WHO IS RESPONSIBLE TO PAY FOR COST OF EDUCATING & BRINGING UP THE CHILDREN

The technical and political challenges of improving learning outcomes Education systems and learning
outcomes are shaped by a range of technical and political complexities. Improving learning outcomes at scale is
not just a matter of “scaling up.” It also entails attending to the technical and political complexities that shape
education reforms. In this study, we draw on country-level quantitative and qualitative data to study the
systemic factors that contribute to improved learning or cause declines. We approached this study through three
activities.
First, we established a database of education reforms and learning trends for 76 countries, enabling us to then
examine the relationship between reform type and trends in learning outcomes. Second, using this database, we
examined the relationship between education system characteristics, political and economic factors, and
episodes of sustained improvements or regressions in learning. Third, we prepared case studies for nine countries
from the database that helped show different themes concerning the politics of education quality reforms. We
then synthesized our findings to identify trends in strategies for deploying information, working with coalitions,
and creating opportunities for strategic change. Findings from the database did not establish strong correlations
with indicators of the economic and political conditions generally believed to have an effect on learning. Across
most countries, the type of reforms introduced during periods of sustained learning improvements versus periods
of decline did not differ systematically. Expansion in primary or secondary education access was not consistently
correlated with trends in learning; however, lagged improvements in pre-primary enrollment was correlated with
a greater probability of sustained learning improvements. The findings also showed that changes in government
spending on education was not strongly correlated with long-term learning trends.
Moreover, neither economic growth during the episode nor lagged growth was correlated with learning
trends. However, there was some suggestive relationship between accelerated growth and learning. Coalitions
and political incentives took different forms. The case study findings also showed that the country's most
effective in introducing and sustaining reforms considered the needs of various stakeholders at different levels of
government and civil society. Those that failed to get the buy-in of a key group at the outset, e.g., teachers’
unions, faced difficulties in implementing reforms, even if leaders were able to push through a policy reform.
Effective communication strategy was also essential. The state needed to take control of the policy 5 reform’s
core message to prevent misinformation by competing interest groups. Effective reforms were focused and
flexible. Policies were effective if they had a clear direction and could also be changed and even re-envisioned
over time. Successful reforms were not necessarily contingent on charismatic leadership (though this could help).
Sequencing popular reforms with those less likely to be supported helped to increase acceptance of less popular
reforms. Reforms built on one another over a longer period of time, gradually adding greater levels of
sophistication and nuance into the system in a way that slowly improved learning outcomes. In conclusion, our
study findings suggest that it is not any one component in education, economic system, or form of governance
that is likely to improve learning. Rather, regardless of form, all technical inputs and political considerations must
be coherent and aligned toward improved learning. Study findings and their implications must be read as
exploratory. However, by offering some simple associations and hypothesizing the relationships of variables, the
study offers a helpful perspective that can complement other recent efforts to understand the relationship
between politics and quality reforms.

EDUCATIONAL REFORMS BY GOVERNMENT

There are other ways of studying education policy reform that would benefit from further investigation. For
example, future research can study other aspects of quality such as repetition and dropout rates and teacher
qualifications. Given the broad reach of the study, it was difficult for us to fully attend to some issues that may
have more salience in some countries than others. We could not capture the significance of conflict, disaster, or
other factors that may contribute to political instability or tell the types of reforms that were (or were not)
introduced as a result. Similarly, the relative brevity of the case studies limited the depth in which they could
engage with the enduring effects of colonialism or structural violence.74 Further research could also explore the
rise of (and demand for) low-fee private schools and whether and how this impacts the drivers and demand for
quality public basic education. Finally, an analysis of politics and reform may benefit from more cross-sectoral
investigation. Such a study could look at whether trends in education reform align with those found in public
health or social protection. Knowing about whether the political drivers of delivering quality education reforms
align with the incentives in other arenas would be instructive for explaining outcomes seen within and across
countries. Type of education reforms Our findings from the database on whether specific types of education

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reforms predict learning trends indicate that the type of education reforms per se may not determine learning
outcomes. We find that reforms related to certifying teachers, strengthening financial management and
accountability, and school-based management (SBM) reforms were more likely to coincide with episodes of
improvement. But aside from these differences, assessing the relative rank of different reforms across episode
types does not suggest that countries favored one set of reforms during periods of learning improvement versus
in periods of decline. This suggests that learning trends also depend on whether reform components are
technically or politically aligned toward improving learning or are coherent with existing programs and policies.

GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON CHILDCARE

Most families need childcare. Childcare is expensive and licensed center-based care is unaffordable for families
of poor to modest means. There is broad public support for more government spending on childcare as long as
that spending does not result in another unfunded entitlement that worsens the deficit. Claims that more
spending on childcare will pay back the taxpayer in the long run based on better child development or increased
workplace productivity are shaky. Political appetite for more spending on childcare will be greater if a childcare
subsidy can be paid for as we go with an offset elsewhere in the federal budget. The federal deduction for
charitable contributions is a possible target for such an offset.

The plan for increased childhood subsidies outlined in this paper would cost $42 billion and would provide a
substantial subsidy for every child from birth to fifth birthday in a family at or below 200 percent of the federal
poverty level. This is nearly half the families in the U.S. If current federal spending on childcare and early
childhood programs, amounting to about $26 billion a year, were shifted to the new subsidy, $16 billion more
would be required. The charitable deduction presently costs the U.S. Treasury $55 billion a year. A $16 billion
offset for childcare would allow the proposed childcare subsidy to be budget neutral while leaving $39 billion on
the table to continue the charitable deduction or to support various tax reform proposals that are in the works.
Most voters want government to spend more money of the care and education of young children, for the good of
families and everything that flows from stable homes and supportive environments for children and adults. The
policy arguments on this topic have largely been sideshows about research on long term benefits for children;
whether it is desirable for government to gain substantial control over the environments in which young children
are reared; and roles of the federal vs. state government. The immediate issues are more direct. The evidence
shows clearly that many families need childcare and that licensed center-based care is not affordable for them.
How can the federal government pay for it, assure that parents remain in the driver’s seat, minimize unintended
negative consequences (including overutilization), and achieve requisite political support. The present paper
provides one solution in the form of childcare and education savings accounts paid for with redirection of current
federal spending on early education and care, and through an offset from the federal deduction for charitable
contributions. There are other policy mechanisms that have overlapping goals, including a Trump plan involving
tax credits. Now is the time and the opportunity for serious political consideration of new funding and delivery
models for childcare.

MORE FEDERAL SPENDING ON CHILDCARE WILL REQUIRE A BUDGET OFFSET

In that context, the task for those who want to identify a politically plausible way forward for increased
childcare subsidies is to find an offset. In other words, what might the Congress be willing to spend less on in
order to spend more on childcare. Finding a place to cut federal spending in order to free up funds for childcare
is, of course, not an easy task. Every federal expenditure of substance has beneficiaries that can be expected to
oppose efforts to roll back the funding from which they reap an advantage. And the oxen to be gored are likely
to be roused to greater levels of advocacy than those who would benefit from the redirected funds, who in this
case are lower income families. Further, there are few federal funding programs for which a plausible
argument of beneficence to the general public good cannot be made. The challenge, then, is to identify a
present program of federal spending that can be restructured so as to free up funds for childcare that has
vulnerabilities, political and functional.

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THE PROGRAM: CHILDCARE AND EDUCATION SAVINGS ACCOUNTS

The politics of increased federal funding for childcare depend not only on data I’ve presented above on need
and the availability of budget offsets from the charitable deduction, but also on how an increased subsidy would
be delivered to families. Further, the outlines of a delivery vehicle are required in order to estimate costs. There
are several ways that a federal subsidy for childcare might be accomplished. Three broad categories are: tax
credits, grants to states, and savings accounts.

The tax vehicle would provide for increased deductibility or credits for childcare expenses, including perhaps
refundable tax credits such that a family that has accrued childcare expenses but whose taxes would be reduced
below zero with a childcare credit would receive a refund for the difference. There are several problems with a
tax credit vehicle, as I describe subsequently. A critical one is that it delivers benefits to parents once a year in
connection with a tax return whereas the costs for childcare are due and payable when they are being received.
The childcare provider needs to be paid at the end of the week or beginning of the month. A tax credit the parent
receives in April is mistimed for families that live from paycheck to paycheck.

A second mechanism is to have a childcare subsidy flow through existing federal programs that are intended to
support states in the provision of needed services. The obvious program through which increased funding could
flow would be the Childcare and Development Block Grant, which provides money to states to support the child
care needs of low-income working parents. The Republican majorities in the House and Senate, as well as the
Trump administration, are not likely to favor a vehicle that involves cutting bigger checks to states. Further, the
Child Care and Development Block Grant has had many problems in design and in implementation at the state
level which make it an undesirable foundation on which to build.[29]
Education savings accounts have been a popular policy proposal among Republicans in recent presidential
campaigns.[30] Here, I tweak the concept and implementation of a federally funded savings account to adapt it to
the particular circumstances of childcare:
Based on prior years’ tax returns and birth records, parents of a young child that qualifies for childcare subsidies,
as described subsequently, would have deposited to the child’s name and their control in a federal Childcare and
Education Savings Account (CESA) the amount of subsidy to which they are entitled for a given year. They would
then pay their childcare providers through a transaction that debits that account. Half of any funds credited to
the account in a given year that are not expended on childcare would remain in the account for expenditure on
the care or education of that child until the child is an adult, e.g., leftover funds in the account could be expended
on college tuition.

CONCLUSIONS

Most families need childcare & education. Childcare is expensive and licensed center-based care is unaffordable
for families of poor to modest means. There is broad public support for more government spending on childcare
as long as that spending does not worsen the deficit. Claims that more spending on childcare will pay back the
taxpayer in the long run based on better child development or greater productivity in the workplace are shaky.
Political appetite for more spending on childcare will be greater if it can be paid for as we go with an offset
elsewhere in the federal budget. The federal deduction for charitable contributions is an attractive target for
such an offset. The plan for increased childhood subsidies sketched in this paper would cost roughly $42 billion
a year and would provide a substantial subsidy for every child in a family at or below 200 percent of the federal
poverty level. This is nearly half the families in the U.S. If current federal spending on childcare and early
childhood programs, amounting to about $26 billion a year, were shifted to the new subsidy, an offset of $16
billion would be required from tax expenditures on the charitable deduction to make up the difference.

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REFRENCES

 Acemoglu, Daron, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James A. Robinson. 2014. Democracy
Does Cause Growth. Working paper no. 20004. National Bureau of Economic Research.
 Andrews, Christina W., and Michiel S. De Vries. 2012. "Poverty and Municipalization of
Education: The Analysis of Ideb Results (2005–2009)." Cadernos de Pesquisa 42(147): 826–
847.
 Department of Basic Education. 2018. National Curriculum Statements (NCS) Grades R–12.
Republic of South Africa.
https://www.education.gov.za/Curriculum/NationalCurriculumStatementsGradesR– 12.aspx
 Avalos, Beatrice, and Jenny Assael. 2006. "Moving from Resistance to Agreement: The Case
of the Chilean Teacher Performance Evaluation." International Journal of Educational
Research.

 1https://www.bls.gov/news.release/famee.t04.htm
 11https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/early-
childhood/reports/2016/06/21/139731/calculating-the-hidden-cost-of-interrupting-a-
career-for-child-care/
 15https://www.brookings.edu/blog/education-plus-development/2017/02/09/why-
devos-should-embrace-early-childhood-education/; https://heckmanequation.org/
 https://www.brookings.edu/research/does-pre-k-work-it-depends-how-picky-you-
are/; https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/02/17/preschool-can-
provide-a-boost-but-the-gains-can-fade-surprisingly-
fast/?utm_term=.9b770fe0a057; https://www.brookings.edu/research/we-need-more-
evidence-in-order-to-create-effective-pre-k-
programs/; https://www.aei.org/publication/does-pre-k-work-the-research-on-ten-
early-childhood-programs-and-what-it-tells-us/

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