Lecture 4
Lecture 4
Maarten De Ridder
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Business Cycles
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
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This term
Part II: Perspectives on business cycles and steady states (weeks 7-10)
I Persistent effects of recessions
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Previous lecture
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In the news
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Inflation
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In the news
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Some evidence
I Romer and Romer (2004): identify deviations from usual CB’s response
2
X
b
∆im = α + βim + [γj ∆ỹmj + λj (∆ỹmj − ∆ỹm−1j )
j=−1
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Some evidence
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Christina Romer
Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=psLIQekHAfo
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Christina Romer AND ME
Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=psLIQekHAfo
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New Keynesian DSGE lectures
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This lecture
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Reference
Gali (2008) Monetary Policy, Inflation and the Business Cycle, Ch 1 and 3
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This lecture
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Nominal rigidities
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Are prices sticky?
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Are prices sticky?
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Are prices sticky?
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Are prices sticky?
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Why are prices sticky?
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Sticky wages?
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Sticky wages?
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Sticky wages?
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Why are wages sticky?
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This lecture
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Overview
Households:
I Consume a basket of goods and supply labor to firms
Firms:
I Produce differentiated goods
I Choose the price at which they sell their variety; staggered (Calvo)
Central Bank:
I Set the nominal interest rate on government bonds
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Representative household: problem
∞
X
max E0 β t U(Ct , Lt ),
Ct ,Nt ,Bt ,Ci,t
t=0
subject to
Z 1
Pi,t Ci,t di + Qt Bt ≤ Bt−1 + Wt Lt + Profitst , and no-ponzi
0
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Representative household: changes
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Representative household: consumption bundle
Bundle of varieties Ct is chosen to minimize expenditures.
Z 1 Z !
1 −1
1−1/
L = Pi,t Ci,t di − λ Ci,t di − Ct
0 0
Z 1 −1 −1
∂L −1/ 1−1/
= Pi,t − λ [1 − 1/] C Ci,t di =0
∂Ci,t − 1 i,t 0
−
⇒ Ci,t = λ pi,t Ct
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Representative household: consumption bundle and prices
Definition: price index Pt is expenditure required to purchase 1 basket
R1
Pi,t Ci,t di
Pt = 0
Ct
To find the index, insert the demand for individual goods i :
R1
Pi,t Ci,t di
Pt = hR 0 i
1 1−1/ −1
0
C i,t di
− R 1
R1 Pi,t 0 Pi,t Ci,t di
0
Pi,t R 1 1− di
0 Pi,t di
= " 1−1/ # −1
R 1 Pi,t − R 1
0 Pi,t Ci,t di
0
R 1 1− di
0 Pi,t di
1
Z 1 1−
1−
= Pi,t di
0
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Representative household: optimality
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Representative household: optimality
Ct1−σ − 1 L1+ϕ
U(Ct , Lt ) = − t
1−σ 1+ϕ
Euler equation:
" #
UC0 ,t+1 Pt
σ
Ct Pt
Qt = βEt ⇒ Qt = βEt
UC0 ,t Pt+1 Ct+1 Pt+1
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Representative household: log-linearized
Notation:
xt ≡ log Xt
Euler equation:
1
ct = Et (ct+1 ) − it − Et [πt+1 ] − ρ
σ
|{z}
| {z } |{z}
−logQt logPt+1 /Pt −logβ
wt − pt = σct + ϕlt
(note: add log-steady state values)
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Derivation?
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Firms
Yi,t = At L1−α
i,t
I But sticky prices: firms can choose price only with probability 1 − θ
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Firms: flexible price
Say prices were flexible and firms could set them every t:
I Firm maximizes present value of dividends for owners (households)
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Firms: flexible price
Optimization problem:
∞
X
max Et Qt,t+k (Pi,t+k Yi,t+k − Wt+k Lt+k )
Pi,t+k
k=0
−
s.t. Yit = (Pit /Pt ) Ct and Yit = At L1−α
it
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Firms: flexible price
1
∞ − " − #
1−α
X Pi,t+k Pi,t+k Ct+k
max Et Qt,t+k Pi,t+k Ct+k − Wt+k
Pi,t+k Pt+k Pt+k At+k
k=0
2. Symmetric equilibrium: all firms have same FOC s.t. Pi,t+k = Pt+k
1
α
FLEX 1 1 1−α
1−α
Pt+k = Wt+k Ct+k
−1 1−α At+k
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Aggregate variables
Wages:
I First order condition for pricing:
1
1 1 1−α α
Pit = Wt Ct1−α
−1 1−α At
1
Wt −1 1−α
α
− 1−α
= At Ct (1 − α)
Pt | {z }
MPLt
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Aggregate variables
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Aggregate variables
GDP:
ϕ+1
1−α
ζ −1 ζ 1−α
Yt = At (1 − α) ζ
where ζ = σ(1 − α) + α + ϕ
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Flexible price symmetric equilibrium
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Flexible price symmetric equilibrium
I Resource constraint: Ct = Yt
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Flexible price symmetric equilibrium
I Resource constraint: Ct = Yt
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Efficiency
1−α
YtFlex
−1 ζ
= <1
Yt∗
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This lecture
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Calvo pricing
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Firms: sticky prices
s.t. Yit+k = (Pit /Pt+k )− Ct+k and Yi,t+k = At+k L1−α
it+k
I Define Ψt+k Yt+k|t as costs at t+k for firm that set prices at t
∞ −
Pt∗
X
θk Et Qt,t+k Pt∗ Yt+k|t − Ψt+k Yt+k|t
max s.t. Yt+k|t = Ct+k
Pt+k
k=0
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Firms: sticky prices
First order condition:
∞ !
X ∂Yt+k|t ∂Ψt+k Yt+k|t ∂Yt+k|t
k
θ Et Qt,t+k Yt+k|t + Pt∗ − =0
∂Pt∗ ∂Yt+k|t ∂Pt∗
k=0
where: −
Pt∗
∂Yt+k|t Yt+k|t
=− Ct+k = −
∂Pt∗ Pt∗ Pt+k Pt∗
∂Ψt+k Yt+k|t
= ψt+k|t ⇒ nominal marginal cost
∂Yt+k|t
such that:
∞
X Yt+k|t
θk Et Qt,t+k Yt+k|t (1 − ε) − ψt+k|t (−) =0
Pt∗
k=0
∞
X
θk Et Qt,t+k Yt+k|t Pt∗ − ψt+k|t =0
−1
k=0 | {z }
flex price m.u. x mar. costs
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Firms: sticky prices log-linearized
Rewrite the first order condition in terms with well-defined steady state:
∞
X
θk Et Qt,t+k Yt+k|t Pt∗ − ψt+k|t = 0
−1
k=0
∞
Pt∗
X
θk Et Qt,t+k Yt+k|t
Pt−1 − −1
MCt+k|t Πt−1,t+k
| {z } | {z }
=0
k=0
ψt+k|t /Pt+k Pt+k /Pt−1
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Firms: sticky prices log-linearized
Left-hand side of the equation:
∞
Pt∗
X
Xt = θk Et Qt,t+k Yt+k|t
k=0
Pt−1
Step 1: steady state using Pt∗ /Pt−1 = 1 and Πt−1,t+k = 1, Qt,t+k = β k , symmetry:
Y
X =
1 − βθ
Step 2: log-linearize the left hand side equation:
I Write the function in exponential terms in deviations from the steady state:
∞
∗
θk Et Qt,t+k Y e qbt,t+k +byt+k|t +pt −pt−1
X
Xt =
k=0
∞ Y
k ∗
X
= X +Y (θβ) Et (b
qt,t+k + ybt+k|t ) + pt − pt−1
k=0 1 − βθ
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Firms: sticky prices log-linearized
Right-hand side of the equation:
∞
X
Xt = θk Et Qt,t+k Yt+k|t MCt+k|t Πt−1,t+k
k=0
−1
Step 1: steady state using Pt∗ /Pt−1 = 1 and Πt−1,t+k = 1, Qt,t+k = β k , symmetry:
Y
X = MC
1 − βθ − 1
Step 2: log-linearize the left hand side equation:
I Write the function in exponential terms in deviations from the steady state:
∞
X
Xt = θk Et Qt,t+k Y (MC ) e qbt+k|t +byt+k|t +mc
c t+k|t +πt−1,t+k
k=0
−1
∂Xt
+ πt−1,t+k
∂π
b t−1,t+k .
! ∞
k
X
= X + MC Y (θβ) Et qbt+k|t + ybt+k|t + mc
c t+k|t + πt−1,t+k
−1 k=0
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Firms: sticky prices log-linearized
Left-hand side log-linearized:
∞
X Y
X +Y (θβ)k Et (b
qt,t+k + ybt+k|t ) + (pt∗ − pt−1 )
1 − βθ
k=0
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Price index
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Price index
I Index:
1
+ (1 − θ)(Pt∗ )1− 1−
1−
Pt = θPt−1
I Log-linearized:
πt = (1 − θ)(pt∗ − pt−1 )
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Next week
I Dynamic IS Equation
1
ybt = − (it − Et (πt+1 ) − ρ) + Et (yd
t+1 )
σ
it = ρ + φπ πt + φy ybt + vt
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What have we done?
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