c.

Commission on Appointments
1. Guingona vs. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING: Provision of Section 18 on proportional representation mandatory in character.—The provision
of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to
the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation; otherwise,
the party with a majority representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can by sheer force of
numbers impose its will on the hapless minority.

The court rejected the respondents' claim that it is mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission on
Appointments, clarifying that the Constitution does not require exactly twelve Senators and twelve
Representatives. Instead, it mandates that the Commission include at least a majority of its total
membership. The court further declared the election of Senators Alberto Romulo and Wigberto Tañada to
the Commission on Appointments as null and void, finding their election violated the proportional
representation rule under Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

SOLUTION: What we intimated is merely this: That those entitled to fractional memberships may join
their half-memberships to form a full membership and together nominate one from their coalition to the
Commission on Appointments. For example, the NPC and the LAKAS-NUCD may join their half-
memberships and jointly nominate one of their own Senators to the Commission. In the same way the LDP
and the LP-PDP-LABAN may nominate Senator Wigberto Tañada to fill up the other slot to complete the
membership to twelve. But the latter, as a coalition, may not insist in electing both Senator Tañada and
Senator Romulo to fill up two slots because this is certainly a violation of the rule on proportional
representation.
 2. Sarmiento vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 549
FACTS: The petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and constitutional law professors, filed a petition for prohibition to prevent Salvador Mison from
performing the functions of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and to stop Guillermo Carague,
Secretary of the Department of Budget, from disbursing payments for Mison's salaries. They argue that
Mison's appointment is unconstitutional because it was not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
The respondents defend the constitutionality of Mison's appointment without such confirmation. The Court,
prioritizing public interest and stability in the public service, decided to proceed with the case, setting aside
procedural issues like whether prohibition is the correct remedy or whether the petitioners have standing.

ISSUE:

RULING: Under the 1973 constitution the president has absolute power of appointment while under the
1987 Constitution, only the first group of appointments requires confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.—In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments, It is now a sad part of our political history that the
power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, under the 1935 Constitution, transformed that
commission, many times, into a venue of "horse-trading" and similar malpractices. On the other hand, the
1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and re-molded by
successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check
on the part of the legislature. Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other,
in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
and the people adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President, without
such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as
those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.

Under the 1987 Constitution, the clear and expressed intent of its framers is to exclude presidential
appointments from confirmation on the Commission on Appointments except appointments to offices
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 Article VII.—In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already
pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in
the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of
Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest
the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to
appoint is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.

The word "alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution is a redundancy in the
light of the second sentence of Sec. 16 Article VII.—Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII
could have stated merely that, in the case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their
appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of various departments of the government. In
short, the word "alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal
import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant
in the light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this redundancy cannot prevail over the
clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments.

Commission on Appointments; Confirmation of the appointment of Commissioners of the Bureau of

Customs by the Commission on Appointments not required.—Coming now to the immediate question
before the Court, it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head)
is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on
Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes
"heads of bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of
bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

Appointment of respondent Savlador Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting
his nomination to the Commission on Appointments is within the constitutional authority of the President
of the Philippines.—Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her
constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He
is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto.
the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or
qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or qualifications
must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII where
it is clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated require the
consent of the Commission on Appointments.
 3. Bautista vs. Salonga, 172 SCRA 169
FACTS: In 1987, Mary Concepcion Bautista was designated as the Acting Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights (CHR) by the President of the Philippines. The following year, recognizing the need for
a permanent appointment to this position as mandated by the Constitution, Bautista was extended a
permanent appointment. This appointment stated that Bautista could qualify and assume the duties of the
office, mandating her to furnish the President’s Office and the Civil Service Commission with copies of her
oath of office, which she took before the Chief Justice.Shortly thereafter, Bautista received a letter from the
Commission on Appointments (CA), requesting her submission of documents and information related to
her appointment, and another inviting her to a meeting for deliberation on her appointment. Bautista
responded by stating that the CHR Commissioners’ appointments were not subject to CA confirmation.

Despite this, and Bautista’s subsequent refusal to participate in the CA’s review process, the CA
disapproved her “ad interim appointment” due to her non-submission to their jurisdiction. Following the
CA’s disapproval, the President designated another individual as the “Acting Chairman” of CHR pending
the resolution of Bautista’s case, which she elevated to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), an "independent
office" created by the 1987 Constitution, is to be made with or without the confirmation of the Commission
on Appointments

RULING: The Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) are not specifically
mentioned in the 1987 Constitution as requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Unlike
other constitutional commissions (Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections, and Commission
on Audit), whose members are appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, the CHR's appointments are not subject to such confirmation.

The President appoints the CHR Chairman and Members directly, as authorized by Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution and further detailed in Executive Order No. 163 (1987). According to this order, the
President appoints the CHR Chairman and Members for a seven-year term without reappointment, with any
vacancy filled for the unexpired term of the predecessor.
 Powers of Congress
a. Legislative
(1) Legislative Inquiries and the Oversight Functions
1. Sabio v. Gordon, GR 174340, Oct. 17, 2006
FACTS: The case involves a Senate inquiry into alleged financial irregularities at the Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporation (PHC), initiated by Senate Resolution No. 455.
The PCGG officials, including Chairman Sabio, were subpoenaed to testify but refused, citing Section 4(b)
of E.O. No. 1, which grants them immunity from testifying in any legislative proceedings. The Senate
responded by holding them in contempt for defying the subpoenas.

The main issue was whether Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 had been repealed by the 1987 Constitution, which
could limit the Senate’s power to conduct inquiries. The PCGG argued that the provision still applied, while
the Senate claimed that its constitutional authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation outweighed the
immunity claim. The Supreme Court had to decide whether the Senate’s inquiry was lawful and whether
the immunity provision from E.O. No. 1 remained valid under the current Constitution.

ISSUE:

RULING: The Constitution's broad power of inquiry is essential for effective legislation and is inherent in
Congress' function to pass laws. This power includes the right to gather information necessary for crafting
laws, a principle supported by both Philippine and American legal precedents. The Court finds that Section
4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repugnant to the Constitution because it exempts the PCGG from this power without
any constitutional basis. The Court emphasizes that no statutory provision can limit Congress' investigatory
authority, as it extends to all government agencies, including the PCGG. Therefore, Section 4(b) is invalid.
 2. Miguel vs. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
 3. Neri vs. Senate Committees, G.R. No. 180843, March 25, 2008
FACTS: The case revolves around the National Broadband Network (NBN) project, which was awarded
by the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE). Romulo L. Neri, the petitioner, was summoned by the respondent Senate Committees to
testify regarding the project. Neri disclosed that he was offered a bribe by then Commission on Elections
Chairman Benjamin Abalos to approve the NBN project, which he reported to President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo, who instructed him not to accept the offer.

However, when questions probing into the President’s involvement and directives concerning the NBN
project arose, Neri invoked executive privilege, refusing to answer specific questions about his
conversations with the President regarding the project. The Senate Committees insisted on Neri’s
appearance and testimony, leading to a legal controversy when Neri, upon the President’s order and citing
executive privilege, did not appear in a subsequent Senate hearing. The Senate Committees then issued a
contempt order and ordered Neri’s arrest for his refusal to testify further, prompting Neri to file a petition
with the Supreme Court to contest the Senate Committees’ actions.

ISSUE: Whether the Senate Committees showed that the communication they sought was critical to their
legislative function.

RULING: The Senate Committees did not adequately demonstrate that the information was critical to the
exercise of their legislative functions. Respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement laid
down in Senate v. Ermita that the invitations should contain the "possible needed statute which prompted
the need for the inquiry," along with "the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative
to and in furtherance thereof." Compliance with this requirement is imperative, both under Sections 21 and
22 of Article VI of the Constitution. This must be so to ensure that the rights of both persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiry are respected as mandated by said Section 21 and by virtue of the express
language of Section 22. Unfortunately, despite petitioner's repeated demands, respondent Committees did
not send him an advance list of questions.
 4. Senate vs. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING: Party-list representatives likewise are allowed to sue to question the constitutionality of E.O.
464, it being sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and duties
as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in
the implementation of laws.—In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur Ocampo (Bayan Muna),
Teodoro Casiño (Bayan Muna), Joel Virador (Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran (Anak-pawis), Rafael Mariano
(Anakpawis), and Liza Maza (Gabriela) are allowed to sue to question the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the
absence of any claim that an investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees
was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464 notwithstanding, it being sufficient that a claim is made
that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct
investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.

Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, and its power of inquiry
extends to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations.—Since
Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to
hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and
informed on executive operations. As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, “with process to enforce
it,” is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by
executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity
of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.

The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation. —Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and
complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question
hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. When
Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has
issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive,
such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section
22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance.
Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is “in aid of legislation” under
Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. In fine, the oversight
function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in
pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.
 5. Balag vs. Senate, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
 (2) Bicameral Conference Committee

6. Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630

FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING: BI-CAM IS CONSTITUTIONAL
 (3) Limitations on Legislative Power
(a) Limitations on Revenue, Appropriations and Tariff Measures
7. Comelec vs. Judge Quijano-Padilla and Photokina Marketing, G.R. No. 151992, September
18, 2002
FACTS: On September 9, 1999, the COMELEC issued an invitation for bids for the supply and installation
of IT equipment for its Voter’s Registration and Identification System (VRIS) Project. PHOTOKINA
Marketing Corporation (PHOTOKINA) pre-qualified and won the bidding with a bid of P6.588 billion. On
September 28, 2000, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3252, approving the Notice of Award to
PHOTOKINA, which accepted the offer and both parties began the process of formalizing the contract.

However, the budget appropriated by Congress for the project under Republic Act No. 8760 was only P1
billion, and the available funds, as certified by the COMELEC’s Chief Accountant, amounted to only P1.2
billion—far less than the winning bid. As a result, COMELEC Chairman Benipayo announced that the
VRIS project had been "scrapped," prompting PHOTOKINA to file a petition in the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Branch 215 to compel COMELEC to formalize the contract.
ISSUE: May a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract with it
notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for the project.

RULING: NO. PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel COMELEC to formalize the
contract. Since PHOTOKINAs bid is beyond the amount appropriated by Congress for the VRIS Project,
the proposed contract is not binding upon the COMELEC and is considered void. The Court ruled that the
government contract with PHOTOKINA for the VRIS Project was invalid due to a lack of sufficient
appropriation. The 1987 Philippine Constitution (Article VI, Section 29(1)) mandates that no public funds
shall be spent without an appropriation made by law. Further, Executive Order No. 292 requires that
contracts involving public funds must be backed by available appropriations, and a certification from the
agency’s accounting officer must confirm the availability of funds.

The bid submitted by PHOTOKINA for P6.588 billion far exceeded the P1 billion appropriated for the
project. The Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) should have rejected the bid as it was above the approved
budget. Additionally, a proposed phased implementation of the project to fit available funds was found to
be illegal, as it could lead to an incomplete project if additional funding was not secured.
The Court emphasized that government contracts must comply with appropriation laws, and any contract
entered without sufficient appropriation is void. Thus, the Court ruled that the contract with PHOTOKINA
could not be formalized.
 8. Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630
FACTS: The motions seek reconsideration of the Court’s decision dismissing petitions challenging the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716 (Expanded VAT Law). Petitioners argue that the law did not originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution. They
claim that instead of passing H. No. 11197, the Senate passed its own version (S. No. 1630), which violated
the constitutional requirement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate's passage of S. No. 1630 violated Article VI, Section 24 of the
Philippine Constitution, which mandates that revenue bills "originate exclusively" in the House of
Representatives.

RULING: The Court found no merit in the petitioners' argument that the Senate's passage of S. No. 1630
violated Article VI, Section 24 of the Philippine Constitution, which mandates that revenue bills "originate
exclusively" in the House of Representatives. The Court clarified that the Senate is allowed to propose
amendments to revenue bills, including enacting its own version of a House bill, as long as the bill originates
in the House. The Senate's action in passing its own version (S. No. 1630) was consistent with this power,
as it merely substituted its own version for the House bill (H. No. 11197). This is a common legislative
practice, and the Senate's authority to amend or substitute revenue bills is plenary, as long as the bill
originated in the House. The historical context and practice in both the U.S. and the Philippines support this
interpretation. Thus, the enactment of S. No. 1630 was a valid exercise of the Senate's power to amend or
propose revenue bills.
 9. Araullo vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 01, 2014
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
 (b) Presidential Veto and Congressional Override

10. Gonzales vs. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452

FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING: Executive Department; Veto-power; The power given the executive to disapprove any item or
items in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the
remaining portion of the same item. —As specified, the President may not veto less than all of an item of
an Appropriations Bill. In other words, the power given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an
Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining
portion of the same item.

A Presidential veto may be overriden by the votes of two-thirds of members of Congress (1987 Constitution,
Article VI, Section 27[1], supra). But Congress made no attempt to override the Presidential veto.
Petitioners’ argument that the veto is ineffectual so that there is “nothing to override” (citing Bolinao) has
lost force and effect with the executive veto having been herein upheld.
 11. Bengzon vs. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

b. Non-Legislative
(1) Informing Function
 C. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Qualifications
1. Poe-Llamanzares vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 221697, March 08, 2016
FACTS: The case involves Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner), a foundling discovered
in a church in Iloilo City, Philippines, who later became the adopted daughter of celebrity couple Fernando
Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces. Having pursued further studies and settled in the United States, she eventually
returned to the Philippines and pursued a career in public service, culminating in her intention to run for
the Philippine presidency. Her candidacy was challenged on grounds of citizenship (being a foundling and
her subsequent acquisition of American citizenship which she later renounced under RA 9225) and
residency requirements as prescribed by law for presidential candidates.

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) canceled Poe’s candidacy on the grounds that she failed to
meet the natural-born citizenship and ten-year residency requirements – she claimed a residency period
longer than what was stated in a previous Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for her senate run. Poe contested
the COMELEC’s resolutions, asserting errors and grave abuse of discretion on their part.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in canceling Poe’s COC based
on the grounds of not being a natural-born Filipino citizen and not meeting the ten-year residency
requirement.

RULING: YES. The Court declared that foundlings are presumed to be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, following both the 1935 Constitution (in effect at the time of Poe’s birth) and international law
principles. As to the residency requirement, the Court found that Poe was able to establish her intent to
return and reside permanently in the Philippines as of May 24, 2005. Even the discrepancy in her declared
residency in her COC for senator was not enough to misrepresent her qualification to run for president. The
Court clarified that actual physical presence, intent to remain in the country, and intent to abandon the
previous domicile are key elements in establishing residency for electoral purposes.
 2. Tecson vs Comelec, G.R. No. 161434, March 03, 2004
FACTS: In December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe Jr. (FPJ), filed his
candidacy for the presidency of the Philippines, claiming to be a natural-born citizen born in Manila on
August 20, 1939. The petitioner now seeks to disqualify FPJ and cancel his candidacy, arguing that FPJ
made a material misrepresentation regarding his citizenship. The petitioner asserts that FPJ's parents were
not Filipino citizens—his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a
Spanish national. That assuming arguendo that Allan Poe was a Filipino citizen, the petitioner contends he
could not pass on his citizenship to FPJ, who was born illegitimate. This claim is based on two points: first,
Allan Poe allegedly had a prior marriage to Paulita Gomez before marrying Bessie Kelley, and second,
even without the prior marriage, he married Bessie only a year after FPJ's birth.

ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino
citizen.

RULING: NO. The 1935 Constitution states that citizens of the Philippines include those whose fathers
are citizens. Respondent FPJ's grandfather, Lorenzo, was identified as a Filipino citizen based on his death
certificate and the presumption of his citizenship due to the "en masse Filipinization" from the Philippine
Bill of 1902. This citizenship would extend to FPJ's father, Allan. FPJ, recognized as Allan's son, is
considered a Filipino citizen through paternal filiation, as confirmed by his birth certificate. The
Constitution does not differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate children regarding citizenship,
making claims about bigamy and FPJ's birth irrelevant to his citizenship status. While the evidence does
not conclusively establish FPJ as a natural-born citizen, it is sufficient to conclude that he did not make a
material misrepresentation in his candidacy certificate, in accordance with the Omnibus Election Code.

Resolving FPJ’s citizenship, the Court found that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino, recognizing entitlement to
Philippine citizenship from his paternal lineage traced to a Filipino father, Lorenzo Pou, born around 1870,
who likely became a Filipino citizen by virtue of the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902. The
alleged illegitimacy of FPJ did not negate his claim to natural-born citizenship since the 1935 Constitution
did not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children concerning the transmission of citizenship.
 2. Privileges, Inhibitions and Disqualifications
a. Presidential Immunity
1. De Lima vs. Duterte, G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019
FACTS: Senator Leila M. de Lima petitioned for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against President
Rodrigo Roa Duterte, alleging violations of her right to life, liberty, and security due to public
statements made by the President. De Lima’s petition traced the animosity between her and Duterte
back to when she, as Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights, investigated the Davao Death
Squad during Duterte’s term as mayor. The dispute escalated when Duterte became President and de
Lima, a senator, criticized his administration’s anti-drug campaign. Duterte responded with public
statements against de Lima, accusing her of corruption, immorality, and involvement in illegal drugs,
prompting her to file the petition.

Sen. De Lima maintains that presidential immunity does not lie because President Duterte's attacks
against her are not part of his official duties and functions; that before presidential immunity applies,
there must first be a balancing of interest; and that the balancing favors her because her right to be
protected from harassment far outweighs the dangers of intrusion on the Office of Chief Executive.

ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President of the Philippines is immune from being the subject of a writ
of habeas data.

RULING: YES. Presidential immunity in this jurisdiction attaches during the entire tenure of the
President. The immunity makes no distinction with regard to the subject matter of the suit; it applies
whether or not the acts subject matter of the suit is part of his duties and functions as President.
Furthermore, no balancing of interest has ever been applied to Presidential immunity under our
jurisprudence. We are not prepared or willing to recognize such a test without constitutional, statutory,
or jurisprudential basis. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from
suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance of
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from
requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention. However, this does not mean
that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the
people but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by
impeachment. The Chief Executive must first be allowed to end his tenure (not his term) either through
resignation or removal by impeachment.
 2. Lourdes D. Rubrico, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 183871, February
18, 2010
FACTS: The petition for a writ of amparo, filed by Lourdes D. Rubrico and her daughters, sought justice
for Lourdes' alleged abduction and harassment. The case involved multiple respondents, including President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The Office of the Solicitor General argued that the President could not be sued
due to presidential immunity. The Court of Appeals agreed, dismissing the petition against the President
but allowing the case to proceed against other respondents, including military and police personnel. The
court also directed continued investigations into the incident.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and
dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.

RULING: The petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals (CA) erred in dismissing their petition and
removing President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as a respondent, claiming that the 1987 Constitution no
longer grants the President immunity from suit. However, the Court reaffirmed that presidential immunity
remains intact, despite its absence from the Constitution’s explicit text. This immunity is established in
jurisprudence, as highlighted by Fr. Joaquin Bernas and reinforced in the David v. Macapagal-Arroyo case.
The Court explained that the President cannot be sued during her tenure to protect the dignity and
effectiveness of the office and allow the President to perform official duties without distraction.
Furthermore, the petition lacked any specific allegation of presidential actions that directly violated the
petitioners' rights.
 3. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160
FACTS: The case stemmed from the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) by then-
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, declaring a state of national emergency. This was allegedly in response
to an imminent threat of a coup d’état, aimed at overthrowing the government. The proclamation cited
attempts by military adventurists, elements in the political opposition, and other forces to destabilize the
government. Following PP 1017, General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5) was issued, operationalizing the
proclamation through directives aimed at the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) to maintain law and order.

The issuance of PP 1017 resulted in various actions by state forces––including arrests without warrants,
dispersal of public assemblies, and the raiding of a national newspaper’s offices––all of which led to the
filing of several petitions to the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5. The petitions were consolidated and brought before the Supreme Court, invoking the Court’s power of
judicial review to ascertain the constitutionality of the acts and commands emanating from PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5.

ISSUE: Whether the presidential issuances are constitutional in granting the President legislative powers
and command over the military to enforce obedience to laws and decrees, and allowing the government to
take over privately- owned public utilities or businesses affected with public interest.

RULING: The Philippine Supreme Courtdeclared that certain provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
exceeded the constitutional powers of the President, thus, unconstitutional. Specifically, the Court found
that while the President has calling-out powers to prevent or suppress lawless violence, rebellion, or
insurrection, the provisions allowing for the issuance of decrees and the takeover of privately-owned
utilities or businesses without legislative delegation are ultra vires and unconstitutional. Furthermore, acts
committed by the military and the police in implementing the questioned proclamation and general order,
which include warrantless arrests, dispersal, and takeover of facilities, were declared unconstitutional as
they violate the rights of citizens to freedom of expression, assembly, and the press.

1. The President does not possess legislative power except when delegated by Congress
during a state of emergency.
2. The President’s calling-out power to use the military does not include conducting
warrantless arrests, suppressing constitutional freedoms, or taking over private property
without legislative authorization.
3. Acts of terrorism cannot be arbitrarily used to justify governmental actions that infringe
on constitutional rights without a clear legal definition and supporting law.
4. Any state action resulting in restriction or suppression of constitutional freedoms must
have a legitimate basis within the scope of executive powers and subject to judicial review
to prevent abuse.
 4. Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
FACTS: Estrada’s presidency was further destabilized by mass protests, the defection of key political allies,
and the withdrawal of military support. On January 20, 2001, amidst mounting pressure and after
negotiations for a peaceful transition of power, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President by the
Supreme Court Chief Justice. Estrada, however, claimed he was merely unable to perform his duties
temporarily and thus did not resign from the presidency.

The procedural path to the Supreme Court included Estrada filing petitions for prohibition and quo
warranto, questioning the constitutionality of Arroyo’s assumption of the presidency and alleging that he
was still the legitimate president on leave. The Supreme Court consolidated these petitions, heard oral
arguments, and resolved to address the main legal issues raised.

ISSUE: Assuming the petitions did present a justiciable controversy, whether Estrada resigned as
President.

RULING: Estrada effectively resigned as President based on his actions and statements. Estrada, as a non-
sitting president, does not enjoy immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his presidency. The
Court reiterated the doctrine that the resignation of a public official can be determined from his actions and
statements, without a formal letter of resignation. It also clarified the extent of immunity from suit of a non-
sitting president, ruling that such immunity does not protect against prosecution for criminal acts committed
during the presidency.
 5. Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000
FACTS: In this case, petitioners argue that the petition for prohibition is improper because it challenges an
act of the President, which would violate the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.

ISSUE: RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAS ALLOWED ITSELF TO BE INSTRUMENTAL

IN PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S CIRCUMVENTION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY FROM
SUIT BY GIVING DUE COURSE AND GRANTING RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN A SUIT
PURPORTEDLY FILED AGAINST PETITIONERS BUT ACTUALLY QUESTIONING AN ACT OF
THE PRESIDENT.

RULING: The court found this argument untenable, clarifying that the petition is directed against the
petitioners’ actions, not the President’s. While presidential decisions can be questioned in court if there is
grave abuse of discretion or if the President acted beyond jurisdiction, the petition here pertains to the
petitioners’ alleged abuse of discretion in reassignment, not a direct challenge to a presidential act.

The court emphasized that where an administrative act, like a reassignment, is done with grave abuse of
discretion, it can be reviewed by the courts, especially if it infringes upon an individual’s security of tenure.
The reassignment in question was found to be effectively indefinite and violated the security of tenure of
the respondent, as it was not a temporary transfer and could lead to removal. Therefore, the court ruled that
the presidential immunity did not shield the petitioners from judicial review of their actions.
 b. Presidential Privilege
6. Neri v. Senate Committee, GR No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner Romulo Neri, then Director General of the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA), was invited by the respondent Senate Committees to attend their joint investigation on
the alleged anomalies in the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project. This project was contracted by
the Philippine Government with the Chinese firm Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE),
which involved the amount of US$329,481,290. When he testified before the Senate Committees, he
disclosed that then Commission on Elections Chairman Benjamin Abalos, brokering for ZTE, offered him
P200 million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the
bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking “executive privilege.” In particular, he refused to answer the questions on 1.) whether or
not the President followed up the NBN Project, 2.) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and 3.)
whether or not she directed him to approve it.

Later on, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to
appear and testify on 20 November 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita sent a letter dated
15 November to the Committees requesting them to dispense with Neri’s testimony on the ground of
executive privilege. Ermita invoked the privilege on the ground that “the information sought to be disclosed
might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China,” and given
the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, Neri “cannot
provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the
privilege is designed to protect.” Thus, on 20 November, Neri did not appear before the respondent
Committees.

On 22 November, respondents issued a Show Cause Letter to Neri requiring him to show cause why he
should not be cited for contempt for his failure to attend the scheduled hearing on 20 November. On 29
November, Neri replied to the Show Cause Letter and explained that he did not intend to snub the Senate
hearing and requested that if there be new matters that were not yet taken up during his first appearance, he
be informed in advance so he can prepare himself. He added that his non-appearance was upon the
order of the President, and that his conversation with her dealt with delicate and sensitive national
security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high
government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the
Philippines. Respondents found the explanation unsatisfactory, and later on issued an Order citing Neri in
contempt and consequently ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms
until he appears and gives his testimony.

Neri filed the petition asking the Court to nullify both the Show Cause Letter and the Contempt Order for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and stressed
that his refusal to answer the three questions was anchored on a valid claim to executive privilege in
accordance with the ruling in the landmark case of Senate vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777, 20 April 2006).
For its part, the Senate Committees argued that they did not exceed their authority in issuing the assailed
orders because there is no valid justification for Neri’s claim to executive privilege. In addition, they
claimed that the refusal of petitioner to answer the three questions violates the people’s right to public
information, and that the executive is using the concept of executive privilege as a means to conceal the
criminal act of bribery in the highest levels of government.

ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to answer were covered by executive
privilege, making the arrest order issued by the respondent Senate Committees void.

RULING: YES. The Court considered whether the claim of executive privilege made by the Executive
Secretary was valid. The Court outlined the three essential requirements for invoking presidential
communications privilege. First, the communication must pertain to a quintessential and non-delegable
power of the President, such as the authority to make decisions on foreign relations or enter into executive
agreements. Second, the communication must be authored, solicited, or received by someone in close
proximity to the President, typically a senior advisor or a cabinet member. Third, the privilege can be
overridden only if there is a compelling need for the information, meaning the requested information is
crucial for the investigation, and there are no other sources for the information.

In this case, the Executive Secretary invoked executive privilege based on the grounds that the
communications sought were part of the President's executive and policy decision-making process related
to diplomatic relations with China. The Court found that these communications satisfied the first two
criteria: they involved the President’s exclusive authority in foreign relations, and the communications were
made with a close advisor, specifically the Executive Secretary, who held a position of operational
proximity to the President.

Furthermore, the Court noted that there was no sufficient compelling need shown to override the privilege.
The requesting party failed to demonstrate that the information was critical to the investigation or that the
information was unavailable from other sources. Therefore, the Court ruled that the executive privilege was
properly invoked, as the communications in question fell under the protected category of presidential
communications related to foreign policy.
The court emphasized that the executive privilege does not require the executive to disclose too many
details, as this would defeat the purpose of the privilege. The Senate v. Ermita ruling highlighted that the
executive’s reasons need only be stated sufficiently to protect the information without compromising the
confidentiality the privilege is designed to uphold. This principle respects the separation of powers between
the executive and legislative branches.