CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

Unit I: Salient Features of the Indian Constitution

The Constitution of India is a monumental legal document that lays the

foundational framework for the governance of the largest democracy in the world.
Drafted by the Constituent Assembly and adopted on 26th November 1949,
coming into effect on 26th January 1950, it reflects a deep understanding of both
indigenous experiences and comparative constitutional traditions. One of its most
remarkable features is that it is the lengthiest written Constitution in the world, a
distinction attributed to the vastness and diversity of India’s population, geography,
languages, religions, and socio-political realities. It originally had 395 Articles divided
into 22 Parts and 8 Schedules, but as of today, it contains over 450 Articles, 25
Parts, and 12 Schedules. This comprehensiveness arises from its attempt to cover
not only the structure of the state but also the rights and responsibilities of citizens,
principles of governance, administrative details, and procedures for conflict
resolution, thus making it a living and evolving document.

The Preamble of the Indian Constitution serves as the philosophical preface to the
text and encapsulates the core values and vision of the Constitution-makers. It
declares India to be a Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic.
Sovereignty implies India’s full autonomy in both internal and external matters.
Socialism, as interpreted after the 42nd Amendment (1976), emphasizes social and
economic justice and aims to minimize inequality of income and status. Secularism
ensures that the State maintains an impartial attitude towards all religions and does
not uphold any religion as the state religion, while protecting the individual’s right to
practice, profess, and propagate religion freely. Democracy, both in its political and
social aspects, guarantees a system of governance based on popular will, with
institutions accountable to the electorate. The term “Republic” reflects the absence of
a hereditary monarchy and ensures that the highest offices in the country are filled
by elected representatives. The Preamble also promises Justice (social,
economic, and political), Liberty (of thought, expression, belief, faith and
worship), Equality (of status and opportunity), and the promotion of Fraternity
to assure the dignity of the individual and unity and integrity of the nation.

Another important aspect of the Indian Constitution is the concept of Citizenship,

provided under Articles 5 to 11 in Part II. At the commencement of the Constitution,
provisions were made to determine who would be considered a citizen of India, with
due consideration to the trauma of Partition and migration between India and
Pakistan. Article 11 empowers Parliament to make laws regarding citizenship, which
led to the enactment of the Citizenship Act, 1955, later amended several times.
Citizenship under the Constitution is single and uniform for the entire country, unlike
in some federations such as the United States where dual citizenship (state and
federal) exists.

Among the most celebrated features of the Indian Constitution is the guarantee of
Fundamental Rights, enshrined in Part III (Articles 12 to 35). These rights are
justiciable, meaning they are legally enforceable through courts. The Fundamental
Rights are often described as the ‘conscience of the Constitution’ and provide a
shield against arbitrary state action. They include the Right to Equality (Articles
14–18) which prohibits discrimination and guarantees equality before law; the Right
to Freedom (Articles 19–22) which includes freedoms of speech, expression,
assembly, association, movement, residence, and the right to practice any
profession; the Right against Exploitation (Articles 23–24) which forbids human
trafficking and child labour; the Right to Freedom of Religion (Articles 25–28)
which upholds secularism by protecting religious freedoms; Cultural and
Educational Rights (Articles 29–30) which protect minority rights; and the Right to
Constitutional Remedies (Article 32), described by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar as “the
heart and soul of the Constitution,” which empowers individuals to approach the
Supreme Court or High Courts directly in case of violation of these rights.

An essential and often debated feature of the Indian Constitution is its nature as a
federal polity with a unitary bias. The Constitution establishes a dual
government—Union and State—with a clear distribution of powers through three lists
in the Seventh Schedule: the Union List, State List, and Concurrent List. However, in
contrast to classical federal systems like that of the United States, Indian federalism
is flexible and tilted in favor of the Centre. During emergencies (Articles 352, 356,
and 360), the Union assumes predominant authority over the states, reflecting the
quasi-federal nature of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Parliamentary system of
government, based on the Westminster model, is adopted at both the Union and
State levels, where the executive is collectively responsible to the legislature.
The President is the constitutional head, while real executive powers are vested in
the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister.

The independence of the judiciary and the provision for judicial review are
cornerstones of the Constitution. The judiciary, especially the Supreme Court (Article
124) and High Courts (Article 214), are entrusted with the responsibility of upholding
the Constitution and ensuring that all laws and executive actions conform to
constitutional norms. Through judicial review, the courts can strike down laws that
violate Fundamental Rights or transgress constitutional limits. Articles 32 and 226
are crucial in this context, empowering the Supreme Court and High Courts
respectively to issue writs for the enforcement of rights. The development of
doctrines like the basic structure doctrine (Kesavananda Bharati v. State of
Kerala, 1973) ensures that the Parliament cannot amend the Constitution in a way
that destroys its essential features, such as democracy, secularism, or judicial
independence.

The Indian Constitution is also notable for providing universal adult franchise,
granting the right to vote to all citizens above the age of 18 regardless of caste,
class, religion, gender, or literacy. This democratic ideal is complemented by the
establishment of the Election Commission of India (Article 324), an autonomous
constitutional body entrusted with the responsibility of conducting free and fair
elections. The Constitution also lays down provisions for a secular State,
distinguishing India from theocratic nations. While religion is deeply rooted in Indian
society, the State maintains equidistance from all religions and ensures that religious
practices do not contravene public order, morality, or health.

Another unique feature is the blend of rigidity and flexibility in the amendment
process under Article 368. While certain provisions can be amended by a simple
majority of Parliament, others require a special majority and the ratification by at
least half the states. This mechanism provides stability to the constitutional
framework while allowing room for necessary evolution. Moreover, the Indian
Constitution incorporates the Directive Principles of State Policy (Part IV) and
Fundamental Duties (Article 51A), which, although not justiciable, serve as guiding
principles for governance and citizen responsibility, contributing to a holistic
understanding of constitutional morality.

In essence, the Indian Constitution is not merely a legal document but a profound
social contract that captures the spirit of the Indian freedom struggle, the aspirations
of its people, and the vision of a just, inclusive, and dynamic society. As Durga Das
Basu aptly observes, its adaptability, depth, and commitment to justice make it an
extraordinary document. It represents a fine balance between tradition and
modernity, individual rights and social duties, central authority and regional
autonomy, thus standing as a testimony to the Indian experiment in constitutional
governance.

Unit II – Directive Principles of State Policy, Fundamental Duties, Parliamentary

Government, Bicameralism, Legislative Process, Privileges, Council of
Ministers, President of India, Governor

The Indian Constitution embodies a blend of legal enforceability and aspirational

guidance, and this duality is vividly reflected in Part IV, which lays down the Directive
Principles of State Policy (DPSPs). Inspired by the Irish Constitution, these principles
are non-justiciable in nature, meaning they are not enforceable by any court of law.
However, they are fundamental in the governance of the country, and it is the duty of
the State to apply them in making laws. The Directive Principles reflect the
aspirations of a welfare State and seek to ensure social and economic democracy,
supplementing the civil and political liberties guaranteed under Part III. Articles 36 to
51 lay out a variety of directives, including the provision of adequate livelihood
(Article 39), equal pay for equal work (Article 39(d)), free legal aid (Article 39A), the
right to work and education (Article 41), just and humane conditions of work (Article
42), and the promotion of international peace and security (Article 51). Although
courts cannot enforce these provisions directly, the judiciary has increasingly used
them to interpret Fundamental Rights in a manner that aligns with the broader goals
of justice and equality. Landmark cases like Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980)
and Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) affirm the importance of
DPSPs in harmonizing state action with constitutional ideals.

Complementing the Directive Principles are the Fundamental Duties, which were
added to the Constitution by the 42nd Amendment Act of 1976, inspired by the
Constitution of the erstwhile USSR. Enshrined in Article 51A, these duties are moral
obligations cast upon citizens to promote a spirit of patriotism and uphold the unity of
the nation. There are eleven Fundamental Duties, which include respecting the
Constitution, the national flag, and the national anthem; promoting harmony and the
spirit of common brotherhood; safeguarding public property; and developing
scientific temper. Though not enforceable by courts, these duties have gained
prominence in legal interpretation, and certain laws have been enacted to ensure
their observance. The Supreme Court, in AIIMS Students Union v. AIIMS (2001),
observed that fundamental duties, though non-enforceable, should be considered by
courts while interpreting constitutional or statutory provisions.

A salient structural feature of the Indian Constitution is the adoption of the

Parliamentary system of government, both at the Union and State levels, modeled
closely on the British Westminster system. Under this system, the executive is
collectively responsible to the legislature, and the Prime Minister, along with the
Council of Ministers, holds real executive power, while the President acts as a
constitutional head or nominal executive. Articles 74 and 75 lay down the framework
of this parliamentary system, mandating the existence of a Council of Ministers
headed by the Prime Minister to aid and advise the President. Unlike the Presidential
form of government seen in the United States, where there is a separation of powers
between the executive and legislature, in the Indian context, the executive is drawn
from the legislature and remains accountable to it. This ensures regular legislative
scrutiny and fosters responsible government. At the state level, the same principles
apply, with the Governor acting as the nominal head and the Chief Minister and
Council of Ministers holding real power under Articles 163 and 164.

India also follows a bicameral legislature at the Union level, consisting of the Lok
Sabha (House of the People) and the Rajya Sabha (Council of States). This
arrangement ensures both popular and regional representation. The Lok Sabha is
the directly elected lower house, reflecting the will of the people, while the Rajya
Sabha represents the states and union territories, with members elected by the
legislative assemblies of states. The Rajya Sabha is a permanent body and cannot
be dissolved, although one-third of its members retire every two years. Bicameralism
promotes detailed scrutiny of legislation, prevents hasty lawmaking, and allows
diverse interests to be represented. However, this system is not uniformly applied
across all states—only a few states like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Maharashtra have
bicameral legislatures.

The legislative process in India involves multiple stages, ensuring thorough debate
and deliberation. A bill may originate in either House (except a money bill, which can
only be introduced in the Lok Sabha). It passes through several readings:
introduction (first reading), detailed discussion (second reading), and
clause-by-clause voting (third reading). Once passed by both Houses (or only the
Lok Sabha in case of money bills), the bill is sent to the President for assent. If the
President gives assent, the bill becomes an Act. The President may, however, return
ordinary bills for reconsideration once, but if re-passed by Parliament, must give
assent. In case of a deadlock between the Houses, a joint sitting may be summoned
under Article 108, as was done in cases like the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and
Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), 2002.

A unique feature of the Indian parliamentary system is the privileges of the

legislature, which protect its autonomy and ensure smooth functioning. These
include freedom of speech in Parliament (Article 105), immunity from legal
proceedings for anything said in the House, and powers to regulate internal affairs
and punish for contempt. These privileges are essential to preserve legislative
independence, but their undefined nature has occasionally led to conflict with the
judiciary and media, raising questions about accountability and transparency.

The Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister, wields the actual executive
authority at the central level. The Prime Minister is the central figure, acting as the
head of the government, the leader of the Cabinet, and the link between the
President and the Cabinet. The Council of Ministers comprises three categories:
Cabinet Ministers, Ministers of State, and Deputy Ministers. According to Article
75(3), the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha, and this
principle forms the bedrock of the parliamentary form of government, ensuring that
the executive remains accountable to the legislature. Similarly, at the state level, the
Governor functions as the nominal head, with real power exercised by the Council of
Ministers headed by the Chief Minister, as stipulated in Articles 163 and 164. The
Governor's role has often been subject to political controversy, especially concerning
the use of discretionary powers under Article 356 (President’s Rule) or in hung
assemblies. Nevertheless, as a constitutional head, the Governor is expected to act
on the advice of the Council of Ministers except in matters where discretion is
constitutionally permitted.
The President of India, under Articles 52 to 78, is the constitutional head of the Union
and represents the sovereignty and unity of the nation. Elected indirectly by an
electoral college comprising Members of Parliament and Members of State
Legislative Assemblies, the President performs a wide array of functions—executive,
legislative, judicial, and emergency-related. The President appoints the Prime
Minister, other ministers, Governors, judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts,
and various constitutional authorities. While most actions are performed on the
advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 74, the President may exercise
discretion in certain cases such as returning a bill for reconsideration, appointing a
Prime Minister in a hung Parliament, or during a constitutional breakdown in a state.
The President also plays a crucial role in the legislative process, giving assent to bills
and issuing ordinances under Article 123 when Parliament is not in session.

In sum, Unit II captures the structural and philosophical pillars of Indian democracy:
the ideals guiding State policy (DPSPs and Fundamental Duties), the responsible
parliamentary system, and the interplay between executive institutions like the
President, Governor, and the Council of Ministers. As Durga Das Basu elaborates,
these components do not function in isolation but form an intricate network that
ensures accountability, continuity, and commitment to constitutionalism. Together,
they embody the vision of a democratic republic committed to justice, equity, and rule
of law, making the Constitution not just a legal charter but a moral compass for
governance.

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UNIT III – Judicial Process under the Constitution, Nature of Judicial Review,
Judicial Review (Articles 32, 226 & 227), Court System in India, Judges –
Appointment and Conditions of Service, Advisory Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, Public Interest Litigation (PIL), Activism vs. Restraint

The Indian Constitution envisages an independent and integrated judicial system as

a critical pillar of democratic governance. The judicial process under the Constitution
is not merely a dispute resolution mechanism; it is a vital instrument for protecting
the rule of law and upholding constitutional morality. Rooted in the traditions of
common law, Indian constitutional jurisprudence treats the judiciary as the guardian
of the Constitution, entrusted with ensuring that all organs of the State function within
their constitutionally mandated boundaries. The Supreme Court and High Courts
have been conferred wide powers of interpretation, enforcement, and review, making
them central to the evolution of constitutional law in India.

A distinctive feature of the Indian judicial system is the power of judicial review, a
doctrine borrowed primarily from American jurisprudence, particularly the landmark
case of Marbury v. Madison (1803). In India, judicial review is not merely a matter of
judicial innovation but is explicitly enshrined in the Constitution. It is the mechanism
by which the judiciary examines the constitutionality of legislative and executive
actions. Through Articles 13, 32, 226, and 227, the judiciary ensures that laws and
state actions conform to the provisions of the Constitution. Judicial review serves
multiple purposes: it protects fundamental rights, maintains federal equilibrium,
ensures the supremacy of the Constitution, and upholds the doctrine of separation of
powers.

Article 32, described by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar as the “heart and soul of the
Constitution,” guarantees the right to constitutional remedies. It empowers
individuals to approach the Supreme Court directly for the enforcement of
fundamental rights through writs such as habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition,
quo warranto, and certiorari. This right is itself a fundamental right and forms the
bedrock of India’s rights-based constitutionalism. Similarly, Article 226 confers
extensive powers upon the High Courts to issue writs for the enforcement of
fundamental rights as well as “for any other purpose,” thereby giving them a broader
jurisdiction than the Supreme Court. Article 227, on the other hand, vests in High
Courts the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals within their
jurisdiction, allowing them to ensure legality and propriety in judicial and
quasi-judicial actions. This layered structure of judicial review ensures that
constitutional violations are checked at multiple levels.

India’s court system is a unified and integrated judicial hierarchy, with the Supreme
Court at the apex, followed by High Courts in the states, and subordinate courts
(district and lower courts) below them. Unlike federal systems such as the United
States, India does not have separate sets of courts for the Union and the states. This
unitary judicial framework ensures consistency in interpretation and application of
laws across the country. The Supreme Court, established under Article 124, is the
highest constitutional court and also functions as a court of appeal in civil, criminal,
and constitutional matters. The High Courts, created under Article 214, exercise
original and appellate jurisdiction and supervise subordinate courts. Their power
under Article 226 has made them crucial in maintaining administrative accountability
and providing immediate relief to aggrieved citizens.

The appointment of judges to the Supreme Court and High Courts is a matter of
considerable constitutional significance. As per Article 124(2), judges of the Supreme
Court are appointed by the President after consultation with such judges of the
Supreme Court and High Courts as deemed necessary. Similarly, under Article 217,
High Court judges are appointed after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the
Governor of the state, and the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court. Over time,
the judiciary developed the “Collegium System” through judicial interpretation,
particularly in the Second Judges Case (1993) and Third Judges Case (1998),
wherein it asserted primacy over judicial appointments. This system, though not
codified in the Constitution, has been the subject of extensive debate regarding
transparency, accountability, and separation of powers. Attempts to reform it through
the 99th Constitutional Amendment and the National Judicial Appointments
Commission (NJAC) were struck down by the Supreme Court in Supreme Court
Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015), reaffirming the primacy of
the judiciary in judicial appointments.

In terms of conditions of service, judges enjoy a host of safeguards to ensure

independence. Their salaries and allowances are charged upon the Consolidated
Fund and cannot be altered to their disadvantage. Their removal is governed by a
rigorous process of impeachment under Article 124(4) for Supreme Court judges and
Article 217 read with Article 124 for High Court judges, requiring a two-thirds majority
in both Houses of Parliament on grounds of proved misbehavior or incapacity. These
provisions are designed to insulate the judiciary from political or executive pressures.

Another significant aspect is the Advisory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,

provided under Article 143. The President of India may seek the advisory opinion of
the Supreme Court on any question of law or fact of public importance. The opinion
rendered is not binding, but it has persuasive authority. This mechanism has been
invoked in important cases such as the Berubari Union case (1960) and the Ayodhya
land acquisition case (1994). It reflects the consultative role of the judiciary in
constitutional governance, enabling the executive to seek constitutional clarity
without engaging in adversarial litigation.

The Indian judiciary has also evolved an innovative tool called Public Interest
Litigation (PIL) to make justice more accessible and participatory. Unlike traditional
litigation which requires the petitioner to have a direct personal interest, PIL allows
any public-spirited individual to approach the court for the enforcement of rights of a
disadvantaged or marginalized group. This jurisprudence began in earnest in the
1980s through judgments by Justice P.N. Bhagwati and Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer,
and has been used to address a wide spectrum of issues—environmental protection,
bonded labor, custodial violence, corruption, and prisoners' rights. PIL has
democratized access to justice and allowed the judiciary to play a proactive role in
social transformation.

However, the increased judicial intervention in governance has given rise to the
debate of “Judicial Activism vs. Judicial Restraint.” Judicial activism refers to the
proactive role played by courts in protecting rights, interpreting constitutional values
expansively, and directing government action. It is often defended as a response to
legislative inaction or executive arbitrariness. On the other hand, judicial restraint
advocates that courts should not encroach upon the domain of the legislature or
executive and should interpret law narrowly, avoiding policy-making roles. The
judiciary’s intervention in matters like environmental regulation (MC Mehta cases),
electoral reforms (PUCL v. Union of India), and the implementation of social welfare
schemes (Right to Food case) reflects activism. However, critics argue that
excessive activism undermines democratic accountability and disrupts the
separation of powers. The judiciary has itself acknowledged this tension and, at
times, reiterated the need for self-imposed limitations.

In conclusion, Unit III encapsulates the judiciary's foundational and evolving role in
constitutional governance. It explores how the courts not only interpret and enforce
the law but also act as custodians of constitutional values and rights. The principles
of judicial review, the structure and independence of the judiciary, and the creative
use of tools like PIL have cemented the judiciary’s place as a dynamic and powerful
organ of the Indian State. As Durga Das Basu consistently emphasizes, the vitality of
the Indian Constitution lies in the juridical conscience of its interpreters—the
judges—who shape its meaning in accordance with changing social realities and
democratic aspirations.

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UNIT IV – Federalism in India: Nature of Indian Federalism, Centre-State

Relations (Legislative, Administrative and Financial), Need for Devolution of
Powers to Local Bodies, Cooperative Federalism, Quasi-Federalism, Role of
Finance Commission and Inter-State Council, Challenges to Indian Federalism

The Constitution of India establishes a unique model of federalism, tailored to suit

the complex pluralism and diversity of the Indian subcontinent. Unlike the classical
notion of federalism seen in countries like the United States, where the Union and
the states are co-equal sovereigns, Indian federalism is characterized by a strong
Centre. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar famously referred to the Constitution as “federal in
structure but unitary in spirit,” a theme extensively elaborated in Durga Das Basu’s
exposition. The distribution of powers between the Centre and the States is
enshrined primarily in Part XI (Articles 245–263) and Part XII (Articles 268–293) of
the Constitution, reflecting a carefully crafted arrangement that preserves the unity of
the nation while allowing functional autonomy to the states.

The nature of Indian federalism is thus sui generis—it incorporates both federal and
unitary features, earning it the label of a “quasi-federal” Constitution. Federal
features include a dual polity, a written and rigid Constitution, a supremacy of the
Constitution, and an independent judiciary. On the other hand, unitary traits such as
single citizenship, all-India services, and emergency provisions tilt the balance in
favour of the Union. During normal times, the states enjoy autonomy in their sphere,
but in exceptional circumstances—such as a national emergency (Article 352) or
President’s Rule (Article 356)—the Centre can exercise sweeping powers over the
states, making the structure temporarily unitary. This elasticity has been a critical tool
in maintaining national integrity, especially in a polity with deep linguistic, ethnic, and
regional diversities.

The Centre-State relations are classified into three categories: legislative,

administrative, and financial. Legislative relations are governed by Articles 245 to
255 and the Seventh Schedule, which divides subjects into the Union List (List I),
State List (List II), and Concurrent List (List III). The Union List includes areas of
national importance (e.g., defense, foreign affairs), while the State List includes local
subjects (e.g., police, agriculture). The Concurrent List includes subjects like
education and criminal law, where both the Union and the states can legislate, but in
case of conflict, the Union law prevails under Article 254. Parliament also has
powers to legislate on State List subjects under extraordinary circumstances (Articles
249, 250, and 252), reinforcing the supremacy of the Centre.

Administrative relations, dealt with under Articles 256 to 263, establish coordination
between the Union and the States. The states are required to comply with laws
made by Parliament and cannot impede the executive power of the Union (Article
256). The Union can give directions to states for implementation of laws and
protection of national interests. The Inter-State Council, established under Article
263, serves as a constitutional forum for dialogue and dispute resolution among
states and between the Centre and states. Administrative cooperation is also
ensured through All India Services (like IAS, IPS), which function under dual control.

Financial relations, found in Articles 268 to 293, reveal another layer of asymmetry.
The Constitution provides for a division of taxing powers, with certain taxes (like
income tax other than agricultural income) levied and collected by the Union and
others (like land revenue) reserved for states. To address imbalances in revenue
capacity and expenditure responsibility, the Constitution provides for grants-in-aid
(Article 275) and the institution of the Finance Commission under Article 280, which
recommends the formula for distribution of the divisible pool of taxes. The Goods
and Services Tax (GST) regime, introduced via the 101st Constitutional Amendment,
has further restructured the financial architecture, requiring a high level of
cooperative federalism through mechanisms like the GST Council.

The concept of cooperative federalism, which implies a partnership model rather

than competition between Centre and States, has gained prominence in recent
years. It encourages policy alignment, coordination, and consensus-building across
tiers of government, especially in areas like health, education, and infrastructure.
The NITI Aayog, which replaced the Planning Commission in 2015, is a key example
of cooperative federalism, designed to promote shared national objectives while
respecting regional diversity.

Simultaneously, the devolution of powers to local bodies, envisaged under the 73rd
and 74th Constitutional Amendments, represents the deepening of federalism at the
grassroots level. These amendments created constitutional status for Panchayati Raj
Institutions (PRIs) and Urban Local Bodies (ULBs), mandating regular elections,
financial autonomy, and planning responsibilities through the Eleventh and Twelfth
Schedules. Despite constitutional recognition, real autonomy of local bodies remains
a work in progress, constrained by inadequate financial resources, limited
administrative capacity, and dependence on state governments.

One of the key institutional mechanisms for inter-governmental dialogue is the

Finance Commission, established every five years to recommend the distribution of
financial resources between the Union and the States. Its recommendations include
vertical (between Centre and states) and horizontal (among states) devolution.
Alongside it, the Inter-State Council plays a crucial role in addressing disputes and
fostering cooperation, though its potential remains underutilized due to infrequent
meetings and limited powers.

Despite these frameworks, Indian federalism faces several challenges. One of the
most pressing issues is the politicization of Centre-State relations, especially when
different political parties govern at the Union and state levels. This has led to
accusations of partisan bias in the use of agencies and discretionary grants. The
misuse of Article 356, particularly during the post-Independence decades, also
undermined federal integrity until the Bommai judgment (1994) imposed strict judicial
scrutiny. Moreover, regional aspirations, demands for greater autonomy (as seen in
Jammu and Kashmir pre-2019), and the uneven development of states have tested
the adaptability of federal principles. The recent abrogation of Article 370 and
bifurcation of Jammu and Kashmir into Union Territories has further intensified
debates on the unitary tilt of Indian federalism.

In conclusion, Indian federalism is a dynamic and evolving framework, designed with

both flexibility and stability in mind. As Durga Das Basu observes, its strength lies
not in rigidity but in the ability to respond to changing political, economic, and social
contexts. The constitutional architecture accommodates both centripetal forces of
unity and centrifugal demands for autonomy, thereby ensuring that India remains a
cohesive yet diverse union. The effectiveness of federalism, however, depends not
only on constitutional design but on political culture, institutional performance, and
cooperative governance across all levels.

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UNIT V – Emergency Provisions (Articles 352 to 360), Effects of Emergency on

Centre-State Relations, Fundamental Rights, Role of President in Emergency,
Judicial Review of Emergency Proclamations, National Security and
Constitutional Safeguards
The Emergency provisions under the Indian Constitution, enumerated in Articles 352
to 360, constitute one of its most significant and distinctive features, reflecting a
deliberate departure from the strict federal structure to a temporarily unitary system
of governance in times of national crisis. These provisions are designed to protect
the integrity, sovereignty, and security of India while simultaneously balancing
constitutionalism and democratic accountability. As Durga Das Basu emphasizes,
the emergency powers, though extraordinary, are not extra-constitutional; they are
embedded within the constitutional framework, subject to specified procedures, and
aimed at preserving the state and its constitutional order during exceptional
circumstances.

There are three types of emergencies recognized by the Constitution:

1. National Emergency (Article 352),

2. Failure of constitutional machinery in states or President’s Rule (Article 356), and

3. Financial Emergency (Article 360).

Each type is invoked under different circumstances and has distinct constitutional
implications.

A National Emergency under Article 352 may be proclaimed by the President of India
if he is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or any
part of it is threatened by war, external aggression, or armed rebellion. Originally, the
term used was "internal disturbance," but after the misuse during the Emergency of
1975–77, the 44th Constitutional Amendment substituted it with "armed rebellion" to
prevent arbitrary use. The President must act on the written advice of the Cabinet,
not merely the Prime Minister (as per Article 352(3), added by the 44th Amendment),
introducing a significant procedural check.

Once proclaimed, a National Emergency drastically alters the federal structure. The
executive and legislative powers of the states come under the overriding control of
the Centre. Article 353 extends the powers of the Union to legislate on matters in the
State List and permits the Union Executive to give directions to any state.
Additionally, during a National Emergency, certain Fundamental Rights under Article
19 are automatically suspended, and others may be suspended under Article 359,
except for the rights under Articles 20 and 21, which are non-derogable post the 44th
Amendment. The effect of this is the centralization of authority in the Union
Government, with Parliament assuming omnipotent legislative powers temporarily,
thereby converting the federal Constitution into a quasi-unitary one.
The most controversial application of Article 352 occurred during the Emergency of
1975, proclaimed on the ground of internal disturbance. The misuse of this provision
led to the arrest of political opponents, press censorship, and suspension of civil
liberties, revealing the potential dangers of unfettered emergency powers. The
Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980) and ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976)
cases highlighted the judicial response to emergency excesses. Although in ADM
Jabalpur the Supreme Court upheld the suspension of Article 21, this decision has
since been widely criticized and effectively overruled in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v.
Union of India (2017), where the Court reaffirmed the inviolability of the right to life
and personal liberty.

The second category of emergency is the President’s Rule under Article 356, which
may be imposed when the President is satisfied that the government of a state
cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. This
provision has been among the most contentious and frequently used (and often
misused) tools for dismissing state governments, especially when they are ruled by
opposition parties. Once proclaimed, the President assumes all functions of the state
government, and Parliament may legislate on any matter in the State List. This
transforms the state into a centrally administered unit, stripping it of both executive
and legislative autonomy.

The misuse of Article 356 led to judicial intervention in the landmark S.R. Bommai v.
Union of India (1994) case, where the Supreme Court laid down strict conditions for
its application. It held that the President’s satisfaction is subject to judicial review,
and that the President cannot dissolve a State Assembly without parliamentary
approval. This case reinforced federalism and imposed substantive constitutional
limitations on the abuse of emergency power.

The Financial Emergency, under Article 360, may be proclaimed by the President if
he is satisfied that the financial stability or credit of India or any part thereof is
threatened. Though this type of emergency has never been invoked in India, it allows
the Centre to issue directions to the states regarding financial matters, including the
reduction of salaries and allowances of public servants, including judges—a
provision that has attracted significant academic and political scrutiny for its potential
to undermine judicial independence.

During all three emergencies, the role of the President is pivotal but not absolute.
Although the formal proclamation is made in the President's name, it is bound by the
advice of the Council of Ministers, making the real power reside with the executive,
particularly the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. However, the Constitution has
inserted checks and balances, especially post the 44th Amendment, to prevent
arbitrary proclamations. All emergency proclamations must be laid before Parliament
and require ratification within one month (for Article 352) or two months (for Articles
356 and 360), ensuring a legislative check.
A crucial constitutional safeguard is the judicial review of emergency proclamations.
Though Article 74(2) bars inquiry into the advice tendered by ministers to the
President, the satisfaction underlying an emergency proclamation is not beyond the
purview of judicial review, especially post the Bommai judgment. The judiciary can
examine whether the satisfaction is based on relevant material and not mala fide or
arbitrary. The power of judicial review thus acts as a constitutional restraint on
executive overreach during emergencies.

Furthermore, the interplay between national security and constitutional safeguards

continues to challenge the Indian polity. The imperative to protect the sovereignty
and integrity of the state must be balanced with the need to uphold civil liberties and
democratic principles. India’s emergency provisions, while constitutionally
entrenched, carry a legacy of overreach that has necessitated cautious interpretation
and responsible application. The 44th Amendment Act of 1978 plays a crucial role in
this context by ensuring that fundamental rights like Articles 20 and 21 remain
inviolable even during an Emergency, and by requiring stricter procedural safeguards
for invoking Article 352.

In essence, the emergency framework under the Constitution reflects the duality of
power and restraint. It equips the State with extraordinary powers to deal with
extraordinary situations, but simultaneously embeds institutional and procedural
safeguards to prevent authoritarianism. As Durga Das Basu observes, the essence
of Indian constitutionalism lies in this delicate balance—the ability of the Constitution
to adapt to crisis without being subverted by it. The real test lies not in the letter of
the law but in its spirit and implementation, requiring a high degree of constitutional
morality and political accountability.

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