World Development, Vol. 8, pp. 513-521 0305-750X/80/0601-0513/$02.

00/0
0 Pergamon Press Ltd. 1980. Printed in Great Britain

Islam and Development zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUT

IBRAHIM A. RAGAB*
Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland
and
Helwan University, Cairo

Summary. - The backwardness of many contemporary Muslim countries is blamed by some

writers on various aspects of Islamic beliefs and behavioural injunctions. It is shown in this
paper that many of these arguments are based on flimsy grounds. The issue of whether Islam is
an obstacle to development is dealt with. An attempt is made to introduce a better explanation
for underdevelopment of many Muslim countries (at least in the Middle East area). Historical-
institutional factors are emphasized. A case is made that, given the unique insritutional nature
of Islam. foreign dominntion (by the Ottoman Empire and later by European colonialism)
resulted in stunted institutional development in the former territories of the Ottoman Empire,
which is a basic reason for the present backwardness

1. INTRODUCTION significant effect of Islamic religious commit-

ment on modernizing values or practices, he
MusIim countries constitute a sizeable seg- devises an interesting ‘assumption’ tailored to
ment of the underdeveloped (or developing) help force his empirical findings into the strait-
countries. Although - in terms of GNP per jacket of clearly outdated Weberian views of
capita - some oil-producing countries are con- Islam. According to Sutcliffe’s interpretation,
sidered to be among the richest in the world, Islam means submission and repudiation of free
they have not attained self-sustaining economic will, but actual behaviour of Muslims does not
growth - characteristic of more developed follow that (negative) ideal.
economies - nor the institutional set-up necess- In fact, even the cursory review of Western
ary to achieve it. Many attempts have been writings dealing with underdevelopment in Mus-
made to account for this phenomenon. The lim countries reveals a painful repetition of
question is often raised: is Islam itself the cause these and other worn-out arguments. We can
of underdevelopment in these Muslim coun- possibly identify four major discernible themes
tries? The connection is simple to make, par- linking Islam and underdevelopment - either
ticularly under conditions of insufficient data explicitly or implicitly. The following state-
or research on Islam and Muslim countries. The ments may be fair representations of these
situation is even more aggravated by a prevail- themes:
ing ‘distorted image of Islam’, dating back to
(a) The ideal Islamic belief system is not
fourteenth-century Europe’s uneasy relations
conducive to modernization. The belief
with Islamic regions, that still persists to this
system is sometimes referred to in the ab-
day.’
stract (without reference to time) and some-
Parkinson’s discussion of the ‘non-economic
times reference is made to the beliefs of
factors in the economic retardation of the rural
contemporary Muslims.
Malays” is a case in point. He argues that the
(b) Ideal Islamic behavioural injunctions are
Malays’ retardation is to be blamed on their
not conducive to modernization. Reference
remarkable insistence on resisting change and
on certain Islamic beliefs that tend ‘to make
them fatalistic in their approach to life’. An- * I wish to thank Dr. Norbert Dannhauser, Professor
other example is Sutcliffe’s study of religious of Anthropology, Case Western Reserve University, for
commitment and modern values and practices.3 offering some valuable remarks on an earlier draft of
Although his empirical evidence shows no this paper.

513
 514 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

here again is either to the abstract or to the class at the expense of another. They are intrin-
present. sically superior to any power-sensitive, man-
(c) The problem is not in Islamic beliefs or made rulings. Submission to divine rulings then
behavioural commandments. The problem is ‘liberates’ man from submission to those biased
that they (beliefs and behaviours) are not as and exploitative principles created by any
effective in guiding behaviour as zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDC
pre- Islamic human authority - be it that of rulers or priests.
elements which tend to persist after embrac- So, if God or his Apostle decided a practical
ing Islam. matter unequivocally, they would feel comfort-
(d) The problem is in the degeneration of able to go by it if they believe in its basic truth.
Islamic ideals as the masses corrupt them as If it was decided only in general terms, then
a result of Islam’s inherent idealism that is leeway is given for human interpretation within
hard to apply in reality. the general limitations. In fact, when these rul-
ings were applied to guide institutional develop-
In view of the relatedness of each consecutive ment in early Muslim communities, they pro-
couple of these standpoints, it may be proper duced one of the best-known approximations
to collapse them into two categories: Islamic to ideal society (although for a short time and
beliefs and behaviours on the one hand, and the not from the point of view of the adversaries).
corrupted mass conceptions on the other. The Muslims compare these rulings with the flawed
next part of this paper will be devoted to a ideological applications in the West and in the
critical appraisal of these two basic themes. East, and feel that Islamic ideals are compara-
After pointing out the basic flaws in the reason- tively more than superior.
ing behind them, an alternative explanation of In addition, Muslims would stress the fact
underdevelopment in Muslim countries will be that only matters of basic and enduring nature
introduced, which emphasizes the role of are decided in detail in Al Koran such as acts
stunted institutional development, resulting of worship, rules of inheritance and some
from the interaction between adverse inter- aspects of the relations between the sexes.
national power relations and the unique insti- When it comes to other basically changing
tutional nature of Islam. matters such as the political or economic
relationships, a few specific decisions are de-
creed in detail. And when that happens, there is
2. ISLAMIC BELIEFS, PRACTICES AND a clear purpose, that is to ascertain the elimin-
DEVELOPMENT ation of a source of injustice. But the bulk is
left to be devised by man within that general
Sutcliffe tells us that the literal Arabic mean- framework. Muslims do not seem to be im-
ing of the word islam is ‘submission’. He quotes pressed by terms like free will if it means oscil-
from Al Koran (the Holy Book of Islam) verses lation between man-made extremes of ideologi-
enjoining the believers that once a matter is cal position in the absence of any known
decided by God or his Apostle, then a believer decisive empirical evidence to guide choice
is in no position to have choice. He concludes between values. It could be safely said that
that this runs against free wilI and, hence, is an Islam is seeking an ultimate sense of free will,
obstacle to development. This kind of reasoning one that frees man from the influence and
is characteristic of many Western writings on power of other men in areas of basic valuation
Muslim countries and their culture. Such con- that are not amenable to empirical validation,
clusions usually rest on limited knowledge of while giving full freedom for application of
these countries and their religion (normally a human will otherwise. Or this is the way
field visit or two to the country involved for a Muslims would argue their case.
duration of a few months up to 2 or 3 yr). A related item quoted by Sutcliffe from
They fail to grasp the inner logic of Islam as it Weber is that ‘Islamic belief in predestination
is understood by M uslims and as it supposedly easily assumed fatalistic characteristics in the
affects their behaviour. In fact, Muslims seem beliefs of the masses’, a claim echoed by others
to me to hold sharply different views of what as well.4 Again, predestination is understood
Islam means to them than those presented by by Muslims as the ‘prior’ knowledge of God
Sutcliffe and his Western colleagues. For Mus- that is revealed to no human being in advance.
lims, submission to the will of God means So, its effect should in fact be to encourage
accepting his Word, and acting according to the rather than to retard positive action, and
path it delineated for man. Because God created eventually to accept the results, knowing ‘then’
all, is just and omniscient, his commandments what was predestined. Modern psychiatrists
could never be partial to any group or social would recognize the benefits of such post facto
 ISLAMANDDEVELOPMENT 515

acceptance of a mishap for the psychological plex belief system for that matter - could help
adjustment of the individual. This should help avoid such misinterpretations. These examples
clear the mind for constructive action. In this seem to us to be sufficient to make our point.
light we can understand how millions of poorly Many references to aspects of belief system or
equipped Muslims could, against all odds, stand behavioural injunctions as having a retarding
up to dispel colonial modernized military forces effect on development are based on misreading
from their lands, or more recently why millions of what these mean to ‘Muslims’. It is possible
of Iranians and Afghanis would fight in the to compile an endless list of quotations from zyxwvutsrqponm
streets and on mountains risking their lives to Al Koran and Sunna to the effect that Islam
overthrow local tyrants supported by foreign calls for utilization of utmost reason, skill and
interests. effort to better the individual’s and the com-
A variation on the theme of fatalism is that munity’s lot. But it is clearly outside the scope
of the belief that the length of man’s life and of this paper to attempt a full study on the
economic lot are also predestined. Sutcliffe effects of Islamic teachings on developmental
found that despite the belief in predestined activities.
length of life, he observed that health clinics
were always crowded in his study area. Because
he could not understand the tine issues in- 3. DEGENERATING MASS BELIEFS,
volved, he attempted to reconcile the disparity PRACTICES AND DEVELOPMENT
by telling us that the people merely paid lip-
service to the belief system. This interpretation Other writers cite specific examples of old
is resorted to by Geertz, who when faced by a or corrupted beliefs and practices of the masses
comparable situation declares that these Mus- as evidence that Islam - twisted or displaced -
lims are just practising ‘self-deception’.5 How stands as an obstacle to development, although
such explanations could help account for by default. Geertz, for example, dedicated one
phenomena under study in a meaningful way is of his works to show that the peasant Indic
difficult to imagine. heritage of Indonesia and the tribal Berber
Economic beliefs and behavior-us, however, heritage of Morocco exerted a great influence
receive somewhat mixed reviews. Swift, for on Islamic development in these Muslim coun-
example, seems to take the Islamic preaching tries to the extent that it ‘is as much to point
against ‘too much concern’ with worldly riches up their differences as it is to locate their
to be inhibitive of wealth accumulation.6 On similarities’.iO Patai refers to the fact that Islam
the other hand, Weber (whose views on Islam forbids representations of God in paintings or
are still alive in many contemporary writings) statues, let alone venerating them which is re-
took Muhammad’s saying to someone who garded as idolatry. But, then, ‘beneath the thin
appeared in ragged attire that ‘When God veneer of official doctrine are old popular
blesses a man with prosperity he likes to see the beliefs, held by the masses who know little of
signs thereof visible on him’ to correspond to the theological tenets of their religion’.”
feudal conceptions of status. This again reflects This is another familiar argument adopted
Weber’s consistently distorted understanding of by some Westerners. Much of the factual obser-
Islam as promoting self-indulgence, taking vation seems to be valid. But the question to be
pleasure in ‘luxurious raiment, perfume, and asked here is: what is the basic reason for such
meticulous beard-coiffure’! ’ This selection corrupted mass beliefs and practices? Is it
from the sayings of Muhammad, ignores equally inherent in Islam’s alleged idealism and com-
binding warnings by him against vanity, deceit plexity that evasions of its commandments and
and extravagance. Failure to take account of corruption of its beliefs are inevitable? Or is
admonitions against both extremes (miserliness this degeneration a function of discontinuities
and extravagance) is certain to lead to lopsided in the process of socialization and dissemination
interpretations. of proper religious concepts to the masses? It is
Swift, however, seems to understand better the contention of this paper that although Islam
that balanced nature characteristic of Islamic is an idealistic religion (in the sense that it seeks
preaching when he refers to what he calls an the attainment of optimal solutions to the
‘ethic of moderation’, a conclusion that was human condition), it is also practical and feas-
reached also by other observers.* The Koran ible. It was once embraced and successfully
itself, at least in one explicit reference, ident- applied by ordinary human beings for centuries.
ifies Islam with moderation.9 Only a compre- And that, incidentally, resulted in a significant
hensive understanding of Islam - or any com- contribution to human civilization.
516 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

Some Islamists tried hard to prove that from advocating absolute, unidimensional ex-
Arabs of the sixth century were not - as Mus- planations to such highly complex phenomena
lims claim - uncivilized, crude or backward. as societal development and underdevelopment.
Lichtenstadter, for example, takes pains to Our intention is to direct attention to some
prove that they were well organized and civi- neglected variables that are potentially promis-
lized.r2 Others talk about the other contem- ing as better explanations of such phenomena.
poraneous older civilizations that were inte-
grated into what came to be described as a
flourishing Islamic civilization in the centuries 4. STUNTED INSTITUTIONAL
that followed. But there seems to be a general DEVELOPMENT
agreement that Islamic civilization constituted
a difference in kind and not only in degree There is general agreement that the Muslim
from older and contemporaneous civilizations. contribution to civilization was not only of
The same author cited above has this to say pure scientific investigation but also of ‘material
about the Muslim East: ‘For centuries, its products and technological discoveries’.i’ In
creative genius had led the medieval world in the Middle Ages, while Europe was basking in
science., philosophy, and the arts, even after its ignorance and superstition, the Muslim regions
political decay set in’.13 Another writer con- were the epitome of ‘development’ of their
cludes that without these Islamic (he uses time. However, we do not need to prove here
‘Arab’) contributions, ‘European science and that Islam was the sole force behind this tre-
philosophy would not have developed when mendous success for our argument to proceed.
they did’.i4 Nor do we even need to prove that it provided
Qualifying the above statements goes beyond a general context for the scientific and techno-
the scope and space of this paper, but could be logical advances of that time. The minimum we
found elsewhere.i5 This ‘astounding’ cultural need for our argument is that zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcba
Islam was ‘not’
achievement, especially its scientific contri- an obstacle to development at that time when
butions, is credited by some, at least in part, to the balances of international power relations
Islam.16 It is hard to believe that such a civiliz- were not unfavourable to M uslim regions.
ation was built on ideals that have no roots in What happened, then, to Muslim lands?
reality. What caused their observed backwardness now,
The claim of inapplicability of Islam to ‘real while Europe and its overseas descendents
life’ and its inherent tendency to invite its own achieved modern economic development at a
corruption by the masses is apparently based scale and pace unknown before? The answer to
on relatively receni rcsearch done in Muslim this basic question lies in exploring two import-
countries under control of foreign powers or ant areas:
those hardly emerging from foreign influences.
(a) The unique institutional nature of Islam
No serious researcher can assume that such
that presupposes full control by Muslims
peoples control their own fates or live under
over their decisions. This could be better
sound authentic institutions with genuine
understood against the background of how
Islamic orientation. It is, therefore, more
Sharia (Islamic Law) developed over time.
plausible to conclude that the frequently
(b) The adverse international power relations,
reported corruption of Islamic beliefs and
especially in terms of the conflicts between
practices in such countries hardly emerging
the Ottoman Empire and Europe and the
from foreign domination could be attributed to
subsequent colonial domination of Muslim
disruptions in educational, political, economic
regions.
and other social institutions. In fact, this
reasoning is only a reflection of the general
argument of this paper: that the backward
conditions prevailing in Muslim countries today (a) ‘Sharia’and societal institutions
can be better explained in terms of truncated
institutional development, which resulted from Muslims believe that Islam is the last and
foreign domination over the fates of people final version of those messages revealed through
whose religion is as concerned with social, the ages by God. It retains some of the valid
political and economic institutions as it is with basic principles included in earlier revelations,
personal acts of worship. But this is the subject but it represents ‘the’ mature plan to guarantee
of the rest of this paper. However, it should be human happiness in this life and in the here-
made clear from the outset that we are far after. One feature of this last Word is that such
 ISLAM AND DEVELOPMENT 517

happiness could not be achieved through ex- were not immediately visible. It seems that the
clusive focus on ‘personal’ spiritual experience societal institutions developed according to
alone. It lays an equal zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
emphasis on social, early Sharia codes were efficient for many more
economic and political arrangements under centuries. But Sharia’s response to change since
which people live and function. In other words, then was intermittent. Whenever need arose, an
it envisages a personal salvation that cannot be exceptional scholar, like Ibn El Kayim or Ibn
sufficiently realized except through the ‘right’ Taymiah, emerged to assume responsibility for
institutional arrangements. Both aspects require ijtihad (finding rules for novel situations). Some
the same degree of adherence by a Muslim. So, researchers, however, suggest that the door to
it is as sinful for him to charge or pay interest ijtihad was closed only as far as the understand-
on a loan as it is for him to neglect doing his ing of the meanings of specific scriptural texts
five daily prayers or his fasting. is concerned. They would argue that ijtihad in
Some of these institutional requirements or applying Sharia rules to everyday living situ-
rulings were specified in detail in AZ Koran, ations was never really closed. According to
some were mentioned in general terms, and still their view, the negative influence of the as-
others were left out to be decided on as need sumed closure of the door to ijtihad (if it at all
arose, but on the basis of the general principles. existed) would be minimal. Still, if we consider
Because these rulings were taken directly from the central place of Sharia to the Muslim’s life,
what Muslims believe to be God’s revelation, it is clear that any limitation on its adaptability
they are regarded as inerrant. Observing them is would have negative effects.
not merely a social duty, but ‘an act of faith in To know what that means for a Muslim, let
God’.18 Naturally, during the lifetime of Mu- us remember with Landau that Sharia:
hammad, the ,Messenger of God, he was the
interpreter par excellence of the word of God . . . is not merely a set of laws that affect the Mus-
and its application to novel situations. After his lim on some specific occasions, but rather it is the
keynote of his existence; his religious, political,
death, his sayings and rulings (Sunna) were the
social, domestic and private life is completely
second source for what came to be called bound up and regulated by the precepts of the zyxwvutsrqponm
‘Sharia’ which is translated with some approxi- la w .‘9
mation as ‘Islamic law’. With the expansion of
the Islamic ‘nation’, there were always new For any generation to claim the final word on.
situations that needed rulings. During the first such vital areas is certain to deprive society of
few centuries after ‘Higera’ a vast body of the some elements of vigour. However, the effects
Islamic law (Sharia) was accumulating. System- of these limitations were not debilitating be-
atic codification went on in earnest taking as its cause of the dynamics of the decentralized rule
source of authority AI Koran, Sunna, ‘analogy in pie-ottoman times. The serious consequences
from these two prime sources, as well as ‘general became clear mainly with the centralized rule
consensus’ of Muslim scholars (among other of the Ottomans.
sources that command less than general agree-
ment). During this period Sharia responded
effectively to the changing needs of the times (b) Ottoman Empire and the great stagnation
and of regions. Not only this, but the jurists of
that day and their disciples in their overzeal It would have been interesting to try to fol-
indulged in attempts to find rulings for far- low Islam through the centuries and across
fetched hypothetical situations that verge on regions to trace the ways in which Sharia re-
the ridiculous (and that may never come to be sponded to change. However, for our purposes
needed) in pursuit of logical closures. the Ottoman Empire seems to be a proper cut-
After that, there developed a feeling - ting point in view of its historical relevance for
maybe instigated by overconfidence on the part an explanation of present conditions in a large
of religious scholars - that there was no further segment of contemporary Muslim countries.
need for codification or for new applications of The golden age of Islam was followed by a
the general principles. Maybe this feeling was period of decline which was brought about,
reinforced by the worldly success of that golden among other things, by the devastating blows
age of Islam. However, this unfortunate and un- dealt by Mogol invasions in the middle of the
timely closure of the door to dynamic develop- 13th century and toward the end of the 14th.
ment of Shark may have taken its toll from its But the Ottomans emerged in the late 15th
vigour and resiliency. century and early 16th as the hope against
Naturally, the effects of this development deterioration. Vigorously, they defended Mus-
518 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

lim regions and they appeared as the champions Although there are those who still argue that
of Islam.2o Under the Ottomans, Muslim expan- European domination was in comparison
sion reached its peak. ‘humane and enlightened’,** there was a basic
However, that same vastness of the areas it difference. Europeans represented a different
controlled, as well as the continued feud with culture and a different religion. Now confident
European powers, was sustained by the Otto- in their superiority, they were not only inter-
man Empire at a high price. By the 18th cen- ested in subjugating the people, but also in
tury the Empire was in the firm grips of stag- replacing their way of life with their own. The
nation and decline. As its control over the ‘civilizing mission’ of the French is a case in
periphery was weakening, it acutely needed point.
more resources to check the emerging Euro- The Muslim who thought the heavy yoke of
pean powers during the 18th century. To Turkish oppression was being at long last
survive, it resorted to brutal repression to removed from his neck found himself prey to
secure the needed economic resources from a new vigorous military and economic power
the regions under its hegemony. The idea of that attempted to root out his culture - good
the ‘Caliphate’ was resurrected to buttress the and bad -in stark and in subtle ways. ‘Modern’,
Ottoman image and give it a religious sanction. a codeword for European or Western, was good
More important for our discussion was the - wholesale - and ‘traditional’ was bad -
growing paranoid zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
isolation and seclusion from wholesale. Western institutions were forced
outside cultural and technological develop- upon colonized Muslim areas as if they owned
ments. Ottomans believed in their basic superi- an inherent universal validity for all people.
ority and saw little need for change: Geertz put it like this: ‘Beyond the economic
and political, the colonial confrontation was
All of the developments in industrial and commer- spiritual: a clash of selves’.23 So, a basic ‘spiri-
cial life, in science and technology and particularly tual’ rejection of colonial institutions that run
in political and military organization and tech- against Sharia was sustained at all times until
niques that had occurred in Europe since the
liberation from foreign rule was finally accom-
Reformation were simply unknown to the Otto-
mans. The only direct contacts with Europe were plished. But adjustment to the imposed foreign
on the batt.letield.zl institutions took divergent forms during the
colonial era and its aftermath.
Under these circumstances, areas under Some realized that centuries of Ottoman
Turkish hegemony were subject, under the thin stagnation left indigenous institutions in a less
veil of religious authority, to a stifling control. than developed state. Finding a successful,
These lands were bled white, sustaining a cor- ready-made, Western alternative, they chose to
rupt hierarchy that was always ready with buy it wholesale. This is clearly the case with
repressive measures against local uprisings, but the Kemalist ‘reforms’ in Turkey. Ataturk built
who succeeded in stemming the tide of Euro- a secular state, in which institutions are fash-
pean encroachment, for a time. Local deterio- ioned after the successful ‘modem’ European
ration became the rule rather than the excep- model, rather than the Islamic model. It should
tion. Survival rather than vigorous institutional be clear to us now what it means for a Muslim
development was the order of the day for to be asked to adopt secularism. Although
centuries. These deteriorating conditions con- Kemalists did not ask Turks to renounce Islam,
tinued until the European powers prevailed at the call for secularism was tantamount to just
last and, in the process, started their own new that, because of the institutional nature of
page of stunting institutional development in Islam alluded to earlier. In many other Muslim
Muslim regions. countries the ruling elite found lesser degrees
of adoption of the Western model to be more
palatable to the people, and they may have
(c) Colonial rule sensed some incompatibility with the local
conditions. This eclectic attitude character-
The Ottoman Empire left its territories in a ized the response of the governments of most
state of rampant stagnation. These territories of the newly independent Muslim countries
were henceforward subjected to a new type of (Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria etc.). Where Sharia was
foreign rule and exploitation. If the Turks were, developed (e.g. personal and family matters), it
in a sense, in-the-family oppressors, Europeans was retained. Where its general principles had
came to be identified as centuries-old, down- not had a chance of real life application in
right enemies, modem-time crusaders (in Mus- modern times, borrowing from the West was
lim reference a symbol of unjustified agression). the solution.
 ISLAM AND DEVELOPMENT 519

At the level of the day-to-day transactions of less or elicit fantastic interpretations from the
the masses, the picture was a little different. outsider. Now, we can understand, for example,
Some adopted the new Western ways, while why modern Turkey is gradually undoing some
many found Westernized deviations from pre- measures of the so-called ‘modernist’ transform-
scribed rules of zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Shard more than they could ations. It could help us understand why thou-
possibly tolerate. But societal institutions sands would sacrifice their lives towards the
systematically went against the latter group. establishment of an ‘Islamic Republic’ in Iran
Market necessity meant that they either deal in or the parallel movements in Afghanistan and
usury or perish. It is within this group that Pakistan. This can also help us understand the
some found an appeal in ‘ruses’ or ‘evasions’ avalanche of so-called ‘apologetics’ in the Arab
of Sharia described in detail by many Western world whose main aim seems to be at least to
wiiters,24 while others still stayed in an inde- clarify the theoretical issues if their hands are
terminate state, knowing of no better altema- chained by foreign domination or by local
tive to Western institutions but refusing to tyranny. Shallow interpretations would hold
participate in them. This explains references that in Turkey the problem is that of the
to people reacting ‘in a passive way’ and gener- erosion of the power of the modernizing
ally standing ‘aloof from foreign inspired crusaders vs traditional masses, They would
capitalism.25 They would partake in the west- tell us people were killed in Iran because they
ernized institutions only as far as necessity are fanatics rioting against rapid modernization.
compelled. This is allowed by Sharia under the They would still marvel over the persistence of
principles: ‘necessities entail exceptions’ and ineffective apologetics. What they fail to notice
‘exceptions should be commensurate with the is that the present of these societies could
degree of necessity’. hardly be understood in isolation from the past.
The yearning of these people to control their
own lives and to decide freely on how to build
(d) The cumulative effect their own basic institutional arrangements
according to their own values - a process of
We argued that the premature closure of the which they have been deprived for a long time
door to dynamic application of general prin- - is hardly understood by ‘modern, enlightened
ciples of Islam to novel situations (ijtihad) and humane’ observers.
around the 11th century may have robbed
from Sharia some of its vitality. But the domi-
nation of Muslim lands by others (from within 5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
or from without) who made major policy
decisions and executed them to the benefit of Noting the current backward conditions in
foreign interests was a major factor in stunting Muslim countries, writers conclude that Islam is
their institutions, and subsequently their an obstacle to development. An attempt was
development. made in this paper to show that the Islamic
Writers such as Rodinson argue that it is not beliefs and behavioural injunctions blamed are
possible to know if Muslim societies would have far from being antithetical to development. As
developed along capitalistic lines of the Euro- Rodinson shows, Al Koran emphasizes rational-
pean type had it not been for colonialism.26 ity, reasoning and activism rather than irration-
However, we have to note that if ‘development’ ality, passiveness or fatalism.28
is assumed to have happened, it may have taken An alternative explanation for the backward-
routes different from the capitalistic one. ness of Muslim countries is presented here.
Islamic emphasis on an absolute ‘right to life’ Backwardness resulted from serious disruptions
and on ‘social justice’27 would have affected in the social organization of these societies by
that model of development significantly. More foreign domination for long periods. The
important, we are here making a clearer case stunted political, economic and social insti-
because we are interested in considering not tutions of these societies are incapable of
only the effect of colonialism but also, from a serving the needs of the population in a mean-
cumulative perspective, that of Ottoman rule. ingful way. Genuine development of institutions
Once this cumulative perspective is utilized, the in accordance with Sharia was halted for cen-
effects of colonialism are seen in their right turies, Foreign institutions that run against
historical-developmental context; their debili- Sharia’s principles are imposed on people who
tative nature would be clearer to understand. experience a continuous acute conflict between
It is in the light of this perspective that we what they hold to be the truth in their con-
can understand phenomena that see,m meaning- science and a dismal status quo.
520 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

Theories of social organization suggest that tutional hypothesis over and above its possible
patterns of social behaviour develop from inter- use to explain underdevelopment in Muslim
actions that take place within the group. Once countries, is that it may help us understand
certain patterns of relationships and norms gov- current developments in these same countries
erning them seem to be functional for the ful- as well. The widely reported ‘fundamentalist
fihnent of the basic needs of the group, they Islamic revival’ in most of these countries at
are institutionalized. This assumes that the flow present is explained by many analysts in terms
from need to interaction to relationship to of second-order factors, particularly pertaining
norm to value to full institutional expression to the local scene in each individual country. A
runs unobstructed. Once we introduce foreign fist-order explanation that cuts across national
intervention into the picture we, in fact, break boundaries should utilize the historical-insti-
that normal flow. Institutions would develop tutional hypothesis. These movements are a
that are mainly functional for the foreign supra- consequence of the accumulated frustrations
system. Although such institutions may benefit resulting from the rampant failures of societal
some indigenous groups, this does not mean a institutions that are not rooted in, but are often
change in the whole system. Moreover, it seems inimical to social and religious values that com-
reasonable to assume that benefits are extended mand their allegiance. Revelations about the
to indigenous groups that show willipgness to limitations of the overwhelmingly materialistic
co-operate with the oppressor and thereby ‘modem’ models of development served to rein-
perpetuate his influence. force and support the quest for genuineness
In the case of Islam, as was explained, rather than transplantation. The Club of
institutional development is not left totally to Rome’s call for redirection of society ‘towards
human interaction, obstructed or not. A goals of equilibrium rather than growth’ carries
religious requirement is for these institutions to a clear disillusionment with the cult of growth.
develop according to certain guiding general Moughrabi% explains that:
principles that guarantee justice for all - by a
neutral legislator - God. Once these principles The old model of development seems to be collaps-
are undermined, Muslims feel that they are not ing under the weight of contradictions and of
living the ‘right’ life. They are playing by alien scarcity. No longer is it desirable or feasible to sus-
rules if they participate in so-called modem tam the social costs imposed by this model, namely,
the social and economic inequities, the imbalance
institutions. This could easily be misunderstood in the human and ecological environment, the
as lack of capacity for participation. This quo- existence of industrial ghettos and of massive
tation from Geertz describing Indonesian small urban problems.
businessmen may serve to illustrate this point: zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJ
Muslim scholars3* argue that the Islamic econ-
. . . they display the typically ‘protestant’ virtues
omic system is uniquely designed to minimize if
of industry, frugality, independence, and deterrni-
not eliminate built-in contradictions and inequi-
nation in almost excessive abundance . . . . They
tack the capacity to form efficient economic insti- ties such as those characteristic of both capital-
tutions; they are entrepreneurs without enter- ist and communist economic systems. If the
prlses.Z9 historical-institutional hypothesis holds true,
we may predict the continuation of upheavals
This may be a valid description for business in the Muslim world until some genuine accom-
people in many Muslim countries as well. But modation is made between societal institutions
this is the bitter harvest of a host of historical- whereby people live and function and cultural-
institutional factors (as noted above) not the religious values that give life meaning and worth.
least of which is colonial domination, or its This again is dictated to Muslims by the unique
successor, neocolonialism. nature of Islam as both a belief sy stem and a
Another advantage of this historical-insti- social sy stem in one.

NOTES
1. W. M. Watt, The Influence of Islam on M edieval 2. B. K. Parkinson, ‘Non-economic factors in the
Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, economic retardation of the rural Malays’, M odem
1972), pp. 54,82-85. Astin Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1967), pp. 31-46.
 ISLAM AND DEVELOPMENT 521

3. C. R. Sutcliffe, ‘Is Islam an obstacle to develop- 17. Watt (1972), op. cit., p. 84.
ment? Ideal patterns of belief versus actual patterns of
behaviour’, The Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 10 18. Landau (1958),op. cit., p. 127.
(October 1975), pp, 77-82.
19. ibid., p. 128.
4. See F. M. Moughrabi, ‘The Arab basic personality:
a critical survey of the literature’, Journal of Middle 20. The New Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed.
East Studies, Vol. 9 (1978), pp. 99-l 12. (1974), Vol. 9, p> 934.

5. C. Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Develop 21. ibid., Vol. 13, pp. 783-784.
ment in Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 17. 22. Patai (1973), op. cit., p. 301.

6. M. G. Swift, ‘Capital, credit and saving in Javanese 23. Geertz (1968), op. cit., p. 64.
marketing’, in R. Firth and B. S. Yamey (eds.), Capi-
tal, Saving and Credit in Peasant Societies (Chicago: 24. See, for example, R. Levy, The Socio[ Structure
Aldine, 1964) p. 150. of Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1965), pp. 256-251.
7. M. Weber, The Sociology of Religion, trans. by
E. Fischoff (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), p. 263. 25. Parkinson (1967), op. cit., p. 44.

8. I. Lichtenstadter, Is&m and the Modern Age 26. M. Rodinson, as paraphrased by K. S. Jomo,
(New York: Bookman Associates, 1958), p. 111. ‘Islam and Weber: Rodinson on the implication of
religion for capitalist development’, Developing
9. The Holy Koran, Sura II, Verse 143.
Economies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1977), p. 243.
10. Geertz (1968) op. cit., p. 14.
27. Jomo (1977), op. cit., p. 242.
11. R. Patai, The Arab Mind (New York: Scribner’s,
1973), p. 145. 28. ibid., p. 243.

12. Lichtenstadter (1958), op. cit., pp. 33-46. 29. C. Geertz, Peddlers and Princes: Social Develop-
ment and Economic Change in Two Indonesian Towns
13. ibid., p. 22. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 28.

14. Watt (1972), op. cit., p. 43. 30. Moughrabi (1978), op. tit
15. See, for example, J. Schacht and C. E. Bosworth
(eds.), The Legacy of Islam (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 31. For similarities and differences between capitalist,
1974); or, for a briefer account, see Watt (1972), communist and Islamic economic systems, see M. R.
op. cit. Zaman, ‘Islamic economic system and modernization’,
Paper presented to the 1979 Annual Meeting of the
16. R. Landau, I&m and the Arabs (London: George Society for Scientific Study of Religion, San Antonio,
Allen & Unwin, 1958) pp. 165-189. Texas, October 1979, Mimeo.