Reliability Block Diagram

and Redundancy Techniques

 System reliability analysis
• Reliability is essential for complex systems
like aircrafts, missiles, satellites, Nuclear
and other power plants.

• Reliability is also essential for common day

to day use items like transportation,
communication, automobiles, refrigerators,
televisions etc.

2
 System reliability analysis

Financial loss

Unreliability Customer Dissatisfaction

Destruction, Human Death

3
 System reliability analysis
• Prior to any system analysis, the failure rates of
the basic parts/components, and their distribution
should be known.

• Aim is to find system failure mode via the failure

modes of the parts/components building the
system.

• For this analysis, functional connection of the unit

should be known.
4
 Basic system reliability
The main objective of system reliability is the
construction of a model (life distribution) that
represents the times-to-failure of the entire system
based on the life distributions of the components,
subassemblies and/or assemblies ("black boxes")
from which it is composed.

5
 System reliability analysis

• The various techniques used for system analysis

are:

• Reliability block diagram

• Fault Tree, Success tree, Event tree methods
• Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
• Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis
(FMECA)

6
 Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs)
 Block diagrams are widely used in engineering and science and exist in
many different forms. They can also be used to describe the interrelation
between the components and to define the system.
 When used in this fashion, the block diagram is then referred to as a
reliability block diagram (RBD)
 A reliability block diagram is a graphical representation of the components
of the system and how they are reliability-wise related (connected).
 An RBD of a simplified computer system with a redundant fan
configuration is shown in the following figure.

7
 Reliability Block Diagram
Series System
• In series configuration, system will fail if
any one of the components in the system
fails.
• The reliability of the system will not be
greater than the smallest component
reliability.

8
 Series System
Psuccess  P As  Bs  Cs 
 P( As ) P( Bs ).... In the case of
 R1 R2 ... independent
n
components, this
Rsys   Ri becomes:
i 1

Fsys  1  Rsys  1  (1  F1 )(1  F2 ) two component

Fsys  F1  F2  F1 F2

9
⑪ Expedistribution:RCt)= e'dt
1 2 3

x, 4x184/hw
=

Rs(t=1000hr) =
?

dz =

3.2x104/yr MTTF=?

d3 9.8x10/yr
=

Rs R, R2 R3
=

(1000x4x156). 3.2x156)- (1000 x 3.2 x 9.8 x

158
(1000
x

-
=

=0.983

NTTF
ItfCtdt=SRC
=
dt

-17x156t
0

dt 2+s
!e
-

-x6 (0-1)
58823.5 Hus
=
RCt) a

0.95

0.9

increasing no. of 0.8

components in series

t
 Series Systems
• A system that contains no redundancy
• Each component of the system is needed to
make the system function correctly
• If any one of the components fails, the
system fails
• Example:

10
 RDB Example: Series System
• System Block Diagram
Monitor

Processor

keyboard
Reliability Block Diagram

Monitor Processor Keyboard

11
 RBD: Example
• Series System R1 R2

• Assume the following data

– R1 = 0.8
– R2 = 0.9
– Rs = R1 x R2 = 0.8 x 0.9
– Rs = 0.72 < 0.8 (R1)

• Hence, in the case of series system, reliability

of the system will never be greater than the
smallest component reliability.
12
 Reliability Block Diagram

Parallel System

1
• System will fail when all the
components in the system fail.
2
• If any one of the components
functions system will function. 3
⑰
• The reliability of the system will
be greater than the highest
component reliability.
13
 Parallel System

PFailure  P AF  BF  CF 
 P( AF ) P( BF )....
 F1 F2 ...
n
Fsys   Fi 5Faiability
i 1

Rsys  1  Fsys  1  (1  R1 )(1  R2 ) two component

Rsys  R1  R2  R1 R2
14
 x, 4x184/hw
=

Expedistribution:RCt)= e'dt
1

dz =

3.2x104/yr
2

d3 9.8x10/yr
=

3
Rs(t=1000hr) =
?

MTTF=?

Fs(t)
MNTE=
RICH dt

Rs(t = 1 -

Fz(t) Fz(t)
F,(t (R, R2 R,Rz) dt
=

=1 - +
-

(1 R,)(1 R2) (1 R3)

...
-

=1
-
-

[components
-

ext( bst]
[(-et)(1
-

-- -

MTTF 5, 2 +2
=

Rs Ri Rz-RiRa
= +

Rz-RiRa-R2R3-RR, +RIRzR3
3rallel.--MTTF j, 2+s dita-testates
Rs Ri Ra
=
+ +

...
=

+
 Parallel Systems
• Basic parallel system: only one of the N
identical components is required for the
system to function
• Example:

15
 RDB Example: Parallel System

• System Block Diagram

Monitor Monitor

Processor Processor

Reliability Block Diagram

keyboard keyboard
Monitor Processor Keyboard

Monitor Processor Keyboard

16
 RBD: Example
• Parallel System R1

• Assume the following data

– R1 = 0.8
R2
– R2 = 0.9
– Rs = R1 + R2 - R1 R2 = 0.8 + 0.9 – 0.8 x 0.9
– Rs = 0.98 > 0.9 (R2)

• Hence, in the case of parallel system, the

reliability of the system will always be greater
than the highest component reliability. 17
 Reliability Block Diagram

• Reliability Bounds
lower bound: Upper bound:

series D
arallel
𝑁 𝑁 *
↑
𝑅𝑆 = 𝑅𝑖 = 𝑅𝐿 𝑅𝑆 = 1 − 𝐹𝑖 = 𝑅𝑈
𝑖=1 𝑖=1

• Reliability of the system lies in between

Lower limit (RL) and the Upper limit (RU).
18
 Reliability Block Diagram

• Example: Exponential failure rates

𝑅1 = 𝑒 −𝜆1 𝑡
𝑅2 = 𝑒 −𝜆2 𝑡

19
 Reliability Block Diagram
• Series System • Parallel System R1

R1 R2
R2

20
 A C

B D-
Minimal Cut set:
fail - system fail
1. Both A GB to
Method:
cut-Set
2. CSD to
Both fail - system fail
fails
The system will fail if following

I
AB ABCD A B
minimal C
cutset A
CD ABCDE -- --

E E

E
AED
D
B
CEB
B C

probabilitof
y entaires failed
as
Minimal cut set - min. no. components
of
or

whose failure
causes the system failure ANEND BNEorC
ANB
S
CND & or
 Path Set:

A B
Reliability
E

C D-
A B

I I
-

C. D-

⑪ A B

A E D
-

⑳ - - D -

C E B-

③ -
A
-
E -
D-

⑭ -
- -

B -
Decomposition Method:
 Redundancy

• The reliability of any product can be

improved through the use of reliable
components which go to make up the
product.
• The reliability can be further improved
through better design practice.
• However, there is limit to which reliability
can be improved by those means.
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 Redundancy

• The improvement in reliability at this stage

can only be effected by using more than one
unit in place of one which can otherwise do
the required technique.

• Redundancy means providing a system with

alternate means of functioning and as such a
system is called a redundant system.

22
 Redundancy

• The redundancy always results in increased

weight, space, cost and decreased
maintainability.

• This necessitates careful consideration of

redundancy approach to reliability
improvement.

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Binomial distribution

The binomial distribution is the discrete probability distribution of the number of successes in
a sequence of m independent yes/no experiments, each of which yields success with
probability p.

There are nCk different ways of distributing i successes in a sequence of m trials. In general, if
the random variable ‘i’ follows Binomial distribution with parameters m and p, the probability of
getting exactly ‘i’ successes in m trials is given by

m!
P(m, i ) = p i (1 − p) m−i
i !(m − i )!
i-out of-m Systems: Generic formulation

Consider a parallel system with ‘m’ components where more than one component is required

to survive for system success.

If ‘p’ is the overall survival probability (reliability), the probability that exactly ‘i’ components

will survive is

m! m −i
P(m, i ) = p (1 − p)
i

i !(m − i )!
i-out of-m Systems

What will be the system reliability ?

m
m!
R S =∑ Ri (1−R)(m−i)
i= k i !(m−i)!

This is the probability of i=k or more components surviving

 Redundancy

• Basically there are three redundant

configurations namely,

• Active
• Standby
• Voting

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 Redundancy

Active Redundancy:
• In this configuration each one of the
elements performs the required function.
• If one element fails for which the
redundant configuration was designed, then
other element provides the function.
• This is similar to the parallel configuration

25
 Redundancy

Standby Redundancy:

• In this system at a time only one unit will

be working.
• When the working unit fails, the sensing
and switching device will sense it and will
switch over to the redundant unit which
will start functioning then.

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 Redundancy
Standby Redundancy:
The reliability of identical n unit standby system following a
exponential law of reliability (constant failure rate) can be given
as:

n 1
( t ) r
1

2 RS  e  t

r 0 r!
SW 3

Assumptions:
•Switch is highly reliable
•Switch action is instantaneous
•Redundant system reaches operating state instantaneously.

27
 Taylor

+......

no failure upto t itfailatt, and comp survived tot, his

 I

Rs edt
=

(l-edtest+(l-edti) (r-ebt edt

+

t.-.

=edt[((1-edt) (1
+ -

edtj2+...].
Taylorseries
Rs
extg(e
=
 Redundancy

Voting Redundancy

• Voting redundancy is a special case of active

configuration wherein some form of switching or
decision making circuitry is almost always used
of 3
c out
logicand all the redundant elements are identical.

• The decision making circuitry determines which

elements of those available are to be used for
performing the function.
28
 Redundancy
Voting Redundancy
of 3 sensors
Ex: I out

• In a general case where there are ‘n’

elements available to function and ‘a’ is the
minimum number required to function the
system will successfully operate when a,
a+1, a+2….n elements are working.

• By using Binomial distribution, reliability

can be given by
29
 Redundancy
Voting Redundancy
1
S

2
m/
n
3

4I

 
n
nm
RS  n
cm R (1  R)
m

ma
30
 Redundancy

• The various types of redundant

configuration can be employed at any level
within the system.

• However the maximum gain per redundant

element is obtained when the redundancy is
applied at the lowest possible level.

31
 Redundancy
• Example

𝑅𝑆 = 𝑅1 𝑅2 𝑅𝐴
𝑅𝐴 = 𝑅3 + 𝑅4 − 𝑅3 𝑅4
𝑅𝑆 = 𝑅1 𝑅2 𝑅3 + 𝑅4 − 𝑅3 𝑅4

32
 Reliability demonstration
System configuration System reliability
(Ra=0.9, Rb=0.6)

A B Rs = RaRb = 0.54

A B Rs = [1-(1-Ra)2 ]Rb = 0.594

A

A B Rs = Ra[1-(1-Rb)2 ] = 0.756
B

A B
Rs = 2RaRb-Ra2Rb2 = 0.7884
A B
High level redundancy: System/Unit

A B Rs = RaRb(2-Ra)(2-Rb)
A B = 0.832
Low level redundancy: Component

33
Example: Compute the reliability and probability of failure for the
Example Problem
following system. Assume the failure probabilities for the
components are Q1 = 0.01, Q2 = 0.02 and Q3 = 0.03.

2
1
3

• Solution:
– First combine the parallel components 2 and 3
– The probability of failure is

– The reliability is

34
 Solution (cont’d)
• Next, combine component 1 and the sub-
system (2,3) in series
• The probability of failure for the system is
then

• The system reliability is

35
 Solution (cont’d)
• The system probability of failure is equal to

• The system reliability is

which is also equal to RSYS = 1 – QSYS

• As shown in this example, the system probability of failure
and reliability are dominated by the series component 1
– i.e. a series system is as good as its weakest link

36
 Parallel/Series System

Processor 1 Keyboard 1 Monitor 1

Bus 1

Bus 2
Processor 2 Keyboard 2 Monitor 2

37
 Corresponding RBD
Assuming Buses are perfect

Monitor Processor Keyboard

Monitor Processor Keyboard

Compare to the RBD shown before, what is the difference?

Monitor Processor Keyboard

Monitor Processor Keyboard

38
 Numerical Comparison(1)
Monitor Processor Keyboard

Monitor Processor Keyboard

Component Pw Pf Pw (1 of 2)
Monitor 0.99 0.01 0.9999
Keyboard 0.9 0.1 0.99
Processor 0.999 0.001 0.999999
Psystem-w
0.98990001
39
 Numerical Comparison (2)
Monitor Processor Keyboard

Monitor Processor Keyboard

Component Pw Pf Pw-single Psystem-w

0.890109 0.987923968
Monitor 0.99 0.01
Keyboard 0.9 0.1
Processor 0.999 0.001
40
 N Modular Redundancy
• M of N System
– M of the total of N identical modules are
required to function
– TMR is one example, where M is 2 and N is 3

41
RBD for TMR
Module 1

Module 2 Voter

Module3 Module 3

Module2 Voter

Module1

2 out of 3
42
 Module3
Reliability Calculation
for TMR Module2 Voter

Module1
Cases for the TMR to be working:
• all of the 3 modules are working 2:3
• any 2 modules are working, and 1 module is failed
Look at it from another way:
Cases for the TMR to be failed
• all 3 modules are failed
• any one module is working, however, the rest 2 are not working
Remember, the voter is a Single-Point-Of-Failure
Module Voter TMR System Pw
0.999 0.999 0.999997 0.998997005
43
 Reliability comparison
Reliability of the TMR system as a function of
Rel of the Module & Rel of the Voter
changing Rel of Voter changing Rel of Module

1
Rel (TMR System)

0.98
0.96
0.94
0.92
0.9
1 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.91
Rel of individual component (voter or module)

44