Date :

Head Operator Date :

Maintenance/Contractor Personnel Date :

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 SPECIMEN FORM 3
PERMIT TO WORK ON OR NEAR
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT

This permit must be issued to the person in charge of the work and retained by
him until the work is completed or stopped . The equipment must not be made
alive again until this permit is surrendered to an authorized person and cancelled
by him .

ISSUED BY DATE TIME

Authorizing the following work
. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Precautions Taken :-(Isolation, Earthing, Potential Tests etc .)

. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. .. . . .
. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . .. . . . . .. . .. . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . .
DANGER NOTICES POSTED AT
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . .

Issued by Received by

CANCELLATION OF AUTHORITY TO WORK

This is to certify that the above work is completed and that all tools and gear have
been removed ready for making alive, and that all men engaged on the work have
been warned that it is no longer safe to touch the equipment .

Signed Date Time

This permit is hereby cancelled . The person cancelling need not necessarily be the
person who issued the permit, provided always that he is authorized to do so and that
he is fully aware of the circumstances and that before making the equipment `alive'
again ensures that all temporary earthing and danger notices have been removed .

Signature of person cancelling permit

Date Time

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 SPECIMEN FORM 4
GENERAL WORK PERMIT

Starting Time : Date

Expiring Time : Date
Maintenance Personnel :
Valid only for this location :
. . . . . .. .. . . . . . .. .. . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(Specify exact extent of work area)
Description :
. .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Check all items for completion Yes No Explain

I . Is equipment live?

2 . Does temperature present

a Safety Hazard?

3 . Is the equipment or area free of

LPG or- inerts?

4 . Is the electrical circuit locked

and tagged out of service?

Permit Approved by : (Signature)

Distribution :
Original : Maintenance Foreman
Copy : Operating Supervisor
Copy : Job Site
THIS PERMIT DOES NOT ALLOW ENTRY OR HOT WORK

RENEWAL
Permit Renewed Time : Date
Authorizing Signatory :
Remarks :
.. . . . . . . .. . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . .. .. . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . . . .. . .. . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. .. . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .

COMPLETION: This is to certify that the above work is complete, all tools and
gear have been removed, the work area has been cleared and applicable locks and
tags have been removed .

Signed :
Time : Date :

THIS PERMIT MA Y BE REVOKED AT ANY TIME

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 SPECIMEN FORM 5
PERMIT FOR LINE DISCONNECTING
AND VESSEL OPENING
Serial No . :
(Please PRINT Clearly)

To be used for opening of tanks or pressure vessels ; insertion or removal of

spades, valves, sections of line, orifice plates, strainers and similar operations .
This includes all operations liable to release Ilammable or harmful materials to
the atmosphere .
This permit is valid on the day of issue until 08 .00 the following day .
This permit does NOT allow entry to tanks, vessels or other equipment .

Request

Permit required (date) (time)

Location of work, specify precisely

Description of work

Signed : Maintenance/Contractor Personnel .

Safety Check

Question Yes No

1 . Is there any Hot Work Permit valid for work within 50 ft of

proposed work location?

2 . Has the equipment been gas freed?

3 . Is the equipment isolated?

4 . Is there a vent/drain open?

Specify protective equipment to be worn

Signatures : Area Operator Date

Head Operator Date

Maintenance/Contractor Personnel Date

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 Appendix 9

SOME CODES OF PRACTICE,

SPECIFICATIONS, STANDARDS, ETC .,
RELEVANT TO THE LPG INDUSTRY

AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE (ANSI)

• 16 .5 Pipe flanges and flanged fittings, steel nickel alloy and other special alloys : 1981
• 16 .9 Factory made wrought steel butt welding fittings : 1978
• 16 .11 Forged steel fittings socket-welded and threaded : 1980
• 31 .2 Piping and piping systems : 1968
• 31 .3 Chemical plant and petroleum refinery piping : 1984
• 36 .10M Pipe steel : 1985

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE (API)

Spec 5L Specification for line pipe, 35th edition, May 1985

API 510 Pressure vessel inspection code-maintenance inspection, rating, repair and alteration, Fourth
edition, 1985
RP 520 Design and installation of pressure-relieving systems in refineries :
Part I-Design, Fourth edition, 1976
Part II-Installation, Second edition, 1963 (Reaffirmed 1973)
RP 521 Guide for pressure-relieving and depressuring systems, Second edition, 1982
STD 620 Recommended rules for design and construction of large, welded, low-pressure storage tanks, 7th
edition, 1982, Revision 1, 1985
STD 2000 Venting atmospheric and low-pressure storage tanks (non-refrigerated and refrigerated), 3rd
edition, 1982

AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS (ASME)

Boiler and pressure vessel code : 1983

Section VIII-Unfired vessels
Section IX-Welding and brazing qualifications

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 CODES OF PRACTICE

BRITISH STANDARDS INSTITUTION (BSI)

BS 449 The use of structural steel in building
BS 476 Fire tests on building materials and structures
BS 1506 Carbon low alloy and stainless steel bars and billets for bolting material to be used in pressure
retaining applications : 1986
BS 1560 Steel pipe flanges and flanged fittings for the petroleum industry : Metric dimensions . Part 2 : 1970
BS 1600 Dimensions of steel pipe for the petroleum industry . Parts 1 and 2 :1970
BS 1640 Steel butt-welding pipe fittings for the petroleum industry . Parts 1 and 2 : 1962, Part 3 : 1968
BS 1965 Butt-welding pipe fittings for pressure purposes . Part 1 :1963 (1983), Carbon steel
BS 2633 Class l arc welding of ferritic steel pipework for carrying fluids : 1973 (1981)
BS 2789 Spheroidal graphite or nodular graphite cast iron : 1985
BS 3351 Piping systems for petroleum refineries and petro-chemical plants : 1971
BS 3381 Metallic spiral wound gaskets for use with flanges to BS 1560 . Parts 1 and 2 : 1973
BS 3601 Steel pipes and tubes for pressure purposes : Carbon steel with specified room temperature
properties : 1974
BS 3602 Steel pipes and tubes for pressure purposes : carbon and carbon manganese steel with specified
elevated temperature properties . Parts 1 and 2 : 1978
BS 3792 Recommendations for the installation of automatic liquid level and temperature measuring
instruments on storage tanks : 1964
BS 3799 Steel pipe fittings, screwed and socket-welding for the petroleum industry : 1974
BS 4250 Commercial butane and propane : 1975
BS 4741 Vertical cylindrical welded steel storage tanks for low-temperature service . Single wall tanks for
temperatures down to -50C : 1971
BS 4871 Approval testing of welders working to approved welding procedures : 1982
BS 4882 Bolting for flanges and pressure containing purposes : 1973
BS 5146 Inspection and test of steel valves for the petroleum, petrochemical and allied industries . Part 1 : 1974
BS 5500 Unfired fusion welded pressure vessels : 1985
BS 5628 Code of practice for use of masonry
BS 5930 Code of practice for site investigations : 1981
(formerly CP 2001)
BS 6031 Code of practice for earthworks : 1981
BS 6399 Design loading for buildings
BS 6683 Installation and use of valves : 1985
CP 3 Code of basic data for the design of buildings
CP 110 Structural use of concrete
CP 114 Structural use of reinforced concrete in buildings : 1969
CP 2004 Foundations : 1972

ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS USERS ASSOCIATION (EEMUA)

Recommendations for the design and construction of refrigerated liquefied gas storage tanks : 1986
FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DE LA PRECONTRAINTE (FIP)
Preliminary recommendations for the design and construction of prestressed concrete containment structures
for the storage of refrigerated liquefied gases (Ref . 3/6 : 1982)
GAS PROCESSORS ASSOCIATION (GPA)
Liquefied petroleum gas specifications and test methods
HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE (HSE)
Guidance notes
CS 1 Industrial use of flammable gas detectors
GS4 Safety in pressure testing
GS5 Entry into confined spaces
Guidance booklets
HS(G)5 Hotwork : Welding and cutting on plant containing flammable materials
HS(G)34 The storage of LPG at fixed installations

' Obtainable from HM Stationery Office, PO Box 569 . London SE19NH, UK .

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 APPENDIX 9

INSTITUTE OF PETROLEUM UP)

Model codes of safe practice in the petroleum industry

Part 1 Electrical
Part 6 Petroleum pipelines
Part 12 Inspection of pressure vessels
Part 13 Inspection of pressure piping systems
Part 14 Inspection and testing of protective instrumentation systems
Part 15 Area Classification (Pending)

INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF SHIPPING/OIL COMPANIES

INTERNATIONAL MARINE FORUM

International safety guide for oil tankers and terminals (ISGOTT)

LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS INDUSTRY TECHNICAL ASSOCIATION UK

Code No . 2 Safe handling and transport of LPG in bulk byroad

Code No . 3 Prevention and control of fire involving LPG

ADDRESSES OF RELEVANT ORGANISATIONS

1. American Gas Association, 1515 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22209, USA

2. American National Standards Institution Inc ., 1430 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA
3. American Petroleum Institute, 1220 L Street, NW Washington, DC 20005, USA
4. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 345 East 47th Street, New York, NY 10017, USA
5. British Gas Plc, Rivermill House, 152 Grosvenor Road, London SW1V 3JL, UK
6. British Standards Institution, Linford Wood, Milton Keynes, MK14 6LE, UK
7. Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association, 14 Belgrave Square, London SW1X 8PS, UK
8. Gas Processors Association, 6526 East 60th Street, Tulsa, Oklahoma 74145, USA
9. Fdderation Internationale de la Prdcontrainte, do The Institution of Structural Engineers, 11 Upper
Belgrave Street, London SW1X 8BH, UK
10 . Health and Safety Executive, Baynards House, 1 Chepstow Place, Westbourne Grove, London W2 4TF,
UK
11 . Institute of Petroleum, 61 New Cavendish Street, London W IM 8AR, UK
12 . International Chamber of Shipping, 30 St Mary Axe, London EC3A 8ET, UK
13 . Oil Companies International Marine Forum, Portland House, Stag Place, London SW1E 5BH, UK
14 . Institution of Gas Engineers, 17 Grosvenor Crescent, London SW1X 7ES, UK
15 . Liquefied Petroleum Gas Industry Technical Association UK, 17 Grosvenor Crescent, London SW 1X 7ES,
UK

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 Appendix 10

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AGA American Gas Association

ANSI American National Standards Institute
API American Petroleum Institute
API/RP American Petroleum Institute Refinery Practice
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
BG British Gas Plc (formerly British Gas Corporation)
BS British Standard
CP Code of Practice
EEMUA Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association
FIP Federation Internationale de la Precontrainte
ISGOTT International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals
GPA Gas Processors Association (USA)
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
LPGITA Liquefied Petroleum Gas Industry Technical Association (UK)
RLG Refrigerated Liquefied Gas
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas

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 INDEX

References are to section and clause numbers . Def. indicates that a definition of the term is in Appendix 7 .
For example `Atmospheric pressure 1 .2.3, 1 .3 .1, 1 .3 .3, etc .' implies references to clauses 1 .2 .3, 1 .3 .1, 1 .3 .3, etc .

Abbreviations, App . 10 Caverns 2 .1 .2.1, 3 .1 .2 .1 Double containment 3 .2 .1 .3

Above-ground storage, Def ., Checking/inspecting/testing 2 .3 .1 .1,
pressure 2.1 .1, 2 .2 .2 .9, 2 .2 .3 .1, 2,3,17, 2 .4 .13, 2.4 .14 .3, 2 .4 .14 .4, Earthing/bonding, Def., 2 .7 .4, 2 .8,
2.2 .4, 2 .2 .7, 2 .3 .6 .4, 2 .3 .14 .4, 2 .5 .8, 2 .9 .7, 2 .11, 3 .9 2 .10 .7 .6
2 .9 .6 .5, 2 .9 .9, 2 .11 .3 Code Electrical 2 .8
refrigerated 3 .1 .1, 3 .2 .1 .1 object of 2 .1 .3, 3 .1 .3 Emergency
Access/accessibility 2 .2.2 .1, 2 .7 .3 .9, scope 2 .1, 3 .1 procedures/plans 2 .10 .3, 2 .10 .4,
2 .9 .4, 2 .9 .6.6 design 2 .3 .1, 2 .4.1, 2 .5 .1, 3 .5 .1 .1, 3 .12 .2
Air 2 .10 .5, 3 .5 .4.6, 3 .10 .4, 3 .11 .6 3.6 .1, 3 .7 .1 .1 shutoff valves 2 .3 .8, 2 .4 .15, 2 .6.5 .4,
Alarms 2 .3 .3, 2 .9 .5, 3 .5 .1 .8 Combustible material 2 .9 .9 2 .7 .3 .1, 3 .2.4
Anchorage 2 .5 .7, 3 .9 .6.6 Commercial butane 1 .1 .1, 1 .1 .4, 1 .2 .1, Entry 3 .4 .4, 3 .11 .6, 3 .11 .7
Area classification, Foreword 1 .2 .3, 1 .3 .3 Excess flow valves 2 .3 .8, 2 .3 .9, 2 .6 .5 .4
Articulated arms/pipe connections Commercial propane 1 .1 .1, 1 .1 .4,
2 .4 .12, 2 .4 .15, 2 .6 .5 .4, 2 .7 .3 .1, 1 .2 .2, 1 .2 .3, 1 .3 .3 Fences 2.2 .8 .1, 2 .2 .8 .3
2.7 .3 .3 Communications 2 .9 .5, 3 .11 .7 .4 Fire
Atmospheric pressure 1 .2 .3, 1 .3 .1, Competent person, Def ., 2 .3 .17, extinguishers 2 .9 .2, 3 .8 .2.1
1 .3 .3, 3 .5 .4 .9, 3 .5 .4 .10 2 .10.7 .7, 3 .9 .7, 3 .11 .7 .2, 3 .12 .4 .4 plan 2 .9 .1, 2 .9 .3 .1, 3 .8.1, 3 .8 .2 .2,
Compressors 2 .6 .2, 2 .6.4, 3 .5 .4 3 .8.3 .3
Below-ground/mounded storage, Condensation 3 .5 .1 .6 proofed, Def., 2 .5 .8
Def ., 2.1 .1, 2 .2 .2, 2 .2 .8, 2 .3 .2 .3, Container, Def ., 1 .3 .9, 2 .3 .2 .1, protection 2 .9, 3 .8
2 .3 .4 .4, 2 .3 .6 .4, 2 .3 .14, 2 .5 .4, 2 .10.7 .1 resistant, Def., 3.5 .4 .9, 3 .5 .5 .1
2 .9 .3 .4 Containment safe, Def ., 2 .3 .7 .1, 2 .4 .6.1, 2 .4 .6 .2
Blank flange, Def ., App . 8 single 3 .2 .1 .2 water 3 .4 .3 .6
Bleed valve, Def., App . 8 double 3 .2 .1 .3 hydrants 2 .9 .6 .3, 2 .9 .6.6, 2 .9 .6.8,
Blind, Def., App . 8 full 3 .2 .1 .4 2.9 .7
Block valve, Def., App . 8 Cooling water 2 .2.2, 2 .9 .3 .2, 2 .9 .6, Flame engulfment 2 .2 .2 .2, 2 .2 .2 .7
Bonding/earthing, Def., 2 .7 .4 .2 .8, 3 .8 .3, App . 5 Flame impingement 2 .9.3 .3, 2 .9 .3 .4,
2.10 .7 .6 Corrosion 2 .3 .6.6, 2.3 .14, 2 .3 .15, 2 .10 .4, 3 .5 .4.12
Breathing apparatus, Def ., 3 .11 .5 .9, 2 .11 .3, 3 .5 .6, 3 .9 .2, 3 .9 .3, 3 .9 .4 Flammable, Def., 1 .3 .2, 1 .3 .4, 1 .3 .9,
3.11 .6 .2, 3 .11 .7 .2, 3 .11 .7 .3 Cryogenic, Def ., 2.2 .6 2 .2 .2 .5, 2 .2.6, 2 .10.5, 3 .10 .4 .1,
Bund, bunding, etc., Def., 3 .11 .3 .3, 3 .11 .5 .1, 3 .11 .5 .2, 3 .11 .6 .1
pressure storage 2 .2 .2 .3, 2 .2 .3 .1, Deluge/spray systems 2 .9 .6, 2 .9.7, Flotation 2 .5 .6 .5, 3 .4 .3.6, 3 .5 .1 .10
2.2 .6 3 .8 .3 .4, 3 .8 .3 .5, 3 .8 .3 .6 Foam 3.8 .2.2
refrigerated storage 3 .2 .1 .2, 3 .2 .5 .1, Design Foundations 2 .5, 3 .7
3 .2 .5 .3, 3 .4 .1, 3 .4 .2, 3.4 .3, 3 .8 .2 .2, pressure storage 2 .3 .1, 2 .3 .2 Frost 1 .3 .6, 2 .9 .6.9, 2 .9 .7, 3 .4 .3 .2,
3 .8 .3 .4, 3 .9 .6 .5 refrigerated storage 3 .5 .1 3 .7 .1 .2, 3 .9.5
Bulk road vehicles 2 .7 .1 .1, 2 .7 .3 .3/4, piping 2.4 .1, 3 .6 .1 Frost burn 1 .3.6
2 .10 .7 .1, 2.10.7 .6 foundations 2 .5 .1, 3 .7 .1 Full containment 3 .2 .1 .4
Burns (frost) 1 .3 .6 Dewatering pots 2 .3 .10.3, 2 .10 .6 .2 Fully in-ground, Def ., 3.1 .1, 3 .2.1 .1
Drainage/draining Fully refrigerated, Def., 1 .1 .2
pressure storage 2 .3 .3, 2.3 .10, 2 .9 .8,
Capacity, Def ., 2 .1 .1, 2 .3 .6 .4, 2 .3 .6 .5, 2 .10 .6 .1, 2 .10.6 .2, 2 .10 .7 .7 Gas-free, Def ., 3 .12 .3, App . 6, App . 8
2.3 .9 .1, 2 .3 .11, 2 .3 .15, 3 .4 .3 .6 refrigerated storage 3 .5 .2 .1, Gauges/gauging 2 .3 .3, 2 .3 .5, 3 .5 .1 .8
Carbon dioxide 3 .9 .3, 3 .10 .4 .3, 3 .10 .6 .4 Glossary App . 7
3.11 .4 .1 Drive-away protection 2.7 .3 .3,
Cast iron 2.4 .2 .2, 2 .4 .6 .4, 3 .6 .2 .2 2 .10 .7 .6 Hazardous area, Def ., App . 8

88
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the licence terms and conditions. It must not be forwarded to, or stored or accessed by, any unauthorised user. Enquiries: e: [email protected] t: +44 (0)207 467 7100
 INDEX

Hazards of LPG 1 .3 Odorization 1 .4 Semi-refrigerated, Def.,

Hoses 2 .4 .14, 2 .4.15, 2 .6 .5 .4, 2 .7 .3 .1, Oxygen 2 .2.6, 2 .10 .5 .2, 2 .10 .5 .3, Shutoff valves 2 .3 .7, 2 .4 .6, 2 .6 .1 .5,
2 .7 .3 .3 3 .10 .4 .4, 3 .11 .4 .2, 3 .11 .6 .6, 3 .11 .7 .3 2 .6 .5 .3
Hot work, Def ., App . 8 Sidings (rail) 2 .7 .1 .2, 2 .7 .3 .5, 2 .7.4 .2
Hydrants 2 .9 .6.3, 2 .9 .6 .6, 2 .9 .6 .8, Partially refrigerated, Def ., 2 .3 .2 .2, Single containment 3 .2.1 .2
2 .9 .7 3 .1 .2 .2 Slip blind, Def ., App . 8
Hydrate 1 .5, 2 .3 .13, 2 .4 .11 .2, 3 .10 .2 Partly in-ground, Def., 3 .1 .1, 3 .2 .1 .1, Source of ignition, Def., App . 8
3 .7 .1 .2 Spacing/location/layout
Ice/icing 2 .3 .13, 2 .4.11, 3 .2 .1 .2, Permit to work systems, Def ., pressure storage 2 .2 .1, 2 .2 .2,
3 .5 .4 .13, 3 .10.2 2 .10 .5 .1, 2 .11 .1, 3 .9 .1, 3 .10 .3, 2 .5 .6 .3, 2 .9 .3 .2, App . 1
Impounding basin, Def., 2 .2 .2 .3, 3 .11 .1, App. 8 refrigerated storage 3.3 .3 .4, 3 .8 .3.1,
3 .4 .1 .2, 3 .4.2 .1, 3 .4 .3, 3 .8 .3 .4 Philosophy 3 .1 .3 .1, 3 .2, 3 .9 .2 App . 1
Inert gas 2 .10 .5 .3, 3 .10 .4, 3 .10 .5 .1, Piping loading/unloading 2 .2 .2 .1, 2 .7 .1,
3 .11 .2, 3 .11 .3, 3 .11 .4, 3 .11 .5 .1, bolting 2 .4 .8 App . I
3 .11 .6 design/construction 2 .4 .1, 2 .4 .3, Spectacle blind, Def., App . 8
Inspection/checking/testing 2 .3 .1 .1, 2 .4 .4, 3.6 .1 Spillage/leakage
2 .3 .17, 2 .4 .13, 2 .4 .14 .3, 2.4 .14 .4, flanges/fittings 2 .4 .1, 2 .4 .7 pressure storage 2 .2 .1, 2 .2 .2, 2 .2 .3,
2.9 .7, 2 .11, 3 .9 inspections 3 .9 .6 .7 2 .2 .7, 2 .7 .2, 2 .9 .9, 2 .10 .4
Insulation 2 .3 .12, 2 .4 .11, 3 .2 .1 .2, installation/flexibility 2 .4.9, 3 .6 .3 refrigerated storage 3 .2.4, 3 .2 .5 .2,
3 .3 .3, 3 .5 .4 .9, 3 .5 .5 .1, 3 .6 .3 .2 insulation 2 .4 .11 3 .3 .1, 3 .3 .2, 3 .3 .3, 3 .4 .1, 3 .4 .2 .2,
materials 2.4 .2, 3 .6 .2 3 .4 .3 .4, 3 .4 .3 .5, 3 .5 .1 .6, App . 3
Kerbs 2.2.3 .2, 2 .7 .1 .1 valves 2 .4 .6 Spray/deluge systems 2 .9 .6, 2 .9 .7,
Pressure storage, Def., 3 .8 .3 .4, 3 .8 .3 .6, 3 .8.3 .8
Layout/location/spacing design 2 .3 Storage
pressure storage 2 .2 .1, 2 .2 .2 . 2 .2 .7, fire protection 2 .9, App . 5 pressure, Chapter 2
2 .9 .3 .2, App . 1 inspections 2 .11 refrigerated, Chapter 3
refrigerated storage 3 .3 .3, 3 .8 .3 .1, location/spacing/layout 2 .2, App . 1 Surges 2 .3 .9 .2, 2 .6 .5 .2
App . 1 operation 2 .10
loading/unloading 2 .2 .2 .1, App . 1 Testing/checking/inspections 2 .3 .1 .1,
Properties of LPG 1 .2
Leakage/leaks/spillage Purging 2 .10 .5, 3 .11 .3, 3 .11 .5, App . 6 2.3 .17, 2 .4 .13, 2 .4 .14 .4, 2 .9 .7,
pressure storage 2 .2 .1, 2 .2 .2, 2 .2 .3, Pumps 2 .6 .1, 2 .6 .4 2 .11, 3 .9
2 .2 .7, 2 .7 .2, 2 .9 .9, 2 .10 .4 Thermal pressure relief 2 .4 .10, 3 .6 .4
refrigerated storage 3 .2 .4, 3 .2 .5 .2, Radiation flux 2 .2 .2 .1, 2 .2 .2 .3 . Training 2 .10 .2, 3 .12 .1
3 .3 .1, 3 .3 .2, 3 .3 .3, 3 .4 .1 . 3 .4 .2 .2, 3 .2 .5 .3, 3 .3 .1, App . 1, App . 2 Transfer operations 2 .10 .7, 3 .12 .4
3 .4 .3 .4, 3 .4 .3 .5, 3 .5 .1 .6, App . 3 Rail tank wagons 2 .7 .1 .2, 2 .7 .3 .
Lighting 2 .10 .9 Unloading/loading 2 .2 .2 .2, 2 .7, 2 .9 .2
2 .7 .4 .2, 2 .10 .7 .1, 2 .10 .7 .6
Lightning 2 .8 .2 Refrigerated storage, Def ., Vacuum 2 .3 .2 .4, 3 .5 .4, 3 .9 .3, 3 .9 .6
Loading/unloading 2 .2 .2 .2, 2 .7, design 3 .5 Vacuum relief valves 3 .9 .6
2 .9 .2 fire protection 3 .8, App . 5 Vapour cloud 2 .10 .4, 3 .2 .5 .1, 3 .3 .3
initial filling 3 .10 Vapour pressure 1 .2 .3, 2 .3 .2
Meters 2.6 .3, 2 .6.4 inspections 3 .9 Vapour travel 2 .2 .2 .2, 3 .3 .3, App . 4
Methanol 1 .5 location/spacing 3 .3, App . 1
Monitors 2 .9 .6 .3 Venting/vent pipes 2 .3 .6, 3 .5 .4,
operation 3 .12 3 .10 .4, 3 .10 .5, 3 .10 .6, 3 .11 .5
Mounded storage, Def ., 2 .1 .1, 2 .2 .2, taking out of service 3.11
2 .2 .8, 2 .3 .2 .3, 2 .3 .4 .4, 2 .3 .6 .4, Relief valves Warning signs 2 .9 .10
2.3 .14, 2 .5 .4, 2 .9 .3 .4 pressure storage 2.2 .2 .8, 2 .3 .6, Welding/welded 2 .4 .2 .4, 2 .4 .4 .2,
2 .3 .7 .1, 2 .3 .8 2 .4 .5, 2 .5 .6 .2, 3 .2 .4, 3 .5 .3 .2
Naked lights/flames, Def ., 2 .9 .10 refrigerated storage 3 .5 .4, 3 .9 .6 .1 Work permits (systems), Def .,
Nodular iron 2 .4 .2 .2, 2 .4 .6 .4 Road vehicles (bulk) 2 .7 .1 .1, 2 .10 .5 .1, 2 .11 .1, 3 .9 .1, 3 .10 .3,
Non-credible, Def., 3 .2 .1 .2, 3 .2 .1 .3 2.7 .3, 2 .10 .7 .1, 2 .10 .7 .6 3 .11 .1, App . 8

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Issued under licence to BG Group employees only
IMPORTANT: This file is subject to a licence agreement issued by the Energy Institute, London, UK. All rights reserved. It may only be used in accordance with
the licence terms and conditions. It must not be forwarded to, or stored or accessed by, any unauthorised user. Enquiries: e: [email protected] t: +44 (0)207 467 7100